Pacific Forum, with support from Sandia National Laboratories and in collaboration with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, convened the 13th Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Nuclear Energy Experts Group (NEEG) Meeting in Bangkok on March 18-20, 2025. About 35 senior researchers, officials, and industry stakeholders attended, all in their private capacity.
The off-the-record discussions focused on emerging developments in the Asia-Pacific’s nuclear energy landscape, including capacity-building in Southeast Asia, evolving governance challenges, and the prospect of commercial fusion energy. Day three involved a site visit to the Thailand Institute for Nuclear Technology’s headquarters, home to Thailand Tokamak 1, Southeast Asia’s first nuclear fusion research facility. Key findings are detailed below.
There has been a broad resurgence in political support for nuclear power in the Asia-Pacific, with rising electricity demand, energy security needs, and decarbonization commitments serving as key drivers. Whereas installed global capacity has largely been flat, Asia has witnessed steady growth for a decade from new builds in China, South Korea, India, and Bangladesh, as well as reactor restarts in Japan. While Southeast Asia retreated from fission in the years following the Fukushima Daiichi disaster, several ASEAN countries are now back at the table – engaging developers and reworking nuclear power into long-term energy transition plans.
The dynamic environment has also stoked enthusiasm across the Asia-Pacific for emerging nuclear technologies such as small-modular reactors (SMRs), micro-modular reactors (MMRs), and floating nuclear power plants (FNPPs). Proponents are optimistic for their potential applications in heavy industry, maritime shipping, data centers, remote communities, and more. However, challenges for “advanced nuclear” reactor companies remain many, including unproven economics, evolving safety, security and safeguards (3S) considerations, and a lack of established solutions for spent fuel management and decommissioning.
Newcomer countries may perceive the smaller scale and per unit cost of SMRs as a lower risk entry point into nuclear energy than the construction of a large conventional plant. While public opinion of nuclear power has improved markedly in recent years, perceptions of nuclear safety and large infrastructure projects remain politically sensitive. In practice, however, Southeast Asia’s first commercial nuclear power is likely to come from a large conventional reactor than from a first-of-a-kind technology. The Philippines is actively investigating a restart of the infamously mothballed Westinghouse plant at Bataan, and Vietnam has resumed cooperation with Rosatom on the development of new pressurized water reactors with a highly ambitious target completion date of 2030.
In Thailand, where the electrical grid is less equipped to accommodate a large reactor, two 300-megawatt SMRs have recently been added to the national Power Development Plan, targeting generation by 2037 and a longer-term goal of technology localization. Indonesia also plans to harness commercial nuclear power by the late 2030s to meet huge rising power needs. It is engaging a variety of vendors from the traditional suppliers to FNPP developers – but outcomes likely hinge on whether it chooses to pursue a technology indigenization strategy through foreign joint partnerships.
Singapore and Malaysia are also displaying growing interest in nuclear energy but maintain gradual approaches, acutely aware that any nuclear power developments within ASEAN are likely of concern to the region as a whole. Emergency planning and the transregional movement of hazardous materials are two areas where multilateral coordination should be proceduralized.
From the IAEA on down, strained regulatory capacity is an ongoing issue. The organization has been inundated with requests for advice on SMR evaluation and adoption, and while eager to support the next wave of nuclear buildout, lacks firm knowledge of cost and construction details for the plethora of new designs. To create a smoother pathway for global implementation, the agency created the Nuclear Harmonization and Standardization Initiative to promote industry best practices and “safeguards by design” across the SMR landscape.
The emergence of FNPPs and new concepts for nuclear-powered cargo ships (NPS) from China, Russia, and South Korea highlight crucial gaps in existing governance frameworks and liability regimes at the intersection of nuclear and maritime law. Since international norms in both domains were developed in silos, implementation and enforcement between multiple competing jurisdictions remains fragmented. New regimes to cover the proliferation of commercial reactors at sea should be developed but will take time. The Nuclear Energy Maritime Organization (NEMO) has focused on the practical application of new nuclear solutions deployable in the maritime sphere. NEMO’s membership is drawn from a broad mix of both maritime and nuclear industries, blending expertise to encourage a robust regulatory pathway.
Since its formation in 2013, ASEANTOM has grown as an institutional framework for cooperation between the nuclear authorities of Southeast Asia and as a liaising body with the IAEA. As an ASEAN sectoral body, ASEANTOM is bound by consensus action. Therefore, national regulators need to assume the responsibility for licensing, oversight, enforcement, and other executive functions. Nevertheless, ASEANTOM will play a key supporting role in the region’s nuclear capacity-building efforts, alongside specialized entities such as the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network and the ASEAN Network on Nuclear Power Safety Research.
Workforce training remains a major priority for countries preparing to launch local nuclear power programs. While many students still pursue nuclear engineering abroad, particularly in China and the United States, regional institutions are recalibrating. Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok is updating its curriculum to include SMRs, while the Australian National University and Charles Sturt University recently launched Australia’s first university program on nuclear nonproliferation safeguards. Japan’s Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN) has been and will continue to be a key resource, having trained over 2,000 professionals from ASEAN member states since 2011.
There has been significant regional interest in investing in the development of nuclear fusion. Recent science breakthroughs in superconducting magnets, laser ignition, and materials sciences have sparked a wave of investment, signaling growing confidence in its commercialization as an energy solution. Global progress is dominated by the United States and China, with the former led by private sector startups, and the latter by state-owned enterprises and research entities.
Japan and South Korea are also promoting domestic fusion industries, and the Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology recently co-developed Thailand Tokamak-1 with the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Southeast Asia’s first fusion research facility.
As with the “advanced fission” space, there is a lot of marketing hype and speculative capital around fusion. Most projects are still in the process of building demonstration reactors, let alone business traction or commercial viability, but clean tech and infrastructure investors are eager for moonshots. Nonetheless, the promise of a future with clean and abundant nuclear energy without the risks of fission is likely to continue growing as an arena for strategic competition.
Looking ahead, the trajectory of nuclear energy development in the Asia-Pacific is clearly upward. Gaps in governance, regulatory capacity, and the nuclear workforce remain, but the region benefits from a growing lattice of international and intraregional cooperation. Debates over the risks and comparative economics of nuclear power continue, but strategic drivers such as energy security and technology leadership are playing an increasingly key role in policy decisions. Geopolitics will likewise influence the selection of technology vendors and foreign development partners. For new-to-nuclear countries, however, the most enduring gains may come not from any particular technology or financing package, but from investing in the institutions and partnerships that provide and preserve long-term energy sovereignty.
For more information about the dialogue and dialogue proceedings, please contact Carl Baker ([email protected]). Note that these findings and recommendations reflect solely the views of the author; it is not a consensus document.