USCSCAP and CSCAP Vietnam, with support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, co-chaired the twelfth meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Nonproliferation and Disarmament (NPD). We convened in Seoul, South Korea on Sept. 4-5, 2025, and 23 scholars and experts, from 11 member committees, attended, all in their private capacity. The off-the-record discussions tackled recent developments related to nonproliferation and disarmament, multilateral control regimes and technology nationalism, missile proliferation in the Indo-Pacific, arms control and risk reduction, developments on the Korean Peninsula, and the future of nuclear energy in the region. Key findings from this meeting follow.
There was consensus that recent developments underscore the need for renewed effort to uphold and reinvigorate nonproliferation and disarmament treaties and conventions but the will to do so is difficult to find. Various conflicts – the Russia-Ukraine war and the India-Pakistan conflict to name the most prominent — have involved nuclear signaling and in the case of Iran, an attack on nuclear facilities. Yet, adversarial dyads are not talking to each other, assuming the worst, and expanding and modernizing nuclear arsenals. There is arms racing around the region, a growing sense of unease about the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent among its allies, and discussion of nuclear use in war planning and being incorporated into military exercises.
All highlight the need for new vigor in multilateral discussions to control, reduce, and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons. Preparations for the 2026 Review Conference (RevCon) for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) continue to stumble, with little progress at the Third Preparatory Conference (PrepCon) held in May. There are fears that another desultory or ineffective RevCon could fatally undermine the NPT. The primary issue is continuing deep division among nuclear weapons states (NWS) and nonnuclear weapons states (NNWS) about priorities and the meaning of the NPT bargains. While this is a longstanding problem and there are invariably worries that the ‘NPT is in real crisis,’ there was agreement that there is little indication that we will see an abatement of the crisis in the foreseeable future.
Vietnam, the chair of the RevCon, is preparing for that assignment, viewing the responsibility as “a vote of confidence from the world.” It is cognizant of the difficulties that it faces and is looking for assistance from other states and groups to ensure the meeting is a success.
There appears to be more hope – albeit still slim — for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Its third RevCon was held in March. Some 80% of the NNWS population supports the treaty but it faces powerful headwinds including from nuclear-armed Asian states and those that shelter under the US nuclear umbrella. Still, supporters are more cohesive and appear more capable of acting under its ambit, when compared to the NPT.
Another success was the US-led political declaration on responsible military use of artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy in 2023. Not only was there broad support for keeping “a human in the loop,” but President Biden and Xi affirmed that objective when they met in 2024.
US skepticism about nuclear treaties, and multilateralism in regard to nonproliferation, is a new phenomenon that transforms the context in which these negotiations take place. There is little indication that any other country, or group of countries, is prepared to step up and fill the role once assumed by Washington. Indeed, while the chief problem for international regimes has long been focused on “rogue states,” the new source of anxiety is so-called “responsible states” that now appear to be turning their back on treaties and negotiations.
There are two potential bright spots. First, there is growing support for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Almost all countries are states parties to the former and there is progress on the margins in some of its working groups. In the CWC, success has triggered fears of complacency, with many countries believing that the job is done, and difficulties in effectively sanctioning Syria for its chemical weapons use. A second potential area of optimism is growing recognition of dangers posed by nuclear weapons and a seeming understanding of the need for risk reduction. This may supplant arms control as a locus of activity.
The discussion of multilateral export control regimes and technology nationalism reiterated many of those themes. Quantum was our case study on the difficulty of regulating new technologies. The fundamental challenge is being able to understand and then impose limits on the use of a dual-use technology as it rapidly develops and evolves. It is difficult if not impossible to identify key points in this process to facilitate effective regulation.
The overlay of technology and geopolitical competition is an uneasy, if not combustible, mix. Technology nationalism undercuts the foundational assumption of the global economic order, namely that cooperation and ultimately dissemination (or, to use another word, proliferation) are to be encouraged. Divergences regarding the readiness to share technology undermine the legitimacy, and ultimately, the efficacy of export controls; widespread acceptance is critical to their effectiveness. While some governments have acted unilaterally or worked to forge coalitions of the willing, this creates compliance dilemmas for companies and countries that are pulled by competing geopolitical demands and results in the Balkanization of markets. Existing control regimes are undermined in the process. More generally, companies slow or resist making decisions as a result of regulatory uncertainty, impeding innovation and economic growth. In the absence of widespread multilateral regimes, these measures reinforce the belief in emerging economies that controls are intended to stifle their growth, further undercutting such controls’ legitimacy and acceptance.
Success may depend on the ability to understand at the micro-level the ways that technologies are developed and intended to be used. Grasping the ultimate purpose of a technology – what it is for – may facilitate efforts to control its proliferation. The finer this understanding, the more granular the regulations may be. To put it another way, the bigger the net (or export control), the greater the resistance is likely to be.
Missile proliferation in the Indo-Pacific is increasingly problematic, as almost all countries in the region (save those of the Pacific Islands) acquire this capability and improve that which they already possess. A change in thinking in Southeast Asia is notable. Several factors are driving this process, but increasing wealth, which fuels growing defense budgets is critical, as are rising threat perceptions coupled with a growing number of suppliers with lower prices. Almost all nations rationalize their own proliferation by pointing to the actions of adversaries. This proliferation is especially worrisome as nuclear armed states modernize their arsenals, and the integration of command and control of nuclear and conventional weapon systems is becoming increasingly common; the risk of launch ambiguity and inadvertent nuclear escalation increases as a result.
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) coupled with the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) is the traditional framework to address this problem, but its limits are increasingly problematic: cruise missiles are below its thresholds, compliance is patchy and it lacks enforcement and verification provisions, and key countries, notably the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korean (DPRK), are not members.
Adoption and expansion of prelaunch notification for tests is a potential confidence building measure, and China deserves credit for having issued a warning prior to a missile test last year, a move that defied precedent. However, here again, adherence to the norm is spotty. Furthermore, the potential problem of allowing missile launches to be justified by pre-launch notifications should also be taken into consideration.
Growing unease about the ultimate success of arms control and disarmament has necessitated a readiness to focus instead on risk reduction (or risk management). This vocabulary seems more acceptable to officials, more understandable to the public, and isn’t as freighted with history and assumptions. Unfortunately, its precise meaning is not clear to many and as a result efforts to shift the focus of conversation frequently encounter the same obstacles and objections as do efforts to promote arms control and disarmament.
Thus, China argues that the primary obligation for action rests on the US and Russia as possessors of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals; only when they reduce to Chinese levels will China consider joining those talks. Beijing argues the US alliance system is a source of instability, dismissing US claims that its alliances prevent those countries from proliferating. It adds that US should acknowledge that it shares “mutual vulnerability” with China to demonstrate its commitment to strategic stability (a position that the US says exists but cannot officially or publicly admit for political and security reasons.) China also counters claims for greater transparency in military and nuclear matters by insisting that weaker powers must always be more opaque in their policy to balance their disadvantages although China should be able to enhance transparency at least in correspondence with the extent of its rapid nuclear build-up. Finally, China argues that risk reduction or crisis management only enables bad behavior by its adversaries.
Regional partners could push great powers for talks in this area, and some wished the Trump administration would take risk reduction seriously. Efforts to do more to promote regional stability would buttress the claim that regional governments are decreasing the US defense burden. Governments were encouraged to prod Russia to stay engaged in arms talks as the 2026 New START expiration approaches.
Finally, it was suggested that regional governments take up the topic of No First Use (NFU), which China often advances as a critical to any peace or arms control initiative. While NFU is often derided as a not-serious policy, it was argued that it could serve as a vehicle to engage China on these issues and get Beijing to flesh out its thinking by pointing out its various problems that come with the concept of NFU.
China sometimes argues that risks can be a deterrent, a position that undercuts the value of risk reduction. This position too might serve as a doorway to more fulsome discussions on this topic.
[An important note: No Chinese attended our meeting. Their absence, along with several other member committees, was noted and their contributions missed. The arguments above are from participants who have engaged with Chinese officials and experts in other forums.]
Developments on the Korean Peninsula offer significant overlap – confirmation, in many ways – of points in previous sessions. North Korea is the key driver of threat perceptions in Northeast Asia, although decisionmakers in Pyongyang argue that they too are merely responding to actions by neighboring countries. A piece of the new security landscape is intensifying cooperation – trilateralism among the US, South Korea, and Japan, and the DPRK’s increasingly intimate relations with Russia (in Ukraine) and with China, with President Xi meeting the DPRK’s head, Kim Jong Un, in a highly publicized summit the day before our meeting.
Domestic political change will impact relations on the Korean Peninsula. While the new progressive government in Seoul appears to be continuing with rapprochement with Tokyo and the trilateralism initiated by his predecessor, it has halted some of the more egregious irritants to Pyongyang, namely loudspeakers targeting the North and the anti-DPRK leaflets dispatched in balloons. While policy toward the DPRK remains a work in progress, the new government seems to be shifting the process of engagement. All eyes are on the US, however. Trump administration policy will likely have a significant impact on inter-Korean dynamics.
There is no indication that the DPRK has any interest in arms control or denuclearization under any circumstances and has repeated that it has “no reason to resume dialogue.” This determination has been strengthened by Pyongyang’s new relationships with Moscow and Beijing. It is assumed that these relationships are similar, but they should be studied to divine differences and ways to undercut the support they give the DPRK and its nuclear ambitions.
This raises the foundational question: does failure of its efforts to date mean the West should abandon its objective of Korean denuclearization? If so, what should the new goal be and what would the impact of that shift be on other countries, especially South Korea? This question assumes increasing relevance and urgency amid reports that the some in the current US administration had called for a policy of “friendly proliferation,” or were actively encouraging some states to acquire a nuclear capability.
Lack of progress on arms control has redoubled attention on monitoring and sanctions regimes designed to punish the DPRK and encourage it to comply with the NPT. Their record is mixed. The United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts under the DPRK sanctions regime was a compelling example of international cooperation and had become increasingly authoritative as a source of insight into North Korean behavior; its reports had been accepted as evidence in sanctions evasion court trials. That success may have prompted Russia to veto its renewal in March 2024.
In its place, a coalition of like-minded states created the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT). It includes a dozen states and has kept the spotlight on DPRK illicit activity. It faces several challenges as it does not enjoy the legitimacy of the UN effort and reports suggest that nonparticipating nations have obstructed its work. If it continues to develop a record of success, it could emerge as an instrument of some significance, however.
The termination of the UN Panel of Experts should not color perceptions of all its work. Sanctions have had valuable peripheral effects. They have encouraged a clean-up in ship registries and their management in ways that benefit efforts to forestall illicit activity generally. The reach of sanctions, especially those of the US Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control, has sobered many governments and encouraged greater compliance with sanctions. At the same time, however, the reluctance of major powers such as China and Russia to enforce sanctions regimes, even those backed by the UN, has fueled disinterest and indifference among other nations that might otherwise support those efforts.
Ultimately, the North Korean experience poses three basic questions. First, what is the purpose of its nuclear weapons arsenal? The answer to that question provides insight into ways to dissuade Pyongyang from pursuing those weapons. Second, has policy failed because it was the wrong policy or because it was not implemented well? Third, is it time to reassess the goal of engaging with the DPRK on this issue? Rather than denuclearization, should the goal be the control of those weapons, ensuring that they are safe and secure and Pyongyang has no incentive to proliferate? If so, what are implications of that shift?
Proliferation concerns assume new urgency as Southeast Asian nations again contemplate nuclear energy. There is by most analyses the beginning of a nuclear renaissance (although veterans of this conversation note that optimism about nuclear power in the region is a regular feature of the discussion). Now, however, the spread of data centers that have a huge demand for energy is driving reassessment. Renewed and intensified attention to climate concerns also fuels new interest across the region.
Another factor is the emergence of small modular reactors that could alter the economics of nuclear energy. While there is uncertainty about the technology, development of these capabilities raises concerns about the capacity of existing nuclear safety, safeguards, and security standards for regulating their use.
The growth of nuclear energy could impact the proliferation debate more indirectly. South Korea is a major player in the export of nuclear reactors. This role could transform the cost calculus for Seoul if it should decide to go nuclear as the price of sanctions for proliferation would be considerably higher if it loses sales opportunities as a result.
Southeast Asia’s nuclear energy trajectory is uncertain. Events invariably intervene; the last time the region contemplated a nuclear future, Fukushima occurred. Moreover, politics and economic considerations will play an important role in the deployment of these technologies. Nevertheless, governance mechanisms should be put in place before their deployment.
For more information, contact the NPD Study Group co-chairs Carl Baker [[email protected]] or To Anh Tuan [[email protected]]. This report reflects the views of the co-chairs; it is not a consensus document.