The Pacific Forum, with the support of the US Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, and in partnership with the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace and the Paragon Institute of International Affairs, conducted a US-Cambodia Track-1.5 Regional Security and Nonproliferation Dialogue in Phnom Penh, Cambodia on March 31, 2025. Approximately 25 scholars and some officials participated, all in their private capacity.
The off-the-record discussions provided an opportunity to discuss, in regular meeting sessions, the following topics: regional security and strategic cooperation; economic partnership and trade relations; strategic competition and regional stability; and nonproliferation and nuclear issues. The dialogue was opened by a keynote address by His Excellency Dr. Sok Siphana, Senior Minister in charge of Special Missions (Multilateral Trade and Economic Affairs) in the 7th mandate of the Royal Government of Cambodia.
This report lists all key findings and recommendations from the dialogue.
Cambodians worry about intensifying US-China strategic competition. They are concerned because Southeast Asia is now a core battleground for influence between the United States and China, creating risks, tensions, and instability, and because regional countries are de facto under growing pressure to “choose sides.”
Several Cambodians, however, insist that relations with their neighbors, notably Thailand and Vietnam, ranks higher on Phnom Penh’s list of priorities than major-power relations. This is in part because Phnom Penh has more agency on the former than the latter.
While aware that the West generally sees them as “leaning towards China,” Cambodians say that they want balanced, pragmatic engagement with both the United States and China, and they seek to avoid over-dependence on either power. They want to enhance cooperation with China, notably in the infrastructure sector, and with the United States, primarily in technology, education, and security areas. To advance its national interests as a sovereign country (and to dispel US concerns that it may have “chosen” China), Cambodia is now allowing US naval visits to Ream Naval Base, deepening its relationship with the United States in other areas (defense, counterterrorism, or peacekeeping), and increasingly diversifying its partnerships, notably with US allies and partners: with Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the European Union.
Cambodians stress that they want to improve and even deepen their country’s relationship with the United States, and they are delighted to see it stabilizing of late, despite outstanding trouble spots that are clear irritants in the bilateral relationship, such as Cambodia’s “dark economy,” which includes large-scale online scams, such an investment or crypto frauds or the impersonation of officials or tech support.
They highlight two challenges to advancing US-Cambodia relations, however:
- First, the United States is, they say, an “extra-regional power” with “unclear commitment” to Southeast Asia (perhaps even the Indo-Pacific). Of note, the weight of history, and “America’s history of abandonment,” plays an important role in Cambodian strategic thinking, and current US tariff policy is creating additional uncertainty, as do issues such travel bans, the lack of education support, and continued criticisms about “alleged human rights abuses.”
- Second, and relatedly, China is, they insist, a regional power with “very deep local engagement,” including at the village level in many parts of Cambodia, plus it is “investing and building massively in the region,” which makes neutrality difficult, even if Phnom Penh is committed to it as a goal and aware of the potential challenges associated with relying “too much” on Chinese investments.
One Cambodian was clear: “by and large, Phnom Penh trusts China more than the United States.” Significantly, Cambodians had a similar dialogue with Chinese just two weeks earlier.
A key point is that greater clarity on US intentions and policy vis-à-vis Cambodia and Southeast Asia in general would go a long way to help Phnom Penh decide how it should deal with the United States. In this regard, per Cambodians, the Trump administration’s apparent proclivity to emphasize “interests over values” could pay dividends.
Cambodians place much value in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), despite its shortcomings and declining public confidence in the organization. They continue to believe that ASEAN can – and must – be an anchor of stability and that it is the region’s best bet to “manage” US-China strategic competition. They want ASEAN to help leverage China’s economic strengths, maintain US military presence (which they see as “essential” for the regional balance of power), and preserve neutrality/resist becoming a proxy. Cambodians confess that the challenges facing ASEAN are formidable and that much of the problem hangs on the issues pertaining to the South China Sea’s Code of Conduct, which remain unresolved.
Cambodia is committed to the key nonproliferation treaties and conventions, such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, and it has domestic laws banning the manufacture (or use) of weapons of mass destruction.
Going forward, further strengthening of strategic trade controls, stronger regional cooperation, and deeper engagement of external actors (notably the United States) is essential to prevent Cambodia from becoming a proliferation vector. Notably areas of cooperation include assistance to enforce UN sanctions on North Korea and Iran, interdict proliferation transfers, promote nuclear safeguards, and secure nuclear and radiological sources.
Cambodia has expressed interest in nuclear power for a variety of reasons: energy security, diversification, and sustainable development. In that context, small modular reactors seem appealing and could be integrated as part of Cambodia’s broader energy mix.
Phnom Penh is weighing its options and increasingly aware that there are numerous challenges ahead should it decide to “go nuclear,” including pertaining to managing “the 3 S’s” (nuclear safety, safeguards, and security) and to concluding safe and effective partnerships.
Because Russia and China are actively engaging Cambodia and other countries in Southeast Asia about investing in nuclear power, the United States should redouble its efforts and explain the costs and risks associated with doing nuclear business with Moscow or Beijing. The United States should also strive to offer better alternatives to Cambodia and others in Southeast Asia, notably in partnership with its allies and partners.
For more information about the dialogue and dialogue proceedings, please contact Dr. David Santoro ([email protected]). Note that these findings and recommendations reflect solely the views of the author; it is not a consensus document.