On Sept. 22, Pacific Forum, with support from the US Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, convened the US-Singapore Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation Dialogue. (We thank the Nanyang Technical University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies for assistance in organizing the meeting.) Thirty-three experts and officials attended, all in their private capacity, for a robust discussion of issues critical to the two countries’ security partnership, with a focus on Singapore’s emerging interest in nuclear energy. Key findings include:

Geopolitical competition between the United States and China looms large in Singapore and broader Southeast Asia. Intensifying rivalry makes it difficult for regional governments to navigate between them and preserve their own agency and autonomy.  Several participants decried a seeming capriciousness in US decision-making and resulting uncertainty about US policies and regional engagement. As one participant explained, “this opens the door to China,” which is now viewed as a credible competitor and in some cases more reliable partner than the United States. Some participants argued that this rivalry could manifest itself in the growing interest in nuclear energy in Southeast Asia, especially in the areas of nuclear power vendor selection and adherence to nuclear security and nonproliferation norms. As suggested by participants, Russia currently owns the fuel cycle card and China currently owns the advanced technology card.

Singaporean participants expressed an urgent need for the US to remain engaged in the region and to avoid framing regional decision making as a function of great-power politics. Meanwhile, regional governments remain strongly committed to engaging as many outside powers as possible to maximize freedom of maneuver and leverage. While there was general agreement that the United Sates should remain engaged and avoid zero-sum thinking, other participants argued that it was equally important that others recognize material circumstances in the United States have changed and policies must be adjusted accordingly.

There is growing interest in nuclear energy in Southeast Asia, primarily a result of rising energy demand and carbon abatement commitments. Other considerations weigh on decision makers, however. They include the desire to ensure energy security (and avoid supply interruptions), balance of payments concerns, new technologies, new financing by multilateral development banks, and efforts by nuclear energy exporters to find new markets.

Nevertheless, talk of “a nuclear renaissance” may be premature. There is considerable skepticism about when this surge will take place. Longstanding obstacles remain formidable, including public concern about safety, the absence of regulatory frameworks, the high cost of nuclear power plants, and a shortage of nuclear power-related workforce in the region.

When the nuclear “dam” breaks, nuclear technology is likely to proliferate in the region with speed.  Many anticipate that Singapore will be a frontrunner, given its history and policy, but Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines have also evinced early interest in nuclear energy capabilities.  As one participant explained, the US considers Singapore a leader for the region as countries consider the nuclear energy future. Others added that any move by Singapore would be done in close consultation and collaboration with neighboring governments. However, when pressed for specific examples, there was a lack of clarity on how existing mechanisms such as the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Nuclear Energy (ASEANTOM) and the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty could be adapted to the task.

A key obstacle to greater use of nuclear energy in Singapore and Southeast Asia is public opinion. In recent years, surveys indicated that public acceptance has doubled but it remains low, in many cases not even in double digits. Younger generations seem more accepting of nuclear energy.  Safety concerns predominate, but there is a NIMBY – not in my backyard – mentality even among segments of the population ready to proceed with nuclear energy. Public acceptance depends on greater education and outreach by all stakeholders that seek to expand the use of nuclear energy. The goal should be to build trust and explain how nuclear energy provides benefits to ordinary citizens. An honest discussion of accidents and contingencies should be part of that process.

The emergence of new technologies, small modular reactors (SMRs) in particular, could transform calculations of the utility of nuclear power. Optimism is tempered by the failure of the technology to deliver on its promise – they have been slow to the market and despite being first designed in 2000 have yet to be cost effective – and the only two models currently available are Chinese and Russian, raising questions about reaching consensus on how they will be regulated. SMRs also magnify all risks attendant to large nuclear power plants, such as sabotage, terrorism or targeting in conflict.

There is considerable skepticism about demand created by data centers, a source of considerable media speculation. While operators are enthusiastic about this possibility, it is not clear that tech companies behind the drive understand the complexity of nuclear energy or its nuances. While those companies have substantial financial resources, it is not enough given the scale of financial demands associated with the adoption of nuclear power facilities.

Floating nuclear power plants are being considered as options, a product of land scarcity and the desire to reach remote communities (because they can be easily transported).  There is only one live model, which is Russian, and a host of legal/governance issues, most importantly, liability. In theory, the legal framework for nuclear-propelled ships could be applied, but there are limits to its use. It is estimated that developing a legal framework would take 5-10 years.

Singapore is taking the nuclear energy challenge seriously. It has stepped up longstanding efforts to build capacity to facilitate the transition to the green economy and promote greater connectivity throughout the region. Participants repeatedly emphasized the need to develop national capacity to engage the public and work with regional governments and publics on nuclear energy issues.

The Singapore Nuclear Safety and Research Institute, a $70 million effort to research prospects for nuclear energy and educate the public, is one important development. While the institute has existed since 2014, its primary focus has been technology; it is now adding a policy dimension centered on safety and regulation. It aims to cultivate 100 local experts by 2030 as part of its effort to reach out to and educate the public.

Discussion of nuclear energy generates a conversation about connectivity and transnational power grids. Singapore already imports energy under the Lao PDR–Thailand–Malaysia–Singapore Power Integration Project (LTMS-PIP); other countries in the region import energy as well. The dream of an integrated ASEAN grid persists and there is movement in this direction amid the energy transition. Financing, regulatory and technical differences, geographic diversity, and vertically integrated power systems throughout the region are key challenges to progress in developing a truly regional grid as envisioned in the ASEAN Power Grid Initiative.

Singapore invariably discusses nuclear energy in a regional context. Its national strategy is to work with the ASEAN Center for Energy to develop a platform for capacity building, technology transfer, and a dialogue for nuclear energy development within ASEAN. It holds workshops and other forums to promote nuclear governance in ASEAN. However, there was also general agreement that countries in the region were focused primarily on national strategies for introducing nuclear power as an energy alternative.

There are opportunities for the United States to play a significant role as this energy transition process unfolds. The two countries have a longtime relationship, even though nuclear issues are a relatively new topic of bilateral discussion. They recently concluded a 123 Agreement, described by one participant as “a comprehensive framework for peaceful coordination with the highest standard for nuclear governance, which could spill over to the entire region.”

The two countries could cooperate over the supply of reactors, education and human capacity building in the many phases of the development of nuclear energy infrastructure, such as investment, business, finance, management, shipping, and engineering. They could conduct joint research on the appropriate energy mix, as well as setting standards for safety, security and safeguards.  Having recently joined the Party of 10 and launched an ASEAN chapter of the American Nuclear Society, Singapore is better positioned to work with the US and help disseminate its ideas throughout the region.

There were, however, concerns that the priority given to nonproliferation internationally has been reduced and fears that the US is not pushing it as hard as in the past, a drift that predates the current administration. As one participant noted, “there is a geopolitical chill after the enthusiasm for nuclear cooperation.” Cooperation continues, but it occurs more on a bilateral and minilateral basis among like-minded nations. Coordinated action among the supplier states, which is essential to ensure that nuclear safety, security, and safeguards are effective, is at an all-time low. Significantly, China is now viewed as part of the problem, with one participant calling it “a fairly predatory top-tier nuclear player” that is now playing a role in proliferation.  While the US insists that nuclear energy and nonproliferation remain priorities, participants worried that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), once considered the “gold standard” for nuclear decision making, has been tarnished by staff and budget cuts.

This report summarizes the discussion of the dialogue and reflects the views of the Dialogue Chair. It is not a consensus document. For more information, contact Carl Baker [[email protected]].