NFT26-02 | Parag Amalnerkar
Parag Amalnerkar is a marketing professional and geopolitical analyst pursuing a Master’s degree in Defence and Strategic Studies at Rashtriya Raksha University, India’s National Security University.
Deterrence can fail not because policymakers miscalculate the costs they can impose, but because they misjudge how much those costs matter to the adversary. This problem becomes particularly acute when ideology, revolutionary purpose, religious conviction, or deeply embedded national narratives form an important part of political legitimacy and strategic decision-making. Such states may accept levels of economic hardship, military punishment, or diplomatic isolation that conventional cost-benefit calculations expect to produce behavioral change. For democracies confronting ideologically anchored adversaries, the challenge is therefore not simply to impose greater costs, but to understand how those costs are interpreted.
This problem is visible across several current confrontations. Western policymakers have expected sustained economic pressure to moderate Iranian behavior. India has anticipated that military and economic costs would constrain Pakistan’s security posture. Israel has relied on overwhelming military superiority to deter ideologically motivated adversaries. These approaches have produced effects, but rarely the durable behavioral change anticipated. The reason may lie less in the inadequacy of deterrence itself than in assumptions about how adversaries calculate costs.
Deterrence has always been psychological. Thomas Schelling argued that deterrence depends not simply on the ability to impose costs, but on convincing an adversary that those costs outweigh the expected benefits of continued action. Military capability is therefore only one component. Equally important is understanding how an opponent values sacrifice, legitimacy, sovereignty, regime survival, and strategic success.
I use the term “ideologically anchored states” to describe governments in which religious conviction, revolutionary identity, or deeply embedded national narratives carry unusual weight in political legitimacy and strategic choices. This does not mean these states ignore material interests, nor does it imply that democracies are ideology-free. India, Israel, and the United States all make strategic decisions influenced by national identity, political values, and perceptions of security. The distinction lies in the relative weight assigned to material costs and ideological or identity-based objectives in particular strategic circumstances.
The India-Pakistan relationship illustrates this divergence. India’s strategic calculations encompass multiple priorities. Economic development and electoral accountability matter, but so do sovereignty, territorial integrity, national identity, and security. These considerations can themselves justify substantial costs when fundamental interests are perceived to be at stake.
Pakistan’s strategic evolution has followed a different trajectory. Since independence, national identity has been closely intertwined with security considerations, while the military establishment has occupied a central role in shaping policy. The enduring asymmetry in conventional capabilities with India has encouraged Pakistan to seek alternative instruments of competition. Its continued reliance on proxy actors can be understood partly as a response to asymmetric competition, reinforced by historical grievance, security narratives, and institutional interests.
Despite decades of military crises, terrorist attacks, diplomatic pressure, and economic costs, this aspect of Pakistan’s strategic behavior has displayed considerable continuity. India has strengthened its military capabilities, expanded its economy, improved its international standing, and demonstrated a greater willingness to impose costs. Yet these measures have not fundamentally ended Pakistan’s reliance on proxy organizations or transformed the underlying security competition.
This persistence is important for deterrence. Policies that appear prohibitively costly when assessed primarily through economic welfare or conventional military balance may remain acceptable when decision-makers believe that fundamental security interests, national identity, or ideological purpose are involved. The point is not that such choices are irrational. Rather, it is that ideology and identity can alter the value assigned to both costs and objectives. A deterrence strategy that fails to account for these risks imposing costs without sufficiently affecting the adversary’s underlying calculus.
India’s responses illustrate the difficulty of calibrating deterrence under such conditions. Operations after Uri in 2016 and Balakot in 2019 demonstrated a greater willingness to impose direct military costs while attempting to control escalation. Following the terrorist attack in Pahalgam in 2025, India launched Operation Sindoor against what it described as Pakistan-based terrorist infrastructure and subsequently selected military targets as the confrontation expanded. India later announced the suspension of operations after stating that its intended objectives had been achieved.
These episodes demonstrate that deterrence is not simply a choice between action and restraint. India must impose sufficient costs to influence Pakistan’s calculations while managing escalation between two nuclear-armed states. Pakistan, meanwhile, evaluates those costs through its own security priorities, institutional interests, and perceptions of asymmetric competition. Effective deterrence therefore depends not merely on increasing punishment but on identifying which costs are capable of changing the adversary’s choices.
The broader relevance can be seen briefly in the confrontation between Israel and Iran. Iran has endured decades of sanctions and diplomatic isolation while preserving important elements of a foreign policy shaped partly by the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary identity. Israel is itself strongly influenced by historical, national, and existential security narratives. The comparison reinforces rather than weakens the argument: ideology is not exclusive to any political system, but where it becomes deeply embedded in legitimacy and strategic purpose, it can significantly affect the costs governments are prepared to absorb.
For the Indo-Pacific, this problem is increasingly consequential. North Korea has demonstrated extraordinary tolerance for economic isolation while prioritizing regime survival and nuclear deterrence. China combines economic ambition with national rejuvenation and historical narratives regarding sovereignty and territorial integrity. These cases differ substantially, but both demonstrate why assessments based predominantly on material costs can be incomplete.
None of this invalidates conventional deterrence theory. It reinforces one of its central insights: deterrence depends upon perceptions. Military capability, economic sanctions, and diplomatic pressure remain indispensable instruments of statecraft, but their effectiveness depends upon how an adversary interprets them. The relevant question is not simply how much punishment can be imposed, but which costs threaten interests the adversary values.
This is where strategic empathy becomes important. It does not mean sympathy with an adversary or acceptance of its objectives. It means understanding the opponent’s hierarchy of interests well enough to anticipate which threats may alter its calculations and which may instead strengthen its determination to resist.
Effective deterrence therefore requires more than superior military or economic power. Policymakers must understand how opponents define legitimacy, sacrifice, security, and acceptable national costs before assuming that familiar instruments of coercion will produce familiar outcomes. Ideology does not make states immune to deterrence. It can, however, change what they are willing to endure and what they consider worth enduring it for. Democracies that understand this distinction will be better placed to design deterrence strategies suited to the strategic realities of the Indo-Pacific.