Introduction

The report “Mitigating Miscalculation: The Role of Pre-Launch Notifications in Strategic Stability” is the first comprehensive study that explores the critical role of pre-launch notifications for ballistic missiles and space-launch vehicles in maintaining global strategic stability. As the world enters a period of renewed nuclear competition without robust bilateral arms control between the United States and Russia, the risk of misinterpreting a test launch as a nuclear first strike has increased. Pre-launch notifications serve as a vital “guardrail” by signaling that a launch is a test rather than an attack.

The report examines the historical evolution of such notifications, beginning with the foundational 1988 US-USSR Ballistic Missile Launch Agreement, which to this day remains a model for how technical risk reduction can survive extreme political tension. It details subsequent bilateral efforts, including the failed attempts to establish a Joint Data Exchange Center and a more intrusive pre- and post-launch notification system due to disputes over missile defense and trust. Other significant bilateral regimes include the India-Pakistan Pre-Notification Agreement and the 2009 Russia-China Pre-Launch Notification Agreement. At the multilateral level, the Hague Code of Conduct seeks to globalize these norms, but it is hindered by the absence of key powers like China, North Korea, and Pakistan.

A central focus of the report is China’s historically cautious and selective approach to risk reduction. While Beijing has participated in regional and bilateral agreements—such as those with Russia and India—it has resisted a formal pre-launch notification agreement with the United States, citing concerns over operational security and intelligence gathering. The report, however, notes a potentially positive shift following China’s 2024 test of an intercontinental ballistic missile over the Pacific, for which it provided notifications to “relevant countries,” including the United States.

The report concludes with several recommendations to expand pre-launch notification regimes. At the bilateral level, it notably recommends prioritizing US-China summits to build on the 2024 notification and reviving the crisis communications working group. The report also includes recommendations for action the multilateral level. To cite a few, it recommends using the P5 process to develop normative statements and pressure China to join more formalized notification exchanges; establishing a regional coalition in East Asia to encourage Chinese adoption of the Hague Code of Conduct; or enhancing compliance and expanding definitions in the Code to include cruise missiles.

More generally, the report’s findings emphasize that while broad, intrusive systems often fail due to a lack of shared security interests, modest and clearly defined bilateral pre-launch notification agreements have proven durable and successful. Ultimately, the report argues that expanding these regimes is a necessary and practical step toward preventing accidental nuclear war in an increasingly unconstrained strategic environment.

Table of Contents

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

US-USSR/RUSSIA RISK REDUCTION

OTHER PRE-LAUNCH NOTIFICATION AGREEMENTS

CHINA-US RISK REDUCTION

CHINA AND RUSSIA, INDIA, AND THE REST OF THE WORLD

CONCLUSIONS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

About the Authors

William Alberque is a Senior Adjunct Fellow at Pacific Forum. He previously served as Director of NATO’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation Centre and the Director of Strategy, Technology, and Arms Control at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, focusing on nuclear deterrence, outer space security, and risk reduction. Previously, he worked for the US government for more than two decades on nuclear security and safeguards, WMD non-proliferation, arms control, CSBMs, SALW, CBRN defense, pandemic response, and nuclear accident response.

Miles Pomper is a Senior Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Washington DC. He specializes in nuclear energy, nonproliferation, security, and arms control. As the former Editor-in-Chief of Arms Control Today, he brings extensive experience. Prior roles include lead foreign policy reporter for CQ Weekly and Legi-Slate News Service, and a Foreign Service Officer with the US Information Agency.

David Santoro is the President and CEO of Pacific Forum. He specializes in strategic and security issues with a regional focus on both Asia and Europe. His current interests focus on major-power dynamics, US alliances, and deterrence, particularly the role of China in an era of nuclear multipolarity. In 2021, Lynne Rienner published his volume on U.S.-China Nuclear Relations – The Impact of Strategic Triangles. Before joining Pacific Forum, Santoro worked on similar issues in France, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom.

Hanna Notte is the Director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and a senior associate (non-resident) with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She’s also an associate fellow with the Kennan Institute. Her expertise is in Russian foreign policy, the Middle East, and arms control and nonproliferation. She is the coauthor of Death Dust: The Rise, Demise, and Future of Radiological Weapons Programs (Stanford University Press, 2023). Her book about Russia’s global foreign policy since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, We Shall Outlast Them: Putin’s Global Campaign to Defeat the West, is forthcoming with W. W. Norton & Company in August 2026.