Introduction
China is advancing a proposal for a treaty on the “No First Use” of nuclear weapons. This proposal sounds reasonable at first glance – nuclear weapon states could pledge that they wouyld never be the first to use nuclear weapons, thus making the world safer from nuclear war and taking the moral “high ground.” China is advocating for a politically binding agreement or legally–binding treaty to be negotiated among the five Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) as defined by the Nuclear Non–Proliferation Treaty of 1970 (NPT).
However, China’s proposal is not all that it seems. The proposal does not address all nuclear weapons states – that is, the nuclear–armed NPT non–parties. Nor does it address the core purpose of deterrence – to prevent an adversary from attacking for fear of consequences that would outweigh any potential benefits of such an attack. By forgoing the possibility of first nuclear use, conventionally stronger states may be tempted to attack, knowing they can prevail without fearing nuclear consequences.
In addition, China’s proposal is founded on cynicism – seeking to distract from China’s massive and rapid nuclear buildup, to deny any need for China to engage in nuclear arms control or transparency, and to delay any coordinated response to its buildup by claiming to be a responsible nuclear power. China has a long–established history of advancing its NFU proposal to distract from key moments in the evolution of its nuclear arsenal. China first announced its own national NFU policy in 1964 to deflect criticism of its sudden abandonment of the claim that it would not seek nuclear weapons. It then sought to advance an NFU
agreement in 1994 to distract from its refusal to join the NWS in a nuclear testing moratorium, instead twice conducting tests that disrupted sensitive global arms control talks. And China’s latest NFU initiative is meant to delay a reaction from the world to its massive nuclear buildup over the past five years.
If the US joins in any such NFU pledge, China may feel more emboldened to initiate a conflict that could involve the United States, such as a war over Taiwan. Russia would welcome an abandonment by the United States of its pledge to use any and all necessary force to defend its NATO Allies, and North Korea may become far more aggressive if it knows that it need not fear a nuclear resposne to restarting hostilities against South Korea. Deterrence between India and Pakistan also could be disrupted if Pakistan were to forgo the potential for first use in the face of Indian conventional superiority. Even Belarus might balk at a declaration of NFU by Russia considering their nuclear sharing arrangements. Thus, a wider adoption of NFU by states could
increase instability and raise the risk of war.
In short, China’s NFU proposal is quite rightly seen by the other four NWS as a non–starter, and states should instead insist that China undertake other measures that it has long avoided – such as decreasing threats against its neighbors, increasing the transparency of its nuclear arsenal and engaging in arms control in a meaningful way.
William Alberque
Senior Adjunct Fellow
Pacific Forum
Table of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
CHINA AND NFU: DISINGENUOUS OFFER TO COVER ITS NUCLEAR AMBITIONS
CHINA AND NFU–INHERENT CONTRADICTIONS
CHINA AND NFU: ON DETERRENCE AND SECURITY
CONCLUSION: CHINA’S NFU PLEDGE IS A DISTRACTION
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
About the Author
WILLIAM ALBERQUE is a Senior Adjunct Fellow at the Pacific Forum. He previously served as Director of NATO’s
Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non–Proliferation Centre and the Director of Strategy, Technology, and Arms
Control at the IISS, focusing on nuclear deterrence, outer space security, and risk reduction.
He has also been a Senior Fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center and the James Martin Center. Previously, he served
as and worked for the US Government for more than two decades on nuclear security and safeguards, WMD non–
proliferation, arms control, CSBMs, SALW, CBRN defense, pandemic response, and nuclear accident response.