“Public-private collaboration” is a catchphrase in Japan’s economic security policy. Yet, unless the government fundamentally changes how it engages and communicates with industry, the term will remain an empty slogan rather than a practical approach to national resilience.

In recent years, the Japanese government has released a range of documents emphasizing this theme. The Action Plan for Strengthening Industrial and Technological Foundations for Economic Security, revised in May 2025, sets out frameworks for “promoting public-private dialogue” and “strengthening economic intelligence.” The plan highlights creation of an economic security council involving private companies and an “Economic Security Center” to serve as a platform for collecting the expertise and information necessary for government research. These initiatives reflect an effort to institutionalize coordination between the state and industry. However, while the documents call on the private sector to provide information, they do not clearly specify what information the government will, in turn, share with companies—a lack of reciprocity that limits mutual trust and engagement.

A similar emphasis appears in the Economic Security Management Guidelines issued in November 2025, which recommend that companies “consult with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)” when implementing measures against information leakage. The attached checklist repeats this advice as part of good corporate practice.

Nevertheless, the gap between policy rhetoric and corporate experience remains wide. Many firms express frustration. Typical is the sentiment of a Japanese businessperson, head of the economic security section of a manufacturing company, who noted that “there is little benefit in reporting to the government,” adding that they are “asked irrelevant questions or burdened with unnecessary homework.” These voices reflect deep-seated differences in perception and incentives between government and business.

Economic security cannot be guaranteed by the government or a few defense-oriented companies. It relies on the participation of a broad spectrum of private actors whose technologies, supply chains, and data infrastructure underpin national competitiveness. Public-private collaboration is therefore indispensable.

The fundamental purpose of private enterprises has not changed, however. They exist to maximize shareholder value and operate according to market principles, not national security mandates.

To shape corporate behavior, the state can employ legal mechanisms and incentives. For instance, the Economic Security Promotion Act authorizes the government to require disclosure of information related to critical supply chains, infrastructure IT suppliers, and key patents. The Active Cyber Defense Act, enacted in May 2025, goes further by permitting the government to obtain data on “critical electronic computers” operated by designated firms.

These instruments have limited reach. Broader cooperation on economic security beyond legal mandates requires voluntary participation. To sustain collaboration, the government must adopt a two-way approach—sharing intelligence with companies, offering policy and technical support, and demonstrating that cooperation generates concrete value for the private sector.

Information collaboration in economic security can be understood across three phases: understanding, analysis, and action.

The understanding phase focuses on raising awareness among private companies that national security risks increasingly encompass the economic domain. Here, the government must play a proactive, even educational, role by sharing contextual information—such as examples of hostile investment, supply disruptions, or cyber vulnerabilities—to help firms recognize the changing strategic environment. For multinationals already exposed to geopolitical dynamics, this recognition occurs naturally, but for domestically oriented firms, government-led enlightenment is essential.

The analysis phase centers on identifying threats and opportunities for the government and private sector. Businesses must assess vulnerabilities internally and across supply chains, analyzing the stability of supply, exposure to espionage, and risks of information leakage. Sharing these analyses with the government enables policymakers to design informed and effective measures. A telling example is Japan’s 2022 decision to include phosphorus in its national stockpile of rare materials—a move reportedly guided by insights from private industry.

Collaboration should also extend to opportunity identification. When a company’s dual-use technology can fulfill a national security need, both the state and the firm can benefit. Such synergy, however, depends on mutual visibility: companies must understand the government’s technological demands, and the government must grasp what unique capabilities exist in the private sector.

The action phase involves implementing solutions to identified risks and seizing opportunities. Companies can strengthen cooperation by sharing best practices, particularly within an industry. The government should encourage horizontal information exchange and disseminate successful practices across sectors.

The most crucial cooperation in this phase lies within the government itself. Silos between or even within ministries often impede cohesive policymaking. For instance, with regard to matching dual-use technology needs, it is necessary to match the needs of the Ministry of Defense or the police with those of METI, which is responsible for industrial policy.

In addition, when considering measures toward employees of particular nationalities as part of corporate countermeasures against industrial espionage or “deemed exports,” METI, which promotes risk countermeasures in the private sector, should coordinate with the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, which deals with “freedom of labor,” to formulate policies. Without internal coherence, companies will continue to view government consultation as unproductive rather than supportive.

Overcoming this fragmentation demands institutional change. The United Kingdom offers instructive examples. Within its Ministry of Science, Innovation and Technology, a small dedicated team liaises with the Ministry of Defence and police agencies to monitor technological requirements while scouting global companies—including startups—capable of meeting them. Selected firms receive grants, creating incentives that align national security needs with industrial policy objectives. This arrangement not only communicates government needs effectively but also reinforces confidence among firms that collaboration can yield business opportunities.

Another British initiative, the Economic Security Advisory Service (ESAS)—launched under the UK Trade Strategy in May 2025—streamlines industry communication by serving as a “one-stop” contact for all economic security inquiries. ESAS coordinates across relevant government departments, ensuring companies are not trapped navigating bureaucratic complexities. While the UK’s relatively flat ministerial structure facilitates such models, establishing a similar cross-agency coordination body could greatly enhance Japan’s internal information flow and responsiveness.

A final area demanding reform is government information sharing with the private sector. With the introduction of Japan’s new security clearance system, the classification and labeling of information should be reexamined to enable broader disclosure of non-sensitive data. Observations from industry interactions reveal that many officials, often out of excessive caution, avoid sharing even harmless information. Beyond the categories protected by the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets or covered under the new clearance regime, officials should overcome the ingrained reluctance to share knowledge that could aid companies’ risk management. The 2025 Action Plan mentions increased information sharing, but genuine improvement depends on each bureaucrat recognizing private companies as partners, not outsiders.

Japan has made significant progress in institutionalizing its economic security framework and stands ahead of many peers in translating economic resilience into policy. Yet progress in institutional design must now be matched by progress in practice. Building true public-private collaboration will require the government to cultivate mutual trust, learn from global best practices, and adapt them to Japan’s unique administrative culture. Only then can economic security become a genuinely shared responsibility rather than a slogan repeated across strategy documents.

Shotaro Nagino ([email protected]) is an Adjunct Fellow at Pacific Forum and a Senior Manager at a global consulting firm in Tokyo, where he leads economic security consulting.

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