When Takaichi Sanae was confirmed as the new leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), it was—as is typically the case in Japanese politics—virtually certain that she would succeed outgoing Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru. Her ascension did face some political uncertainty after long-time coalition partner Komeito broke with the LDP, raising questions about who would ultimately become prime minister. However, with a breakthrough in negotiations between the LDP and the Japanese Innovation Party (JIP), the potential for an anti-LDP opposition coalition quickly evaporated.
The new administration has a window of opportunity to present itself as a visionary one with the injection of a new prime minister and the political partnership with the JIP. It has brought the LDP a chance to rebrand itself since the late PM Abe Shinzo handed party leadership to his successors. Takaichi’s has ideological similarities with the late Abe on foreign policy, in addition to the more proactive stance advocated by the JIP on domestic economic reform. This policy convergence may allow Takaichi to act boldly and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOP) vision, which has served as Japan’s central diplomatic vision since its inception in 2016, is the most obvious vehicle for doing so.
Innovating the FOIP
The new Takaichi administration has three distinct choices in its approach to the FOIP.
The most unlikely one would be to scrap it and replace it with something else. Given the longevity and international traction through norm diffusion which the FOIP has shown, this would be counterproductive and hamper and potential for political momentum in the realm of foreign policy.
The second option is to keep the status quo, opting for continuity, as the FOIP already offers a comprehensive approach to Japan’s interests in the Indo-Pacific. It would also present the least amount of effort, needing only to take on the current formulation and run with it. Given that this formula has been a proven success, this would be a low-risk but low-reward scenario
The third would be an evolution of the FOIP, building upon the previous formulations by both inculcating Takaichi’s own comparative advantages and vision, such as her economic security acumen, to keeping it relevant in the context of current regional dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. For instance, expanding the scope of the FOIP to include the promotion of Taiwan as a global public good.
Another promising and critical avenue involves deepening cooperation with ASEAN countries—notably, Takaichi’s chosen destination for her first official visit as prime minister. While ASEAN has adopted its own “Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” incorporating FOIP vocabulary, its approach remains notably more cautious and ambivalent. Given that Japan’s ally the United States and strategic partners like Australia, New Zealand, and European stakeholders have already embraced Japan’s FOIP vision, Tokyo should prioritize engaging regional players who remain uncommitted. This engagement could materialize through security initiatives, including expanded Official Security Assistance (OSA) programs and capacity-building efforts with selected countries, alongside enhanced cybersecurity cooperation. Additionally, Japan shares significant interests with ASEAN members in disaster prevention, combating illegal fishing, and strengthening maritime domain awareness—areas that offer practical entry points for deeper collaboration beyond traditional security frameworks.
FOIP as a foreign policy tool
US President Donald Trump, keeping with the expectations of what the LDP presidency means, congratulated Takaichi on Truth Social as soon as she became the new leader of LDP on becoming Japan’s 104th Prime Minister. Takaichi, writing on X, thanked Trump for his words and continued by wishing for continued cooperation in upholding a free and open Indo-Pacific, highlighting the ubiquitousness of the framework.
Although the conceptual underpinnings of the FOIP can be traced at least all the way back 2007 under Abe’s first stint as prime minister, Yoichi Hosoya labels this loose conceptual constellation FOIP 1.0. It would not become a declared policy until almost 10 years later, in 2016, which can be seen as FOIP 2.0. In 2018, it was rebranded as a vision rather than a strategy, to make it more appealing in light of accusations of it being anti-China. Stephen Nagy and Nanae Baldauff argue that FOIP 3.0 emerged in 2023 under then Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, who framed it through four conceptual pillars that capture Japan’s core interests in the region. These are (1) sovereignty, rules, transparency and dialogue, (2) collaborative solutions to regional issues such as disaster prevention and environmental resilience, (3) connectivity and infrastructure as well as (4) expanded maritime security and capacity building.
FOIP 4.0?
As a legacy of the second Abe administration, FOIP has been sustained and developed by later government but, to remain relevant, it must be kept up to date as realities of economics, security, and politics in the region change. As Japan sees a new prime minister for the fourth time in five years, a revamped FOIP 4.0 stressing the points above may prove one of the ingredients for a stable government, offering a clear vision of Japan and its role, something the previous administration struggled with. Given Takaichi’s claim as successor to the late Abe in terms of foreign policy, this is a no-brainer and opportunity to present a convincing vision for a future of Japan as a key player in the Indo-Pacific region.
As Kazuto Suzuki notes, however, the conditions which Japan is faced with are substantially different from those of 2012, when Abe returned to power. Japan faces an increasingly dire demographic situation and an economic that has remained stagnant despite efforts by Takaihchi’s predecessors. The new aforementioned coalition with the JIP may, however, open up new windows as the LDP no longer has to adhere to the pacifist inclinations of its former coalition partner Komeito. Despite a more challenging environment, both domestically and internationally, a “Takichification” of the FOIP may inject well needed energy into a fresh administration that needs all the momentum it can get.
PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.
William Winberg ([email protected]) is a PhD Candidate, Japanese government (MEXT) research scholar and teaching assistant at the International Christian University, Tokyo. He is the Indo-Pacific Policy Dialogue event coordinator for the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies (YCAPS), part of Pacific Forum’s Young Leaders Program as well as Regional Research Associate at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC).
Photo: Prime Minister Takaichi speaking on Official Security Assistance (OSA) as a part of the FOIP evolution at the Japan-ASEAN Summit || Credit: Cabinet Public Affairs Office