India’s formal entry into the Pax Silica framework in February 2026 marks a decisive shift in its geopolitical posture from cautious equidistance to selective technological alignment. By embedding itself within a US anchored semiconductor and AI ecosystem, New Delhi has taken a calculated step toward accessing advanced technology networks that will accelerate its rise in an era where computing power and chip supply chains define strategic influence. But this alignment comes with embedded asymmetries; it would be naïve to see Pax Silica as merely a cooperative framework. It has the potential to become an architecture of control designed to secure trusted supply chains while restricting access to adversaries. In such systems, hierarchy is typically structural with decision-making concentrated at the core. For India, the greatest risk is not being left out but being incorporated on unequal terms.
The danger lies in mistaking access for autonomy. Participation in advanced supply chains does not automatically translate into technological sovereignty. Without a deliberate strategy, India risks being confined to lower the lower end of the value chain, such as assembly, testing, and packaging (ATP), and market consumption while remaining dependent on external actors for high-end design, fabrication, and AI computing capacity (or “compute”). In effect, it could trade one form of dependence for another, replacing China-centric vulnerabilities for Western ones.
India must therefore move beyond traditional notions of non-alignment and embrace “networked strategic autonomy.” This is not about disengagement but about structuring interdependence on favorable terms. This requires India to leverage Pax Silica for capability acquisition while at the same time diversifying partnerships, investing in domestic ecosystems, and retaining policy independence in areas such as export controls, digital governance, and critical technology regulation. Equally important is India’s role as a rule-shaper. If Pax Silica evolves into a bloc that sets standards, New Delhi must take care that it has a seat at the decision- and policy-forming table to set the agenda for AI and semiconductor security and supply chain governance. Otherwise, it risks becoming a rule-follower in a system that will increasingly govern the global technological order. Done correctly, Pax Silica offers India a pathway to the frontlines of the 21st century’s most consequential technological competition.
For a country like India, still developing its semiconductor and AI capabilities, Pax Silica clearly offers relief from earlier “Tier 2” restrictions that limited access to high-performance GPUs and constrained domestic AI development. In effect, it opens the door to scale. Yet, this access carries the risk of an autonomy deficit. India could risk slipping into a “subcontractor trap” in which it supplies data, talent, and market depth while control over intellectual property, advanced fabrication, and high-end design remain with the West. The problem could be structural, because if India remains dependent for compute and fabrication—while contributing primarily at the lower end—its strategic leverage will remain limited.
Data sovereignty presents another non-negotiable front for India. While Pax Silica encourages cross-border data flows, India’s Digital Personal Data Protection Act of 2023 must remain the governing authority over any data involving Indian citizens. Further, integration into global data pipelines should not dilute domestic jurisdiction regardless of where the data is being processed. It is possible that complying with Pax Silica’s collaborative monitoring framework risks exposing highly sensitive national infrastructure data. This includes insights into grid topology, peak loads, operational data, and energy allocation priorities, which could reveal critical grid vulnerabilities to external parties.
Similarly, India must preserve autonomy in export controls. The Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies (SCOMET) framework is India’s national export control list and regulatory framework for dual-use goods with both civilian and military applications which may be used as weapons of mass destruction. This framework reflects a country agnostic about multilateralism—as well as alignment with unilateral export control regimes—which risks constraining India’s ability to engage with longstanding partners such as Russia and Iran without exposing it to the threat of secondary sanctions. As Indian firms integrate deeper into a US-anchored semiconductor and AI ecosystem it is possible that they would become subject to extraterritorial reach of US export control laws irrespective of their compliance with SCOMET. This, in other words, could create a “compliance trap” resulting in “regulatory friction” where Indian firms may be compliant with domestic law but may become vulnerable to extraterritorial US enforcement.
Finally, the task for India should be to convert access into capability. Pax Silica can be a catalyst but needs to be accompanied by deliberate capacity building. To safeguard its long-term interests, India will have to make sovereign choices across critical technological domains. This begins with the ability to develop indigenous architectures and standards. Initiatives such as Atmanirbhar Bharat and India First lose strategic meaning if coalition frameworks implicitly lock India into reliance on US certified cloud systems or chip providers for AI training and deployment. Technological alignment cannot come at the cost of design independence. Equally vital is the protection of critical infrastructure. As AI systems become embedded in sectors such as energy, demands for standardization could extend into sensitive areas like grid monitoring, potentially exposing critical data and operational vulnerabilities. India must preserve the right to reject frameworks that enable external visibility into such systems.
Ultimately, India’s leverage within Pax Silica lies in its vast consumer market, deep design talent, access to critical minerals and an emerging leadership role in next-generation technologies such as 6G. These are not the attributes of a junior partner but of a system-shaping actor capable of mediating between competing technological blocs. A country of such capabilities can and should structure alignment on equitable terms.
For India to realize its ambition of becoming a Viksit Bharat (“Developed India) by 2047 it must ensure that its technological foundations are built on negotiated strength, where integration enhances sovereignty rather than eroding it. Negotiation, it must be noted, is a quality India has displayed many times in the recent past.
Rami Niranjan Desai ([email protected]) is an anthropologist and a scholar of South Asia and the Indo Pacific. She is a columnist and author and presently Distinguished Fellow at India Foundation, New Delhi.
The author acknowledges the use of AI tools in editing, but the ideas remain their own and the content has been evaluated to ensure accuracy and originality.
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