Introduction

Amid the global complexity and uncertainty, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), along with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) jointly established a new geometric framework during their meeting in May 2025 known as the “ASEAN-GCC-China Summit.” This is the first time that ASEAN has expanded its partnership mechanism to include its partner country, China, and a regional grouping, the GCC, which consists of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. At both the ASEAN-GCC-China Summit and the 38th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim highlighted ASEAN’s strong economic synergies with China. From that foundation, ASEAN is reaching out to new players like the oil-rich Gulf states to widen its strategic footprint and embrace a more outward-looking agenda.

The ASEAN + 1 + 1 Framework: ASEAN-GCC-China Cooperation

At first glance, the ASEAN-GCC-China cooperation appears to be primarily centered on economic engagement among the three parties. And it is not misplaced – the joint statement emphasizes economic integration based on the rules-based multilateral economic system that is open, inclusive, and transparent to address the rise of global uncertainty and weaponization of trade. Each of the trio wields economic strength, which amounted to over USD 23.7 trillion in 2023, or 22.3% of the world’s GDP. However, trilateral cooperation stretches the ambition beyond economic integration.

For instance, the joint statement of the ASEAN-GCC-China Summit delineated the trio’s objective in energy cooperation, which outlined the commitment to establish joint infrastructure, supply chain, technology, and market stability with the focus on sustainability and long-term collaboration. Moreover, the trio also stressed the importance of people-to-people connections, focusing on tourism cooperation, cultural exchanges, and educational collaboration with alignment to the ASEAN priority initiatives such as the ASEAN 2045 vision and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, other long-term plans such as connectivity, digital transformation and innovation, and food and agriculture cooperation were also devised among the trio to signal the long-term ambition of the trilateral.

More importantly, this cooperation positioned ASEAN as a hub between East and West Asia. By design, the three-party collaboration formed a vast market triangle and strategically reinforced ASEAN’s relevance as it brings both China and the GCC into the ASEAN-led framework. Through this metric, the association is utilizing its strong economic ties with China to stretch its outreach beyond its traditional Asia-Pacific sphere to the Gulf, thereby integrating a new regional grouping for multilateral strength. Therefore, instead of isolating China or aligning with Beijing’s vision, this ASEAN + 1 + 1 model is a de-risking strategy of diluting any one power’s dominance by inviting multipolar interactions. 

Built from the existing formats, such as the ASEAN + 3 and ASEAN + 6 models, the ASEAN + 1 + 1 geometry consisted of two vital implications for the regional grouping. Firstly, the model showcased ASEAN’s hedging strategy to diversify and de-risk its market supply chain through deepening ties with the GCC nations to mitigate the risk posed by the tariff hike set by the United States, rather than going all out on China. ASEAN is betting on multilateral economic insurance in which it keeps Beijing close, but not as a lone patron, while enmeshing the Gulf states to balance ASEAN’s alternative options and bargaining power. 

Secondly, in the fragmented multilateralism with a vulnerable economic network due to free trade weaponization for unilateral interest, the model advanced ASEAN centrality as the irreplaceable platform for order-building in the multipolar Asia-Pacific – the one that is based on the regional economic values, not unilateral purposes. The model combined the strengths of ASEAN and the two participants to create a vast opportunity for infrastructure, energy, and digital economic development. In the case of ASEAN-GCC-China cooperation, each participant of the trio consisted of their individual participating strength. As posited in May 2025 by Dr. Oh Ei Sun, a principal advisor at the Pacific Research Center of Malaysia, “China has the technology, GCC the money, and ASEAN the market,” which could reinforce cooperation that is resistant to the abrupt change in the geopolitical economic landscape brought upon by inward-looking and protectionist movements.

The Reality Check

While it is too soon to evaluate the trilateral’s success or failure, structural and systematic challenges of the three-way cooperation could be speculated through the realist and liberalist schools of thought. Through a realist lens, the imbalance of power and the coherence among the trio could be one possible challenge for the trilateral down the road. Although the ASEAN-GCC-China format was able to connect East and West Asia through ASEAN, the coalition is still a loose aspiration. China, the GCC, and ASEAN possess different priorities, in which the GCC could assert more emphasis on the Middle East affairs, China pursues its global strategic objectives, and ASEAN concentrates on practical cooperation. Therefore, the ASEAN + 1 + 1 metric, with ASEAN’s consensus-based approach along with China’s strong geopolitical and economic heft as well as the GCC’s wealthy energy hegemony, could result in ASEAN having the driver’s seat rhetoric but a backseat in practice.

Through the liberalist perspective, a strong framework such as the ASEAN-GCC-China cooperation requires a strong institutional legal framework with shared rules and norms for a win-win economic integration. At the current setting, decisions are made chiefly at high-level summits, including setting the group’s broad goals. This could be a good platform for outlining priorities but could also fall short on having a significant breakthrough due to coordination deficit without formal working groups, binding agreements, specific timeline, which makes converting plans into actions difficult. 

Furthermore, the ASEAN-GCC-China summit was convened amid the U.S. tariff hikes as a way to strengthen economic resilience and hedge against protectionism. This reactive motive signals the urgency for a short-term economic relief strategy rather than a long-term commitment to deep economic integration reform, despite the partnership being fixated on responding to the global uncertainty. Therefore, credible commitment issues could come into play once the U.S. were to remove the tariffs or if the global economic conditions shift.

Conclusion

It is without a doubt that the ASEAN + 1 + 1 formula and the ASEAN-GCC-China trilateral have their own foreseeable drawbacks. Structural issues, related to power asymmetries and conflicting priorities among the three actors, as well as institutional issues, such as the inadequate coordination and implementation mechanism, could undermine the credibility of the group’s long-term commitment. 

In spite of that, the new ASEAN + 1 + 1 formula and the ASEAN-GCC-China cooperation are still in their initial stage; it is imperative to allow these mechanisms sufficient time to mature and evolve to realize their full potential. This configuration does not only de-risk ASEAN from any power domination in the grouping but also cements its centrality by drawing in new partners and expanding its presence beyond the Asia-Pacific. If it succeeds, the formula could pave the way for future partners, such as South Korea, Japan, Australia, and many others, to adopt and establish similar frameworks that connect ASEAN with other multilateral groupings, which would further enforce ASEAN centrality as East Asia’s largest multilateral institution in the long run. 

Bunly Ek is a Young Leader for the Pacific Forum and a Researcher at the Cambodian Center for Regional Studies (CCRS). He is the 2022 Global Korea Scholarship (GKS) graduate at Yonsei University in the Republic of Korea. His research interest focuses on ASEAN – U.S. Relations and Northeast Asia security dynamics. Email: [email protected]

Photo: Leaders from ASEAN, the GCC, and China link traditional ASEAN cross–handshake at the Kuala Lumpur Summit. Credit: ASEAN Official Website.