July 17, 2023

“Within a day, with not a single shot fired and not a drop of blood seen; the ‘armed rebellion’ that attracted global attention was settled.”

That’s how one Chinese news commentary described the Wagner incident that shook Russia. However, in the aftermath of the short-lived uprising, views in China remain diverse and often conflicting.

A view from Beijing

The official response from China has been muted. In a two-line statement, the foreign ministry described the incident as “Russia’s internal affair” and assured of China’s support in helping Moscow “maintain its stability and achieve development and prosperity,” reaffirming its “good neighborliness” and “Comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for the New Era” with Russia. Other opinions, particularly in the media, have been more reflective of the situation.

The hawkish Global Times took shots at the “wishful thinking of the West.” Citing Chinese international relations experts Wang Yiwei and Cui Heng, the report denied that Wagner’s call to move to Moscow constituted an “armed rebellion,” instead calling it a mere display of dissatisfaction with the ruling regime. It further stated that the Kremlin’s ability to stop the revolt within 24 hours refutes any claims of Putin growing weak, calling such analysis one of the many “cognitive warfare” tactics of the West fanning “anti-Russia sentiment” or stemming from ignorance of Russian politics. A report in the People’s Daily similarly credited strong public support to the Russian government as a major factor in defusing the crisis.

However, such assurances have failed to calm Chinese investors, particularly in the energy sector, who rushed to stop shipments as the news of the revolt broke out. Others in the media display similar concerns. An editorial in the China Daily described the situation as an “uneasy calm” which displays Russia’s socio-economic and political problems and contradictions—specifically stemming from the use of private mercenaries—that have come to the fore since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

While the reasons for the mutiny are assessed as ranging from heavy losses incurred during the prolonged war, failure to demilitarize Ukraine, demands for more cash, tussles with the Russian Ministry of Defense and Prigozhin’s own political ambitions; one surpasses all—the Russian defense ministry’s order to incorporate all private mercenaries under its command by July 1. Talking to China’s Observer, military expert Song Zhongping noted that Prigozhin feared losing power and, as the deadline neared, decided to wage a mutiny. While all commentaries criticize Moscow’s overreliance on private mercenaries as “getting caught in one’s own cocoon” (zuojian zifu 作茧自缚), Song stated that Wagner did play an unparalleled role in the war. Being a private military company independent of the state, Wagner took losses without impacting the legitimacy of the Russian state nor its purse.

Though Putin’s political acumen and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s diplomatic skill in handling the crisis have been hailed, many in China believe that the dust is not yet fully settled. Talking to Sina News, Geng Xin noted that the Wagner fiasco was not a “false alarm” as many “contradictions” continue to lurk.

First and foremost being the dilemma in Russia on whether it sees itself as part of the East or the West. Such a phenomenon is coupled with a poor record of economic development, with the Russian political elite’s miscalculations that a return to the former “glory” of the Soviet Union is possible. Another contradiction is the underestimation of Ukraine’s potential to fight back and the disastrous decision to go to war. Third, the lack of an effective military system which allows too much space for private mercenaries poses a major challenge. Fourth, the phenomenon of “chaos giving birth to heroes” (luan shi chu xiaoxiong 乱世出枭雄) i.e. when all political, social, and economic contradictions elevate inequality to the extent that produces men prone to revolt like Prigozhin.

Moreover, Prigozhin not only refused to surrender but openly defied Vladimir Putin by describing Wagner soldiers as “true patriots.” Talking to The Observer, Tan Dekai noted that many in Russia see Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu as a product of the oligarchic system and do not think he is fit for the job. Being a war hero, Prigozhin enjoys popularity, but Russians do not favor him as a leader. The continued presence of several private military forces such as those held by Gazprom is seen as a threat for China since a divided Russia ruled by warlords would invite external forces, particularly the United States, to intervene. Another commentary in Sina News described the incident as the “biggest gray rhino” since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine War, a term Xi Jinping used in his 20th Party Congress Report to refer to unexpected security threats.

Whither the Ukraine war?

Russia has clarified that this incident will not impact the “special military operation” in Ukraine. But many in China are not so sure. The Paper, a Shanghai-based publication, noted that Prigozhin has destabilized the two main arteries of Russia’s military offensive, Rostov Oblast in South and Voronezh Oblast in North. A war between Wagner and the Russian military would have been disastrous but, even with the crisis averted, dealing with the demobilized soldiers and ensuring their loyalty in Prigozhin’s absence would be an uphill task. Beijing is also worried about the misuse of Moscow’s nuclear arsenal. As Ukraine’s counteroffensive intensifies, many in China believe Putin did the right thing to negotiate with Prigozhin, but will he come out stronger? They say he would, but this is dampened by concerns of entrenched problems in post-Soviet Russian society. Analysts in Moscow share similar beliefs. Talking to Russia Today, Dmitry Trenin described the deal as nothing short of a miracle, specifically as concerns were high over a lack of opposition against Prigozhin’s march into Rostov-on-Don and on to Moscow. Vladimir Bruter noted that the incident has heavily tarnished Moscow’s international image and a prolonged warfare with Ukraine would be “too optimistic” to expect. He believes that the need of the hour is to formulate a consistent plan for the military operation.

But will Putin end the war? As of now, no. He would like to deal with the internal challenges to his authority that the incident has exposed and making a move to negotiate first would be equal to conceding defeat.

“No limits” no more?

While Beijing has reaffirmed that its “comprehensive strategic partnership” with Russia in its official statement, opinions reflect that a prolonged war with growing aggression from private military groups is bad news. The main reason behind supporting Russia remains the challenge Moscow presents to the expanding influence of Western liberal ideas that China views as a threat and Beijing’s own sovereignty concerns over Taiwan. However, it will never allow any partnership, no matter how “comprehensive,” to derail economic development that robs Beijing’s international significance and tarnishes the image of the Communist Party at home. Neither can it afford to send military troops in support of Moscow and face Western sanctions. The idea remains to engage so far as the relationship remains profitable but as the tides turn unfavorable, Beijing finds itself caught in the quagmire.

China is hence highly likely to reassess its “no limits” partnership with Moscow, but without an official announcement, just as support for Russia was never explicitly committed to. Beijing is likely to push ahead its peace plan for ending the war once again before Washington does but how well China succeeds depends on to what extent Putin agrees to listen to Beijing, for he certainly has bigger ambitions and far less at stake.

The incident however presents a flickering hope for the United States and China to restart dialogue. Analysts in China agree that ensuring stability in nuclear-armed Russia and bringing the war to an end are concerns Beijing shares with Washington.

Instability in Russia is a mounting concern which China finds hard to address on its own. If sincere attempts to end the war do spring from Beijing, the United States must be ready to work with China. However, for that to happen, Beijing must tone down its prerequisites for dialogue with Washington that have blocked all high-level attempts at thawing the ice. The Wagner incident could facilitate what diplomatic negotiations so far have failed to achieve.

Cherry Hitkari ([email protected]) is a Non-resident Vasey Fellow and Young Leader at Pacific Forum.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo credit: Wagner Group boss Yevgeny Prigozhin in St. Petersburg, Russia, for the funeral of one of his fighters who died in Ukraine, December 24, 2022. AP

July 13, 2023

An earlier version of this article appeared in The National Interest.

For more from this author, please see his recent chapter of Comparative Connections.

Over the last few weeks, Washington has been abuzz with everything India. On June 22, President Joe Biden, cabinet secretaries, and the U.S. Congress gave a rousing reception to the visiting Indian prime minister Narendra Modi. For his part, the prime minister cheered Republican and Democratic congressmen with his quip that he could “help them reach bipartisan consensus,” referring to the across-the-aisle support India enjoys in Washington.

It was certainly an apt decision to honor the Indian leader, given that the U.S.-India partnership has significantly expanded under President Biden. Both the White House and several members of the Biden administration, from the National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan to the Indo-Pacific Coordinator Kurt Campbell, have characterized it as the “most important bilateral relationship of the twenty-first century.”

However, over the last few months, some of the Biden administration’s regional policies in the Indo-Pacific have done more harm to its partners, particularly India and its geopolitical leverage in the Indo-Pacific region. 

The Biden administration’s foreign policy cut a significant departure from its predecessors until last month, returning to Washington’s old ways: myopic democratic interventions, benevolent outreach to adversarial nations, and partisan bickering. Over the last few weeks, Washington’s primary Indo-Pacific partners, India and Japan, have borne the brunt of these missteps.

President Biden, in a last-minute change of plans, canceled his scheduled trip to Papua New Guinea and Australia to address the debt-ceiling crisis in Washington, with Republicans stalling the Democrats from raising the debt ceiling levels. While Secretary of State Anthony Blinken went ahead with his trip to Papua New Guinea and signed a crucial defense agreement with the Pacific Island nation, Biden canceling that leg of the tour was not the best messaging to a region increasingly falling under China’s orbit.

Nonetheless, Prime Minister Modi went ahead with his travel itinerary as scheduled and turned it into an opportunity to showcase India’s position on the global stage. New Guinea’s president hailed Modi as the leader of the Global South. Taking an implicit jab at the United States and China, the island-nation leader said, “we are victims of global powerplay, and you [Modi] are the leader of Global South. We will rally behind your leadership at global forums.” Prior to Biden’s cancellation, the Indian government had decided to accommodate his visit and cut short their visits as a courtesy to the incoming American presidential delegation.

While this was a minor setback for a coordinated approach toward Chinese expansionism in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean challenge is a more geopolitically complex Gordian knot.

In mid-May, Blinken threatened Bangladesh with sanctions if the Indian Ocean state did not host free and fair elections in the 2024 poll. Suppose the United States were to follow through with its threat. In that case, India and Japan will be in a quandary as they have consistently positioned Bangladesh as a gateway connecting the Indian subcontinent to Southeast Asia for supply chain and infrastructure connectivity initiatives. Geographically, Bangladesh is nestled between India’s state of Bengal to the west and India’s northeastern provinces to the east, bordering a thin strip of land the connects the rest of India to the northeast (also known as the “chicken’s neck”). Thus the densely populated country’s interaction with the rest of the world is directed through India or the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.

Both New Delhi and Tokyo have invested in infrastructure in the region and have long-term plans to invest in Dhaka’s growth. Recently, Japan and India agreed to jointly develop the Matabari deep-sea port in Bangladesh to serve as a “strategic anchor” in the Indian Ocean. Though often underreported, Japanese investment plays a vital role in South Asian development. It is also undeniably India’s Northeast region’s major infrastructure and development partner. Through the Bay of Bengal-Northeast India Industrial Value Chain, the Japanese government envisions increased connectivity between India’s landlocked northeast and Southeast Asia, creating a single economic zone and an alternative trade connectivity project to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida articulating his government’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy in New Delhi in early March this year, called for increased integration of India’s Northeast with Bangladesh to transform the region into a single economic zone.

Moreover, Japan is attempting to capture the businesses moving out of the pricier markets of Southeast Asia, using the Bay of Bengal region. Japan’s regional strategy has neatly complemented the Modi government’s policies. Modi transformed the older “Look East” policy into an “Act East” policy of increasing strategic and economic engagement with Southeast Asia as a countervailing force to China’s involvement in the region. 

Tokyo has slowly and steadily supported this transformation. A case in point is Tokyo and New Delhi hosting the India-Japan Act East forum to discuss cooperation on a range of projects that will increase connectivity in India’s Northeast to Southeast Asia.

India’s Northeast has a history of civil unrest and strife, making it a challenging region for development. Furthermore, its landlocked topography and poor infrastructure limited its connectivity to both its neighboring countries and the rest of India. Only parties interested in the long game or have a vision for the region could invest in that part of the world, and in this case, it is Japan.

Interestingly, as an extension, both Japan and India are engaging the immediate eastern neighbor to Bangladesh and India, Myanmar. Sanctioned by the United States, Myanmar has limited partners on the world stage. Nonetheless, Japan and India have continued engagement with the military junta to prevent the nation from falling entirely under China’s influence.

However, once again, Indo-Japanese interests are affected by America’s sanctions.

Earlier in May, India-Myanmar inaugurated the Sittwe port in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. India supported this port to enhance sea lane connectivity between India’s eastern states and Myanmar. However, since the sanctions, Indian companies have either had to depart Myanmar altogether or face global scrutiny for working with the military junta-led government.

As satellite images released earlier this year indicated, increased activity on the Great Coco Islands of Myanmar had the markings of Chinese military involvement. Situated less than thirty miles north of India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands, any potential militarization of the Coco Islands by the Chinese could pose a significant threat to India’s security in the Indian Ocean. In this geopolitical equation, India cannot afford to disengage from Myanmar. And yet, America’s economic statecraft is undercutting India’s vital regional partnerships.

Henry Kissinger, who celebrated 100 years last May, summed up this dynamic well, “it may be dangerous to be America’s enemy, but to be America’s friend is fatal.” It is undoubtedly proving so for Japan and India, but more so for New Delhi in the Indian Ocean. 

Against the backdrop of these measures comes the Biden administration’s attempts at thawing relations with China. While Biden departs from his predecessors as the only recent president to not ask for Kissinger’s advice, he is beginning to walk in the footsteps of a grand strategist by making attempts to mend ties with China.

From the dialogue in Vienna to Blinken rescheduling his trip to Beijing for last month to the official abandonment of economic “decoupling” for the less confrontational “de-risking,” Washington’s approach to China shows signs of softening. While members of IPEF agreed on moving ahead with a supply chain agreement in Detroit, in the same week, on the sidelines of the APEC meeting, U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai met with her Chinese counterpart to discuss trade and economic ties. Washington’s blow-hot and blow-cold approach does not assure allies and partners of the consistency of its priorities and policies, particularly partners that it courts for strategic competition with China.

Furthermore, Washington’s skewed sanction policies toward democratic backsliding in a few states while calling for engagement with authoritarian China raise questions about the motives of such policies. While the United States has sanctioned Chinese officials allegedly involved in human rights abuses in Xinjiang, it continues to do massive business with Beijing. This selective condemnation only further isolates partners and strengthens Chinese engagement with the sanctioned nations.

Director for Regional Affairs at the Pacific Forum, Rob York, called this misbegotten strategy “a holdover from America’s unipolar moment that we [America] need to outgrow. America’s moral authority, and the benefits of aligning with Washington, are no longer assumed but must be competed for, and sanctions must be employed far more judiciously than they have been.”

This type of awakening to multipolar realities of the world order should inform Washington of the pitfalls and shortsightedness of its foreign policies. America’s sanctions and other tools of economic statecraft should not be used for democratic interventions but to deter its enemies. If not, the United States will have few allies in its strategic competition with China.

Akhil Ramesh ([email protected]) is a Senior Fellow at the Pacific Forum and author of the US-India chapter for Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal of Bilateral Relations in the Indo-Pacific.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: President Joe Biden and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi walk along the Colonnade to the Oval Office after a state arrival ceremony Thursday on the South Lawn of the White House.Stefani Reynolds / Pool via AP

July 12, 2023

Issues & Insights is Pacific Forum’s publication series that includes special reports (SR), conference reports (CR), and working papers (WP). These in-depth analyses cover a range of topics and are published on an occasional basis. The following have been published in 2023 and are available online here.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR1 — Toward a Unified NATO Response to the People’s Republic of China

By Rob York

Following the Cold War’s end there were those who questioned NATO’s continued relevance. Such views may have found little currency among scholars of foreign policy and security, but among the general public it was not unheard of to wonder why, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 its rival organization did not also become defunct, especially given the Russian Federation’s friendlier tilt in the decade that followed. On the part of the United States, by the 2010’s a fatigue had settled in among much of the populace over US foreign commitments, especially regarding partner countries not perceived as pulling their own weight. By the middle of that decade, that fatigue had begun to manifest itself in US election results.

Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and its brazen invasion of Ukraine last year may not have succeeded in bringing Ukraine to heel or establishing Moscow as a great military power again, but it did accomplish two other things. For one, it demonstrated for the world what the countries separated by the Atlantic could achieve—even indirectly—by helping partners (even non-NATO members) acquire the means to defend themselves. For another, and for all Putin’s claims to the contrary, it showed that nations near Russia’s western border have a very good reason for wanting NATO membership. Putin, more so than any mainstream American or continental European security scholar, has demonstrated the alliance’s continued relevance in providing for the security of countries that desire self-determination and alignment with the liberal, rules-based international order.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR2 — The World After Taiwan’s Fall

By David Santoro and Ralph Cossa

Let us start with our bottom line: a failure of the United States to come to Taiwan’s aid—politically, economically, and militarily—would devastate the Unites States’ credibility and defense commitments to its allies and partners, not just in Asia, but globally. If the United States tries but fails to prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan, the impact could be equally devastating unless there is a concentrated, coordinated U.S. attempt with like-minded allies and partners to halt further Chinese aggression and eventually roll back Beijing’s ill-gotten gains.

This is not a hypothetical assessment. Taiwan has been increasingly under the threat of a military takeover by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and, even today, is under attack politically, economically, psychologically, and through so-called “gray zone” military actions short of actual combat. The U.S. government, U.S. allies, and others have begun to pay attention to this problem, yet to this day, they have not sufficiently appreciated the strategic implications that such a takeover would generate. To address this problem, the Pacific Forum has conducted a multi-authored study to raise awareness in Washington, key allied capitals, and beyond about the consequences of a Chinese victory in a war over Taiwan and, more importantly, to drive them to take appropriate action to prevent it.

The study, which provides six national perspectives on this question (a U.S., Australian, Japanese, Korean, Indian, and European perspective) and fed its findings and recommendations into the second round of the DTRA SI-STT-sponsored (and Pacific Forum-run) Track 2 “U.S.-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue,”[1] outlines these strategic implications in two alternative scenarios. In the first scenario, China attacks Taiwan and it falls with no outside assistance from the United States or others. In the other scenario, Taiwan falls to China despite outside assistance (i.e., “a too little, too late” scenario).

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, WP1 — Why Gender Balance Matters for Equity and Peace in the Indo-Pacific 

By Maryruth Belsey Priebe

Who shows up at events and conferences matters. Public and closed-door events are where successes and failures are analyzed; where conceptions about security, what it means, and how we can achieve it bump up against one another; and where problems are solved in novel ways. The greater the diversity of perspectives, the more powerful the outcomes. But within the security sector, predominantly all-male panels—or “manels”—suggest a lack of gender diversity, resulting in the exclusion of women, people of non-binary identities, or both. Manels represent a more serious lack of gender inclusion at leadership levels, making it difficult for women to gain recognition through promotion to senior decision-making positions. The following is a discussion of Pacific Forum’s work to study more than nine years of programming with a goal of understanding historical trends in order to implement and measure policies to increase the number of women attending and speaking at Pacific Forum events. The analysis identified room for improvement, and marks a jumping-off point for Pacific Forum’s work on mainstreaming gender within institutional programming.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, WP2 — Digital China: The Strategy and Its Geopolitical Implications 

By David Dorman and John Hemmings

Over the past few years, there has been growing concern inside the United States, Europe, and in the Indo-Pacific on the strategic direction behind China’s technology policies. Beginning with the debate over 5G and Huawei, this debate has covered Artificial Intelligence (AI), quantum teachnology, and semi-conductors – a foundational technology. And despite a large number of policies in place – Made in China: 2025, Cyber Super Power, and the New Generation AI Development Plan – few in the West have known China’s overall digital grand strategy.

This report discusses the rise and current state of “Digital China,” a strategy supported by General Secretary Xi Jinping to make China more competitive against the West through digital transformation. It has become the overarching strategy for digital development in the eyes of the Chinese Communist Party leadership, surpassing other initiatives like the Digital Silk Road and 5G. Digital China aims to challenge the existing global system and has profound implications for China’s development, great power competition, and international norms. The Party leadership has incorporated “data” into its digital economy, creating a concept called “Digital Marxism.” The strategy also seeks to foster innovation through the digital transformation of tools, talent, and learning as a means to facilitate China’s rise as a global power and challenge to the West.

The US and its allies have begun to effect strategic counter-effect to the myriad of PRC technology policies, there is almost zero understanding or public discussion of this digital grand strategy. Whether inattention, mistranslation, or obfuscation, Digital China has been mostly missed by the West over the past decade.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR3 — Strategic Competition and Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

By Carl Baker

There is a growing acceptance among countries in the Into-Pacific region that strategic competiiton between the United States and China is changing perceptions about security and the adequacy of the existing security architecture. While some have characterized the competition between the two as a new Cold War, it is clear that what is happening in the region is far more complex than the competition that characterized the original Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. First, the economic integration that has taken place since the early 1990s makes it much more difficult to draw bright ideological lines between the two sides. Further, the Asian context of the emerging competition is one where the two competitors have grown to share power. As the dominant military power, the United States has been the primary security guarantor in Asia and beyond. China, on the other hand, has emerged over the past decades as the primary economic catalyst in Asia and beyond. Currently, each side seems increasingly unwilling to accept that arrangement.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR4 – A History of Shared Values, A Future of Shared Strategic Interests: US-Australia Relations in the Indo-Pacific 

By Rob York

Authors of this volume participated in the inaugural U.S.-Australia Next-Generation Leaders Initiative, sponsored by the U.S. Department of State through the U.S. Embassy in Canberra. With backgrounds from academia, public policy, civil society, and industry, the cohort brings rich insights on the past, present, and future of the U.S.-Australia relations. This program was conducted from February 2021 – September 2021.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, CR1 – South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Emerging US-Japan-Philippines Trilateral 

By Jeffrey Ordaniel

The U.S.-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Maritime Security Dialogue conducted in December 2022 confirmed that there is very little difference in threat perceptions regarding the East and South China Seas. The three countries view China’s increasingly assertive claims to the territories and maritime zones in the two bodies of water as antithetical to their shared vision of a free, open, rules-based Indo-Pacific. China’s reapid military expansion, including unprecedented nuclear weapons and missile buildup, reinforces the urgency of the threat. Japanese and Philippine interlocutors worry that as China approaches nuclear parity with the United States, the region’s strategic environment will worsen. American participants emphasized greater and tangible demonstration of alliance commitments and agreed that some risk-taking is required to push back against Chinese coercion. There was a consensus about the challenge of addressing Beijing’s gray zone activities that have so far succeeded in seizing territories and maritime areas in the South China Sea and establishing regular intrusions into Japanese waters in the East China Sea. Participants struggled to find a strategy to blunt China’s salami-slicing tactics while avoiding escalation and armed conflict.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, WP3 – Understanding JI Resilience and Australia’s Counterterrorism Efforts in Indonesia

By Tom Connolly

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) remains one of Indonesia’s longest standing state security threats. It has survived major organizational transformations, state security crackdowns, and international military operations in its pursuit of an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia that could extend to incorporate Malaysia, Singapore, and the southern Philippines. Jemaah Islamiyah rose to prominence for its role in orchestrating the 2002 Bali Bombings, which prompted the United States and Australia to engage Jakarta with the shared goal of destroying the organization and its links to al-Qaeda. Security pressures from Indonesian security services and international forces led to the dismantling of much of Jemaah Islamiyah’s leadership by 2007, which pushed it into a state of hibernation, where members focused on consolidating numbers and religious outreach. The emergence of the Islamic State and its Southeast Asian affiliates in 2014 occupied much of the Indonesian security services’ resources, which gave space to Jemaah Islamiyah to regenerate its strength with renewed vigor. The 2017 discovery of a JI military training program in Syria re-alerted Indonesian counterterrorism authorities to the risk posed by the group, and successive waves of arrests and crackdowns ensued. Although the COVID-19 pandemic meant that many terrorist groups ceased offensive operations and maintained a low profile, Jemaah Islamiyah began to infiltrate Jakarta’s state apparatus, civil society, and academia to promote its political objectives. Jemaah Islamiyah’s long history in Indonesia has proven it to be adaptable, patient, and persistent in pursuit of its objectives. Although it is not currently engaged in military operations, JI’s long history in Indonesia has shown the group is adaptable, patient, and long-term in its thinking. Observers suspect that leaders in Jemaah Islamiyah are biding their time and seeking gaps in state authority that they can exploit to pursue their organizational goals.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR5 – ROK-US Alliance: Linchpin for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

By Rob York

The US-ROK alliance in 2023 celebrates its 70^th anniversary, and in both countries remains broadly popular. Previous doubts that both countries have had about the other’s commitment have largely given way to a sense of shared opportunities, and shared challenges. Not only is there an ever-more belligerent North Korea, with its growing nuclear and missile arsenals, but the People’s Republic of China uses both military and economic means to coerce other countries and Russia has demonstrated a willingness to upend norms, redraw borders, and dare former partners (including Seoul) to risk its ire.

This is also an era of the minilateral, as the US seeks to move past its previous hub-and-spokes alliance system in Asia and draw its partners into closer cooperation. South Korea, especially under its current administration, demonstrates increased interest in becoming a regional player, with its recent gestures toward old frenemy Japan representing a key test: historical differences between the US’ two closest partners have prevented a “normal” relationship from emerging despite many similarities in political systems, values, and interests, and Korean public opinion remains skeptical of the Seoul-Tokyo rapprochement. Furthermore, there is always a chance that issues complicating US-ROK relations in the past—conduct by US military personnel in Korea, trade disputes, environmental concerns related to US bases—could resurface.

All of these issues present challenges for the alliance that will require addressing. In that light, the Pacific Forum, with the generous support of the Korea Foundation, has launched the “ROK-US Next Generation Leaders Initiative” program, bringing together young burgeoning scholars and analysts from both countries to discuss pressing issues in the alliance the way forward. This edited volume contains edited papers on pressing topics—extended deterrence, North Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and much more—by rising scholars we expect to see addressing these issues in the years to come. Their active engagement, we believe, will help the alliance endure another 70 years, will providing for the security and prosperity of both countries.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR6 – Pressing Security Concerns in Southeast Asia: Next-Generation Perspectives

By John Hemmings

Southeast Asia is a pivotal sub-region of the Indo-Pacific. Spanning 1,700,000 square miles, its total population is 676 million – around 8.5% of the world’s population – and has a collective GDP of US$3.67 trillion (as of 2022). Over the years, it has been associated with both economic dynamism and significant security challenges. As authors in this volume note, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, disagreements over water rights in the Mekong Delta, and the current conflict in Myanmar highlight fault lines not only between Southeast Asian states themselves, but also between great powers such as China and the United States. There are many more – the EU, India, Japan, Australia, and South Korea – that pay close attention to developments in the sub-region. Maintaining peace and stability in a region that plays host to one-third of global sea-borne trade, hosts major undersea internet cables, and is a major thoroughfare for energy supplies from the Middle East to the advanced manufacturing hubs in China, Japan, and South Korea is both challenging and complicated.

The primary mechanism for engagement with Southeast Asian countries is through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its associated bodies. ASEAN promotes the principle of “ASEAN centrality” to prevent major power interference in the region and retain influence over security cooperation. However, the evolution of institutions and processes associated with ASEAN is lagging behind the pressing nature of regional challenges.

The “ASEAN Way” of informal consultation, non-interference, and consensus has fostered internal cohesion but hindered collective responses to conflicts. ASEAN’s influence is also vulnerable to great powers that can use their leverage to break consensus. While some believe ASEAN will adapt over time, others are skeptical about its ability to maintain its role in regional security.

The essays in the collection cover a broad range of security issues, including traditional and non-traditional ones. Traditional security topics include the South China Sea dispute, the political crisis in Myanmar, and dealing with rising Chinese influence. Non-traditional security issues encompass climate change’s impact on the Philippines and Timor-Leste, human trafficking in Vietnam, and Thailand’s brain drain challenge.

The essays reflect the diverse perspectives and challenges in Southeast Asia. They cover issues that range from well-covered topics to unique perspectives on local variations of international issues. The collection aims to spark regional conversations and discussions on these pressing security issues.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR7 — Southeast Asia’s Clean Energy Transition: A Role for Nuclear Power?

By David Santoro and Carl Baker

To bring clarity on these developments and their implications in Southeast Asia, the Pacific Forum commissioned several Southeast Asian scholars to write analytical papers on the energy transition that is underway in the region, which are compiled in this volume. Each chapter looks at the current and possible future energy landscape of a specific Southeast Asian country and focuses especially on the place and role of nuclear power in it. This “nuclear focus” is important because, for decades, most Southeast Asian countries have expressed on-and-off interest in nuclear power but never brought it online. Interest is now picking up again, especially for SMRs, so if this time one or several Southeast Asian countries successfully went nuclear, it would be a first.

It is good timing, therefore, to devote attention to how Southeast Asian countries are thinking about nuclear power in today’s context, for multiple reasons, including those related to safety, security, and safeguards.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.