August 8, 2023

This PacNet was developed as a part of the United States-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Next-Generation Leaders Dialogue to encourage creative thinking about how this vital partnership can be fostered. 

In December 2022, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration released its “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region” in which ROK will take a leading role as a “Global Pivotal State” to promote the freedom, peace, and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific. To implement the strategy, the next step for the Republic of Korea would be joining the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IP MDA), an initiative that was announced in Quad Leaders’ Tokyo Summit in May 2022.

As an Indo-Pacific nation, South Korea is at a critical juncture where Seoul is required have a delicate balance between addressing the increasing multifaceted challenges in the Indo-Pacific region while also countering threats from DPRK on the Korean peninsula. Fortunately, since South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol took office in May 2022, South Korea, the United States and Japan have conducted trilateral Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and anti-submarine exercises in the East Sea to strengthen deterrence against North Korea’s increased missile threats and agreed to regularize the trilateral exercises during the Defense Trilateral Talks in June 2023.

Nevertheless, Seoul should pay more attention to increasing traditional and transnational security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. Tensions have been rising in the South China Sea as well as the Taiwan Strait which threaten the free and open sea lanes of communication (SLOC) while non-traditional and transnational security challenges at sea including the piracy and armed robbery at sea, trafficking of humans and illicit goods, and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, and climate change are also on rise.

The United States has been leading in promoting the free and open Indo-Pacific through its annual Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations in the South China Sea to demonstrate that no coastal state can unlawfully restrict navigation and overflight rights and freedoms guaranteed in international law. Japan, on the other hand, has advanced maritime surveillance system that is being synchronized and integrated between the coast guard and self-defense force. Whether it is greater naval presence in the Indo-Pacific region or improved maritime surveillance, Seoul has lessons what it means to be a real maritime nation.

While maritime issues were not the main focus of ROK’s Indo-Pacific strategy, it included that Seoul would deepen maritime security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region while adhering to the maritime order based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as participation in the establishment of a maritime domain awareness (MDA) system. Against this backdrop, Seoul should join the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IP MDA) to implement its Indo-Pacific strategy.

Joining IP MDA would help South Korea to enhance its maritime security capabilities by sharing information and collaborating on maritime domain awareness, including monitoring, identifying, and responding to maritime security threats. By joining the IP MDA, Seoul would have access to valuable information and resources to better monitor its maritime domain and protect its interests without having to shift all of its assets originally missioned to countering DPRK threats.

Furthermore, joining IP MDA would also help ROK Navy and Coast Guard to strengthen its regional partnerships and cooperation. By working closely with other countries in the Indo-Pacific region such as Southeast Asian nations, Seoul would be better positioned to address such issues. This could help ROK to build stronger ties with its neighbors and establish its role as a responsible stakeholder demonstrating its commitment to maintaining a rules-based international order and promoting regional stability.

Nevertheless, there are also challenges. One would be the potential impact on South Korea’s relationship with China. China is a major power in the region, and its territorial claims in the South China Sea have been a source of tension with other countries in the region. By joining IP MDA, Seoul may be seen as aligning itself with the US-led efforts to contain China’s influence, which could negatively impact its relationship with Beijing.

To address concerns about its relationship with China, South Korea should emphasize that its partnership with the IP MDA is based on the three principles of cooperation—inclusiveness, trust, and reciprocity. Seoul neither targets nor excludes any specific nation, but rather has made it clear that the Republic of Korea is committed to partnering with like-minded countries that share the universal values of freedom, rule of law, and human rights. To avoid the economic coercion from China as shown by the THAAD deployment in 2017, South Korea can contribute toward “collective resilience” against China’s economic statecraft, by partnering with like-minded countries, and leverage its position as one of the world’s leading manufacturers of advanced semiconductors to complicate China’s calculus.

Another challenge would be the costs of integration of technology. As countries have their own information platforms, as shown by India’s own information center IFC-IOR, standardizing a common operating information with often classified information is not an easy task. However, it is important to note that the MDA is an information sharing platform which deals primarily with maritime surveillance to ensure that maritime activities abide by international law such as UNCLOS, as opposed to the sharing classified military intelligence. Once the information sharing process is standardized, which Seoul should participate in, different agencies will be able to utilize information in a more cost-effective way.

In return, South Korea should also make more investments into commercially available data and existing technologies such as satellites to contribute to make the IP MDA more useful by providing real-time data. Seoul certainly has the capacity to do so, as South Korea ranked eighth among 63 countries in the 2022 IMD World Digital Competitiveness Ranking. The good news is that the Korean Coast Guard has recently announced its plans to allocate its budget to establish the Korean MDA system which would increase the area of surveillance of its territorial sea area by more than four times through introduction of medium-altitude UAVs, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), and AI maritime security support system.

In conclusion, it is time for the Republic of Korea to step up as a “Global Pivotal State” to implement its “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region” by joining the IP MDA. Joining IP MDA would enable ROK to enhance its maritime security capabilities, strengthen regional partnerships and cooperation, and promote a rules-based international order and ultimately, become the Global Pivotal State it aspires to be.

Jeung Seung Lee ([email protected]) is a research associate at the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy (KIMS) in Seoul, South Korea.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo credit: Zhang Long/For China Daily

August 4, 2023

Many analysts and commentators called Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state visit to the United States late last month a historic and defining moment in the India-US relationship. That’s because the agreements unveiled by Prime Minister Modi and US President Joe Biden are, by all accounts, unprecedented in both depth and breadth. They include commitments to strengthening advanced technology cooperation, enhancing the bilateral defense partnership, promoting shared prosperity and people-to-people connections, and showing joint leadership to address key challenges in the Indo-Pacific and on the global stage.

A convergence of interests on various fronts is behind these developments. For starters, the United States and India share numerous similarities. That’s why, in an address to the Asiatic Society back in 2000, former Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee had described this relationship as that of “natural allies.” To be sure, the two countries have never been formal allies. But the operative word in Vajpayee’s statement was “natural,” highlighting the centuries-old tradition of freedom, democracy, openness, pluralism, inclusivity, and liberal political ideas that both countries, on two different continents, steadfastly upheld.

A hegemonic, as opposed to a peaceful, rise of China has also been a cause for concern for both the United States and India. Both appreciate the necessity and opportunity of working together to confront this challenge and build a more inclusive and peaceful multipolar Indo-Pacific. This is also a key driver of stronger US-India cooperation in multilateral forums, notably in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with Australia and Japan.

Beyond counterbalancing China, the United States and India are interested in leveraging their comparative advantages to stand as responsible stakeholders of the changed and changing Indo-Pacific order. They want to expand their joint role as net exporters of public goods both through enhanced cooperation in several functional areas and through closer geographical rapprochement. Traditionally focused on the Pacific side, the United States is now emphasizing the importance of the “Indo” side; it has, in that spirit, renamed the Hawaii-based US Pacific Command the US Indo-Pacific Command. And India is expanding its role beyond South Asia and the Indian Ocean and into ASEAN and the Pacific, having transformed its “Look East” policy into an “Act East” policy, wherein it invests more in Southeast Asia and beyond.

Although based on mutual goodwill and commitment, operationalizing US-India cooperation may be challenging, however, due to at least two potential impediments.

The first is differences between the two countries’ preferred approach to partnership. The United States has long felt more comfortable partnering with countries committed to following its leadership, or countries it has power to shape the thinking and actions. Absent that, it has felt frustrated.

Consider US-France relations; the United States places much value in its alliance relationship with France but also often deems it difficult, in part because Paris is determined to maintain a degree of strategic autonomy. So is New Delhi. Unlike France, India not is a treaty ally of the United States; India never joined military alliances. But, like France, India is a powerful country with an approach to partnership that preserves independence in its strategic thinking and decisions. These fundamental differences in approach could thus complicate implementation of the US-India agenda of work.

The second potential impediment in taking the US-India relationship to the next level is the difficulty of adapting the US and Indian bureaucratic and political systems to permit bilateral cooperation to blossom. High-level attempts to advance a more cooperative relationship, after all, are not new, and history has shown that they have had limited success or failed primarily because of hurdles in the US and Indian internal systems. In each country, bureaucratic hurdles can be maddening, and political hurdles stand as major obstacles, too. For instance, while India’s continued relationship with countries like Russia are viewed negatively by the US establishment, the United States’ support to Pakistan or its unilateral actions in India’s neighbourhood attract the hackles in New Delhi.

What, then, should the United States and India do in the face of these potential impediments?

For starters, both should refine and redefine their traditional approach to partnership. The United States should embrace the idea that partnering with India means working with India, not rallying India behind its leadership. Doing so means accepting that India will remain strategically autonomous and, therefore, that New Delhi will not always see eye-to-eye and could even have deep disagreements with Washington, and that such circumstances should not prevent or jeopardize cooperation so long as the overall benefits outweigh the costs and risks.

Similarly, India should acknowledge that increased cooperation with the world’s preeminent power involves certain give and take, especially at a time of intense strategic competition. Plainly, even as it remains master of its own destiny, India should be clear-eyed that its convergence with the United States is growing and that, as a result, it will have to adapt to this new reality to maintain, let alone further deepen, that relationship.

The United States and India should also work their internal systems relentlessly to remove actual and potential barriers to cooperation. In the immediate term, they should focus on cooperation in geo-economics because there is fertile ground for joint work in this space, while not losing sight of the imperative of working together in geo-strategic areas in the long term.

There has never been a time to be more enthusiastic about the future of the US-India relationship. Potential impediments notwithstanding, this new-found bonhomie is bound to rise to phenomenal heights if the two countries can finetune their objectives in the framework of larger global good than their own strategic interests.

David Santoro is President and CEO of Pacific Forum. Follow him on X @DavidSantoro1 

Ram Madhav is President of the India Foundation. Follow him on X @rammadhav

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo credit: Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images

July 27, 2023

An earlier version of this article in The Lowy Institute.

Since the United States terminated its formal alliance with Taiwan in 1979, Washington has adhered to a strategy known as “strategic ambiguity.” The Taiwan Relations Act, which Congress passed in that same year, declares that the United States will “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means…is considered a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” It additionally specifies that “the President and the Congress shall determine the appropriate action in response to any such danger.” This language resembles the United States’ formal alliance treaties with its Indo-Pacific allies, but falls short of an explicit defense commitment. In order to communicate to Beijing that Washington might defend the self-governing island, US presidents and officials have routinely referred to the US policy towards Taiwan as being rooted in the Taiwan Relations Act and made general references to its interest in peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. In the last few years, however, President Biden has explicitly declared on four occasions that the United States would defend Taiwan. That said, the White House walked back Biden’s remarks each time saying that there had been no change in US policy, adding more ambiguity to “strategic ambiguity.”

On top of this shift, the Biden administration has pursued a new strategy that could be termed “collective strategic ambiguity.” Part of Washington’s effort to bolster deterrence across the Taiwan Strait has involved signaling to China that there could be a combined allied effort to defend the status quo. Since Biden entered office, Washington has released joint statements with 9 of its formal treaty allies—Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and the United Kingdom—that include a line in the vein of “we emphasize/underscore/reaffirm the importance of preserving peace and stability in/across the Taiwan Strait.” In June 2021, Kurt Campbell, the White House Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, indicated the Biden administration’s intent with these statements. Discussing the references to Taiwan in the US-Japan and the US-South Korea joint statements issued earlier that year, he declared that “we are seeking to take these concerted actions to send a clear message of resolve that we are determined to maintain that peace and stability” across the Taiwan Strait.

These joint statements have resulted from various types of diplomatic engagements at different levels of seniority, including bilateral leadership-level summits, bilateral 2+2 ministerial dialogues, trilateral ministerial meetings, and a G7 summit. Notably, some of these joint statements mentioned Taiwan for the first time ever or in decades. For instance, in April 2021, when Japanese Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide made an official visit to Washington, the leaders released a joint statement that referenced their shared interest in the “importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait,” marking the first time since 1969 that Taiwan was mentioned in a joint statement by the two countries. Next month in June, the G7 (made up of 6 NATO members and Japan) published a joint statement in which they referenced Taiwan for the very first time, declaring that they “underscore the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.” More recently, when Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. made an official visit to Washington in May, a US-Philippines joint statement declared that “they affirm the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.”

Even outside of joint statements with the United States, leaders and senior officials of US allies have made comments suggesting that their countries would get involved in a Taiwan contingency. For instance, in July 2021, Japanese Deputy Prime Minister Aso Taro declared that “if a major incident occurs in Taiwan, it’s not at all unusual to consider it an existential threat…In such a case, Japan and the United States will have to work together to defend Taiwan.” In November 2021, Australian Defense Minister Peter Dutton stated that it would be “inconceivable” for Australia not to join a US defense of Taiwan. In February this year, President Marcos Jr. stated that given “our geographical location,” it is “very hard to imagine a scenario where the Philippines will not somehow get involved” in a Taiwan conflict.

In addition to these messages, US allies in the Indo-Pacific are seeking to bolster their military capabilities in ways that could be used to help protect Taiwan. US defense cooperation is key to these efforts. For instance, through the AUKUS partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States that was formed in 2021, the United States will sell Australia three to five nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), as well as share its nuclear propulsion technology to help Australia develop its own SSN. This will enable Australia to reach the waters around Taiwan to conduct operations such as anti-submarine warfare against China’s subsurface fleet, which poses a threat to US carrier groups that would be key to defending Taiwan. Similarly, Japan announced plans this year to acquire counter-strike capabilities, which will include purchasing 400 intermediate-range Tomahawk cruise missiles from the United States. These would allow Japan to target China’s missile launchers and command-and-control sites which would be key to an invasion of Taiwan. Moreover, the United States has engaged in planning with its allies over potential joint responses to a Taiwan contingency. For instance, the interim US Ambassador to Australia Michael Goldman claimed in April 2021 that the United States and Australia are engaged in “strategic planning” for a “range of contingencies” of which Taiwan is an “important component.” Similarly, it was reported in December 2021 that the United States and Japan have drawn up a plan for a joint operation in response to a Taiwan contingency.

Speaking at the G7 summit in May this year, President Biden communicated a message of confidence that the United States and its allies are united in their willingness to defend the status quo. He declared that “there is clear understanding among most of our allies that, in fact, if China were to act unilaterally, there would be a response.” At the time of this remark, the United States had 34 formal treaty allies; 29 in NATO and five in the Indo-Pacific.

Despite this signaling, uncertainty remains over not just the type of support allies would provide, but over whether they would even provide support. Regarding potential contributions from NATO allies, for example, some analysts are deeply skeptical as to whether they could and would make consequential military contributions. There is even uncertainty among analysts as to whether US allies in the Indo-Pacific would provide any substantial military support. A recent report by the RAND Corporation assessed that just two US allies in the Indo-Pacific, Australia and Japan, could be expected to help the United States. Moreover, the authors conclude that this support would likely just lie in the realm of “limited support,” rather than “operations support,” which would entail providing the “full range of its capabilities.” As such, it is perhaps more realistic to assume that allied assistance would largely consist of a sanctions regime similar to that which Washington and its allies imposed on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine. However, the threat of sanctions may do little to deter China given that it likely expects sanctions and would have incorporated these expected costs into its calculus. Moreover, the costly worldwide economic fallout that would result from a conflict could render sanctions moot, meaning that US allies may see little point in sanctioning China.

To strengthen this collective signaling to China that there could be a combined effort to defend Taiwan, the United States should take the following actions. First, the United States should formulate comprehensive plans with its allies that outline specific roles, whether that be logistical, reconnaissance, or combat, for how they might aid US forces in a contingency. Second, Washington and its allies should inform Beijing privately about the existence of some type of contingency planning, so as to mitigate China’s propensity to retaliate against “provocations” to satisfy public nationalist sensitivities. Third, depending on the willingness of certain US allies to endure potential pushback from China, the United States and its allies could eventually begin to conduct joint exercises drilling these plans. Together, these actions could help convince China’s leadership that US allies are serious about participating in a US defense of Taiwan, which could bolster deterrence against potential aggression. Moreover, in the event of a deterrence failure, coordinated planning could result in a more effective response that has a greater prospect of denying China its objective. That way, the United States and its allies can better ensure the continuation of peace across the Taiwan Strait.

Rupert Schulenburg ([email protected]) is an analyst focusing on Indo-Pacific security, US alliances and force posture, as well as US-China competition. He holds an MPhil in International Security Studies from the University of St Andrews and a BA (Hons) in International Relations from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. He can be found on Twitter at @R_Schulenburg.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo credit: Taiwan’s armed forces hold two days of routine drills to show combat readiness ahead of Lunar New Year holidays at a military base in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, January 11, 2023. REUTERS/Ann Wang

July 26, 2023

Aung San Suu Kyi for some two decades made Western policy toward Myanmar. Her supposed views, even those attributed to her when she was under house arrest and could not communicate, have more than influenced policy—they have determined it. She rejected the military-imposed name of the country, “Myanmar,” and even today the United States officially, and virtually alone, avoids the military designation, preferring “Burma.” In influential opposition policy circles, and in the media and popular opinion—strongly supported by her winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991—she was pictured as the brave, stalwart icon of truth and justice opposed to a murderous, corrupt military.

Ironically, this image was shattered at the International Court of Justice in The Hague in 2019 by her defense of the brutal military criminal and ethnic cleansing actions against the Rohingya Muslim minority. But even as it reverberated against her internationally, it increased her support amongst the Bamah (Burman) Buddhist ethnic majority— as she no doubt intended—who are deeply prejudiced against the Muslim minority. There seemed little doubt about the high level of support for her, despite the failings of the regime she, even unconstitutionally, “headed.”

The Myanmar situation, always complicated however, has become even more complex since the Feb. 1 coup of 2021. Previously, multiple splits among ethnic minorities and with the central, ethnic Burman controlled government, together with conflicts between the National League for Democracy (NLD)—reformed since the coup into the National Unity Government (NUG)—and the military has metastasized. A seeming myriad of anti-military, mostly uncoordinated, local defense forces have sprung up against the Tatmadaw (military). Each of these groups have divergent views of the degree of power to be shared, and at what level, if and when the military ceases to be in control.

The country is now more chaotic and has collapsed into what has been called a civil war. But the term and its use dangerously oversimplify something far more complex. Each local group and ethnic minority has distinct, conflicting views on their desired level of local authority and autonomy. The NUG, the nexus of the former NLD, has changed. Aung San Suu Kyi once led that government. Previously, she advocated and led the opposition in a non-violent political and moral campaign against the military.  Now, it espouses targeted assassinations and violence in its self-declared “war” against the military. It has abdicated the high moral ground even if its authorized and performed violent incidents dwarf extensive military atrocities.

The NUG is engaged in a full-court press in international circles to attempt to get diplomatic recognition of its authority. It has established an office in Washington DC. Its lobbying forces have extensive access and support there. The military, instead, has turned to Russia, and a degree to China as well, for support. ASEAN has proven to be both inept and inconsequential in dealing with Myanmar in spite of the latter’s membership. India and Japan have their own national interests in Myanmar that are at least in part at variance with those of the European Union and the United States.

For US policymakers, the dilemmas are even more profound. Following the chaos of the failed people’s revolution of 1988, the Republicans strongly backed Aung San Suu Kyi (she was mentioned in the Congressional Record about double the times of Democrats just by Kentucky Republican Sen. Mitch McConnell, and a chair was established and funded in her honor at the University of Louisville). Even in the late 2000s, when the Obama administration slowly shifted its policies, it did not want to use its limited political ammunition directly confronting Republicans on Myanmar, which was known as a “boutique issue” in the policy community. That pattern seems to have occurred again, with Myanmar now overshadowed by other international flashpoints like Ukraine, North Korea, Taiwan and others.

A great deal of bipartisan support still exists in the United States for Aung San Suu Kyi and in enforcing the sanctions she endorsed and it reimposed on the military regime after the coup.  The complexity of the political issues internally in the U.S. are magnified by any administration’s political and diplomatic needs: to avoid insulting Muslims anywhere in the world (the Rohingya, for example, by Aung San Suu Kyi), and upholding democracy, which it interprets as supporting Aung San Suu Kyi as well. These positions are incompatible.

US policies are in favor of the NUG, and it will provide humanitarian assistance to the opposition. Some prominent observers in Washington are calling for political recognition and arming of the NUG. Any such move would exacerbate tensions with China, as one of its prime foci is the restriction of US power and influence on its southern periphery. Improvement in the economic conditions in one of China’s poorest provinces, Yunnan, is largely dependent on tranquility and trade with Myanmar.

As in the past, any major policy shift in US circles accepting some negotiated, modified military role in Myanmar will depend in part on the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from prison or house arrest. But the military leadership has clearly indicated their abhorrence of Aung San Suu Kyi ever assuming any degree of political power, a goal she seems to desire based on her father’s pivotal role in independence and her own extensive sacrifices. They have demonstrated that they believe the lengthy (and political) jail sentences imposed on her, together with her age, will effectively eliminate her from authority. In each case of military rule (Ne Win’s coup in 1962, the SLORC/SPDC rule from 1988 until 2012, and now) the military has thought it had devised a system of perpetual military rule or control. They are likely thinking of that again. Their inept previous attempts failed. The present efforts are likely to follow in some inscrutable manner.

But there is no indication that the United States or the European Union has interest in dialogue with the military, or indeed the reverse, nor has it devised policies to mitigate future, but even now evident, problems. New approaches are badly needed and require serious exploration. Neither the military nor the NUG can effectively rule with any degree of equity in those multiple societies.

But the West seems locked into past policies that badly need reconsideration and should now be transformed as more blood flows throughout that poor society. Alternative approaches are badly needed and require serious exploration. Any amelioration or solution must be Burmese engineered. But the West has potential roles in helping to suggest and evaluate alternatives.

David I. Steinberg ([email protected]) is Distinguished Professor of Asian Studies Emeritus, Georgetown University.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo credit: Aung San Suu Kyi was arrested as the generals launched their coup in February 2021 [File: Stringer/Reuters]

July 25, 2023

Emmanuel Macron is gearing up for an unprecedented journey to the Indo-Pacific, making it the first visit by a French president to Pacific Island states. This upcoming visit to Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea, following a second visit to New Caledonia since his election in 2017, addresses the inconsistency between France’s growing engagement in the region and the lack of a high-level visit until now.

Above all, President Macron should seize this opportunity to enhance communication by evolving certain criticized terms such as “balancing power.” In this regard, France must better conceptualize its engagement in the region and its willingness to assume a unique role, presenting itself as a proactive power, a provider of solutions, and an enhancer of sovereignty.

According to France’s maximalist conception, the Indo-Pacific region comprises 52 states, spanning from Djibouti to Papeete, and from Pretoria to Tokyo. As a sovereign country, France boasts a significant presence in the region, with seven of its thirteen overseas territories situated there. Among them, three are in the Indian Ocean, and four are in the Pacific: New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, and Clipperton. These territories represent over 90% of France’s exclusive economic zone, giving the country the second-largest maritime domain in the world.

Over 1.6 million French citizens reside in the French territories, and in 2021, 190,000 expatriates were officially registered in countries within the region, with sizable communities in the United Arab Emirates, China, Australia, and Madagascar. Last year, the Indo-Pacific region accounted for over 35% of France’s foreign trade, excluding trade with European Union countries. France has its largest trade deficit with China and its largest trade surplus with Singapore. Additionally, the region attracts over 120 billion euros ($133 billion) of French investments.

France has built a dense and diverse network in the Indo-Pacific region. Diplomatically, 36 embassies, some with extensive geographical coverage, cover all countries in the region. In Oceania, there are no fewer than five embassies, situated in Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea. For example, the embassy in Port-Vila, Vanuatu, serves as the only embassy of an EU member state in the country and also covers the Solomon Islands.

Furthermore, over 7,000 military personnel are stationed in the region, with three sovereign forces in the French territories and two presence forces in Djibouti and the United Arab Emirates. The armed forces of New Caledonia regularly participate in fisheries surveillance in the South Pacific on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency. Force projection exercises are now a regular occurrence, with the ongoing unprecedented deployment of a dozen Rafales as part of the Pégase 2023 mission, which will visit several countries.

Culturally, 34 French institutes organize events, festivals, and support artist residencies. Cooperation in education is strengthening, with direct support for the development of the University of Vanuatu, for instance. In the Indo-Pacific, there are also 169 French Alliances that promote the French language, including in Vanuatu, where French is one of the official languages and the country is a member of the International Organization of the Francophonie.

Furthermore, France plays an active role in development aid. The French Development Agency (AFD) allocated 25% of its resources for 2022 to projects in the Indo-Pacific. The AFD’s mandate in the South Pacific has gradually expanded to include regional initiatives on climate change adaptation and mitigation, and biodiversity. One flagship project in collaboration with partners, including Australia, is the Kiwa initiative, which aims to help 19 Pacific countries adapt to climate change and preserve their biodiversity through nature-based solutions.

This French contribution is reflected in the involvement of state agencies such as Expertise France, which provides detached experts to national authorities, and France Volontaires. Over 200 young people have already benefited from the Oceanian Volunteer Service Program. France has also demonstrated its commitment to humanitarian aid in the face of natural disasters, as illustrated by the FRANZ mechanism with Australia and New Zealand, which is celebrating its 30th anniversary. This mechanism recently facilitated assistance to the populations of Vanuatu in 2023, Tonga in 2022, and Papua New Guinea in 2021.

As the intensification of the Sino-American rivalry in the Indo-Pacific is felt worldwide, France intends to offer additional options to the region’s states. However, it is fundamental for the country to position itself appropriately and communicate effectively. The term “balancing power,” in particular, is poorly defined, misunderstood, and even counterproductive. It creates unnecessary doubts among partners and fuels the stereotype of an arrogant country with ambitions disconnected from its actual capabilities. Two concepts could be used to better explain France’s actions in the region.

Firstly, as a proactive power and provider of solutions, France aims to be a responsible country with a unique capacity for mobilization and impetus in the multilateral framework. This international activism translates into the implementation of projects that contribute to solving global problems for the benefit of populations and the mitigation of global imbalances.

Secondly, France also seeks to be an enhancer of sovereignty. Through its actions and cooperation, it facilitates the expression of its partners’ sovereignty by presenting a distinct French and European offering that aims to enable decision-making without constraints. This approach, which involves strengthening capacities and forming coalitions, empowers partners to fully defend their interests.

As proposed in a recent paper for the Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS), to materialize these two concepts better, France should propose the creation of a “Pacific Islands Security Forum.” This forum would bring together citizens, experts, and officials from the region, mainly addressing environmental and human security issues, a priority clearly identified for the Pacific Island states.

This cooperation mechanism would add real value by positioning itself at the nexus of defense, diplomacy, and development, complementing existing forums such as the SPDMM and the IPESF. It would focus on the needs of the actors involved and explicitly aim to identify the levers to activate to assist them in meeting those needs. Far from being a simple forum for dialogue, this would be an action-oriented mechanism.

An annual summit could be first held in New Caledonia in 2024, then alternately in Nouméa and in one of the Pacific Island states’ capitals, starting with Port-Vila in 2025. It would bring together regional players around unifying themes, while identifying and then implementing concrete projects on the appropriate scale. Amid other initiatives, this forum would serve as a symbol of France’s dedication and resolve to collaborate with its regional partners.

Antoine Bondaz ([email protected]) is the director of the Observatory of Multilateralism in the Indo-Pacific at the Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS). He teaches at Sciences Po Paris.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo credit:  Photograph: Ludovic Marin/AFP/Getty Image

July 17, 2023

“Within a day, with not a single shot fired and not a drop of blood seen; the ‘armed rebellion’ that attracted global attention was settled.”

That’s how one Chinese news commentary described the Wagner incident that shook Russia. However, in the aftermath of the short-lived uprising, views in China remain diverse and often conflicting.

A view from Beijing

The official response from China has been muted. In a two-line statement, the foreign ministry described the incident as “Russia’s internal affair” and assured of China’s support in helping Moscow “maintain its stability and achieve development and prosperity,” reaffirming its “good neighborliness” and “Comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for the New Era” with Russia. Other opinions, particularly in the media, have been more reflective of the situation.

The hawkish Global Times took shots at the “wishful thinking of the West.” Citing Chinese international relations experts Wang Yiwei and Cui Heng, the report denied that Wagner’s call to move to Moscow constituted an “armed rebellion,” instead calling it a mere display of dissatisfaction with the ruling regime. It further stated that the Kremlin’s ability to stop the revolt within 24 hours refutes any claims of Putin growing weak, calling such analysis one of the many “cognitive warfare” tactics of the West fanning “anti-Russia sentiment” or stemming from ignorance of Russian politics. A report in the People’s Daily similarly credited strong public support to the Russian government as a major factor in defusing the crisis.

However, such assurances have failed to calm Chinese investors, particularly in the energy sector, who rushed to stop shipments as the news of the revolt broke out. Others in the media display similar concerns. An editorial in the China Daily described the situation as an “uneasy calm” which displays Russia’s socio-economic and political problems and contradictions—specifically stemming from the use of private mercenaries—that have come to the fore since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

While the reasons for the mutiny are assessed as ranging from heavy losses incurred during the prolonged war, failure to demilitarize Ukraine, demands for more cash, tussles with the Russian Ministry of Defense and Prigozhin’s own political ambitions; one surpasses all—the Russian defense ministry’s order to incorporate all private mercenaries under its command by July 1. Talking to China’s Observer, military expert Song Zhongping noted that Prigozhin feared losing power and, as the deadline neared, decided to wage a mutiny. While all commentaries criticize Moscow’s overreliance on private mercenaries as “getting caught in one’s own cocoon” (zuojian zifu 作茧自缚), Song stated that Wagner did play an unparalleled role in the war. Being a private military company independent of the state, Wagner took losses without impacting the legitimacy of the Russian state nor its purse.

Though Putin’s political acumen and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s diplomatic skill in handling the crisis have been hailed, many in China believe that the dust is not yet fully settled. Talking to Sina News, Geng Xin noted that the Wagner fiasco was not a “false alarm” as many “contradictions” continue to lurk.

First and foremost being the dilemma in Russia on whether it sees itself as part of the East or the West. Such a phenomenon is coupled with a poor record of economic development, with the Russian political elite’s miscalculations that a return to the former “glory” of the Soviet Union is possible. Another contradiction is the underestimation of Ukraine’s potential to fight back and the disastrous decision to go to war. Third, the lack of an effective military system which allows too much space for private mercenaries poses a major challenge. Fourth, the phenomenon of “chaos giving birth to heroes” (luan shi chu xiaoxiong 乱世出枭雄) i.e. when all political, social, and economic contradictions elevate inequality to the extent that produces men prone to revolt like Prigozhin.

Moreover, Prigozhin not only refused to surrender but openly defied Vladimir Putin by describing Wagner soldiers as “true patriots.” Talking to The Observer, Tan Dekai noted that many in Russia see Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu as a product of the oligarchic system and do not think he is fit for the job. Being a war hero, Prigozhin enjoys popularity, but Russians do not favor him as a leader. The continued presence of several private military forces such as those held by Gazprom is seen as a threat for China since a divided Russia ruled by warlords would invite external forces, particularly the United States, to intervene. Another commentary in Sina News described the incident as the “biggest gray rhino” since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine War, a term Xi Jinping used in his 20th Party Congress Report to refer to unexpected security threats.

Whither the Ukraine war?

Russia has clarified that this incident will not impact the “special military operation” in Ukraine. But many in China are not so sure. The Paper, a Shanghai-based publication, noted that Prigozhin has destabilized the two main arteries of Russia’s military offensive, Rostov Oblast in South and Voronezh Oblast in North. A war between Wagner and the Russian military would have been disastrous but, even with the crisis averted, dealing with the demobilized soldiers and ensuring their loyalty in Prigozhin’s absence would be an uphill task. Beijing is also worried about the misuse of Moscow’s nuclear arsenal. As Ukraine’s counteroffensive intensifies, many in China believe Putin did the right thing to negotiate with Prigozhin, but will he come out stronger? They say he would, but this is dampened by concerns of entrenched problems in post-Soviet Russian society. Analysts in Moscow share similar beliefs. Talking to Russia Today, Dmitry Trenin described the deal as nothing short of a miracle, specifically as concerns were high over a lack of opposition against Prigozhin’s march into Rostov-on-Don and on to Moscow. Vladimir Bruter noted that the incident has heavily tarnished Moscow’s international image and a prolonged warfare with Ukraine would be “too optimistic” to expect. He believes that the need of the hour is to formulate a consistent plan for the military operation.

But will Putin end the war? As of now, no. He would like to deal with the internal challenges to his authority that the incident has exposed and making a move to negotiate first would be equal to conceding defeat.

“No limits” no more?

While Beijing has reaffirmed that its “comprehensive strategic partnership” with Russia in its official statement, opinions reflect that a prolonged war with growing aggression from private military groups is bad news. The main reason behind supporting Russia remains the challenge Moscow presents to the expanding influence of Western liberal ideas that China views as a threat and Beijing’s own sovereignty concerns over Taiwan. However, it will never allow any partnership, no matter how “comprehensive,” to derail economic development that robs Beijing’s international significance and tarnishes the image of the Communist Party at home. Neither can it afford to send military troops in support of Moscow and face Western sanctions. The idea remains to engage so far as the relationship remains profitable but as the tides turn unfavorable, Beijing finds itself caught in the quagmire.

China is hence highly likely to reassess its “no limits” partnership with Moscow, but without an official announcement, just as support for Russia was never explicitly committed to. Beijing is likely to push ahead its peace plan for ending the war once again before Washington does but how well China succeeds depends on to what extent Putin agrees to listen to Beijing, for he certainly has bigger ambitions and far less at stake.

The incident however presents a flickering hope for the United States and China to restart dialogue. Analysts in China agree that ensuring stability in nuclear-armed Russia and bringing the war to an end are concerns Beijing shares with Washington.

Instability in Russia is a mounting concern which China finds hard to address on its own. If sincere attempts to end the war do spring from Beijing, the United States must be ready to work with China. However, for that to happen, Beijing must tone down its prerequisites for dialogue with Washington that have blocked all high-level attempts at thawing the ice. The Wagner incident could facilitate what diplomatic negotiations so far have failed to achieve.

Cherry Hitkari ([email protected]) is a Non-resident Vasey Fellow and Young Leader at Pacific Forum.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo credit: Wagner Group boss Yevgeny Prigozhin in St. Petersburg, Russia, for the funeral of one of his fighters who died in Ukraine, December 24, 2022. AP

July 13, 2023

An earlier version of this article appeared in The National Interest.

For more from this author, please see his recent chapter of Comparative Connections.

Over the last few weeks, Washington has been abuzz with everything India. On June 22, President Joe Biden, cabinet secretaries, and the U.S. Congress gave a rousing reception to the visiting Indian prime minister Narendra Modi. For his part, the prime minister cheered Republican and Democratic congressmen with his quip that he could “help them reach bipartisan consensus,” referring to the across-the-aisle support India enjoys in Washington.

It was certainly an apt decision to honor the Indian leader, given that the U.S.-India partnership has significantly expanded under President Biden. Both the White House and several members of the Biden administration, from the National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan to the Indo-Pacific Coordinator Kurt Campbell, have characterized it as the “most important bilateral relationship of the twenty-first century.”

However, over the last few months, some of the Biden administration’s regional policies in the Indo-Pacific have done more harm to its partners, particularly India and its geopolitical leverage in the Indo-Pacific region. 

The Biden administration’s foreign policy cut a significant departure from its predecessors until last month, returning to Washington’s old ways: myopic democratic interventions, benevolent outreach to adversarial nations, and partisan bickering. Over the last few weeks, Washington’s primary Indo-Pacific partners, India and Japan, have borne the brunt of these missteps.

President Biden, in a last-minute change of plans, canceled his scheduled trip to Papua New Guinea and Australia to address the debt-ceiling crisis in Washington, with Republicans stalling the Democrats from raising the debt ceiling levels. While Secretary of State Anthony Blinken went ahead with his trip to Papua New Guinea and signed a crucial defense agreement with the Pacific Island nation, Biden canceling that leg of the tour was not the best messaging to a region increasingly falling under China’s orbit.

Nonetheless, Prime Minister Modi went ahead with his travel itinerary as scheduled and turned it into an opportunity to showcase India’s position on the global stage. New Guinea’s president hailed Modi as the leader of the Global South. Taking an implicit jab at the United States and China, the island-nation leader said, “we are victims of global powerplay, and you [Modi] are the leader of Global South. We will rally behind your leadership at global forums.” Prior to Biden’s cancellation, the Indian government had decided to accommodate his visit and cut short their visits as a courtesy to the incoming American presidential delegation.

While this was a minor setback for a coordinated approach toward Chinese expansionism in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean challenge is a more geopolitically complex Gordian knot.

In mid-May, Blinken threatened Bangladesh with sanctions if the Indian Ocean state did not host free and fair elections in the 2024 poll. Suppose the United States were to follow through with its threat. In that case, India and Japan will be in a quandary as they have consistently positioned Bangladesh as a gateway connecting the Indian subcontinent to Southeast Asia for supply chain and infrastructure connectivity initiatives. Geographically, Bangladesh is nestled between India’s state of Bengal to the west and India’s northeastern provinces to the east, bordering a thin strip of land the connects the rest of India to the northeast (also known as the “chicken’s neck”). Thus the densely populated country’s interaction with the rest of the world is directed through India or the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.

Both New Delhi and Tokyo have invested in infrastructure in the region and have long-term plans to invest in Dhaka’s growth. Recently, Japan and India agreed to jointly develop the Matabari deep-sea port in Bangladesh to serve as a “strategic anchor” in the Indian Ocean. Though often underreported, Japanese investment plays a vital role in South Asian development. It is also undeniably India’s Northeast region’s major infrastructure and development partner. Through the Bay of Bengal-Northeast India Industrial Value Chain, the Japanese government envisions increased connectivity between India’s landlocked northeast and Southeast Asia, creating a single economic zone and an alternative trade connectivity project to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida articulating his government’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy in New Delhi in early March this year, called for increased integration of India’s Northeast with Bangladesh to transform the region into a single economic zone.

Moreover, Japan is attempting to capture the businesses moving out of the pricier markets of Southeast Asia, using the Bay of Bengal region. Japan’s regional strategy has neatly complemented the Modi government’s policies. Modi transformed the older “Look East” policy into an “Act East” policy of increasing strategic and economic engagement with Southeast Asia as a countervailing force to China’s involvement in the region. 

Tokyo has slowly and steadily supported this transformation. A case in point is Tokyo and New Delhi hosting the India-Japan Act East forum to discuss cooperation on a range of projects that will increase connectivity in India’s Northeast to Southeast Asia.

India’s Northeast has a history of civil unrest and strife, making it a challenging region for development. Furthermore, its landlocked topography and poor infrastructure limited its connectivity to both its neighboring countries and the rest of India. Only parties interested in the long game or have a vision for the region could invest in that part of the world, and in this case, it is Japan.

Interestingly, as an extension, both Japan and India are engaging the immediate eastern neighbor to Bangladesh and India, Myanmar. Sanctioned by the United States, Myanmar has limited partners on the world stage. Nonetheless, Japan and India have continued engagement with the military junta to prevent the nation from falling entirely under China’s influence.

However, once again, Indo-Japanese interests are affected by America’s sanctions.

Earlier in May, India-Myanmar inaugurated the Sittwe port in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. India supported this port to enhance sea lane connectivity between India’s eastern states and Myanmar. However, since the sanctions, Indian companies have either had to depart Myanmar altogether or face global scrutiny for working with the military junta-led government.

As satellite images released earlier this year indicated, increased activity on the Great Coco Islands of Myanmar had the markings of Chinese military involvement. Situated less than thirty miles north of India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands, any potential militarization of the Coco Islands by the Chinese could pose a significant threat to India’s security in the Indian Ocean. In this geopolitical equation, India cannot afford to disengage from Myanmar. And yet, America’s economic statecraft is undercutting India’s vital regional partnerships.

Henry Kissinger, who celebrated 100 years last May, summed up this dynamic well, “it may be dangerous to be America’s enemy, but to be America’s friend is fatal.” It is undoubtedly proving so for Japan and India, but more so for New Delhi in the Indian Ocean. 

Against the backdrop of these measures comes the Biden administration’s attempts at thawing relations with China. While Biden departs from his predecessors as the only recent president to not ask for Kissinger’s advice, he is beginning to walk in the footsteps of a grand strategist by making attempts to mend ties with China.

From the dialogue in Vienna to Blinken rescheduling his trip to Beijing for last month to the official abandonment of economic “decoupling” for the less confrontational “de-risking,” Washington’s approach to China shows signs of softening. While members of IPEF agreed on moving ahead with a supply chain agreement in Detroit, in the same week, on the sidelines of the APEC meeting, U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai met with her Chinese counterpart to discuss trade and economic ties. Washington’s blow-hot and blow-cold approach does not assure allies and partners of the consistency of its priorities and policies, particularly partners that it courts for strategic competition with China.

Furthermore, Washington’s skewed sanction policies toward democratic backsliding in a few states while calling for engagement with authoritarian China raise questions about the motives of such policies. While the United States has sanctioned Chinese officials allegedly involved in human rights abuses in Xinjiang, it continues to do massive business with Beijing. This selective condemnation only further isolates partners and strengthens Chinese engagement with the sanctioned nations.

Director for Regional Affairs at the Pacific Forum, Rob York, called this misbegotten strategy “a holdover from America’s unipolar moment that we [America] need to outgrow. America’s moral authority, and the benefits of aligning with Washington, are no longer assumed but must be competed for, and sanctions must be employed far more judiciously than they have been.”

This type of awakening to multipolar realities of the world order should inform Washington of the pitfalls and shortsightedness of its foreign policies. America’s sanctions and other tools of economic statecraft should not be used for democratic interventions but to deter its enemies. If not, the United States will have few allies in its strategic competition with China.

Akhil Ramesh ([email protected]) is a Senior Fellow at the Pacific Forum and author of the US-India chapter for Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal of Bilateral Relations in the Indo-Pacific.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: President Joe Biden and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi walk along the Colonnade to the Oval Office after a state arrival ceremony Thursday on the South Lawn of the White House.Stefani Reynolds / Pool via AP

July 12, 2023

Issues & Insights is Pacific Forum’s publication series that includes special reports (SR), conference reports (CR), and working papers (WP). These in-depth analyses cover a range of topics and are published on an occasional basis. The following have been published in 2023 and are available online here.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR1 — Toward a Unified NATO Response to the People’s Republic of China

By Rob York

Following the Cold War’s end there were those who questioned NATO’s continued relevance. Such views may have found little currency among scholars of foreign policy and security, but among the general public it was not unheard of to wonder why, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 its rival organization did not also become defunct, especially given the Russian Federation’s friendlier tilt in the decade that followed. On the part of the United States, by the 2010’s a fatigue had settled in among much of the populace over US foreign commitments, especially regarding partner countries not perceived as pulling their own weight. By the middle of that decade, that fatigue had begun to manifest itself in US election results.

Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and its brazen invasion of Ukraine last year may not have succeeded in bringing Ukraine to heel or establishing Moscow as a great military power again, but it did accomplish two other things. For one, it demonstrated for the world what the countries separated by the Atlantic could achieve—even indirectly—by helping partners (even non-NATO members) acquire the means to defend themselves. For another, and for all Putin’s claims to the contrary, it showed that nations near Russia’s western border have a very good reason for wanting NATO membership. Putin, more so than any mainstream American or continental European security scholar, has demonstrated the alliance’s continued relevance in providing for the security of countries that desire self-determination and alignment with the liberal, rules-based international order.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR2 — The World After Taiwan’s Fall

By David Santoro and Ralph Cossa

Let us start with our bottom line: a failure of the United States to come to Taiwan’s aid—politically, economically, and militarily—would devastate the Unites States’ credibility and defense commitments to its allies and partners, not just in Asia, but globally. If the United States tries but fails to prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan, the impact could be equally devastating unless there is a concentrated, coordinated U.S. attempt with like-minded allies and partners to halt further Chinese aggression and eventually roll back Beijing’s ill-gotten gains.

This is not a hypothetical assessment. Taiwan has been increasingly under the threat of a military takeover by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and, even today, is under attack politically, economically, psychologically, and through so-called “gray zone” military actions short of actual combat. The U.S. government, U.S. allies, and others have begun to pay attention to this problem, yet to this day, they have not sufficiently appreciated the strategic implications that such a takeover would generate. To address this problem, the Pacific Forum has conducted a multi-authored study to raise awareness in Washington, key allied capitals, and beyond about the consequences of a Chinese victory in a war over Taiwan and, more importantly, to drive them to take appropriate action to prevent it.

The study, which provides six national perspectives on this question (a U.S., Australian, Japanese, Korean, Indian, and European perspective) and fed its findings and recommendations into the second round of the DTRA SI-STT-sponsored (and Pacific Forum-run) Track 2 “U.S.-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue,”[1] outlines these strategic implications in two alternative scenarios. In the first scenario, China attacks Taiwan and it falls with no outside assistance from the United States or others. In the other scenario, Taiwan falls to China despite outside assistance (i.e., “a too little, too late” scenario).

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, WP1 — Why Gender Balance Matters for Equity and Peace in the Indo-Pacific 

By Maryruth Belsey Priebe

Who shows up at events and conferences matters. Public and closed-door events are where successes and failures are analyzed; where conceptions about security, what it means, and how we can achieve it bump up against one another; and where problems are solved in novel ways. The greater the diversity of perspectives, the more powerful the outcomes. But within the security sector, predominantly all-male panels—or “manels”—suggest a lack of gender diversity, resulting in the exclusion of women, people of non-binary identities, or both. Manels represent a more serious lack of gender inclusion at leadership levels, making it difficult for women to gain recognition through promotion to senior decision-making positions. The following is a discussion of Pacific Forum’s work to study more than nine years of programming with a goal of understanding historical trends in order to implement and measure policies to increase the number of women attending and speaking at Pacific Forum events. The analysis identified room for improvement, and marks a jumping-off point for Pacific Forum’s work on mainstreaming gender within institutional programming.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, WP2 — Digital China: The Strategy and Its Geopolitical Implications 

By David Dorman and John Hemmings

Over the past few years, there has been growing concern inside the United States, Europe, and in the Indo-Pacific on the strategic direction behind China’s technology policies. Beginning with the debate over 5G and Huawei, this debate has covered Artificial Intelligence (AI), quantum teachnology, and semi-conductors – a foundational technology. And despite a large number of policies in place – Made in China: 2025, Cyber Super Power, and the New Generation AI Development Plan – few in the West have known China’s overall digital grand strategy.

This report discusses the rise and current state of “Digital China,” a strategy supported by General Secretary Xi Jinping to make China more competitive against the West through digital transformation. It has become the overarching strategy for digital development in the eyes of the Chinese Communist Party leadership, surpassing other initiatives like the Digital Silk Road and 5G. Digital China aims to challenge the existing global system and has profound implications for China’s development, great power competition, and international norms. The Party leadership has incorporated “data” into its digital economy, creating a concept called “Digital Marxism.” The strategy also seeks to foster innovation through the digital transformation of tools, talent, and learning as a means to facilitate China’s rise as a global power and challenge to the West.

The US and its allies have begun to effect strategic counter-effect to the myriad of PRC technology policies, there is almost zero understanding or public discussion of this digital grand strategy. Whether inattention, mistranslation, or obfuscation, Digital China has been mostly missed by the West over the past decade.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR3 — Strategic Competition and Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

By Carl Baker

There is a growing acceptance among countries in the Into-Pacific region that strategic competiiton between the United States and China is changing perceptions about security and the adequacy of the existing security architecture. While some have characterized the competition between the two as a new Cold War, it is clear that what is happening in the region is far more complex than the competition that characterized the original Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. First, the economic integration that has taken place since the early 1990s makes it much more difficult to draw bright ideological lines between the two sides. Further, the Asian context of the emerging competition is one where the two competitors have grown to share power. As the dominant military power, the United States has been the primary security guarantor in Asia and beyond. China, on the other hand, has emerged over the past decades as the primary economic catalyst in Asia and beyond. Currently, each side seems increasingly unwilling to accept that arrangement.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR4 – A History of Shared Values, A Future of Shared Strategic Interests: US-Australia Relations in the Indo-Pacific 

By Rob York

Authors of this volume participated in the inaugural U.S.-Australia Next-Generation Leaders Initiative, sponsored by the U.S. Department of State through the U.S. Embassy in Canberra. With backgrounds from academia, public policy, civil society, and industry, the cohort brings rich insights on the past, present, and future of the U.S.-Australia relations. This program was conducted from February 2021 – September 2021.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, CR1 – South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Emerging US-Japan-Philippines Trilateral 

By Jeffrey Ordaniel

The U.S.-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Maritime Security Dialogue conducted in December 2022 confirmed that there is very little difference in threat perceptions regarding the East and South China Seas. The three countries view China’s increasingly assertive claims to the territories and maritime zones in the two bodies of water as antithetical to their shared vision of a free, open, rules-based Indo-Pacific. China’s reapid military expansion, including unprecedented nuclear weapons and missile buildup, reinforces the urgency of the threat. Japanese and Philippine interlocutors worry that as China approaches nuclear parity with the United States, the region’s strategic environment will worsen. American participants emphasized greater and tangible demonstration of alliance commitments and agreed that some risk-taking is required to push back against Chinese coercion. There was a consensus about the challenge of addressing Beijing’s gray zone activities that have so far succeeded in seizing territories and maritime areas in the South China Sea and establishing regular intrusions into Japanese waters in the East China Sea. Participants struggled to find a strategy to blunt China’s salami-slicing tactics while avoiding escalation and armed conflict.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, WP3 – Understanding JI Resilience and Australia’s Counterterrorism Efforts in Indonesia

By Tom Connolly

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) remains one of Indonesia’s longest standing state security threats. It has survived major organizational transformations, state security crackdowns, and international military operations in its pursuit of an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia that could extend to incorporate Malaysia, Singapore, and the southern Philippines. Jemaah Islamiyah rose to prominence for its role in orchestrating the 2002 Bali Bombings, which prompted the United States and Australia to engage Jakarta with the shared goal of destroying the organization and its links to al-Qaeda. Security pressures from Indonesian security services and international forces led to the dismantling of much of Jemaah Islamiyah’s leadership by 2007, which pushed it into a state of hibernation, where members focused on consolidating numbers and religious outreach. The emergence of the Islamic State and its Southeast Asian affiliates in 2014 occupied much of the Indonesian security services’ resources, which gave space to Jemaah Islamiyah to regenerate its strength with renewed vigor. The 2017 discovery of a JI military training program in Syria re-alerted Indonesian counterterrorism authorities to the risk posed by the group, and successive waves of arrests and crackdowns ensued. Although the COVID-19 pandemic meant that many terrorist groups ceased offensive operations and maintained a low profile, Jemaah Islamiyah began to infiltrate Jakarta’s state apparatus, civil society, and academia to promote its political objectives. Jemaah Islamiyah’s long history in Indonesia has proven it to be adaptable, patient, and persistent in pursuit of its objectives. Although it is not currently engaged in military operations, JI’s long history in Indonesia has shown the group is adaptable, patient, and long-term in its thinking. Observers suspect that leaders in Jemaah Islamiyah are biding their time and seeking gaps in state authority that they can exploit to pursue their organizational goals.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR5 – ROK-US Alliance: Linchpin for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

By Rob York

The US-ROK alliance in 2023 celebrates its 70^th anniversary, and in both countries remains broadly popular. Previous doubts that both countries have had about the other’s commitment have largely given way to a sense of shared opportunities, and shared challenges. Not only is there an ever-more belligerent North Korea, with its growing nuclear and missile arsenals, but the People’s Republic of China uses both military and economic means to coerce other countries and Russia has demonstrated a willingness to upend norms, redraw borders, and dare former partners (including Seoul) to risk its ire.

This is also an era of the minilateral, as the US seeks to move past its previous hub-and-spokes alliance system in Asia and draw its partners into closer cooperation. South Korea, especially under its current administration, demonstrates increased interest in becoming a regional player, with its recent gestures toward old frenemy Japan representing a key test: historical differences between the US’ two closest partners have prevented a “normal” relationship from emerging despite many similarities in political systems, values, and interests, and Korean public opinion remains skeptical of the Seoul-Tokyo rapprochement. Furthermore, there is always a chance that issues complicating US-ROK relations in the past—conduct by US military personnel in Korea, trade disputes, environmental concerns related to US bases—could resurface.

All of these issues present challenges for the alliance that will require addressing. In that light, the Pacific Forum, with the generous support of the Korea Foundation, has launched the “ROK-US Next Generation Leaders Initiative” program, bringing together young burgeoning scholars and analysts from both countries to discuss pressing issues in the alliance the way forward. This edited volume contains edited papers on pressing topics—extended deterrence, North Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and much more—by rising scholars we expect to see addressing these issues in the years to come. Their active engagement, we believe, will help the alliance endure another 70 years, will providing for the security and prosperity of both countries.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR6 – Pressing Security Concerns in Southeast Asia: Next-Generation Perspectives

By John Hemmings

Southeast Asia is a pivotal sub-region of the Indo-Pacific. Spanning 1,700,000 square miles, its total population is 676 million – around 8.5% of the world’s population – and has a collective GDP of US$3.67 trillion (as of 2022). Over the years, it has been associated with both economic dynamism and significant security challenges. As authors in this volume note, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, disagreements over water rights in the Mekong Delta, and the current conflict in Myanmar highlight fault lines not only between Southeast Asian states themselves, but also between great powers such as China and the United States. There are many more – the EU, India, Japan, Australia, and South Korea – that pay close attention to developments in the sub-region. Maintaining peace and stability in a region that plays host to one-third of global sea-borne trade, hosts major undersea internet cables, and is a major thoroughfare for energy supplies from the Middle East to the advanced manufacturing hubs in China, Japan, and South Korea is both challenging and complicated.

The primary mechanism for engagement with Southeast Asian countries is through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its associated bodies. ASEAN promotes the principle of “ASEAN centrality” to prevent major power interference in the region and retain influence over security cooperation. However, the evolution of institutions and processes associated with ASEAN is lagging behind the pressing nature of regional challenges.

The “ASEAN Way” of informal consultation, non-interference, and consensus has fostered internal cohesion but hindered collective responses to conflicts. ASEAN’s influence is also vulnerable to great powers that can use their leverage to break consensus. While some believe ASEAN will adapt over time, others are skeptical about its ability to maintain its role in regional security.

The essays in the collection cover a broad range of security issues, including traditional and non-traditional ones. Traditional security topics include the South China Sea dispute, the political crisis in Myanmar, and dealing with rising Chinese influence. Non-traditional security issues encompass climate change’s impact on the Philippines and Timor-Leste, human trafficking in Vietnam, and Thailand’s brain drain challenge.

The essays reflect the diverse perspectives and challenges in Southeast Asia. They cover issues that range from well-covered topics to unique perspectives on local variations of international issues. The collection aims to spark regional conversations and discussions on these pressing security issues.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR7 — Southeast Asia’s Clean Energy Transition: A Role for Nuclear Power?

By David Santoro and Carl Baker

To bring clarity on these developments and their implications in Southeast Asia, the Pacific Forum commissioned several Southeast Asian scholars to write analytical papers on the energy transition that is underway in the region, which are compiled in this volume. Each chapter looks at the current and possible future energy landscape of a specific Southeast Asian country and focuses especially on the place and role of nuclear power in it. This “nuclear focus” is important because, for decades, most Southeast Asian countries have expressed on-and-off interest in nuclear power but never brought it online. Interest is now picking up again, especially for SMRs, so if this time one or several Southeast Asian countries successfully went nuclear, it would be a first.

It is good timing, therefore, to devote attention to how Southeast Asian countries are thinking about nuclear power in today’s context, for multiple reasons, including those related to safety, security, and safeguards.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.