PacNet #56 – Western policy and the Aung San Suu Kyi dilemma

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July 26, 2023

Aung San Suu Kyi for some two decades made Western policy toward Myanmar. Her supposed views, even those attributed to her when she was under house arrest and could not communicate, have more than influenced policy—they have determined it. She rejected the military-imposed name of the country, “Myanmar,” and even today the United States officially, and virtually alone, avoids the military designation, preferring “Burma.” In influential opposition policy circles, and in the media and popular opinion—strongly supported by her winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991—she was pictured as the brave, stalwart icon of truth and justice opposed to a murderous, corrupt military.

Ironically, this image was shattered at the International Court of Justice in The Hague in 2019 by her defense of the brutal military criminal and ethnic cleansing actions against the Rohingya Muslim minority. But even as it reverberated against her internationally, it increased her support amongst the Bamah (Burman) Buddhist ethnic majority— as she no doubt intended—who are deeply prejudiced against the Muslim minority. There seemed little doubt about the high level of support for her, despite the failings of the regime she, even unconstitutionally, “headed.”

The Myanmar situation, always complicated however, has become even more complex since the Feb. 1 coup of 2021. Previously, multiple splits among ethnic minorities and with the central, ethnic Burman controlled government, together with conflicts between the National League for Democracy (NLD)—reformed since the coup into the National Unity Government (NUG)—and the military has metastasized. A seeming myriad of anti-military, mostly uncoordinated, local defense forces have sprung up against the Tatmadaw (military). Each of these groups have divergent views of the degree of power to be shared, and at what level, if and when the military ceases to be in control.

The country is now more chaotic and has collapsed into what has been called a civil war. But the term and its use dangerously oversimplify something far more complex. Each local group and ethnic minority has distinct, conflicting views on their desired level of local authority and autonomy. The NUG, the nexus of the former NLD, has changed. Aung San Suu Kyi once led that government. Previously, she advocated and led the opposition in a non-violent political and moral campaign against the military.  Now, it espouses targeted assassinations and violence in its self-declared “war” against the military. It has abdicated the high moral ground even if its authorized and performed violent incidents dwarf extensive military atrocities.

The NUG is engaged in a full-court press in international circles to attempt to get diplomatic recognition of its authority. It has established an office in Washington DC. Its lobbying forces have extensive access and support there. The military, instead, has turned to Russia, and a degree to China as well, for support. ASEAN has proven to be both inept and inconsequential in dealing with Myanmar in spite of the latter’s membership. India and Japan have their own national interests in Myanmar that are at least in part at variance with those of the European Union and the United States.

For US policymakers, the dilemmas are even more profound. Following the chaos of the failed people’s revolution of 1988, the Republicans strongly backed Aung San Suu Kyi (she was mentioned in the Congressional Record about double the times of Democrats just by Kentucky Republican Sen. Mitch McConnell, and a chair was established and funded in her honor at the University of Louisville). Even in the late 2000s, when the Obama administration slowly shifted its policies, it did not want to use its limited political ammunition directly confronting Republicans on Myanmar, which was known as a “boutique issue” in the policy community. That pattern seems to have occurred again, with Myanmar now overshadowed by other international flashpoints like Ukraine, North Korea, Taiwan and others.

A great deal of bipartisan support still exists in the United States for Aung San Suu Kyi and in enforcing the sanctions she endorsed and it reimposed on the military regime after the coup.  The complexity of the political issues internally in the U.S. are magnified by any administration’s political and diplomatic needs: to avoid insulting Muslims anywhere in the world (the Rohingya, for example, by Aung San Suu Kyi), and upholding democracy, which it interprets as supporting Aung San Suu Kyi as well. These positions are incompatible.

US policies are in favor of the NUG, and it will provide humanitarian assistance to the opposition. Some prominent observers in Washington are calling for political recognition and arming of the NUG. Any such move would exacerbate tensions with China, as one of its prime foci is the restriction of US power and influence on its southern periphery. Improvement in the economic conditions in one of China’s poorest provinces, Yunnan, is largely dependent on tranquility and trade with Myanmar.

As in the past, any major policy shift in US circles accepting some negotiated, modified military role in Myanmar will depend in part on the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from prison or house arrest. But the military leadership has clearly indicated their abhorrence of Aung San Suu Kyi ever assuming any degree of political power, a goal she seems to desire based on her father’s pivotal role in independence and her own extensive sacrifices. They have demonstrated that they believe the lengthy (and political) jail sentences imposed on her, together with her age, will effectively eliminate her from authority. In each case of military rule (Ne Win’s coup in 1962, the SLORC/SPDC rule from 1988 until 2012, and now) the military has thought it had devised a system of perpetual military rule or control. They are likely thinking of that again. Their inept previous attempts failed. The present efforts are likely to follow in some inscrutable manner.

But there is no indication that the United States or the European Union has interest in dialogue with the military, or indeed the reverse, nor has it devised policies to mitigate future, but even now evident, problems. New approaches are badly needed and require serious exploration. Neither the military nor the NUG can effectively rule with any degree of equity in those multiple societies.

But the West seems locked into past policies that badly need reconsideration and should now be transformed as more blood flows throughout that poor society. Alternative approaches are badly needed and require serious exploration. Any amelioration or solution must be Burmese engineered. But the West has potential roles in helping to suggest and evaluate alternatives.

David I. Steinberg ([email protected]) is Distinguished Professor of Asian Studies Emeritus, Georgetown University.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo credit: Aung San Suu Kyi was arrested as the generals launched their coup in February 2021 [File: Stringer/Reuters]

PacNet #55 – France as an “enhancer of sovereignty” in the Pacific Islands

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July 25, 2023

Emmanuel Macron is gearing up for an unprecedented journey to the Indo-Pacific, making it the first visit by a French president to Pacific Island states. This upcoming visit to Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea, following a second visit to New Caledonia since his election in 2017, addresses the inconsistency between France’s growing engagement in the region and the lack of a high-level visit until now.

Above all, President Macron should seize this opportunity to enhance communication by evolving certain criticized terms such as “balancing power.” In this regard, France must better conceptualize its engagement in the region and its willingness to assume a unique role, presenting itself as a proactive power, a provider of solutions, and an enhancer of sovereignty.

According to France’s maximalist conception, the Indo-Pacific region comprises 52 states, spanning from Djibouti to Papeete, and from Pretoria to Tokyo. As a sovereign country, France boasts a significant presence in the region, with seven of its thirteen overseas territories situated there. Among them, three are in the Indian Ocean, and four are in the Pacific: New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, and Clipperton. These territories represent over 90% of France’s exclusive economic zone, giving the country the second-largest maritime domain in the world.

Over 1.6 million French citizens reside in the French territories, and in 2021, 190,000 expatriates were officially registered in countries within the region, with sizable communities in the United Arab Emirates, China, Australia, and Madagascar. Last year, the Indo-Pacific region accounted for over 35% of France’s foreign trade, excluding trade with European Union countries. France has its largest trade deficit with China and its largest trade surplus with Singapore. Additionally, the region attracts over 120 billion euros ($133 billion) of French investments.

France has built a dense and diverse network in the Indo-Pacific region. Diplomatically, 36 embassies, some with extensive geographical coverage, cover all countries in the region. In Oceania, there are no fewer than five embassies, situated in Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea. For example, the embassy in Port-Vila, Vanuatu, serves as the only embassy of an EU member state in the country and also covers the Solomon Islands.

Furthermore, over 7,000 military personnel are stationed in the region, with three sovereign forces in the French territories and two presence forces in Djibouti and the United Arab Emirates. The armed forces of New Caledonia regularly participate in fisheries surveillance in the South Pacific on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency. Force projection exercises are now a regular occurrence, with the ongoing unprecedented deployment of a dozen Rafales as part of the Pégase 2023 mission, which will visit several countries.

Culturally, 34 French institutes organize events, festivals, and support artist residencies. Cooperation in education is strengthening, with direct support for the development of the University of Vanuatu, for instance. In the Indo-Pacific, there are also 169 French Alliances that promote the French language, including in Vanuatu, where French is one of the official languages and the country is a member of the International Organization of the Francophonie.

Furthermore, France plays an active role in development aid. The French Development Agency (AFD) allocated 25% of its resources for 2022 to projects in the Indo-Pacific. The AFD’s mandate in the South Pacific has gradually expanded to include regional initiatives on climate change adaptation and mitigation, and biodiversity. One flagship project in collaboration with partners, including Australia, is the Kiwa initiative, which aims to help 19 Pacific countries adapt to climate change and preserve their biodiversity through nature-based solutions.

This French contribution is reflected in the involvement of state agencies such as Expertise France, which provides detached experts to national authorities, and France Volontaires. Over 200 young people have already benefited from the Oceanian Volunteer Service Program. France has also demonstrated its commitment to humanitarian aid in the face of natural disasters, as illustrated by the FRANZ mechanism with Australia and New Zealand, which is celebrating its 30th anniversary. This mechanism recently facilitated assistance to the populations of Vanuatu in 2023, Tonga in 2022, and Papua New Guinea in 2021.

As the intensification of the Sino-American rivalry in the Indo-Pacific is felt worldwide, France intends to offer additional options to the region’s states. However, it is fundamental for the country to position itself appropriately and communicate effectively. The term “balancing power,” in particular, is poorly defined, misunderstood, and even counterproductive. It creates unnecessary doubts among partners and fuels the stereotype of an arrogant country with ambitions disconnected from its actual capabilities. Two concepts could be used to better explain France’s actions in the region.

Firstly, as a proactive power and provider of solutions, France aims to be a responsible country with a unique capacity for mobilization and impetus in the multilateral framework. This international activism translates into the implementation of projects that contribute to solving global problems for the benefit of populations and the mitigation of global imbalances.

Secondly, France also seeks to be an enhancer of sovereignty. Through its actions and cooperation, it facilitates the expression of its partners’ sovereignty by presenting a distinct French and European offering that aims to enable decision-making without constraints. This approach, which involves strengthening capacities and forming coalitions, empowers partners to fully defend their interests.

As proposed in a recent paper for the Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS), to materialize these two concepts better, France should propose the creation of a “Pacific Islands Security Forum.” This forum would bring together citizens, experts, and officials from the region, mainly addressing environmental and human security issues, a priority clearly identified for the Pacific Island states.

This cooperation mechanism would add real value by positioning itself at the nexus of defense, diplomacy, and development, complementing existing forums such as the SPDMM and the IPESF. It would focus on the needs of the actors involved and explicitly aim to identify the levers to activate to assist them in meeting those needs. Far from being a simple forum for dialogue, this would be an action-oriented mechanism.

An annual summit could be first held in New Caledonia in 2024, then alternately in Nouméa and in one of the Pacific Island states’ capitals, starting with Port-Vila in 2025. It would bring together regional players around unifying themes, while identifying and then implementing concrete projects on the appropriate scale. Amid other initiatives, this forum would serve as a symbol of France’s dedication and resolve to collaborate with its regional partners.

Antoine Bondaz ([email protected]) is the director of the Observatory of Multilateralism in the Indo-Pacific at the Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS). He teaches at Sciences Po Paris.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo credit:  Photograph: Ludovic Marin/AFP/Getty Image

PacNet #54 – How China sees the Wagner fiasco

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July 17, 2023

“Within a day, with not a single shot fired and not a drop of blood seen; the ‘armed rebellion’ that attracted global attention was settled.”

That’s how one Chinese news commentary described the Wagner incident that shook Russia. However, in the aftermath of the short-lived uprising, views in China remain diverse and often conflicting.

A view from Beijing

The official response from China has been muted. In a two-line statement, the foreign ministry described the incident as “Russia’s internal affair” and assured of China’s support in helping Moscow “maintain its stability and achieve development and prosperity,” reaffirming its “good neighborliness” and “Comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for the New Era” with Russia. Other opinions, particularly in the media, have been more reflective of the situation.

The hawkish Global Times took shots at the “wishful thinking of the West.” Citing Chinese international relations experts Wang Yiwei and Cui Heng, the report denied that Wagner’s call to move to Moscow constituted an “armed rebellion,” instead calling it a mere display of dissatisfaction with the ruling regime. It further stated that the Kremlin’s ability to stop the revolt within 24 hours refutes any claims of Putin growing weak, calling such analysis one of the many “cognitive warfare” tactics of the West fanning “anti-Russia sentiment” or stemming from ignorance of Russian politics. A report in the People’s Daily similarly credited strong public support to the Russian government as a major factor in defusing the crisis.

However, such assurances have failed to calm Chinese investors, particularly in the energy sector, who rushed to stop shipments as the news of the revolt broke out. Others in the media display similar concerns. An editorial in the China Daily described the situation as an “uneasy calm” which displays Russia’s socio-economic and political problems and contradictions—specifically stemming from the use of private mercenaries—that have come to the fore since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

While the reasons for the mutiny are assessed as ranging from heavy losses incurred during the prolonged war, failure to demilitarize Ukraine, demands for more cash, tussles with the Russian Ministry of Defense and Prigozhin’s own political ambitions; one surpasses all—the Russian defense ministry’s order to incorporate all private mercenaries under its command by July 1. Talking to China’s Observer, military expert Song Zhongping noted that Prigozhin feared losing power and, as the deadline neared, decided to wage a mutiny. While all commentaries criticize Moscow’s overreliance on private mercenaries as “getting caught in one’s own cocoon” (zuojian zifu 作茧自缚), Song stated that Wagner did play an unparalleled role in the war. Being a private military company independent of the state, Wagner took losses without impacting the legitimacy of the Russian state nor its purse.

Though Putin’s political acumen and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s diplomatic skill in handling the crisis have been hailed, many in China believe that the dust is not yet fully settled. Talking to Sina News, Geng Xin noted that the Wagner fiasco was not a “false alarm” as many “contradictions” continue to lurk.

First and foremost being the dilemma in Russia on whether it sees itself as part of the East or the West. Such a phenomenon is coupled with a poor record of economic development, with the Russian political elite’s miscalculations that a return to the former “glory” of the Soviet Union is possible. Another contradiction is the underestimation of Ukraine’s potential to fight back and the disastrous decision to go to war. Third, the lack of an effective military system which allows too much space for private mercenaries poses a major challenge. Fourth, the phenomenon of “chaos giving birth to heroes” (luan shi chu xiaoxiong 乱世出枭雄) i.e. when all political, social, and economic contradictions elevate inequality to the extent that produces men prone to revolt like Prigozhin.

Moreover, Prigozhin not only refused to surrender but openly defied Vladimir Putin by describing Wagner soldiers as “true patriots.” Talking to The Observer, Tan Dekai noted that many in Russia see Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu as a product of the oligarchic system and do not think he is fit for the job. Being a war hero, Prigozhin enjoys popularity, but Russians do not favor him as a leader. The continued presence of several private military forces such as those held by Gazprom is seen as a threat for China since a divided Russia ruled by warlords would invite external forces, particularly the United States, to intervene. Another commentary in Sina News described the incident as the “biggest gray rhino” since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine War, a term Xi Jinping used in his 20th Party Congress Report to refer to unexpected security threats.

Whither the Ukraine war?

Russia has clarified that this incident will not impact the “special military operation” in Ukraine. But many in China are not so sure. The Paper, a Shanghai-based publication, noted that Prigozhin has destabilized the two main arteries of Russia’s military offensive, Rostov Oblast in South and Voronezh Oblast in North. A war between Wagner and the Russian military would have been disastrous but, even with the crisis averted, dealing with the demobilized soldiers and ensuring their loyalty in Prigozhin’s absence would be an uphill task. Beijing is also worried about the misuse of Moscow’s nuclear arsenal. As Ukraine’s counteroffensive intensifies, many in China believe Putin did the right thing to negotiate with Prigozhin, but will he come out stronger? They say he would, but this is dampened by concerns of entrenched problems in post-Soviet Russian society. Analysts in Moscow share similar beliefs. Talking to Russia Today, Dmitry Trenin described the deal as nothing short of a miracle, specifically as concerns were high over a lack of opposition against Prigozhin’s march into Rostov-on-Don and on to Moscow. Vladimir Bruter noted that the incident has heavily tarnished Moscow’s international image and a prolonged warfare with Ukraine would be “too optimistic” to expect. He believes that the need of the hour is to formulate a consistent plan for the military operation.

But will Putin end the war? As of now, no. He would like to deal with the internal challenges to his authority that the incident has exposed and making a move to negotiate first would be equal to conceding defeat.

“No limits” no more?

While Beijing has reaffirmed that its “comprehensive strategic partnership” with Russia in its official statement, opinions reflect that a prolonged war with growing aggression from private military groups is bad news. The main reason behind supporting Russia remains the challenge Moscow presents to the expanding influence of Western liberal ideas that China views as a threat and Beijing’s own sovereignty concerns over Taiwan. However, it will never allow any partnership, no matter how “comprehensive,” to derail economic development that robs Beijing’s international significance and tarnishes the image of the Communist Party at home. Neither can it afford to send military troops in support of Moscow and face Western sanctions. The idea remains to engage so far as the relationship remains profitable but as the tides turn unfavorable, Beijing finds itself caught in the quagmire.

China is hence highly likely to reassess its “no limits” partnership with Moscow, but without an official announcement, just as support for Russia was never explicitly committed to. Beijing is likely to push ahead its peace plan for ending the war once again before Washington does but how well China succeeds depends on to what extent Putin agrees to listen to Beijing, for he certainly has bigger ambitions and far less at stake.

The incident however presents a flickering hope for the United States and China to restart dialogue. Analysts in China agree that ensuring stability in nuclear-armed Russia and bringing the war to an end are concerns Beijing shares with Washington.

Instability in Russia is a mounting concern which China finds hard to address on its own. If sincere attempts to end the war do spring from Beijing, the United States must be ready to work with China. However, for that to happen, Beijing must tone down its prerequisites for dialogue with Washington that have blocked all high-level attempts at thawing the ice. The Wagner incident could facilitate what diplomatic negotiations so far have failed to achieve.

Cherry Hitkari ([email protected]) is a Non-resident Vasey Fellow and Young Leader at Pacific Forum.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo credit: Wagner Group boss Yevgeny Prigozhin in St. Petersburg, Russia, for the funeral of one of his fighters who died in Ukraine, December 24, 2022. AP

PacNet #53 – Washington’s myopia is undercutting its Indo-Pacific partners

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July 13, 2023

An earlier version of this article appeared in The National Interest.

For more from this author, please see his recent chapter of Comparative Connections.

Over the last few weeks, Washington has been abuzz with everything India. On June 22, President Joe Biden, cabinet secretaries, and the U.S. Congress gave a rousing reception to the visiting Indian prime minister Narendra Modi. For his part, the prime minister cheered Republican and Democratic congressmen with his quip that he could “help them reach bipartisan consensus,” referring to the across-the-aisle support India enjoys in Washington.

It was certainly an apt decision to honor the Indian leader, given that the U.S.-India partnership has significantly expanded under President Biden. Both the White House and several members of the Biden administration, from the National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan to the Indo-Pacific Coordinator Kurt Campbell, have characterized it as the “most important bilateral relationship of the twenty-first century.”

However, over the last few months, some of the Biden administration’s regional policies in the Indo-Pacific have done more harm to its partners, particularly India and its geopolitical leverage in the Indo-Pacific region. 

The Biden administration’s foreign policy cut a significant departure from its predecessors until last month, returning to Washington’s old ways: myopic democratic interventions, benevolent outreach to adversarial nations, and partisan bickering. Over the last few weeks, Washington’s primary Indo-Pacific partners, India and Japan, have borne the brunt of these missteps.

President Biden, in a last-minute change of plans, canceled his scheduled trip to Papua New Guinea and Australia to address the debt-ceiling crisis in Washington, with Republicans stalling the Democrats from raising the debt ceiling levels. While Secretary of State Anthony Blinken went ahead with his trip to Papua New Guinea and signed a crucial defense agreement with the Pacific Island nation, Biden canceling that leg of the tour was not the best messaging to a region increasingly falling under China’s orbit.

Nonetheless, Prime Minister Modi went ahead with his travel itinerary as scheduled and turned it into an opportunity to showcase India’s position on the global stage. New Guinea’s president hailed Modi as the leader of the Global South. Taking an implicit jab at the United States and China, the island-nation leader said, “we are victims of global powerplay, and you [Modi] are the leader of Global South. We will rally behind your leadership at global forums.” Prior to Biden’s cancellation, the Indian government had decided to accommodate his visit and cut short their visits as a courtesy to the incoming American presidential delegation.

While this was a minor setback for a coordinated approach toward Chinese expansionism in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean challenge is a more geopolitically complex Gordian knot.

In mid-May, Blinken threatened Bangladesh with sanctions if the Indian Ocean state did not host free and fair elections in the 2024 poll. Suppose the United States were to follow through with its threat. In that case, India and Japan will be in a quandary as they have consistently positioned Bangladesh as a gateway connecting the Indian subcontinent to Southeast Asia for supply chain and infrastructure connectivity initiatives. Geographically, Bangladesh is nestled between India’s state of Bengal to the west and India’s northeastern provinces to the east, bordering a thin strip of land the connects the rest of India to the northeast (also known as the “chicken’s neck”). Thus the densely populated country’s interaction with the rest of the world is directed through India or the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.

Both New Delhi and Tokyo have invested in infrastructure in the region and have long-term plans to invest in Dhaka’s growth. Recently, Japan and India agreed to jointly develop the Matabari deep-sea port in Bangladesh to serve as a “strategic anchor” in the Indian Ocean. Though often underreported, Japanese investment plays a vital role in South Asian development. It is also undeniably India’s Northeast region’s major infrastructure and development partner. Through the Bay of Bengal-Northeast India Industrial Value Chain, the Japanese government envisions increased connectivity between India’s landlocked northeast and Southeast Asia, creating a single economic zone and an alternative trade connectivity project to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida articulating his government’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy in New Delhi in early March this year, called for increased integration of India’s Northeast with Bangladesh to transform the region into a single economic zone.

Moreover, Japan is attempting to capture the businesses moving out of the pricier markets of Southeast Asia, using the Bay of Bengal region. Japan’s regional strategy has neatly complemented the Modi government’s policies. Modi transformed the older “Look East” policy into an “Act East” policy of increasing strategic and economic engagement with Southeast Asia as a countervailing force to China’s involvement in the region. 

Tokyo has slowly and steadily supported this transformation. A case in point is Tokyo and New Delhi hosting the India-Japan Act East forum to discuss cooperation on a range of projects that will increase connectivity in India’s Northeast to Southeast Asia.

India’s Northeast has a history of civil unrest and strife, making it a challenging region for development. Furthermore, its landlocked topography and poor infrastructure limited its connectivity to both its neighboring countries and the rest of India. Only parties interested in the long game or have a vision for the region could invest in that part of the world, and in this case, it is Japan.

Interestingly, as an extension, both Japan and India are engaging the immediate eastern neighbor to Bangladesh and India, Myanmar. Sanctioned by the United States, Myanmar has limited partners on the world stage. Nonetheless, Japan and India have continued engagement with the military junta to prevent the nation from falling entirely under China’s influence.

However, once again, Indo-Japanese interests are affected by America’s sanctions.

Earlier in May, India-Myanmar inaugurated the Sittwe port in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. India supported this port to enhance sea lane connectivity between India’s eastern states and Myanmar. However, since the sanctions, Indian companies have either had to depart Myanmar altogether or face global scrutiny for working with the military junta-led government.

As satellite images released earlier this year indicated, increased activity on the Great Coco Islands of Myanmar had the markings of Chinese military involvement. Situated less than thirty miles north of India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands, any potential militarization of the Coco Islands by the Chinese could pose a significant threat to India’s security in the Indian Ocean. In this geopolitical equation, India cannot afford to disengage from Myanmar. And yet, America’s economic statecraft is undercutting India’s vital regional partnerships.

Henry Kissinger, who celebrated 100 years last May, summed up this dynamic well, “it may be dangerous to be America’s enemy, but to be America’s friend is fatal.” It is undoubtedly proving so for Japan and India, but more so for New Delhi in the Indian Ocean. 

Against the backdrop of these measures comes the Biden administration’s attempts at thawing relations with China. While Biden departs from his predecessors as the only recent president to not ask for Kissinger’s advice, he is beginning to walk in the footsteps of a grand strategist by making attempts to mend ties with China.

From the dialogue in Vienna to Blinken rescheduling his trip to Beijing for last month to the official abandonment of economic “decoupling” for the less confrontational “de-risking,” Washington’s approach to China shows signs of softening. While members of IPEF agreed on moving ahead with a supply chain agreement in Detroit, in the same week, on the sidelines of the APEC meeting, U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai met with her Chinese counterpart to discuss trade and economic ties. Washington’s blow-hot and blow-cold approach does not assure allies and partners of the consistency of its priorities and policies, particularly partners that it courts for strategic competition with China.

Furthermore, Washington’s skewed sanction policies toward democratic backsliding in a few states while calling for engagement with authoritarian China raise questions about the motives of such policies. While the United States has sanctioned Chinese officials allegedly involved in human rights abuses in Xinjiang, it continues to do massive business with Beijing. This selective condemnation only further isolates partners and strengthens Chinese engagement with the sanctioned nations.

Director for Regional Affairs at the Pacific Forum, Rob York, called this misbegotten strategy “a holdover from America’s unipolar moment that we [America] need to outgrow. America’s moral authority, and the benefits of aligning with Washington, are no longer assumed but must be competed for, and sanctions must be employed far more judiciously than they have been.”

This type of awakening to multipolar realities of the world order should inform Washington of the pitfalls and shortsightedness of its foreign policies. America’s sanctions and other tools of economic statecraft should not be used for democratic interventions but to deter its enemies. If not, the United States will have few allies in its strategic competition with China.

Akhil Ramesh ([email protected]) is a Senior Fellow at the Pacific Forum and author of the US-India chapter for Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal of Bilateral Relations in the Indo-Pacific.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

Photo: President Joe Biden and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi walk along the Colonnade to the Oval Office after a state arrival ceremony Thursday on the South Lawn of the White House.Stefani Reynolds / Pool via AP

PacNet #52 – 2023 Issues & Insights half-year index

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July 12, 2023

Issues & Insights is Pacific Forum’s publication series that includes special reports (SR), conference reports (CR), and working papers (WP). These in-depth analyses cover a range of topics and are published on an occasional basis. The following have been published in 2023 and are available online here.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR1 — Toward a Unified NATO Response to the People’s Republic of China

By Rob York

Following the Cold War’s end there were those who questioned NATO’s continued relevance. Such views may have found little currency among scholars of foreign policy and security, but among the general public it was not unheard of to wonder why, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 its rival organization did not also become defunct, especially given the Russian Federation’s friendlier tilt in the decade that followed. On the part of the United States, by the 2010’s a fatigue had settled in among much of the populace over US foreign commitments, especially regarding partner countries not perceived as pulling their own weight. By the middle of that decade, that fatigue had begun to manifest itself in US election results.

Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and its brazen invasion of Ukraine last year may not have succeeded in bringing Ukraine to heel or establishing Moscow as a great military power again, but it did accomplish two other things. For one, it demonstrated for the world what the countries separated by the Atlantic could achieve—even indirectly—by helping partners (even non-NATO members) acquire the means to defend themselves. For another, and for all Putin’s claims to the contrary, it showed that nations near Russia’s western border have a very good reason for wanting NATO membership. Putin, more so than any mainstream American or continental European security scholar, has demonstrated the alliance’s continued relevance in providing for the security of countries that desire self-determination and alignment with the liberal, rules-based international order.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR2 — The World After Taiwan’s Fall

By David Santoro and Ralph Cossa

Let us start with our bottom line: a failure of the United States to come to Taiwan’s aid—politically, economically, and militarily—would devastate the Unites States’ credibility and defense commitments to its allies and partners, not just in Asia, but globally. If the United States tries but fails to prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan, the impact could be equally devastating unless there is a concentrated, coordinated U.S. attempt with like-minded allies and partners to halt further Chinese aggression and eventually roll back Beijing’s ill-gotten gains.

This is not a hypothetical assessment. Taiwan has been increasingly under the threat of a military takeover by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and, even today, is under attack politically, economically, psychologically, and through so-called “gray zone” military actions short of actual combat. The U.S. government, U.S. allies, and others have begun to pay attention to this problem, yet to this day, they have not sufficiently appreciated the strategic implications that such a takeover would generate. To address this problem, the Pacific Forum has conducted a multi-authored study to raise awareness in Washington, key allied capitals, and beyond about the consequences of a Chinese victory in a war over Taiwan and, more importantly, to drive them to take appropriate action to prevent it.

The study, which provides six national perspectives on this question (a U.S., Australian, Japanese, Korean, Indian, and European perspective) and fed its findings and recommendations into the second round of the DTRA SI-STT-sponsored (and Pacific Forum-run) Track 2 “U.S.-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue,”[1] outlines these strategic implications in two alternative scenarios. In the first scenario, China attacks Taiwan and it falls with no outside assistance from the United States or others. In the other scenario, Taiwan falls to China despite outside assistance (i.e., “a too little, too late” scenario).

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, WP1 — Why Gender Balance Matters for Equity and Peace in the Indo-Pacific 

By Maryruth Belsey Priebe

Who shows up at events and conferences matters. Public and closed-door events are where successes and failures are analyzed; where conceptions about security, what it means, and how we can achieve it bump up against one another; and where problems are solved in novel ways. The greater the diversity of perspectives, the more powerful the outcomes. But within the security sector, predominantly all-male panels—or “manels”—suggest a lack of gender diversity, resulting in the exclusion of women, people of non-binary identities, or both. Manels represent a more serious lack of gender inclusion at leadership levels, making it difficult for women to gain recognition through promotion to senior decision-making positions. The following is a discussion of Pacific Forum’s work to study more than nine years of programming with a goal of understanding historical trends in order to implement and measure policies to increase the number of women attending and speaking at Pacific Forum events. The analysis identified room for improvement, and marks a jumping-off point for Pacific Forum’s work on mainstreaming gender within institutional programming.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, WP2 — Digital China: The Strategy and Its Geopolitical Implications 

By David Dorman and John Hemmings

Over the past few years, there has been growing concern inside the United States, Europe, and in the Indo-Pacific on the strategic direction behind China’s technology policies. Beginning with the debate over 5G and Huawei, this debate has covered Artificial Intelligence (AI), quantum teachnology, and semi-conductors – a foundational technology. And despite a large number of policies in place – Made in China: 2025, Cyber Super Power, and the New Generation AI Development Plan – few in the West have known China’s overall digital grand strategy.

This report discusses the rise and current state of “Digital China,” a strategy supported by General Secretary Xi Jinping to make China more competitive against the West through digital transformation. It has become the overarching strategy for digital development in the eyes of the Chinese Communist Party leadership, surpassing other initiatives like the Digital Silk Road and 5G. Digital China aims to challenge the existing global system and has profound implications for China’s development, great power competition, and international norms. The Party leadership has incorporated “data” into its digital economy, creating a concept called “Digital Marxism.” The strategy also seeks to foster innovation through the digital transformation of tools, talent, and learning as a means to facilitate China’s rise as a global power and challenge to the West.

The US and its allies have begun to effect strategic counter-effect to the myriad of PRC technology policies, there is almost zero understanding or public discussion of this digital grand strategy. Whether inattention, mistranslation, or obfuscation, Digital China has been mostly missed by the West over the past decade.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR3 — Strategic Competition and Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

By Carl Baker

There is a growing acceptance among countries in the Into-Pacific region that strategic competiiton between the United States and China is changing perceptions about security and the adequacy of the existing security architecture. While some have characterized the competition between the two as a new Cold War, it is clear that what is happening in the region is far more complex than the competition that characterized the original Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. First, the economic integration that has taken place since the early 1990s makes it much more difficult to draw bright ideological lines between the two sides. Further, the Asian context of the emerging competition is one where the two competitors have grown to share power. As the dominant military power, the United States has been the primary security guarantor in Asia and beyond. China, on the other hand, has emerged over the past decades as the primary economic catalyst in Asia and beyond. Currently, each side seems increasingly unwilling to accept that arrangement.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR4 – A History of Shared Values, A Future of Shared Strategic Interests: US-Australia Relations in the Indo-Pacific 

By Rob York

Authors of this volume participated in the inaugural U.S.-Australia Next-Generation Leaders Initiative, sponsored by the U.S. Department of State through the U.S. Embassy in Canberra. With backgrounds from academia, public policy, civil society, and industry, the cohort brings rich insights on the past, present, and future of the U.S.-Australia relations. This program was conducted from February 2021 – September 2021.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, CR1 – South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Emerging US-Japan-Philippines Trilateral 

By Jeffrey Ordaniel

The U.S.-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Maritime Security Dialogue conducted in December 2022 confirmed that there is very little difference in threat perceptions regarding the East and South China Seas. The three countries view China’s increasingly assertive claims to the territories and maritime zones in the two bodies of water as antithetical to their shared vision of a free, open, rules-based Indo-Pacific. China’s reapid military expansion, including unprecedented nuclear weapons and missile buildup, reinforces the urgency of the threat. Japanese and Philippine interlocutors worry that as China approaches nuclear parity with the United States, the region’s strategic environment will worsen. American participants emphasized greater and tangible demonstration of alliance commitments and agreed that some risk-taking is required to push back against Chinese coercion. There was a consensus about the challenge of addressing Beijing’s gray zone activities that have so far succeeded in seizing territories and maritime areas in the South China Sea and establishing regular intrusions into Japanese waters in the East China Sea. Participants struggled to find a strategy to blunt China’s salami-slicing tactics while avoiding escalation and armed conflict.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, WP3 – Understanding JI Resilience and Australia’s Counterterrorism Efforts in Indonesia

By Tom Connolly

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) remains one of Indonesia’s longest standing state security threats. It has survived major organizational transformations, state security crackdowns, and international military operations in its pursuit of an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia that could extend to incorporate Malaysia, Singapore, and the southern Philippines. Jemaah Islamiyah rose to prominence for its role in orchestrating the 2002 Bali Bombings, which prompted the United States and Australia to engage Jakarta with the shared goal of destroying the organization and its links to al-Qaeda. Security pressures from Indonesian security services and international forces led to the dismantling of much of Jemaah Islamiyah’s leadership by 2007, which pushed it into a state of hibernation, where members focused on consolidating numbers and religious outreach. The emergence of the Islamic State and its Southeast Asian affiliates in 2014 occupied much of the Indonesian security services’ resources, which gave space to Jemaah Islamiyah to regenerate its strength with renewed vigor. The 2017 discovery of a JI military training program in Syria re-alerted Indonesian counterterrorism authorities to the risk posed by the group, and successive waves of arrests and crackdowns ensued. Although the COVID-19 pandemic meant that many terrorist groups ceased offensive operations and maintained a low profile, Jemaah Islamiyah began to infiltrate Jakarta’s state apparatus, civil society, and academia to promote its political objectives. Jemaah Islamiyah’s long history in Indonesia has proven it to be adaptable, patient, and persistent in pursuit of its objectives. Although it is not currently engaged in military operations, JI’s long history in Indonesia has shown the group is adaptable, patient, and long-term in its thinking. Observers suspect that leaders in Jemaah Islamiyah are biding their time and seeking gaps in state authority that they can exploit to pursue their organizational goals.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR5 – ROK-US Alliance: Linchpin for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

By Rob York

The US-ROK alliance in 2023 celebrates its 70th anniversary, and in both countries remains broadly popular. Previous doubts that both countries have had about the other’s commitment have largely given way to a sense of shared opportunities, and shared challenges. Not only is there an ever-more belligerent North Korea, with its growing nuclear and missile arsenals, but the People’s Republic of China uses both military and economic means to coerce other countries and Russia has demonstrated a willingness to upend norms, redraw borders, and dare former partners (including Seoul) to risk its ire.

This is also an era of the minilateral, as the US seeks to move past its previous hub-and-spokes alliance system in Asia and draw its partners into closer cooperation. South Korea, especially under its current administration, demonstrates increased interest in becoming a regional player, with its recent gestures toward old frenemy Japan representing a key test: historical differences between the US’ two closest partners have prevented a “normal” relationship from emerging despite many similarities in political systems, values, and interests, and Korean public opinion remains skeptical of the Seoul-Tokyo rapprochement. Furthermore, there is always a chance that issues complicating US-ROK relations in the past—conduct by US military personnel in Korea, trade disputes, environmental concerns related to US bases—could resurface.

All of these issues present challenges for the alliance that will require addressing. In that light, the Pacific Forum, with the generous support of the Korea Foundation, has launched the “ROK-US Next Generation Leaders Initiative” program, bringing together young burgeoning scholars and analysts from both countries to discuss pressing issues in the alliance the way forward. This edited volume contains edited papers on pressing topics—extended deterrence, North Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and much more—by rising scholars we expect to see addressing these issues in the years to come. Their active engagement, we believe, will help the alliance endure another 70 years, will providing for the security and prosperity of both countries.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR6 – Pressing Security Concerns in Southeast Asia: Next-Generation Perspectives

By John Hemmings

Southeast Asia is a pivotal sub-region of the Indo-Pacific. Spanning 1,700,000 square miles, its total population is 676 million – around 8.5% of the world’s population – and has a collective GDP of US$3.67 trillion (as of 2022). Over the years, it has been associated with both economic dynamism and significant security challenges. As authors in this volume note, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, disagreements over water rights in the Mekong Delta, and the current conflict in Myanmar highlight fault lines not only between Southeast Asian states themselves, but also between great powers such as China and the United States. There are many more – the EU, India, Japan, Australia, and South Korea – that pay close attention to developments in the sub-region. Maintaining peace and stability in a region that plays host to one-third of global sea-borne trade, hosts major undersea internet cables, and is a major thoroughfare for energy supplies from the Middle East to the advanced manufacturing hubs in China, Japan, and South Korea is both challenging and complicated.

The primary mechanism for engagement with Southeast Asian countries is through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its associated bodies. ASEAN promotes the principle of “ASEAN centrality” to prevent major power interference in the region and retain influence over security cooperation. However, the evolution of institutions and processes associated with ASEAN is lagging behind the pressing nature of regional challenges.

The “ASEAN Way” of informal consultation, non-interference, and consensus has fostered internal cohesion but hindered collective responses to conflicts. ASEAN’s influence is also vulnerable to great powers that can use their leverage to break consensus. While some believe ASEAN will adapt over time, others are skeptical about its ability to maintain its role in regional security.

The essays in the collection cover a broad range of security issues, including traditional and non-traditional ones. Traditional security topics include the South China Sea dispute, the political crisis in Myanmar, and dealing with rising Chinese influence. Non-traditional security issues encompass climate change’s impact on the Philippines and Timor-Leste, human trafficking in Vietnam, and Thailand’s brain drain challenge.

The essays reflect the diverse perspectives and challenges in Southeast Asia. They cover issues that range from well-covered topics to unique perspectives on local variations of international issues. The collection aims to spark regional conversations and discussions on these pressing security issues.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR7 — Southeast Asia’s Clean Energy Transition: A Role for Nuclear Power?

By David Santoro and Carl Baker

To bring clarity on these developments and their implications in Southeast Asia, the Pacific Forum commissioned several Southeast Asian scholars to write analytical papers on the energy transition that is underway in the region, which are compiled in this volume. Each chapter looks at the current and possible future energy landscape of a specific Southeast Asian country and focuses especially on the place and role of nuclear power in it. This “nuclear focus” is important because, for decades, most Southeast Asian countries have expressed on-and-off interest in nuclear power but never brought it online. Interest is now picking up again, especially for SMRs, so if this time one or several Southeast Asian countries successfully went nuclear, it would be a first.

It is good timing, therefore, to devote attention to how Southeast Asian countries are thinking about nuclear power in today’s context, for multiple reasons, including those related to safety, security, and safeguards.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged.

2023 Issues & Insights Half-Year Index

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July 12, 2023

Issues & Insights is Pacific Forum’s publication series that includes special reports (SR), conference reports (CR), and working papers (WP). These in-depth analyses cover a range of topics and are published on an occasional basis. The following have been published in 2023 and are available online here.

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR1 — Toward a Unified NATO Response to the People’s Republic of China by Rob York

Following the Cold War’s end there were those who questioned NATO’s continued relevance. Such views may have found little currency among scholars of foreign policy and security, but among the general public it was not unheard of to wonder why, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 its rival organization did not also become defunct, especially given the Russian Federation’s friendlier tilt in the decade that followed. On the part of the United States, by the 2010’s a fatigue had settled in among much of the populace over US foreign commitments, especially regarding partner countries not perceived as pulling their own weight. By the middle of that decade, that fatigue had begun to manifest itself in US election results.

Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and its brazen invasion of Ukraine last year may not have succeeded in bringing Ukraine to heel or establishing Moscow as a great military power again, but it did accomplish two other things. For one, it demonstrated for the world what the countries separated by the Atlantic could achieve—even indirectly—by helping partners (even non-NATO members) acquire the means to defend themselves. For another, and for all Putin’s claims to the contrary, it showed that nations near Russia’s western border have a very good reason for wanting NATO membership. Putin, more so than any mainstream American or continental European security scholar, has demonstrated the alliance’s continued relevance in providing for the security of countries that desire self-determination and alignment with the liberal, rules-based international order.

 

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR2 — The World After Taiwan’s Fall Edited by David Santoro and Ralph Cossa

Let us start with our bottom line: a failure of the United States to come to Taiwan’s aid—politically, economically, and militarily—would devastate the Unites States’ credibility and defense commitments to its allies and partners, not just in Asia, but globally. If the United States tries but fails to prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan, the impact could be equally devastating unless there is a concentrated, coordinated U.S. attempt with like-minded allies and partners to halt further Chinese aggression and eventually roll back Beijing’s ill-gotten gains.

This is not a hypothetical assessment. Taiwan has been increasingly under the threat of a military takeover by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and, even today, is under attack politically, economically, psychologically, and through so-called “gray zone” military actions short of actual combat. The U.S. government, U.S. allies, and others have begun to pay attention to this problem, yet to this day, they have not sufficiently appreciated the strategic implications that such a takeover would generate. To address this problem, the Pacific Forum has conducted a multi-authored study to raise awareness in Washington, key allied capitals, and beyond about the consequences of a Chinese victory in a war over Taiwan and, more importantly, to drive them to take appropriate action to prevent it.

The study, which provides six national perspectives on this question (a U.S., Australian, Japanese, Korean, Indian, and European perspective) and fed its findings and recommendations into the second round of the DTRA SI-STT-sponsored (and Pacific Forum-run) Track 2 “U.S.-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue,”[1] outlines these strategic implications in two alternative scenarios. In the first scenario, China attacks Taiwan and it falls with no outside assistance from the United States or others. In the other scenario, Taiwan falls to China despite outside assistance (i.e., “a too little, too late” scenario).

 

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, WP1 — Why Gender Balance Matters for Equity and Peace in the Indo-Pacific by Maryruth Belsey Priebe

Who shows up at events and conferences matters. Public and closed-door events are where successes and failures are analyzed; where conceptions about security, what it means, and how we can achieve it bump up against one another; and where problems are solved in novel ways. The greater the diversity of perspectives, the more powerful the outcomes. But within the security sector, predominantly all-male panels—or “manels”—suggest a lack of gender diversity, resulting in the exclusion of women, people of non-binary identities, or both. Manels represent a more serious lack of gender inclusion at leadership levels, making it difficult for women to gain recognition through promotion to senior decision-making positions. The following is a discussion of Pacific Forum’s work to study more than nine years of programming with a goal of understanding historical trends in order to implement and measure policies to increase the number of women attending and speaking at Pacific Forum events. The analysis identified room for improvement, and marks a jumping-off point for Pacific Forum’s work on mainstreaming gender within institutional programming.

 

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, WP2 — Digital China: The Strategy and Its Geopolitical Implications by Dr. David Dorman and Dr. John Hemmings

Over the past few years, there has been growing concern inside the United States, Europe, and in the Indo-Pacific on the strategic direction behind China’s technology policies. Beginning with the debate over 5G and Huawei, this debate has covered Artificial Intelligence (AI), quantum teachnology, and semi-conductors – a foundational technology. And despite a large number of policies in place – Made in China: 2025, Cyber Super Power, and the New Generation AI Development Plan – few in the West have known China’s overall digital grand strategy.

This report discusses the rise and current state of “Digital China,” a strategy supported by General Secretary Xi Jinping to make China more competitive against the West through digital transformation. It has become the overarching strategy for digital development in the eyes of the Chinese Communist Party leadership, surpassing other initiatives like the Digital Silk Road and 5G. Digital China aims to challenge the existing global system and has profound implications for China’s development, great power competition, and international norms. The Party leadership has incorporated “data” into its digital economy, creating a concept called “Digital Marxism.” The strategy also seeks to foster innovation through the digital transformation of tools, talent, and learning as a means to facilitate China’s rise as a global power and challenge to the West.

The US and its allies have begun to effect strategic counter-effect to the myriad of PRC technology policies, there is almost zero understanding or public discussion of this digital grand strategy. Whether inattention, mistranslation, or obfuscation, Digital China has been mostly missed by the West over the past decade.

 

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR3 — Strategic Competition and Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific by Carl Baker

There is a growing acceptance among countries in the Into-Pacific region that strategic competiiton between the United States and China is changing perceptions about security and the adequacy of the existing security architecture. While some have characterized the competition between the two as a new Cold War, it is clear that what is happening in the region is far more complex than the competition that characterized the original Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. First, the economic integration that has taken place since the early 1990s makes it much more difficult to draw bright ideological lines between the two sides. Further, the Asian context of the emerging competition is one where the two competitors have grown to share power. As the dominant military power, the United States has been the primary security guarantor in Asia and beyond. China, on the other hand, has emerged over the past decades as the primary economic catalyst in Asia and beyond. Currently, each side seems increasingly unwilling to accept that arrangement.

 

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR4 – A History of Shared Values, A Future of Shared Strategic Interests: US-Australia Relations in the Indo-Pacific by Rob York

Authors of this volume participated in the inaugural U.S.-Australia Next-Generation Leaders Initiative, sponsored by the U.S. Department of State through the U.S. Embassy in Canberra. With backgrounds from academia, public policy, civil society, and industry, the cohort brings rich insights on the past, present, and future of the U.S.-Australia relations. This program was conducted from February 2021 – September 2021.

 

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, CR1 – South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Emerging US-Japan-Philippines Trilateral by Jeffrey Ordaniel

The U.S.-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Maritime Security Dialogue conducted in December 2022 confirmed that there is very little difference in threat perceptions regarding the East and South China Seas. The three countries view China’s increasingly assertive claims to the territories and maritime zones in the two bodies of water as antithetical to their shared vision of a free, open, rules-based Indo-Pacific. China’s reapid military expansion, including unprecedented nuclear weapons and missile buildup, reinforces the urgency of the threat. Japanese and Philippine interlocutors worry that as China approaches nuclear parity with the United States, the region’s strategic environment will worsen. American participants emphasized greater and tangible demonstration of alliance commitments and agreed that some risk-taking is required to push back against Chinese coercion. There was a consensus about the challenge of addressing Beijing’s gray zone activities that have so far succeeded in seizing territories and maritime areas in the South China Sea and establishing regular intrusions into Japanese waters in the East China Sea. Participants struggled to find a strategy to blunt China’s salami-slicing tactics while avoiding escalation and armed conflict.

 

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, WP3 – Understanding JI Resilience and Australia’s Counterterrorism Efforts in Indonesia by Tom Connolly

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) remains one of Indonesia’s longest standing state security threats. It has survived major organizational transformations, state security crackdowns, and international military operations in its pursuit of an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia that could extend to incorporate Malaysia, Singapore, and the southern Philippines. Jemaah Islamiyah rose to prominence for its role in orchestrating the 2002 Bali Bombings, which prompted the United States and Australia to engage Jakarta with the shared goal of destroying the organization and its links to al-Qaeda. Security pressures from Indonesian security services and international forces led to the dismantling of much of Jemaah Islamiyah’s leadership by 2007, which pushed it into a state of hibernation, where members focused on consolidating numbers and religious outreach. The emergence of the Islamic State and its Southeast Asian affiliates in 2014 occupied much of the Indonesian security services’ resources, which gave space to Jemaah Islamiyah to regenerate its strength with renewed vigor. The 2017 discovery of a JI military training program in Syria re-alerted Indonesian counterterrorism authorities to the risk posed by the group, and successive waves of arrests and crackdowns ensued. Although the COVID-19 pandemic meant that many terrorist groups ceased offensive operations and maintained a low profile, Jemaah Islamiyah began to infiltrate Jakarta’s state apparatus, civil society, and academia to promote its political objectives. Jemaah Islamiyah’s long history in Indonesia has proven it to be adaptable, patient, and persistent in pursuit of its objectives. Although it is not currently engaged in military operations, JI’s long history in Indonesia has shown the group is adaptable, patient, and long-term in its thinking. Observers suspect that leaders in Jemaah Islamiyah are biding their time and seeking gaps in state authority that they can exploit to pursue their organizational goals.

 

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR5 – ROK-US Alliance: Linchpin for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific by Rob York

The US-ROK alliance in 2023 celebrates its 70th anniversary, and in both countries remains broadly popular. Previous doubts that both countries have had about the other’s commitment have largely given way to a sense of shared opportunities, and shared challenges. Not only is there an ever-more belligerent North Korea, with its growing nuclear and missile arsenals, but the People’s Republic of China uses both military and economic means to coerce other countries and Russia has demonstrated a willingness to upend norms, redraw borders, and dare former partners (including Seoul) to risk its ire.

This is also an era of the minilateral, as the US seeks to move past its previous hub-and-spokes alliance system in Asia and draw its partners into closer cooperation. South Korea, especially under its current administration, demonstrates increased interest in becoming a regional player, with its recent gestures toward old frenemy Japan representing a key test: historical differences between the US’ two closest partners have prevented a “normal” relationship from emerging despite many similarities in political systems, values, and interests, and Korean public opinion remains skeptical of the Seoul-Tokyo rapprochement. Furthermore, there is always a chance that issues complicating US-ROK relations in the past—conduct by US military personnel in Korea, trade disputes, environmental concerns related to US bases—could resurface.

All of these issues present challenges for the alliance that will require addressing. In that light, the Pacific Forum, with the generous support of the Korea Foundation, has launched the “ROK-US Next Generation Leaders Initiative” program, bringing together young burgeoning scholars and analysts from both countries to discuss pressing issues in the alliance the way forward. This edited volume contains edited papers on pressing topics—extended deterrence, North Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and much more—by rising scholars we expect to see addressing these issues in the years to come. Their active engagement, we believe, will help the alliance endure another 70 years, will providing for the security and prosperity of both countries.

 

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR6 – Pressing Security Concerns in Southeast Asia: Next-Generation Perspectives by John Hemmings

Southeast Asia is a pivotal sub-region of the Indo-Pacific. Spanning 1,700,000 square miles, its total population is 676 million – around 8.5% of the world’s population – and has a collective GDP of US$3.67 trillion (as of 2022). Over the years, it has been associated with both economic dynamism and significant security challenges. As authors in this volume note, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, disagreements over water rights in the Mekong Delta, and the current conflict in Myanmar highlight fault lines not only between Southeast Asian states themselves, but also between great powers such as China and the United States. There are many more – the EU, India, Japan, Australia, and South Korea – that pay close attention to developments in the sub-region. Maintaining peace and stability in a region that plays host to one-third of global sea-borne trade, hosts major undersea internet cables, and is a major thoroughfare for energy supplies from the Middle East to the advanced manufacturing hubs in China, Japan, and South Korea is both challenging and complicated.

The primary mechanism for engagement with Southeast Asian countries is through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its associated bodies. ASEAN promotes the principle of “ASEAN centrality” to prevent major power interference in the region and retain influence over security cooperation. However, the evolution of institutions and processes associated with ASEAN is lagging behind the pressing nature of regional challenges.

The “ASEAN Way” of informal consultation, non-interference, and consensus has fostered internal cohesion but hindered collective responses to conflicts. ASEAN’s influence is also vulnerable to great powers that can use their leverage to break consensus. While some believe ASEAN will adapt over time, others are skeptical about its ability to maintain its role in regional security.

The essays in the collection cover a broad range of security issues, including traditional and non-traditional ones. Traditional security topics include the South China Sea dispute, the political crisis in Myanmar, and dealing with rising Chinese influence. Non-traditional security issues encompass climate change’s impact on the Philippines and Timor-Leste, human trafficking in Vietnam, and Thailand’s brain drain challenge.

The essays reflect the diverse perspectives and challenges in Southeast Asia. They cover issues that range from well-covered topics to unique perspectives on local variations of international issues. The collection aims to spark regional conversations and discussions on these pressing security issues.

 

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, SR7 — Southeast Asia’s Clean Energy Transition: A Role for Nuclear Power? by David Santoro and Carl Baker

To bring clarity on these developments and their implications in Southeast Asia, the Pacific Forum commissioned several Southeast Asian scholars to write analytical papers on the energy transition that is underway in the region, which are compiled in this volume. Each chapter looks at the current and possible future energy landscape of a specific Southeast Asian country and focuses especially on the place and role of nuclear power in it. This “nuclear focus” is important because, for decades, most Southeast Asian countries have expressed on-and-off interest in nuclear power but never brought it online. Interest is now picking up again, especially for SMRs, so if this time one or several Southeast Asian countries successfully went nuclear, it would be a first.

It is good timing, therefore, to devote attention to how Southeast Asian countries are thinking about nuclear power in today’s context, for multiple reasons, including those related to safety, security, and safeguards.

PacNet #51 – 2023 PacNet Commentary half-year index

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July 7, 2023

The comprehensive half-year index includes each PacNet commentary published from January through June 2023 below. Click here to request a PacNet subscription.

  1. Taking the US-India relationship to the next level by David Santoro and Akhil Ramesh
  2. The Indian Coast Guard, the Quad, a free and open Indo-Pacific by Dr. Pooja Bhatt
  3. The 118th Congress and China policy – Continuity over change in defending America by Robert Sutter
  4. The Japan Coast Guard’s role in realizing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific by Capt. Kentaro Furuya (JCG)
  5. Australia’s Maritime Border Command: Grappling with the Quad to realize a free and open Indo-Pacific by Kate Clayton and Dr. Bec Strating
  6. Comparative Connections summary: January 2023
  7. Dealing with increased Chinese aggressiveness – PART ONE by Ralph A. Cossa
  8. Dealing with increased Chinese aggressiveness – PART TWO by Ralph A. Cossa
  9. The US Coast Guard: Provide public goods for a free and open Indo-Pacific by James R. Sullivan
  10. The inconvenient trust: Aspirations vs realities of coexistence between “the West” and China by Stephen Nagy
  11. What China’s challenge to NATO is, and what it isn’t by Rob York
  12. It’s up to the National Unity Government to forge “Union Spirit” in Myanmar by Shwe Yee Oo
  13. After China’s Party Congress, steeling for competition with the West by Kim Fassler
  14. South Korea’s Indo-Pacific pivot strategy by David Scott
  15. For India and ASEAN, an opportune reorientation by Dr. Shristi Pukhrem
  16. The world after Taiwan’s fall – PART ONE by David Santoro
  17. The world after Taiwan’s fall – PART TWO by David Santoro
  18. China has a digital grand strategy. Does the president know? by Dr. David Dorman and Dr. John Hemmings
  19. Rare earths realism: Breaking the PRC’s global refining monopoly by Brandt Mabuni
  20. How feminist is Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy – PART ONE: The Good by Maryruth Belsey Priebe and Astha Chadha
  21. How feminist is Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy – PART TWO: The ‘Needs Improvement’ by Maryruth Belsey Priebe and Astha Chadha
  22. The refresh of the Integrated Review: Putting Britain at the heart of the Atlantic-Pacific world by James Rogers
  23. Japan’s new strategic policy: Three overlooked takeaways by Thomas Wilkins
  24. How to help Korea-Japan rapprochement endure by Rob York
  25. Bangladesh’s remarkable journey and challenges ahead by Md Mufassir Rashid
  26. The UK integrated review and integrated deterrence by Brig Rory Copinger-Symes and Dr. John Hemmings
  27. Why China’s Middle East diplomacy doesn’t herald a new world order by Henry Rome and Grant Rumley
  28. A principled approach to maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific by Ariel Stenek
  29. Toward a resilient supply chain to counter Chinese economic coercion by Su Hyun Lee
  30. Now is the time for a US-Japan-Taiwan security trilateral by Masatoshi Murakami
  31. Time for a shift on the Korean Peninsula by Daniel R. Depetris
  32. Europe’s China confusion does the world a disservice by Brad Glosserman
  33. Myanmar’s Coco Islands: A concern not to be ignored by Shristi Pukhrem
  34. The rise of ISKP in South Asia: A threat to regional stability by Neeraj Singh Manhas
  35. Mekong water usage tests China’s claimed good-neighborliness by Denny Roy
  36. How Biden can make the most of his Pacific Islands trip by Michael Walsh
  37. Comparative Connections Summary: May 2023
  38. EU holds the key to US-China rivalry by Stephen Olson
  39. AUKUS: Enhancing Undersea Deterrence by John Hemmings
  40. Decoding the infrastructure development on Myanmar’s Coco Islands by Shwe Yee Oo
  41. ASEAN unity and the Russia-Ukraine crisis by Shakthi De Silva
  42. Coast Guard cooperation: Heading off a troubling storm? by John Bradford and Scott Edwards
  43. Indo-Pacific middle powers: Rethinking roles and preferences by Alexander M. Hynd and Thomas Wilkins
  44. What happens in Crimea will determine Taiwan’s fate by David Kirichenko
  45. G7 attendance highlights South Korea’s growing stature by Jennifer Ahn
  46. Bangladesh’s Indo-Pacific outlook: A model for maintaining balance by Doreen Chowdhury
  47. Breaking the US-China logjam by Daniel R. Depetris
  48. A work in progress: The Indo-Pacific partnership for maritime domain awareness by Ahana Roy
  49. China’s military engagements with Cuba: Implications of a strategic advance in Latin America by R. Evan Ellis
  50. Despite Blinken’s trip, the US’ slide toward war with China continues by William Overholt

Photo: President Joe Biden speaks with Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi at the G20 Summit by Wikimedia commons. 

Issues & Insights Vol. 23, CR1 – South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Emerging US-Japan-Philippines Trilateral

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Executive Summary

The U.S.-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Maritime Security Dialogue conducted in December 2022 confirmed that there is very little difference in threat perceptions regarding the East and South China Seas. The three countries view China’s increasingly assertive claims to the territories and maritime zones in the two bodies of water as antithetical to their shared vision of a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific. China’s rapid military expansion, including unprecedented nuclear weapons and missile buildup, reinforces the urgency of the threat. Japanese and Philippine interlocutors worry that as China approaches nuclear parity with the United States, the region’s strategic environment will worsen. American participants emphasized greater and tangible demonstration of alliance commitments and agreed that some risk-taking is required to push back against Chinese coercion. There was a consensus about the challenge of addressing Beijing’s gray zone activities that have so far succeeded in seizing territories and maritime areas in the South China Sea and establishing regular intrusions into Japanese waters in the East China Sea. Participants struggled to find a strategy to blunt China’s salami-slicing tactics while avoiding escalation and armed conflict.

Key Findings & Recommendations

The geographic locations of the Philippines and Japan make them frontline allies in addressing maritime security challenges brought about by an increasingly assertive China. Long term, Chinese coercion is expected to worsen  as  it  commissions  new  vessels,  deploys sophisticated missile systems, and approaches nuclear parity with the United States. The three countries should be willing to take some risks to prevent China’s coercion from succeeding. The alliances need to be reinforced through more explicit demonstration of commitments. Discussion between these countries on the strategic implications of Beijing’s rapid nuclear and missile buildup should commence. The dialogue emphasized these findings, among other takeaways.

Finding: One function of Beijing’s gray zone operations is to test the resolve of other claimants and the United States, hoping they prioritize de-escalation to avoid armed conflict and eventually back down. During a “gray zone” crisis, prioritizing de-escalation when China escalates will likely result in fait accompli, with Beijing gaining more maritime spaces and territories.

  • Recommendation: The United States, Japan, and the Philippines should be willing to take some risks (for example, by conducting operations to get past a blockade instead of abandoning the mission) to prevent China’s coercion from succeeding.

Finding: Chinese gray zone coercion in the South China Sea follows a pattern. Militia vessels first establish a presence in another country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), inside the nine-dash line. Since they pose as fishing vessels, they force other claimants to consider two difficult options: either conduct law enforcement operations against the vessels, risking tension with China or simply monitor and record. CCG vessels and occasionally PLA Navy vessels anchor close by to deter other claimants from taking action.

  • Recommendation: Operationally, the United States and its allies should consider abandoning the concept of gray zone and instead draw a clear line between benign peaceful activities and non-peaceful activities to encompass operations carried out by civilian agents taking orders from military agencies.
  • Recommendation: Instead of identifying China’s actions as being in the gray zone, which leads to confusion about how to respond without risking armed conflict, the United States and its allies should instead match the escalation and turn the tables on China, for instance by reinforcing presence to maintain the status quo, instead of focusing on ways to de-escalate and end the crisis.

Finding: When Washington committed to the Japan- administered Senkaku Islands in 2014 and refused to offer the same to Philippine-administered land features in the South China Sea, the credibility of the U.S.-Philippine alliance significantly decreased, which resulted in more Chinese assertiveness and stronger voices in the Philippines calling for an accommodation of Chinese security preferences.

  • Recommendation: The United States needs to become more willing to commit explicitly to existing defense treaties during crises to increase deterrence while also compelling China to reverse course.

Finding: There are legal constraints to Japan’s response to China’s gray zone challenges. For instance, the JCG is legally mandated to conduct law enforcement operations against fishing vessels, and even against militia vessels, as they are not sovereign immune vessels. The JMSDF is in charge of maritime security operations but is only allowed to act when the JCG cannot manage a specific threat and when the defense minister has given an order. The JCG cannot conduct law enforcement operations against CCG vessels, which are sovereign immune vessels. However, the JMSDF also cannot conduct maritime security operations against CCG vessels because they are not considered warships by the Japanese government. Meanwhile, the U.S. military has made clear since April 2019 that it would make no distinction between Chinese Coast Guard and militia boats and PLA Navy ships.

  • Recommendation: The United States and Japan should discuss the roles of JCG, JMSDF, and U.S. Forces Japan during crises to cope with political constraints and mitigate the operational implications of legal gaps.

Finding: Beijing’s unprecedented nuclear weapons build-up is integral to China’s long-term maritime security goals in Southeast Asia. The trajectory of China’s nuclear weapons build-up predicting a stockpile of about 1,500 warheads by 2035 and reaching nuclear parity with (if not nuclear superiority over) the United States, could shape the cost-benefit calculations of U.S. allies and partners.

  • Recommendation: The United States should make investments and not allow China to achieve nuclear superiority while also commencing discussions with Japan on nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing and with the Philippines on its appetite for a nuclear umbrella in exchange for greater U.S. access to Philippines bases.

Finding: The biggest challenge for Japan and the U.S.- Japan alliance vis-à-vis gray zone coercion in the East China Sea is that CCG vessels are sovereign immune vessels and, therefore, cannot be subjected to ordinary law-enforcement operations. China would see JMSDF conducting maritime security operations against warships as an act of war and could trigger escalation toward armed conflict.

  • Recommendation: Japan should reconsider CCG vessels’ sovereign immunity since intrusion into the Japanese territorial sea to assert territorial jurisdiction is a violation of Japan’s sovereignty. This could mean taking considerable risks by maneuvering to physically challenge the presence of Chinese government vessels inside the Japanese territorial sea or block any resupply mission. Any risk-taking should be fully coordinated with the United States to avoid a mismatch in expectations.

Finding: U.S. and Japanese participants diverged on how they perceived the usual refrain of not taking sides on sovereignty issues that accompany U.S. statements related to territorial disputes in the region. Some Japanese participants view the wording as unnecessary and worry it could give the impression that U.S. commitment is weak.

  • Recommendation: The United States should word statements to highlight the source of tension and Washington’s strong alliance commitments.

Finding: Winning the information war is critical to holding China to account for its assertive behavior.

  • Recommendation: Philippine and Japanese militaries and coast guards should invest in surveillance hardware and facilitate the release of data (including photographs, satellite data, and videos) to the public. Data should be released after an incident in a matter of hours, not days or weeks. Doing so would put Chinese propagandists on the defensive and not dominate the information domain. The United States should assist in providing ISR data and ensuring full maritime domain awareness.

Finding: The United States now has a clear position on maritime claims in the region. In July 2020, Washington explicitly stated that it does not recognize China’s nine- dash line claim, effectively reversing its position on maritime claims. The new U.S. policy on maritime entitlements mirrors the decision of the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal that ruled in favor of the Philippines. This could have implications for the ongoing negotiation for a joint U.S.-Philippine patrol in the South China Sea.

  • Recommendation: The U.S. Coast Guard and Navy should join their Philippine counterparts in patrolling areas identified in the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal as part of Philippine entitlements.

Finding: Funding remains an issue for the modernization of Philippine forces. While the Philippine Navy continues to procure more modern platforms, budget constraints slow the process. Japan has made the PCG the largest in Southeast Asia in terms of the number of surface assets, but PCG vessels lack modern weapon systems necessary for law enforcement. Japan cannot provide weapon systems because of institutional constraints.

  • Recommendation: The United States and Japan should consider a burden sharing-arrangement to help the Philippines safeguard its maritime entitlements in the South China Sea. Japan should continue to provide the platforms, while the United States provides the weapon systems. Also, the United States can focus its foreign military financing on modernizing the Philippine Navy while Japan can focus its resources on helping the civilian maritime agencies in the Philippines, such as the PCG and the Bureau of Marine and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), increasing their presence in the South China Sea, and developing overall capabilities.

About this report

Pacific Forum, with support from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) organized the inaugural Track 2 U.S.-Japan- Philippines Trilateral Maritime Security Dialogue on December 1- 2, 2022. Strategic thinkers from the United States, Japan and the Philippines, including scholars, policy experts, and retired military and government officials, participated in the dialogue. This report contains the general summary of the discussions.

The recommendations contained in this report, unless otherwise specifically noted, were generated by the discussions as interpreted by the Principal Investigators. This is not a consensus document. All participants attended in their private capacity.

The statements made and views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the Pacific Forum, the project sponsors, or the dialogue participants’ respective organizations and affiliations. For questions, please email [email protected].

Click here to download the full report.

Issues & Insights Vol. 22, CR1 – Getting past constraints: Deepening U.S. security relations with Vietnam and Indonesia

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Executive Summary

INTRODUCTION

Pacific Forum reconvened two Track 2 dialogues with Vietnam and Indonesia in August 2022 to help identify ways the United States and its two Southeast Asian partners can work together to enhance bilateral cooperation on security issues of shared concern. Functional cooperation between Washington and its two Southeast Asian partners has considerably advanced in the past ten years, but differing strategic considerations still handicap some aspects of these relationships. The two security dialogues emphasized these findings, among other takeaways.

FINDINGS SUMMARY

In its February 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy document, the United States stressed that “collective efforts over the next decade will determine whether the PRC succeeds in transforming the rules and norms that have benefitted the Indo-Pacific and the world.” The 2021 U.S.-Vietnam and U.S.-Indonesia security dialogues had made clear that such framing would not generate broad Southeast Asian cooperation. This year’s dialogues echoed similar themes while underscoring functional cooperation as vital to the two countries’ security relations with the United States. Their strategic autonomy and agency are central to their response to threats from Beijing, and they are reluctant to align outright with the United States on China-related strategic considerations. Nevertheless, Indonesia and Vietnam are interested in working with the United States when it strengthens their strategic autonomy and ability to stand up to threats, including those from China. Two interconnected factors determine Indonesian and Vietnamese strategic thinking regarding China’s assertive behavior and willingness to cooperate with the United States on security issues. First, geography makes China an everyday presence for Hanoi and Jakarta and their economies. Second, the self-help regional security environment compels Jakarta and Hanoi to be extra cautious in dealing with Chinese assertiveness. They are not U.S. treaty-allies. Vietnamese and Indonesian interlocutors do not expect the United States to defend Vietnam and Indonesia should Beijing use force.

KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE TWO SECURITY DIALOGUES

Finding: China has specifically designed its operations in the South China Sea to avoid thresholds for escalation and response by using civilian or non-military actors to operationalize claims using tactics that fall short of kinetic armed conflict. China would perceive any response to a gray zone coercion either as “escalatory”—possibly provoking a stronger Chinese response that could result in a complete reversal of status quo of certain features—or “muted”—which could encourage Beijing to attempt more coercive maneuvers.

  • Recommendation: The United States and its partners must challenge the narrative surrounding the existence of civilian and non-military actors in the South China Sea. First, Washington should support regional partners’ efforts to identify, document, and publicize militia operations, including publishing photos and videos in open source, disseminating evidence in Track 1 forums and venues like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministers Meeting Plus and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Second, Washington must link the behavior of China’s maritime militia and Coast Guard to its interactions with the PLAN. The United States should communicate publicly and privately that it expects the PLAN, the Coast Guard, and the maritime militia to abide by the internationally recognized standards of seamanship and communications, including the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES).
  • Recommendation: Washington should take three actions to address the gradual, non-kinetic nature of China’s gray zone tactics. First, it should help improve situational awareness through capacity-building efforts that enhance partners’ maritime domain awareness, such as through provisions of maritime Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, including remote sensing tools, unmanned platforms, and coastal radar. Second, it should help address the asymmetry in capabilities by tailoring defense assistance to partners with more surface assets to maintain sustained presence and expanding maritime law enforcement capabilities through initiatives like Coast Guard ship-riding programs. Finally, the United States and its partners should thoroughly discuss potential non-kinetic tactical responses to harassment.
  • Recommendation: The United States should establish a task force within the Seventh Fleet, modeled on Task Force 59 in the Fifth Fleet, to develop and deploy unmanned and automated maritime domain awareness platforms in coordination with Vietnam and other regional partners. This could vastly improve the ability to monitor and identify Chinese gray zone actors in a persistent and affordable manner.

Finding: U.S. efforts at direct deterrence (e.g., U.S. Navy operations to defend its own freedom of navigation) in the South China Sea have been much more successful than extended deterrence (e.g., assisting Vietnam and other coastal states in the region to protect their own maritime rights and interests against Chinese coercion).

  • Recommendation: The United States should reinforce the principle of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea by clearly articulating through official documents and in meetings with China that the use of force to deny U.S. civilian or military vessels from rightful access to the South China Sea is a red line for the United States.
  • Recommendation: The United States should articulate through official documents and in meetings with regional states that changing the status quo of disputed features by using force or gray zone coercion (e.g., ejecting existing Vietnamese presence on a disputed land feature) is another U.S. red line. The United States should engage its regional partners to establish acceptable parameters for a combined response and then respond appropriately in coordination with partner countries.

Finding: In a gray zone maritime crisis involving China, Vietnam will simultaneously de-escalate by engaging Beijing and defend its interests by deploying non-military assets to assert presence or control. Coordinating with Washington to address a China-related gray zone crisis would not be a top priority for Hanoi. Meanwhile, Indonesia will resolutely respond to a gray zone crisis by safeguarding its interests and preventing a fait accompli while maintaining its strategic autonomy. Jakarta will use its diplomatic, military, and paramilitary assets to maintain the status quo. The Indonesians would prefer the United States carefully balance its engagement and avoid direct involvement in any Indonesia-China tension. Both Hanoi and Jakarta expect that their strategic space to de-escalate or arrive at an acceptable solution would be severely constrained once the United States is directly involved, and the crisis would be reframed in the context of “great power competition.”

  • Recommendation: Addressing a gray zone crisis requires coordination between Washington and the partner country directly involved. In this regard, the United States should immediately consult with partner countries about the best course of action before making any move.

Finding: Beijing is unlikely to use outright aggression against Southeast Asian states. Instead, China will continue to push the envelope in the South China Sea and elsewhere through gray zone/non-kinetic means. Absent any effective response, Beijing will achieve more fait accomplis, which are extremely difficult to roll back without the use of force.

  • Recommendation: The United States should continue to devote more resources (e.g., by sponsoring more tabletop exercises, research, and dialogues) to better understand China’s use of gray zone coercion and draft plans accordingly. The United States should also discuss potential responses to counter gray zone coercion with partners and allies.

KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE U.S.-VIETNAM SECURITY DIALOGUES

Finding: Vietnam’s policy documents regard defense cooperation, including joint exercises, with other countries as important “to improve capabilities to protect the country and address common security challenges.” However, Vietnam makes a distinction between military exercises that are aimed at developing war-fighting skills (tp trn) and military training exercises to learn or improve basic skills (din tp). Vietnam will not participate in the former with the United States, which could potentially explain Hanoi’s lack of interest in joining the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise.

  • Recommendation: When the United States invites Vietnam to join a bilateral or multilateral exercise, Washington should clarify that the purpose is to improve basic skills (din tp). In bigger exercises like the RIMPAC, U.S. invitation extended to Hanoi should stress the din tp value of the activities.

Finding: The United States sees Hanoi as a stabilizing force in the region. Vietnam has shown determination to continue the trajectory of its military modernization, which could present opportunities for the United States, not just in providing hardware, but also in deepening institutional ties, interoperability, and long-term trust. In 2021, Vietnam committed to “building a streamlined and strong Army by 2025, and a revolutionary, regular, highly-skilled and modern People’s Army by 2030,” vowing to prioritize Air Defense/Air Force Service, Navy, Signal Force, Electronic Warfare Force, Technical Reconnaissance Force, Cyber Warfare Force, and Cipher (cryptology) Force.

  • Recommendation: Washington could offer to help Hanoi realize some of the aspects of its 2030 military modernization plan, for example, by building on the successful U.S.-Vietnam deal for the transfer of three T-6 trainers by 2023, along with spare parts and a maintenance package. The U.S. should continue to probe Vietnamese willingness to purchase more T-6s with a package including simulators, maintenance, and participation in an expanded aviation leadership program. This could provide the basis for Vietnam to acquire more advanced fighter jets in the future. Helping modernize Vietnam’s military capabilities could promote mutual trust, which in turn could result in deeper bilateral cooperation. It could also help Hanoi secure its maritime zones amidst Chinese coercion and contribute to regional security free from Chinese dominance.

Finding: Vietnam is unlikely to reinvigorate its civilian nuclear power program in the near future.  Despite the high expectations surrounding the advent of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), interest in Vietnam is still not enough to push policymakers to reconsider a 2016 decision to halt Vietnam’s pursuit of nuclear energy. The view remains that Vietnam and Southeast Asia broadly have considerable alternatives to nuclear power. Nevertheless, Vietnamese experts stressed that SMRs and floating nuclear power plants are important topics for research, but any development is beyond the 10-year horizon.

  • Recommendation: The U.S. Government should provide educational opportunities for Vietnamese nuclear engineers and nuclear policy/security experts. This would ensure that U.S.-educated engineers and experts are readily available should Hanoi decide to restart its civil nuclear program. This would counter potential Chinese or Russian influence in determining the trajectory of Vietnam’s nuclear energy policy.

Finding: The U.S. and Vietnamese responses to the Itu Aba exercise conducted at the U.S. Vietnam Track 2 dialogue revealed the undercurrents in U.S. and Southeast Asian strategic thinking. First, Washington would not go to war against China to defend partner countries over small offshore territories in the South China Sea. Second, Southeast Asians’ primary consideration when dealing with Chinese provocation is the idea that when hostilities escalate, they are on their own. U.S. partners do not expect the U.S. military to fight for them should there be a conflict.

  • Recommendation: capacity-building initiatives should focus on helping partner countries obtain capabilities that allow them to maintain an active, sustained and visible presence in their own maritime zones. This means providing partner countries with surface assets like law enforcement patrol vessels that are capable of navigating their vast exclusive economic zones for longer periods and with the capacity to respond to Chinese coercion.

KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE U.S.-INDONESIA SECURITY DIALOGUES

Finding: Disagreement related to Archipelagic Sea-Lane (ASL) passage could become a long-term operational issue between Indonesia and the United States. The United States wants Indonesia to allow all navigational rights and freedoms within its archipelago as described in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Indonesia, however, remains reluctant to introduce more archipelagic sea-lanes, fearing the presence of more foreign warships in its archipelagic waters.

  • Recommendation: The United States should have regular, standalone maritime security dialogues with Indonesia at the Track 1 and Track 2 levels to understand the factors that inhibit Indonesia from fully complying with the ASL provisions of the UNCLOS and help reassure Jakarta that U.S. military operations fully respect Indonesian sovereignty and territorial integrity. On the former, Indonesia’s lack of maritime domain awareness may be discouraging it from establishing additional ASLs, in which case the United States could be helpful. On the latter, regular interactions between Indonesian and U.S. maritime institutions and experts would increase trust over time, which could lead to more maritime cooperation that accommodates both U.S. preferences and Indonesian interests.

Finding: Indonesia’s growing Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities, while not targeted at any specific country, could complicate assumptions about force flows, supply chains, and ally reinforcements. In this context, Indonesia could potentially close off its waters from all military forces, including the United States and its treaty allies, in the event of a crisis, for example, over Taiwan.

  • Recommendation: U.S. military planning should take into account access to Southeast Asian territorial seas, and archipelagic waters (including their airspaces) to assess the impact of potential restrictions or differing interpretations of international maritime law.
  • Recommendation: More U.S. Government-sponsored dialogues and tabletop exercises should include Indonesia and other important partner countries in Southeast Asia to help promote common understanding and appreciation of key issues that arise during crises.

Finding: Two U.S.-led frameworks, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), could assist Indonesia with its Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation capacity-building. Neither the GICNT nor the PSI creates new obligations for participating states. Instead, cooperation is voluntary, with individual members’ respective national authorities coordinating to help ensure that bad actors, including extremists, do not obtain Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)-related materials. Indonesia’s persistent refusal to join U.S.-led security institutions is a political decision, rather than an objection to their operating principles.

  • Recommendation: Washington should clearly articulate in Track 1 dialogues involving policymakers that both GICNT and PSI would allow Indonesia to remain carefully protective of its own national sovereignty and independence. The United States should also underscore the multilateral nature of these arrangements.

About this report

Pacific Forum, in collaboration with local partners, the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV), and the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI), organized the Track 2 U.S.-Vietnam and U.S.-Indonesia Security Dialogues in August 2022. With support from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), ten U.S. strategic thinkers, including scholars, policy experts, and retired military and government officials, traveled to Hanoi on August 3-5, 2022, and to Bali on August 9-11, 2022, to meet and engage with 19 counterparts from Vietnam and 14 from Indonesia. Both Track 2 dialogues included one day of panel discussion on thematic issues and one day devoted to a scenario-based exercise. The recommendations contained in this report, unless otherwise specifically noted, were generated by the discussions as interpreted by the Principal Investigators. This is not a consensus document. Both the agenda and participant list are included in the appendix; all participants attended in their private capacity. The statements made and views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the Pacific Forum, the project sponsors, or the dialogue participants’ respective organizations and affiliations. For questions, please email .

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Extended ‘Gray Zone’ Deterrence in the South China Sea

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Issues & Insights Vol. 22, SR9, pp. 31-39

Abstract

Strong military commitments by stronger allies to defend weaker partners is just one necessary component of extended deterrence to limited (gray zone) aggression. Another essential part is the weaker partners’ presence in disputed domains. In the context of the South China Sea, given the vast capability gap between China and Southeast Asian claimants, bolstering the latter’s control of and presence in disputed domains through material assistance focused on offshore patrolling assets and ISR capabilities (such as drones and space-based monitoring systems) is critical to preserving the status quo. This study employed a quantitative data analysis of territorial conquests and a formal analysis of gray zone conflict to support the claim.

About this Volume

Authors of this volume participated in the inaugural U.S.-Japan Next-Generation Leaders Initiative, sponsored by the U.S. Department of State, through the U.S. Embassy Tokyo. With backgrounds from academia, government, military and industry, the cohort brings rich insights on the past, present, and future of the U.S.-Japan bilateral security relations.

The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of their respective organizations and affiliations. Pacific Forum’s publications do not necessarily reflect the positions of its staff, donors and sponsors.

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Shusuke Ioku is a Ph.D. student at the Department of Political Science, the University of Rochester where he studies formal Political Theory and International Relations. His current research projects address inefficiency of coercive diplomacy and subnational political consequences of Chinese economic statecraft. He has a particular interest in gray-zone maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas since he did an internship at the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative under the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Before coming to the United States, he received an M.A. in Political Science from Waseda University and B.A. in Philosophy from the University of Tokyo.


PhotoA Planet Skysat captured this image of Fiery Cross Reef in the South China Sea on May 3, 2020. Constructed between 2014 and 2017, Fiery Cross reef is one of China’s seven militarized artificial islands in the Spratlys that have become symbols of China’s gray zone coercion and salami slicing. Source: Photo by Skysat/Creative Commons