YL Blog #44 – A Trilateral Discourse: The Role of Hawai’i in a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

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The Next-Gen Trilateral Young Leaders Dialogue was a riveting exercise that demonstrated the strength, resilience, and future areas for growth in our Trilateral alliance between Japan, the ROK, and the United States. It was a wonderful opportunity to learn from area experts as well as collaborate with our peers in the historic metropolis of Tokyo. As we visited the US Embassy, RCAST, Sankei Shimbun, and the Prime Minister’s cabinet offices, the intricacies of diplomacy and policy making became clearer. The main activity of the Next-Gen Trilateral Young Leaders Dialogue was a tabletop exercise that allowed us to put everything that we had learned into practice. As we discussed our countries’ priorities and perspectives, it became clear that while our short-term goals were aligned, our long-term projections were not as connected. The United States’ geographic location and its commitments to the region were reflected in our responses. Young leaders from Japan and the ROK were anxiously awaiting greater U.S. military responsiveness to aggression in the region, beyond just the increase in forward posturing with in the first-island chain.

The experts at the Trilateral Dialogue emphasized that the United States and its allies are not worried about China breaking laws, but rather China changing the rule of law in order to assert itself as the world superpower. As the United States and its allies fight to maintain their position, there are two fronts in the wake of rising tension between the PRC and the Trilateral to be aware of: first, military advancements in the first island chain and second, transport control and ownership in the second and third island chains. One of the most common concerns among young leaders and experts alike was military advancements in the region. Of particular note was the future of disruptive technology. While the U.S. military had been quick to increase the intensity of military exercises and presence in the region, like RIMPAC 2022, Balikatan 2023, and supporting Japan’s counterstrike abilities, our peers from the ROK and Japan worried that it was not enough to counter China’s emerging technology and digital policies. Looking for a way to bring about potential solutions, experts urged young leaders to deepen their commitment to share intelligence and increase dialogue within the Trilateral.

Equally as important, and potentially critical to long term sustainability in the Pacific, is the challenge of economic and political independence in Oceania, specifically in regards to transport control and private ownership in the second and third island chains. As the tabletop exercise progressed, it became clear to young leaders that while the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) discussion was focused on Taiwan, in many ways it neglected the importance of other countries in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Here is where I see one of the United States’ greatest opportunities for growth, specifically with regards to Hawaii’s potential role in regional leadership.

Just as Hawaii is used as a hub for the United States defense forces, Hawaii can also serve as a diplomatic/political epicenter for the Pacific and Southeast Asia. In recent months, we have seen an increase of formal US relations being established in the region, such as the embassies in the Solomon Islands and Tonga, with more to potentially open in Vanuatu and Kiribati. Re-emphasizing the Pacific in FOIP is crucial to counter China’s soft power advances in the region. U.S. policymakers should leverage Hawaii’s diverse population and interconnected community to strengthen soft power in the region. This can be done through local leaders in Hawaii encouraging greater economic exchange in Oceania and staffing indigenous people in the diaspora in Pacific embassies and government offices. As we enter into a new era of multipolarity, the importance of self-sustainable countries and economies in the second and third island chains will grow, and Hawaii can play a fundamental role in their establishment. The future of the Trilateral is heavily dependent on maintaining of the rule of law, stabilizing trade, and creating opportunities for sustainable development throughout the Indo-Pacific region.

Attending the Next-Gen Trilateral Young Leaders Dialogue was an eye-opening experience. Not only was this my first time in Japan, but it was also one of my first experiences seeing how diplomatic relationships work in real time. As we nourish our relationships with members of the Trilateral through intelligence sharing and a unified vision of a peaceful Indo-Pacific region, we can engage more in sustainable trade relations and enter a new era of political stability.

Disclaimer: All opinions in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent any organization.

APAL Scholar travel opportunities are made possible through the generous support of the Freeman Foundation.

Tess Schwalger ([email protected]) is an Indigenous Samoan MA candidate in History at UH Manoa, a high school history teacher, and an intern at Pacific Forum. She is also an Alumni of Pacific Forums Hawaii Asia-Pacific Affairs Leadership (APAL) Program. Her research interests include the rights of indigenous women in Oceania, United States PI diasporic relations, and Indigenous frameworks in policymaking. Her work has been presented at conferences at the University of Cambridge and Singapore Management University.

Issues & Insights Vol. 20, CR 1 – Deepening Progressive Partnerships: TAYLE & PF Young Leaders

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Since beginning our partnership two years ago, the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation (TAEF) and Pacific Forum have provided meaningful exchanges under our organizations’ youth engagement programs, the Taiwan-Asian Young Leaders Engagement (TAYLE) and the Young Leaders Program respectively.

Seeing the potential behind youth-led initiatives and the value of diverse perspectives on contemporary international issues, the TAEF and Pacific Forum hope to broaden the exposure of young leaders from the Asia-Pacific to pressing matters that affect their respective communities and the region at large. Under the TAEF’s TAYLE program, select Pacific Forum Young Leaders and peers from Southeast and South Asia are invited to Taiwan to participate in the annual Yushan Forum: Asian Dialogue for Innovation and Progress, which takes place in October and coincides with the country’s National Day celebrations. The theme, “Deepening Progressive Partnerships in Asia,” focused on the progressive partnerships and achievements in the areas of economic and technological exchange, talent cultivation, sustainable development, civil society development, think tank collaboration, cultural exchange and youth leadership within the region.

2019 was a very meaningful year for Taiwan and its people. It marked the third Yushan Forum, which has been a successful platform to communicate Taiwan’s commitment to promoting lasting partnerships and cooperation with the 18 New Southbound Policy countries—the 10 ASEAN member states, six South Asian countries, Australia and New Zealand—and other like-minded states.  It also marked the 20th anniversary of the 921 earthquake and the 10th anniversary of Typhoon Morakot, events that heavily impacted the island and other countries in Asia. In commemoration, a special event, “Facilitating Asian Partnership for Disaster Preparedness” was held in conjunction with the 2019 Yushan Forum. It showcased regional efforts in disaster preparedness, management, and relief, and stood as a testament that, in times of disaster, the countries in the region stand as one.

For the 2019 TAYLE-Young Leader cohort, nine promising youths from Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, India, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and the United States, were given the opportunity to attend the Yushan Forum’s seven thematic sessions over a span of two days, affording them the opportunity to engage international leaders and subject matter experts, as well experience Taiwan from a different lens. Before returning to their countries, the Young Leaders discussed among themselves their key takeaways from the experience as well as possible areas of cooperation between Taiwan and their countries.

In her speech during the Yushan Forum, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen emphasized the importance of exposing young minds to experiences that will broaden their horizons and allow them to help address regional issues from a regional perspective. Answering this call, the following essays offer rich perspectives and pressing concerns from the region’s emerging leaders.

Under this partnership between the TAEF and Pacific Forum, we hope to continue providing young professionals and scholars the opportunity to better appreciate Taiwan and its growing role in the Asia-Pacific, as well as to help them realize their potential as leaders and build connections with peers early in their careers. In the spirit of the 2019 Yushan Forum, we look forward to seeing their partnerships deepen to ensure continued regional innovation and progress.

PacNet #23 – How ASEAN Should Respond to China’s South China Sea Tactics

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“The South China Sea is a major issue in the heart of ASEAN’s own region. For ASEAN not to address it would severely damage its credibility. ASEAN must not take sides on the various claims, but it has to take and state a position which is neutral, forward-looking, and encourages the peaceful resolution of issues.” Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong

The South China Sea territorial disputes are among the region’s most critical issues. The first clash occurred in 1974 between the People’s Republic of China and South Vietnam around the Paracel Islands. In 1988, another open conflict erupted between China and a now-unified Vietnam in the Spratly Islands. In 1995, a different conflict between China and the Philippines highlighted Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef, Kalayaan. What is the main reason for this territorial dispute? Scholars point to reasons such as natural resources, fisheries, sea lines of communication, and maritime strategy.

ASEAN member states push the South China Sea as one of the top agenda items because of Beijing’s aggressive efforts to enforce its claims. Although China clearly states that they prefer to discuss the dispute within a bilateral framework rather than multilateral, ASEAN as a regional organization continues to work with other organizations from the UN to resolve the dispute peacefully.

In 1976, ASEAN introduced the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), the informal code of conduct for the South China Sea, based on notions of conflict avoidance. In 1990, Indonesia initiated an informal meeting, the Workshop Process on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, which ended with the Declaration on Code of Conduct (DCOC). However, in early 1992, China passed the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Waters and Contiguous Areas, reiterating China’s claims in the South China Sea and stipulating the right to use force to protect islands and their surrounding waters. Months later, in July 1992, ASEAN responded, with ASEAN’s foreign minister signing the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea to promote the informal code of conduct based on self-restraint, the non-use of force, and peaceful resolution of disputes.

It took years for ASEAN and China to commit to and sign the DCOC, which brings both parties to work towards a COC in line with the TAC and a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. Both parties agreed to maintain the status quo over the islands and promote cooperation in the South China Sea. ASEAN and Beijing held a second meeting called the ASEAN-China Joint Working Group on the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DCOC). Both parties agreed on six projects scheduled to be implemented from 2006 with funding support from the ASEAN-China Cooperation Fund (ACCF). Despite having those projects together, China made a statutory declaration to the UN secretary-general that it would reject any arbitration over military activities, as well as sea and territorial disputes. Furthermore, in 2007, China conducted military exercises around the Paracel Islands, which raised strong protests from Vietnam. China has not only conducted military exercises but also established the Sansha administrative district in Hainan Island, responsible for managing the Paracel and Spratly islands.

In 2011, ASEAN and China adopted the Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC, which enhanced the practical cooperation in the South China Sea. Months later, ASEAN and China issued a Joint Statement of the Fourteenth ASEAN-China Summit. China promised to work with ASEAN countries on the adoption of a consensus-based COC in the South China Sea to maintain peace, cooperation, security, and stability in the region. Chinese Primer Wen Jiabao also planned to establish ASEAN-China Maritime Corporation Fund. The National Institute for South China Sea Studies held a seminar on “Implementing DOC: Maintaining Freedom and Safety of Navigation in the South China Sea,” showing China’s willing to work together with ASEAN in developing the sea. During the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN failed to issue the joint communique, yet Indonesia helped ASEAN with crafting ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South China Seaand released it on July 20, 2012.

ASEAN had moved to keep its diplomacy focused on legally codifying the DOC in a binding COC. Initiated by Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, ASEAN brought China to the diplomatic table to complete the COC agreement. Moreover, Natalegawa made a so-called “zero draft” for a COC with the DOC as its foundation, yet Beijing insisted that the drafting of COC had to start from scratch. The negotiation started in 2013 with the formation of a working group and, until 2015, the group had not moved beyond procedural issues. ASEAN gives China control of the timetable agreement, yet Beijing keeps mentioning that there can be no COC until the DOC is fully implemented. As China holds the DOC hostage by continuing to assault other claimants’ rights, it looks like China is using it as a delaying tactic to change the status quo of South China Sea disputes.

ASEAN keeps trying to clarify the status of the South China Sea dispute, yet Beijing has a different perspective and mentions that there is no sense of urgency over it. China’s delaying tactic has worked very well as it seeks to militarize its artificial islands in the Spratlys. With diplomacy stuck, it is better for ASEAN to maintain neutrality as its collective response and concentrate on promoting cooperation and joint development. For ASEAN member states, the most beneficial action to address China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea is acting like rationalists who combine the realist and liberalist approach. As a realist, it is important to show and maintain national security around the disputed islands by having good relations with other non-claimant great powers, such as the United States, Japan, Australia, or India. ASEAN member states also need to act like liberals by engaging in economic cooperation and join in the development of disputed areas with Beijing.

The Philippines case, which brought the South China Sea case against China to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), has shown that confrontation alone will produce no results. As Graham Allison argues, China, like all great powers, will ignore international legal verdicts. As Thucydides’ summarized in the Melian Dialogue: “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”—it is commonly understood that the PCA and the International Court of Justice, along with the International Criminal Court, only work for small powers.

Despite China’s disregard of international law, it is important for ASEAN to continue promoting the DOC and COC to keep ASEAN as a credible organization in the region.

Tenny Kristiana ([email protected]) is a member of Pacific Forum’s Young Leaders Program. She has achieved her second postgraduate degree in International Relations from Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University.

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged. Click here to request a PacNet subscription.

YL Blog #27: Reinforcing the US Extended Deterrence in the ROK and Japan

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I attended the US-ROK-Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue on September 5-6, 2019 in Maui, Hawaii as a part of Pacific Forum Young Leaders delegation. In this piece, I would like to discuss key lessons of the dialogue session at Maui and lay out next steps for trilateral security cooperation.

Nuclear Policy Discussions among Allies

First of all, participants from the ROK and Japan expressed concerns over the credibility of the US extended deterrence with President Trump’s statements on downplaying the role of alliance. While the working level relationship is robust and alliance coordination mechanism is well in place, there were increasing concerns over the prospect of high-level decision to abort or undermine alliance commitment. As a result, a few participants from the ROK and Japan invoked an example of the US-NATO nuclear sharing to illustrate a way to enhance the US extended deterrence in East Asia.

On the other hand, the US participants expressed subtle opposition against the NATO style nuclear sharing on two grounds. First, the US side urged the ROK and Japanese counterparts to understand better what it takes to have NATO style nuclear sharing, both in operation and burden sharing. The US side questioned whether the ROK and Japan are ready to operationalize and plan nuclear weapons into its respective national security planning, while in mindful of public opinion and potential oppositions. Second, and less explicitly articulated during the discussion, the US participants expressed its concern over escalation control during crisis. The sharing of nuclear weapons, though neither the ROK nor Japan will be able to launch it without consultation with the US in advance, invites uncertainty of controlling escalation from the US side.

Requirements of Coordinated Nuclear Policy

Nevertheless, all three nations agreed in principle that there is a need to enhance allies’ nuclear policy discussions. Such discussion will have to bear in mind the following consequences. First, nuclear policy discussion requires responsibility for all actors, both in operational and financial terms. The US domestic decision making on nuclear sharing notwithstanding, the ROK and Japan should assess the pros and cons of NATO-style nuclear sharing option in terms of its implication on allies’ force structure and costs of such planning. Second, domestic opinion of each nation should be taken into consideration – in particular that of Japan. Co-operating nuclear weapons with the US can invite strong opposition from domestic factions, considering Japanese views on the role of nuclear weapons. Third, broader regional security situation – China and Russia – has to be considered to minimize the potential oppositions from regional actors. While nuclear sharing options may suffice as critical national interest, regional actors may beg to differ and advance its own nuclear posture.

At the same time, North Korea factor should be considered when measuring the pros and cons of nuclear sharing option. In other words, we need to calculate whether the marginal benefit of nuclear sharing option exceeds the negative costs of the DPRK’s enhancement of its nuclear weapons program. It is possible, without full confidence on the US extended deterrence, that the ROK and Japan will develop its own nuclear arsenal or take other measures necessary to compensate for lacking US extended deterrence. Such prevention of nuclear proliferation in the region itself is certainly a benefit. In addition, co-operation of nuclear assets in the region could bolster strong deterrence against adversaries including but not limited to North Korea alone. On the other hand, it has to be noted that the DPRK has expressed critical views on the US-ROK combined military exercises, with or without the US strategic assets such as B-52 bombers. It is certainly the case that the DPRK will respond in its kind on the ROK and Japan’s decision to co-operate the US nuclear weapons in the region.  

Will Coordinated Nuclear Policy Solve Allies’ Concerns? 

Separate, however equally important, issue is that the nuclear sharing option may not address the root cause of allies’ concern on the US extended deterrence. The nuclear sharing option may not address the concern over the credibility of US extended deterrence because such arrangement can be reversed by high-level political decisions, likewise the extended deterrence itself. While such mechanism of co-operating nuclear arsenal in the region offers aesthetic of firm extended deterrence, the fact does not change that the US can change its policy as it withdrew tactical nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula in 1990s. Furthermore, the nuclear sharing option does not allow US allies an option to launch nuclear weapons without explicit US consent. In other words, nuclear weapons may be a paper tiger without full US endorsement.

The credibility of extended nuclear deterrence is a puzzle that can never be solved easily. Nuclear policy discussions certainly will have marginal effect on strengthening the US extended deterrence in the region, both in the ROK and Japan. However, such arrangement comes with financial cost and adversaries’ aggressive responsive measures have to be considered. On top of that, a nuclear sharing mechanism may not address the root cause of concern over the credibility of extended deterrence. Considering aforementioned variables, nuclear policy discussions among allies have merits both in terms of minimizing misunderstandings among allies and increasing the credibility of extended deterrence. While it is uncertain how such policy discussion will conclude, the process of nuclear policy coordination will certainly offer a room to address allies’ concern over the US extended deterrence.

Disclaimer: All opinions in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent any organization.

YL Blog #26 – Extended Deterrence in the Age of Trump: Hardware, Software, and Malware

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2019 US-ROK-Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue offered an excellent forum to gauge the current strategic thinking and debates in Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul. The event comprised experts’ remarks apropos the extended deterrence in the Asia-Pacific and trilateral cooperation, as well as a two-move tabletop exercise (TTX) that brought alliance management issues to light.

The “hardware” component of extended deterrence was discussed at length, particularly the post-INF developments and implications for the region. The majority of participants agreed that INF withdrawal, albeit problematic in its execution and style, will positively contribute to countering Russian and Chinese previously unchecked advances. Putting aside the basing question, participants agreed that new missiles would strengthen the deterrence posture.

The second element, the “software,” which relies on assurance and credibility, needed more discussions and deliberations. Assuring allies that the United States will honor its treaty obligations in case of an attack is infinitely more challenging than developing a certain type of military equipment. This is what strategists and policymakers grappled with throughout the Cold War. They succeeded by supporting allies economically and politically, and by signaling unified positions despite serious disagreements that were dealt with behind closed doors. In regards to adversaries, the United States consistently communicated that an attack on an ally will automatically precipitate a devastating American response. This, indeed, is the underlying logic of deterrence: an aggressor-state is dissuaded from launching an attack on an ally, knowing that the United States will retaliate on its behalf which would negate any potential gain from launching an attack in the first place.

Since it is a part of the red theory of victory, it comes as no surprise that China, Russia, and North Korea are working hard to break the U.S. alliance structure. What is frustrating to watch is our commander-in-chief making comments that undermine allies’ confidence and play right into our opponents’ hands. For lack of a better analogy, I treat these comments as “malware.” One tweet might not unravel the alliance structure per se, but allow enough of them to roam in your system, and soon enough one will have to scrap the old and install a new infrastructure altogether.

In the recent past, few instances stand out. First, President Trump continues to downplay the importance of North Korea’s short-range missile launches, even though these missiles threaten Japan’s and ROK’s survival and security. Second, bickering over trade deals and troops cost-sharing underscores Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy and skepticism of alliances writ large. Third, adopting North Korean lexicon and calling defensive military exercises “war games” is not just a diplomatic gaffe, but an insult to men and women in uniform. Put together, these blunders create a dangerous situation and invite aggressors to test our will to defend allies, particularly on the sub-conventional level.

As we are upgrading hardware, Trump unwittingly inserts malware into the trilateral relationship. Particularly unhelpful has been “public-shaming” of South Korea and its contributions for military cost-sharing. Koreans are already overly sensitive when it comes to the U.S. troops and the move to Camp Humphreys. Fueling the anti-American sentiments in the South facilitates North Korean long-held strategic thinking that once the U.S. troops out of the peninsula, South Korea will be ripe for reunification on the DPRK’s terms. Undoubtedly, Kim Jung Un is enjoying the new reality show.

TTX was designed to discern how the U.S., ROK, and Japan would react and respond to Beijing’s and Pyongyang’s coordinated assault on the rules-based international order. Japan and South Korea correctly calculated that the adversaries were seeking to alter the status quo, and that the situation merited a strong response. To demonstrate firm resolve and commitment to the alliance structure, all allied states, in fact, expressed willingness to “escalate to de-escalate.” Moreover, a component of the final move was North Korea’s wielding its nuclear card: a nuclear explosion in the Pacific Ocean as well as a missile launch over Japan. Allies unequivocally conveyed that they will watch the reaction and comments from the White House closely, and that their subsequent steps will be guided by what they observe.

Relatedly, neither Japanese nor South Korean delegates raised issues with Trump’s style of diplomacy, and only a handful of American experts acknowledged Trump’s malign effects on the U.S. standing in the world. One participant alluded that we need to brace ourselves for the partial or complete U.S. troop withdrawal from Korea, given Trump’s intransigence with cost-sharing and his record. The fact that the U.S. credibility was not openly questioned is perhaps a good sign. However, Trump’s foreign policy track record was the elephant in the room. (Remember Paris Accords? JCPOA?).

The extended deterrence framework has played an essential role in ensuring peace in Northeast Asia, but currently it is undergoing major shifts. Allies have a decent understanding of an appropriate response to revisionist states’ attempts to overthrow the status quo. However, Japanese and Korean participants (American as well, for that matter) remain unsure how to deal with self-inflicted wounds. Explicit signaling needs to be a priority; there should be no doubt in Beijing, Moscow, or Pyongyang that regardless of the domain and intensity, the United States and allies will respond and inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary’s forces. More hardware in the region will certainly alleviate some allies’ anxieties. However, returning to basics-updating the software and protecting it from malware-will deliver more bang for the buck.

Disclaimer: All opinions in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent any organization.

 

YL Blog #20: Pacific Forum Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Follow-up TTX

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Players: United States (U.S.), Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan (JAP)

Move 1 

CHINA/HK

Into the spring of 2020 the Hong Kong protests remain well-organized and participant numbers are at an all-time high. Protestors utilize guerilla tactics, rising up in city districts and dispersing as the police arrive. They ignore the face mask ban, yet hundreds of protestors are arrested in their homes. The arrests only incite more protests and result in more extreme public demands, including for Chief Executive Carrie Lam to step down and allow the Hong Kong people to directly elect their city government without interference from Beijing. President Xi continues to dig in, denouncing protests as foreign-inspired terrorism. Protestors appeal to the international community – and especially the U.S. – to aid Hong Kong in defense of its democracy.

China dispatches non-military personnel to Hong Kong to advise Carrie Lam and her staff. The next evening an outspoken Hong Kong protest leader’s house is raided and he disappears.

That week a radical group of students brutally assaults an armed police unit, leaving 2 policemen dead in the streets of Hong Kong.

In response, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army mobilizes along the Frontier Closed Area and increases security along the Hong Kong-Shenzhen border as a contingency plan. 

The Hong Kong government declares a state of emergency and demands that protestors to disband or face arrest.

DPRK

Working level US-DPRK Negotiations continued into the fall of 2019 and the two parties agreed to implement the first phase of a multi-step agreement. In phase one, they struck a formal agreement to freeze nuclear development and testing and IAEA inspectors entered Yongbyeon to oversee facility dismantlement. While there was no formal agreement to freeze missile development and testing, Chairman Kim extended his promise to refrain from long-range missile tests. In return, the U.S. agreed to freeze all combined exercises/drills during negotiations and extend partial sanctions relief on civilian use of energy products.

In the spring of 2020, the U.S. promptly expands negotiations from the nuclear to the missile domain. Media reports state that the US seeks a formal moratorium on all missile testing, a declaration of DPRK missile facilities, agreement to cease production, and IAEA verification of a production freeze. As the DPRK resists this demand, planned further sanctions reduction measures are stalled, and talks stalemate.

Recent “leaked” Japanese satellite intelligence reveals the presence of surfaced DPRK submarines–believed to be SLBM-capable–in the ROK EEZ approximately 100 km south of Ulleung Island.

Unverified Japanese sources confirm that the JS Oryu of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force has left port.

Time: 60 minutes

Questions for individual country teams:

  1. What information/intelligence do you need and how do you obtain it?
  2. What are your three diplomatic and three military actions? Prioritize them.
  3. What message would you send to China? 
  4. What actions would you request of your allies, the United States, Republic of Korea and Japan?

Move 2

China/HK

Several leaders from the Civil Human Rights Front are abducted by unknown persons, presumed to be the government police force.

A group of evacuating Chinese citizens are held hostage by the same student protest group.

The next day President Xi publicly states that the People’s Liberation Army is deploying a mechanized battalion of commandos into Hong Kong to “restore order and protect innocent Chinese people from terrorism and destabilizing foreign influences.” 

Lam’s statement urges the people of Hong Kong not to engage the People’s Liberation Army.

Ambassador Harris and USFK General Abrams state to Korean media that in light of precipitating events the U.S. is considering sending more forces ISR forces to the region, including airborne early warning and control systems, and bolstering U.S. naval presence in the East China Sea and South China Sea.

White House statement: “The United States will act to maintain stability and protect the autonomy of free societies in the region” as consistent with the 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy.

The US 7th Fleet maneuvers to international waters near the East Sea. The USS Ronald Reagan leaves Yokosuka Air Base and enters the East China Sea past Okinawa. The USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group sailed from the Indian Ocean to just off the coast of Subic Bay.

The Chinese Southern Theater Command prepares for mobilization by recalling its troops to bases and Army Rocket Force mobilizes its short-range and medium-range missiles.

The spokesperson for the People’s Liberation Army’s Southern Theater Commander issues a public statement: “The Southern Theater Command and the Army Rocket Force are mobilized in response to rising threats from the US carrier groups in China’s near seas. The People’s Liberation Army will take all the necessary actions to preserve peace and order in the region.”

Chinese Foreign Minister states: “The US military presence is a threat to regional stability and emboldens terrorist acts in Hong Kong. China is being pressed to demonstrate its resolve to protect its people, its sovereignty, and its peaceful development with all forms of national power.”

US-DPRK

In response to the US fleet presence in the East China Sea, the DPRK Foreign Ministry demands that “threatening US assets leave the area surrounding the peninsula.” It declares negotiations void, accuses the US of “violating the spirit of the Singapore Declaration”, and tests an SLBM that lands in international waters about 50 km from the USS Ronald Reagan.

The DPRK Foreign Ministry states that a submarine was sunk and its 20 service members died in the East China Sea.

The ROK Ambassador to the United Nations informs the Security Council that the research center on the Socotra Rock collected data pertaining to the incident and that the ROK government will launch a formal investigation to uncover further details.

Time: 60 minutes

Questions for bilateral groups: U.S.-ROK, ROK-JAP, U.S.-JAP:

  1. What information/intelligence do you need and how do you obtain it?
  2. What are your three diplomatic and three military actions? Prioritize them.
  3. What message would you send to China? 
  4. What actions would you request of your allies, the United States, Republic of Korea and Japan, and the United Nations Security Council?

Disclaimer: All opinions in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent any organization.