Changes in Japan Push the Alliance Forward

The Seventh US-Japan Strategic Dialogue

By
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# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Changes in Japan Push the Alliance Forward</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Seventh US-Japan Strategic Dialogue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Findings</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference Report</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appendices</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference Agenda</td>
<td>A-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference Participant List</td>
<td>B-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Key Findings/Recommendations

The Pacific Forum CSIS with support from the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), held a US-Japan Strategic Dialogue on July 25, 2014. Twenty-nine US and Japanese experts, officials, military officers, observers, and 10 Pacific Forum Young Leaders attended, all in their private capacities. Key findings include:

The state of the alliance is good. There was virtually no discussion of traditional hot-button issues. Japanese had few complaints about US behavior, commitment, or support for Japan or the alliance. There remain important concerns about a divergence among the allies regarding China, however, particularly with regard to “gray-zone” provocations. Stronger deterrence of medium- and high-end conflicts is important to dissuade Beijing from engaging in low-level provocations. Washington and Tokyo also need to coordinate planning and responses in the event of a contingency over the Senkakus.

All participants agreed that the reinterpretation of the right of collective self-defense (CSD) would have far less impact on Japanese security policy and behavior than many (especially within the region) anticipate or fear. There would be no fundamental change in the role or capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces. One significant challenge will be managing the “expectation gap” between what Americans might envision Japan doing and what Japan might actually do.

Some participants warned that even this minimal change in Japanese security policy might be more than the Japanese public would support. Japanese participants added that some politicians might object to the change, but they are cowed by Prime Minister Abe’s popularity ratings – implying that the ruling coalition could fracture on this issue if Abe’s support rate drops.

Japanese and Americans agreed that the real significance of changes in CSD is not to be found in high intensity situations, but in expansion of the scope of peacetime operations, such as joint patrols. Americans in particular emphasized the value of being able to train and plan together.

On a range of issues, and CSD in particular, Japanese bristled at Korean complaints. Japanese worry that on hot-button items, no Japanese response will suffice because Koreans will move the goalposts. Some Japanese participants worry more about “Korea passing” in Japan than Korea bashing. Americans stressed the need to explain what CSD does and does not entail to Japan’s neighbors.

Japanese participants rejected the idea that a Japanese prime minister had no say in the use of bases in Japan for rear-area support for a Korean Peninsula contingency. As one explained, this could subject Japan to a North Korean attack – trading Tokyo for Seoul – and no Japanese leader could be sidelined in such a decision.

“Gray zone” provocations consumed the majority of discussion. The alliance division of labor in gray zone contingencies is unclear. Americans worry that the US-Japan alliance
would not be able to match the US-ROK plans for a coordinated response as agreed upon post-Yongpyeongdo.

Planning by the US and Japan should go beyond technical issues to promote the resilience of US bases in Japan, including the hardening and survivability of facilities, and wider dispersal issues, such as the use of civilian and commercial ports and airports.

Japanese worried that the US could set their country up for failure in such situations: expecting their country to do more in such contingencies while simultaneously cautioning Tokyo against actions that would antagonize China.

The United States must signal to all nations in Asia that efforts to promote greater activity by alliance partners is an attempt to strengthen deterrence and is not a sign of – or effort to stave off – US decline.

As the US and its allies think about broader forms of multilateral cooperation – such as linking alliances – all parties must agree on the ultimate objective of such efforts.

Maritime capacity building should be a key dimension of multilateral efforts by the US and Japan, in particular maritime domain awareness that provides a common multilateral operating picture.

Japanese participants also emphasize that the most important part of the bilateral defense guidelines review process is the war planning that follows the review.
**Conference Report**

The July 1 announcement by the Abe Cabinet that it would change the interpretation of Japan’s exercise of the right of collective self-defense (CSD) has prompted breathless speculation across the region. The consensus view among experts is that most discussion about Japan’s evolving security policy misses the point, and there is considerably less to changes than meets the eye. Yet even if the impact of the CSD decision is less sweeping than anticipated, an accurate assessment of its scope and meaning is vital for the US-Japan alliance. Fortunately, the seventh round of the US-Japan Strategic Dialogue, supported by the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), was convened by the Pacific Forum CSIS just weeks after that decision. Twenty-nine US and Japanese experts, officials, military officers, observers, and 10 Pacific Forum Young Leaders attended, all in their private capacities. A day of discussion deflated the hype surrounding many of the changes promulgated by the Abe government, while underscoring efforts to adapt the US-Japan alliance to changing national, regional, and global realities.

**Japanese defense policy**

All participants agreed that Japanese defense policy has remained consistent through recent administrations, despite the change from Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) rule to that of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the claims of the Abe Shinzo government that it has transformed security policy. There was similar agreement that the change in the interpretation of CSD isn’t a tectonic shift in Japanese policy or practice, although it will widen the set of options available to the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Our Japanese speaker emphasized that this is not the end of Japan’s postwar pacifism. The change in the interpretation of CSD “does not constitute a fundamental shift in the role of the SDF. It only authorizes the minimum use of force necessary for self-defense.” Prime Minister Abe has pledged that Japan will never participate in war for the purpose of using force and that the major role of the SDF within the alliance will be logistical support and defensive missions. The Japanese people are, however, changing their understanding of the role of the military and recognizing that the SDF can be a force for peace.

Our presenter worried that hype surrounding the CSD change may inflate expectations of what Japan will do in the event of a crisis and this could be a problem with Washington. More disturbing, he suggested that even the “minimal” changes advanced by the Abe government may be more than the Japanese public can stomach; he faulted Tokyo for insufficient explanations of the stakes and what will actually occur. Finally, he worried that political support for defense policy changes is a function of Abe’s own popularity: if it falls, then politicians will be less willing to pursue changes already in motion.

Our US presenter echoed those points, while reminding the group that a near constant in Washington over the past several decades has been a call for Japan to make many of the changes that the Abe administration has embraced. Americans are keenly attuned to the Japanese claim that reforms are being done in service to the alliance, and see little if any indication of a lack of faith in the US security commitment to Japan or “hedging”
behavior. (Indeed, our entire discussion was notable for the lack of discussion of traditional hot-button issues. Japanese had few complaints about US behavior, commitment, or support for Japan or the alliance.) He agreed that the proposed changes are not such a big deal, especially since the government of Japan has traditionally done what it had to in difficult situations – its capacity for “workarounds” is limited only by desire and creativity – as well as the more prosaic fact that the specific contours of CSD changes will be evident only after enabling legislation is passed.

Instead, structural issues – the demographic trajectory and budget deficits – are a powerful constraint on Japanese behavior. While the Abe government can take credit for boosting the defense budget by 0.8 percent in FY2013, that follows a decade over which the defense budget decreased by 5 percent. Moreover, there are complaints about the process – in this and other legislation – by which the Abe Cabinet brought about the CSD change that troubles many Japanese. Neighboring countries worry about the transparency of the policy-making process as well; our speaker (along with others) urged Tokyo to make more outreach to regional capitals, Seoul in particular. Finally, our US speaker worried about the perception in Japan and elsewhere in the region that Tokyo is acting at the behest of Washington. While some Japanese want the US to more vocally back the Abe decisions to give them additional legitimacy, our US presenter countered that this could undercut those steps by making Tokyo look less autonomous and painting the US as “the bad guy.”

There was little dissent from the central themes of those presentations. Americans pressed Japan to be more transparent and to do more to explain its policies to regional governments, in particular how they will be operationalized. Japanese participants acknowledged the defense decision-making process was less clear than it should have been – one noted that the Cabinet announcement was “poorly structured and confusing” – adding that the precise nature of the CSD changes will not be evident until enabling legislation is passed, along with the revised US-Japan Defense Guidelines. At the same time, they pushed back against regional complaints (channeled through US interlocutors). China, they pointed out, would object no matter what Tokyo said or did. There had been several Japanese offers to explain deliberations to Korea but Seoul had rebuffed them. (Some Japanese worried about “Korea passing” in Japan as frustration levels reached new highs.) Japanese participants added that many other regional governments quietly back Japan’s moves.

The paramount danger for many participants was of unrealistic expectations of Japan. As one Japanese participant explained, “the real meaning of CSD is not be found in high intensity situations but in the expansion of the scope of operational exercises in time of peace, such as training together or joint operations and joint patrols.” Restrictions, even on logistical support in wartime, would persist. “Don’t expect too much from Japan,” he warned.

Prime Minister Abe has insisted that CSD and other changes in Japan’s defense posture are intended to serve Japanese national interests and to be a better partner and ally of the US. Several participants underscored the Japanese government’s commitment to shoring
up the US deterrent. In operational terms, this has meant that the focus of alliance and
trilateral defense planning has been a Korean Peninsula contingency. Much Japanese
anger and frustration at South Korea reflects a belief that South Koreans don’t understand
that Japan is attempting to support US efforts to defend the ROK.

Equally important is how Japan’s defense policy fits into regional security dynamics. One
American noted that Japan in many ways is driving regional security cooperation. He
pointed to Abe’s aggressive courting of Southeast Asia along with the CSD decision. US
and Japanese participants highlighted the ways that Japan’s posture fits into the US
“rebalance” to Asia: it is an attempt to shore up the alliance network at a time of
increasing fiscal restraint. CSD allows Japan to work with other US allies and partners to
strengthen ties among “the spokes.” While all applauded this effort, several cautioned,
however, that US policy must be framed as a positive form of engagement and not as an
attempt to stave off decline.

**Reassuring US commitments to Japan**

Fending off the notion of US decline is no new task for US policy makers: every decade
or so developments challenge US policy and positions in Asia. Adapting to those new
realities raises questions about US commitment. Reassurance is an ongoing and
somewhat eternal process. Our US presenter highlighted an important paradox: as the US
strengthens its capabilities and positions itself to better defend its interests from afar –
rendering instruments of US power less vulnerable to attack – allies worry about
disengagement and slacking US commitment. In response, the US has launched extended
deterrence dialogues with Northeast Asian allies: the Extended Deterrence Dialogue with
Tokyo and the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee with Seoul.

Today’s challenges differ significantly from those of the past, however: regional
adversaries’ capabilities have improved and the points of conflict are sharper and more
acute. As our US speaker observed, Japan has realized that deterrence doesn’t result from
having equipment and being present. Very practical considerations regarding use and
specific scenarios are critical factors to assessing deterrent capabilities – and being
reassured as well. Once again, Japan’s CSD decision could figure prominently here.

Our US speaker saw no perception gap between the two countries, but he did see a
“priority gap” in thinking about contingencies. That divergence is evident in assessments
of Senkaku scenarios. He worries about differing expectations of the US in such a
contingency. He called for creation of a standing body for coordination on the defense
guidelines; this would always be operating, in contrast to a body that would be activated
in particular situations. He was not confident that the US-Japan alliance would respond as
effectively to a crisis as did the US-ROK alliance when Yeonpyeong Island was shelled
in November 2010.

Our Japanese presenter marveled at how the fundamentals of the US-Japan alliance –
deterrence and reassurance – remain unchanged despite the evolution of both the alliance
and domestic politics in each country. Fortunately, the alliance is in good shape, for
which he credited the day to day efforts of alliance managers in both countries as well as the relative stability of Japanese politics. The return to power of the LDP, the end of the “twisted Diet,” and Abe’s soaring approval ratings have permitted the Tokyo government to act in behalf of national and alliance interests. In this environment, the government has produced a new National Security Council, a National Security Strategy (NSS), revisions in export control laws, the CSD decision, the National Secrecy Law, movement on the Futenma Replacement Facility, and other key legislation. These developments have reduced US complaints about Japan, which have, in turn, reduced Japanese concerns about US credibility and commitment.

Still, questions persist. Do the two countries have shared perceptions of regional security dynamics? Do they have a policy agenda to address those dynamics, and the resources to implement it? More specifically, our Japanese presenter noted that the NSS espies an evolution in the regional balance of power that appears to favor China. For Japan, a country that uses a regional lens, this “looks more precipitous” than it does to the US, which employs a more global perspective. Japan’s air and naval superiority is being challenged, and China’s swelling defense budget suggests the gap will continue to close. With Japan’s power “constantly inferior” to that of China, Tokyo is obliged to worry about the contested nature of US power in Asia. The emergence of new domains where the US combat experience is not relevant troubles many Japanese strategists.

The adaptation of Japanese defense planning to these new challenges raises new issues for the alliance. What are the two countries respective roles in such situations? How can collaboration and cooperation best proceed? Our speaker worried in particular about US handing off of responsibilities while admonishing allies and partners not to do anything that might ensnare the US in a local dispute. It is a tricky defense planning balancing act.

The US forward deployed presence remains the starting point for any analysis. The two countries need to be planning together and working on ways to make that presence more resilient. This demands attention to hardening, survivability, and wider dispersal issues, such as using airports and ports. Maritime domain awareness is critical, which requires a wider spectrum of peace-time ISR, etc, in the East China Sea and beyond. Coast Guards will play key roles in this effort. The US and Japan should also continue efforts to build capacity among Asian littoral states, but this demands a shared vision among Tokyo, Washington and those regional allies and partners. Like-minded countries should establish a multilateral and common operating picture, along with common operational schemes and know-how for gray zone problem. A particular focus should be escalation management when allies’ core interests are at stake. Our speaker argued that the only stable balance of power would be based on asymmetrical denial and an asymmetrical equilibrium among littoral states.

Our discussion revealed no challenges to US commitments to Asia. US participants repeated the language President Obama used in his West Point speech in which he stated that the US was prepared to impose costs in defense of core interests. His statement during his April visit to Japan on the application of Article 5 of the Mutual Security Treaty to the Senkakus was, said one Japanese participant, “a big reassurance.” Follow-
up remains important, however. Here, again, the Bilateral Defense Guidelines will be critical. A US participant noted the importance of having governments speak with one voice on these topics. He was blunt: “make sure underlings understand what official commitments are and don’t undermine them.”

Russia is a particularly thorny problem for the alliance at this time. While the US seeks to raise costs to Moscow for aggression against Ukraine, Japan engages Russia through a different lens. The immediate issue is the prospect of a peace treaty and some resolution of the dispute over the Northern Territories. Japanese participants argued, however, that the chief Japanese concern was strategic and the prospect of Western actions reinforcing the China-Russia relationship by foreclosing Moscow’s other diplomatic options. Tokyo would like to block the strengthening of that axis.

**Using the US-Japan alliance to strengthen extended deterrence in East Asia**

The US and its allies have had to rethink extended deterrence in recent years. Traditionally, Washington extended its deterrent to its allies; increasingly, however, the US and its allies recognize that deterrence is the result of combined actions by both partners. That evolution is visible in the US-Japan alliance. As our Japanese presenter explained, until 2010, Japan merely relied on the US extended deterrent. In the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines, Japanese defense planners explained that their country would now be contributing to the provision of extended deterrence, primarily through participation in the US missile defense (MD) network.

That raises a fundamental question: are regional threats deterrable? How can the US and Japan respond to so-called “gray zone challenges”? China’s response to the 2010 nationalization of the Senkaku islands, Beijing’s creeping annexation of South China Sea islets, and North Korea’s penchant for provocations that do not warrant a full-throated response lift this question from the realm of theoretical concern and make it a focus of strategic planning. According to our Japanese speaker, the answer lies in demonstrating operational readiness to respond to any adversary, no matter what the challenge. As these are lower-level probes that directly affect Japanese national interests, the primary responsibility for responding rests with Japan. Nevertheless, the two countries must understand the transition from “gray zone contingencies” to those that invoke Article 5 of the Mutual Security Treaty. Previously, that shift was clear. Today the distinction between the two is blurred; after all, *by definition* “gray zone” situations are unclear. Operationalizing that transition will be the greatest challenge for the bilateral defense guidelines review. Effective planning requires the incorporation of new domains of conflict – cyber and space – but the most important part of the process will be the war planning that follows.

Our US presenter was more blunt, arguing that China’s salami-slicing tactics in the East and South China Seas erode US credibility. The most urgent task for alliance planners is creating a framework for strategic stability with China, identifying a role for Japan in that creation process and in the resulting framework. A credible US deterrent demands a counter A2AD network, one that would likely include the stationing of medium-range
antiship missiles near choke points. At the same time the US should invest in smaller, cheaper, more resilient capabilities via transformational technologies, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, directed energy weapons, and nonkinetic weapons. In this environment, US allies play critical roles, facilitating cooperation with third countries, promoting defense industrial cooperation, and developing new technologies.

Two ideas animated our discussion. The first is that extended deterrence is shared, not just provided. This was a heretical concept during the Cold War, but changes in threats and the acquisition of new capabilities by US allies makes this reformulation of roles and responsibilities a necessity. Countries that are not US allies can contribute to regional stability by coordinating security policy and operations with Washington and allied governments. The key to success is common goals and objectives along with a shared desire and capacity to increase uncertainty for countries that might profit from changing the status quo or instability. In this context, the US-Japan alliance can be central to regional defense planning and coordination.

A second, related, idea is that this new approach must be framed in a way that does not suggest that the US and its allies are acting from perceived weakness. There is a tendency to see a shifting balance of power in the region and extrapolate from that observation actions by the US to preserve its regional hegemony. No assumption could be more deleterious to the US deterrent. Washington and its allies must explain to regional governments, China in particular, that efforts to strengthen relationships with allies and partners are not a sign of decline. This process will also include the “selling” of US alliances as a regional public good. Asian nations should see individual alliances and the larger network that is emerging as in their interest as well.

While adaptation to regional security challenges will necessitate increasingly close ties among US allies, this evolution also creates new obligations among those allies. Our discussion underscored one especially thorny problem for Northeast Asia. It is well known among security strategists and assumed by defense planners that the US-Japan alliance will be a core component of the response to a security contingency on the Korean Peninsula. Legal structures have been put in place to facilitate that response; the working assumption is that access to US facilities on Japan to flow materiel and personnel will be automatic. (There are secret annexes to the US-Japan agreements regarding bases that exempt the US from consulting with the Tokyo government in the event of an emergency.) Japanese participants were insistent, however, that because North Korea could now threaten their homeland with nuclear weapons, no Japanese prime minister could be sidelined on a decision to use those bases. The prospect of 300,000 Japanese casualties – “trading Tokyo for Seoul” – makes Japanese input in any decision imperative. In this light, the longstanding historical and political issues between Tokyo and Seoul, and the tensions they create, take on new and compelling significance.
Trilateral options in Asia

Which countries are best suited to these larger regional partnerships? For a variety of reasons, other US allies are the most attractive options. As our Japanese presenter explained, they share values, interests (despite geographic differences), and institutional preferences. They back the rule of law, human dignity, and seek a level playing field to expand economic opportunities. The link to the US makes defense equipment and industrial cooperation a no-brainer, facilitating interoperability. Other areas of cooperation and coordination include defense capacity building, with a focus on ASEAN, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

The most obvious partners for the alliance include Australia, which already has close ties to the US and Japan bilaterally, and trilaterally through the Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD); India, a potentially huge partner in a variety of ways, even though that potential remains largely unrealized because of Delhi’s concerns about compromising its autonomy; the UK, another strong bilateral partner of both Washington and Tokyo, and a government with strong ties to Australia as well; and NATO, a favorite of Prime Minister Abe, as well as an institution with which the US and Japan have substantial security cooperation on counter piracy efforts, and which has a potentially powerful operational connection to extended deterrence. Indeed, despite the very different security environments, the US-Japan alliance and NATO confront similar challenges: developing and deploying MD architectures, getting the right mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, and forging strategic stability with a large regional power while dealing with destabilizing regional powers.

After agreeing with all the preceding arguments by the Japanese speaker, our US presenter emphasized that trilateral and multilateral cooperation doesn’t have to be formal. While communications and planning channels can (and should) be set up in advance, actual responses will likely be ad hoc, dependent on the details of a particular contingency. When dealing with North Korea, for example, the preferred partner will be South Korea. Australia is likely to be the first on the speed dial to deal with a Pacific Islands problem or some Southeast Asian crises. India, too, should rank high on the list of preferred partners, despite the well-known constraints on more formal trilateral cooperation with Delhi.

The gold standard for trilateral cooperation is the TSD with Australia. In fact, however, the particulars of those three countries’ relationships may make replication of the TSD impossible. Nevertheless, it remains a target for other initiatives. Two critical lessons should be distilled from that experience. The first is that politics cannot be isolated from security relations. Each of the dyads has to be strong and balanced. Second, there has to be real agreement among the partners on the objectives of trilateral relations. The three countries must agree on the ends to which trilateral cooperation will be put to use. The

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1 The emphasis in this session was on trilateral relationships other than the US-Japan-ROK relationship, which was the subject of a companion two-day seminar. This report on the trilateral dialogue will be forthcoming.
test of that consensus is the ability to plan, train, and operate together. This capacity should strengthen deterrence.

The starting point for any discussion of more expansive coordination is a solid US-Japan axis. A US participant bemoaned the lack of communication between the US and Japan within larger multilateral settings, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) or the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+). Even without a formal agenda, the two governments should try to advance shared interests. Cooperation and coordination among the two could serve as a cornerstone for broader cooperation among like-minded countries in those fora. At a minimum, it could demonstrate the value of the US-Japan alliance to other countries. A Japanese participant argued that Washington and Tokyo should show other regional governments that cooperation with the US-Japan alliance is better for them than working with China. One of his colleagues suggested that a distribution of labor with Tokyo within these fora would help undercut criticism that those institutions are dominated by the US.

Institutionalized coordination beyond bilateral alliances will be difficult. The biggest obstacle will be strenuous Chinese objections (as it does to any strengthening of the alliances that are “Cold War relics” in Chinese eyes). Beijing will attempt to suborn governments that might be inclined to work with Washington and Tokyo, no matter what the objective, for fear that such alignments will ultimately be used to contain China. More prosaic are scheduling difficulties: coordinating three bureaucracies is difficult. This challenge also undercuts the rationale for expanding successful trilateral coordination to fourth countries. While some participants suggested adding South Korea to the TSD, others were skeptical, worrying that lowest common denominators would be too low and the TSD itself might be diluted.

At the same time, however, as one US participant noted, Asia needs more effective regional security architecture. China has put its ideas on the table and they do not appear to be consistent with the US national interest. Beijing may seek to exclude the US from the Western Pacific and the meaning of “the new type of major country relations” remains uncertain. But Chinese views of the US alliance system are crystal clear and President Xi Jinping has proposed a new model for regional security at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). The US and its allies must anticipate future events and shape regional security developments. Washington and Japan should be proposing and driving alternative institutional arrangements that better respond to their interests and concerns – as well as those of like-minded countries. The US-Japan alliance should be at the heart of the structure, to reinforce deterrence and promote stability in the Asia Pacific.
APPENDIX A

Seventh US-Japan Strategic Dialogue
Royal Lahaina Resort, Maui, July 25, 2014

AGENDA

Friday, July 25, 2014

8:30 AM  Continental breakfast

9:00 AM  Session 1: Assessing Collective Self Defense

How does each country assess the Japanese government’s attempts to update its defense policy? How does each country evaluate the debate to reinterpret the right of collective self-defense? What is expected to happen? How will those anticipated changes impact the US-Japan alliance and extended deterrence?

Japan Presenter: Matake KAMIYA
US presenter: Brad GLOSSERMAN

10:45 AM  Coffee break

11:00 AM  Session 2: Reassuring U.S. Commitments to Japan

How does each country assess President Obama’s trip to Japan and the wider region in April 2014? What factors shape perceptions of US commitment and credibility? How do participants see events in Europe affecting US policy in Asia? How can reassurance be strengthened? How does the Trans-Pacific Partnership and commercial ties align with US commitments to Japan?

US presenter: Jim SCHOFF
Japan presenter: Ken JIMBO

12:30 PM  Lunch

1:45 PM  Session 3: Using the US-Japan Alliance to Strengthen Extended Deterrence in East Asia

What can the alliance do, specifically, to strengthen deterrence in the region? Should the emphasis be on individual national action or as an alliance? How do the revisions to the bilateral defense guidelines impact extended deterrence? What should priorities be? What should not be done?
Japan presenter: Sugio TAKAHASHI
US presenter: Robert MANNING

3:15 PM  Coffee break

3:30 PM  Session 4: Trilateral Options in Asia

How does each country view trilateral defense cooperation? Who are preferred third partners? Why? How can other trilateral options (i.e., not involving the ROK) strengthen extended deterrence? What specifically can be done to facilitate trilateral cooperation? What are the prerequisites for such action?

US presenter: Michael URENA
Japan presenter: Michito TSURUOKA

5:00 PM  Meeting adjourns
APPENDIX B

Seventh US-Japan Strategic Dialogue
Royal Lahaina Resort, Maui, July 25, 2014

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<thead>
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<th>Title/Position</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Foreign Policy Advisor, US MARFORPAC&lt;br&gt;Foreign Service Officer&lt;br&gt;US Department of State</td>
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<td>24.</td>
<td>Mr. James L. SCOFF</td>
<td>Senior Associate, Asia Program&lt;br&gt;Carnegie Endowment for International Peace</td>
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<td>25.</td>
<td>Dr. James M. SMITH</td>
<td>Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies&lt;br&gt;Professor, USAF Academy</td>
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<td>26.</td>
<td>Dr. Shane SMITH</td>
<td>Senior Research Fellow&lt;br&gt;Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University</td>
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<td>27.</td>
<td>Mr. Scott A. SNYDER</td>
<td>Senior Fellow for Korea Studies and Director of the Program on U.S.-Korean Policy&lt;br&gt;Council on Foreign Relations</td>
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<td>28.</td>
<td>Mr. Michael A. URENA</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Officer&lt;br&gt;Strategic Engagement Division, Office of Strategic Affairs&lt;br&gt;Bureau of Arms Control, Compliance and Verification, US Department of State</td>
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<td>29.</td>
<td>Mr. David WOLFF</td>
<td>Lead Associate&lt;br&gt;Booz Allen Hamilton</td>
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**Pacific Forum Young Leaders**

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<tr>
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<th>Name</th>
<th>Title/Position</th>
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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Mr. Will ATKINS</td>
<td>SPF Fellow&lt;br&gt;Pacific Forum CSIS</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Ms. Julia CUNICO</td>
<td>Kelly Fellow&lt;br&gt;Pacific Forum CSIS</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Ms. Darcie DRAUDT</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Mr. Tyler HILL</td>
<td>SPF Fellow&lt;br&gt;Pacific Forum CSIS; JD Candidate&lt;br&gt;University of North Carolina</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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