



4th US/UK-Myanmar Nonproliferation Dialogue

**A Conference Report of the
Fourth Myanmar-US/UK Nonproliferation Dialogue
By Carl Baker and Federica Dall' Arche**

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Pacific Forum CSIS

Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate areas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International Studies

Founded in 1992, Myanmar ISIS aims to act as an academic institute concerned with the study of international relations and foreign policy issue areas. It is also concerned with strategic studies and research works on current regional and international issues. Myanmar ISIS's other important task is to contribute timely inputs, views and recommendations for the formulation of policies and decisions on bilateral and multilateral issues with the aim of serving Myanmar's national interest while enhancing peace, friendship and cooperation with other countries of the world. Another area of importance is to project Myanmar's true image and better understanding of it by the world on its stands, policies, and actions on issues related to Myanmar.

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Key Findings and Recommendations
4th Myanmar-US/UK Nonproliferation Dialogue
December 5-6, 2016, Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar

There have been remarkable transformations in UK/US-Myanmar relations over the past few years with the signing of trade agreements, lifting of sanctions, and investments. Nevertheless, some issues such as the government's alleged violations of the human rights of minority ethnic groups have prevented better relations.

There is currently a fairly wide gap in perceptions regarding the issue of human rights violations in the Rakine State. While some outsiders accuse the government of genocide or ethnic cleansing, the Myanmar government has consistently portrayed its actions as justified based on the need for counterterrorism measures against international terrorists. An open dialogue over these perceptions is much needed.

Myanmar is firmly committed to improving economic and diplomatic relations with the US and the UK and several participants warned that we should not be distracted by Myanmar's internal challenges while pursuing those efforts.

US-Myanmar relations are likely to change under the Trump administration. The new administration will not be as personally invested in improving relations with Myanmar as the Obama administration was. However, with the strong foundation established over the past several years, it is likely that the US foreign policy community will sustain cooperation between the two countries for the foreseeable future.

Relations between Myanmar and China are a challenge for stronger US-Myanmar ties. However, it is important for all sides to avoid characterizing the two relationships in zero-sum terms.

As a close neighbor that is involved in the peace process in the Northern region and major investor and trade partner, China will always play a significant role in Myanmar's foreign policy. Close China-Myanmar relations should not impede or prevent the US from investing in the country and from strengthening bilateral relations.

Myanmar views its relationship with Pyongyang as a "marriage of convenience." Now that economic sanctions on Myanmar have been lifted, more countries will be able to engage with Myanmar, which should make that marriage less convenient. Myanmar is taking concrete steps to achieve a holistic understanding of United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding the DPRK and hopes to be able to implement and respect the provisions of the resolutions as earliest as possible.

The Myanmar government is working intensively toward the implementation of major nonproliferation treaties and conventions and the establishment of a credible national strategic trade control system. More pressing priorities, including fighting terrorism and corruption and promoting national reconciliation with minority groups,

together with a still significant lack of capacity, resources, and expertise, keep the implementation process from being as fast and as easy as desired.

Nonproliferation capacity-building should remain the top priority of any donor seeking to assist Myanmar. Myanmar needs training courses and education programs that will prepare the next generation of Myanmar policymakers and scholars in the field of nonproliferation.

Fourth Myanmar-US/UK Nonproliferation Dialogue

A Conference Report of the
Fourth Myanmar-US/UK Nonproliferation Dialogue
By Carl Baker and Federica Dall' Arche*

The Pacific Forum CSIS, with support from the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Strategic Programme Fund (FCO/SPF) and the US Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) held the fourth US/UK-Myanmar Nonproliferation Dialogue in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar on Dec. 5-6, 2016. Some 45 US, UK, and Myanmar experts, officials, military officers, and observers along with 10 Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders attended. The off-the-record discussions were intended to provide a forum for developing a better understanding of how the US and UK could facilitate Myanmar's adoption of several nonproliferation-related regimes and to understand emerging nonproliferation threats in the region. To that end, the discussion began with a broad focus on developments impacting Myanmar's relations with the United States and the United Kingdom and the anticipated priorities of the respective governments. This was followed by two sessions covering specific regimes that Myanmar has taken steps to adopt or ratify, including the Additional Protocol (AP) and the modified Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement; the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC); and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). A session on strategic trade controls discussed the role a national strategic trade control program could play in demonstrating Myanmar's commitment to nonproliferation and the potential economic advantages associated with doing so. The final two sessions of the dialogue focused on emerging proliferation trends in the region and next steps for Myanmar in response to these threats, which include signing The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOB) and ratification of several nuclear safety and security regimes. The presentations in each session are available on the Pacific Forum CSIS website.

Future directions for Myanmar, the United States, and the United Kingdom

Bates Gill (*Australian National University*) began with an overview of the evolution of the relationship between Myanmar and the United States over the past years. Under President Barack Obama, the first US president to visit Myanmar in 50 years, the US has supported democratic reforms, lifted sanctions on trade and investments, and signed bilateral trade agreements. While important progress has been made in improving bilateral security relations, Gill underlined challenges that obstruct further progress. On the US side, legislation continues to restrict the scope and content of security exchanges, particularly limitations that have been placed on working with Myanmar's military based on concerns regarding human rights abuses and its continued involvement in politics. Myanmar's relations with China and North Korea also seem to constitute an obstacle to stronger US-Myanmar relations. For Myanmar, there seems to be a concern by the

* Carl Baker is director of programs and Federica Dall' Arche is a resident nuclear policy fellow, Pacific Forum CSIS.

National League for Democracy (NLD), the new ruling party, and perhaps even the military, that leaning too much toward the West could lead to a deterioration of the country's relations with China, and in eventual exclusion of the military from Myanmar's political scene. Gill argued that these challenges should not get in the way of strengthening US-Myanmar relations. Instead, the United States should view the relationship from an economic perspective and support Myanmar in seeking more diplomatic, security, and trade relations with other countries in Southeast Asia.

Khin Maung Lynn (*Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International Studies*), argued that the single biggest challenge Myanmar faces is establishing national unity through stable peace with armed ethnic groups, both in the Northern and Western regions. While this issue consumes much domestic attention and considerable resources, it should not divert Myanmar's attention from other priorities. Myanmar is forging friendships and partnerships with the regional and the international community, hoping to spur foreign investments in numerous sectors such as agriculture, energy, mining, and tourism. Given the country's ripeness for economic growth and development, Myanmar is looking in every direction for partnerships and foreign investments, believing that trade agreements with one country (i.e., China) should not impede or jeopardize investments from and agreements with other countries (i.e., the US). Assessing the US-Myanmar relationship, Myanmar appreciates the lifting of sanctions and hopes for further US investments.

The discussion following presentations touched a wide range of topics, including the effects of "Brexit" on UK-Myanmar relations, the alleged Myanmar violation of human rights of minority groups, and the relationship between Myanmar and the DPRK. While Brexit is not believed to be an obstacle to bilateral relations, and anticipating that the UK could be more flexible in its trade agreements, the complicated issue of human rights could constitute a potential distraction from other cooperation efforts. Several Myanmar participants stressed how differing perceptions of the situation in Rakine State should not jeopardize relations between the US/UK and Myanmar. Rather, the US and the UK should help Myanmar through cooperation and intelligence-sharing.

Several Myanmar participants argued that events in the Western region represented a major shift in the nature of that conflict, charging that recent attacks on police outposts were orchestrated by international terrorists with links to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other "jihadist" organizations. These accusations led to a discussion of proportionality and the need for careful evaluation of the current crisis.

On Myanmar-DPRK relations, some US participants stressed that the United States is primarily concerned about military trade between the two countries (and not about legitimate diplomatic relations), as military trade constitutes a violation of United Nations sanctions against the DPRK. A Myanmar counterpart responded that the government is studying and examining UNSCR 2270 and UNSCR 2321 and, while it will take some time to reach a holistic understanding of all the provisions, Myanmar is committed to implementing sanctions against the DPRK.

An effort to clarify the relationship between China and Myanmar revealed that Myanmar considers China a “big brother: a bully at times, but also indispensable.” China is the largest investor and trade partner in Myanmar and it is also involved in peace processes between the government and minority groups in the Northern region. Nay Pyi Taw cannot afford to alienate itself from China. A US participant stressed that the US does not perceive close Myanmar-China ties as negative, and recognized that Washington needs to cooperate with China to strengthen relations with Myanmar. Most Americans recognize that China will always be a significant economic and security partner for Myanmar given its proximity and extensive involvement in resolving the conflict in the Northern region. Efforts must be made to avoid the perception that the US is attempting to create a zero-sum mindset regarding US-Myanmar and China-Myanmar relations.

Finally, concerns were raised over the possibility that the Trump administration will not sustain the momentum toward normalizing relations started during the Obama administration, leading to deterioration in Myanmar-US relations. Several participants noted that while the new president may not be as personally involved in the bilateral relationship as were President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton, the bureaucracy will provide continuity to US foreign policy and help sustain cooperation between the two countries.

Implementing the Additional Protocol and Modified Small Quantities Protocol

Khin Maung Latt (*Ministry of Education, Department of Technology Promotion and Coordination*) and Matthew Cottee (*International Institute for Strategic Studies - IISS*) examined Myanmar’s progress on nonproliferation, with particular attention on the status of implementing the Additional Protocol (AP) and the Modified Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) to Myanmar’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (INFCIRC/477). Khin noted that Myanmar is taking several tangible steps to implement a strong nuclear nonproliferation regime. It has acceded and signed major international instruments such as the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992, the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) and the CSA and the basic SQP in 1995, and the AP in 2013. It has also hosted numerous seminars and workshops to learn how to establish regulatory frameworks and fully implement nuclear safeguards. It has reviewed its nuclear regulation and is drafting a law that prohibits the use, production, storage, distribution, and import/export of nuclear material, radioactive materials or irradiation apparatuses without a government license. The law is currently under the scrutiny of Parliament in its second reading. Myanmar is also in the process of translating the provisions of the AP and the modified SQP into the local language so that stakeholders can learn about the obligations and proceed with implementation. Myanmar is also working on implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540. In 2005, the country submitted its first report; it has been recently updated and submitted again to the UNSCR 1540 Committee. Next steps for Myanmar are signing and ratifying other major nuclear security and safety conventions. In fact, Myanmar formally acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (as amended) on Dec. 6, 2016. Both will enter into force on Jan. 5, 2017.

Several ministries and departments, including the Department of Technology Promotion and Coordination, have been actively involved in developing an internal regulatory framework for implementing nonproliferation-related commitments. Despite these efforts and the significant progress that has been achieved over the past several years, the discussion following the presentations revealed several challenges that hinder faster implementation, including a major restructuring of ministries, which involved the elimination of several ministries, time-consuming bureaucratic procedures, lack of clarity over which ministries have responsibility for specific regulations, and the lack of adequate education on a variety of subjects, including safeguards, nuclear security, and trade controls.

The discussion following the presentations recognized the important steps Myanmar has taken in implementing several regimes to demonstrate its commitment to the principle of nonproliferation and in recognition of its responsibility to implement UNSCR 1540. It was also acknowledged that there remains a lack of capacity in the country to develop the full range of implementing regulations needed to ensure complete full compliance and transparency. Implementation has also been slowed by the decision to eliminate the Ministry of Science and Technology since this has meant primary responsibility for implementation has shifted to the Ministry of Education.

Implementing the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions

Myanmar ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in December 2014 and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in July 2015. While these ratifications represent a milestone for the country, there is still work to be done to implement obligations associated with ratification. Angela Woodward (*Verification Research Training and Information Centre - VERTIC*), and Vaclovas Semaskevicius (*Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons - OPCW*) provided a general overview of the two conventions, defining their scope and objectives, their national implementation requirements, and provided recommendations for assistance in completing them. Thar Htat Kyaw (*Ministry of Education - Department of Research and Innovative, and member of the Myanmar CWC National Authority*) offered an update on the status of CWC implementation in Myanmar.

For the BTWC, Myanmar needs to establish a national authority to coordinate implementation programs, which includes development of a national regulatory framework that regulates the use of biological and toxin agents and controls the import and export of such materials. Myanmar also needs to adopt measures to facilitate education and outreach to promote a culture of responsibility among the scientific community. This is a critical first step in the process of developing a required explanation of the confidence building measures being implemented in lieu of any verification mechanism associated with the convention.

For the CWC, Myanmar submitted an initial declaration in September 2015 stating that it does not possess chemical weapons. It has also established a national

authority and implemented basic legislation that defines and prohibits scheduled chemicals. Looking forward, Myanmar will need to work toward the implementation of a recently drafted law (November 2016) that covers all other initial measures required by the CWC. Specifically, it was noted that Myanmar has not yet completed its full declaration on scheduled chemicals in the country.

In his presentation, Thar Htat Kyaw stressed that Myanmar needs external support to ensure efficient implementation of the BTWC and the CWC. Specifically, he identified additional financial resources, capacity, and technical expertise as areas where Myanmar's needs are most immediate. Woodward and Semaskevicius noted that there are several approaches to adopting implementing measures (for example, states can develop a single comprehensive legislation, adopt a series of legal instruments, or amend existing legislation), and that numerous agencies, such as the OPCW, and independent nonprofit organizations, like VERTIC, can provide implementation assistance to governments that request it.

Implementing Strategic Trade Controls

A national strategic trade control program is a fundamental requirement for the development of a comprehensive national nonproliferation regime as it provides the necessary mechanisms to control the flow of strategic goods and technologies in and out of the country. Khin Mya Mya Htwe (*Myanmar Ministry of Commerce, Department of Trade*) began the session with an explanation of Myanmar's efforts to modernize and standardize its customs procedures with a new trade law in 2012, which requires licenses and permits for traders to import and export goods. However, the country is far from having a robust STC regime in place in that the current legislation does not apply to transit and transshipment of items and, most importantly, it does not have a control list that includes strategic goods as required in UNSCR 1540, international treaties and conventions, and the multilateral control regimes.

After describing what is meant by strategic goods and explaining the objectives of a national STC system, Carl Baker (*Pacific Forum CSIS*) offered four rationales for implementing a robust STC program: responsibility for implementing international commitments, transparency in trade activity, accountability of traders and licensing authorities, and the reputation of the country as being committed to nonproliferation. From past experience in Southeast Asia, Baker suggested that Myanmar should secure support from the national leadership to make an STC program a political priority to ensure all ministries and agencies make the effort needed to implement a comprehensive system. The adoption of such a regime would be beneficial from a national security and safety standpoint; it would also enhance Myanmar's international reputation by demonstrating its commitment to a strong nonproliferation regime. A reliable STC program would also incentivize foreign investments, contributing to economic growth. To be effective, a STC system requires a legal basis (comprehensive legislation), a licensing system (with control lists and registration requirements), an enforcement mechanism to detect violations and prosecute offenders, an outreach program to facilitate industry participation, and international engagement and cooperation to ensure

compliance with international standards. Baker concluded by outlining next steps needed to move Myanmar's STC program forward and several sources for assistance in building capacity and developing the necessary regulatory framework.

Regional proliferation trends

Next, the group examined proliferation trends in Asia and international efforts to counter these trends. Carson Kuo (US *Department of State*) focused on the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) case and its efforts to improve and expand its nuclear arsenal. Over the past decades, the DPRK has used complicated trading networks to disguise the trade/traffic of illicit items. The country has resorted to the use of procurement agents, financial institutions, and various intermediaries such as brokers, shippers, and front companies to acquire its nuclear and missile capabilities. By concealing the true nature and scope of its transactions to involved parties, by falsifying statements and declarations, and by abusing diplomatic status and conventions, the country has been able to conceal the shipment of strategic items and goods, and to develop a nuclear weapons program. The case of the Chinpo Shipping in Singapore, a company that the DPRK used for illicit financial transactions, is only one of the many examples of the DPRK's abuse of diplomatic relationships. Countries and companies have often found themselves unwitting contributors to and ensnared in DPRK proliferation networks. The international community has responded by adopting increasingly restrictive sanctions, with the aim of limiting and controlling DPRK's transactions. Kuo stressed that full implementation of all UNSC resolutions is paramount, especially for countries that have diplomatic ties with the DPRK. Increasing national capabilities and capacities to counter DPRK efforts and finding alternative trading partners were also strongly suggested.

Following the presentation some participants noted that Myanmar had been dependent on North Korea for small arms and ammunition to counter armed ethnic groups when both countries were under stringent international and US sanctions. The relationship was seen as a "marriage of convenience" whereby in exchange for rice and other basic commodities Myanmar obtained military equipment. While relations between the two countries are still positive and based on the "marriage of convenience" principle, the Myanmar government is trying to minimize trading relations with the DPRK as much as possible. Myanmar is seeking to build cordial relations and trading ties with other regional and global powers and eventually, with the support of the international community and with the increase of foreign investments, it will not need to rely on the DPRK anymore – especially from a military perspective. Myanmar has also repeatedly stated that it has no intention to acquire biological/chemical/nuclear arsenals or missile technologies. To prove its bona fides, the country is trying to be as transparent as possible in regard to its defense budget and defense procurement programs.

Another concern raised in the discussion was the impact President-elect Trump's stated opposition to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (also known as the Iranian deal) could have on the relationship between Iran and the DPRK. One US participant reiterated the view that bureaucracies usually provide continuity to their work, and that they only change direction in the extreme event they are asked to do so. Even in that case,

however, there are strong disincentives for Iran to engage in illicit trade with the DPRK. The country, in fact, would be re-subjected to strong international sanctions, resulting in a loss of foreign investments and in a serious blow to its economic growth. At this point, it seems unlikely that Tehran is prepared to allow that to happen.

Next Nonproliferation Steps

The final session of the dialogue focused on next steps that Myanmar could take to strengthen its nonproliferation efforts and to counter regional proliferation trends. After providing a general overview of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, Federica Dall'Arche (*Pacific Forum CSIS*) discussed the provisions, requirements, and objectives of four instruments that would help strengthen Myanmar's nonproliferation regime: the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), the International Atomic Energy Agency Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (IAEA CoC), and the International Convention on the Suppression Of Acts Of Nuclear Terrorism (NTC). The adoption of these instruments is particularly timely and relevant to Myanmar, considering the country's recently stated interest in developing nuclear energy and taking into account the government's stated concerns about international terrorism. Beyond enhancing the country's safety and security, adherence to these conventions would also reinforce Myanmar's nonproliferation commitments, sending a strong signal to the international community about its serious and concrete participation in the global nonproliferation regime and reassuring others about the safety of investing in Myanmar.

Dall'Arche discussed the benefits of implementing The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC). The HCOC, which aims at countering the proliferation of systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and radiological dispersion devices, is a voluntary political statement and a transparency and confidence-building instrument. While guaranteeing cooperation for peaceful access to space, the HCOC obliges adhering states to refrain from developing, testing, trading, and deploying ballistic missiles, and from assisting or contributing to ballistic missile programs of countries suspected of developing or acquiring WMD. Myanmar's subscription to the HCOC would provide another way to demonstrate its commitment to nonproliferation without diverting resources from other priorities. Subscription to the HCOC does not require states to create legislation or an implementing agency, nor does it oblige its subscribers to take any specific actions beyond basic reporting to reassert its commitment to the principles contained the code.

During the discussion, it was agreed that Myanmar has taken remarkable steps toward the implementation of a credible nonproliferation regime. One Myanmar participant reported that it recently submitted the necessary documents to complete accession to the CPPNM and the CNS. In fact, as noted earlier, the accession to the CPPNM and the CNS were finalized on Dec. 6, 2016, and the CPPNM 2005 Amendment was ratified on the same date. Both conventions will enter into force in January 2017. The same participant stated that Myanmar has also expressed its commitment to adherence to the CoC.

General observations and next steps

Compared to our previous UK/US-Myanmar nonproliferation dialogues, the general sentiment of this discussion seemed more optimistic. Myanmar participants appeared confident that given the openness of the new government and investments by new foreign partners, the country would soon realize important economic growth that would enable it to be integrated in the international community. Despite some challenges in implementing nonproliferation commitments, particularly in regard to resources, capacity, and knowledge, Myanmar is moving in the right direction by implementing several key conventions and treaties. Supporting the country by building the next generation of nonproliferation experts, policymakers, and scholars through workshops, training, and education programs remains a high priority as a way to guarantee sustained success.

Appendix A

Fourth Myanmar-US/UK Nonproliferation Dialogue

**December 5-6, 2016
Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar**

AGENDA

Sunday, December 4, 2016

18:30 - 20:30 **Opening Dinner**

Monday, December 5, 2016

9:00 **Session 1: Future directions for Myanmar, the United States & the United Kingdom**

This session will focus on Myanmar's relations with the United States and the United Kingdom. How has Myanmar changed since the new government took office? How will the lifting of sanctions and new governments in the US and the UK impact relations with Myanmar? How have perceptions about the relationships changed? What are the priorities for the future?

Presenters:

Bates GILL

U Khin Maung LYNN

10:45 **Coffee Break**

11:00 **Session 2: Implementing the Additional Protocol & Modified Small Quantities Protocol**

This session will examine implementation of the Additional Protocol (AP) and modified Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) in Myanmar. What are the requirements associated with implementing the two protocols? What is Myanmar's timeline for implementing them? What are the benefits and challenges associated with implementation? What external agencies can provide assistance in the implementation process? What can the United States, the United Kingdom, and others do to facilitate the process?

Presenters:

Matthew COTTEE

Dr. Khin Maung LATT

12:30 **Lunch**

13:45 Session 3: Implementing the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions

This session will examine implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in Myanmar. What are the requirements associated with implementing these conventions? What steps has Myanmar taken to incorporate the provisions of the conventions into its national laws and regulations? What challenges does Myanmar face in implementing these conventions? How can they be overcome? What are the benefits associated with implementation? What assistance is available implementing the conventions? What can the United States and the United Kingdom help Myanmar do to facilitate the implementation process?

Presenters:

Angela WOODWARD

Vaclovas SEMASKEVICIUS

Dr. Thar Htat KYAW

15:00 Coffee Break

15:30 Session 4: Implementing strategic trade controls

This session will discuss implementation of strategic trade controls (STC) in Myanmar. What are the main components of an STC program? What are the benefits associated with a robust national STC program? How is an STC program best implemented? What is Myanmar's current trade control regime? Does Myanmar intend to reform/improve this regime? How? What assistance is available for implementing a more robust STC program in Myanmar?

Presenters:

Carl BAKER

17:00 Session Adjourns

18:30 Dinner

Tuesday, December 6, 2016

9:00 Session 5: Regional proliferation trends

This session will explore regional proliferation trends and efforts to combat them. What are today's top proliferation threats in Asia? How can they be addressed? Specifically, what is the best way to respond to North Korean proliferation activities? What is the role of United Nations sanctions resolutions? What are their implementation requirements? What are the priorities for implementing these resolutions?

Presenters:

Carson KUO

10:30 Coffee Break

10:45 Session 6: Next nonproliferation steps

This session will consider potential “next steps” for Myanmar, focusing on the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) and nuclear safety and security conventions. What are the HCOC’s purpose, key provisions, and implementation requirements? What are the key nuclear safety and security conventions? What are their goals and implementation requirements? What are the benefits associated with acceding to these instruments?

Presenters:

Federica DALL’ARCHE

12:00 Lunch

13:30 Session 7: Wrap-up

This session will summarize the meeting’s discussions, identify its key findings, and reflect on next steps for this dialogue.

14:00 Meeting Adjourns

18:30 Farewell Dinner

Appendix B

Fourth Myanmar-US/UK Nonproliferation Dialogue

December 5-6, 2016,
Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar

Participant List

Myanmar

1. **Brig-Gen Than Tun**
Head of Department, Directorate of
Defence Industries
Ministry of Defence
2. **Brig- Gen Tin Aung Myint**
Head, Office of the Chief of Air
Defence
Ministry of Defence
3. **Dr. Soe Naing**
Managing Director
No.3 Heavy Industries Enterprise
Ministry of Industry
4. **Dr. Khin Maung Latt**
Director General
Technological Promotion and
Cooperation Department
Ministry of Education
5. **Dr. Thar Htat Kyaw**
Deputy Director
Department of Research and
Innovative
Ministry of Education
6. **U Ko Ko Hlaing**
Executive Director
CSIS Myanmar
7. **Daw Tin Tin Htoo**
Deputy Director-General
Directorate of Industrial
Collaboration
Ministry of Industry
8. **Daw Kay Thwe Htun**
Union of Ministerial Office
Ministry of Industry
9. **U Myo Zarni Win**
Assistant Secretary
Union Ministerial Office
Ministry of Industry
10. **Daw Khin Mya Mya Htway**
Deputy Director
Department of Trade
Ministry of Commerce
11. **U Lwin Myo Zaw**
Assistant Director
Department of Trade
Ministry of Commerce
12. **Daw Win Pa Pa Thu**
Assistant Director
Department of Trade
Ministry of Commerce
13. **Dr. Min Thaung**
Professor
Dagon University
IR Department
14. **Dr. Marlar Aung**
Lecturer
Yangon University
IR Department
15. **Daw Ei Ei Htwe**
Assistant Lecturer
Yangon University
IR Department

16. **Daw Nan Lei Yee Win**
Tutor
Yangon University
IR Department
17. **U Hlaing Tint**
Lecturer, East Yangon University
IR Department
18. **Daw Hnin Mya Thida**
Tutor
East Yangon University
IR Department
19. **Dr. Soe Tun**
Executive Member
UMFCCI
20. **U Nyan Win Myint**
Deputy Director
Ministry of Health and Sports
21. **Daw Win Thaw Dar Lwin**
Deputy Director
Medical Research Department
Ministry of Health and Sports
22. **Dr. Su Thet Oo**
Specialist Doctor
X-Ray Division
Department of Medical Treatment
Ministry of Health and Sports
23. **U Than Swe Tint**
Assistant Director
Customs Department, Ministry of
Planning and Finance
24. **U Nay Myo Thu**
Assistant Director
Customs Department, Ministry of
Planning and Finance
25. **U Ngwe Soe**
Staff Officer
Customs Department, Ministry of
Planning and Finance
26. **U Khin Maung Lynn**
Joint Secretary 1
Myanmar ISIS
27. **U Zaw Miin**
Advisor
Myanmar ISIS
28. **U Maung Hau Thang**
Director
Strategic Studies and Training
Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
29. **Daw Win Lei Phyu**
Deputy Director
Strategic Studies and Training
Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
30. **U Khant Ko Ko**
Head of Branch II
International Organizations and
Economic Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
31. **Daw Hnin Myat Nwe**
Head of Branch II
Strategic Studies and Training
Department
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
32. **Daw Su Hlaing Aye**
Head of Branch II
Strategic Studies and Training
Department, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
33. **Daw Nwe Ni Myo Aung**
Head of Branch II
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US/UK

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6. **Bates GILL**
Professor
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7. **Carson KUO**
Foreign Affairs Officer
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8. **Jason PORTNER**
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US Department of Energy
9. **Vaclovas SEMASKEVICIUS**
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10. **Robert SWARTZ**
National Nuclear Security
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11. **Angela WOODWARD**
Deputy Executive Director
Verification Research
Training and Information Centre
12. **Andrea YAFFE**
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Countering Weapons of
Mass Destruction
U.S. Department of Defense

Pacific Forum Young Leaders

1. **Andray ABRAHAMIAN**
Director of Research
Choson Exchange
2. **Nikita DESAI**
Director of Policy and Corporate
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