



Terrorism in Southeast Asia:
Perspectives From The Region

A CSCAP Roundtable Discussion
Featuring Kumar Ramakrishna,
Dino Patti Djalal, Carolina Hernandez, and
Mohamed Jawhar Hassan

Issues & Insights
Vol. 3 – No. 2

Pacific Forum CSIS
Honolulu, Hawaii
February 2003

Pacific Forum CSIS

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The Pacific Forum joined with nine other institutes in July 1993 in Kuala Lumpur to establish CSCAP as a forum for non-governmental "track-two" multilateral security dialogue. Founding members represent institutes in Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the U.S. Newer members include China, Mongolia, New Zealand, North Korea, Russia, Vietnam, the European Union, India, Cambodia, and Papua New Guinea. CSCAP members seek to enhance regional security and stability through dialogue, consultation, and cooperation on concrete policy issues and problems of mutual concern. The Council's research and analyses support and complement the efforts of regional governments and official multilateral dialogue mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The Pacific Forum manages the U.S. committee (USCSCAP).

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**Terrorism in Southeast Asia:
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Introduction by Ralph A. Cossa

Southeast Asia has been identified as the “second front” in the international war on terrorism, a title that took on new meaning after the horrific terrorist attacks in Bali on Oct. 12, 2002. Even before the Bali attacks, the nations of Southeast Asia had expressed growing concern about both regional and international terrorism, calling for “concerted efforts and concrete initiatives at all levels” to combat terrorism in the Joint Communiqué issued at the close of the 35th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Brunei. (Appendix A). Terrorism was high on the agenda of the broader ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting as well, with the ministers laying out specific “Measures Against Terrorist Financing” (Appendix B). In addition, an ASEAN-U.S. Joint Declaration was signed pledging cooperation in this field (Appendix C), a remarkable public alignment with Washington on a very high-profile security issue.

The multilateral, nongovernmental Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) has been at the forefront in examining this phenomenon, issuing a “Report on International Terrorism” in March 2002 (Appendix D), calling on all states in the region to increase cooperation and coordination in preventing and combating international terrorism, to include concerted efforts at addressing its root causes in Southeast Asia. CSCAP’s various International Working Groups have also continued their investigation of various aspects of international terrorism and its impact on East Asia security.

As part of this continued examination, a panel of experts provided their perceptions on terrorism in Southeast Asia during the December 2002 CSCAP Steering

Committee Meeting in Singapore. This report provides a summary of key points made during presentations by four CSCAP specialists: Kumar Ramakrishna, Dino Patti Djalal, Carolina Hernandez, and Mohamed Jawhar Hassan. Each was speaking in his or her own private capacity. Their comments represent their own personal views, and not those of their respective governments or CSCAP member committees.

In his opening presentation, Dr. Ramakrishna focused first on the region's most important terrorist organization, the Jemaah Islamiah (JI) network, before making four major points regarding terrorism in the region.

First, he noted that al-Qaeda's penetration into Southeast Asia is more extensive than first imagined, with JI functioning as its regional arm. Since the 1990s, al-Qaeda has been seeking opportunities to lure and absorb local militant Southeast Asian groups into the larger, global al-Qaeda network.

Second, he warned of the emergence of a Rabitatul Mujahideen (RM), apparently formed in 1999 in Malaysia, pooling the resources of Southeast Asian militant Islamist groups to launch attacks on Western targets. JI appears to be the driving force behind RM, in concordance with JI's declared aim to create a pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia.

Third was concern about suicide attacks, which were previously unprecedented in the region – the detonation of Oct. 12, 2002 at Paddy's Bar in Bali appears to have been the act of a suicide bomber. (The Singapore government's White Paper on JI, published in January 2003, reported that a few Singapore JI members were willing to become suicide bombers, while JI Singapore head Mas Selamat Kastari was captured with a book on suicide bombing in his possession.)

Fourth, without diminishing the importance of law enforcement measures, it seems clear that a comprehensive solution to the Southeast Asian terror problem cannot

depend on such measures alone. They should be complemented by parallel socio-economic measures aimed at root causes.

Dr. Djalal provided an Indonesian perspective, noting that, prior to Bali, Indonesia's counterterrorism policy had been pulled in different directions by different forces. As a result, the government had been over-cautious in advancing its policy. The Bali bombings changed that: the debate in Indonesia ended with the conclusion that terrorism posed a clear and present danger. The voice of the moderates is also becoming more vocal and confident, while the radicals have been forced on the defensive. The Bali attack also resulted in the enactment of Indonesia's provisional law on counterterrorism.

Dr. Djalal also mentioned several difficulties that persist. Capacity-building remains a problem, Indonesian police are still under-equipped and under-funded, and many communities can be accommodating to radical agendas. More needs to be done in the areas of intelligence- and equipment-sharing to plug these gaps. Foreign aid conditionality further complicates counterterrorism efforts.

Indonesia is also occasionally distracted by external events, such as Australian Prime Minister John Howard's remarks about pre-emptive strikes, which detracted from much needed mutual support in the fight against terrorism. In addition, Dr. Djalal observed that, rightly or wrongly, Muslims in Indonesia are still nervous about their place in the world; numerous conspiracy theories about the Bali blasts reflect this sense of prevailing insecurity.

Dr. Hernandez made three preliminary points. First, the solution to terrorism cannot be the same for all ASEAN countries; there is a need to highlight individual domestic dynamics. Second, there has to be a balance between national security and the advancements made in the areas of human rights, human security, the rule of law, and transparency. Third, there needs to be a comprehensive approach toward counterterrorism that addresses root causes.

Dr. Hernandez explained that the Philippines considers terrorism a criminal act and started responding to this perceived threat prior to Sept. 11, 2001. Since then, Manila has adopted a comprehensive 14-point program to counter terrorism and is also reaching out to Philippine Muslims. Lastly, the Philippines has ratified a number of antiterrorism-related instruments.

Dato' Jawhar reminded that terrorism has long plagued the region and that there is much less terrorism in, and emanating from, Southeast Asia today than there was in the 1940s through the 1990s. Terrorism and militancy in Southeast Asia has taken, and still takes, various forms. In the past there was communist terrorism, sectarian militancy, separatism, ethnic militancy, and (arguably) even state terrorism. The tide is now turning in the region, but the threat is far from over and Southeast Asia still has to be vigilant.

Malaysia's response has been uncompromising and unequivocal in its condemnation of terrorism in all its forms. Malaysia's strategy in combating terrorism, based on its experience in defeating the communist insurgency, is on two parallel levels: on the one hand, there must be punitive/preventive law enforcement measures; but there should also be an examination of root causes. Measures need to be taken both domestically and internationally to address terrorism. There are still doubts about whether the war on terrorism is really being won. Concerns also remain about U.S. "isolation" and the marginalization of the UN, as well as the potential threats arising from the dispersal of the al-Qaeda network. Dato Jawhar also noted that the unifying factor of Arab Muslim anger that feeds into international terrorism is the Palestinian issue. Until this is resolved, it does not seem likely that terrorism will, either.

All four shared the view that the war on terrorism in Southeast Asia must address root causes as well as ongoing criminal activity. Southeast Asia remains a breeding ground for terrorism, especially among poor Muslim communities that have not enjoyed the benefits of the previous ASEAN economic miracle and have disproportionately felt the more recent economic downturns and the disadvantages of globalization. Regional

governments must also be more proactive in providing education as well as economic assistance to potentially disaffected communities to prevent terrorist organizations from capitalizing on the discontent or lack of awareness.

Primary responsibility for combating terrorism in Southeast Asia rests first and foremost with the ASEAN nations themselves. There is much the West can do, however, by extending unfettered economic assistance aimed at eliminating root causes while also providing intelligence and equipment to help local law enforcement better defend their homelands. It is also clear that what nations like the United States do in regions remote from Southeast Asia – in the Middle East in particular, and especially vis-a-vis Iraq and the Palestinian issue – have a direct bearing on terrorist network activities, sympathy, and support in Southeast Asia.

Remarks by Dr. Kumar Ramakrishna

Dr. Kumar Ramakrishna began by pointing out that the key organization most often focused on in discussions on terrorism in Southeast Asia is the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network. It is by far the most important terrorist organization in the region. Among others, it has been implicated in several terrorist incidents including the Christmas eve bombings in Jakarta and Batam in 2000; the Dec. 30, 2000 bombing in Manila; and the December 2001 plot to bomb the U.S., Australian, British, and Israeli diplomatic missions and U.S. commercial firms in Singapore. More recently, JI has also been implicated in the Oct. 12, 2002 Bali blasts.

As to the current situation, it is fair to say that police and law enforcement actions against JI have been extremely effective over the past year. According to Zachary Abuza, an expert in the JI structure in Southeast Asia and author of *Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda's Southeast Asian Network*, approximately 100 JI members have been detained, including several high-ranking members. Abuza claims that the JI membership is not very large, numbering around 500 people with 6-12 upper-level operatives still on the loose.

According to Indonesian intelligence reported in the media, 20-25 operatives are currently on the run and need to be corralled to yield a crippling blow to JI, region wide.

Indonesian police have to be commended for their extremely quick detentions of suspected JI militants following the Bali bombings, including Amrozi, Imam Samudera, Ustaz Mukhlas (alias Ali Gufron), Ali Imron, and Mas Selamat Kastari. Mukhlas is a significant detainee because he was allegedly appointed the chief of operations of JI in Southeast Asia, replacing Riduan Isamuddin (alias Hambali). Also, the alleged spiritual head of JI, Ustaz Abu Bakar Baashir is currently in detention in relation to the earlier Christmas eve bombings, and is in the process of being investigated in direct relation to the Bali blasts. Mas Selamat Kastari is the head of JI in Singapore.

Thus, it could be said that the war on terror in Southeast Asia is speeding up. However, Dr. Ramakrishna made four points to complete the summary of the antiterror campaign in the region at this point in time.

First, what is al-Qaeda's role? Throughout the past year, it has become clear that al-Qaeda's penetration into Southeast Asia has become more extensive than first imagined. It must be recalled that before some of the more recent developments, the media reported that terrorist activities in the region were essentially driven by indigenous local elements. However, the picture that is emerging as of early 2003 is that JI is in fact functioning as a regional arm of al-Qaeda. Since the 1990s, it has seemed that al-Qaeda has been seeking opportunities to lure and absorb local militant Southeast Asian groups with their own origins and agenda into the larger, global al-Qaeda network. This has been done through ideological synchronization, training, and funding. In 2002, there was firm evidence that Hambali was the JI chief of operations and also al-Qaeda's regional director, of sorts. It also emerged that Hambali is now one of the top six al-Qaeda leaders, after the first tier of leadership was dispersed in U.S. military action in Afghanistan.

Also, with respect to the Bali blasts, it seems that an al-Qaeda member – a Yemeni named Syafullah – may have provided advice to the bomb plotters. In June 2002, Omar Faruq, an al-Qaeda operative, was detained by Indonesian authorities and in September, a Syrian of German nationality, Sayam Reda, was similarly detained. It is believed that the latter had operated as a conduit between al-Qaeda and Indonesian militant groups for the past three years. It is, therefore, fair to say that al-Qaeda has been interested in Southeast Asia as a base for its operations to target U.S. and other Western interests through JI, which, despite its regional origins, appears to have become coopted as part of al-Qaeda. It should be of no surprise to learn of more JI operations financially, and perhaps even operationally, supported by al-Qaeda to target Western interests as well as governments allied to the U.S. in the war on terror.

The second point Dr. Ramakrishna raised was about the emergence of a group called Rabitatul Mujahideen (RM), apparently formed in 1999 in Malaysia, pooling the resources of Southeast Asian militant Islamist groups to launch attacks on Western targets and U.S. allies in the war on terror. According to intelligence reports emanating from the Philippine National Police, RM held three meetings in Malaysia between 1999 and 2000. RM seeks to facilitate cooperation and share resources in terms of training, procurement of arms, financial assistance, and terrorist operations. RM also has a policy-making central committee and what is interesting is that JI appears to be the driving force behind the former, in concordance with JI's declared aim to create a pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia.

Abu Bakar Baashir has reputedly been the spiritual leader of RM with Hambali as the designated secretary general. RM meetings have allegedly been attended by militant Islamists from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Myanmar, and even Bangladesh and Egypt. If the Egyptian connection is true, it suggests another conduit for al-Qaeda to gain access to militant Islamist groups in the region. The implication of RM is that by cooperating more closely with such groups, these constituent groups gain access to wider resources and expertise to mount attacks on targets in their individual countries. Thus, even

as Southeast Asian governments are uniting in the fight against terrorism, terrorist organizations are appearing to do the same against these governments.

Third, the question of suicide attacks, unprecedented in the region, has also arisen with the questioning of Imam Samudera in detention. According to him, the detonation of Oct. 12, 2002 at Paddy's Bar in Bali was the act of a suicide bomber named Iqbal. Forensic teams appear to have confirmed this claim. Malaysian authorities recently also captured a four-man team, comprising three Malaysians and one Singaporean, who reportedly participated in the thwarted December 2001 terrorist plot against Western diplomatic missions in Singapore. It was suggested that a blast in Zamboanga city in the Philippines, which killed one U.S. Special Forces soldier, was the work of a suicide bomber although this claim has been disputed.

The trend of suicide bombings in Southeast Asia is not particularly new. In October 1997, there was a suicide attack on a Philippines Armed Forces base by two al-Qaeda trainers reportedly attached to the MILF. There were also planned USS Cole-type attacks against U.S. naval warships off Singapore and in Surabaya earlier in 2002. Both of these plans fell through. In detention, Omar Faruq confessed to having planned a truck bomb attack on the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta in October 2000, the same month that the USS Cole attack happened. That plan did not materialize, either. Al-Qaeda does not usually rely on local operatives in Southeast Asia to carry out suicide attacks but would depend on them for surveillance information and planning. Foreign operatives, typically from the Middle East would then be sent in to execute the final act(s). The Singapore government's White Paper on JI, published in January 2003, however, reported that a few Singapore JI members were also willing to become suicide bombers, while JI Singapore head Mas Selamat Kastari was captured with a book on suicide bombing in his possession. In January 2002, in Southern Thailand, Hambali allegedly presided over a meeting in which it was decided that due to the tightening of security measures surrounding Western diplomatic missions, al-Qaeda would shift to attacking softer targets such as bars, nightclubs, and schools that Westerners frequent or are located. The Bali

blast was reflective of this. The question of whether Southeast Asian Islamist extremists are foraying into suicide bombings is an open one.

Fourth, without diminishing the importance of law enforcement measures such as tightening border controls, immigration procedures, and suffocating terrorist funding, it seems clear that a comprehensive solution to the Southeast Asian terror problem cannot depend on such measures alone. They should be complemented by simultaneous measures taken at a parallel level. Dr. Ramakrishna identified three, in particular. In relating the first – socio-economic measures – he drew attention to an article in the *Asian Wall Street Journal*, which reported that the Front Pembela Islam and Laskar Jihad in Indonesia had disbanded. This, however, was not necessarily good news for the release and demobilization of thousands of jobless young Indonesians in Central Java with little education and plenty of spare time on their hands. This rendered them even more susceptible to the inflammatory preaching of radical anti-Western and anti-Christian clerics. There should, therefore, be an effort at increased educational opportunities and job creation.

The second parallel measure should be ideological in nature. Amrozi told his captors that Abu Bakar Baashir and Mukhlas were his heroes because of their unwavering commitment to the Islamic struggle, despite all the pressures against it. Dr. Ramakrishna referred to the earlier *Asian Wall Street Journal* article which revealed that Laskar Jihad preachers at headquarters preached the very simple but highly damaging message that Muslims could not live together with Jews and Christians. Thus, support should be given to moderate Muslim intellectuals to counter such hate messages.

The third parallel measure should include the political element. The key sentiment that binds all detained Southeast Asian militants is their hatred of the United States. U.S. policy toward the Palestinian issue appears to be the single biggest contributing cause toward anti-Americanism amongst radical Islamists in the region and throughout the world. Therefore, addressing the political causes of radical Muslim discontent will also

play a huge role in nullifying the threat of militant Islamist groups in the region in the future.

Comments by Dr. Dino Patti Djalal

Dr. Dino Patti Djalal, as first discussant, spoke about Indonesia's perspective on, and efforts at, counterterrorism. The tide is turning in Indonesia, post-Bali bombings. Prior to Bali, Indonesia's counterterrorism policy had been pulled in different directions by different forces. As a result, the government had been over-cautious in advancing its policy. The Bali bombings changed that and resulted in several effects on the country's counterterrorism policy: first, the debate in Indonesia ended with the conclusion that terrorism posed a clear and present danger to Indonesians, and that the nation was a target for the menace. Politicians stopped being defensive about whether Indonesia was a haven for terrorism, and instead became defensive about not doing enough or speaking out against terrorism.

Second, the voice of the moderates is becoming more vocal and confident. Amien Rais, speaker of the Upper House, referred to terrorists as evil, whatever their religious denomination, and called for the death sentence for them. Leaders such as Syafie Maarif of Muhammadiyah have also strongly criticized religious extremism; in an interview, he referred to radicalism as a suicidal move for Islam. Whereas the moderates have begun to regain ground in Indonesia, the radicals have been forced on the defensive. Laskar Jihad and the Front Pembela Islam, for example, have disbanded and members are returning from conflict areas in Poso and Maluku while the head of the Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia, Abu Bakar Baashir is in police detention. The net effect of this is that it has enabled the government to do more in terms of its counterterrorism policy, as reflected in its support of the inclusion of JI in the UN list of foreign terrorist organizations. Although the Indonesian government expected strong public reaction against its decision, the move has been received very well.

The other net effect has been the acknowledgement that the Indonesian police have been doing a very good job contributing to the country's counterterrorism efforts. Suspects in the Bali attacks, for example, were uncovered and detained only one month after the blasts. What remains to be discovered is the extent to which the JI network is connected to others or how many sleeper cells exist. Amrozi and Mukhlas had not even been on the radar screen before the Bali bombings and it is unclear how many more of their types are scattered throughout Indonesia.

The third impact has been the enactment of Indonesia's provisional law on counterterrorism. This particular law is meant to be a convenient short-cut to dealing with terrorism, given that the nation currently has no specific legislation for counter-terrorism. With this law, authorities may detain a suspect based on intelligence reports for seven days with a court order. It applies retroactively to cover the Bali bombings. At the same time, an antiterrorism law has been submitted to Parliament and is still being debated. [Editor's note: it was passed in March, 2003]

Dr. Djalal went on to mention several difficulties that persist. First, capacity-building remains a problem. Indonesian police are still underequipped and underfunded to carry out surveillance over three time zones and 17,000 islands within its territory. The country continues to be a very attractive hideout for any foreign terrorist because of less stringent border patrols. Further, there are many communities that can be accommodating to radical agendas. More needs to be done in the areas of intelligence- and equipment-sharing to plug this gap.

Second, Indonesia is occasionally distracted by external elements, such as Australian Prime Minister John Howard's remarks of pre-emptive strikes in the region, despite Indonesia having rendered very strong cooperation in intelligence exchange, particularly in the investigation of the Bali blasts. Indonesian spokespeople and politicians were put on the defensive for cooperating with Australia in the face of a public outcry over those remarks. This unfortunately resulted in less talk of cooperation with the

Australian government by Indonesia, detracting from much-needed mutual support in the fight against terrorism in the region.

Third, Dr. Djalal observed that, rightly or wrongly – and despite the moderates reclaiming stolen ground – Muslims in Indonesia are still nervous about their place in the world. There are, for example, numerous conspiracy theories about the Bali blasts that reflect this sense of prevailing insecurity.

Fourth, foreign aid conditions complicate counterterrorism efforts. One case in point is that although the U.S. has offered to assist Indonesia – and specifically, the Indonesian police – in the latter’s counterterrorism efforts, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution denying aid to BRIMA, one of the units within the police. This has resulted in a demoralizing setback for the police and placed the police chief in a difficult position. Overall, such conditions undoubtedly detract from the value of such cooperation.

Fifth, counterterrorism assistance should also include nongovernment organizations (NGOs). A lot of development assistance is currently channeled to NGOs with democracy or human rights as their agenda. There is a dearth of NGOs dedicated to counter-terrorism and it would be worth considering diverting a portion of developmental aid and assistance to establish or support such NGOs, rather than leaving the matter to the monopoly of governments and law enforcement authorities.

Comments by Dr. Carolina Hernandez

Dr. Carolina Hernandez, as second discussant, made three preliminary points. First, the solution to terrorism cannot be the same for all countries; there is a need to highlight individual domestic dynamics. Second, there has to be a balance between national security and the advancements made in the areas of human rights, human security, the rule of law, and transparency. Dr. Hernandez linked this point to Dr. Djalal’s remark about involving NGOs and civil society in the struggle against terrorism. Third,

there needs to be a comprehensive approach toward counterterrorism. Although poverty is an indirect link to terrorism, it remains one of the latter's root causes and must be redressed.

As regards the Philippines' responses to terrorism, Dr. Hernandez explained that the Philippines considers it a criminal act and started responding to this perceived threat prior to Sept. 11 because of various acts – terrorist in character – committed by local groups such as the CPP/NPA. Since Sept. 11, the Philippines has adopted a comprehensive 14-point program to counter terrorism. In addition to this, immediately after the Bali bombings, the Philippine government decided to host a World Tourist Organization meeting, held back-to-back with a conference on terrorism, to respond to the regional threat of terrorism, particularly given the fact that tourism is a major source of income for countries in Southeast Asia. In addition, as a confidence-building measure and in recognition of the country's Muslim communities' culture and practices, the government also decided to extend the Muslim celebration of Aidilfitri, normally observed only in the southern region, to the rest of the country.

In reaching out to the Muslims in the Philippines, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo managed to convince the U.S. not to declare the Mindanao Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) a foreign terrorist organization. A ceasefire agreement, brokered by the government of Malaysia, is already in place and monitored by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). President Arroyo gained a lot of political capital from participating in the international coalition against terrorism; in particular, by improving the capacity of the Philippines armed forces, through joint military exercises with U.S. forces, in fighting the nation's armed secessionist movements. While this cooperation has enhanced the capacity of the Philippines forces, one impact of this has been the dispersal of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) from Basilan to other parts of the country such as Tawi-Tawi and various areas in Luzon. A subsequent Mutual Logistics Support Agreement has also been signed by the Philippines and the U.S. This has drawn considerable amount of criticism

from civil society and even Congress, because negotiations had been conducted with very little transparency, confined only to the defence and military establishments.

Lastly, the Philippines has ratified a number of antiterrorism-related instruments. It suspects that the MILF and the ASG have links with JI although it is not prepared to declare this without further assessment.

Comments by Dato' Mohamed Jawhar Hassan

Dato' Jawhar, as third discussant, reminded that terrorism has plagued Southeast Asia for a long time and is, therefore, not a new phenomenon in the region. There is, however, much less terrorism in, and emanating from, Southeast Asia today than there was in the 1940s through the 1990s. Terrorism and militancy in Southeast Asia have taken, and still take, various forms. In the past, for example, there was communist terrorism, sectarian militancy, separatism, ethnic militancy and, arguably, even state terrorism. The tide is now turning in the region, particularly now that Indonesia is firmly on board the international struggle against terrorism, post-Bali. The threat, however, is far from over and Southeast Asia still has to be vigilant.

Malaysia's response, even prior to Sept. 11, has been uncompromising and unequivocal in its condemnation of terrorism in all its forms by, and toward, whomever. To succeed in the fight against terrorism, Malaysia believes that the enemy should be identified and that terrorism should, preferably, be defined (although it acknowledges the difficulty of this task). The country's own definition covers state and nonstate actors. This, however, has been met with opposition from different parties. The U.S., for example, has welcomed the inclusion of nonstate actors but disagrees with that of states, whereas the OIC has declined to accept Malaysia's definition covering Palestinian suicide bombers.

Malaysia's strategy in combating terrorism, based on its experience in defeating the communist insurgency, is on two parallel levels, as elaborated by Dr. Ramakrishna. While, on the one hand, there must be punitive/preventive law enforcement measures, there should also be an examination of the root causes of terrorism. In Malaysia's history, political causes were an important factor in the country's victory over the communists. When citizenship was awarded to the Chinese community in Malaysia, for example, the popular base of support for the communist movement largely eroded.

Although Malaysia has often been criticized for its detention laws, Dato' Jawhar pointed out that these had been democratically passed and have proven particularly successful in recent times. In addition, Malaysia is reasonably good at human intelligence and is supported by an equally capable law enforcement sector. The nation participates and cooperates with neighbors in almost every counterinsurgency measure available. Since Sept. 11, bilateral and trilateral cooperation have also been enhanced.

Malaysia is unwavering in its position that terrorism cannot be solved without addressing the root causes. Measures need to be taken both domestically and internationally. Domestic measures taken by the Malaysian government include the cessation of assistance to 500 Islamic religious schools, alleged to be abusing religion to preach antigovernment sentiment and ideologies of militancy, as well as ill equipping students to contribute toward modern society. The government is also monitoring Malaysian students at religious institutions in Pakistan where particularly virulent forms of Islam are being taught. In contrast, Malaysia is continuing its efforts at promoting a peaceful, moderate, and democratic brand of Islam in the country.

At the international level, while there may be a positive development in Southeast Asia since Indonesia's commitment to the struggle against terrorism, there are still doubts about whether the war on terrorism is really being won. There remain, for example, general fear from threat alerts every now and then and concerns about U.S. "isolation" and marginalization of the UN, as well as the potential threats arising from the dispersal

of the al-Qaeda network. The unifying factor of Arab Muslim anger that feeds into international terrorism is the Palestinian issue. Until this is resolved, it does not seem likely that terrorism will, either.

Dato' Jawhar ended by drawing attention to a recently passed UN General Assembly resolution on East Jerusalem which garnered an overwhelming majority of 154-5 against Israeli actions. The only countries who voted "no" were the U.S., Israel, Costa Rica, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia.

About the Authors *

Mr. Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu.

Dr. Dino Patti Djalal is Director for North and Central America, Department of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia.

Dr. Carolina Hernandez is president of the Institute of Strategic and Development Studies in Manila and professor of political science at the University of the Philippines.

Dato' Mohamed Jawhar Hassan is director-general of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Dr. Kumar Ramakrishna is assistant professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore.

* Opinions expressed represent their own personal views and not necessarily the views of their respective governments, institutions, or CSCAP member committees.

APPENDIX A

JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF THE 35TH ASEAN MINISTERIAL MEETING Bandar Seri Begawan, 29-30 July 2002

(Abridged)

Responding to Challenges: Securing A Better Future

1. We, the Foreign Ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), met in Bandar Seri Begawan to review regional and international political and economic developments, bearing in mind our resolve, to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by globalisation and address the new security concerns raised by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. These were among the important factors in the evolving situation that underlined the urgency for ASEAN to respond.

2. We expressed with appreciation the keynote address by His Majesty Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah of Brunei Darussalam. His Majesty stated that the most pressing issue for ASEAN is economic progress and ASEAN needs to respond rapidly to this challenge. His Majesty also stated that the cooperation between ASEAN and its Dialogue Partners is now an integral part of ASEAN itself. His Majesty highlighted that terrorism, at its deepest, level threatened all international order and challenges the fundamental values set in the Bangkok Declaration. His Majesty also stressed that terrorism must be addressed through a comprehensive strategy. His Majesty emphasised that ASEAN countries, individually and as a group, have enormous strength, vigour and dynamism and there is no lack of resolution, foresight and sheer talent in the region. In this regard, ASEAN needs to make its work more meaningful to the people so as to fulfill the dream of the founding fathers of ASEAN and the vision set out by the leaders in the new century.

3. We are fully committed to strengthening our bilateral, regional and international cooperation to counter terrorism in a comprehensive manner and to make Southeast Asia a safer place for all as reflected in the 7th ASEAN Summit Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism. We believe this would ensure peace, stability and security in our efforts to achieve greater development, progress and prosperity in ASEAN.

4. Encouraged by the achievements and progress of ASEAN over the years, we are determined to work even harder. We resolved towards realising the ASEAN Vision 2020 through the implementation of the Hanoi Plan of Action and the development of the Roadmap for the Integration of ASEAN (RIA) as instructed by our Leaders at the 7th ASEAN Summit.

5. Our priority is to further enhance our integration especially in ensuring the strength and competitiveness of our economies. In this regard, the realisation on 1 January 2002 of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) among the original six signatories represented a very

important milestone to an even deeper integration. We are confident that the implementation of AFTA by our new members would be carried out as scheduled. We would exert every effort to go beyond AFTA and the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) by deepening market liberalization in trade, services and investment.

6. We recognised the strategic value of intensifying our dialogue processes within ASEAN as well as developing linkages with friends and partners in promoting cooperation, broader understanding and addressing areas of common concern. Through our own Summits and Ministerial Meetings, Post Ministerial Conferences (PMC), ASEAN Dialogue Relations, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN + 3 process and other relevant international fora, we can maintain our coherence and cohesiveness and ensure that ASEAN continues to play a pivotal role, and to remain open and outward-looking.

7. In order to provide for better prospects and greater confidence for our people, friends and partners, we are determined to take urgent concrete measures in addressing the immediate and long-term concerns affecting the region.

Combating Terrorism

8. We recognised that terrorism is a global threat and that the disturbing acts of terrorism and transnational crimes, which continue to threaten world peace and stability, must be tackled by the international community. Towards this end, we called for the need to undertake concerted efforts and concrete initiatives at all levels.

9. We acknowledged that following the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism adopted during the 7th ASEAN Summit in November 2001 in Brunei Darussalam, ASEAN at all levels had undertaken practical measures and further enhanced its role and contribution in the fight against terrorism. We noted the increased cooperation and activities among the frontline agencies in ASEAN. We welcomed the adoption of the Work Programme on Terrorism by the Second Annual Senior Officials' Meeting on Transnational Crime and endorsed by the Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism in Kuala Lumpur in May 2002. We believed that the Work Programme would further enhance information / intelligence exchanges particularly on terrorists and their organisations, movement, financial support as well as strengthen our legal infrastructure and law enforcement capabilities. We would also work towards developing our regional training and capacity-building programmes. We are also determined to enhance counter-terrorism cooperation in line with specific circumstances in our respective countries.

10. We welcomed the signing of the Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures between the Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Republic of the Philippines in Putrajaya, Malaysia on 7 May 2002 as a significant building block in the international campaign against terrorism. We also welcomed Cambodia's accession to the Agreement on 30 July 2002.

11. We have also broadened our cooperation and involvement with the international community through the United Nations, our Dialogue Partners, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN + 3 process. We affirmed that at the international level the United Nations should play a major role. In this regard, we fully supported the implementation of the Security Council Resolution 1373 and noted that all ASEAN countries have submitted their reports in compliance with the Resolution. We looked forward to further efforts by the international community to provide technical assistance and other support to ASEAN Member Countries in need of such in implementing Security Council Resolution 1373.

12. We believed that all these efforts would bolster ASEAN's capability and capacity to contribute to the fight against terrorism at the regional as well as at the international levels.

APPENDIX B

ARF STATEMENT ON MEASURES AGAINST TERRORIST FINANCING 30 JULY 2002

H.R.H. Prince Mohamed Bolkiah, the Chairman of the ASEAN Regional Forum, on behalf of the participating states and organization, issues the following statement:

In the interest of global peace and security, the participants in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) are determined to stop the financing of terrorism. In October 2001 the Chairman issued a statement on behalf of the participants that stated that we will address ways and means to cooperate together in the fight against terrorism. The fight against terrorist financing is a shared responsibility of the international community. We have therefore today endorsed a statement of our intention to work individually and in concert to prevent terrorists and their associates from accessing or using our financial systems and to stop abuse of informal banking networks.

These recommendations arise from the work done by senior officials of ARF participating states, notably the ARF Workshop on Financial Measures Against Terrorism hosted by Malaysia and the United States in Honolulu from March 24-26, 2002.

We agree that ARF participants will implement quickly and decisively measures that the United Nations has identified as mandatory to combating terrorist financing. We will block terrorists' access to our financial system. We will work with other relevant international bodies, including the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), FATF-style bodies, and the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to prevent abuses to the financial system and threats to its integrity through the promotion of international standards relevant to terrorist financing, money laundering and financial sector regulation and supervision. We welcome the conclusions of the FATF extraordinary plenary on terrorist financing and its eight special recommendations on terrorist financing. Above all, we will enhance our ability to share information domestically and internationally as a vital component in the fight against terrorism. We call on all ARF participants to make every effort to provide assistance to those countries who require assistance in accordance with this statement. In pursuing our goals, we have agreed to the following concrete steps:

Freezing Terrorist Assets

- Each ARF participant will implement the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, particularly UNSCR 1373, to stop the financing of terrorism.
- In accordance with UNSCR 1373, each ARF participant will, within its jurisdiction, freeze without delay the assets of terrorists and their associates and close their access to the international financial system.

- Each ARF participant will, consistent with its laws, make public the lists of terrorists whose assets are subject to freezing, and the amount of assets frozen, if any.

Implementation of International Standards

- Each ARF participant will aim to approve, accept, ratify or accede to and implement the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism as soon as possible.
- Each ARF participant will aim to approve, accept, ratify or accede to and implement to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
- We will work co-operatively and in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, FATF and FATF-style bodies, FSF, Basle Committee of Banking Supervisors (BCBS), and other relevant international and regional bodies to promote the adoption, implementation, and assessment of international standards or recommendations to combat the abuses of the financial system, including in respect of terrorist financing, financial regulation, and money laundering.

International Cooperation: Exchange of Information and Outreach

- We will enhance our cooperation on the international exchange of information, including regarding actions taken under UN resolutions. ARF participants will promptly implement such measures as are necessary to facilitate this exchange.
- Each ARF participant should establish promptly, or maintain, a Financial Intelligence Unit or its equivalent and will take steps to enhance information sharing among them, including through promoting increased participation in groups of such units.
- An important element of this effort is the work of the regional FATF-style anti-money laundering bodies. Accordingly, the ARF participants call on these regional bodies to meet promptly and to expand their mandates to include terrorist financing.

Technical Assistance

- We are committed to providing, where possible, technical assistance to countries that need help in developing and implementing necessary laws, regulations and policies to combat terrorist financing and money laundering.
- We welcome the efforts of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and other multilateral and regional organizations to

provide technical assistance, including by expanding existing programs and training centers.

Compliance and Reporting

- To promote implementation and compliance with international standards, and to share information regarding our respective laws, regulations, and best practices to address terrorist financing, we will support the activities of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee. We will also actively support surveillance and voluntary self-assessment through the IFIs, FATF and relevant international bodies.
- ARF participants should respond to the FATF's invitation to participate in a self-assessment of the eight special recommendations on terrorist financing.
- We encourage the FSF to continue its work respecting the actions of financial sector regulators in the fight against terrorism.
- We will ensure that our financial institutions and citizens comply with measures to combat the financing of terrorism and other financial crimes, and will assist them to do so, including through informing financial institutions of their obligations and new developments.
- We welcome the active contribution of the regional FATF-style bodies to the FATF's worldwide self-assessment program.
- We will review progress on our efforts to combat the financing of terrorism at our next Ministerial meeting.

APPENDIX C

ASEAN-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA JOINT DECLARATION FOR COOPERATION TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

The Governments of Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Republic of Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the United States of America (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the participants");

Mindful of the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, which, inter alia, undertakes to strengthen cooperation at bilateral, regional and international levels in combating terrorism in a comprehensive manner and affirms that at the international level the United Nations should play a major role in this regard;

Reaffirming their commitment to counter, prevent and suppress all forms of terrorist acts in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, international law and all the relevant United Nations resolutions or declarations on international terrorism, in particular the principles outlined in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373, 1267 and 1390;

Viewing acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed wherever, whenever and by whomsoever, as a profound threat to international peace and security, which require concerted action to protect and defend all peoples and the peace and security of the world;

Recognising the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and non- intervention in the domestic affairs of other States;

Acknowledging the value of existing cooperation on security, intelligence and law enforcement matters, and desiring to strengthen and expand this cooperation to combat international terrorism through the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime, as a leading ASEAN body for combating terrorism, and other mechanisms;

Recognising the transnational nature of terrorist activities and the need to strengthen international cooperation at all levels in combating terrorism in a comprehensive manner;

Desiring to enhance counter-terrorism cooperation between the relevant agencies of the participants' governments;

Solemnly declare as follows:

Objectives

1. The participants reaffirm the importance of having a framework for cooperation to prevent, disrupt and combat international terrorism through the exchange and flow of information, intelligence and capacity-building.
2. The participants emphasize that the purpose of this cooperation is to enhance the efficacy of those efforts to combat terrorism.

Scope and Areas of Cooperation

3. The participants stress their commitment to seek to implement the principles laid out in this Declaration, in accordance with their respective domestic laws and their specific circumstances, in any or all of the following activities:
 - I. Continue and improve intelligence and terrorist financing information sharing on counter-terrorism measures, including the development of more effective counter-terrorism policies and legal, regulatory and administrative counter-terrorism regimes.
 - II. Enhance liaison relationships amongst their law enforcement agencies to engender practical counter-terrorism regimes.
 - III. Strengthen capacity-building efforts through training and education; consultations between officials, analysts and field operators; and seminars, conferences and joint operations as appropriate.
 - IV. Provide assistance on transportation, border and immigration control challenges, including document and identity fraud to stem effectively the flow of terrorist-related material, money and people.
 - V. Comply with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373, 1267, 1390 and other United Nations resolutions or declarations on international terrorism.
 - VI. Explore on a mutual basis additional areas of cooperation.

Participation

4. Participants are called upon to become parties to all 12 of the United Nations conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

5. The participants are each called upon to designate an agency to coordinate with law enforcement agencies, authorities dealing with countering terrorism financing and other concerned government agencies, and to act as the central point of contact for the purposes of implementing this Declaration.

Disclosure of Information

6. The participants expect that no participant would disclose or distribute any confidential information, documents or data received in connection with this Declaration to any third party, at any time, except to the extent agreed in writing by the participant that provided the information.

7. All the participants are urged to promote and implement in good faith and effectively the provisions of the present Declaration in all its aspects.

Signed at Bandar Seri Begawan this first day of August, Two Thousand and Two.

For ASEAN
Mohamed Bolkiah
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Brunei Darussalam

For the United States of America
Colin L. Powell
Secretary of State

APPENDIX D

Report on International Terrorism CSCAP Study Group Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 25-26 March 2002

1. Introduction

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in the Asia Pacific region or in other regions of the world. Terrorism has proven to be a problematic concept to define, but a useful working definition (adapted from an IISS version) may be:

The use of violence, often against people not directly involved in a conflict, by parties which generally claim to have high political or religious purposes, and believe that creating a climate of terror will assist attainment of their objectives. Terrorism of this kind almost always appears to be non-governmental, but terrorism can also be conducted by states. Movements engaging in terrorism may also have a degree of clandestine support from governments.

The terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, however, to all intents and purposes highlighted profound new dimensions in the evolution of terrorism. These include the wider reach and networking of terrorist movements, the greater capabilities amassed by them through the availability of modern communication and other technology, and the enhanced susceptibility of domestic constituencies to external developments.

The campaign against international terrorism launched since September 11 has achieved some tangible successes, but it has yet to address the root causes. Some of the measures taken, including military campaigns, have also impacted negatively upon national security concerns in some Asia Pacific countries by radicalizing sentiment among sections of the population.

2. Aim

This paper aims to identify the elements of a comprehensive strategy to combat terrorism in the Asia Pacific region, and how CSCAP can contribute to the formulation of such a strategy.

3. Principles of Counter-Terrorism in the Asia Pacific Region

a. Terrorism poses a real menace and challenge to world peace and security, harming the life, dignity and safety of innocent people. Combating terrorism is a contest between peace and violence. The international society should take the same resolute position against terrorism no matter when, where and in what form it occurs, or at whom it is targeted.

- b. All actions combating international terrorism should comply with the purposes and principles of the UN charter and other recognized norms of international law, and implement UN Security Council Resolutions 1373, 1377, 1383 and 1386 faithfully. Efforts to strengthen the international anti-terrorism regime should also be made, with the United Nations and its Security Council playing a leading role in international efforts to this end.
- c. All Asia-Pacific countries should step up their cooperation and coordination in all specific fields in preventing and combating international terrorism. CSCAP Working Groups should co-ordinate their research agendas in order to advance the collective effort in combating international terrorism.
- d. There should be greater international co-operation in securing convincing evidence and identifying clearly defined targets. Special care should be taken to avoid harm to innocents while combating international terrorism. In particular, there should be no interference in the internal affairs of states. The scope of operations taken by states against international terrorism must not be arbitrarily enlarged.
- e. Terrorism is a crime committed by a handful of extremist elements and should not be equated with any specific ethnic group or religion. Under no circumstances should double standards in applying this principle be allowed.
- f. To fight terrorism effectively requires efforts to address its ideological, socio-economic and political root causes. This should involve strategies aimed at concurrently solving both current problems and identifying permanent solutions in the long run. An important prerequisite in this connection is to resolve the question of development and narrow the gap between the rich and poor.
- g. The so-called war on terror is not just a war that can be won by sole reliance on military and coercive measures. It is in fact a war for hearts and minds. Hence a careless over-reliance on military and coercive measures may generate the undesirable impression that this is a war between civilizations.

4. Towards a Comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region

In combating the new international terrorism, it is necessary to grasp two aspects of this phenomenon: its root causes and its technological complexity.

- a. **Root Causes.** The root causes of terrorism, both domestic and international, are varied and complex. One set of factors is essentially political, and include foreign occupation, political oppression and religious and ethno-nationalistic extremism. In addition, another set of factors is due to serious socio-economic deficits such as poverty and unemployment resulting from a combination of poor governance and the inability to cope with globalization processes.

b. Technological Complexity. The new terrorists are distinguished by their general ability to use new information and communication technologies such as encrypted email, satellite television, cellular telephones and fax to more efficiently co-ordinate their operations, monitor government responses to their activities, and efficiently and discreetly transfer funds electronically. Moreover, the terrorists are fully able to exploit technology to enhance their illegal trans-national activities including underground banking, drug trafficking, kidnapping, as well as people and arms smuggling, so as to generate further funding. In addition, they are able to harness vast amounts of information on the World Wide Web so as to conceive and plan operations using WMD or even non-nuclear technical means to cause mass casualties.

In order to deal with such a complex phenomenon, it is essential to shape a comprehensive and nuanced strategy. The success of the strategy is dependent on three factors. Because any lasting solution to the problem of terrorism must ultimately be political, that is, it must involve the gradual and painstaking winning of the hearts and minds of disaffected peoples, great patience and endurance is required.

Impatience in this campaign could pose great pitfalls. Second, the political nature of the campaign against terror suggests that such a comprehensive strategy cannot be pursued without full cognisance of the potential negative consequences of any action contemplated. Third, a comprehensive strategy must be implemented within a substantive multilateral framework, and ensure the fullest regional participation. There should be four key elements of such a strategy, socio-economic, coercive, political and technical:

c. Socio-economic Measures. It must be recognized that poverty and extreme socio-economic marginalization are root causes of terrorism. These may be the result of either deficient domestic policies or powerful globalization processes. Hence developed countries should increase trade, investment and aid linkages with developing countries to enhance their capacities for good governance, enabling the latter to eradicate corruption as well as ameliorate mass resentment by generating jobs and raising living standards across the board.

d. Coercive Measures. It must be recognized that strong legal enforcement measures such as freezing of assets and detentions of individuals suspected of complicity in terrorist plots, are the first line of attack in the campaign against terror.

These however must be carefully calibrated so as to target terrorists precisely and not the wider community in which they lurk. Failure to apply anti-terrorist legal and administrative measures precisely and effectively may lead to a deterioration in the situation, leading to possible use of military options which could result in unintended negative consequences.

e. Political Measures. Terrorists by definition fight for a political cause, perceived as 'just' or otherwise. Terrorist groups also often feed upon political

issues for support, such as grievances and opposition to illegal and armed occupation, the presence of foreign military bases, oppression, and abuse and denial of civil and political rights. Terrorist movements may also exploit and use religious, racist and nationalist appeals to buttress their cause. Counter-terrorism measures must address these political issues as well in order to effectively respond to threats of terrorism.

f. Technical Measures. It is vitally important that the functional capacity of the terrorists to plan, fund and implement their activities must be targeted. In this respect, enhanced international co-operation in developing up-to-date terrorist databases, as well as more regular intelligence sharing and exchanges; shutting down financial and arms pipelines; and tightening immigration and border controls, are all crucial elements of a comprehensive strategy for neutralizing the new international terrorism. To achieve success in countering terrorism, in whatever form it may take, requires the region-wide adoption of measures to facilitate international and regional cooperation. Particular co-operative measures include:

- Operational Cooperation
 - Developing more effective information and intelligence storage and sharing arrangements within the region;
 - Improving the cooperation of law enforcement agencies to enhance deterrence and to fight effectively against terrorism in the region;
 - Enhancing the technological capacities of less developed countries to combat terrorism in the region;
 - Enhancing cooperation on border and visa systems to improve the detection and apprehension of suspect terrorists;
 - Sharing information and intelligence on identity fraud and counterfeit documentation used for covert movement of terrorists in the region;
 - Increasing public awareness of the nature and threat of regional terrorism to encourage an inclusive response to the threat;
 - Encouraging inter-jurisdictional joint law enforcement operations against targets of mutual concern.

- Terrorist Finance
 - Ratifying the *United Nations Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Financing, 1999*;
 - Criminalizing the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organizations;
 - Freezing and confiscating terrorist assets;
 - Requiring financial institutions to report suspicious transactions which may be linked to terrorism;

- Assisting other governments' investigations of terrorist financing networks;
 - Reducing the opportunities for alternative remittance systems to be manipulated for money laundering purposes;
 - Strengthening customer requirements for domestic and international wire transfers;
 - Taking steps to ensure that non-profit organizations are not misused to finance terrorist groups.
- Legal Cooperation

There is a need to encourage regional governments to ratify the various United Nations Conventions in relation to transnational crimes and related issues; adopt the United Nations Resolutions on terrorism; and implement international and regional resolutions on transnational crimes and terrorism. On the other hand, governments should strike a judicious balance between a fundamental respect for legal due process and the need to capitalize on fleeting opportunities thrown up by rapidly evolving operational circumstances. Specifically there is scope for:

- Introducing compatible national counter-terrorist and transnational criminal laws to facilitate regional cooperation;
- Introducing legal measures, such as bilateral or multilateral treaties, MOUs, or other agreements to facilitate extradition, mutual support in criminal matters, asset confiscation and the admissibility of evidence in other legal jurisdictions.

5. Proposed CSCAP Action Plan to Study International Terrorism

The Working Group on Comprehensive and Cooperative Security will undertake work on the following areas:

- a. Conceptual and definitional aspects of terrorism. The aim will be to highlight the issues involved and identify some possible common characteristics of terrorism rather than to work towards an agreed definition.
- b. The factors that contribute towards terrorism in the Asia Pacific region.
- c. The principles and strategies for effective counter-terrorist policies.

The Working Group on Transnational Crime will continue to address:

- a. The technical aspects of terrorism, its criminal manifestations, its links to transnational criminal organizations;
- b. Issues relating to terrorist financing, money laundering, identity fraud, and the like;
- c. A menu of other research agendas into various aspects of terrorist activities in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Working Group on Maritime Cooperation will continue to examine:

- a. The vulnerability of naval and commercial shipping, offshore platforms, ports and harbours and coastal settlements to terrorist attack;
- b. The threat of maritime terrorism generally, including the use of ships as vehicles for conducting terrorist attacks;
- c. The potential for reducing vulnerabilities, and to counter the threat from maritime terrorist attacks.

The nature of the threats from terrorism, and the response to such threats, will increasingly require close collaboration between the various Working Groups, including joint meetings and/or joint studies.