



Regional Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

A Review of the Work of the
2nd Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on
Peacekeeping and Peace-Building in the Asia Pacific

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Pacific Forum CSIS

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Executive Summary

On March 11-12, 2006, 22 experts from across the Asia Pacific convened in Vancouver for the second meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Regional Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding. Participants came from South Asia, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand, and North America, and had extensive professional training in government, military, civilian policing, academia, NGOs, and former and current UN and other multilateral monitoring, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding missions.

Four developments formed the backdrop to the meeting's discussions. First, international peace operations have become increasingly comprehensive, with a corresponding proliferation in the number and type of stakeholders involved. Second, the structures and mechanisms for coordinating these missions' various components and for securing the resources to ensure their successful completion have yet to fully materialize. Third, while these organizational gaps are a challenge for the international community, they are also an opportunity for the Asia Pacific to assume a more proactive and visible role in peace operations. Finally, a distinctly Asia Pacific regional contribution to these operations has yet to coalesce, however, either in material contributions or in a regional perspective on how existing modalities might be adapted to Asian capabilities and concerns. The Study Group identified several political, operational, and organizational challenges to, and opportunities for, expanding and improving upon the Asia Pacific's current contributions to international peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts.

Political Obstacles to the Formation of a Regional Standing Capacity

While overall Asian contributions to international peace operations have increased, initiatives to channel these efforts into a regional standing capacity have been lacking. Two primary obstacles were identified. First, the region's strong non-intervention norm requires that a clear distinction be made between scenarios of state collapse, where regional intervention may in some cases be acceptable, and intra-state conflict, where regional involvement would constitute a violation of this norm. Second, regional political will has been hampered by the absence of a leader willing and able to give impetus and structure to the formation of such a capacity.

Practical Obstacles to the Inter-Operability of Existing Efforts

The inter-operability of existing contributions to international peace operations is deficient in two respects. First, while national peacekeeping training centers constitute an important node through which Asian states contribute to international peacekeeping efforts, the lack of uniformity across their curricula creates inconsistencies in standards and expectations. Second, military and civilian policing roles are not always effectively synchronized in terms of their rules of engagement, technical capabilities, communications strategies, human rights practices, and community rehabilitation efforts. Insufficient English language training and economic development challenges are two additional obstacles to deepening the engagement of newly contributing countries.

Questions about the Role of the UN Peacebuilding Commission

The UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was created to counter, in two ways, the relapse of post-conflict societies into civil war. First, once the “CNN effect” dissipates and donor fatigue sets in, the PBC must ensure that reconstruction efforts to reinforce the peace remain properly funded. Second, the activities of the various actors and agencies, both within and outside the UN framework, must be more effectively integrated under a single plan to ensure that a mission’s components do not work at cross-purposes. But uncertainties regarding the PBC’s authority vis-à-vis UN member states, including the Security Council, raise doubts about the PBC’s ability to implement these much-needed organizational changes. Furthermore, an Asian perspective on the PBC’s proper role has yet to crystallize.

Challenges of Integrating Nonstate Actors into the Overall Mission

In post-conflict reconstruction, NGOs play an invaluable role in elections monitoring, fact-finding, gender and human rights development, policy advocacy and influence, and more generally in re-building fractured civil society networks. At the same time the failure to integrate the work of both domestic and international NGOs into an overarching plan can undermine the mission’s overall coherence. Furthermore, the benefits of NGO services may be hindered by their insufficient material and organizational capacities.

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Changing Global Approaches to Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

Session I began with a report by Dr. Catherine Guicherd on "UN Peace Operations from the Brahimi Report to the Peacebuilding Commission." She noted that the UN is still very much a European construct in its Security Council composition and in its operational culture. At the same time, the UN's peacekeeping activities are heavily concentrated in Africa. There is no clear and strong Asian voice in and perspective on UN peacekeeping activities. Do emerging trends at the UN offer opportunities for Asians to assert themselves into new roles?

Dr. Guicherd identified four trends in peacekeeping and peacebuilding:

1. *UN Peace Operations as a Booming Industry.* After a surge of activity in the early to mid-1990s, the number of peace operations subsequently declined in response to disasters in Rwanda and Somalia. Beginning around 2000, however, and following the release of Brahimi Report, this number has rebounded. The UN is now the second largest mover of soldiers around the world (after the U.S.) and its peacekeeping budget is now over \$5 billion per year (compared with its regular budget of \$1.8 billion). Furthermore, the UN currently has 16,000 field staff, 14,000 of whom are engaged in peace operations. Despite regional organizations' greater involvement in peace operations, this involvement has not offset the increase in the number of UN peacekeepers deployed.
2. *Long-term Record of Success.* Although research and documentation confirming this trend is still tentative, two reputable sources suggest a long-term trend of UN success in peace operations. *The Human Security Report* (produced by The Human Security Centre at the University of British Columbia), suggests that worldwide, the number of conflicts and conflict-related deaths have been decreasing and that the UN's and others' active

engagement in peace missions may be part of the explanation. The research of Richard Dobbins at the Rand Corporation has shown that the UN is quite effective and efficient in performing its peace operations (even more so than the U.S.). A sobering caveat, however, is that 40 percent-50 percent of states that experience civil wars relapse into civil war within about five years if not attended to by the international community. This has been the impetus for creating the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC).

3. *An Imbalanced Asian Representation.* Asia's role in terms of the number of troops deployed in peace operations has been significant, though this is less true for police deployments than for military deployments. Troops from Central and South Asia comprise 46 percent of all UN troops and military observers, while East Asia and Pacific countries contribute only 3 percent. What is more striking is that Asia is marginal as a focus of UN peacekeeping activity, which is highly concentrated (82 percent) in Africa. In terms of civilian staff in UN missions, Asians comprise 9 percent, and make up only 13 percent of staff representation at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). These puzzling discrepancies require further exploration.
4. *Growing Complexity of Peace Operations.* The complexity of peace operations has two dimensions. First, peace operations have become very comprehensive in nature; these operations are now expected to bring stabilization and security to war-torn countries, to protect civilian populations, to reform their security sectors, to successfully disarm, demobilize and reintegrate (DDR) warring parties, to build/rebuild state institutions, to deliver humanitarian assistance, and to lay the overall foundation for post-conflict economic recovery. Second, not only is the number of stakeholders increasing, but their interests often put them in conflict with one another. This second dimension has two layers. First, within the UN itself, there are multiple programs, departments, funds, and specialized agencies with a stake in a given operation. Second, external actors such as the World Bank, IMF, the EU, NATO, the AU, and various international NGOs and bilateral donors have also become increasingly involved in the provision of peacekeeping and peacebuilding services. Coordination of these various stakeholders is often elusive, making it difficult to ensure that they are all working toward the same purpose.

For both the UN and its member states, these trends pose three challenges. They must: (1) manage the magnitude of the task; (2) manage its complexity; (3) ensure the sustainability of the international community's effort. They are trying to rise to these challenges by:

1. *Developing New Skills and Capacities.* Part of this development was urged by the Brahimi Report. Current priorities are in the following areas: (1) creating a strategic reserve force which could be deployed in emergency situations, whether prior to the deployment of a UN mission itself, or as a reinforcement of that mission (Dr. Guicherd raised the possibility of Asians forming a strategic reserve force to serve at the UN's disposal to raise their profile in UN peacekeeping operations.); (2) enhancing police deployment capacity, particularly through the formation of a Standing Police Capacity to help with the start-up of missions; (3) improving the training of both military and civilian staff at all stages and levels, including pre-deployment training, in-mission training, and senior management training; (4) improving guidance and clarifying standard operating

procedure (this is particularly important for protecting civilians, and ensuring agreed rules of engagement for increasingly dangerous missions); (5) allowing the Secretariat greater flexibility in allocating and re-allocating funds for QIPs (Quick Impact Projects) and pre-deployment mandates.

2. *Better Integrating Efforts Within the UN and between the UN and its Partners in Peace Operations.* Since the Brahimi Report, the UN has tried to develop more integrated mission planning and management, with more clearly defined lines of responsibilities for all mission components and more clearly defined roles for SRSGs (Special Representatives of the [UN] Secretary General) and deputy/ies. The UN recently created a Policy Committee, which brings together the SG and top Undersecretary Generals on a regular basis. This committee is an important instrument within the UN to prevent “turf battles” and to ensure that all actors’ activities coher around the same goals.

The Role of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in Integration and Coordination

The PBC can play a crucial role in structuring activities in a way that facilitates agreement on both the priorities and sequencing within UN missions. This structure will help to:

- a) Balance political and military stabilization activities with those of economic reconstruction and institution building. Tradeoffs are often necessary, but they should be made on the basis of the comprehensive approach of the end purpose of the mission.
- (b) Harmonize financial contributions to minimize funding gaps and overlaps. When certain key tasks are insufficiently funded, these become the weak links in the chain that can jeopardize the mission’s success (DDR, for example). At the same time, other components of a mission may be over-funded because they are attractive for domestic political reasons. Furthermore, on a more general level, the tendency of the Security Council to pass, without guaranteeing the financial means for carrying them out, increasingly comprehensive mandates should be checked.
- (c) Counteracting the “CNN effect” by sustaining support for an operation through to its successful completion, even if it should require a long-term engagement.

The PBC has been created on paper, but needs to be given substantive form. A Peacebuilding Support Office should be established to enable the PBC to perform the tasks outlined above. An Organizational Committee is supposed to form the core and permanent component responsible for defining the PBC’s strategies, but with 31 members (representing the SC, major troop and financial contributors, and ECOSOC and General Assembly members) this committee risks being unwieldy – even once agreement has been reached on its precise composition (which was not the case at the time of the Study Group meeting).

If these initial problems can be solved, a critical next step will be ensuring that heavyweights such as big donors and large institutions like the World Bank, IMF, and UNDP heed the PBC’s recommendations. The latter is a consultative body only, and does not have mechanisms for enforcing its decisions. It must therefore quickly and effectively establish a moral and political basis for its authority. For this reason, a Peacebuilding Support Office will require a staff that is both sufficient in number and of a senior level to be able to interact with other UN bureaucracies and with key outside players as an equal. Many assume that the PBC

will start by taking on less challenging cases so that it may establish an early pattern of success. This success will help it to assert its role and prove its value.

The Peacebuilding Support Office's size and composition are being negotiated by the member states who sit on the committees overseeing the UN's administrative and financial decisions. Many member countries, including Asian ones, may not wish to grant this office too much power. This tension is part of a much larger and on-going question about whether it is the member states or Secretariat that ultimately drives the UN.

3. *Developing Partnerships with Regional Organizations.* Many partnerships were formed in the 1990s, but they tended to be *ad hoc* in nature and primarily at the field level. The September 2005 Summit reflected a changed UN mood, however, with the UN acknowledging the contributions that these regional organizations have made to peacekeeping efforts. Partnerships can be essential to peace operations, as we can see today in Darfur, where the AMIS mission has the support of the EU, NATO, and the UN.

Dr. Guicherd concluded with two questions. First, the international community has made it a high priority to develop peacekeeping capacity specifically for Africa. What does this Africa-dominated peacekeeping agenda mean for Asia? Is there room in this agenda for Asians to play a role? Second, if the next UN SG is from an Asian state, will this in any way impact the UN's peacekeeping and peacebuilding agenda? More specifically, would an Asian SG influence the nature or extent of Asians' commitments to peace operations?

Ambassador Ma then provided “Chinese Views on the UN Peacebuilding Commission.” He noted that peace operations are one of the major ways in which the UN fulfills its duties to maintain international security and to assist post-conflict societies in consolidating peace and beginning the process of national reconstruction. The UN has played a critical role in this regard, and has won increasing support and trust from important parties. As the complexity and scope of post-conflict challenges has increased, however, so too has the UN’s work in providing humanitarian assistance and emergency aid to longer-term reconstruction and recovery efforts.

The world’s expectations of the UN have also raised. Although many different parts of the UN system are involved in the peacebuilding process, no specific body is responsible for overseeing the process of assisting countries transitioning from war to lasting peace, for ensuring the process’s coherence, and for sustaining the mission over the long term. As a result, peacebuilding operations have been fractured, with no single forum where relevant actors can share information and develop a common strategy. Too often, fragile peace has been allowed to crumble into renewed conflict.

The UN PBC was established in December 2005 in accordance with the decisions of the World Summit Outcome document, a mechanism for assuring countries emerging from conflict that ‘post-conflict’ does not equal ‘post-engagement’ of the international community. This mechanism can help end an earlier pattern of conflict re-erupting due to insufficient support for the healing process.

On the whole, China is in favor of the establishment of the PBC as a means to more effectively coordinate UN peacekeeping and post-conflict rehabilitation and development efforts. China endorses the SG’s view that the PBC should be largely an advisory body, without early warning or monitoring functions. The PBC should focus its responsibilities on assisting in the planning of transitions from conflict to post-conflict reconstruction and on coordinating international efforts. In the interest of efficiency and effectiveness, the Commission should be responsible primarily to the UNSC. China also supports ECOSOC’s full participation in the Commission’s work, and feels that ECOSOC and other UN development aid agencies will have an important role to play in the PBC.

The establishment of the PBC is a historic measure, but must be a beginning and not an end. China hopes it will fill the gaps by facilitating institutional and systematic connections between peacekeeping and post-conflict operations and the international network of assistance and donor mobilization. It also hopes the PBC will bring together all major actors to determine long-term peacebuilding strategies. By advising on recovery and by focusing its attention on reconstruction and institution-building, the PBC can improve coordination both within and beyond the UN system, can develop best practices and ensure predictable funding, and can help countries make the transition from war to peace.

Discussion focused on the following points:

1. *UN Coherence and Effectiveness.* A participant noted that coordination problems at the UN are not new. The UN has an Administrative Committee on Co-ordination where all specialized agencies and organizations are represented, and which, in theory, could coordinate the entire UN system. But the ACC has never functioned particularly well in that respect. On the matter of the Policy Committee, the SG has always been able to convene within the Secretariat itself the Under-Secretary General for Economic and Political Affairs, together with the DPKO and the UNDP heads. But this has not worked well either, not only because of the UN structure, but also because of the personalities and political divisions within these departments. The UN SG, technically the highest functionary within the UN, is often not in firm control of his respective departments because the under-secretary generals are often more responsive to the interests of their own national governments.

Another participant stated that UN mandates, as well as the authority and operational capacity to implement them, are often insufficient. Some have argued, in fact, that “peacekeeping forces” should more accurately be called “buying time forces” or “war-dampening forces.” Member states’ political will is essential to ensure stronger commitments to peacekeeping efforts. Specifically, states must be willing to partner with local actors and institutions to put in place a workable post-conflict structure, including the four components advocated by the UN: the rule of law, a market economy, liberal democratic governance, and civil society. These *ad hoc* partnerships need to be systematized into inter-locking, reliable, predictable, and sustainable relationships.

The discussion then shifted to civilian police forces’ low visibility and engagement in UN peacekeeping missions, with another participant noting that recent discussions at the UN DPKO revealed that civilian policing was a ‘poor cousin’ to the military in peacekeeping. How might this imbalance be corrected to better integrate civilian police forces?

A fourth participant added that practical operational and tactical matters need to be addressed. The perceptions of countries designing the policies and strategic guidance for these missions are not always consistent with the perceptions of countries responsible for carrying them out. This disconnect often hinders long-term success.

2. *Peacebuilding Commission.* A participant noted that the shift in the UN’s attention toward peacebuilding raises questions about the PBC’s authority. The PBC is an advisory body that is not authorized to make decisions, but whom is it advising? The UNSC is in charge of UN peacekeeping operations, but in the past, particularly during the proliferation of peacekeeping missions in the early 1990s, the SC believed that the UN Charter granted it sole responsibility to maintain international peace and security. Will the SC be more receptive to the PBC’s advice?
3. *Possible Impact of an Asian SG.* One participant felt that while this would certainly be a step forward for Asian involvement in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, this question raises more fundamental questions about who comprises “Asia” and what constitutes an “Asian identity.” Even in the present discussions the term “Asia Pacific” is said, when referring to the East

Asian Community or the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Neither of these bodies, this participant pointed out, is specifically Northeast Asian.

Another participant said there was no real connection between a SG's national origin and focus of international peace operations. Although the current SG is African, increased devotion of resources to peacekeeping operations in Africa is due to that region's many conflicts and humanitarian crises. Asians are already playing a larger role in peacekeeping; China was not very active in past UN peacekeeping operations, but has become more active in recent years.

Dr. Guicherd offered the following responses:

1. *UN Coherence*. This is a persistent problem, but is one that is now starting to be addressed inside the UN. Compared to the early 1990s, the concept of integrated missions and the importance of training staff on integrated planning and management have gained some traction. But the responsibility for incoherence is a shared one; member states often fund and instrumentalize a particular UN program because it suits their national interests. This "cherry picking" tends to strengthen one component against another, undermining the system's coherence. The coordination problem also exists at the national level, with one ministry saying one thing and another ministry saying something different.
2. *Visibility and Engagement of Civilian Police Forces*. The Secretariat has tried to put together a standing police capacity, but this has required much convincing vis-à-vis member states.
3. *Consultations with Those on the Ground*. Although the UN has tried to improve the consultation process, the comments made here suggest that some countries feel they are not sufficiently consulted. Dr. Guicherd added that it is ultimately member states' responsibility to ensure they are training their own soldiers according to UN standards. The UN has done a good job in developing training modules, but member states have to make effective use of them.

Ambassador Ma reiterated that a body as young as the PBC can not be expected to solve such complex issues. Many questions remain about how it will actually function. The establishment of the PBC is a useful first step toward reforming the UN, but the UN still faces problems such as the discrepancy between the expectations of post-conflict countries and the actual capacity of the UN to deliver on those promises.

The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)

Session two looked at the Aceh Monitoring Mission, asking specifically if it could be a model for future regional cooperation. Rena Korber began by looking at the "AMM: Challenges in the Field." In early 2005 (one month after the tsunami), the government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) began discussions to end a 30-year conflict that had claimed 15,000 lives and displaced tens of thousands more. The EU, together with Norway, Switzerland, and five ASEAN countries (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Brunei) formed the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) to monitor this process. The AMM's

objectives are to assist GoI and GAM in implementing their Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The tasks of the AMM are to: a) monitor the demobilization of GAM and the decommissioning of its armaments; b) monitor the relocation of non-organic military forces and non-organic police troops; c) monitor the reintegration of active GAM members; d) monitor the human rights situation and provide assistance in this field; e) monitor the process of legislation change; f) rule on disputed amnesty cases; g) investigate and rule on complains and alleged violations of the MoU; h) establish and maintain liaison and good cooperation with the parties. The first two tasks have been completed on schedule.

The AMM has successfully completed its six-month mandate of facilitating implementation of the MoU. The mandate is expected to be extended for another three months, with an official invitation from GoI and with GAM support. Crucial to the successful start of the mission was that the parties had already agreed to ask the AMM to be present in Aceh from the day the agreement was signed. An Initial Monitoring Presence (IMP) prevented a political and security vacuum and allowed the AMM to begin decommissioning weapons on the first day of the official mission.

Organization of the Mission. AMM is headquartered in the capital of Banda Aceh, with monitoring capabilities throughout the entire province and four mobile decommissioning teams (which have since been disbanded). The AMM also has 200 unarmed international personnel. As the mission enters its second mandate, AMM has begun downsizing this number to 85. The staff is equally distributed between ASEAN and the EU, although there will be a slight surplus of EU staff due to the fact that the mission is funded by the EU and so financial matters are dealt with by EU staff. The AMM is a civilian, not a military mission. Its monitors do not carry weapons, although it does have personnel with a military background, needed particularly for the decommissioning of weapons. The AMM's personnel have expertise in a whole range of competencies needed to fulfill its tasks.

The mission's costs are borne by the EU (9 million euros, or approximately \$12 million), and by contributions of UN states and other participating states, for a total budget of approximately \$50 million. Salaries are paid by participating member states, with the exception of some per diems paid by GoI.

The AMM's success depends on:

1. *Linkage of Peace and Development.* Without a peaceful settlement of the conflict, the post-tsunami rebuilding of Aceh could not happen, and vice-versa. The reintegration process will have to be embedded in other programs to avoid problems after AMM's departure June 15.
2. *Decommissioning and Redeployment.* Relocation of non-organic military and police forces is divided into four stages, parallel with GAM decommissioning from September-December 2005. Under the peace agreement, 3,000 GAM combatants have been demobilized, 840 GAM weapons have been decommissioned, and non-organic military and armed police personnel have been relocated. If weapons are found, police will treat

this as a criminal case. GoI has also met its obligations and relocated about 25,000 non-organic military personnel and 4,700 non-organic police forces.

3. *Reintegration.* Reintegration involves support for the permanent demobilization of armed groups. The MoU stipulates three categories of people who are entitled to economic facilitation packages (including land, housing, employment, and cash for former rebels): former combatants, pardoned political prisoners, and civilians affected by conflict. So far, both sides have generally shown an impressive willingness to comply with the MoU's conditions for reintegration. The GoI has allocated a sizable budget for this, and many GAM soldiers' reintegration has been facilitated by the fact that they never permanently left their home villages.
4. *Amnesty.* To date, approximately 1,800 GAM prisoners have been released, approximately 80 more remain in prison. A key issue will be determining whether the charges against them are related to GAM activities. GAM representatives have met with high-ranking officials to examine these disputed cases more closely. If these talks do not produce a solution, the AMM will exercise its obligation to hire an international lawyer.
5. *The Law of the Governing of Aceh (LoGA).* As stipulated in the MoU, a new LoGA will be promulgated and will enter into force no later than March 31, 2006. In early December, a draft law was sent to GoI. This draft law was a consolidated effort by universities in Aceh, the regional parliament, civil society, GAM, and religious leaders. Local elections are scheduled for June 15, but will ultimately depend on whether this law is passed on time.
6. *A Future Model for Crisis Management?*

The AMM's excellent cooperation with its ASEAN colleagues is a step toward building a partnership between the EU and Southeast Asian states. In every part of the mission, there are fully integrated teams of EU and ASEAN monitors. ASEAN participation increases the mission's legitimacy and provides a better understanding of the local culture and customs (over 40 AMM Asian colleagues are Muslim, and many speak Malay, a linguistic cousin of Bahasa Indonesian); EU colleagues contribute their extensive experience with peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The AMM's mix of civilian and military competencies is well-adapted to this particular operation because it makes use of diverse sources of knowledge.

No other mission has ever been deployed as quickly as the AMM, and during the negotiations, both GoI and GAM agreed to a monitoring presence in Aceh immediately after the signing of the MoU. This could set a standard for future EU missions. The future of crisis management may also lie more with effective DDR and human rights monitoring than with traditional peacekeeping.

Omar Halim examined "the AMM: Lessons for the Region." Mr. Halim said while there are reasons to be optimistic about the AMM's success, there are also reasons to be skeptical about what will transpire once the AMM withdraws from Aceh. When the GoI and GAM reached an agreement in 2002, it was assumed that within a year confidence would increase on

both sides. But it soon became clear that the GAM had not truly abandoned its separatist intentions. Two GoI figures showed that after the signing of the MoU, 1,300 GAM weapons were confiscated and about 3,000 GAM personnel killed, surrendered or arrested. Closer analysis of the MoU's provisions reveals several opportunities for GAM to try to turn this intention into a reality. First, although the election law of Indonesia is based on political parties that are national in character, the people of Aceh will have the right to nominate for their regional parliament and executive branch candidates who might disregard the national parties. Second, GoI will grant amnesty to individuals who participated in GAM activities. Once these individuals are granted amnesty and their political rights restored, they will be free to participate in these elections. Third, GoI must consult with the Aceh government before undertaking any administrative measures that may affect Aceh. Assuming that the next election produces a GAM member as Aceh's governor, this governor will be able to influence what GoI does with respect to Aceh. Fourth, Aceh will have the right to raise funds through external loans and to set interest rates beyond those of the Central Bank of Indonesia. This will effectively allow Aceh to set its own monetary policy. Fifth, GoI must consult with the legislature of Aceh before it enters into international agreements that may have bearing on Aceh's interests. This means that Aceh has the legal power to impact certain arrangements the national government may want to make.

Mr. Halim summarized the implications of these developments for the peace process: if GAM establishes local political parties, they will certainly get enough electoral support to capture the regional legislature in 2009, further consolidating GAM's control over the government of Aceh. This will allow the GAM to claim the democratic support of the Acenese people, which will give it an advantage in pressing for independence.

The discussion explored

1. *Political Factors in the AMM's Success.* A participant reiterated that although the AMM may be successful in a technical sense, it will only succeed if the political situation is amenable. In the past, GoI retaliated violently whenever a part of Indonesia threatened secession. But 1998 brought democratic reforms that rendered this strategy unworkable. In Aceh, several conditions were initially promised by GoI so long as Aceh remained a loyal part of Indonesia. But the Indonesian government has not fulfilled these promises, so Aceh feels betrayed by both this and by military abuses. On the other hand, this process may be the first instance of Indonesia dealing with such matters democratically and peacefully. But things can only move forward if both sides avoid too much legal 'nit picking.'

One participant drew a comparison with an emerging situation in Canada. Quebec could soon be under a secessionist government, but that government would still have to hold a referendum on secession since the international community will not recognize a claim to independence without a referendum. It is unclear why GoI signed the MoU with GAM, since it seems to be a recipe for disaster, but perhaps the two belong on political rather than legal aspects.

2. *EU/International Involvement.* A participant asked why the EU has been leading, staffing, and almost entirely funding the mission from the beginning. Why is there not

more Asian involvement? Another participant pointed out that the Aceh case was the second time a state in the region (Indonesia) welcomed the international community's assistance with peace operations. The question is to what extent the international community *should* be involved in this way. Should it become more involved in facilitation, or should it limit its concerns to the "nitty-gritty" of performing peace operations? Are there national sovereignty issues here to be considered?

3. *Lessons for Other Conflict Situations.* One participant asked whether the post-tsunami dialogue was the continuation of a pre-existing process, or if the tsunami had shocked both sides into action. He added that while things appear to have improved in Aceh, they seem to have deteriorated in Papua, much as they did in East Timor. Will international involvement in Papua drag the international community into a messy political situation, or are there lessons in the Aceh experience that may be used to stabilize the situation in Papua?

Dr. Korber offered the following responses:

1. *EU involvement in Aceh.* The reasons for EU involvement in Aceh are threefold: First, the EU wanted to utilize its experiences elsewhere to assume a role that the UN had played in the past. Second, the EU funded the peace talks in Helsinki. Third was the tsunami, to which the EU contributed approximately 500 million euros (more than any other group).
2. *AMM withdrawal.* The AMM differs from other missions whose beginning and end are not entirely clear. The AMM has committed to withdrawing from Aceh on June 15. GoI has asked the AMM to stay beyond that deadline, but the AMM does not want to jeopardize the mission by staying longer, and does not want to assume a role that local parties can play. She clarified that the AMM is not a peacekeeping mission, but rather a monitoring mission.
3. *Impact of the tsunami.* Although most believe the tsunami was the catalyzing factor in the peace talks, the talks had support from both sides prior to the tsunami.
4. *Concerns about Papua.* While concerns about the deterioration of the Papua situation are warranted, there are reasons to be confident that GoI has learned enough from Aceh and East Timor that it will be able to solve the Papua issue on its own.

Mr. Halim offered his comments on the same set of questions.

1. *Papua Situation.* The situation in Papua had deteriorated perhaps because it has seen East Timor's become independent. The Papuans have neither the capabilities of the East Timorese, however, nor do they enjoy the same level of international support. At the same time, after 32 years of autocratic rule, during which the center exploited its various regions, the Papuans have good reasons to hold grievances against GoI. The best-case scenario is that despite its vested interests in Papua, GoI has learned lessons about how better to handle these situations.

2. *National Sovereignty.* States needing peacekeeping services are failed states in which governments are no longer capable of governing. In such cases, the UN has no choice but to act, lest total chaos descend. In these cases there is less controversy over international intervention. But in states such as Indonesia and Sri Lanka, where the governments still function reasonably well, it is far more difficult to inject an international element into the situation. Indonesia had to accept this in East Timor because certain members of GoI did not have a clear understanding of this issue. But why should a foreigner handle these matters? Does there need to be involvement by a third party when the government is part of the problem?

Chinese and Vietnamese Perspectives on Peace Operations

Session three explored “Chinese and Vietnamese Perspectives on Peace Operations.” Col. Kang Honglin gave an assessment of China’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations. In 1990, China dispatched five military observers to UNTSO in the Middle East. Between 1992 and 1993, China deployed a corps of engineers to UNTAC (Cambodia), which marked the beginning of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) non-combat participation in a UN peacekeeping mission. In 2001, to meet its UN requirements, the [Chinese] Ministry of National Defense established a Peacekeeping Affairs Office, which has authority over unitary coordination and management of Chinese military contingents in UN peacekeeping missions. The following year, China officially joined the UN Class I Standby Arrangements and designated PLA units as the UN standby force. This consists of a UN-standard engineer battalion, a UN-standard Level II hospital, and two UN-standard transportation companies. The standby force is able to deploy to UN missions within 90 days of receiving the request from the UN DPKO. In 2003, China dispatched two contingents, one to MONUC (DRC) and the other to UNMIL (Liberia). Finally, in 2004, China deployed an Anti-Riot Team with 125 policemen and policewomen to Haiti. This marked the first Chinese police contingent to join a UN mission.

Since China first dispatched military observers to UNTSO in 1990, as many as 4,500 PLA personnel - 900 military observers and staff officers and 3,600 troops – have joined 14 UN missions. Today, 864 PLA officers and soldiers are working in eight UN missions, including UNTSO, MINURSO (Western Sahara), UNMEE (Ethiopia and Eritrea), MONUC, UNMIL, ONUCI (Cote d’Ivoire), ONUB (Burundi), and UNMIS (Sudan).

Chinese peacekeepers’ tasks have been varied. For military observers and staff officers, the major tasks are verification and monitoring implementation of peace agreements, as well as supporting DDR operations. The engineer units provide mobility, survivability, and general engineering support to these missions. They also carry out construction and maintenance of roads, bridges, barracks, airfields, and facilities for water and power. The transportation unit is responsible for providing second- and third-line personnel and cargo transportation support to all military units. Finally, the medical units’ functions include providing health care, emergency stabilization, life saving surgical interventions, and casualty evacuations. They also provide humanitarian medical services to the local population.

China’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations has shown that these peacekeepers have very high political, military, psychological, and physical standards, in part due to the fact

that they are carefully selected from among the PLA. They strictly observe domestic and UN rules and regulations. Chinese peacekeepers have stood the test of difficult environments and volatile situations to make their due contributions to international peace and security. In the past decade, seven Chinese soldiers have died serving this noble cause. The performance of Chinese soldiers in UN missions has won widespread praise from the local people, from the UN itself, and from the international community.

In the DRC (MONUC) the first 10 Chinese military observers were deployed in 2001. In 2003, at the UN's request, China also dispatched an engineering company and a Level II hospital of 218 troops. This was the first time China deployed formed non-combat troops to a UN peacekeeping operation in Africa. Chinese peacekeeping units are now deployed in the eastern area of the DRC where UN DDR operations are currently in a critical phase. In the fall of 2003, China deployed peacekeepers to Liberia, where it now has a contingent of 572 military personnel. This contingent consists of an engineering company, a transportation company, a Level II hospital, military observers, and staff officers. In addition, there are also 25 Chinese civilian police in this mission. This is by far the largest Chinese contingent to a UN mission.

Finally, to support UN peace efforts in Sudan and the Middle East, the Chinese government, at the UN's request, deployed contingents to UNMIS and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The UNMIS contingent includes engineering, transportation, and medical units. 435 troops will be dispatched to southern Sudan very soon. Simultaneously, an engineering battalion of 182 troops is expected to arrive in southern Lebanon shortly. Once the contingents to Sudan and Lebanon are deployed, the total number of Chinese peacekeepers deployed to UN missions will be over 1,500, making China the largest troop contributor to UN-led peacekeeping missions among the permanent members of the Security Council.

Le Dinh Tinh then gave a Vietnamese perspective on peacekeeping. Mr. Le pointed out that the peacekeeping experience is quite new for Vietnam, which only recently participated for the first time as an observer in the Liberia mission. His presentation thus focused more conceptually on two dimensions of Vietnam's role in peacekeeping: the discursive construction of peace, including conceptualizations of what peace means, and the reality of how peace can be improved.

Concepts of Peace. Concepts of peace vary among scholars. A Norwegian scholar distinguished between dimensions of peace: internal vs. external, universal vs. local, and short-term vs. perpetual peace. If peace is not merely the absence of war, then peace "keeping" is not merely not fighting in the narrowest sense, but must include peace restoration and conflict resolution in a much broader sense.

Since economic renovation began in 1986, Vietnam's overriding foreign policy objective has been to further a foreign policy of peace, independence, sovereignty, multilateralization, diversification of international relations, and of being a reliable partner in the international community. Given the international controversy over the concept of "internal peace," the "foreign policy of peace" means essentially external peace. Of course, this peace should form part of a broader international peace, but this specifically refers, in the first place, to peace with neighbouring and other ASEAN countries.

ASEAN wants to avoid the need for peacekeeping activities in the region, so it tries to maintain peace within, but primarily between, ASEAN states. The ARF has three stages for cultivating this peace: confidence building measures, then preventive diplomacy, and finally conflict resolution. We have not reached the third stage, which is the most relevant for peacekeeping. Furthermore, the ARF's role in international peacekeeping will be further discussed among the countries in the region.

Practical Requirements for Developing Peacekeeping. Improving Vietnam's embryonic peacekeeping capacity requires several things. First, an increase in the level of confidence both within and outside Vietnam. Second, the Vietnamese military may need to engage in skill sharing with other militaries, even for basic skills like English language, to be able to participate in international peacekeeping training. Third, Vietnam must discuss how it can develop the appropriate personnel for participation in these missions.

Obstacles to Developing Capacity. Internal challenges to developing peacekeeping capacity are twofold. The first is the low level of economic development. Since there is a close correlation between a country's level of economic development and its ability to build peacekeeping capacity, how can poor countries still commit troops to UN missions abroad? The second is the need to divert attention and resources to vexing social problems such as socio-economic inequality, corruption, and drug trafficking. External challenges are also twofold. The first is the need to manage lingering regional and international uncertainties such as those arising from the 1997 – 1998 financial crisis in the region. The second is the demands of responding to the increasingly complex nature of war and other nontraditional security concerns, such as natural disasters, avian flu, HIV/AIDS, and environmental pollution.

Opportunities for Developing Capacity. Despite these challenges, other factors enhance Vietnam's confidence when looking at the possibility of joining peacekeeping operations. First, Vietnam's GDP growth rate has averaged around 8 percent per year since the start of economic renovation in 1986. Second, its experiences with war, along with other traditional cultural values, have made Vietnam a peace-loving country. Third, the current mood in the leadership and grass-roots levels is one of open-mindedness, as is reflected in Vietnam's foreign policy. Fourth, Vietnam has been a reliable partner and active member of the international community, which can be taken as evidence of its commitment to international peace and stability. Finally, since the start of the open-door policy, Vietnam has enjoyed various forms of international assistance and cooperation, including at the track-two level.

The year 2008 may be a milestone in shaping Vietnam's international role because then Vietnam's bid for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council will be decided. If granted, this seat will be a good venue from which Vietnam can project its commitment to international peace. This will help prepare the way for Vietnam's participation in peacekeeping.

Discussion focused on the potential for greater Chinese and Vietnamese roles in peacekeeping. Two participants asked whether China's participation in peacekeeping missions included the deployment of logistical personnel or infantry. If not, would China consider upgrading its participation in UN missions? If China suffered casualties in UN operations, what would Chinese public opinion and reaction be? Another participant, acknowledging that

developing the capacity to participate in peacekeeping operations can be costly, suggested that one way African states cope with this is by partnering with Western countries. Is this too sensitive in terms of national sovereignty?

A participant asked how China's and Vietnam's greater involvement in peacekeeping operations has affected both civil-military relations and the internal dynamics within their militaries. He also noted that Chinese and Vietnamese engagement in peacekeeping operations requires that they adapt to existing frameworks. Does either state see deficiencies in these existing frameworks? A more provocative question is how China or Vietnam might seek to *change* these existing frameworks.

Col. Kang said that China has only dispatched non-combat troops to UN missions because it feels that it first needs to accumulate more experience. The Chinese government, armed forces, and public all care about casualties. If China were to deploy combat troops to future UN missions, it would need to take the necessary measures to protect its military personnel.

Col. Wu added that involvement in peacekeeping operations will not have a transformative effect on the Chinese military because it is and always has been defensive in orientation. Although China is still an economically developing country, it participates in peacekeeping operations mainly out of a sense of international responsibility. Furthermore, things in Chinese culture develop gradually, not abruptly. To upgrade its involvement, China needs more time to gain additional peacekeeping experience. Finally, China has not contributed infantry because many PLA soldiers are from rural areas and their education level is not very high. As in the case of Vietnam, foreign language skills are thus an obstacle.

Mr. Le said he also did not feel that engagement in peacekeeping operations would have tremendous implications for Vietnam's military and civil-military relations. Vietnam's military has already distinguished between external and internal security and has recognized that these are clearly two different functions. Furthermore, Vietnam's military is a battle-tested one already adept at functioning in risky areas.

He added that the trade-off between national sovereignty and receiving international assistance for developing peacekeeping capacity could be acceptable. But Vietnam also knows that international assistance does not come without conditions, it is a matter that would still need to be discussed internally. Furthermore, before deploying forces overseas, Vietnam would need both time and guidance in two areas: ensuring the international community that Vietnam's intentions are peaceful, and increasing the transparency and improving the technological sophistication of Vietnam's armed forces.

Several participants noted that as a practical matter, the language issue should be given high priority. Mission leaders must be able to communicate among themselves and with the people with whom they are working. Another added that the UN assumes that the commander needs English to control deploys, but in fact it is also important to have a working command of the local language. If China assumes a larger role in training peacekeepers, what will the common language be? Should we consider alternatives to English? One participant noted that

while many assume that English is the world's peacekeeping language, four of the five largest UN peacekeeping operations are in French-speaking countries: three in Africa and one in Haiti.

Several others added that perhaps the real limiting factor for China and Vietnam was not language, but lack of experience in peacekeeping environments. Perhaps the larger issue is not understanding clearly the rules of engagement.

Col. Wu said that while it was feasible that Chinese could become a common peacekeeping language, in many conflict areas the local people cannot understand either English or Chinese. This may change, however, since in response to China's rapid development and growing international role, the use of Chinese in the Asia Pacific region is becoming more common.

Mr. Le said the language issue is really more a matter of navigating cultural differences, which can be difficult for poorly educated, low-income soldiers who may be motivated to join peacekeeping forces for financial reasons. This may be offset, however, by the increasingly high educational requirements for Vietnam's military personnel, especially for promotion.

One participant said that China and Vietnam are still hesitant to further their involvement because of concerns about how this will be interpreted by their neighbors. Japan faced a similar challenge when it began participating in peacekeeping operations. Perhaps participation in peacekeeping activities is how states like China and Vietnam can help their neighbors overcome these suspicions.

Another participant noted that the aim of peacebuilding activities is to create an enduring structure that supports peace. This structure should include a liberal democratic political system and a vigorous civil society. But should we be concerned about China's peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities? Are there specific Chinese norms that guide these activities? Can Chinese involvement minimize Western or UN efforts to build political and economic transparency within those African countries?

This participant also noted that being a non-Western, developing country is not necessarily an obstacle to participating in peacekeeping operations. Since 1998, most volunteers have been from non-Western countries. So the question really is whether there any specific capacity-building efforts by the Vietnamese government to support peacekeeping operations.

Colonel Wu asserted first that the present discussion is about peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and should not become discussion on politics. Second, China is not hesitant to devote troops to international peace operations. The Chinese government has made many efforts to overcome difficulties in fulfilling these responsibilities. China is still a developing country with several million people living in poverty, a military weapons system that is not technologically advanced, and 15 bordering states with which it must manage diplomatic relations. Taking all of these things into consideration, the Chinese government has done and will continue to do an admirable job of committing to international peacekeeping operations.

Finally, a participant asked how much time China, as permanent member of the UN SC and as a country with a long and rich history, will need to deepen its involvement in peace operations. Is it possible that the Chinese perspective on peacekeeping can evolve into a regional perspective? She also enquired into the kind of training offered at China's peacekeeping training center, and whether experience from other Asian training centers might be useful.

Col. Wu reiterated that China's participation in peace operations falls entirely under the framework of the UN. China does not participate in EU- or NATO-dominated operations.

One participant noted that the ARF has not taken the initiative to establish a peacekeeping training center despite Southeast Asians' growing willingness to be involved in peace operations. Might the region be amenable to having a regional peacekeeping center as a substitute for having a regional peacekeeping force, or as a first step?

Another suggested that nationally based centers not be abandoned in favor of a regional center, but added that there is still great value in making a regional effort to coordinate training and inter-operability. Could the region produce a regional standing army that, if not used for regional peacekeeping purposes, could still be sent elsewhere as part of a UN operation? The major challenge would be determining its decision-making body.

Another participant concurred that there is not much consistency across training programs, even though the UN produces standardized training modules and is willing to recognize other curricula. This lack of consistency becomes problematic when trying to integrate different national forces.

Cols. Wu and Kang ended the discussion by informing the group that in addition to its first peacekeeping training center, the PLA is also constructing an additional police training center, which is expected to be finished within the next year. Once complete, this training center will welcome foreign students and instructors.

Police Capacity Building in the Pacific Region

Session four examined "Police Capacity Building in the Pacific Region." Federal Agent Mark Walters provided a look at "Police Peace Operations in the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu." He began by noting the need for the Asia Pacific to have a standing capacity to respond to region's humanitarian crises. The International Deployment Group (IDG) of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) is one such mechanism that provides front-end, off-shore law enforcement assistance to failing states. He also noted what had been missing from the day's discussions: the 'P' (Pacific) in CSCAP. The IDG's police peace operations in the Pacific region, while falling within the broader continuum of international peace operations, provide the region with something of an alternative model to traditional peacekeeping.

The IDG was created in 2004 at the initiative of the Australian prime minister. Its activities are both bilateral and multilateral and are concentrated primarily in building the capacity of the receiving country's law and justice sector. Although the Asia Pacific area is a

major focus of IDG activity, this focus does not come at the expense of commitments to other areas in need of assistance; the IDG also contributes to missions in Cyprus, Jordan, and Sudan.

The Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands (RAMSI). Although many IDG activities happen under UN auspices, the RAMSI mission is somewhat unique in that it was initiated not by UN mandate, but rather by a direct request from the Solomon Islands (SI) government. From its inception, RAMSI has been a police-led mission, with the military playing a supportive role. The mission is multilateral, with 11 countries contributing a total of 350 police officers, and its goal is to support a peaceful, well-governed and prosperous Solomon Islands through a cross-sector, ‘whole of government’ approach. The main components of this approach include developing institutional capacity in policing, corrections, the judiciary, financial management, and in the overall machinery of government.

The RAMSI mission has proceeded in three phases:

1. *Implementation* (July - December 2003): The primary goals of this police-led phase were the restoration of basic law and order, the removal of illegally held weapons, and the disarmament and neutralization of key militants. When IDG initially deployed, the situation in SI had all the elements of a failed state: a paralyzed government, a deteriorating economy, a corrupt and impotent police force, and militant groups roaming the countryside.
2. *Consolidation* (January – December 2004): The goals of the second phase were consolidating the rule of law, building and reforming institutions, restoring the public’s trust and confidence in the in the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP), and creating an environment conducive to economic reconstruction and commerce.
3. *Sustainability and Self-Reliance* (January 2005 and beyond): The goals of the current phase are the transition to self-reliance by the RSIP, a focus on training and capacity development, entrenching reforms and enabling long-term stability, and the draw-down and eventual exit of the Participating Police Force (PPF). In 2005, an Australian was sworn in as the police commissioner and a New Zealander was sworn in as his deputy. In addition, 150 new officers have been recruited into the RSIP. Emphasis in this final phase is on working side-by-side with the RSIP to develop the latter’s capacity.

RAMSI Progress and Achievement. The successes of the RAMSI mission to date are: the quick and effective restoration of law and order during Phase I; the restoration of public trust and confidence, as indicated by the growing willingness of Solomon Islanders to report crimes directly to the RSIP; the recovery of approximately 3,700 weapons that had been the mainstay of the conflict; the eradication of corrupt and violent elements within the police force; and the arrest and prosecution of key militants.

Like the AMM, RAMSI is committed to being a regional mission. It was endorsed by the Pacific Islands Forum Eminent Persons Group, which has expressed its satisfaction with the mission’s progress. This endorsement, along with the participation of 14 Pacific states, has given the mission both institutional and public legitimacy. Unlike the AMM, however, RAMSI sees the

need for a more open-ended and long-term commitment. IDG hopes to draw down the existing police force within the next two years, but the mission's milestones are outcomes in terms of SI's stability and capacity, rather than pre-determined dates.

Despite its successes, RAMSI still faces several challenges:

1. *Expectation Management.* Although the IDG wants and needs to begin disengaging, the expectation among Solomon Islanders is that the mission will remain for a long time. The disengagement process thus needs to be managed delicately.
2. *Economic Outlook.* Although the outlook has improved, the SI economy still needs to grow 5 percent per year for the next 20 years to return to its 1995 level. The timber and forestry industries have been a major source of income, but those resources will likely be depleted in about 10 years.
3. *Impact of the April Elections.* In SI history, few governments get re-elected. If a new government is elected in April, it is possible this new government will erode RAMSI's mandate.
4. *Rearming the RSIP.* Currently, the police force is the only group permitted to carry weapons, and the strategy is now one of arming a select group of experienced police officers who form a specialized response group. Successful achievement of this objective is a precondition for IDG withdrawal.
5. *Civil Litigation.* There are currently two constitutional challenges to RAMSI's legitimacy. If successful, these challenges may undermine RAMSI's future status.
6. *Legacy and Affordability.* IDG has devoted considerable resources to build a framework for stability and prosperity, but ultimately the SI government must be able and willing to sustain it.

Other IDG Missions. The IDG has many other current missions, including Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Vanuatu. The PNG mission began in 2004, and differs from RAMSI in that the former was an Australian initiative in response to state failure in PNG. A PNG governor has challenged the constitutionality of the mission, prompting a withdrawal of the IDG's Law Enforcement Cooperation Program out of concern for the safety of its officers. Australia has continued negotiations with the PNG government and expects to re-deploy later this year, though may do so on an advisory basis only.

The IDG's Vanuatu mission is more recent, having been launched in February 2006. This mission is a five-year project at the official request of the Vanuatu government, and its activities include developing Vanuatu's legal sector, community policing, and combating transnational crime.

John McFarlane then gave an assessment of “The Timor Leste Police Development Project.” The AFP’s commitment to East Timor began in 1999 as violence in the capital city of Dili was becoming pervasive and much of East Timor’s infrastructure was destroyed. The Timor Leste Police Development Project (TLPDP) was subsequently launched in 2003 to “strengthen(ing) the capacity of the Police Service (PNTL) in Timor Leste, to maintain law and order effectively and professionally, with full respect for human rights”, within the overall goal of “contribut(ing) to the maintenance of a stable environment in Timor Leste, conducive to economic and social development and sustainable poverty reduction.” The TLPDP is funded primarily by Australia, though it receives some support from the UK government and in-kind support from the East Timorese government. The TLPDP has four main components: Crime Prevention and Community Safety, Investigations and Operations, Training and Development, and Administration, Oversight and Strategy.

Last year, the Commission for Reception Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (CAVR) released a report on the alleged violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in East Timor in 1999. Once completed, the report was delivered to the UN SG, as well to the East Timorese and Indonesian governments. Both parties agreed, quite sensibly, to set that report aside for the time being, on the grounds that concentration on the findings of the report at this stage would not promote reconciliation and reconstruction in East Timor.

Progress: Timor Leste’s police force (PNTL) is very young, and although it includes officers who had served with the Indonesian National Police, it has little accumulated experience. For this reason, the TLPDP is providing the PNTL with a wide range of training, including community policing, policy and professional development, “train the trainers” and curriculum development, and investigations and forensic skills. The project also includes the development of a compendium of rules of procedure and a law reference manual.

The TLPDP is trying to encourage the work of the PNTL Management Coordination Group to bring about a shift in the decision-making process from the ministerial level down to lower levels. Emphasis is also being given to the development of procedures to ensure a closer linkage between the PNTL strategic planning and its resources and budget. The establishment of a PNTL Operations Planning Group has also been recommended.

Challenges: Language has posed practical challenges to East Timor’s reconstruction and reconciliation process. The criminal code, as it now applies, is an Indonesian code. But the legislation is written in Portuguese, which is spoken by only 3 percent of the population. Furthermore, Tetun, the *lingua franca* of East Timor, does not lend itself well to legal codification.

There is some uncertainty over the future role of the Timor Leste military (F-FNTL) and how its role fits in with that of the PNTL. The relationship between the PNTL and the F-FNTL needs to be improved. Recent unrest within the F-FNTL led to the dismissal of approximately 600 soldiers.

Discussion focused on three themes

1. *Sovereignty Implications.* One participant said that these Australian-led missions seemed very intrusive in terms of their role in re-shaping domestic systems. Furthermore, because of Australia's prominent role, they did not have the same international legitimacy as multi-national UN missions.

Another participant said that in the case of small and failing Pacific island states, intervention by another state may be necessary. But the more basic question is why these governments requested assistance not from the UN, but specifically from Australia and New Zealand. Rather than a regional giant like Australia taking the lead, could this be an opportunity to develop a regional approach to help smaller developing countries that are on the brink of failure? Is there sufficient political will within the region to do this?

Several others noted these experiences forces a re-thinking of traditional approaches to peacekeeping. The UN model is to intervene militarily only after conflict breaks out, but the Australia-led missions are initiated before the conflict reaches crisis proportions. Furthermore, they are police-led as opposed to military-led, and most are at the invitation of the receiving state. Nonetheless, there still needs to be careful consideration given to the question of whether these are cases of intra-state conflict or a breakdown in governance. If the former, the legitimacy of the mission would be called into question since intervention and capacity-building require the intervening force to take sides in the conflict.

A final participant suggested that perhaps these scenarios were not well understood. Many of the Pacific islands, despite their official statehood status, are not truly viable as states, a problem that is likely to persist. Australia intervened in these cases because the rest of the world, including the UN, looked the other way. Furthermore, RAMSI received strong support from other Pacific island states, perhaps because out of a concern for their own futures. In this sense, the RAMSI-style operation is becoming a catalyst for creating bonds of security into the Pacific over the next few years. Some may question the legitimacy of the intervention, but given the lack of interest by the rest of the world, what else could be done?

2. *Applicability of the Australian Model to Other Parts of the Region.* Two participants noted that the success of the IDG missions was impressive, particularly their ability to deploy rapidly, since they did not require first obtaining UN SC support. But both raised questions about the applicability of this model to a broader regional framework. Within the Pacific, many island states depend on an actor with developed capacity, such as Australia. The IDG-style missions are thus a good ad hoc option. But within the ASEAN region there are 10 countries with no real footing. Indonesia is the largest of these states, but it does not play a role within Southeast Asia comparable to the role Australia plays in the Pacific.

One participant suggested, the model might not be exportable to other states whose landmasses are not comparable to those of the Pacific islands. But if the model could be

amplified, and many of the techniques that are sub-sets of the model could be emulated, it could be workable in other settings. Another participant said that while Australian expertise could benefit other missions, it would be difficult to apply this model in a straight-forward manner to cases such as Aceh, which is still part of another state, thus making it difficult to integrate the two police forces.

3. *Training.* Two sets of questions about the AFP/IDGs training arose. First, do Australian peace operations incorporate human rights and gender elements into their mentoring, training and capacity-building? Second, can a division of labor be developed for police peace operations? Is it feasible to have joint training of police who practice different norms, regulations, and practices? Does Australia have plans to utilize its police operations beyond the Asia Pacific?

The two presenters offered the following comments:

1. *Legitimacy Issues.* Mr. Walters disagreed with the assessment that the IDG's missions were any more intrusive than UN missions. He pointed out that RAMSI was not instigated by Australia, but was a response to a request for support from the SI government. Australia subsequently convened a meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum, which has a similar regional function as ASEAN, and received the endorsement of its Pacific Islands partners. Furthermore, although an Australian and New Zealander currently occupy key positions within the SI police force, the goal of the mission is to work alongside SI counterparts to reform existing structures and to build up capacity in areas such as policing and economic and financial management. He added that in the case of PNG, the court found that swearing in and giving police powers to non-nationals was not consistent with the PNG constitution. Because of this, Australia withdrew from this mission.

Mr. McFarlane noted that although RAMSI was a regional operation, the UNSG recognized that the best course of action was simply to do what needed to be done, and the RAMSI mission was given UN endorsement. Beyond these two cases, there are 14 other small- to micro-sized Pacific island nations, many of which are very isolated, highly dependent on international aid, (much of it from Australia and New Zealand), and in some cases these states are struggling for viability. Australia and New Zealand are the only two regional metropolitan states able and willing to help, so their involvement in assisting disrupted states in the South Pacific is a matter of practicality.

Mr. McFarlane also noted that at the time of RAMSI's deployment, SI was on the verge of collapse for the second time in three years. The first time SI asked for help, Australia rejected it. The second time it was clear that the SI government was incapable of providing any of the services of a functioning state, its infrastructure was collapsing, and the country was effectively dominated by bands of armed militias and gangsters. In the PNG case, Port Moresby is one of the most dangerous capital cities in the world, with about 100,000 unemployed young people living in shanty towns on the city's outskirts and an extremely high level of socio-economic disparity, leading to serious crime and high levels of gratuitous violence. In that atmosphere, there is little investment in

business, and without that investment, there are few employment opportunities and thus serious social and economic problems. In this context, what mattered first for the Enhanced Cooperation Program mission re-establishing the rule of law, restoring public confidence in the criminal justice system, and revitalizing the economic sector in order to create more employment opportunities.

2. *Applicability to the Broader Asia Pacific Region.* Both presenters said they felt that the model could be applied to the broader Asian Pacific region, but would depend on: whether the model could be adapted to different social and political contexts, and whether a regional state would step up to play the role of broker and leader.
3. *Training.* Mr. Walters said the Australian training complex offers a two-week training course with a substantial human rights component. This component is not merely a classroom-based theoretical session, but is very practical and based on scenarios with elements relevant to human rights and cultural awareness. The AFP/IDG is currently reviewing this component and is inviting input from academic institutions to develop a more comprehensive human rights training. It is also incorporating lessons learned from its experiences in Timor Leste, SI, and PNG. The gender question is more complicated; the IDG has tried to ensure sensitivity to the cultural dimensions of the Pacific *wantok* system, which determines women's position in society. From a policing aspect, women are currently 25 percent of deployments. The IDG has tried to bring more women into key roles, but cannot compromise skill sets for the sake of filling a gender quota.

On the final question about developing joint training and a division of labor in police peace operations, Mr. Walters pointed out that the Best Practices Unit of the UN utilizes a concept of "layers" within the peacekeeping model. This is where the IDG will be doing further work.

Developing Mechanisms of Coordination between All Actors Involved in Peace Operations

Song Heran then explained "Problems and the Challenges of the Afghan Experience." The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established following the Bonn Agreement in December 2001. Its mandate is promoting national reconciliation and managing, in partnership with the Afghan government, all UN humanitarian relief, recovery, and reconstruction (RRR) activities in Afghanistan. The way in which UNAMA was created reveals its distinctive nature as an integrated mission. It was structured through advice from and in consultative decision with the UN agencies operating in Afghanistan prior to the Bonn Agreement. UNAMA is therefore the product of two pre-existing UN functions: political affairs and the coordination of humanitarian activities. UNAMA now has two pillars: one related to political and security matters, and the other related to RRR efforts. UNAMA is also integrated geographically, with its headquarters in Kabul, and seven regional offices.

UNAMA's political mandate during the Bonn process is considered a success. Elections in Afghanistan have produced a legitimate and functioning government. Yet coordination is critical for the successful management of such a complex and complicated environment with multi-functional tasks ranging from security, politics, the rule of law, human rights, gender,

counter-narcotics, and all RRR activities. Without major institutional reform at the UN's top level, however, including within the Secretariat and inter-governmental structures, this coordination will be limited.

As an example, Ms. Song said that Afghanistan must coordinate its counter-narcotics efforts with the 13 states with which it shares borders. But no one wants to be coordinated. This example is precisely the reason why the international community needs to develop clear guidelines that bind all major players under a more formal and legitimate coordinating mechanism. Without these mechanisms, reconstruction efforts quite easily become dysfunctional, creating more obstacles to humanitarian and human rights work.

Challenges to Field-level Coordination:

1. *New Security Managing System.* The newly established Department of Security and Safety (DSS) handles UN security matters. All UN agencies are under the same security and safety management system. It is not always easy to coordinate all agencies in the area of security without compromising operations in the field. Non-UN international community partners such as USAID, EC, GTZ, and INGOs have separate security regulations and restrictions, which are not always compatible with the UN's.
2. *Light Footprint Approach.* UNAMA is chronically short of trained staff, often leading to lost momentum and services not being delivered. The UN's neutrality and impartiality are called into doubt when resources are allocated to serve political agendas in prioritized areas and do not reach remote and insecure places. The UN also tends to absorb all qualified nationals, leaving few people to work for the government and civil society. Finally, there is the difficult question whether the 'light footprint' approach is in fact excusing the security situation.
3. *Clearer Guidelines for Civil-Military Cooperation.* When the concept of military operations includes reconstruction activities like capacity and institution building, training police, and judicial reform, guidelines are essential, especially when civil-military relations do not fall under UN supervision. In other missions, the military has often first secured an area to pave the way for UN agencies and NGOs. In Afghanistan, these efforts have been happening simultaneously. Many NGOs and UN agencies are not used to working side-by-side with the military, however, so it often appears as though they are competing with, rather than reinforcing, each other.
4. *Local Environment.* In Afghanistan, corruption, warlordism, and a narcotics-based economy are the norm, not an exception. The individuals and groups associated with those activities are often UNAMA's local counterparts that the UN is mandated to empower. Furthermore, local dynamics are often driven by these interests, and often occur at the expense of the majority. If not coordinated, these groups can easily manipulate the international community's activities.
5. *Logistical and Administrative Support.* Strategic coordination needs to be mapped out specifically at the mission's outset, not only within individual UN agencies, but also

across agencies throughout the UN system. The timeliness of service delivery is also an important factor in the overall quality of the service.

6. *Clear Benchmarks or Timelines.* Benchmarks and timelines need to be established at the outset to avoid loss of momentum when carrying out RRR and institution building, and to balance development across different sectors and geographical regions. Public outreach and expectation management are also important within the UN, with participating member countries, and within the host country itself.

Ms. Song added that in an integrated mission such as Afghanistan, there is a window of opportunity for Asians to get involved in certain phases of the operation, or with priority focus in certain areas. But Asian participation in the Afghanistan mission has been lacking. Asians have contributed in the form of Japanese funding and some military and police participation. But Asian personnel have not been visible in NGO activities or other forms of participation such as elections monitoring, fact-finding missions, and human rights and gender development.

Brigadier (Retd) Roger Mortlock looked at “Current Issues of Concern in International Peace Operations.”

The Need for a Common Peacekeeping Philosophy: To begin, Gen. Mortlock argued, we need an internationally recognized philosophy of peacekeeping, particularly among contributing nations. Any intervention raises the hopes of desperate people, so when a mission is deployed, it must be done with a total commitment to its success.

Success in peacekeeping does not simply mean the absence of war. Peace is not an environment in which the seeds of the next war are growing. The peace must be achievable, and the mandate must reflect that. Unless and until there is a workable mandate, the mission should not begin. When the peace process takes a step forward, the mechanics that reinforce war must simultaneously take a step back. The following are means for embedding throughout the mission the seeds of success and rooting out the seeds of failure.

Centre of Gravity. The mission needs to inculcate the hope that peace is possible. This requires a program of activities that reinforces the mission’s success. As soon as center of gravity shifts away from this hope, adjustments may need to be made to the programs that underpin success.

Environment. The environment in which peacekeepers operate can be dreadful, with cultural unfit, inertia, fear, vested interests, and revenge. Specifically, there can also be resistance to change, particularly if the war endures longer than 10 years. Disarmament and demobilization of soldiers after 10 years becomes difficult because there are many armed young men for whom war is normal, and peace is thus a threat to their understanding of “normal.” Mission leaders must have program of activities to deal with this.

Intimidation and Rumor: Visibility, transparency, and trust must all be embedded into society as the mission proceeds. Communication must occur directly with the people and

meetings should not take place behind closed doors. The mission might otherwise become the subject of the rumor mill for those who do not wish to see the mission succeed.

Peacekeeping Mission Structuring. War-torn countries often have their infrastructures destroyed, leaving them without the very things needed for a successful deployment: passable roads, helicopter landings, and a workable communication network. These are precisely the aspects of a peacekeeping mission that are often under-resourced

Endurance. Before committing to a mission, the parties should ask whether those inside the country can endure a long, difficult, and demanding peace process, and whether the contributing governments have the endurance to go the distance.

Protagonist Accountability: If warlords offend, there should be mechanisms to hold them to account. As a practical matter, the start of any mission should include television and radio distribution so that if an individual violates the terms of the peace process, this could be effectively communicated to the local population.

Political Intervention. When large missions enter a country, the intervention produces a dynamic similar to a political system trying to accommodate a new political party. To pretend that the leaders and commanders are not political is naïve. This raises questions about the constraints to be put on military commanders if they are allowed to become politicians.

Politics and Justice Within a conflict situation, the groups and individuals who make the peace are the power-holders. They are often confronted with a choice between peace and justice in the form of trials for war criminals. But if they want a success, they cannot have both. We thus need to give power holders reasons to choose peace. If they think they will be losers in the deal, they will try to sabotage the process.

Economics. The modern peacekeeping military commander needs to be an economist, since so often the peace process is sabotaged by economic factors such as rampant inflation. Economic instability turns the local population against the peace process.

Location. Where the mission is inserted is critical, and the peace is negotiated is also important.

Intelligence. An intervention force without a sound intelligence capability is blind. In East Timor and SI, the intervening missions were outright and transparent about the fact that they would be gathering intelligence. No police force can successfully function without the support of the local people because they are the main providers of intelligence.

Agency integration. NGOs can be obstacles to integration. If they are not willing to be part of an integrated plan, they should not be part of the peacebuilding process.

Standing Rules of Engagement for Escalation. When things go wrong, there should be an armed reserve that can fly in at short notice, restore order, and leave. Perhaps if the protagonists knew that this reserve existed, they would be more reluctant to commit acts of atrocity.

Common Core Training. The old theory was that all 10 soldiers in an outpost had to be from different countries. But for the sake of enhancing security, it is better to have a mission comprised of just two countries, but is also adept at following common procedures. We currently have 28 different operational styles, although the police are advancing more rapidly in this area.

Although there are lessons and principles and philosophies from previous missions to guide planning, every mission now has to be designed for a particular purpose and situation. The UN simply cannot do this because it oversees too many committees and has too many obstacles to efficient decision-making.

Discussion

1. *Coordination Issues and the Role of Other Actors.* A participant felt that Ms. Song's presentation implied that the UN's efforts to address coordination and integration problems at headquarters were not trickling down to the field level. She suggested that UNAMA was not an ideal gauge of these changes since many peacekeeping and peacebuilding functions there are in the hands of other actors such as NATO and major donor nations. UNAMA may be having difficulties with integration because it has so little control over the circumstances in which it is operating. Ms. Song's comments also raised the question of proportion: is it worth taking the risks that the UN is taking, when the effort seems to achieve so little? When should the UN stay engaged, and when should it pull out?

Another participant added that if the UN's mandate is problematic, then so too will be the mission upon which it is based. The mandate should determine lines of authority, and authority is comprised of different civil and military components. But these components can undermine each other. Things have become even more complicated because of the involvement of other actors and because the mandates themselves have expanded. Furthermore, implementation can be hampered by the presence of NGOs. Domestic NGOs can proliferate because they can be tools for generating revenue. How can these NGOs be coordinated given strong local personalities and no common language?

A third participant suggested that since coordination problems in Afghanistan were due partly to the involvement of these other actors, perhaps the Afghan case could be a laboratory for better understanding how to coordinate actors.

Finally, a participant said that the greater involvement of regional organizations such as NATO and the EU potentially jeopardizes the universality of these peace operations.

2. *Civil Society.* A participant noted that the discussions had focused on how states contribute to peacekeeping operations, including the re/construction of civil society networks. But what is the role for civil society in peacekeeping and peacebuilding?
3. *Intelligence:* A participant said the UN often prevents peacekeepers from gathering intelligence. This can be a problem for the mission commander and staff trying to acquire the input and information they need to complete the mission.

4. *Concepts and Definitions.* One participant said that if you go exercise and focus on definitions can create major philosophical differences about what constitutes peace and how to measure success. In practice, the way the UN carries out peacebuilding is according to liberal democratic principles, such as rule of law and market economics. This is fine on a case-by-case basis, but if you put this in a blueprint for how to rebuild a country, many states will find this unacceptable.

On the definition of a “lasting peace,” it was proposed that the group consider the Brahimi Report’s three steps of peace operations. He also added that the concept of ‘hope as a center of gravity’ is perhaps more applicable to failed state scenarios than to other types of conflicts.

The presenters offered the following comments:

1. *Coordination Issues and the Role of Other Actors.* Ms. Song said that although her presentation highlighted certain coordination problems, UNAMA’s coordinating role has never been challenged. The fact that Afghanistan held successful elections in an insecure and sensitive environment is impressive since Afghanistan has been physically and institutionally devastated by 23 years of war. It is precisely because of these difficulties that the international community needs to stay engaged. The UN in particular is the legitimizing glue that holds certain bilateral linkages together. In this respect, coordination is done quite well. Furthermore, with different actors taking on different areas of responsibility, this opens a window of opportunity for Asians as a group to become more involved in peacekeeping.

On the matter of losing the universality of international peace operations, Gen. Mortlock commented that the window of opportunity to stop a war is often very narrow. The UN has too many points of contention to grapple with to do this expediently. On the other hand, the AMM and Bougainville missions deployed in 12 and 14 days, respectively. This is only possible with regional peace operations structures. With more experience and success in regional operations, it is possible, though still somewhat questionable, that the UN may gradually withdraw from direct involvement in peacekeeping and become more of a licensing and auditing authority. As more actors become involved in the active promotion of international security, we may find that regions have more capacity than we think they have.

2. *Civil Society.* Ms. Song said that building institutional capacity also needed to include building civil society capacity. After the Afghan election, many civil society groups emerged, and were searching for partnerships with European and American NGOs and academic groups. But aside from a few Japanese groups, Asians have not been well represented in this area. This could be a way for Asians to contribute to UN peacekeeping.

Gen. Mortlock agreed that building civil society networks needed to be part of the mission leader’s job. This is being tried in Bougainville, where war undermined the matrilineal system by which women held power and claimed ownership of land.

3. *Intelligence.* Gen. Mortlock explained the mission's leaders should be transparent about collecting intelligence and legitimize it by gathering intelligence solely for the purpose of ensuring the mission's success. The intelligence can subsequently be shared with the host government to solidify the peace. This approach has worked quite well in the South Pacific.
4. *Definitions and Concepts.* Gen. Mortlock argued that if you begin grappling with philosophical problems once you are already in-country, then you are too late. Interpretations of critical concepts become vulnerable to manipulation by parties who try to define them in a way that suits their particular interests.

He also said the notion of "hope as the center of gravity" occurred to him was during the Angolan civil war, and he was working on the old adage that a government can only govern to the extent that its people allow it to. If people have no hope that they can change their situation, then war-like governments will continue to be war-like. On the other hand, if people have strong hope that they can dispose of the war, then political leaders, if they want to remain political leaders, will have to react to that hope. Such a philosophy has application beyond failed state scenarios.

Canada's Approach to Peacekeeping: Defining Lessons and Future Agendas

Jocelyn Coulon began with a look at "The Role of NGOs in Training for Peace Operations and Capacity Reinforcement." The implementation and management of peace operations and the training of their personnel are the exclusive resort of states and intergovernmental organizations. The latter, in particular, are at the heart of the political decisions that allow the deployment of such operations. Only they have the financial and logistical means required for such enterprises. In 2004, the G8 launched an Action Plan on Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations, with the hope that by 2010, the plan would accomplish the training and equipping of 75,000 soldiers, most of whom will serve in peace support operations in Africa. The G8 also hopes to support regional and sub-regional organizations in planning and implementing peace support operations.

The programs for training in peace operations were created over 10 years ago when the international community committed itself seriously and massively to conflict resolution. Four developments are noteworthy. First, in 1992-93, the UN suddenly found itself managing a force of 80,000 blue helmets deployed in 15 missions, but with little in the way of planning resources or a doctrine suitable to this new situation. Second, peace operations have been given multi-functional mandates where military elements, hitherto dominant, have had to coexist with police and civilian organizations and have had to operate under rules that may be quite different from their own. Third, the multiplication of internal conflicts and the cruel failures of Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia have precipitated a general reflection on the need to review the skills of mission personnel, particularly the blue helmets. Finally, the growing participation of regional and sub-regional organizations has raised concerns about their political, logistical, and doctrinal preparedness to undertake peace support operations.

In the early 1990s, the governments of Canada, Australia, and the Scandinavian states responded to these developments by establishing peace operations training centers. Today, there are over 70 peace operations training centers worldwide. These centers are essentially managed or financed by their respective governments through their Foreign Affairs or Defense departments.

Peace support training has two main streams: theory and technique. Governments have turned to NGOs and other private and university centres for help in developing peacekeeping theory. This has opened up a role for civil society in the training and reinforcement of peace support operations. NGOs have played a particularly strong and influential role in 11 areas: promoting public awareness, forming support groups, refocusing issues, defining agendas and policies, developing and changing standards, lobbying and advocacy, exchanging and targeting information, research and advice, controlling and assessing the behavior of players, taking informal initiatives, and implementing policy.

In 1994, the Pearson Centre for Peacekeeping was established in Canada to offer training programs in over 30 mostly African and Eastern European countries. The Pearson Centre is an independent NGO whose mandate is to support Canadian participation in the maintenance of international peace and security by offering instruction, training and research programs on all aspects of peace operations. The Centre supports governments, armies, NGOs and civil society in their peace operation training and capacity reinforcement efforts. The Centre offers an extraordinary opportunity for exchange and dialogue between governments, armed forces, media and NGOs. All participants follow training courses of between one and eight weeks in which they study, discuss, argue, and share their meals and leisure time.

A second example is the Francophone peace operations research group, the Réseau francophone de recherche sur les opérations de paix. The idea for this group arose upon realizing that Francophones do not have a forum for discussion, meetings and publishing, as their Anglophone colleagues do. The world of English-speaking researchers is well organized around major institutions – no doubt due to the tradition of their states participating in a permanent and major way in peace operations. Hence, the International Peace Academy (IPA), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the International Crisis Group (ICG), and the United States Institute for Peace (USIP). In the French-speaking world, this did not previously exist.

What can such a network do for international peace and security? It has already begun working closely with the Government of Canada and the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, to set up conference of foreign affairs ministers from the Francophonie on conflict prevention in the francophone world. The Francophonie Affairs Directorate of Canada's Foreign Affairs department asked this group last October to organize a closed seminar of francophone experts, with the objective of formulating recommendations for conflict prevention. Senior officials took part in the discussions, and the experts produced more than 50 recommendations, some of which were adopted by Foreign Affairs Canada and will form the framework of Canada's proposals to the ministerial conference in Winnipeg next May.

Dr. Mely Anthony provided a thematic summation of the meeting's discussions.

New Trends in Peace Operations. In the past, the success of a peacekeeping mission was defined by its ability to maintain borders and monitor peace agreements. This old “blue helmet” model has given way to a new generation of peace operations. Today, peace operations are far more multi-functional in nature with a multitude of stakeholders involved. This evolution brings its own set of challenges for the international community, but it also creates opportunities for Asia to engage on a deeper level and contribute to international peace and security.

Developments in the Region. There has been a perceptible attitudinal shift among the region’s major powers toward participation in peace operations. As part of its desire to be seen as a more “normal” country, Japan has passed the International Peace Cooperation Law in 2001. Similarly, China’s desire to be seen as a more responsible international player is reflected in its growing engagement in international peace operations.

The experiences of Cambodia and East Timor have forced many in Southeast Asia to re-think existing modalities, including UN peacekeeping operations, for managing conflict. This has translated into ad hoc regional initiatives. This has also translated into a more proactive role toward conflict prevention. This role is now envisioned as one that can include mediation and facilitation.

At the ARF, ideas are abounding, particularly in the debate over moving beyond confidence building measures and toward preventive diplomacy. This can be seen in ARF discussions on an enhanced role for the ARF Chair, on the need for early warning mechanisms, and on the establishment of a Friends of the ARF Chair and/or Experts and Eminent Persons Group.

In sum, we are seeing dynamic developments in the region defined increasingly by proactive rather than reactive attitudes. Such changes must be seen within the broader picture of new notions of security and new considerations of the regionalization of peace operations.

There are three significant developments of note. First, there is a move from conflict prevention to conflict resolution and peacemaking. The AMM can be seen as an extension of conflict prevention that builds upon regional experiences in the area of third-party mediation. Similarly, Malaysia participated in monitoring the ceasefire between the GRP and MILF. Second, the region has also begun to talk about intra-state conflict. Third, there is also a new willingness to bring external actors, such as regional organizations like the EU and NGOs, into the process.

These regional approaches could be regarded as peculiar to the region, in that they were either initiated outside the UN framework or through a coalition of the willing. Furthermore, notwithstanding their differences, they are all geared toward building or increasing various capacities of the state in question. But these changes raise issues of their own, such as what gaps remain in peacekeeping operations, how to overcome language incompatibility and inter-operability challenges, and whether to establish a regional peacekeeping training center or at least to coordinate and facilitate exchanges between the region’s existing national centers.

The Asia Pacific experience in peace operations also saw significant examples set by two large countries in their own respective sub-regions: Australia and Indonesia. Indonesia opened up space for what can be regarded as possible/alternative approaches to peace operations such as allowing for third party mediation and the inclusion of external actors (AMM). As for Australia, RAMSI and similar police-led operations also demonstrated a new paradigm for resolving the region's humanitarian crises.

In light of the above, we need to examine: first, the modalities involved in bringing NGOs into regional approaches, whether in conflict prevention, mediation, or post-conflict rebuilding roles; and second, the importance of the role played by civilian police in peace operations. What are the implications of these new actors in re-crafting or creating new regional mechanisms? What are the operational gaps that need to be filled? What best practices may be culled from experiences so far?

These trends have implications for norms. First, intervention norms are not ironclad, as is borne out by the nuances and adjustments in regional experiences and practices discussed in this meeting. Second, there are new attitudes in Asia that are underpinned by new concepts of security. These attitudes reflect some acknowledgement of the human security, cooperative security, and comprehensive security concepts. Third, contrary to perceptions, the region is now more engaged in conceptual and practical aspects of international peace operations.

Co-Chairs' Closing Remarks

Dr. Pierre Lizee noted that there is much energy and willingness within the Asia Pacific region to broaden engagement in peace operations, as well as a growing desire to be heard in global institutions. This Study Group is thus operating in a timely context and speaking at a moment of high implications.

On the basis of the meeting's discussions, Dr. Lizee proposed four areas to which he felt the Study Group could make substantive contributions.

1. *Peacekeeping Training Centres*: Training standardization, coordination, and interoperability were all flagged as practical areas in need of improvement. We have identified specific issues such as language training and network building. How might the region improve upon these and other areas to facilitate greater regional engagement?
2. *Asia and the UN Peacebuilding Commission*. The Peacebuilding Commission is still young and quite unsure of its footing in terms of what it will do and say, and to whom. What does the Asia Pacific region have to say about what role the PBC should play, or about changes at the UN more broadly? What does Asia want the PBC to do with respect to vital issues such as use of force and protection of civilians?
3. *Regional Peace Operations Capacity*. What about regional capacity and regional identity vis-à-vis peace operations? Should the discussion be more focused on the nature of peace operations? There have been regional discussions about the formation of an ASEAN Security Community, which could include an ASEAN peacekeeping force and an ASEAN peacekeeping training center. How can this Study Group move these discussions forward? What recommendations should we make in terms of next steps?
4. *The Role of the Non-State Sector*: The discussions were quite state-centered. But what role can the non-state sector, namely track-two forums and NGOs, play in international peace operations? What is the role of NGOs in Asia, and what are the implications of their role in developing an Asian presence and identity within a broad dynamic of the regionalization of peace operations?

Participants offered the following comments and suggestions:

1. Training Centers

- 1.1 Focus on the curricula of regional peacekeeping training centers might offer a valuable "Asian" or regional perspective on conflict management. This focus should include attention to these centers' training in cultural diversity and sensitivity to other local factors.
- 1.2 If we choose to propose the formation of a regional training center, we should consider how such centers have been designed in Africa. Although the current centers are nationally based, they should still offer courses with multinational student bodies.

- 1.3 While there are benefits to having a variety of peacekeeping training models, even missions that are not UN-led should still seek UN approval.
- 1.4 A long-term goal should still be the establishment of a multinational regional peacekeeping training center. This center would give legitimacy to Asia's involvement in peacekeeping activities. In the mid-term, we should aim for greater use of the training modules put out by the UN. In the short term, we should begin by establishing networks that facilitate the exchange of training resources and ideas. Furthermore, if we study the mandates of 15 ongoing missions, this breadth of curriculum will provide a sense of what types of skills and sensitivities should be built in to this training. We should also study how to make these centers more multi-functional to include a larger role for civilian police.

2. Peacebuilding Commission

- 2.1 If the PBC's objective is to help countries prevent the relapse into war, it will need to have input and feedback from those carrying out the PBC's work on the ground.
- 2.2 We need to delineate carefully between different stages in peace operations. Does peacebuilding refer to maintaining peace for negotiating a conflict's settlement and preventing conflict from re-erupting? Or are we talking about preventive diplomacy and mediation before the conflict erupts?
- 2.3 One major difficulty has been in identifying a distinctly Asian perspective of the PBC. Within the UN, Asian states belong to different groups and institutional bodies, many of which compete in their day-to-day interaction. Forging a common Asian voice to shape the PBC will be difficult.

3. Building Regional Capacity

- 3.1 There is a tendency to focus on the military role in peacekeeping, but the role of civilian policing should remain on the radar screen. If the region is going to establish a peacekeeping training center, it should have several layers and a range of functions. The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) should factor heavily into any recommendations about regional training.
- 3.2 Each peacekeeping case will be specific to its own environment. As a general recommendation, however, civilian police and the military need to determine several things prior to deployment: they must be familiar with each other's doctrines; they should understand what role each will play, whether in peacekeeping, peacemaking, capacity building, conflict resolution, or dealing with human rights cases; they should share their communications strategies to ensure inter-operability, communications discipline, and technical familiarity; they need to understand each other's methods of armed and unarmed operation and each other's rules of engagement; they should be familiar with each other's physical deployment (the military operates as a structured unit, whereas police may be disaggregated); they must understand the role the other

plays in contributing to community rehabilitation; and finally, their respective exit strategies should have clear performance measures and indicators. In this regard, it would be valuable for this group to produce a framework document that serves as an overall useful guideline for these matters.

- 3.3 We should clarify whether we are talking about Asia contributing to UN operations or Asia contributing to the resolution of Asian problems. Many Asian countries have experience in mediation and peacekeeping, but less so with peacebuilding since the latter is a fairly new concept. We should recommend to ARF that Asians play a mediating role, since that is where we have experience. Not every Asia Pacific country is suitable for mediating any conflict, but there is enough variation to use appropriate countries to mediate specific issues. We therefore need to identify who in the region would have the capacity to do this.
- 3.4 Northeast Asia has been a missing link in discussions of regional capacity, even though Japan is the second largest financial contributor, and South Korea is the 10th largest. Furthermore, South Korea has a specific peacekeeping concern in the form of future North Korean scenarios. The former just signed with the U.S. a bilateral agreement in the event of North Korea's sudden collapse. Some have been critical of this, arguing that South Korea should not depend entirely on its partnership with the U.S. This Study Group's future discussions should thus broaden its geographical focus to include scenarios in Northeast Asia.
- 3.5 When we are asking what voice Asia should have in peace operations, are we talking about Asia or the Asia Pacific? To what extent should the Pacific have a voice? Is it represented through the Australian and New Zealand voices? Is there room for participation by the Pacific Islands Forum? Although the Pacific population is small, it does possess policing capabilities. Therefore, the Pacific should have a louder voice in discussions of peace operations, particularly considering that PNG, Bougainville, and other potential conflicts may require some form of regional response.

4. Roles for Other Actors

- 4.1 Since it will be difficult for regional states to produce a uniform 'Asian' perspective on peacekeeping and peace-building matters, perhaps this is where track-two forums such as this one can make a contribution.

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
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