



The Future of Nonproliferation Cooperation with Myanmar after the 2015 General Election

**A Conference Report of the
Third Myanmar-US/UK Nonproliferation Dialogue**

By David Santoro

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Pacific Forum CSIS

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Founded in 1992, Myanmar ISIS aims to act as an academic institute concerned with the study of international relations and foreign policy issue areas. It is also concerned with strategic studies and research works on current regional and international issues. Myanmar ISIS's other important task is to contribute timely inputs, views and recommendations for the formulation of policies and decisions on bilateral and multilateral issues with the aim of serving Myanmar's national interest while enhancing peace, friendship and cooperation with other countries of the world. Another area of importance is to project Myanmar's true image and better understanding of it by the world on its stands, policies, and actions on issues related to Myanmar.

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Key Findings and Recommendations

Third Myanmar-US/UK Nonproliferation Dialogue

December 9-10, 2015, Yangon, Myanmar

The Pacific Forum CSIS, with support from the US Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) and the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Strategic Programme Fund (FCO/SPF), held the third US/UK-Myanmar Nonproliferation Dialogue in Yangon, Myanmar on Dec. 9-10, 2015. Some 35 US, UK, and Myanmar experts, officials, military officers, and observers attended, all in their private capacity, along with 18 Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders. The off-the-record discussions focused on the future of nonproliferation implementation after the Myanmar election; the Additional Protocol (AP), the modified Small Quantities Protocol (SQP), and radioactive source management; the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions (BWC and CWC); strategic trade controls; and the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOG). Key findings from this meeting include:

While Myanmar's November election is a promising step, many questions remain about the country's democratic transition. Right now, it is still unclear who will become president; an amendment to the Constitution to allow Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) to take office is unlikely to be made. Also unclear (and too often overlooked) is who will be nominated to form a cabinet that can govern effectively. The newly-elected National League for Democracy (NLD) does not have a deep bench but it is unclear who, if anyone, from outside the NLD they will draw for key political appointments.

Myanmar's new government is facing multiple challenges priorities, including fighting corruption, promoting national reconciliation, advancing the peace process with ethnic minorities, passing economic reforms, and improving center-periphery relations. These challenges and priorities will keep the incoming government extremely busy.

Foreign policy is not considered an immediate priority for the new government, but Myanmar participants made clear their view of Myanmar's geopolitical realities. Sandwiched between two major, nuclear-armed powers (China and India), the new government will likely continue to promote good relations with its neighbors. The new government must also be careful not to appear to be "tilting" toward the West. It will likely be committed to improving relations with the West, especially the United States. Significantly, Myanmar participants emphasized that they should not be made to choose between the United States and China "because it's too risky."

Myanmar views US sanctions as an impediment to moving away from its isolationist policies. In the words of one Myanmar participant, the US remains the "sanctioner-in-chief." Given the broad range of sanctions, it would be helpful to both sides to gain a better understanding of the basis for each set of sanctions and the actions needed to facilitate their removal now that free and fair elections have taken place.

US (and UK) participants stressing that the termination of military cooperation with North Korea *and* clarity on past cooperation will help improve relations with the

West and stand as the most important impediment to lifting sanctions. Myanmar participants insisted that the NLD government will likely continue to burnish its nonproliferation credentials and “may even intensify its efforts.” Several Myanmar participants insisted, both during the formal dialogue and in private conversations, that there are no more military ties between Myanmar and North Korea.

Progress on nonproliferation will be challenging because Myanmar needs to move from instrument adoption to implementation. Myanmar has endorsed the AP (2013), the BWC (2014), and the CWC (2015), and the new government’s commitment to these instruments seems assured; of note, Myanmar has already designated a national authority for implementation of the CWC. Implementing these instruments, however, requires considerable time, resources, and expertise, all of which are currently in short supply.

Nonproliferation capacity-building should be the top priority for any donor seeking to assist Myanmar. Training the next generation of Myanmar policymakers and scholars is particularly important for sustained success. Accordingly, the participation of Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders in this meeting, including a strong contingent from Myanmar, was an important addition to this dialogue.

An immediate obstacle to implementation of the CWC and BTWC is the apparent limited knowledge and visibility that Myanmar officials and experts have of facilities that are engaged in relevant activities in their country. A first step should be a national inventory of facilities involved in the handling of toxic chemicals and precursors that are included in the Schedules of Chemicals Annex of the CWC and a cataloguing of biological research facilities according to established biosafety containment levels.

Myanmar lacks established criteria for controlling strategic goods and materials. For instance, a Myanmar participant explained that there is no official registry for radioactive source materials, no national lists of biological and chemical agents, and no control lists for these materials and other sensitive items and technologies. Therefore, in addition to assisting Myanmar with treaty implementation per se (e.g., drafting legislation), research is needed to help map Myanmar’s key technology and material holdings to begin the process of controlling strategic goods.

There are important nonproliferation instruments that Myanmar is yet to endorse. They include the modified SQP, the main nuclear safety and security conventions, and the HCOC. While stressing that all are “on their radar” or, in the case of nuclear security conventions, “already in the works,” Myanmar participants insisted that the West should not expect too much, too soon. The challenge remains capacity, not intent.

The Future of Nonproliferation Cooperation with Myanmar after the 2015 General Election

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Third Myanmar-US/UK Nonproliferation Dialogue
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What is the outlook for nonproliferation cooperation with Myanmar after the 2015 General Election? This, in short, was the key question that the third US/UK-Myanmar Nonproliferation Dialogue, which took place in Yangon, Myanmar on Dec. 9-10, 2015, sought to answer.

Since the Myanmar government began to implement sweeping democratic reforms in 2011, a key component has included burnishing its nonproliferation credentials, which has so far progressed well and in close cooperation with the West. The 2015 General Election and the victory of the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) party raises several questions about the future of these efforts. To help address them, the Pacific Forum CSIS, with support from the US Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) and the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Strategic Programme Fund (FCO/SPF), and cooperation of Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International Studies, brought together some 35 US, UK, and Myanmar experts, officials, military officers, and observers, along with 18 Pacific Forum CSIS "Young Leaders." All attended in their private capacity. The off-the-record discussions focused on the future of nonproliferation implementation after the Myanmar election; the Additional Protocol (AP), the modified Small Quantities Protocol (SQP), and radioactive source management; the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions (BWC and CWC); strategic trade controls (STC); and the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC).

Myanmar after the general election

Because our meeting took place just over a month after Myanmar's General Election (Nov. 8), we kicked it off by discussing the implications of the results for Myanmar, its foreign policy, and its nonproliferation policy. Two Myanmar scholars gave their perspectives. The first speaker explained that the predictions that nobody would win a majority proved completely wrong. The NLD, which ran on a promise to (continue the reforms initiated in 2011 and) bring about change in Myanmar, won an absolute majority of seats in the combined national parliament. The NLD and Myanmar voters, however, may have differing views on priorities for the upcoming government. Whereas the NLD may focus on (democratic) constitutional reforms, the Myanmar people may be more concerned with improving their living standards. Pragmatism and expectation management, therefore, will have to be the guiding principles of the new government.

Our second Myanmar speaker concurred that the new government will continue the current democratic transition and will seek to bring about change, but that it will be a long process. As he put it, "the outcome of the election does not signal a happy ending, it

signals a happy beginning.” Many questions remain. Right now, for instance, it is still unclear who will become president. Myanmar participants pointed out that an amendment to the Constitution to allow Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) to take office is unlikely in the near term. Also unclear (and too often overlooked) is who will be nominated to form a cabinet that can govern effectively. Significantly, the newly-elected NLD does not have a deep bench of specialists with the experience necessary to tackle the myriad of challenges Myanmar will face, and it remains unknown who, if anyone, from outside the NLD will be appointed to key political positions.

Both speakers stressed that Myanmar’s new government is facing multiple challenges and priorities, including building a new era in civil-military relations, fighting corruption, promoting national reconciliation, advancing the peace process with ethnic minorities, passing economic reforms, and improving center-periphery relations. These challenges and priorities will keep the incoming government extremely busy. In this context, foreign policy is *not* considered an immediate priority. Myanmar participants, however, made clear their view of Myanmar’s geopolitical realities. Sandwiched between two nuclear-armed powers (China and India), the new government will likely continue to promote good relations with its neighbors. The new government must also be careful not to appear to be “tilting” toward the West. It will likely be committed to improving relations with the West, especially the United States. Of note, Myanmar participants emphasized that they should not be made to choose between the United States and China because given their geography “it’s too risky.”

There was general agreement among Myanmar participants that US sanctions are an impediment to moving away from its isolationist policies. In the words of one Myanmar participant, the United States remains the “sanctioner-in-chief.” Given the broad range of sanctions, it would be helpful to both sides to gain a better understanding of the basis for each set of sanctions and the actions needed to facilitate their removal now that free and fair elections have taken place.

US (and UK) participants stressed that the termination of military cooperation with North Korea as well as clarity on past cooperation will help improve relations with the West and stands as the most important proliferation-related impediment to lifting sanctions. Myanmar participants insisted that the NLD government will likely continue to burnish its nonproliferation credentials and “may even intensify its efforts.” Several Myanmar participants insisted, both during the formal dialogue and in private conversations, that there are no more military ties between Myanmar and North Korea. Nevertheless, suspicion about the relationship remains among many Western intelligence agencies.

The Additional Protocol, the Modified Small Quantities Protocol, and Radioactive Source Management

The meeting’s second session initiated our discussion of specific nonproliferation instruments, which began with a focus on the AP, the modified SQP, and radioactive source management. Due to unforeseen circumstances, our Myanmar speaker from the

Ministry of Science and Technology had to cancel his participation. This session, therefore, only featured one presentation from a UK speaker, who laid out the purpose of the international nuclear safeguards regime and explained how its various components work.

Designed to assess whether a country's nuclear activities are peaceful, the regime requires a country to maintain oversight and control over these activities and to provide information that is verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The regime includes several agreements: the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), the modified SQP, and the AP. While Myanmar already has a CSA in place with the IAEA, it has signed but has yet to bring an AP into force and has not yet concluded a modified SQP. Our speaker explained that the AP and modified SQP work together and are both required to provide the highest level of confidence that nuclear materials and facilities are being used for peaceful purposes. Significantly, while the AP provides the IAEA with better tools to verify the correctness and completeness of states' declarations, the modified SQP provides it with an initial report of nuclear material, early notification of any decision to construct a nuclear facility, and it also allows inspectors to conduct ad hoc and special inspections.

For the first time in this dialogue, our UK speaker also discussed requirements associated with the management of radioactive sources. Used widely in a variety of applications, these sources present risks, including explosion, external radiation, or environmental contamination. Source management, therefore, is important. It needs to include a "cradle-to-grave" system as well as a legislative framework for safety, a national infrastructure for control of radiation sources, and the implementation of regulatory control activities. In this regard, the IAEA has developed a number of best practices for newcomer countries interested in enhancing radioactive source management, including the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the Guidance on Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

Myanmar participants stressed that Naypyitaw is working toward the development of a nuclear safety and security law. This will help make progress toward adoption of the AP and modified SQP and, for that matter, strengthen radioactive source management. A representative from the London-based Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre (known as VERTIC) stressed that his organization could, if Myanmar so desired, review this legislation. The Pacific Forum CSIS also offered to make use of its US DOE nonproliferation capacity-building funds to translate key documents from English to Myanmar in an effort to assist implementation.

Implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention

This session examined the next steps that Myanmar needs to take to implement the BWC and CWC, which it ratified in December 2014 and July 2015, respectively. It featured three speakers: a US speaker who presented on the BWC and a Myanmar speaker and a US speaker who focused on the CWC.

Our US speaker explained that Myanmar crossed a milestone when it ratified the BWC, which bans the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons and means of delivery. It is all the more significant as Myanmar was the only BWC holdout state from Southeast Asia. Now, the next step for Naypyitaw is to implement the Convention's requirements. BWC implementation requires Myanmar to develop national legislation and regulations governing the use of biological agents and toxins, as well as controls on import and export of such materials. They also include developing and instituting biosafety and biosecurity standards at biological research facilities. Additionally, BWC states parties are expected to promote a culture of responsibility among the scientific research community through education and outreach, emphasizing the importance of assessing potential safety and security risks when planning research projects. Another important aspect of BWC implementation is the annual submission of confidence-building measures, which provide the transparency necessary to build trust among the parties to the Convention. The UK speaker welcomed progress to date and flagged opportunities for Myanmar to bolster its BWC credentials through active preparation in the preparatory committee meetings in the run-up to the Eight Review Conference scheduled for November 2016.

The good news is that there are multiple mechanisms to assist Myanmar in meeting BWC obligations, both within the Convention framework and through other initiatives, including opportunities for assistance through the European Union. BWC Article X, which protects states parties' rights to assistance and cooperation on projects with peaceful purposes, can facilitate support in developing national legislation and regulations, building biosafety and biosecurity capacity, and a broad range of other activities. To benefit from these resources, Myanmar can utilize the Assistance and Cooperation Database, which is administered by the BWC Implementation Support Unit and provides a platform for matchmaking among states parties that are offering and requesting assistance. Another important mechanism for relevant assistance is the Global Health Security Agenda (GHS), which aims to "accelerate progress toward a world safe and secure from infectious disease threats." Launched in February 2014, the GHS has brought together high-level leaders and technical experts from dozens of countries, and they have made commitments to implement its vision through 11 "Action Packages" that collectively articulate a comprehensive plan for building health security capacity worldwide. Two of these Action Packages have particular relevance to the BWC: Biosafety and Biosecurity, and Linking Public Health with Law and Multi-sectoral Rapid Response. If Myanmar were to sign up for these two BWC-related Action Packages, states participating in the GHS could help assess national needs and support Yangon's efforts to meet them.

Turning to the CWC, our Myanmar speaker explained that, following ratification in July 2015, Naypyitaw made the Ministry of Science and Technology the focal point for implementation, where the country's national authority was established. Since September 2015, Myanmar also has had a permanent representative at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). It has also sent Myanmar officials to attend OPCW training courses delivered jointly with the UK National Authority in The Hague, including site visits to the United Kingdom. These developments will help

implement the CWC. Significantly, Myanmar made its first declaration to the OPCW in September 2015 and anticipates making additional, more thorough declarations in the near future. Subject to resource and capacity constraints, the US and UK speakers offered to try and provide additional support if needed.

Our Myanmar speaker stressed that the law of relevance to the CWC is the “Prevention of Hazard from Chemical and Related Substances Law,” which was enacted in August 2013. This law, however, is inadequate to fully implement the Convention. New laws are needed. Moreover, a considerable amount of work is needed to help prepare for declaration activities or organize working groups for inspection, among other things. Myanmar, in other words, does *not* have, at present, the capacity it needs to fulfill its CWC obligations. The UK speaker welcomed Myanmar’s efforts to date, suggesting that a skills and capacity audit might help inform decisions on how best to approach the OPCW/bilateral partners for further assistance. Similarly, other relevant Export Control Regime guidelines might assist Ministry of Trade and Customs personnel in updating relevant Myanmar control lists.

Our US speaker, a representative from VERTIC, outlined CWC obligations and described the findings of a legislative survey that his organization conducted for Myanmar. The survey recommends that key terms be defined in line with the ones used by the Convention and that national legislation be specific about prohibited acts. It also recommends that measures to control scheduled and unscheduled discrete organic chemicals be adopted and that violations of those measures entail criminal penalties. Significantly, the survey recommends that control lists covering dual-use chemical manufacturing facilities and equipment along with related technology and software be drafted and adopted.

Discussions about BWC and CWC implementation left no doubt that an immediate obstacle is the apparent limited knowledge and visibility that Myanmar officials and experts have of facilities that are engaged in relevant activities in their country. A first step, therefore, should be a cataloguing of biological research facilities according to established biosafety containment levels and a national inventory of facilities engaged in the handling of toxic chemicals and precursors that are included in the Schedules of Chemicals Annex of the CWC.

Strategic Trade Controls and UN sanctions implementation

A Myanmar representative of the Ministry of Finance’s Customs Department kicked off this session by giving a historical background of his department and explaining that its purpose is “to create customs services that generate the security and facilitation of international trade, production off social well-being, and trade partnership with stakeholders.” While Myanmar is committed to modernizing and standardizing its customs procedures to bring them in line with international practices, a core goal of the Department is trade promotion. Recently, the Department has increased in size, going from 2,203 to 3,171 staff members and establishing new offices and special economic zones throughout the country.

Myanmar, however, is far from having an effective STC regime. In fact, at present, it lacks established criteria for controlling strategic goods and materials. For instance, a Myanmar participant explained that there is no official registry for radioactive source materials, no national lists of biological and chemical agents, and no control lists for these materials and other sensitive items and technologies. Therefore, in addition to assisting Myanmar with treaty implementation per se (e.g., drafting legislation), research is needed to help map Myanmar's key technology and material holdings to begin the process of controlling strategic goods. This is an effort that could be undertaken as part of an STC-only dialogue process; significantly, the US DOE and the Pacific Forum CSIS launched such a process in Yangon in June 2015, where the rationale for and key components of a standard STC regime were discussed.

Moving on from STC, our UK speaker discussed the implementation requirements of United Nations Security Council sanctions regimes on North Korea and Iran. The regime on North Korea imposes an arms embargo on Pyongyang and requires UN member states to prevent supply of goods relevant to nuclear and missile programs. It also requires UN member states to prevent the supply of luxury goods and imposes an asset freeze and a travel ban on designated persons, among other things. Regardless of the requirements of the sanctions regime, our speaker emphasized that it is reasonable to suspect that any North Korean entity or ship may contribute to prohibited activity, suggesting that UN member states should show extreme vigilance when or if dealing with them. The UN sanction regime on Iran imposes similar restrictions. Of note, implementation of these regimes is a legal obligation for all UN member states. Engagement with the relevant UN Panel of Experts can help states like Myanmar receive assistance to implement the regimes. Significantly, at present, there is no lead Myanmar agency designated to implement UN sanctions; Myanmar participants simply stated that this falls under the responsibility of the UN mission.

The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation

The meeting's final session focused on missile proliferation and a key instrument to combat it: the HCOC. This instrument, our US speaker explained, establishes good practices to curb the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and encourages its subscribing states to reduce their national holdings. Specifically, it is a multilateral transparency and confidence-building instrument that commits subscribing states to ratifying, acceding to, or otherwise abiding by the main space arms control treaties; combating the proliferation of ballistic missiles to states that might be developing or acquiring WMD; curbing and preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering WMD, both at the global and regional levels, through multilateral, bilateral, or national efforts; exercising maximum restraint in developing, testing, and deploying such missiles and, where possible, reducing national holdings; and exercising necessary vigilance in assisting space launch vehicle programs to prevent ballistic missile proliferation. The HCOC also includes several transparency measures, including pre-launch notifications on launches and test flights or annual declarations of ballistic missile and space launch vehicle policies and numbers.

Myanmar stands to benefit much from subscribing to the HCOC. For starters, it would send a strong (and new) signal of commitment to nonproliferation; it is important for Myanmar to confirm this commitment in the aftermath of the election. Second, HCOC membership is not restricted or preconditioned by any criteria. Third, and significantly, the HCOC is an informal political arrangement, not a legally binding treaty. This means that its focus is on broad principles, not detailed action plans. Unlike the BWC or CWC (or even strategic trade controls), it does not require specific the drafting of national legislation or the establishment of an implementing agency. It is, in other words, a low-hanging fruit, an easy way for Myanmar to “check another nonproliferation box” without diverting resources away from other priorities.

While stressing that the West should not expect too much, too soon, Myanmar participants confirmed that it was not their intention to develop an offensive ballistic missile program and signaled support in principle for the HCOC, but stressed that subscribing to the HCOC was “on their radars,” although progress was likely to be slow. For that matter, they pointed out that Myanmar is also committed to other nonproliferation instruments that they have not yet endorsed. Efforts to adopt the main nuclear safety and security conventions, for instance, are “already in the works.” The US and UK speakers offered to mentor or assist with any membership application if required.

General observations and next steps

While the interest in and commitment to this dialogue remains high, it is worth noting that the seniority and expertise levels of Myanmar participants were slightly lower than in the previous dialogue iteration. This is likely due to the elections, as the bureaucracy is waiting to see what happens when the leadership changes. It may also be due to the limited number of Myanmar officials and experts working on these issues or may be a direct result of the unexpected loss of the head of the Ministry of Science and Technology. Significantly, a key theme of this year’s dialogue was that progress on nonproliferation will be increasingly challenging because Myanmar now needs to move from instrument adoption to implementation. Time and time again, Myanmar participants stressed that implementing these instruments requires time, resources, and expertise, all of which are in short supply; capacity issues may even become more acute in the near-term after the transition in government. Nonproliferation capacity-building, therefore, should be a priority for any donor seeking to assist Myanmar. Helping to build the next generation of Myanmar policymakers and scholars is particularly important for sustained success. In this regard, the participation of Pacific Forum CSIS “Young Leaders” in this meeting, including a strong contingent from Myanmar, was an important addition. The US and UK speakers welcomed commitment shown to date and signaled a willingness to try and support further development where possible.

Appendix A

Third Myanmar-US/UK Nonproliferation Dialogue

December 9-10, 2015, Park Royal Hotel
Yangon, Myanmar

AGENDA

Tuesday, December 8, 2015

18:30 Opening Dinner

Wednesday, December 9, 2015

8:30 **Registration**

9:00 **Session 1: Myanmar after the General Election**

This session will discuss the implications of Myanmar's election results. What do election results mean for Myanmar? What do they mean for Myanmar's foreign policy and, in particular, for its relations with Western countries? What are the implications for Myanmar's approach to nonproliferation? Are we likely to see change or continuity in Myanmar's efforts to burnish its nonproliferation credentials?

10:30 **Coffee Break**

10:45 **Session 2: The Additional Protocol, the Modified Small Quantities Protocol, and Radioactive Source Management**

This session will look at the Additional Protocol (AP), the modified Small Quantities Protocol (SQP), and radioactive source management, and how the US/UK can assist this effort. How far has Myanmar gone in implementing the AP? What challenges has it faced? When does Myanmar anticipate adopting its AP? Given that the AP and modified SQP complement each other, when does Myanmar intend to submit a modified SQP? How prevalent are radioactive source materials in Myanmar? How are they managed and how can management be improved? What assistance does Myanmar need in these areas?

12:15 **Lunch**

13:45 **Session 3: Implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention**

This session will examine the implementation processes associated with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and how the US/UK can assist this effort. What are the BTWC's implementation requirements? So far, what steps has Myanmar taken to incorporate the Convention's provisions into its national laws and regulations? What challenges does Myanmar face? How can they be overcome? What assistance mechanisms can Myanmar use to help implement the BTWC?

15:15 **Coffee Break**

15:30 **Session 4: Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention**

This session will explore the implementation processes associated with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and how the US/UK can assist this effort. What are the CWC's implementation requirements? So far, what steps has Myanmar taken to incorporate the Convention's provisions into its national laws and regulations? What challenges does Myanmar face? How can they be overcome? What assistance mechanisms can Myanmar use to help implement the CWC?

17:00 **Session Adjourns**

18:30 **Dinner**

Thursday, December 10, 2015

9:00 **Session 5: Strategic Trade Controls and UN Sanctions Implementation**

This session will discuss strategic trade controls, UN sanctions implementation, and how the US/UK can assist Myanmar in building capacity in this area. What is Myanmar's current trade control regime? What are its main components? How is Myanmar's regime governed legally and institutionally? Does Myanmar intend to reform/improve it? How? What the provisions and implementation requirements of UN sanctions regimes on North Korea and Iran? What are the priorities to best implement these regimes?

10:30 **Coffee Break**

10:45 **Session 6: The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation**

This session will explore the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC). What is the HCOC? What is its purpose? What is its scope? What are its key provisions and requirements? How is the HCOC implemented? Does Myanmar envision joining the HCOC? What steps would it need to take to become a subscribing party? Would this entail specific challenges? How could they be resolved?

12:00 **Lunch**

13:30 **Session 7: Conclusions and Next Steps**

This session will summarize the meeting's discussions, identify its key findings, and reflect on next steps for this dialogue. What are the key takeaways? What are the problems facing Myanmar in its efforts to endorse nonproliferation rules and norms? What are the solutions in the short-, medium-, and long-terms? How can this dialogue better assist Myanmar's efforts?

15:00 **Meeting Adjourns**

Appendix B

Third Myanmar-US/UK Nonproliferation Dialogue

**December 9-10, 2015, Park Royal Hotel
Yangon, Myanmar**

Participant List

Myanmar

1. **Dr. Khin Maung Latt**
Director General
Department of Atomic Energy
Ministry of Science and Technology
2. **Dr. Aung Myo**
Deputy Director
Department of Atomic Energy
Ministry of Science and Technology
3. **Dr. Thar Htat Kyaw**
Deputy Director
Research and Innovation Department
Ministry of Science and Technology
4. **Dr. Aye Aye Khine**
Deputy Director
Research and Innovation Department
Ministry of Science and Technology
5. **Colonel Tin Aung Myint**
Office of the Chief of Air Defense
Forces
Ministry of Defense
6. **Colonel Aung Kyaw Moe**
Office of the Chief of Defense
Industries
Ministry of Defense
7. **Colonel Aye Soe**
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Ministry of Defense
8. **Dr. Maung Maung Lay**
Vice Chairman
UMFCCI
9. **U Maung Maung Myint**
Head of Department
International Relations Department,
UMFCCI
10. **U Maung Maung Lwin**
Deputy Director
Customs Department
Ministry of Finance
11. **Daw Win Min Phyo**
Deputy Director
Ministry of Commerce
12. **Dr. Khin Ma Ma Myo**
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13. **Dr. Khaing Khaing Tun Myint**
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International Relations Department,
East Yangon University
14. **Dr. Tin Myo Thwe**
Professor
International Relations Department,
East Yangon University
15. **Dr. Htay Htay Nyein**
Professor
International Relations Department,
East Yangon University

16. **Dr. San San Khine**
Associate Professor
International Relations Department
Dagon University
17. **Dr. Aye Mya Nandar**
Associate Professor
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18. **Dr. Win Win Khine**
Lecturer
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20. **U Kyee Myint**
Senior Research Fellow
Myanmar ISIS
21. **U Khin Maung Lynn**
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22. **U Ba Hla Aye**
Joint Secretary 2
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23. **Dr. Soe Naing**
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Ministry of Industry
24. **U Maung Maung Than**
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