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**Regional Overview: Coming of Age and Coming Out: Shifts in the Geopolitical Landscape** by Ralph A. Cossa

The geopolitical landscape in Asia has changed dramatically and permanently in the past quarter, largely as a result of two landmark events--the coming of age of Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party and the coming out of North Korea's reclusive supreme leader, Kim Jong-il. Chen Shui-bian's inauguration as Taipei's first non-Kuomintang leader provides further validation of the fundamental, seemingly irreversible, change that began in 1996 with Taiwan's first truly democratic presidential election. Meanwhile, Kim Jong-il's sudden appearance in the international spotlight, first through his visit to Beijing and then as a result of his summit with ROK President Kim Dae-jung, was even more dramatic; the so-called Dear Leader's actions necessitate a rethinking of what is and is not possible on the Peninsula and raise hopes of near-term reconciliation and eventual peaceful reunification. Both events will have a profound impact on American security strategy and interests and on the prospects for peace and stability in East Asia. They will also affect upcoming and future attempts at multilateral cooperation in the region.

**U.S.-Japan: Security and Economic Ties Stabilize before the Okinawa Summit** by Michael Jonathan Green

After a frustrating first quarter, the bilateral agenda seems to have stabilized in time for the July G-8 summit. It is not that Washington and Tokyo have made dramatic breakthroughs. In fact, most of the contentious first quarter issues remain unresolved. However, there is a quiet confidence that enough can be done before the summit to establish a generally positive atmosphere. In part, this is because the Mori cabinet has survived June 25 elections and now recognizes that further intransigence on trade and security issues will only undermine the prime minister's already flagging credibility. Meanwhile, Washington has taken its measure of the Mori coalition and has lowered its expectations accordingly. Finally, in Okinawa, the prospects for a political conflagration over bases seem to have subsided. Overall, the relationship looks set for a steady course through the summit.

**U.S.-China: Progress on PNTR Boost Relations, but only Slightly** by Bonnie S. Glaser

The Clinton administration made important progress this quarter toward securing congressional support for granting permanent normal trading status to China. The House approved the trade bill and Senate approval of the legislation

is expected before the August recess. In an unprecedented gesture, President Jiang telephoned President Clinton to express his gratitude for the administration's effort to win congressional backing. Other accomplishments in bilateral ties were less significant. A bilateral agreement was penned to share information and evidence related to drug smuggling and the commander in chief of the Chinese Navy made a visit to the U.S. followed by a delegation headed by the Nanjing Military Region Commander. Last but not least, Secretary of State Albright made a last-minute stop in Beijing to engage in security discussions with Chinese leaders.

**U.S.-Korea: Looking Forward, Looking Back**  
by Stephen Noerper

The inter-Korean summit spoke to the possibility of dramatic forward progress in inter-Korean relations. The meeting drew unqualified support from the U.S. and other regional actors, but also raised questions about U.S. military presence on the Peninsula. Despite official proclamations to the contrary, pre-summit reports indicated some divergence between U.S. and South Korean policymakers on agenda topics, with the U.S. (and Japan) concerned about nuclear and missile issues and South Korea keen on leading with economic cooperation and family visitations. Controversy over the Nogun-ri massacres and the pace investigations, the 20th Anniversary of the Kwangju massacres, protests over U.S. test ranges, and the Status of Forces Agreement reflect future challenges in managing U.S.-Korean relations.

**U.S.-Russia: President Putin: The First Ninety Days**  
by Toby Trister Gati

Following his election, Vladimir Putin moved swiftly to consolidate power at home and to project an image of a revitalized Russia abroad. His team of economic advisors put together far-reaching proposals to reform the economy, while the presidential administration presented the Duma with a reorganization plan aimed at reining in the power of the governors. Ratification by the Duma of START II and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, followed in quick succession by a series of well publicized foreign visits and a summit with President Clinton in Moscow, conveyed the image of a can-do, energetic new leader. That image was undermined by the attacks on Media Most and its head, Vladimir Gusinsky, the storm of negative publicity that followed, and the continuing war in Chechnya.

**U.S.-ASEAN: Lingering Concerns Amidst Some Promising Developments** by Samantha Ravich

Despite continuing public criticism of the Indonesian military's conduct in East Timor, the U.S. quietly resumed limited military-to-military contact with Indonesia during the last quarter. Indonesia also was invited as an observer to the COBRA GOLD 2000 military exercises, which were

expanded from the Thai-U.S. format to include Singapore as well. In the Philippines, the FBI became frustrated with the lack of a legal framework for prosecuting cybercrime during the "Love Bug" incident, while President Estrada was also called to task over Manila's inability or unwillingness to settle its hostage crisis. This latter incident has raised further questions regarding ASEAN's cohesion as well.

### **China-ASEAN: China Consolidates Its Long-term Bilateral Relations with Southeast Asia**

by Carlyle A. Thayer

China further consolidated its bilateral relations with Southeast Asia by signing four long-term cooperation agreements with Myanmar, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore. China also exchanged high-level delegations with Singapore, the Philippines, and Myanmar. Discussions on territorial disputes in the South China Sea continued without resolution, while Chinese and Vietnamese leaders expressed concern over the pace of negotiations over delineation of the Gulf of Tonkin. A new dimension was added to China's relations with ASEAN states--the inauguration of direct party-to-party ties between the Chinese Communist Party and governing parties in non-socialist states. China also reinforced its ideological relations with Vietnam and Laos, its military ties with Thailand, and reportedly increased its military support for Myanmar.

### **China-Taiwan: Groping for a Formula for Cross-Strait Talks**

by David Brown

Since President Chen's remarkably conciliatory comments on cross-Strait relations in his inaugural address, both Taipei and Beijing appear to be groping, thus far unsuccessfully, for a formula for reopening talks. Inconsistent actions and statements from China imply considerable disagreement in Beijing on how to handle the new regime in Taipei; no decisions are expected until the summer leadership meetings in Beidaihe. In Taipei, Chen has been in a honeymoon period where his positions have enjoyed wide support. Despite its initial fears, Washington now sees Chen as a pragmatic conciliator. The Democratic Progressive Party has undergone a remarkable transformation from its past fear of U.S. pressure to a new desire to elicit American help in initiating cross-Strait talks. If a mutually acceptable formula is not found, the debate in Beijing is likely to shift toward a more confrontational approach. This, in turn, will constrain Chen's room for compromise.

### **China-Korea: Beijing at Center Stage or Upstaged by the Two Kims?**

by Scott Snyder

Beijing was the venue for many secret visits in the past quarter. ROK Minister of Culture Park visited Beijing secretly on April 8 to make an agreement with the DPRK Asia Pacific Peace Committee's Song in preparation for the inter-Korean summit held in June. Even more dramatically, DPRK leader Kim Jong-il stepped onto the world's diplomatic stage with a visit to Beijing at the end of May, where he was received by all the top members of the Chinese Communist Party. Supporting these developments, ROK Foreign Minister Lee visited Beijing for pre-summit consultations, Seoul played host to two senior PRC officials, and former ROK presidents Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam visited China in June.

Additionally, Seoul and Beijing staged their first major trade spat since official relations were established in 1991, threatening an otherwise banner year for the Sino-South Korean economic relationship.

### **Japan-China: Old Issues...and New Approaches?**

by James Przystup

After a first quarter that featured several diplomatic flare-ups, both Tokyo and Beijing appear intent on putting the bilateral relationship on a more even keel. Foreign Ministers met to review outstanding political, economic, and security issues. Foreign Minister Kono raised the possibility of Japan taking a new tack on China's military modernization, suggesting that future levels of development assistance could be linked to China's military spending. Japan voiced increasing interest in, and concern with, the activities of PLA navy ships and research vessels in Japan's Special Economic Zone. Beijing's reaction to Prime Minister Mori's remarks about Japan as a "Divine Country" was markedly low-key. At the same time, Japanese speculation over the implications of Beijing's role in advancing the inter-Korean summit turned quickly to recognition of China's growing influence on the Peninsula and to the future of U.S. forward-deployed forces both in Korea and in Japan.

### **Japan-Korea: The Roller Coaster of Experiences**

by Victor D. Cha

Disappointment, hope, and uncertainty. This roller coaster of expectations best describes Japan's attitudes toward events on the Korean Peninsula this quarter. The psychic low was a result of the inauspicious start to Japan-North Korea normalization talks, followed by the hopes, expectations, and uncertainty produced by the inter-Korean summit. The trilateral policy coordination precedent set by the Perry review faced and passed important tests this quarter related to the summit. On the Japan-ROK bilateral front, noteworthy positive steps deserve highlighting, especially because they were overshadowed by the focus on the summit. If real (rather than atmospheric) changes come to the security situation on the Peninsula pursuant to the summit, some larger questions regarding how to frame Japan-Korea relations deserve consideration.

### **Japan-Russia: A Return to the Deep-Freeze?**

by Joseph Ferguson

Like Russia, Japan now finds itself with a new leader at the helm. In spite of the new blood at the top, political relations appear to be as stagnant as they were at the beginning of the year. It appears more and more unlikely that a peace treaty will be signed by the end of the year. The leaders of the two countries are not expected to discuss in-depth bilateral relations at the upcoming G-8 summit. Policymakers in Japan are instead setting their sights on the expected late summer visit of Russian President Putin to Tokyo. Until then, little progress can be expected in political relations. Contacts at the regional level will continue to be pushed by Tokyo, and now that one of the Sakhalin energy projects has come back on-line, energy and trade relations could see a resurgence.

## **China -Russia: Strategic Distancing...or Else? By Yu Bin**

From time to time in Sino-Soviet relations, young men in the Kremlin challenged older leaders in Beijing. Now, 45 years after Khrushchev's de-Stalinization and 15 years after Gorbachev's "new thinking," Russia's new president is reshaping his foreign policy in a remarkably realpolitik way, which may not be fully anticipated--nor welcomed--by his older Chinese counterparts. To be sure, much of Russo-Chinese relations in the second quarter was business as usual: Russian arms continued to flow to China; trade was up; vows of mutual commitment to territoriality were routinely uttered; bureaucrats frequented each other's capital. The chemistry between top leaders, however, did not seem to be an amicable mix.