



Comparative Connections January 2003

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Regional Overview: Multilateral Solutions to Bilateral Problems Help Contain Unilateralist Tendencies

by Ralph A. Cossa and Jane Skanderup

Is George W. Bush becoming "Mr. Multilateralism"? Not exactly! But, even as his administration was releasing another "unilateralist" report on combating weapons of mass destruction and Australian Prime Minister John Howard was keeping the word "preemption" on everyone's lips, Bush continued to work through the UN Security Council to disarm Iraq while less formally working to build an international consensus to pressure North Korea to come into compliance with its nuclear disarmament commitments. Regional multilateral organizations blended economics and politics in some unprecedented ways. The new year's economic forecast for East Asia seemed generally (albeit cautiously) positive. <http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0204Qoverview.html>

U.S.-Japan Relations: Vindication! by Brad Glosserman

This quarter vindicated the optimism alliance-backers had in Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro. Tokyo continued its support for the U.S.-led war against terrorism and even sent an Aegis-equipped destroyer to the Indian Ocean. News of North Korea's clandestine nuclear weapons development program raised unfounded concern about a possible split between Washington and Tokyo on dealing with Pyongyang. Comments about Japanese participation in the missile defense program also comforted alliance hawks, but the reaction they prompted reveals that over-reaching is a danger. Consensus on security issues is still elusive. A similar caution is necessary on the economic front. Recession will constrain Tokyo's efforts to share international economic burdens.

http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0204Qus_japan.html

U.S.-China Relations: Sustaining Cooperation: Security Matters Take Center Stage by Bonnie S. Glaser

This quarter opened with summitry as Presidents George W. Bush and Jiang Zemin held their third meeting, at Bush's ranch in Crawford, Texas. Their discussion and subsequent U.S.-Chinese consultations covered a broad range of issues, but security matters received special attention as North Korea revealed a previously unknown uranium-enrichment program and the Bush administration stepped up its efforts to disarm Iraq. Beijing issued new export control regulations for weapons of mass destruction. Bilateral human rights talks took

place for the first time in over a year and high-level military contacts resumed.

http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0204Qus_china.html

U.S.-Korea Relations: Trials, Tribulations, Threats, and Tirades by Ralph A. Cossa

This quarter will likely go on record as one of the most troubling in U.S.-Korea relations. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly's visit to Pyongyang began a steady decline in U.S.-DPRK relations after Pyongyang reportedly acknowledged having a uranium enrichment program, threatened to restart its nuclear reactor, and began removing monitoring devices in a bid to force the U.S. to negotiate. Meanwhile, growing anti-Americanism in the South continued to simmer following the acquittal of the two soldiers involved in a training accident. Ruling party presidential candidate Roh Moo-Hyun rode the anti-U.S. bandwagon to a close election victory. Outgoing President Kim Dae-jung and Roh, despite echoing Washington's call for North Korean compliance with its nuclear obligations, were increasingly critical of Washington's refusal to enter into negotiations with the North.

http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0204Qus_skorea.html

U.S.-Russia Relations: A Continued Emphasis on Geo-strategy by Joseph Ferguson

Moscow and Washington focused on the large-picture issues that have brought the two nations together over the past 18 months: the war on terrorism and, increasingly, energy cooperation. The November summit between Presidents George Bush and Vladimir Putin highlighted the goodwill pervading the relationship. Irritants remain, including the war in Chechnya and Russia's relations with Iran and Iraq. Even these, however, have become less divisive. The Chechen hostage crisis in late October caused many in the West to look with sympathy on Russia's dilemma with Chechnya. In the Middle East, Russia moved closer to support U.S. policy, backing a U.S.-authored UN resolution threatening the use of force in the event of Iraqi noncompliance.

http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0204Qus_rus.html

U.S.-Southeast Asia Relations: After Bali, Before Iraq by Richard W. Baker

The terrorist bomb that exploded Oct. 12 in a nightclub in Bali, killing nearly 200 people, triggered a change both in the political equation in Indonesia and in the overall tenor of U.S. relations with Southeast Asia. Bali crystallized and energized a regional consensus on the need to counter international terrorism, and on the desirability of closer cooperation both with the United States and among the states of the region to meet this challenge. Numerous contentious issues - domestic,

bilateral, and multilateral - remain, and the U.S. attack on Iraq, widely expected for early 2003, contains the potential for serious strains and even anti-American violence.

http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0204Qus_asean.html

China-Southeast Asia Relations: China Caps a Year of Gains by Lyall Breckon

China capped a year of significant gains in relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors with a series of summit-level agreements with ASEAN. Responding to increasing ASEAN concerns that China's success in attracting foreign investment will keep their economies depressed, Beijing promised early trade liberalization measures, and agreed on a framework for negotiating the world's largest free trade agreement (FTA). A long road remains, and Southeast Asian countries are realizing that a China-ASEAN FTA will require painful structural adjustments on their part. China and ASEAN also agreed on a pledge of restraint in the South China Sea, although its provisions are vaguer than ASEAN wanted. Taiwan continued to seek ways to expand economic and, where possible, political relations in Southeast Asia, but had to backtrack when news broke that President Chen Shui-bian was planning a visit to Indonesia in December.

http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0204Qchina_asean.html

China-Taiwan Relations: Is China's Flexibility Tactical or Significant? by David G. Brown

In recent months, Beijing has shown greater flexibility on issues related to Taiwan. Beijing has said that cross-Strait transportation does not have to be called "domestic"; it has agreed to a proposal from opposition members in Taipei to permit charter flights and given up its initial request that some of the charter flights be flown by PRC airlines; and, in his meeting with President George W. Bush, President Jiang Zemin indicated that China might reduce missile deployments opposite Taiwan if U.S. arms sales were reduced. Are these and other moves tactical maneuvers or a significant adjustment in Beijing's approach to cross-Strait relations? Beijing's moves challenge the Chen administration but present opportunities to consider seriously.

http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0204Qchina_taiwan.html

North Korea-South Korea Relations: Nuclear Shadow Over Sunshine by Aidan Foster-Carter

The final quarter of 2002 was one of uncertainty in inter-Korean relations. There were several promising initiatives. Pyongyang designated two areas adjoining the demilitarized zone for South Korean business, while a high-powered delegation spent a week visiting South Korean industry. There were also negatives. Some encounters were brief, formalistic, or limited. Pyongyang's refusal to admit the authority of the United Nations Command meant that by year's end a land route to Mt. Kumgang had not yet opened, nor had groundbreaking for the Kaesong industrial complex taken place. The North continued to stall even on basic rules for inter-Korean business. It remains to be seen if Southern aid and other contact with the North will continue unconditionally

or even expand, or whether rising tensions will see projects suspended or abandoned.

http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0204Qnk_sk.html

China-Korea Relations: Beijing in the Driver's Seat? China's Rising Influence on the Two Koreas

by Scott Snyder

The last quarter of 2002 closed with a rush by Korean automobile manufacturers to invest in the PRC. China's economic emergence has become a primary driver for Korea's own economic reforms and strategy. By placing North Korea's designated director of a newly established Sinuiju economic zone under arrest, Beijing also made clear that it could brake North Korea's economic reforms. Likewise, China's influence on North Korea became a focal point in shaping a response to Pyongyang's nuclear weapons production program. It remains to be seen how new leaderships in Beijing and Seoul will manage a maturing and complex Sino-Korean diplomatic relationship - a relationship that may play an increasingly critical role in the future.

http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0204Qchina_skorea.html

Japan-China Relations: Congratulations, Concern, Competition, and Cooperation by James J. Przystup

During the last quarter of 2002, Japan's relations with China played second fiddle to relations with North Korea, and, after Oct. 3, the nuclear crisis emerging on the Korean Peninsula. Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro met with Chinese President Jiang Zemin in October and Premier Zhu Rongji in November. Issues of the past - exemplified by the prime minister's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine - and the future - North Korea and free trade agreements - dominated the discussions. Public opinion surveys, however, pointed to problems in the relationship. Nevertheless, China's new leaders were favorably evaluated in Japan. China's concerns over Japan's steel exports caused Beijing to impose safeguards on steel imported from Japan. Yet, commercial relations continued to broaden and deepen, with Japanese companies focusing on China as the market of the future.

http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0204Qjapan_china.html

Japan-Korea Relations: The Sweet, the Sour, and the Bittersweet by Victor D. Cha

Do crises bring allies together or drive them apart? The nuclear weapons "crisis" with North Korea put this question to the test this quarter. Trilateral coordination among Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo operated in overdrive as they reacted to revelations of North Korean nuclear intransigence, producing mixed results. Japan-DPRK relations soured about as much as they had sweetened with the Koizumi summit in Pyongyang in September, over the same issue: abductions. Meanwhile, the Japanese wait nervously for the incoming Roh Moo-hyun government, virtually ignorant of the president-elect's views on Seoul-Tokyo relations.

http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0204Qjapan_skorea.html

China-Russia Relations: Putin's Partners in Beijing: Old and Young by Yu Bin

Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to China in December proved timely and imperative. Despite notable improvement in relations with the U.S. in 2002, both China and Russia were sensing stronger winds of war from distant places (Persian Gulf and Iraq) as well as from their door-step (North Korea). A December joint statement signed by Presidents Putin and Jiang reflects bilateral and multilateral issues of mutual concern. In contrast to the 2001 historical friendship treaty, the current statement focuses on specific areas for coordination and cooperation. The nonpolitical issue areas discussed are more specific, more technical and therefore, more achievable. The statement also offered a fair assessment of bilateral relations, highlighting 2002 as a year with "dynamic development in all areas." Chinese leaders believe that China-Russia relations are perhaps the best China has ever had with any other major power.

<http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0204Qchina-rus.html>

India-East Asia Relations: The Weakest Link, but not Goodbye by Satu P. Limaye

During the two years since India-East Asia relations were last considered here, India has achieved incremental progress in building political, economic, and even limited security ties in East Asia. Still, India is not an integral part of the region's international relations or a critical bilateral relationship for Southeast Asia, China, or Japan. India's relationship with East Asia thus remains the weakest link when compared to the region's other major partners. But India's growing engagement in 2001-2002 demonstrates that India has neither bid the region, nor been bidden by it, goodbye! India's "Look East" policy has remained focused on Southeast Asia. India exchanged high-level visits with nearly every ASEAN country, some more than once. It also made notable strides in its official relationship with ASEAN, culminating in the inaugural ASEAN-India summit or "ASEAN Plus One" formulation.

<http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0204Qoa.html>