United States-Japan Strategic Dialogue: Beyond the Defense Guidelines

Policy Recommendations for the New Millennium

Co-sponsored by
Pacific Forum CSIS
The Policy Study Group
The Okazaki Institute
and the
The Reischauer Center at The Johns Hopkins Nitze School of Advanced International Studies

Issues & Insights
Vol. 1 – No. 1

Pacific Forum CSIS
Honolulu, Hawaii
May 2001

Pacific Forum CSIS

Based in Honolulu, Pacific Forum CSIS operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic/business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate areas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a network of more than 30 research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

The Okazaki Institute

The Okazaki Institute for Strategic and Area Studies, established in 1995, is a private, non-profit think tank focusing on regional and national security analysis, area studies, and surveys of modern diplomatic history. With more than one hundred resident associates from government, academia, the media, and business, the Okazaki Institute integrates political, economic, and military analysis to make a comprehensive and long-term contribution to policy formulation in Japan and abroad. Based in Tokyo, the Okazaki Institute is directed by Hisahiko Okazaki, a retired Japanese Foreign Ministry official and former ambassador to Thailand and Saudi Arabia.

United States-Japan Strategic Dialogue: Beyond the Defense Guidelines

Table of Contents

Page

Acknowledgment v

Foreword

Ralph A. Cossa vii

SECTION 1: INTERNAL ALLLIANCE ISSUES

Roles and Missions

Chapter 1: Agenda for the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Rethinking Roles and Missions

Michael J. Green and Robin "Sak" Sakoda 1

Chapter 2: Roles and Missions of the United States and Japan in the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Nishimoto Tetsuya 8

Japanese Legal Issues

Chapter 3: Japan's National Emergency Legislation: Problems with the Current Status and How it Should be in the Future

Nishimoto Tetsuya 29

Chapter 4: Legal Reform of the Self-Defense Forces

Mark Staples 41

Chapter 5: New Japan-U.S. Alliance Project Presentation: The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Right to Collective Self-Defense

Sakamoto Kazuya 50

Bases and Okinawa

Chapter 6: American Bases in Japan: Strategic Importance, Local Treatment

Paul Giarra 60

Chapter 7: Complication: American Military Presence in Okinawa and Enhancing the U.S.-Japan Alliance
Iguchi Haruo 75

Armaments Cooperation
Chapter 8: Armaments Cooperation in U.S.-Japan Security Relations
Gregg A. Rubinstein 90

SECTION II: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ISSUES
Theater Missile Defense
Chapter 9: TMD and Japan: The First Stage of Integrating TMD and NMD into Alliance Missile Defense
Shibayama Futoshi 100

Chapter 10: TMD, East Asia, and the U.S.-Japan Alliance
Michael O'Hanlon 126

Taiwan and China Issues
Chapter 11: The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Taiwan
Murata Koji 136

Chapter 12: The China Problem, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security of Taiwan
Ben Self 145

About the Authors 156

Appendices
Appendix A: Conference Agenda and Participant List

Acknowledgment

The Pacific Forum CSIS, The Okazaki Institute, and The Policy Study Group, are grateful to the U.S.-Japan Foundation and The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership for their generous support to make this project possible. The institutes are grateful to Ambassador Hisahiko Okazaki and Dr. Michael Green for providing intellectual leadership, and to Ogawa Akira and Furukawa Katsu for their tireless organizational efforts. This volume was edited by Jane Skanderup, Robin "Sak" Sakoda, Brad Glosserman, and Eun Jung Cahill Che. The editors are grateful to Georgette Guerrero Almeida and Tracey Torres for their expert administrative assistance.

Foreword
United States-Japan Strategic Dialogue: Beyond the Defense Guidelines

Ralph A. Cossa

The revised Defense Guidelines outlining future military cooperation between Japan and the United States should be viewed as a "floor" upon which to build further bilateral defense cooperation and not as a "ceiling" preventing further, deeper cooperation. This was one of the major findings of the October 2000 *Special Report on The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership* produced by the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS). The so-called Armitage-Nye Report (after its two primary authors, Richard Armitage, a former assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in the Reagan administration, and his Clinton-era counterpart Joseph Nye) calls for an expanded Japanese role in the transpacific alliance, while noting that the uncertainties of the post-Cold War regional setting require a more dynamic approach to bilateral defense planning between Washington and Tokyo.

What exactly does this mean? What does the United States expect from Japan? How much is Japan willing or able to contribute beyond current levels, given both legal and political restrictions to greater Japanese participation in collective defense activities? And, how can any revitalization or reconfiguration of the alliance and respective roles and missions be accomplished in ways that are generally acceptable to the publics of both nations and non-threatening to Japan's neighbors?

It was with questions such as these in mind that the Pacific Forum CSIS joined with the Tokyo-based Policy Study Group and the Okazaki Institute to examine the future of U.S.-Japan security cooperation. This one-year project was driven by a belief that the U.S.-Japan governmental dialogue on security issues is overly preoccupied by short-term problems without adequate attention to where both countries are going in the long-term. The project was designed to develop thoughtful analyses by U.S. and Japanese experts on a selected range of topics, in order to solicit comparative perspectives on the future direction of the alliance. The paper writers met a half dozen times between June 2000 and May 2001, both as a group and with additional experts in both countries for maximum feedback and critique. The project's objective was not to achieve consensus on future paths as much as to stimulate

thinking by laying out various policy options and by discussing topics that, at least until very recently, were often too sensitive or controversial to be placed on the official dialogue agenda. As a result, this *Issues & Insights* report on "U.S.-Japan Strategic Dialogue: Beyond the Defense Guidelines" provides divergent as well as some commonly-held views of what the United States and Japan individually or jointly need to do to shape the alliance for the future interests of the two countries.

The papers included in this volume represent the personal views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of their respective organizations or the group at large. We also recognize that many of the papers are not reflective of mainstream thinking. They purposely push the envelop to stimulate thinking about what is (or could be) possible. All the authors do share one common view and objective, however: all believe that the U.S.-Japan alliance is fundamental to long-term peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region and must be sustained and revitalized because it is in the mutual national security interests of both nations, and of the region in general, to do so.

The timing of this *Issues & Insights* report could not be better. The new Bush administration has made it clear that the U.S.-Japan relationship retains pride of place in Washington's strategic calculus for Asia. It seems fully prepared to take the relationship to a higher level, along the lines outlined in the Armitage-Nye Report. While that study was an unofficial, bipartisan effort, many members of the INSS study group are now serving in the Bush administration, including one of its primary authors, current Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. (Other participants include the former president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, James Kelly, currently assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs; former Pacific Forum Senior Associate Torkel Patterson, currently Asian Director at the National Security Council; and Michael Green, who also played an instrumental role in this study group before being called to join the National Security Council Asia staff.) We believe that this *Issues & Insights* volume complements and builds upon the bipartisan Armitage-Nye INSS Report, although the efforts are completely separate from one another.

Meanwhile, the recent selection of Koizumi Junichiro as Japan's new prime minister appears to signal a greater willingness on the part of Japanese authorities to expand the U.S.-Japan relationship and to take the steps necessary to ensure that Japan can play a greater role in regional security affairs. While stating that he is not prepared at this time to put the difficult question of constitutional revision on the political agenda, Prime Minister Koizumi has stated that it is "desirable" for Japan to be allowed to participate in "collective defense" activities and to help defend its allies (read: the United States) in the event of regional crisis. In a comment

that appears aimed at stimulating debate on this once-taboo subject, the new prime minister noted that "we should stop branding anyone speaking about revising Article 9 as hawkish or a rightist," correctly noting that this section of the Japanese constitution (that stipulates that Japan shall never maintain land, sea, or air forces) "fails to reflect reality." Our study group welcomes and applauds this call for debate.

Secretary Armitage's remarks during his early May visit to Tokyo that "the lack of consensus on collective self-defense is an obstacle" to expanding U.S.-Japan security cooperation U.S. support such a debate. Armitage noted that "the lack of an ability to participate in collective self-defense, although they are signatories to a defense treaty, is an obstacle. I think it is a healthy thing for the Japanese to look at some of these things and see what is reasonable and what is not." While Armitage appears clearly supportive of an increased Japanese security role, even if this requires constitutional reinterpretation or revision, he was careful not to directly call for such a move, recognizing (as did the Armitage/Nye Report) that this is a domestic Japanese decision.

This volume lays out some of the legal and political challenges that any Japanese leader will face in trying to move Japan in the direction of becoming a more "normal" nation, along with some policy prescriptions aimed at moving the nation further down this path. The topic of Japanese participation in collective defense arrangements is discussed in detail, along with arguments regarding the necessity and feasibility of amending Japan's constitution to permit a more active Japanese role in regional and international security affairs.

One consensus did emerge on this topic during our study group discussions: the U.S. should not been seen as pressuring Japan to change its constitution . . . neither should Washington be seen as opposing such change if this is the will of the Japanese people. Washington has a responsibility to make it clear to Japan what it expects and desires from Tokyo in terms of greater security cooperation. It is then the Japanese government's responsibility to determine where it wants to go and where and how its desires overlap with Washington's. The two sides then need to reach some common understanding about revised roles and missions to ensure that their actions continue to be complementary -- this is what strategic dialogue is all about. Once Japan has determined what it is willing to do, it must further determine if reinterpretations or amendments to current laws or even the constitution itself are required in order to travel down this chosen path.

It has long been the Japanese position that Japan, like all other members of the United Nations, has the right of collective self-defense. But, unlike all other states, Japan has elected not to exercise this right. The decision to change, or not to change, this self-imposed

restriction is for the Japanese people and government alone to make. Whether more active Japanese participation in international peacekeeping, peacemaking, or other such activities requires a reinterpretation or revision of the current constitution or just more courageous political leadership and greater national consensus is likewise for Japan to decide. Our study group takes no position on this subject, even though many participants had strong opinions on this issue. Rather, our effort was aimed at stimulating the dialogue and identifying the possible challenges and the future roles and missions breakdown that would best sustain the alliance relationship well into the 21st century.

This volume is loosely divided into two sections with U.S. and Japanese experts each analyzing policy recommendations on a selected topic. In the first part, we focus on internal issues, beginning with the fundamental debate over roles and missions for the two military forces. Robin Sakoda, a former Japan desk officer in the Pentagon, currently with Armitage Associates, Michael J. Green, Director for Asian Affairs at National Security Council, and Nishimoto Tetsuya, a retired Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces general now with Toshiba Corporation, provide their individual but largely complementary views of future roles and missions, with both calling for a more equal, balanced partnership. Sakoda and Green (chapter one) praises the level of cooperation involved in the vitally important 1997 revision of the Defense Guidelines but argues that even greater change and deeper cooperation are needed as the very concept of deterrence changes and the revolution in military affairs makes improved command, control, and communications more essential. Nishimoto (chapter two), a strong proponent of constitutional revision, is most concerned with Japan's inability today to respond effectively in the event of crisis. He calls for a comprehensive national emergency law to ensure a single, unified response in the event of a crisis.

Nishimoto also outlines his views on the need for Japan to reinterpret or revise Article 9 in order to allow Japan to exercise its right of collective self-defense (chapter three). The legal impediments to deeper U.S.-Japan security cooperation are also the primary subject of papers by Mark Staples, Mansfield Fellow at the Japan Defense Agency in Japan, and Sakamoto Kazuya, a professor at Osaka University. Staples (chapter four) traces the history of national security debate in Japan and agrees with Nishimoto's contention that legislation is needed in Japan to permit a more effective response in the event of national emergencies. He also sees the current interpretation of the constitution as too restrictive and as an impediment to more effective alliance management. Sakamoto (chapter five) agrees that Japan must be able to exercise the right to collective self-defense in order to create a truly mutual alliance, while also arguing that sending forces overseas (or into international waters and airspace) and exercising collective self-defense are two different things, with only political will being

required to do the former.

Section one also includes discussion of Okinawa and other base issues by Paul Giarra, a former Pentagon Japan desk officer currently with SAIC, and Iguchi Haruo -- professor at the Center for American Studies at Doshisha University. Giarra (chapter six) notes that reviewing the bases is, in effect, reviewing the alliance, and should be driven by a broad strategic approach rather than a bottom up, numbers-driven process. Fewer is not better, he argues, better is better. Japan must more fully acknowledge that the bases are in Japan's (as well as America's) interest and should be justified in these terms, not through external pressure or *gaiatsu*. Iguchi (chapter seven) agrees with the necessity of understanding and stressing the strategic rationale for the bases but also recognizes the need to understand and address the special concerns of the people of Okinawa. The three key principles of real estate – location, location, location – still apply but more creative solutions, including full implementation of the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa and the possible convening of SACO to discuss topics such as joint use of Okinawa facilities and joint training outside Okinawa should be considered.

Section one wraps up with a discussion of bilateral armament/technology transfer issues by Gregg Rubinstein, director of GAR Associates. Rubinstein (chapter eight) stresses the need to build in interoperability at a much lower level, which demands adjustments to the currently outmoded framework of U.S.-Japan defense cooperation. The two sides must increase efforts to overcome the legacy of the FSX effort to ensure effective cooperation on missile defense and other technology-driven issues. He also stresses the need for greater information security.

In section two, we look at some of the regional and global issues that impact the relationship, beginning with discussions by Shibayama Futoshi, associate professor at Aichi-Gakuin University, and Michael O'Hanlon, senior fellow at Brookings, and on missile defense issues. Shibayama (chapter nine) calls for the evolutionary integration of theater missile defense (TMD) and national missile defense (NMD) into alliance missile defense (AMD), acknowledging that the problem and need to cooperate in addressing it transcends national boundaries or the U.S.-Japan alliance alone. He stresses the need for a joint Japan-U.S. operational and command and control center to deal with ballistic missile defense and forge greater joint cooperation on mutual defense issues in general. O'Hanlon (chapter 10) sees an operational need for Japan to have TMD, even if it can never provide a 100 percent effective, impenetrable shield, since it has psychological value and can limit the ability of potential enemies to threaten Japan with a limited first-strike capability. He also discusses the pros and

cons of the various missile defense systems and options currently available or being proposed.

One of the greatest challenges facing the U.S. and Japan is managing their respective relations with an emerging China, which is increasingly suspicious of the U.S.-Japan security relationship. Murata Koji, associate professor, Department of Political Science at Doshisha University, and Ben Self, senior associate at Stimson Center, offer some advice on how best to take on this task. Murata (chapter 11) argues that the current policy of strategic ambiguity vis-à-vis the defense of Taiwan followed by the U.S. and Japan still makes sense, as does Tokyo and Washington's insistence on a peaceful settlement to the cross-Strait dispute. A common U.S.-Japan approach toward dealing with the rise of China is needed. Self (chapter 12) agrees, but notes that there has really never been very good dialogue between Tokyo and Washington on this issue. He calls for greater Japanese input into the ongoing U.S. strategic review of China policy while cautioning that disagreement over China policy, especially as regards Taiwan, should not be allowed to adversely affect the alliance.

Finally, I would like to refer to comments made by Ambassador Hisahiko Okazaki on the Korea Peninsula during the public panel portion of our May conference. Okazaki underscores the importance of closer Japan-Korea cooperation and praises the significant leap forward brought about through the efforts of ROK President Kim Dae-jung and former Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo. He expresses his concern -- widely shared by many at the meeting -- over the potential damage the current history text book controversy could inflict on mutual efforts to further improve relations between Tokyo and Seoul but appears confident that the current storm will be weathered.

Regrettably, I must acknowledge that I do not fully share Okazaki's optimism over how quickly this issue may blow over or be resolved. Even among Koreans who understand the textbook review process and the limited options available to the Japanese foreign ministry in addressing Korean concerns, there is growing frustration with the apparent lack of Japanese appreciation for the severity of Korean concern. A joint ROK-Japanese history commission, perhaps similar to the effort previously taken by Germany and Poland, to develop a mutually agreed-upon version of Korea-Japan relations in the 20th century, seems advisable, if not at the official level, then at least among concerned non-governmental research institutes. (The Pacific Forum stands ready to help facilitate this effort.)

It should also be noted that Ambassador Okazaki was one of the earliest and most enthusiastic proponents of Japanese participation in collective self-defense -- should Article 9

ever be amended, one could argue that revision could rightly be called the "Okazaki Amendment" -- and a leading force in promoting greater dialogue between Japan and South Korea through the institution of what has become know as the "K-J Shuttle," whereby young scholars in the ROK and Japan engage in regular informal discussion on regional security issues.

In closing, it is important to point out that the U.S.-Japan alliance today is essentially sound. Both the current state of the relationship and the opportunity for improvement are as good or better than at any time since the historic 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto Joint Declaration set the Defense Guidelines revision process in motion. But maintaining the status quo does not mean doing nothing. Considerable effort is required on both sides to sustain the momentum and take advantage of the opportunity to further expand and reinvigorate the alliance as new, forward-thinking leaders take command on both sides of the Pacific. Greater strategic dialogue is needed in order to ensure the alliance's future relevance. This volume is aimed at stimulating and informing that debate.

Ralph A. Cossa is President of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu. He manages Pacific Forum's programs on security, political, economic, and environmental issues. He sits on the steering committee of the multinational Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and serves as Executive Director of the U.S. Committee of CSCAP. He is also a board member of the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies. Mr. Cossa is a political-military affairs and national security strategy specialist with over 25 years of experience in formulating, articulating, and implementing U.S. security policy in the Asia-Pacific and Near East-South Asia regions. He is a retired USAF Colonel and a former National Security Affairs Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He holds a B.A. in international relations from Syracuse University, an M.B.A. in management from Pepperdine University, and M.S. in strategic studies from the Defense Intelligence College. Recent works include "The Bush Presidency: Prospects for Sino-U.S. Arms Control," *Disarmament Diplomacy*, Jan. 2001; "U.S.-China Relations under the Bush Administration," *Gaiko Forum*, Jan. 2001; "Potential Reduction Measures in Cross-Strait Conflict," *Panorama*, Vol. 4/2000; "U.S.-ROK-Japan: Why a 'Virtual Alliance' Makes Sense," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Summer 2000; and "U.S.-Korea Alliance" in Robert Blackwill and Paul Dibb (eds.), *America's Asian Alliances* (MIT Press, 2000).

Chapter 1: Agenda for the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Rethinking Roles and Missions

Michael J. Green and Robin Sakoda

Overview

In 1981 a new U.S. administration began work bringing a new focus on its security relationship with Japan. Both sides sought a greater security role for Japan, and U.S. pressure for Japan to increase its defense spending gave way to discussions of roles and missions. One result was that Japan assumed responsibility for the protection of 1,000 nautical miles of sea-lanes to its south and southwest.

Now, 20 years later, as the Bush administration formulates its security policies, there will be changes with significant effect on the alliance. It appears that U.S. national security and defense strategies may shift focus from Europe to East Asia, where greater uncertainties and instability interact with U.S. interests. Missile proliferation will likely reduce U.S. access to forward-operating locations, requiring a force structure that is more capable of conducting rapid strategic deployment. As a result, Japan – politically, economically, and militarily – will become more important to U.S. security strategy. Coordinating U.S. strategy and areas for bilateral cooperation with Japan, specifically roles and missions, will benefit both sides as the U.S. updates its East Asia security strategy.

Recent Programs and Future Challenges. Significant progress has been made in U.S.-Japan defense cooperation since the 1996 Joint Security Declaration. The United States and Japan have revised the Defense Guidelines. Japan has passed relevant implementing legislation. Appropriate coordination mechanisms and liaison committees have been established to integrate Japanese civilian agencies in the planning process. U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) and Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) have held the first joint and bilateral exercises based on the revised Guidelines.

These steps have added greater operational credibility to an alliance that was not ready for crises such as the 1990-91 Gulf War or the 1994 confrontation with North Korea over its nuclear weapons development program. Yet in spite of incremental progress in bilateral defense cooperation, the alliance is still continually bogged down in highly political, but strategically insignificant irritants such as the Shinkampo trash

incinerator at Atsugi, negotiations on host nation support, the 15-year time limit on U.S. bases in Okinawa. These are important matters in terms of alliance maintenance deserve considerable attention from leaders in both Tokyo and Washington. However, they have little to do with harnessing the alliance to address the security concerns in this new era.

Over the next few years, the United States and Japan must move beyond maintenance of the status quo and construct a framework that allows the alliance to shape the strategic environment, respond to crises, and prepare for the emerging security dynamics of the region. This framework must be based on a strategic dialogue, but provide guidance for defense cooperation beyond the Guidelines. This dialogue should include development of new security strategies being considered by the new U.S. administration and areas where alliance partners can better support the strategies.

We propose a review of roles and missions for this purpose. This approach follows logically in the incremental redefinition of the alliance that began in the 1990s. The Cold War alliance was constructed around the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), the 1978 Defense Guidelines, and the 1981-82 bilateral division of roles and missions. Those steps to strengthen Japan's security role during the Cold War were premised on a direct Soviet attack on Japan, however, and proved too restrictive for the more fluid strategic environment in East Asia in the 1990s. The Japan Defense Agency (JDA) therefore began adjusting Cold War-era policy guidance by revising the NDPO in 1995 to prepare not only for "direct limited invasion" but also for "situations in the area around Japan that have a direct effect on Japan's security." This was then used as a baseline for revising the Defense Guidelines in 1997 to outline areas for bilateral cooperation in the event of regional contingencies. That is where we stand today. The next logical step is a review of the division of roles and missions.

The roles and missions approach of the early 1980s added meat to the bones of the 1978 Guidelines. The Guidelines outlined the functional areas of bilateral cooperation but provided no strategic context. In 1981-82, the United States and Japan added that strategic context through the roles and missions dialogue. In broad terms, the allies agreed that the United States would assume all offensive operations and Japan would be responsible for all operations for the defense of Japan and Japanese sea-lanes. The two sides then applied that division to the emerging security environment in Northeast Asia – specifically thinking through how each side's complementary roles and missions would construct a web of capabilities to complicate Soviet planning and strengthen deterrence in Northeast Asia.

Over the next few years it is appropriate for the United States and Japan to rethink roles and missions, particularly in the context of new U.S. security and defense strategies, in order to provide a clearer strategic context for the implementation of the new functional areas described in the Defense Guidelines. This review should assess:

1) the emerging security environment;
2) challenges or crises that the security environment could present to the alliance;
3) opportunities for the alliance to shape that environment; and
4) opportunities to strengthen and recalibrate the alliance.

This assessment should form the basis for a rethinking of the division of roles and missions.

The Security Environment. The United States and Japan face a far more complicated security environment than the simple – if dangerous – linearity of the Soviet threat and strategies of containment. East Asia today exhibits signs of both interdependence and growing rivalry. China's economic development could lead to its steady participation in the community of responsible nations, or it could result in a more powerful central government that seeks expanded hegemony in the region. China's integration in the community of responsible nations is complicated by its weak political legitimacy and Taiwan's steady political drift away from the Mainland –conditions that provide fuel for conflict in the Taiwan Strait. North Korea has taken a new diplomatic approach to the outside world and might be lured towards a Chinese-style integration and opening, but Pyongyang has made no effort to reduce its military threat or accept economic interaction beyond handouts. Southeast Asia could return as the newest economic miracle story in the region, with ASEAN as a stabilizer in the strategic underbelly of Asia, but Indonesia's shaky condition also raises the possibility of collapsing states and a new Balkanization.

Challenges or Crises for the Alliance. This uncertain environment could provide serious challenges for the alliance. The Defense Guidelines review puts the United States and Japan in a better position to deal with conflict on the Korean Peninsula, but there is little confidence in either Tokyo or Washington about the readiness of the alliance to deal with a Taiwan contingency. In addition, the Defense Guidelines provide some guidance for cooperation on humanitarian crises in Southeast Asia, but not much. Part of the problem is that the response to these sorts of crises is part operational (the domain of the Guidelines), but it is also strategic and political – and that requires a different sort of bilateral dialogue.

Opportunities to Shape the Environment. The U.S.-Japan alliance will be an important determinant of whether interdependence or instability prevails in East Asia. At the very least, a strong alliance signals that the United States will retain a forward military presence in the region and that all players can afford to focus on economic growth, rather than rivalry with their neighbors. But we should also think about more nuanced opportunities to shape the security environment. For example, robust implementation of the Defense Guidelines signals to China that the use of force against Taiwan will be countered, without undermining stability by extending an explicit defense commitment to Taipei. Similarly, a U.S.-Japan commitment to theater missile defense (TMD) cooperation and trilateral defense dialogue with South Korea devalues Pyongyang's Nodong missiles and increases the strategic costs of moving ahead with the Taepodong (since that would strengthen trilateral U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation). Moreover, an active Japanese tactical capacity for peacekeeping operations (PKO) and humanitarian relief operations (HRO), backed by the strategic capacities of the United States for intelligence, lift, and power projection would provide confidence to the region that major powers will not allow instability or humanitarian crises in Southeast Asia to go unmet.

Opportunities to Strengthen the Alliance. A strategic assessment of the challenges and opportunities of the emerging security environment will also lead to a strengthening of the alliance. As a recent report by the respected Japan Forum on International Relations lamented, the U.S.-Japan alliance works too often on an "action-reaction" basis in which the United States crafts a strategy and Japan then reacts to whatever role Washington demands of Tokyo. Instead, as the Japan Forum argues, there should be "co-action." This requires a joint assessment of the security environment, the challenges it presents, and the opportunities to harness U.S. and Japanese power to shape it. As the Nye-Armitage report urged, the U.S.-Japan alliance needs to move from burden-sharing to power-sharing. That means crafting strategy and dividing roles and missions together.

The Task: A Review of Roles and Missions

The review of roles and missions should have the following principles:

1. The Defense Guidelines must be implemented even as the roles and missions review begins. Specifically, Japan should move forward on emergency legislation, strengthening of crisis management capabilities in the government, bilateral contingency planning, joint and bilateral exercises, and liaison with non-defense agencies and ministries.

2. The Defense Guidelines are the floor, not the ceiling, for determining U.S. and Japanese roles and missions.

3. That said, the essential division of roles and missions should not change from the 1981-82 period (at least not yet). Japan should still do defense, and the United States should do offense.

4. The review of roles and missions should consider how to utilize tools already at hand, such as the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) of 1996 and ACSA II of 1997, which are underutilized at present.

5. The United States and Japan do not need to cooperate in all areas of Japanese security policy, such as PKO and HRO. However, we should be prepared to cooperate smoothly if called upon to do so.

6. We should consider roles and missions in operations that are both simultaneous and sequential: simultaneous, working together, perhaps on different tasks, but doing things at the same time toward a common objective, and sequential, working heal-to-toe cooperation where each side supports the other based on capabilities and tasks (for example, SDF preparation for deployment, U.S. strategic deployment to area of operation, SDF PKO, U.S. strategic redeployment).

7. We should use the roles and missions review to examine longer-term requirements, and leverage this to enhance bilateral armaments cooperation.

8. We should utilize the review of roles and missions to establish more power-sharing and resource-sharing in the alliance. For example, we should use this strategic operational approach to explore expanded joint use of bases or opportunities to turn over more responsibility for rear-area support to the SDF (reducing redundancies in U.S. force structure).

9. We should begin by identifying five-year goals. How do we want to be able to shape the strategic environment in 2006? What capabilities do we need to respond to likely crises that we do not have today? What should the alliance relationship look like in 2006, and how can we adjust roles and missions to get there? (See Addendum.)

10. We should put this review at the center of our efforts in the alliance.

Conclusion

The U.S.-Japan alliance was on the successful side of the Cold War. We developed a partnership with distinctly unique roles and missions that were mutually supportive. Among the most powerful aspects of the alliance is how we have been able to combine our capabilities under a common strategy, focused on a common goal. Among the enduring strategic goals of our alliance is continued regional peace and stability. The alliance should build on the successful cooperation formed through the Cold War by implementing the new roles and missions suggested by the revised Defense Guidelines. This is a significant task, however, the revised Defense Guidelines are the midway point of the process, not the end. We must have a strategy that continues to meet the security challenges to our mutual interests. Because of this, a U.S.-Japan review of roles and missions and development of security cooperation is a continuous, never-ending process. The alliance must also continue to develop areas of cooperation to become more effective.

Addendum

Possible Endgame for Roles and Missions Review: Objectives for 2006

Assumptions
Maintain Japan's limitation on offensive operations against third countries
No changes to the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty
Clarification of legality of roles and missions listed below

Japan's Roles and Missions
Defense of Japanese territory and sea-lanes (1,000 nautical miles)
Counteroffensive (tactical) operations in the territory and sea-lanes of Japan
Rear area support for regional and (as appropriate) global U.S. operations
Integration of joint-service and civil-military for command, control, coordination, and intelligence

U.S. Roles and Missions
Nuclear deterrence
Defense of Japan
Strategic offensive operations (outside of defense of Japan)

Bilateral
Seamless and watertight intelligence cooperation
Full interoperability in theater air and missile defense
Full readiness for global HRO/PKO/Disaster relief operations – unilateral and bilateral
Sea-lane defense (as necessary and without geographic restrictions)

Chapter 2: Roles and Missions of the United States and Japan in the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Nishimoto Tetsuya

Introduction

Japan is a small country with scarce natural resources and a population exceeding 126 million people. In order to ensure survival and prosperity, securing stable access to various resources including energy supplies, assuring stable markets, and ensuring the safety of sea-lanes to markets and countries that supply raw materials are extremely important. This is in addition to ensuring our own national security, continued technological innovation, and the maintenance of the free trade system. In other words, Japan's peace, stability, and prosperity are connected directly to that of other regions and the world. Moreover, as the second largest economic power in the world, Japan bears the responsibility of helping ensure global and regional peace, stability, and prosperity.

However, as we assume a leading role in securing in regional stability, our participation is limited not only by existing concerns and doubts from surrounding countries, but also by our domestic circumstances. This is very much unlike Germany, which has formed alliances with many of the countries it once waged war against.

The ability of the United Nations to assure world stability is also limited, and regional organizations in the Asia-Pacific region are limited compared to those in Europe. It is extremely unlikely that a reliable regional security organization such as NATO will be established in the future.

In this situation, in order for Japan to ensure peace, security, and prosperity, it is of vital importance to strengthen the alliance with the United States, with whom we share ideals and values, a common geopolitical condition as a maritime nation, and hold the strongest economic relationship.

This is by no means an easy thing to do. Even the Anglo-American alliance, which appeared to be completely unified in various situations which arose in the post-Cold War, has established the current relationship only after going through a complex process woven with aggression and compromise, friction and cooperation, distrust and trust in its long history. Considering this, it is clear that Japan, in which various aspects

such as race, religion, language, and customs are different, must push harder to establish a relationship like the Anglo-American alliance.

I would like to reflect upon the history of efforts to define and strengthen the Japan-U.S. security arrangements in post-Cold War era, and to focus upon the roles and missions of both countries in order to consider measures to strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance.

New Experiences and Responses from the End of the Cold War Until the Approval of the "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation"

The actual collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the declaration of the end of the Cold War by U.S. and Soviet leaders at Malta in December of the same year brought that conflict to an end. The world's strategic structure underwent a complete change. Hopes for the dawning of a new age of peace and stability were quickly dashed by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait the following year, in August of 1990. Since that time, the world has been groping for a new, stable order, but that process continues while unpredictable, uncertain, and unstable factors intertwine with efforts to create stability.

In the meantime, through trial and error, Japan has gradually established responses to the new era as described below. The central focus was the serious effort by both Japan and the U.S. to construct a new definition of the Japan-U.S. alliance and to strengthen the system of mutual cooperation (and its posture).

(1) The Gulf Crisis/War. The Gulf War was the first situation to significantly affect Japan's security in the post-Cold War era. Since Japan did not have a sufficient understanding of how the end of the Cold War affected security, the Japanese government initially had a difficult time dealing with it. Later realizing how critical the situation was, the Japanese government made efforts to support as much as possible both the peace recovery operations by the multinational forces that participated in the Gulf region, while planning to implement Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs). However, it could not overcome the domestic political conditions that continued to drag upon the "1955 order." Because of this, a timely policy could not be implemented, and in spite of financial support totaling as much as $13 billion, Japan could not redeem itself after its initial hesitation.

(2) Dispatching the Maritime Self-Defense Force Minesweeping Unit to the Persian Gulf. In the post-Gulf War era, however, the Japanese government dispatched

the Maritime Self-Defense Force Minesweeping Unit to the Persian Gulf and in some measure fulfilled Japan's international responsibilities.

Though merely reaching the Persian Gulf by traversing the Indian Ocean was a difficult operation for a minesweeper of less than 500 tons, by gaining extensive cooperation from U.S. forces, including provision of intelligence, which was the fruit of the strong ties forged between the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) and U.S. forces during the Cold War, the Maritime Self-Defense Force Minesweeping Unit fulfilled its task admirably, and at one stroke raised the international assessment of Japan. At the same time, this had the effect of making Japanese people intensely aware of the importance of the manpower contributions that go hand in hand with Japan's national interests.

(3) Starting with Cambodia, Groping for Japan-U.S. Cooperation in PKO Actions. When Japan participated in the 1992 Cambodian Peacekeeping Operation (PKO), a first for Japan, and in the following Mozambique Peacekeeping Operation in 1993, it received maps and local information from U.S. forces. In addition, air transportation by the U.S. Air Force C-5A Galaxy was seriously considered for moving military units and supplies to what was then the Goma area of Zaire for Rwandan refugee relief in 1994, but this had to be given up because of the unconcluded Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). However, for the 1998 international disaster relief activities in Honduras, the (C-130) airlift units received tremendous support from U.S. forces.

(4) Unofficial Japan-U.S. Considerations (Situation Analysis and the Ideal of the Bilateral Relationship). In 1993, having agreed as part of regular duties on the military side of both Japan and the U.S. to undertake a joint analysis of international military conditions in the post-Cold War era, the Joint Staff Office and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff begun a study. Far eastern Russia, the Korean Peninsula, China, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East were the five key areas and were examined in terms of recognition of threats (dangers), the security goals of both Japan and the U.S., specific points of cooperation, and points of collective response in case of the occurrence of a crisis. These tasks developed into a politico-military game in which each chief of staff of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF from Japan and the U.S. Pacific Command and the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) participated. By advancing a variety of later considerations, it was greatly instructive.

(5) Exchange of Intelligence and Groping for Japan-U.S. Cooperation During the Korean Peninsula Crisis. During the first nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula

from 1993 to 1994, serious, specific, and substantial examinations were frequently undertaken with regard to the ideal cooperation between Japan and the U.S., including intelligence exchange, surveillance, strengthening of intelligence-gathering systems, search and rescue operations, minesweeping, towing damaged vessels, support for air control and airspace control, and security for important facilities such as bases, as well as how logistic support should be provided for the U.S. Furthermore, in these examinations detailed studies were carried out on the feasibility of various operations under prevailing legislation concerning Japan's territory, territorial waters and airspace, international waters and airspace, geographical scope of combat area and so forth, resulting in the basis of today's Defense Guidelines.

(6) The Outbreak of Arguments in both Japan and the U.S. for Reconsideration of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. In the meantime, reconsideration of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements was actively debated in both Japan and the United States.

In Japan, the arguments included the following: to eliminate Cold War logic in the post-Cold War era; to change the Japan-U.S. security arrangements to a multinational security system; a fundamental reconsideration based on the disappearance of a powerful threat; and a reevaluation originating in emotion or nationalism.

In the United States, on the other hand, the arguments were: to maintain the current situation; to change to a more reciprocal and equal alliance; to adhere to the Japan-U.S. security arrangements by reducing the size of the U.S. Forces Japan, but maintaining and strengthening the U.S. military as a whole; to strengthen the Japan-U.S. security arrangements by reducing the size and function of the U.S. Forces Japan and by increasing proportionately the function of Japan; and to annul the Japan-U.S. security arrangements.

(7) The Higuchi Report and the Nye Initiative Brought to a Conclusion These Reconsiderations between Japan and the United States. The "Report on the Round-Table Conference on Defense Issues," (The Higuchi Report) given to then Prime Minister Murayama Tomoichi in August of 1994, found a new significance in the Japan-U.S. security arrangements after the end of the Cold War by suggesting a comprehensive security policy including diversified security cooperation to construct peaceful and stable global and regional environments responding to changes in the post-Cold War period, the functional enrichment and improvement of reliability of the Japan-U.S. security arrangement to make such diversified cooperation effective, and the maintenance of

reliable and efficient defense capabilities. The framework of this report was followed by the "National Defense Program Outline" of November 1995.

In the United States, the "U.S. East Asia-Pacific Security Strategy," (EASR) (commonly referred to as the "East Asian Strategy Report") was announced in February of 1995. Against the background of the rapid economic development in the Asia-Pacific region at that time, the report emphasized the importance of stability in an area that was of great economic interests to the United States, as well as the importance of the maintaining and strengthening the bilateral alliance. In particular it stressed that the Japan-U.S. alliance was the centerpiece of U.S. strategy in Asia. In addition, it reported on the importance of maintaining approximately 100,000 forward-deployed forces in East Asia.

In this way, reconfirmation, re-recognition, and redefinition of the Japan-U.S. alliance of the post-Cold War were officially begun in both Japan and the United States, leading to the "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security" and the revision of "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation."

(8) Dialogue on Security, and Defense Exchanges with Neighboring Countries. The "National Defense Program Outline," decided by a Cabinet meeting in November of 1995, set the goal of establishing a more stable security relationship centering on the Japan-U.S. defense relationship. As a result, Japan began promoting dialogues on security and defense exchange with neighboring countries as one of the roles to fulfill as a defense power, and decided to promote them. The experience of the U.S. forces, as well as intermediation by U.S. forces facilitated these various activities. The success of the September 2000 PAMS (Pacific Armies Management Seminar), co-sponsored by both the U.S. Army and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, is an example of Japan-U.S. cooperation in this kind of activity.

(9) Conclusion of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). This treaty went into effect in October 1996. It covered bilateral training and logistic support for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and international humanitarian relief activities. It also established the framework for mutual provision of supplies and labor when the Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. Forces Japan perform these operations, as well as determined the basic conditions for these provisions and enabled prompt and mobile cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. military. To ensure the effectiveness of the new "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation" announced by the Japanese and U.S. governments in September of 1997, the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the 1998

amendments to the ACSA aim at making more effective the response to regional contingencies.

(10) Considerations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO). Because of the outbreak of the Korean War and other contingencies in East Asia, U.S. forces requisitioned lands in Okinawa primarily during the 1950s. Concurrent with the return of Okinawa to Japan in May 1972, the Japanese government, in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, provided 83 facilities, about 278 square kilometers, for U.S. Forces Japan. Although essential for achieving the goals of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the facilities not only hindered regional development but also greatly affected the lives of the people in the prefecture because these facilities and grounds were concentrated in a key part of the main island of Okinawa. In order to alleviate these burdens, at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee Meeting in June of 1990 it was mutually agreed upon to move forward the necessary adjustments and procedures specified in the so-called 23 items directed at the return. After that, concern about Okinawa increased because of such factors as the rape incident that occurred in September of 1995, and SACO was established between Japan and the U.S. in November of the same year.

In April of 1996, after receiving an interim report from SACO, the Japanese government made a Cabinet decision to promote further investigation to solve the problem. As a result, in May of the same year the investigation was advanced by the establishment of the "Working Committee to Resolve the Issues Concerning Total Return of Futenma Air Station, etc.," and in December 1996, the final report, which combined the return of lands including the comprehensive return of Futenma airport, as well as plans and measures for periodic exercises on the main island for live artillery fire training over Highway 104, was approved in December 1996 by the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC).

(11) Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security by Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton. The Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, signed by Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro and President Bill Clinton in April 1996, reconfirmed that the Japan-U.S. alliance would continue to be the basis for maintaining the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region as we approached the 21st century. At the same time, it refined United States-Japan cooperation into new fields by dividing bilateral cooperation into three tiers: cooperation between Japan and the United States, regional cooperation, and global cooperation.

(12) Approval of the Existing Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (Hereinafter referred to simply as the Guidelines). As a result of reconsideration of

the Guidelines based on the agreement under the Japan-U. S. Joint Declaration on Security, the current Guidelines approved by the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee added not only responses to an armed attack against Japan, but also the new field of cooperation under normal circumstances, as well as cooperation in cases where contingencies in areas surrounding Japan would have a significant effect on the peace and safety of Japan. This, coupled with the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, had great significance for the meaning of the Japan-U.S. alliance, adding a new dimension to post-Cold War cooperation, from joint defense against a common enemy to everyday crisis prevention and for crisis containment and swift settlement in times of crisis.

Considerations to Ensure the Effectiveness of the Guidelines

As mentioned before, active policy consultations were continued between Japan and the United States from the end of the Cold War until the approval of the Guidelines. However, while shifting to domestic considerations in order to assure policy efficacy through such policy consultations, not only did the measures to execute the policy come to strongly reflect circumstances in Japan but were ultimately inconclusive and gradually tapered off.

(1) Establishment of the Guideline-Related Law. In May 1999, a series of laws were established centered around the the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan to assure the effectiveness of the Guidelines, but the scope of support and cooperation for the U.S. forces ended up being quite limited. In particular, during various kinds of support, Gulf Crisis in 1990 were regrettably limited, as in the case of the failed deliberations upon the International Peace Cooperation Law, and the prohibition of logistic support directly connected to battle activities.

In addition, the “Ship Inspection Law” that was pending at that time went into effect in December 2000. Unlike maritime interdiction operations (MIO), the law was limited to shipping inspections, requiring consent from the nation of registry or a decision by the United Nations Security Council, thus, the scope became extremely limited.

(2) Establishment of a Coordination Mechanism. As for bilateral measures under the Guidelines, it is stated that two kinds of mechanisms will be constructed: a coordination mechanism and a comprehensive mechanism to effectively advance bilateral defense cooperation, promote deliberations to achieve success, and coordinate policy as well as strategy and activity fields. The comprehensive mechanism is a so-called mechanism for planning to perform bilateral tasks under normal circumstances, and it

was approved for establishment in January 1998 as the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC), where planning and examination tasks are currently under consideration.

The coordination mechanism is to be established by both governments in order to coordinate the activities of Japan and the U.S. in an emergency, such as an armed attack against Japan or contingencies in the area. In the Security Consultative Committee (the so-called 2+2) of September 2000, an agreement was reached regarding the outline of the structure as well as a favorable reception for the establishment of a coordination mechanism assuring good coordination between the two countries. However, settlement of the participating members, as well as concrete coordination concerning points of execution for working procedures, etc., have not progressed and are yet to be established.

(3) Delay in Examination of SACO. In the SCC held in September 2000, both Japan and the United States emphasized the importance of steady progress concerning presentation of the SACO final report. In particular, although the issue of transfer or return of Futenma airport was picked up in accordance with the December 1999 Cabinet decision, "Policy concerning the transfer of Futenma airport," a concrete measure for solution has not yet been defined, and it remained merely a re-confirmation of continuous "close deliberations."

In the meantime, the special report by the U.S. Institute for National Strategic Studies (the so-called "Armitage-Nye Report"), published in October of 2000 discusses U.S. forward deployment in Asia as a common interest of Japan and the United States. It points out that the U.S. Third Marine Expeditionary Forces stationed in Okinawa is causing a burden due to excessive concentration, saying, "the U.S. should consider wide ranging and more flexible deployment and training based on the circumstances in Asia as a whole." A positive attitude for dealing with this problem is seen on the U.S. side.

The new Bush administration's security policy vis-à-vis Japan will be watched closely, but the problems that will fundamentally affect the allied relationship, such as submitting a 15-year expiration date in advance for the use of a substitute facility for Futenma airport, cannot be neglected forever. Thus, the leadership of the Japanese government is being questioned. Especially when we consider the possibility of the extremely difficult situation both Japan and the United States would face in the event of an armed dispute in the Taiwan Strait, the swift resolution of this issue is desirable to prevent this from occurring.

Concerning the resolution of this issue, we need the energy of ex-Prime Minister Hashimoto, who in April of 1996 made a strategic move for post-Cold War security between Japan and the U.S. in the "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security," and became responsible for Okinawa policy during the second Mori Yoshiro Cabinet.

Areas for Future Japan-U.S. Cooperation and Political Problems

The end of the Cold War brought significant changes to the Japan-U.S. alliance. During the Cold War, Japan's geopolitical characteristics constituted an important part of the U.S.-centered system of deterrence against the Soviet Union, contributing to the defense of the West as a whole. Because of this, even though Japan and the U.S had an unequal alliance in which Japan was permitted only self-defense and was dependent on the United States, it was basically accepted. In addition, the Japan-U.S. security arrangement was strengthened only in terms of the defense of Japan.

Since the end of the Cold War, however, significant changes have been seen in the strategic environment such as the proliferation of threats, ambiguities, the occurrence of various regional disputes, and the increase in new, complex, and diverse dangers including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. The original meaning of the Japan-U.S. alliance, to deter aggression against Japan (including nuclear deterrence) and to defend Japan from an unexpected future threat, remains fundamentally unchanged.

However, the significance of the Japan-U.S. alliance as an anchor for regional or global stability has become extremely important. This includes contributing to the maintenance of regional or global peace and stability by responding to significant changes in the strategic environment to prevent crises; preventing the emergence of a crisis before it happens; responding in a timely and appropriate manner to prevent further deterioration of a dangerous situation should it become confrontational; and keeping a crisis under control at an early stage.

Accordingly, I believe that even if we hold constant our viewpoint concerning the strengthening of the defense of Japan, the strengthening of Japan-U.S. security arrangements should emphasize crisis prevention and the management and early control of crises in order to ensure peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the world.

Yet even if Japan maintains host nation support for U.S. forces – the mainstay of the forward deployment in the Asia-Pacific region – the alliance could be shaken if there is a situation that would seriously affect the peace and safety of Japan in the areas

surrounding Japan, and Japan takes no action, or if support and cooperation for the United States are extremely delayed because of factors such as the lack of preparation by Japan's emergency response system, excessive concern for neighboring countries, or the Japanese domestic situation; or if the stationing and training of American forces in Japan becomes even more oppressive than they are now.

When evaluating the overall significance of the Japan-U.S. alliance in the post-Cold War period, the direction of efforts for maintaining and strengthening the alliance, and the changes in the relative positions of both countries it is best to make the Japan-U.S. alliance more equal.

I would like to consider from the operational point of view what kind of roles and missions both nations, in particular Japan, have to fulfill, as well as what might prove to be obstacles to those roles and missions.

(1) Common Matters. Both Japan and the U.S. should first establish a Japan-U.S. security strategy that could accurately respond to the security environment of the 21st century. Throughout normal circumstances, crises, and emergencies, they should unify mutual recognition by closely and continuously sharing intelligence and having strategic communication and consulting on specific policy based on the shared intelligence. Both countries, moreover, should mutually provide goods and services, and closely coordinate air control and sea and airspace management (control and coordination of use of sea and air space). Moreover, Japan should support the U.S. deployment by providing support based on agreements such as SOFA and ACSA as well as by providing facilities and areas necessary for the U.S.

Based on such a viewpoint, Japan must first establish her own national interests, national security goals, and national security and defense strategy.

(2) Crisis Prevention Under Normal Circumstances. Both Japan and the U.S. need to contribute to the prevention of regional or world crises by positively promoting the various measures for security and defense indicated below by mutually cooperation together with various measures in fields such as politics, foreign policy, economics, and others based on the Japan-U.S. security arrangements.

- Promotion of security dialogues and defense exchanges with neighboring countries

- Cooperation on arms control and reduction in armaments, in particular cooperation with non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles

- Execution of bilateral or multilateral exercises

- Participation in or execution of peacekeeping operations (PKO) or humanitarian relief operations (HRO)

It is urgently needed for both Japan and the U.S., in harmony with the world and concerned countries in the region based to strengthen the function and effectiveness of the security aspect of the United Nations and regional organizations in the Asia-Pacific, and to facilitate the execution of the Japan-U.S. security strategy.

In the meantime, the two countries must cooperate with the concerned countries to deal with problems such as piracy, international terrorism, and refugees in a timely and appropriate manner.

Furthermore, to prevent the proliferation of ballistic missiles, which is one of the most pressing matters for current international security as well, it is necessary to promote joint Japan-U.S. technological research concerning ballistic missile defenses.

In these fields in contemporary Japan there exist the following restrictions:

First, there is the possibility of restrictions on participation in joint multinational training and practice, depending on the kind of training.

Second, it is difficult to participate in or execute peacekeeping operations or humanitarian international relief operations in a timely manner because of the five restrictions on PKO participation that are unique to Japan and that may not match the characteristics of PKO anticipated in the 21st century.

Third, even in the event of participation in operations such as PKO, the international peace cooperation duties stipulated in the PKO Law that was established considering the circumstances in Japan are different from the standard of the U.N.: thus, there are major restrictions on the duties, such the as inability to guard U.N. personnel, facilities, and convoys, and the inability to counter with force an action obstructing the PKO even within the scope of self-defense because the authority to use weapons is remarkably limited.

Fourth, when freedom of navigation is threatened by piracy on an internationally important strait or sea area and a joint international security operation is executed, it is questionable whether Japan can participate in a timely manner.

(3) Flexible Responses to Crises.

1. In cases where conditions worsen and tensions build in the areas surrounding Japan, and there is an emerging danger (situations in areas surrounding Japan) having a significant influence upon Japan's peace and security, both Japan and the U.S. will strengthen intelligence-sharing and policy consultation while strengthening through mutual cooperation preparation for both surveillance and intelligence collection systems. Moreover, in order to prevent the crisis from deteriorating, changes in conditions should be grasped, and political, diplomatic, and economic measures should be taken. In this case, if Military Flexible Deterrence Options (MFDO), such as military deployment for deterrence prove necessary, the U.S. will be in charge and Japan will support it to the extent possible to defuse the crisis.

If a situation in which freedom of maritime traffic is threatened around the mentioned area and an international security operation is performed, Japan must participate.

In addition, when maritime blockades as part of economic sanctions decided by the Security Council are executed, they will be executed in cooperation with relevant countries to nip the situation in the bud based on the close solidarity between Japanese and U.S. military forces.

As needed, we will cooperate mutually to take measures such as non-combatant evacuation operations and refugee measures.

2. If the situation develops further, and an emergency (military conflict or dispute) arises, the U.S. will take the lead in dealing with it, and Japan will cooperate as much as possible to attempt to get the situation under control at an early stage. Furthermore, when a U.S.-led multinational force is organized and the situation is dealt with after receiving approval for the use of military force from the Security Council, we will cooperate. The scope of support and cooperation for the U.S. forces and the multinational force will be decided from the following items and will depend on circumstances:

- Intelligence sharing
- Various rear-area support
- Security support for facilities and areas for U.S. Forces, etc.
- Escorting vessels of U.S. forces, etc.
- Search and rescue

- Towing damaged vessels of the U.S., etc.
- Communications support
- Support for air control, airspace control, and sea and airspace management
- Minesweeping (mine removal)

Moreover, maritime blockades, NEO, mass-refugee measures, etc., will be continued or executed from the start.

3. When the emergency extends directly to Japan, an order for defense operations or the dispatch of security forces will be issued. Both Japan and the U.S. will jointly respond to promptly bring the situation under control at an early stage.

4. When the situation is successfully controlled, both Japan and the United States will cooperate to strive for temporary restoration, prevention of the crisis from reoccurring, and serious reconstruction in cooperation with the U.N. and concerned countries. It is also necessary to make efforts to participate in and cooperate actively when the PKO is in operation.

5. In these cases, many problems exist that are more serious than those in the category concerning the prevention of crises under normal circumstances.

The first problem, which is probably the biggest problem, is the possible danger of a gap arising between Japan and the United States regarding the recognition of and response to situations, and possible delays in decision-making concerning the recognition of situations in areas surrounding Japan.

It is understood that the U.S. first emphasizes the concept of crisis management or control to prevent a threat from becoming tangible by taking pre-emptive measures. On this point, the Guidelines states that both the Japanese and the U.S. government will prevent situations in areas surrounding Japan from arising, or make all possible efforts including diplomatic ones in order to control and avoid further deterioration of the situation. Following the preparatory steps chosen by agreement, they are to do what is necessary to ensure a coordinated response.

In Japan, however, the idea of crisis management or control has not been established. Thus, the possible measures that can be taken by Japan include: the recognition of situations in areas surrounding Japan, as well as issuing orders for maritime security operation, police operation and defense operation. These are all fixed, graded steps, and this has become an extremely significant hurdle for decision-making.

Accordingly, this makes it difficult for Japan to take uninterrupted, consistent actions in response to contingencies by emphasizing the idea of crisis management and control as the United States does. In addition, Japan has a tendency to be overly concerned with avoiding any provocation of target countries. For these reasons, Japan's decision-making concerning the recognition of situations in areas surrounding Japan may be delayed.

Second,in response to situational tensions (emerging from a narrowly defined crisis), if the Japanese acknowledgement of a situation in areas surrounding Japan is delayed, along with political, diplomatic, and economic measures, the U.S. may exercise its authority by using airplanes or naval vessels, deploying a deterrent military force such as a carrier task force or the Marine Corps, and taking MFDO actions such as increasing and strengthening forward deployment forces. If Japan were asked for various support for or cooperation with these military forces, under current conditions Japan could not go beyond the provisions of the agreement pertaining to normal circumstances.

In cases in which maritime interdiction operations (MIO) are executed as part of economic sanctions based on a decision by the U.N. Security Council and if Japan participates, it will be a shipping inspection operation based upon the consent of the country of registry. Thus, Japan cannot use the authority permitted according to international law, such as firing a warning shot. There is a possibility that there will be a hole in the international cordon, making effectiveness questionable.

The third problem, is that Japan cannot perform logistic support directly connected to a battle, so there is a major limitation to intelligence and security support for U.S. facilities and areas or escorting U.S. vessels.

The fourth problem is that the object of support is limited to the U.S., and when UN Forces are organized for operation at an earlier time, the legality of support for them is unclear.

The fifth is that if freedom of navigation is violated as a result of disorder in an internationally important strait or sea area in the surrounding area, and an international joint security operation is executed to restore stability, Japan, the country that will benefit most, may not be able to participate in an appropriate and timely manner.

The sixth problem, which is often mentioned, is the fact that if there is an attack during the various kinds of operations mentioned, the Self-Defense Forces cannot support the U.S. or other forces even within the scope of self-defense.

The seventh problem is that cooperation from local governments and citizens cannot be forced, so that not only is timely cooperation questionable, but also there is a limit to the scope of cooperation itself.

(4) Controlling and Responding to Armed Attacks Against Japan. As for deterring and responding to armed attacks against Japan, necessary measures may be taken jointly by Japan and the U.S. throughout normal, tense, and emergency circumstances.

The Defense Guidelines stipulate the roles of Japan and the United States as follows: "The Self-Defense Forces will execute defensive military operations in Japan's territory and its surrounding area, and the U.S. Forces will support the operations of the Self-Defense Forces. The U.S. Forces, moreover, will execute operations to supplement the capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces." Considering the operational environment of the post-Cold War period, the forms of armed attack Japan could face, and how Japan fights, I wonder if it is time to reconsider the roles and missions of this traditional shield-and-sword relationship.

Unfortunately, there are serious problems here as well.

The first is the fact that emergency legislation pertaining to defense operations by the Self-Defense Forces and the protection of the public in case of an emergency has not been enacted. Although there has been study of the first and second categories of legislation, which pertain primarily to defense operations of the Self-Defense Forces, and they are now waiting for political action. Yet legislation pertaining primarily to the protection of the people has not even been studied.

Second, the laws and treaties concerning operations by the U.S. military operating in Japanese territory for the defense of Japan (ACSA, or contingency mutual support) have not been enacted. Currently, the only prepared legislation pertaining to this is domestic legislation to make effective the treaties concerning facilities, areas, and ranks of the U.S. military based on Section 6 of the security treaty. They provide a foundation for the bases provided to the U.S. forces, but are insufficient to allow the U.S. military to perform operations in Japanese territory in the same way as the Self-Defense Forces. Therefore, unless these matters are studied and legislation promptly prepared, an extremely serious situation could occur.

Third, there is no comprehensive national plan or treaty to respond to armed attacks against Japan. Japan has comprehensive national plans for natural disaster

contingencies from the government level to the local government level and training is performed every year in accordance with the plans. However, in the Defense Ministry and the Self-Defense Forces there are only vertical and horizontal plans, but neither national nor governmental comprehensive plans exist regarding armed attacks.

Establishing a Foundation to Fulfill the Roles and Missions Expected of Japan in the Future

I understand that both Japan and the United States are currently working to draw up a plan based on the 1997 Guidelines, and it is necessary to complete the plan soon. In addition, Japan should make efforts to construct the mechanism that both governments agreed upon to coordinate actual operations by Japan and the United States in the event of an emergency. Furthermore, it is hoped that progress will be made on unresolved issues in SACO.

In order to fulfill the roles and missions expected of Japan, we must make every possible effort to prepare the foundation described below.

(1) Unification of Understanding between Japan and the U.S. through Continuous Strategic Dialogues. There are slight differences in Japanese and American understanding with respect to threats, the goals of national security, deterrence of crises, and measures for responses because of different geopolitical conditions, national circumstances, and military forces. Thus, throughout normal, crisis, and emergency circumstances, it is necessary to deepen cooperation by confirming mutual understanding of those circumstances, coordinating if necessary, and defining the roles and missions of Japan and the United States in all situations. Because of this, intelligence sharing, continuous strategic dialogues, and specific political deliberations are essential. Before that, however, Japan must establish and submit to the U.S. her own national interests, national security goals, and national security and defense strategies, without them, there is a danger that continuous strategic dialogues or specific political consultations will be symbolic rather than substantive.

(2) Preparation of a System to Respond to Emergency Contingencies, in particular the Preparation of Legislation. As is clear from the discussion in Section 3, the biggest and most concrete obstacle to the fulfillment of the roles and missions expected of Japan is that Tokyo does not have a response system for national emergencies, especially with regard to legislation and a crisis management system. This is closely related to the very serious problem of the interpretation of the constitution, in terms of issues such as the exercise of the right of collective self-defense.

It is not a mistake to say that the Japanese constitution, unlike those of other countries lacks reference to national emergency contingencies. The reality is that the rationales for responding to national emergency contingencies are individually ruled by the relevant laws. The most serious problem is the fact that the Japanese Constitution lacks stipulations regarding the marshalling of the nation's forces in the event of a national emergency, granting a national authority holder (the prime minister) supreme emergency powers, and securing a single, unified national response. For almost half a century, moreover, there have been circumstances unique to Japan, such as recognition of, or policy estrangement from, the issue of national security in the nations political system, constant pressure from surrounding countries that exploit this, the extreme narrow-mindedness of policy resulting from policy adjustments during that period, and the interpretation of the constitution.

Here, I would like to mention only in part the significance of the limitations caused by interpretations of the constitution, such as the "exercise of the right of collective self-defense" and the "use of force overseas," when the roles and missions that are expected of Japan are fulfilled.

- Even if we hear that a member of a unit or staff from another country is being attacked during U.N. peacekeeping operations, we are not allowed to go to the site, rescue the person, or eliminate the enemy.

- At this time, even if the peacekeeping forces primary duties that are fixed by the PKO law can be executed, tasks such as the security of facilities or assets under U.N. administration and escort of convoys are not stipulated in the law, and thus cannot be executed. Furthermore, to eliminate by force a power that interferes with the execution of the task stipulated in the PKO law is considered to constitute a use of weapons overseas even when it is within the scope of self-defense.

- When a Japanese national is transported from a foreign country, it is permitted to use weapons in order to protect the life or body of the Japanese person under the protection of the Self-Defense Forces, but if we can see a Japanese national being attacked in the vicinity of an airport, for example, the use of weapons to rescue the personnel is considered to constitute the use of force overseas.

- If a Japanese vessel is attacked during a Japan-U.S. joint operation on the high seas, the U.S. forces present in the vicinity will immediately come to support, but the converse is not permitted.

- In the event of situations in areas surrounding Japan, search and rescue operations by Japan for the U.S. forces are limited to the rear area, that is the Japanese territorial sea and high seas around Japan where hostilities are not occurring, and if danger is anticipated, the operation has to be halted or canceled.

Revising the constitution is the most desirable way to resolve these problems, but this requires time and it is difficult to respond to the demands of the new era as discussed above. Thus, while aiming at the revision of the constitution, it is necessary to establish a fundamental law for responding to emergency contingencies (tentative title) that stipulates for the time being the basics of responding to national emergency contingencies. (Details based on the "Emergency Legislation.")

(3) Measures to Make the Japan-U.S. Alliance as Balanced as Possible. In order to fulfill the roles appropriate to Japan's situation or international status, Japan has to be able to confidently and independently execute the various measures discussed. I believe that this will enable us to bring the Japan-U.S. alliance closer to a more balanced relationship. Therefore, measures must be taken to revise as soon as possible interpretations concerning the "exercise of the right of collective self-defense," the "use of armed force overseas," and the "participation in collective measures by the U.N." (Details based on the "Emergency Legislation.")

(4) Preparation of the Japan-U.S. Intelligence Cooperation System. As mentioned, the gathering and processing of accurate intelligence in a timely manner are extremely important in order to be absolutely certain about crisis management steps including crisis prevention, crisis deterrence, and response to, or control of, a crisis if one occurs. The U.S. is overwhelmingly superior in this field, but it is necessary to develop intelligence cooperation between Japan and the U.S. by working with the U.S. in the field of intelligence analysis, utilizing Japan's strongest technical fields or characteristics as well as fulfilling and strengthening the preparedness of its own intelligence system. In order to achieve this, preparation of legislation pertaining to the protection of confidential intelligence in Japan is essential.

(5) Strengthening Interoperability Between Japan and the U.S. In order to fulfill the roles and missions expected of both Japan and the U. S. in an appropriate and timely manner, it is necessary to strengthen further both the soft and hard aspects of overall interoperability between Japan and the U.S. To this end, having established a common operational doctrine, together with planning for standardization of C4ISR equipment, various procedures, and so forth, it is necessary to work toward the activation of both the comprehensive mechanism and the coordination mechanism.

Factors that Will Influence the New Japan-U.S. Relationship

Even if the measures discussed above are put into force, as long as human beings manage the Japan-U.S. alliance, we have to acknowledge that there exist some factors that will negatively affect Japan, the U.S., and bilateral cooperation. I will mention the factors briefly to draw attention to them.

(1) Factors on the Japanese side. The following factors influence Japan.

1. Nationalism and the demand for securing autonomy in Japan
2. Japan's half-hearted international participation
3. Japan's excessive inclination toward multilateral security
4. The unequal responsibilities of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements
5. Base issues and host nation support

As Japan develops into a "normal" democratic nation in terms of national security, defense, and the education of the Japanese people, the elevation of demands for securing autonomy and nationalism may be unavoidable. Furthermore, U.S. concern about Japan's excessive inclination toward multilateral security as a substitute for the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty has already appeared from late summer to fall of 1994. It is believed that some sectors of the United States always have such concerns. However, these are based on the Japan-U.S. security relationship, and cannot be considered in isolation from that relationship. In order to prevent the occurrence of these sorts of discrepancies in understanding, I would like to emphasize again the significance of the continuous strategic dialogues.

Next, although Japan has been passive when it comes to passivity in international participation, I believe this will improve in the near future. International participation requires public understanding of the importance of contributing to the prevention of crises under normal circumstances, the prevention of crisis escalation and the control of a crisis at an early stage and the kinds of measures that must be taken to this end, most of which depend upon the leadership of politicians. In addition, it is necessary to contribute to the improvement of regional organizations in the Asia-Pacific region, in particular the ASEAN Regional Forum, in order to clear away concerns and suspicions of surrounding countries. In this case, a system of cooperation between Japan, the United States, Canada, and Australia in the Asia-Pacific region or cooperation between Japan, the U.S., and South Korea in the Far East may be a direction to explore.

Finally, the unequal responsibilities in the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, base issues, HNS, and the various other issues mentioned are interrelated. Here, I would like to examine these issues comprehensively, just to point out the need to resolve them.

(2) Factors on the U.S. side, in particular global strategic trends. As seen from Japan, the following sorts of factors are thought to exist.

1. Experiences and lessons from the Gulf Crisis/War, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Indonesia and East Timor, etc.

2. The change from one-nation commitment to multilateral commitment

3. The change from bilateral cooperation to multilateral cooperation

4. Responses to U.N. PKO, etc.

5. The effect of the progress of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) upon the U.S. military's operational doctrine, organization, and stationing, especially the effect upon the forward deployment of U.S. forces

First, I am aware that since the end of the Cold War there is a growing tendency in the U.S. to make decisions by emphasizing national interests when involved or intervening in international situations. We are certain that these interests are closely related to and essential to the peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community. What is more, as the new administration is making clear, I would strongly hope that the United States will not withdraw from the world.

However, we cannot deny that the U.S. commitment to the U.N. is passive. The U.S. intends to retain as far as possible the power she now possesses, but I would like to hope for case-by-case consideration of PKO or peace enforcement operations.

Currently, it seems that Japanese participation in multilateral exercises is being carried out on a case-by-case basis. I am sure that Japan will make an effort to participate actively in the cases that are minimum confidence building measures. Together with this Japanese effort, we are hoping that the U.S. will continue to share a common understanding that the basis for multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region lies in the Japan-U.S. alliance.

Finally, since future progress in the Revolution in Military Affairs will have significant effects on the organization and stationing of U.S. forces, the influence upon the forward deployment strategy of the United States must also be considered. This will be constant influence on future strategic dialogues.

Conclusion

The geographic and geopolitical conditions of maritime nations have made Japan and the U.S. neighbors across the Pacific Ocean, history has made us friends, our economic relationship has made us partners, and the necessity for security has made us allies.

The Japan-U.S. security relationship is not necessarily a result of the Cold War. It is a true partnership that is deeply rooted in politics, diplomacy, military affairs, economics, society, and culture.

Therefore, I think that we should bring about a substantial change by making the Japan-U.S. alliance an alliance in the Asia-Pacific region that can be equal to NATO. To achieve this, we must continue to make efforts to substantially change the alliance into one that has as great an overall balance as possible, while resolutely working on the problems mentioned resolving them one by one, as well as providing facilities and areas and host country support. If this is not done, there is the possibility that discrimination against the alliance will arise within the U.S.

Fortunately, in Japan among young politicians, scholars, and students, as well as among ordinary citizens, a shared foundation concerning national security is emerging. The rest is up to the wisdom and strong leadership of politicians. We all eagerly anticipate this.

Chapter 3: Japan's National Emergency Legislation: Problems with the Current Status and How it Should be in the Future

Nishimoto Tetsuya

Introduction

The research on national emergency legislation being conducted by the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) is very limited in scope. It addresses various legislative matters related to one issue only: the effective and smooth operation of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in a situation where an order for defense operations is issued in accordance with Article 76 of the SDF law. Originally, this legislation was only one part of a wider body of legislation dealing with a variety of national emergency contingencies, and therefore should be established based on general constitutional provisions pertaining to national emergency contingencies. In the Japanese Constitution, however, there are almost no provisions pertaining to national emergency contingencies, neither does there exist fundamental laws stipulating how to respond to such contingencies. As a result, individual laws are established in response to specific situations. This is the fundamental problem with legislation dealing with emergencies in Japan.

The 1995 National Defense Program Outline calls for new defense roles for Japan while maintaining the "defense of Japan" as its foundation. Two new roles stand out in this 1995 document. One is "response to various situations such as a large-scale disaster," which stipulates the following:

> "When a situation that would seriously affect the peace and safety of Japan occurs in the surrounding areas, while abiding by the constitution and related laws and appropriately supporting the operations of the U.N. as necessary, Japan will respond appropriately by such measures as attempting to smoothly and effectively utilize the U.S.-Japan security system."

The second new defense role establishes the "contribution to the establishment of a more stable security environment," and states the following:

> "The execution of international cooperation duties and international disaster relief activities, the furthering of a trustworthy relationship by promoting security

dialogues and defense exchange, and cooperation with various activities conducted by the U.N. or international organizations in the field of arms control or arms reduction, including the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or missiles."

As Japan evaluates future legislation to effectively implement these new roles as a defense power, sufficient consideration must also be given to the implications of their fulfillment, namely, the prevention of crises under normal circumstances, as well as the prevention of crisis escalation and the early control of a crisis should one occur. However, there does exist a problem with the constitutional interpretation of such issues as the "exercise of the right of collective self-defense," the "use of armed forces overseas," and "participation in U.N. collective measures," resulting in major limitations to the legislative measures that our country can take.

In this paper, I will make some suggestions for the future, based on the current state of Japan's emergency legislation, as well as on Japan's new roles as a defense power mentioned above. I will also point out from an operational standpoint the problems that urgently need to be solved.

Current State of Legislation Dealing with Emergency Contingencies

The laws currently subject to study on legislation dealing with emergency contingencies can be roughly categorized as follows:

1. Laws within the Defense Agency's jurisdiction, such as the Defense Agency Act of Incorporation and the SDF Law (category 1);
2. Laws within the jurisdiction of other agencies, such as regulations pertaining to transferring of forces, transportation of materials, communications, and the handling of gunpowder (category 2); and
3. Laws pertaining to items over which jurisdiction is unclear. This includes legislation to carry out measures to protect, evacuate, and guide the people during an emergency contingency, as well as domestic legislation of the international humanitarian treaty (the so-called Geneva 4 Conventions) (category 3).

Among these, the study of categories 1 and 2 has already been completed and are waiting consideration for legislation, while study on category 3 has not yet begun.

Additional legislation has been prepared to a point. The "International Peace Cooperation Law" deals with my previously cited concern about "crisis prevention under normal circumstances." The "Security Assurance Law for Contingencies in Areas Surrounding Japan" and the "Ship Inspection Law" deal with the prevention of crisis escalation as well as the early control of a crisis should one occur.

Operational Problems with Emergency Contingency Legislation

There are several urgent problems that need to be resolved.

First, as I indicated in the introduction, legislation relating to basic responses to a national emergency contingency is lacking. Second, in responding to such a contingency, there is always the accompanying problem of the constitutional interpretation of such issues as the "exercise of the right of collective self-defense," the "exercise of armed forces overseas," and "participation in U.N. collective security measures."

Third, the legislation being studied to deal with emergency contingencies pertains only to the SDF in "such a situation where the Self-Defense Forces are ordered dispatched for defense." This does not cover the response of the whole nation and government, and is stalled at the study stage, with no concrete measures yet taken to put it into law. In addition, there is other important legislation that has yet to be even considered. This includes: enabling laws to provide for the protection, evacuation, and guidance of residents in the event of an emergency; category 3 legislation to cover international humanitarian treaties; and laws to govern the conduct of U.S. military forces that are obligated to defend our country in the event of an emergency, including a Contingency Mutual Support (CMS) treaty to support this.

Fourth, the response to a national emergency contingency lacks the concept of crisis management, or deterrence, whether in normal, crisis, or emergency situations. It is difficult to take consistent measures to respond in an appropriate and timely manner to shifts in any given situation.

In our country, it is unavoidable that we take unwelcome measures such as the recognition of a situation in surrounding areas during normal circumstances, orders for a maritime surveillance operation, orders for security operations (stand-by), or orders for defense operations (stand-by) either step by step or at once. Because of this, preparation for effective responses to situations, and deterrence measures from normal circumstances

through each of these stages is very difficult. In addition, not only does taking such preparatory or deterrent measures in response to a contingency cause uneasiness and useless confusion among the public, but there also exists the deeply ingrained belief that these actions only provoke the targeted country, resulting in a unique situation in which the obstacles are made much more significant compared to those in other countries.

Fifth, in the current legislation there is no stipulation concerning the gray zone between orders for security or defense operations and a ballistic missile defense that necessitates special operational considerations.

Sixth, there is a big loophole in legislation pertaining to crisis prevention under normal circumstances, prevention of crisis escalation, and early resolution in the event of a crisis.

How the Preparation of Comprehensive Legislation for Emergency Contingencies Should be in the Future

Having considered the principal problems, I would like to propose a future direction to prepare legislation that should be swiftly put into operation.

One: Preparation of a Comprehensive Fundamental Law. It is a general observation that most countries have fundamental constitutional laws to guide the government's response to a national emergency contingency in order to protect national autonomy and sovereignty as well as lives, property, and public order – although the scope and depth of these laws may differ. In Japan, however, the appropriate constitutional provision is found in Article 54, which requires an emergency session of the House of Councilors – which means that under current constitutional law, individual laws are established for each contingency.

It is desirable that this problem be addressed through constitutional revision. However, the current state of examination on this issue in both the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors suggests that quite some time will be required before this happens. While I believe constitutional revision should be the aim, I think the most urgent need is to prepare a comprehensive fundamental law to respond to a national emergency contingency in an appropriate and timely manner.

The following is an outline of a comprehensive fundamental law.

- Establishment of the basics for a response, meaning a system to muster the aggregate power of the nation (national and local governments, private sector, resources, industry, etc.). Although differences will still depend on the situation, in general the following matters should be stipulated: a unified national response; mutual cooperation between each organization, such as between central and local governments; temporary use of land or facilities; collection of supplies; use of public services such as transportation and communications; use of ports and airports; leadership for the public, including means of evacuation; securing the lifeline and necessities of life; and securing the use of funds, among other matters.

- Granting of emergency powers to the prime minister and establishing a hierarchy of authority. Under the reorganization of government ministries and offices begun in January 2001, the strengthening of the prime minister's authority to plan, draft, and propose policy is being attempted – but it cannot be said that the authority to actually implement policy is sufficient. In a system like Japan's, where there is a strong tendency toward vertical organization, responding in a timely and appropriate manner to national emergency contingencies in which the battle with time distinguishes success from failure appears to be difficult.

  It is said that in the republican system of ancient Rome, the system employed to deal with a crisis was that a "dictator" was chosen from among the consuls and great powers were concentrated in him. Even today, some countries have established a system to grant a national authority in overcoming a national emergency contingency (although there are differences in degree among nations). Therefore, it is necessary in Japan, as well, to grant the prime minister temporary authority that, depending on the situation, is far-reaching within a limited area, until a national emergency situation has been surmounted. This may not be desired, because it may entail some restrictions on the rights or freedom of the people, but this is unavoidable to protect lives and property, as well as the autonomy of the nation.

- Compensation measures for people and limitations on the private rights of the people.

- Measures to prevent abuses of emergency authority, including specific issues concerning the time of commencement and conclusion of the authority, as well as how the authority is exercised. Even though emergency authority is granted to the prime minister, preventing the abuse of that authority becomes an important theme.

This should be stipulated in the constitution or in a law, so that when the Cabinet authorizes the emergency, measures to clarify the duration of the emergency authority will be necessary.

- Provision of a system for the protection (preparation) of the people.

- A national-level decision-making system and procedure.

- Recognition of and conditions for the "exercise of the right of collective self-defense," the "use of limited armed forces overseas," and "participation in U.N. collective measures," etc. In order to prevent crises under normal circumstances, and in the event a crisis seriously affects the peace and security of our nation, it is necessary to approve the exercise of and clarify the conditions for this emergency authority. It is important to be able to respond in an effective and timely manner in order to prevent the escalation of the crisis, to contribute to the early control of the crisis, and in order to cooperate with international security-related joint operations.

- Emergency legislation procedures.

- A structure to ensure the effectiveness of the national emergency contingency response.

Two: Approval of the "exercise of the right of collective self-defense," the "use of limited arms overseas," and "participation in U.N. collective measures," among other issues. Other analysts in this project have acknowledged the degree to which the constitutional interpretation of these three issues has not only caused major limitations to peace-time multinational joint training, peacekeeping activities, and to various support and cooperation activities in a situation in the surrounding areas, but also to non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) and response actions to an armed attack against our country.

Mr. Sakamoto discusses one part of the specific limitations in Chapter 5. The future issue is how to solve this problem as a question of policy. As to concrete policy, I agree with what Mr. Sakamoto refers to as the "Constitution Problem (Kenpo)," which I discuss further below. (Although Mr. Sakamoto tentatively calls his solution "Fundamental National Security Law," while I term it a "Comprehensive Fundamental Law Concerning National Emergency Contingency Responses," I consider them to have a similar purpose.)

Three: Promotion of Legislation for Categories 1, 2, and 3. As mentioned out the outset, categories 1 and 2 legislation deal with laws and treaties related to the conduct of U.S. military forces during an emergency in Japan; while category 3 deals with legislation for the protection of the lives and property of the Japanese people. I urge the swift passage of legislation for categories 1 and 2, and consideration of, and eventual legislation for, category 3.

From now through the foreseeable future, it does not appear as if an actual armed attack against Japan will arise. However, the occurrence of sudden changes in conditions beyond human knowledge is proven by history. Moreover, the escalation of a contingency in surrounding areas into an armed attack against Japan can be imagined.

To sum up, the defense of our nation is based in principle upon Japan-U.S. cooperation, and although legislation and treaties have been provided *for the support and cooperation* of the U.S. military in the event of a contingency in surrounding areas, the fact that legislation and treaties *for the conduct* of U.S. military forces in the event of an emergency in Japan that would most seriously affect our peace and independence have not been provided, which shows a lack of integration.

These laws, for an independent, sovereign nation, must be considered as a first priority, and their provision is urgently needed.

Four: Measures to Deter and Respond to the Occurrence of Contingencies. In order to respond in an appropriate and timely manner to various situations anticipated in the future, it is important to prepare legislation that will enable necessary measures to be taken in order to deter contingencies from arising. In the interest of smooth cooperation between Japan and the United States when necessary, it is also important to prepare for the conduct of operations through various stages – from normal circumstances to a recognition of a situation in surrounding areas – including for maritime surveillance operations, orders for stand-by and actual security operations, as well as orders for stand-by and actual defense operations.

To this end, the following measures are necessary.

- First, the necessary measures for defense preparation – clarified by the study of category 1 legislation – should be operable from the time when an order to "stand-by" is issued. Under current legislation, even if an order to "stand-by" for a

defense operation is issued, it is difficult to carry out substantial national defense preparations, other than calling up reserve personnel and ready reserve personnel for defense purposes. Thus, the study of category 1 legislation necessitates measures so that defense preparation will permit the organization and administration of special forces; the administration of facilities; use of lands; accommodation of supplies; orders for medical, public engineering, and construction works; and transportation tasks.

- Second, legislation should be prepared for "gray zone" situations: operations falling between normal and emergency, between non-military and military, and between police and national defense. (Legislation to respond to a suspicious ship or armed agents will be discussed in point five.)

- Third, establish preparatory steps to ensure an appropriate and timely response to the establishment of rules of engagement (ROE) for the SDF. Defense operations to respond to an armed attack against Japan were discussed in the first point, and those issues also apply to a case in which Japan participates in a U.N. peacekeeping operation, in rear area support, or rear area search and relief operations, in the event of a contingency in the surrounding area. Under current legislation, when such response measures are carried out, it is stipulated that a proposed plan be drawn up, and a Cabinet decision must be requested. When we reflect upon developments in Japan until now, the various preparations preceding approval of such a plan (i.e., the organization of forces, the preparation of equipment and supplies, and the execution of training) will be quite limited. However, it is essential to promote advance preparation so as to carry out these operations in an appropriate and timely manner.

Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to set up a nationally unified standard for three stages of preparation, so that defense operations, security operations, sea surveillance operations, rear area support, rear area search and relief activities, U.N. peacekeeping operations, and international humanitarian relief activities can be executed smoothly in response to shifts in the situation. At the same time, it is important to establish rules of engagement for the forces corresponding to shifts in the situation or circumstances.

Taking the above measures in full will make it possible to promote advance preparations for various operations. I believe, then, that these measures will help prevent contingencies from arising.

Five: Preparation of legislation pertaining to the operation of the Self-Defense Forces in the gray zone between normal and emergency situations, between non-military and military situations, and between police and national defense operations. My first recommendation is for legislation pertaining to the treatment of suspicious ships and armed agents. This contingency is an act that violates national sovereignty. But having considered the characteristics of and possible actions required to deal with this contingency, in order to eliminate it immediately it is necessary to clarify the roles of the Self-Defense Forces in relation to the police and the Maritime Safety Agency. Moreover, it is necessary to take measures for either "preparation of comprehensive legislation pertaining to territorial surveillance" or, from the standpoint of territorial surveillance, "revision of the provisions pertaining to security operations under current legislation." It goes without saying that the first is desirable. In that case, the preparation of an "agreement with concerned organizations such as police and Maritime Safety Agency," as well as preparation of "rules of engagement" for the forces, etc. will be necessary.

My second recommendation is for legislation concerning responses to a contingency such as an attack or threat using ballistic missiles. This kind of situation is basically an armed attack against Japan, but it is specifically considered here because of its unique situational and operational characteristics. When responding to this situation, the following factors have to be considered: action before launch is difficult even if various signs can be generally ascertained in advance; the time between the launch and the impact of the missile is very short; there exists no reliable interceptor system at this point; and the psychological effect upon the people is serious. Therefore, under the clear recognition of an obvious armed attack against our country, a unified and comprehensive national response is needed. First, for that purpose, it is necessary to clarify by law the government offices having jurisdiction over various responses caused by a ballistic missile attack, the cooperation between those offices, and the relationship with local government, etc. Under that assumption, a "response manual" regarding the following matters should be prepared.

- Responses up until the first attack is made
  - -- Collection, analysis, and use of information
  - -- Decision-making regarding the response policy
  - -- Response operations
  - -- Warning the public
  - -- Measures for necessary protection such as the evacuation of the public

- Matters to be delegated and required procedures for responses after the second attack

However, when a bilateral response with the U.S. military for ballistic missile defense is required, the characteristics of ballistic missile defense make it essential to examine the proper nature of the command relationship regarding information and overall operations, for instance, consideration of a unified command.

The third is legislation pertaining to terrorism (including terrorism using weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons), piracy, and an influx of refugees.

Since any of the situations are considered to be difficult for a single organization to deal with, when legislation is prepared, it is necessary to establish a national or government policy to respond, as well as to clarify the roles of principal organizations and other agencies.

Six: Preparation of legislation contributing to the prevention of crises under normal circumstances, as well as prevention of escalation of a crisis and early resolution of a crisis should one occur. The main thing is revision of the "International Peace Cooperation Law," the "Security Assurance Law for Contingencies in Areas Surrounding Japan," the "Ship Inspection Law," and the "SDF Law pertaining to NEO."

Below are items to be considered toward that end.

- "International Peace Cooperation Law"
  - -- Revision of the five principles of PKO participation to ensure appropriate and timely responses to anticipated peacekeeping operations in the future, in particular a standard for the use of arms.
  - -- Nullification of the freeze on participation in the duties of the main PKO force.
  - -- The addition of duties to accord with the U.N. standard, in particular the addition of assisting in the maintenance of law and order in a sector.
  - -- Escorting convoys, and protecting U.N. property, installations, and personnel under U.N. custody.

- Revision of the standard for use of arms to accord with the U.N. standard, in particular the use of arms to protect U.N. personnel (personnel of U.N. High

Commission for Refugees, etc.), PKO personnel from other countries, U.N. volunteers, equipment necessary for PKO activity such as arms, vehicles, and communication equipment (including those of other countries), and necessary facilities for PKO activity (including those of other countries), or approval of the "use of arms within the scope of self-defense for eliminating or blocking by force any forces that interfere with U.N. peacekeeping operations."

- "Security Assurance Law for Contingencies in Areas Surrounding Japan"
  - -- Removal of limitations for rear area support and rear area search and relief activity, etc.
  - -- Rear area support should be approved even if it is directly related to battle activity; search and relief activities should be approved whether or not a battle activity is included if they are carried out on the high seas; and any support for multinational forces approved by the U.N. Forces or U.N. Security Council should be approved.
  - -- Escort of the vessels of the U.S. and other countries, towing of damaged vessels, and guarding of bases or facilities used by U.S. and other forces.

- "Ship Inspection Law." Take measures so that maritime interdiction operations as part of economic sanctions approved by the U.N. Security Council can be put into effect in accordance with international law.

Conclusions

The legislative provisions mentioned above are certainly nothing special, and they take place in any ordinary democratic nation. In Japan, however, this has been suppressed because of the long history of political polarization concerning national security policy, excessive consideration (restraint) vis-à-vis surrounding countries due to history, and the almost constant containment from countries that take advantage of this. Fortunately, a common foundation concerning national security is in the process of being established in the political system of our country and among the public.

Now that the 21st century is here, we must respond appropriately to the various contingencies that are anticipated and attempt to the extent possible to make provisions for the legislation mentioned in this paper in order to contribute to ensuring the peace, stability, and prosperity of not only Japan, but that of the region and the world. Otherwise, there is the concern that within our ally the United States, the phenomenon of "alliance discrimination" may arise because Japan is so different from NATO

countries, Australia, and South Korea.

Neither time nor our allies may wait.

Chapter 4: Legal Reform of the Self-Defense Forces

Mark T. Staples

The Importance of Legal Reform

Some Japanese scholars have pointed out that the departing U.S. administration made very few comments – outside of the new Defense Guidelines – on legal reform of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF), such as emergency legislation (*Yuji Hosei*) or revision of the constitution. There is a good reason for this silence. Former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Thomas Foley recently said during an interview in a Japanese magazine, "the debate in Japan on revision of the constitution is strictly a matter of Japanese sovereignty and it would be inappropriate for the U.S. to enter this process." That said, Ambassador Foley also stated that the U.S. would "welcome revision of the Constitution, if the Japanese people decided to do so." And, indeed, it seems the Japanese people are inclined to consider these important issues as indicated by the current political movement of both the ruling and major opposition parties. As of April 2001, within the Liberal Democratic Party the Hashimoto faction appears to be seeking a consensus on Constitutional revision and a new status for the SDF, while the Yamazaki faction has already decided to announce Constitutional legislation during "*Kempo no Hi*" later this year. As for the main opposition parties, both Ozawa Ichiro and Hatoyama Yukio's positions to support reform of the Constitution and have the right of collective self-defense are well known. Some party factions are calling for recognition of the SDF as a military force, perhaps with a new name such as *koku boei gun*, a "National Defense Military," and legislation on *yuji hosei* will probably be presented to the Diet for approval in 2001. Additionally, several prominent Japanese politicians are calling for the Japan Defense Agency to be changed to a ministry. The new Bush administration should not only pay great attention to this growing current of political activity in Tokyo, but also consider its implications for the alliance.

It is often said that the U.S.-Japan alliance is the foundation of U.S. security strategy in Asia. There is no doubt that the alliance provides a springboard for American security policy in the Far East, permitting extra degrees of military maneuver in the region – and beyond to the Persian Gulf – through the benefit of forward-deployed forces based in Japan. However, the security alliance itself should be considered fragile because of a deep uncertainty over what action Japan may, or may not, take to support the alliance during a security crisis in the region that involves U.S. military forces. This delicate

situation is partially based in the uncertainty of Japanese security policy during a potential crisis, but more important, the primary cause of this ambiguity in bilateral crisis-response is based in the restrictive nature of Japanese laws regarding national defense.

Although Japan's Constitution broadly restricts the maintenance of war potential and the use of force in settling international disputes outside of Japan, national laws crafted by the Diet after the occupation period have placed far greater restrictions on SDF operations within Japan. The inherent contradiction of maintaining a security alliance between the highly restricted SDF and the power-projection forces of the U.S. military in Japan is a leading cause of the power-sharing imbalance within the alliance, and has been a source of much friction between American and Japanese security managers during the past. However, greater bilateral friction may develop in the future if U.S. policy does not keep abreast of pending legal reform of the SDF and adjust the security relationship accordingly.

As Japan contemplates emergency legislation and revision to its constitution, it is imperative that security policy makers in the U.S. understand Japanese perceptions of the necessity to reform legal deficiencies related to Japanese national security. Furthermore, to prepare for the inevitable reform of the SDF's legal status, the U.S. government should support this natural evolution of Japanese national security policy by:

- providing a symbolic gesture, at the appropriate time, that sends a message to the region that the U.S. government will "recognize" the legal transformation of the SDF from a *de facto* to *de jure* military force;

- restructure outdated bilateral security mechanisms and processes that are currently employed, so to better manage the alliance and adequately respond to a possible increase in Japanese security roles and missions (both within and outside of the alliance); and

- consider new strategic options for the alliance based on new roles and missions that Japan may choose to enact.

Any inaction by the new U.S. administration, while Japan incrementally exercises a sovereign right to transform the SDF into a *de jure* military, will likely weaken the alliance and possibly contribute to an increase of tensions in the region. Indeed, the region could interpret silence by the U.S. as a signal of disapproval. Conversely, U.S. recognition of, and support to, Japan's legal reform of the SDF would likely contribute to

the development of a more mature, equal security relationship and assist in promoting long-term stability in the region. It would be prudent for the new administration to prepare for this possibility of legal and constitutional reform and support Japan in this evolutionary process.

Legal Framework For Bilateral Defense

The year 2001 marks the 50th anniversary of the first security treaty between the U.S. and Japan. I would like to point out two important features during this anniversary year of the alliance. First, there has been dramatic change in Japan regarding perceptions of national security in recent years. From the end of the U.S. occupation of Japan until 1994, debate on Japanese security was practically frozen in time, unable to move forward because of an inability to reach a political consensus on the constitutional legitimacy of the SDF. This deep split in public opinion over the constitutional status of the SDF prevented any meaningful discussion on national security in Japan. Indeed, mere mention of taboo security topics, such as defense plans or even the word "alliance," resulted in the automatic dismissal of both security officials and diplomats in Tokyo. However, the taboo over debating national defense evaporated when the coalition government of Socialist Party Prime Minister Murayama Tomoiichi reversed a decades-old policy of the Japanese left and recognized the existence of the SDF in 1994. In the six years since Murayama's watershed decision, political debate in Japan on the constitution and the appropriate legal status of the SDF has gradually increased and is now flourishing. According to several polls, a solid majority of Japanese people now supports revision to Japan's Constitution, including Article 9. And, as stated earlier, political parties are becoming increasingly active in legal reform of the SDF and constitution.

The second feature that that should be noted during this anniversary year of the security treaty is the consistency of U.S. policy toward Japan since the original treaty was signed in 1951. Indeed, when we think of the main issue of negotiation between our nations for the first security treaty and the main issue of the current security debate within Japan, it seems a bilateral consensus is finally developing on collective security – although it has taken time. Almost 50 years ago today, then-U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated that collective security was the ideal preference for U.S.-Japanese security relations during a speech to the Japanese press club in February 1951. Dulles said:

> "Collective measures are the only dependable deterrent. The likelihood of failure is a deterrent to aggression...Japan can draw some useful lessons from these elemental security principles...the Japanese government and people will then have primary

responsibility to maintain in their homeland, a protection corresponding to that of a householder...the U.N. was formed with its first stated purpose to effect collective measures for the preservation of peace. The Security Council was given the duty to create an international force to deter aggression. Japan, if so disposed, can share collective security protection against direct aggression. The security plan we outline does not require that the Japanese nation become militaristic...*the program would realize the U.N. ideal, which is the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense* shall so be implemented that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest...we seek a peace in which will afford Japan opportunity to protect by her own efforts the integrity of full sovereignty which peace will have restored" (emphasis added).

America's desire for Japan to enter into a collective security framework 50 years ago was, of course, part of a global strategy of containment by the leader of the free world against the threat of communism. The goals of U.S. foreign policy toward Japan 50 years ago, collective security, guided the negotiations of the first U.S.-Japan security treaty, and it is worth recalling some salient points of that 1951 agreement. The former treaty's preamble stated that:

"The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and around Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself *increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression*…" (emphasis added).

Further support for collective security was included in Article Four:

"*This treaty will expire whenever* in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and Japan there *shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative or collective security dispositions* as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan area" (emphasis added).

Of course, the 1960 mutual security treaty removed the above references to collective security and Japan assuming primary responsibility for territorial defense. After the occupation, the U.S. National Security Council approved NSC-125 in 1952 as a supporting strategy to NSC-68, the Cold War policy of containment, for the Far East. Japan, as an independent nation, declined to accept the main proposal of NSC-125, which anticipated that Japan would have a central role in the long-term stability of Northeast Asia. The specific goals of NSC-125 were the following:

- The United States would defend Japan from external aggression, given the importance of Japan (geopolitical and economic).

- The United States would set up a Pacific Collective Security Organization (Pacific Pact), which Japan was be expected to join, along with the republics of Korea and China.

- The United States would promote Japan's rearmament with conventional weapons and provide necessary assistance.

- The United States would support Japan's admission into the United Nations.

Japan elected to focus on economics rather than security, a policy termed *seikei-bunri*, for several reasons. One Japanese concern was the fear of the nation being drawn into a third-county war by the U.S. (*Makikomu Ron*). But the primary focus of the Yoshida Doctrine, to economically catch up to the U.S. and Europe, permitted the U.S. to assume primary responsibility of regional defense while Japan provided base facilities, and this arrangement became the alliance as we know it today; Japan had the burden of hosting U.S. bases, while the U.S. had the burden of regional security. The Yoshida Doctrine, along with national laws that established the SDF, was acceptable to both alliance partners for decades. However, concern over the Korean Peninsula during the nuclear crisis of 1994-95, Nodong and Taepodong missile firings, and the intrusion into Japanese territorial waters by North Korea spy ships caused alliance security planners on both sides of the Pacific to reconsider the appropriateness of the existing legal arrangements for bilateral and unilateral security.

Legal Quandary. The New Defense Guidelines of 1997 were largely brought about by a realization during the 1994-95 Korea nuclear crisis that the U.S. could not "plan in" Japanese support during a regional contingency. However, the solution to this dilemma, revision of the Defense Guidelines to permit rear-area support of U.S. forces, is a somewhat backward effort to smooth the functions of the alliance during a crisis surrounding Japan. This is because Japanese national law that provides the SDF front-area support within Japan is both ambiguous and inadequate, according to many Japanese defense experts. For example, SDF law is subservient to the laws of other relevant agencies and ministries in many ways. The SDF would need permission from the Health Ministry to construct field hospitals, or permission from the Land/Construction Ministry to build new bridges and develop defensive positions on public or private property, even if an attack on Japan occurred and a defensive deployment was ordered (*Boei Shitsudo*). To highlight these unusual restrictions, the SDF would not have to seek the same permission from relative agencies and ministries during a national disaster operation (*Saigai Hakken*), such as an

earthquake. Until Japanese laws are revised to adequately permit the SDF to respond to all manners of national crisis between peace-time to the outbreak of conflict – in short, passage of *Yuji Hosei* – then the U.S. should not assume that rear-area support under the new Defense Guidelines will be planned or conducted in a smooth, efficient manner. To use an analogy, appropriate laws on Japanese defense (such as *Yuji Hosei*) should be the locomotives to pull the alliance train ahead into the future, not the new Defense Guidelines. Indeed, single focus on rear-area support for U.S. forces by the past U.S. administration has been seen by some Japanese as a role equivalent to "a bell-hop baggage boy at a hotel." Although it is easy to understand such frustration, especially by members of the SDF, the initial urgency by the U.S. to revise the Defense Guidelines was based on very real concerns of a regional contingency that would have certainly affected the security of Japan.

The prohibition against the right of collective self-defense also impedes the smooth functioning of the alliance. A direct attack against Japan, or the threat of one, is required before there can be real operational cooperation between U.S. forces in Japan and the SDF on a large scale. This is especially true in the area of command and control, as this alliance has no bilateral staffs, or a full-time bilateral center for exchange of operational information. Compared to other alliances the U.S. maintains in South Korea, Europe, or the Middle East, this alliance has very serious deficiencies when it comes to interoperability. For example, because Japan cannot exercise the right of collective self-defense, a "gray area" has developed on providing operational information to the U.S. outside of that required for the defense of Japan. In other words, sensor information from SDF AWACS and Aegis that cover this theater-area are not provided to U.S. forces on a routine basis because of Japanese "gray area" concerns that the information would be used in means other than defense of Japan, i.e., collective security. Consequently, although unit-to-unit information exchange (ship to ship/plane to plane) is routinely conducted between U.S. and SDF forces, the sum information from theater-area "netted" sensors, especially air defense, are not exchanged. This "gray area" restriction would severely impede bilateral air defense, especially against cruise missiles and theater ballistic missiles, which require wide-area sensor coverage that is "netted" together for an efficient response.

It is possible that Japan could declare that it will exercise the right of collective self-defense as many interpretations of the constitution have changed over the years. For example, it was once considered illegal for Japan to have jet aircraft, but now Japan has more jet fighter aircraft deployed than the United States in the Far East. Also, it was considered contrary to the spirit of the Japanese Constitution for Japanese maritime vessels to carry certain arms such as torpedoes. However, so many successive Japanese governments have continued to abide by the current interpretation on collective security that it would be very difficult for the government of Japan to execute collective security with the

constitution intact. As the debate in Japan sharpens on constitutional revision, the new U.S. administration may have an opportunity to shape the security relationship with Japan into a more durable and flexible alliance.

Alliance Recommendations

Recognition of a Japanese Military. Japan, if it desires, has the sovereign right to revise the constitution, reform SDF laws, and transform the SDF into a "National Defense" military. If Japan enacts this sovereign right, any perception by the Japanese people that the U.S. is interfering in this process would certainly lower trust and confidence in the alliance. However, this author recommends that the U.S. government proactively support Japanese reform of the SDF because this process will likely draw extreme attention from Japan's neighbors. China, and perhaps South Korea, may view constitutional revision and legal reform of the SDF as the resurrection of Japanese "militarism." This could increase tension, cause reactionary arms buildups, and upset the balance of power in the region. The U.S. should assist in alleviating any perceived concerns in the region by providing a symbolic gesture that sends a strong signal of approval for the transformation of the SDF into a *de jure* military. At the highest political level possible, the U.S. should make a symbolic visit to a historical Japanese military institution, after an invitation from the government of Japan. This would send a signal of approval to Japan's neighbors that the alliance looks to the future and not the past.

Restructure Mechanisms for Managing a Stronger Alliance. The structural mechanisms that manage the alliance have changed little in the last 50 years, and consequently, reflect asymmetrical aspects of power sharing within the alliance. The following recommendations seek to readjust management mechanisms for a stronger alliance.

- ***Increase Defense Representation in Washington and Tokyo.*** Strategic dialogue requires appropriate follow-up and constant consultation. Increasing defense representation between the U.S. and Japan, in a reciprocal manner, is severely needed. For example, NATO has official representation at the Pentagon, but unfortunately, South Korea and Japan do not. The heavy influence of European allies vis-à-vis Asian allies in the Department of Defense needs balance. America's Asian allies, Japan and South Korea, should be provided official representation in the Pentagon to share in appropriate regional strategy development, bilateral – and perhaps multilateral – policy planning, and other issues that concern the alliances, such as acquisition and interoperability. Increased U.S. defense representation in

Tokyo is also needed, especially as a potential solution to the issue of U.S. Forces Korea/U.S. Forces Japan command structure after Korean reunification. The level of U.S. defense staff in Tokyo, virtually a handful, stands in stark contrast to other security consultation mechanisms the U.S. maintains in Seoul or Brussels.

- ***Refocus the Pentagon.*** The recent Office of the Secretary of Defense/Net Assessment Summer Report points out that for every four U.S. generals and admirals in Europe, there is only one in the Pacific. This overabundance of staff on the European theater, 10 years after the Cold War, explains why U.S. alliances in Asia do not receive appropriate attention in Washington, although the potential for conflict in this region is increasing. This imbalance of staff and attention toward Asia in the Pentagon contributes to a lack of demand for foreign area officers who are Asian specialists, compared to other regions of the world. Few officers who serve at USFJ speak Japanese, while a large number of officers assigned there are conducting a "Pacific tour" for the first time. Efficient management of the U.S. alliances in Asia, especially for Japan, requires a large cadre of dedicated specialists that do not exist today. Within the Department of Defense, the number of personnel responsible for directly managing the alliance should be increased ten-fold, and they should be led by senior directors who have several years of experience associated with the alliance, both in Tokyo and Washington.

- ***Establish a Bilateral Information Exchange Center.*** If Japan revises security laws to become a more "normal" country (*futsu no kuni*) then closer bilateral military staff cooperation will become necessary for the security relationship to be reflective of a more "normal" alliance (*futsu no domei*). The lack of any bilateral command center or staff highlights an inability to respond to a regional crisis in a manner appropriate for true allies. Bilateral staffs are the hallmark of any security relationship that is founded on deep trust and cooperation. Without a Bilateral Information Exchange Center (BIXC) that can provide both forces the necessary theater-level operational information required for successful operations, any future bilateral military cooperation between the U.S. and Japan during a contingency would be hampered. This is an especially important point as both the U.S. and Japan adapt future security strategies and adjust force structures to the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the Information Technology (IT) revolution. Furthermore, future threats to the alliance will certainly include both cruise and theater missiles targeted at Japan and U.S. forces stationed in Japan, so a BIXC should become a top priority to exchange theater-level operational information between U.S. and Japanese forces. A BIXC should have no forces to command and serve solely as an information hub between respective military forces, guarding against cyber-warfare threats to the alliance.

Also, it would provide a symbol of unity during contingency response and other bilateral or unilateral activities, such as humanitarian operations and disaster relief. Naturally, command of a BIXC should be rotated between U.S. and Japanese officers.

Consider New Strategic Options for the Alliance. Japan currently has few strategic options under current legal restrictions, so today's bilateral "Strategic Dialogues" express little more than political consultations. However, Japanese legal reforms that transform the SDF into a military are likely to occur in this decade, and perhaps during the Bush administration. When this occurs, Japan will have *strategic options*. If the U.S.-Japan alliance keeps abreast of this watershed change, a more equal security relationship may develop. Although there may be some concern by Japan's neighbors, a stronger alliance based on bilateral strategic interests and equal role sharing is far preferable to a continuation of an unequal alliance, while Japan continues to develop military capabilities. In other words, it would appear to be in America's interest to deepen the alliance with Japan by promoting a Japanese military in name and law, rather than continue the ambiguity of Japan's security forces, which have an immense capability. American and Japanese strategic interests are both common and vital. In the 21st century, all that the alliance requires for the preservation of regional security is for both nations to enhance strategic options to promote bilateral strategic interests.

Chapter 5: New Japan-U.S. Alliance Project Presentation: The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Right to Collective Self-Defense

Sakamoto Kazuya

Introduction

During the last half century, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty has functioned well as both a pillar of deterrence that has maintained peace and security in East Asia and the foundation of the Japan-U.S. relationship, one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world. Whether this treaty can continue to fulfill such functions in the 21st century depends on whether Japan and the U.S. can deepen and expand their defense cooperation by supplementing the treaty's fundamental rights and obligations. This is because the security treaty's fundamental form of cooperation of "exchange of security and military bases," might have been appropriate in the international environment and the U.S.-Japan relationship of the past, but it will not suffice for the Japan-U.S. alliance in the 21st century. Both Japan and the U.S. must search for a new give-and-take suitable to the new environment. An essential precondition for this is Japan's ability to exercise the right to collective self-defense even in a limited area. This author argues that Japan should be able to exercise this right at least in Japanese territory, as well as on the high seas and in international airspace.

The End of the Cold War and the Limits of "Cooperation by Goods and People"

The basis of the security treaty is that Japan lends military bases to the U.S., and the U.S. assures Japan's security. According to a Japanese diplomat (Kumao Nishimura, chief of the Treaty Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) who was involved in the conclusion of the security treaty in 1951, the treaty was mutual in the sense that it called for "cooperation by goods (military bases) and people (the U.S. troops)." But this exchange of "goods and people" is not truly equal. Even if it benefits both countries, it also contains an element that easily arouses complaints on both sides. The party that provides troops would not respect the other party that does not do so, while the party that provides bases may feel unhappy about the attitude of the other side that does not really understand their inconvenience and cost.

The Cold War worked to suppress that discontent. One reason for this was that during the Cold War the military bases in Japan played a decisive role in the U.S. strategy to contain the Soviet Union. Not only was Japan in the best place geographically to contain the Soviet Union so that it could not advance toward the Pacific Ocean or the East China Sea, but Japan was also able, by utilizing its industrial power, to support U.S. forces by providing military supplies and repairs.

Furthermore, the Japan-U.S. alliance during the Cold War assumed that there would be an all-out war. In the event of an emergency, Japan could not possibly remain unscathed and would use its Self-Defense Forces to defend itself. Thus, in actuality it was understood that "cooperation by goods and people" alone would not suffice, and the Self-Defense Forces would fight in tandem with the U.S. forces. This was two-way human cooperation – "cooperation by people and people" – an appropriate partnership for allied nations, and this gave a sense of psychological unity to the Japan-U.S. alliance.

However, a decade has passed since the end of the Cold War, and the circumstances of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty have changed significantly. It is true that the military bases in Japan still play a significant role in U.S. global strategy. However, it is questionable whether they are absolutely critical, as was the case during the Cold War. It is possible that the development of the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) may decrease the future necessity of the forward deployment strategy. That aside, convincing the American public of the strategic value of the military bases in Japan is no longer as easy as it was during the Cold War. In Japan, meanwhile, pressure is mounting for scaling down and integrating the U.S. bases in Okinawa and elsewhere.

Moreover, the threat for which Japan and the U.S. should be prepared has changed from an all-out war to regional conflicts, and the premise that Japan and the U.S. will fight together is not assured. Consider a hypothetical situation. A regional conflict breaks out somewhere in East Asia and the United States, which is situated far from the region, takes action while Japan, a key regional player, only provides military bases and watches from the sidelines in the absence of a direct attack against its territory. In such a situation, the Japan-U.S. alliance would cease to function effectively even if the two nations fulfilled their obligations under the security treaty. Proponents of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty were fearful of the occurrence of such a situation during the 1994 Korean Peninsula crisis.

The idea that "Japan would merely lend its military bases" was acceptable in the early postwar period when the security treaty was concluded (1951) and revised (1960). In those days, all Japan could do was lend the military bases because of the demilitarization in the

occupation period, excessive "pacifism" stemming from the shock of defeat, the urgency to put a priority on economic recovery, and so on. Japan had neither the intention nor the ability to do more.

However, Japan now possesses great economic power and considerable military strength, and intends to take more responsibility for the security of the region and the world. Japan, therefore, will not be allowed to stand by and idly watch a regional conflict in East Asia.

"Cooperation by goods and people" to support the presence of the U.S. forces and maintain the balance of power in East Asia is still necessary. But there is ample concern that depending upon this solely will weaken the Japan-U.S. alliance to the extent that it becomes the equivalent of a marriage that exists in name only. To prevent that, it is necessary to make constant efforts to keep the alliance strong through a combination of "cooperation by goods and people" and "cooperation by people and people."

Interpretation by the Japanese Government Concerning the Right to Collective Self-Defense

A major obstacle to these efforts is the Japanese government's interpretation of the right to collective self-defense. The new "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation" agreed upon between the Japanese and U.S. governments in 1997 made it possible for Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to cooperate with U.S. forces even outside of Japanese territory, in regional conflicts in which Japan itself is not under attack. The Guidelines state that if there is a situation in the area surrounding Japan that may affect significantly the peace and security of Japan, the Self-Defense Forces may provide "rear area support," such as supply and logistics, to the U.S. forces. The SDF may provide such support not only in Japan but also upon the high seas and in the international airspace around Japan. This reflects efforts to expand the geographical scope of two-way human cooperation, and should be highly evaluated. (The mutual defense cooperation between the SDF and U.S. forces that is stipulated is an obligation of the existing Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and is limited to an operation performed within the "territories under Japanese administration.")

There is, however, a major restriction posed to the "rear area support" outside Japan The Guidelines specify that the Self-Defense Forces can provide such support only in areas that are "distinguished from the areas where combat operations are being conducted." This prevents the SDF from operating in "dangerous areas."

The official explanation for this absurd restriction is that "rear area support" for U.S. forces in combat areas, even if it only consists of supplying water, can be seen as an integral part of the use of military force. The Japanese government believes that this is something that Japan, which cannot exercise the right to collective self-defense, is not permitted to do. The concept of "integration with the use of military force" is an ambiguous concept that does not have a standard as to what constitutes "integration." But the fundamental problem is the government's interpretation of the right to collective self-defense.

The Japanese government has stuck to an unclear explanation that Japan has the right to collective self-defense but cannot exercise this right. (According to the government, the right to collective self-defense is the right of a state to prevent by force an armed attack on other states with which it has a close relationship, even if the state itself is not under direct attack.) As Ambassador Okazaki and many other security experts have pointed out, the explanation involves a distorted interpretation of the constitution that has been necessitated by domestic politics.

The Japanese government has long insisted that exercising collective self-defense exceeds the scope of the use of military force allowed Japan under Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, since it is limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense. This insistence leads to the government's explanation that Japan has the right to collective self-defense but the nation cannot exercise it. It is, however, difficult to argue that such an insistence arises naturally from the provisions of the constitution. The use of force clearly prohibited in Article 9 of the constitution is limited to that employed to solve an international dispute. While it is true that the provision stipulates that the country cannot have military forces, this means that Japan cannot possess military forces employed to solve international disputes. Of course, Japan, to ensure that it realizes the spirit of this provision, should be extremely careful about using military force. But it does not inevitably mean that the exercise of military force by Japan is limited to the minimum necessary for individual self-defense. There is no persuasive reason to believe Japan cannot use the minimum military force necessary for collective self-defense, the right to which is stipulated in the Charter of the United Nations, in the same manner as the right to individual self-defense.

The Japanese government's interpretation of the constitution in which Japan cannot exercise the right to collective self-defense hinders the development of security cooperation within the Japan-U.S. alliance. The case of "rear area support" in the new Defense Guidelines is an example, as will be cooperation concerning missile defense that will be an important issue for the future of the alliance. Assume that a missile launched by a third country to attack Hawaii or Guam is flying toward the Japanese archipelago. If the exercise

of the right to collective self-defense is not permitted, Japan can shoot down the missile only if it is aimed at Japan (using the right to individual self-defense), but cannot do so if it is aimed at Hawaii or Guam. Under this rationale, it will be impossible to carry out close cooperation for missile defense in which one second is crucial; far more important, the spirit of the alliance cannot be maintained.

The Right to Collective Self-Defense and Dispatching Troops Overseas

What makes the Japanese government hold to its interpretation that the constitution prohibits the exercise of the right to collective self-defense? Aside from the mere fact that the government has done so too long, it seems to have much to do with the question of dispatching troops overseas. The government initially disclosed the interpretation during debates related to the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces in 1954. At that time the government was under pressure to show the limits of the military force to be exercised by this new organization. In Japan, the argument that the constitution prohibited even the right to individual self-defense had a vigor that could not be ignored. One of the reasons lending weight to such an argument might have been the memory of the justification of the Manchurian Incident as an exercise of the right to self-defense.

In order to gain popular support for the establishment of the SDF, the Japanese government had to make it crystal-clear that Japan would never send its forces overseas under any pretext. The Japanese people hated to see that happen again. In the Diet, the issues concerning the overseas dispatch of the National Police Reserve Force or the National Security Force, the forerunners of the Self-Defense Forces, had been discussed many times against the backdrop of the Korean War. The government had strongly denied the possibility of dispatching forces to the Korean Peninsula every time the question came up.

It seems that the interpretation that the right to collective self-defense cannot be exercised was one means of clarifying that the new Self-Defense Forces would never be able to carry out overseas military operations. On June 2, 1954, the House of Councilors made a resolution confirming that the Self-Defense Forces would not be dispatched overseas “in light of the constitutional provisions and the people’s keen peace-loving spirit.” On the very next day, the chief of the Treaty Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained as a government-related person for the first time in the Diet that Japan could not exercise the right to collective self-defense. By that time, the government had explained that the Self-Defense Forces would not be dispatched overseas.

Several years later, in the deliberations upon the revision of the security treaty, the Kishi administration explained that Japan could not exercise the right to collective self-defense in the sense that Japan could not go to a foreign country to defend it. The administration also explained, at that time, that troops could not be dispatched overseas, and depending upon the definition, there was a way to exercise the right to collective self-defense.

Making clear the inability to exercise the right to collective self-defense might have been useful for the Japanese people to accept the Self-Defense Forces. It might also have been helpful to facilitate acceptance of the security treaty by the people. However, the exercise of the right was regarded in the same light as the dispatch of troops overseas, resulting in a confusion of the two. The exercise of the right to collective self-defense ended up being haunted by a bad image – the image of the prewar exercise of military force overseas by Japan. The image made it difficult to argue that the exercise of the right to collective self-defense does not always involve dispatching troops overseas. For instance, Article 5 of the security treaty stipulates that Japan and the U.S. would act to meet a common danger in the territories under Japanese administration. Although the scope is as narrow as in the Japanese territories, this stipulation obviously assumes the exercise of the right to collective self-defense. However, the right to individual (not collective) self-defense is used for the government's explanation of the article. The government is concerned with the image of the dispatch of troops overseas that is linked to the right to collective self-defense.

As Japan reconsiders the exercise of the right to collective self-defense, one important point will be to distinguish this right from the issue of dispatching troops overseas. (According to the Japanese government "overseas" means territories, territorial waters, or airspace of foreign countries.) If it is the strong will or desire of the Japanese people not to exercise the right along with the use of military force in foreign territories, Japan simply cannot do so. A democratic nation cannot act against its people's will or desire. Besides it is perhaps a wise policy for Japan, which has long been extremely careful about the use of force, not to use its military forces in foreign territories. It may be a legitimate position for a state not to use force overseas even for a just cause. If the acceptance of the exercise of the right to collective self-defense is being hindered by concerns over the possibility that the Self-Defense Forces might have to be dispatched overseas, the Japanese government should make it clear that this will not happen.

The Japanese government should also make it clear, however, that the exercise of the right to collective self-defense does not always involve dispatching troops overseas, and

there is a way to exercise the right without doing so. The government, then, should study how Japan can exercise this right in order to strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance.

This author believes that Japan needs to be able to exercise the right to collective self-defense at least in the Japanese territories, as well as upon the high seas and in the international airspace. If this becomes possible, many problems concerning the Japan-U.S. alliance can be resolved, and the alliance will be reinforced. After all, the Japan-U.S. alliance is an alliance between maritime nations. Strengthening the theoretical foundation of defense cooperation on the high seas and the airspace above them would prove highly significant in strengthening the alliance. Symbolic issues that are often discussed, for example, whether a Self-Defense Forces vessel can rescue a U.S. Navy vessel that is nearby and is under attack on the high seas, can be resolved. Defense cooperation between Japan and the U.S. can be advanced in various aspects, such as joint patrols and joint training. The ability to respond jointly to regional disputes in East Asia will be improved.

A few words are necessary to avoid a misunderstanding. This author is recommending the exercise of the right to collective self-defense without dispatching troops overseas. But this author is not recommending a new constitutional interpretation that prohibits the exercise of the right to collective self-defense involving the dispatch of troops overseas. Such an interpretation would be complex and would merely cause unnecessary arguments, doing more harm than good. For Japan to have the right to collective self-defense under international law means that Japan has the right to exercise the right of collective self-defense like other countries. If Japan does not dispatch troops overseas as a matter of policy, it will be sufficient to emphasize that we "will not" dispatch troops overseas.

How to Authorize the Exercise of the Right to Collective Self-Defense

How would it become possible for Japan to exercise, even in a limited manner, the right to collective self-defense? If the Japanese government simply changes the present constitutional interpretation on the right, it will swiftly become possible. But, considering the fact that the government has long asserted the impossibility of the exercise of the right to collective self-defense, it will not be easy for the government to change this interpretation, however problematic it is. The Cabinet Legislation Bureau, the government's watchman on legal issues, has clearly stated a constitutional amendment is necessary for the exercise of the right to collective self-defense to be authorized.

If the government does not change the interpretation, resolving this issue with a constitutional amendment will be desirable, but it will take time. Moreover, if the constitution has to be amended for the sake of the exercise of the right to collective self-defense, this implies that the government's interpretation of the constitution has been correct. It will not be a very pleasant idea to acknowledge that the previous questionable constitutional interpretation was correct.

It is the job of the Supreme Court to make the final decision upon whether the constitution allows the exercise of the right to collective self-defense. Therefore, if the Supreme Court rules that the government's interpretation is wrong, this will solve everything. But the Japanese Supreme Court tends in practice to avoid constitutional rulings on this sort of issue.

Some have suggested that the Diet, the highest organ of state power, make a resolution authorizing the exercise of the right to collective self-defense. It should be carried out so that the decision would not violate the 1954 resolution prohibiting the overseas dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces. For example, it may be sufficient if a resolution is made to the effect that: "The constitution does not prohibit the exercise of the right to collective self-defense. Considering the spirit of the constitution, however, Japan must be extremely cautious with the use of force. Therefore, Japan will not exercise the right to collective self-defense involving the use of force overseas."

Customarily, a Diet resolution is made, in principle, by a unanimous vote, however. In reality such a resolution on this issue will not be easy. Moreover, it may be argued that it is not appropriate to depend on a resolution of the Diet to change a constitutional interpretation merely because the Supreme Court has not provided an interpretation to authorize the right, or because the governmental interpretation is questionable. In addition, even if a Diet resolution could change the interpretation of the constitution, the effect of the change in interpretation would not be substantial unless a law is actually enacted that uses the premise of such an interpretation.

Accordingly, as former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone proposes, it is desirable that the Diet make a "Fundamental Law for National Security" to clarify the nature of actions that Japan must take in the 21st century in order to preserve the peace and security of the nation and the world. The law will stipulate such things as the kind of actions to take in time of emergency, what daily preparations must be made for them, and how to achieve civilian control on them. In the law, the scope of support for U.S. forces by the Self-Defense Forces exercising the right to collective self-defense may also be stipulated. For instance, it may be

stated that the Self-Defense Forces are able to support U.S. forces operating upon the high seas and the airspace above them for the purpose of the security of Japan and the U.S. This support could include military support, but the specific support offered in specific cases – whether it will involve supplies, or involves direct battle activity – will depend on political or military judgments in each individual case.

If such a law passes, the interpretation of the right to collective self-defense that the government has held to date can be overcome. If this law gets taken to court for constitutional review, and if the Supreme Court decides that the section pertaining to the right to collective-self defense is unconstitutional, that will also be helpful. The issue of whether the Japanese Constitution prohibits the right to collective self-defense will finally be clarified. The only option left, then, will be amendment of the constitution.

Conclusion - Why Is Exercising the Right to Collective Self-Defense Necessary for Japan?

By deepening and expanding mutual defense cooperation, Japan and the United States will have to readjust the present give-and-take of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In this vein, Japan needs to gain the ability to exercise the right to collective self-defense as mentioned above, even if it is limited in scope. If this becomes possible, the gains will be significant.

First, the Japan-U.S. alliance will be strengthened both psychologically and practically. An alliance must be based on the national interests of the parties, but it can only function well when it is founded upon good human relations. Truly good human relations will come from deepening two-way human cooperation, and the right to collective self-defense provides the theoretical basis for such cooperation. If Japan can correct its view of the right to collective self-defense, and does whatever it can with the right, it will help strengthen the human bonds of the alliance. If it becomes possible for Japan to actually exercise the right to collective self-defense, it will be easier for the United States to add the Self-Defense Forces to its strategic calculus. The Self-Defense Forces and U.S. forces will be able to respond to a common threat with much more diverse scenarios, for which training will be possible. Thus, there is no doubt that the deterrent power of the Japan-U.S. alliance will be increased.

Next, if Japan can exercise the right to collective self-defense and can do more for defense cooperation, Japan's voice in the Japan-U.S. alliance will increase proportionately. For example, it will be easier for Japan to make requests with respect to the issue of U.S.

bases in Japan. Bilateral consultations will become more serious and fruitful on various issues at diverse levels. In the traditional "cooperation by goods and people," one party desires to act freely and without interference, while the other is tempted to depend on the partner by avoiding responsibility and decisions. In order for Japan to become able to say yes or no clearly in consultations with the U.S. – which is indispensable for the two countries to be mature partners – the element of "cooperation by people and people" needs to be established through the right to collective self-defense.

In addition to strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance, Japan's ability to exercise the right to collective self-defense may have another significance: it may help Japan to reconsider its posture toward security issues in general. Peace and security in modern times can be achieved only through collective efforts. Every nation is expected to take an interest in the security of other nations and to take a certain amount of responsibility for it. Japan is not an exception. Of course how Japan takes that responsibility should be decided by Japan itself. Japan does not have to focus its efforts on military means in taking that responsibility, and it may be better not to do so. It is quite difficult, however, if Japan turns its back completely on the use of military force in the fields of collective security, whether it is for the collective security of the United Nations, or for the Japan-U.S. alliance, or for a possible regional security arrangement in East Asia. Japan needs to reconsider in what cases it would unavoidably have to use minimum military force in its efforts to strengthen collective security, whether global, regional, or bilateral. The exercise of the right of collective self-defense without dispatching troops overseas will be a first step toward this reconsideration.

Chapter 6: American Bases in Japan: Strategic Importance, Local Treatment

Paul S. Giarra

Introduction and Objective

American bases in Japan are a key building block of the bilateral security alliance. Never uncontroversial, for the past decade they have been under increased if not unprecedented pressure as the clear exigencies and structured response of the Cold War fade from our collective consciousness and alliance routine.

The Three Principles of a Strategic Base Review

One: Future of the Bases Amounts to a Review of the Alliance Itself. Because U.S. bases in Japan are so fundamental to the alliance as we know it today as well as historically, a review of the future of the bases essentially amounts to a review of the alliance itself. An essential aspect of this review must be to raise the consideration of the future of U.S. bases from the particular to the general, from the single issue level to the conceptual procedures that will in turn shape our subsequent responses to those particular issues.

American bases in Japan are a means to several vital strategic ends, including but not limited to:

- Deterrence, crisis response, and warfighting capabilities that underscore our bilateral commitment to regional stability and bilateral security;

- Responsibility-sharing that is the essence of alliance solidarity in the U.S.-Japan security relationship;

- A conscious and legitimate alternative to Japanese force structure and capabilities that otherwise would be necessary; and

- The enhancement of forward-deployed U.S. military power that underscores U.S. engagement in the region.

These and other strategic ends should be catalogued and validated in a strategic review of the alliance. Priority should be given to reformulating the objectives of the U.S. force presence in a broadened and rationalized, rather than political and local, context. This would include taking the following factors into consideration as fundamental drivers of base issues:

- The realities of the Asia-Pacific region and the security environment of the early 21st century, anticipating changes through 2020;

- Clarification of potential challenges for the alliance that are in essence planning cases for base issues;

- Alliance alignment, modernized for the 21st century;

- Respective national security and military roles and missions; and

- The anticipated requirements of modern and future warfare;

Two: A "Top Down" Approach. This paper will put the bases in strategic perspective, describe the strategic context for the next 20 years in which they must be examined, and lay out recommended course of action for the alliance. This is a consciously top-down approach. It has been rejected in the past because alliance mechanisms have been designed for dealing with individual discrete issues almost to the exclusion of general principles. Our alliance management heritage has become one of individuals or events forcing the resolution of individual issues and incremental progress in the alliance. This approach, suited to alliance politics, may still be necessary, but it is no longer sufficient during a period of significant strategic, military, and political transformation in the region and within the alliance.

Three: "Fewer is Not better; Better is Better." At the outset, the alliance must reject the approach adopted in the past, that is, to identify an installation or facility for reversion or consolidation, or a unit for reduction or re-deployment, and then focus attention on that goal as an isolated issue that becomes an end unto itself. Further, the alliance should reject the increasingly accepted principle of alliance management that the fewer American troops in Japan the better.

This so-called normalization of the alliance and transfer of responsibilities within the alliance <u>as an end in itself</u>, in the long run will undercut and destabilize the alliance rather than shore it up.

Because alliance process is so important to the issue of base review, conclusions will attempt to strike a balance between describing what should happen and recommending how to achieve productive change.

The Problem of the Bases in the 21st Century

Although they represent a significant contribution to stability, deterrence, and defense, American bases in Japan almost never have been discussed in their strategic context. They were treated as an exclusive American concern during the Cold War. Except in Okinawa, periodic large-scale base reversion efforts relatively early in the Cold War reduced friction over bases in most of Japan to manageable levels. Since the Persian Gulf War, however, base issues, especially in Okinawa, have come to be a major factor in the alliance as the countries of the region have recalculated their national interests after the Cold War. Some refer to this new dynamic strategic environment of shifting power relationships as the new "Great Game" in Asia.

American Bases in Japan Are Not a Prefectural or Municipal Issue. In Japan, base issues have been treated as a prefectural problem to be resolved by American concessions for too long. Addressing prefectural and municipal concerns is of course important, and there are approaches to basing – including technology alternatives, integration with the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and dual civil and military use – which can reduce the local burden of American bases in Okinawa and elsewhere in Japan. However, the strategic relevance of American bases should be the starting point for base discussions rather than an afterthought, and must no longer be deferred by alliance managers, military commanders, politicians, and the press.

American practices reflect this localized approach. Responsibility for the administration of American bases resides largely with the American Country Team. The administration of the Joint Committee Process and the formulation of the Host Nation Support and Facilities Improvement Program budgets are examples of both responsibility and authority having been localized in the Embassy and U.S. Forces Japan. This delegation of authority no longer is sufficient to deal with the strategic and alliance management issues that are beyond the capabilities and authority of the Country Team. From an American perspective, these issues must be decided and led from Washington and Pacific Command Headquarters.

A Status of Forces Alliance. Emphasizing local concerns reflects the real character of the bilateral Japan-U.S. security relationship. Bases are viewed in an exclusively local context because the bilateral alliance has been and remains to this day a

Status of Forces Agreement designed to facilitate American presence rather than a warfighting pact concerned with strategic issues. Alliance mechanisms relegate base issues to the local level because that is what they were designed to do.

Japan's Strategic Interests. American bases in Japan affect Japan's own national security interests in a dynamic region and alliance commitments and the U.S. strategic posture in East Asia, as well as relations throughout the region.

Japan's Own National Security Interests. American bases defend Japanese interests directly and throughout the region. Critics argue that American bases, especially in Okinawa, and American Marines in particular, are obsolete and a relic of the Cold War or even of the American occupation. Nevertheless, the long-term contribution of these bases to stability, deterrence, and defense is broadly acknowledged and generally accepted in Washington, Tokyo, and throughout the region. Even Pyongyang has come to recognize this fact. These strategic circumstances will persist as long as the United States remains a superpower committed to maintaining a significant military presence in the region, the Korean Peninsula remains unstable, and China and Japan emerge as great powers.

American bases in Okinawa and elsewhere in Japan still exist because Japanese and American security interests generally overlap. These common interests are the fundamental basis for the bilateral security relationship. Japan's interest in stability, deterrence, and defense will remain constant with or without American bases. Keeping the bases is the simplest and most direct way for Japan to secure these interests, and reflects a clear Japanese preference for strictly limited self-defense and a military reliance upon the United States.

American and Alliance Realities. Because of the lack of viable alternatives elsewhere in Japan and throughout the region, American commitment to bases in Okinawa has remained strong. From a strategic perspective they fill an essential role, providing significant combat capability for deployment throughout the region in response to alliance commitments and American national interests.

However, these bases are not a perfect solution from a military perspective. Military planners would prefer a more distributed presence throughout the region, for instance, and the concentration of assets on Okinawa limits the operational flexibility of American forces in Japan. Given Okinawa's location and the concentration of U.S. forces there, logistics and strategic lift also are challenges for American commanders.

And the proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles, in both North Korea and China, put the bases at risk and reduce their utility as secure rear area staging points.

In the alliance context, the negative consequences of what amount to strategic limitations on American bases in Japan, especially in Okinawa, are as significant in the negative sense as their benefits are positive. Extensive restrictions have been imposed on routine training and other peacetime functions in order to reduce the negative impact upon the communities that host the bases.

Will the Alliance Work?

These daily restrictions are significant and have a severe practical effect upon the training and readiness of U.S. forces. The more severe political limitations on crisis response are even more significant.

Routine Impediments Are an Indicator of Insufficient Alliance Readiness. An honest appraisal of the readiness of the alliance to respond effectively to a crisis in East Asia – the commonly accepted planning case is that of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula – would judge that progress has been unsatisfactory. In particular, coordination with Japanese agencies and local governments outside the classic range of MOFA, JDA, and the SDF has been insufficient. If there were a conflict in Korea tomorrow, the utility of American bases in Japan would be significantly and unnecessarily constrained. The broader implementation of bilateral agreements reached in 1996 and 1997 extending beyond the traditional range of defense cooperation – the Defense Guidelines and ACSA in particular – has not been satisfactory so far. This is a good opportunity to conduct a zero-based review of progress so far, to check it against objective requirements, and re-calibrate the efforts to achieve the new procedural breakthroughs necessary to successfully exploit base capabilities in case of crisis.

There is no substitute for exercising alliance capabilities and plans, learning from shortfalls and deficiencies, and incorporating lessons learned into revised alliance procedures and requirements.

Another gap in the process appears to be the continuing resistance on the part of U.S. military commanders to coordinate internally and then share with Japanese political leaders, commanders, and alliance managers a realistic and detailed range of potential American operations and support requirements. The reality of the alliance is that the political costs of Japanese cooperation expand exponentially the closer the request comes

to the time of the requirement, and the quality and extent of that cooperation decreases in the inverse proportion.

This is not a new concept: astute military commanders prefer to have planned, exercised, checked, and re-checked everything they can control before an operation begins. We should be able to anticipate requirements for a Korean crisis, and plan, exercise, and revise procedures and practices accordingly, in advance.

This raises five important points:

- First, prudent planning of the sort described above reflects an alliance changed conceptually, in accordance with political agreements now several years old. If we cannot undertake such tasks, then we will have to re-calibrate our assessment of the evolution of the alliance.

- Second. military-to-military planning is drastically insufficient to achieve these results.

  – The required military planning itself is inherently policy and political, and should be led by the defense and diplomatic bureaucracies on both sides and guided by the political leadership.

  – Alliance military planning is dependent upon the knowledge, acceptance, and active cooperation of many contributors not generally associated with security issues in Japan. As a political or as a practical matter, it does absolutely no good to have a perfect plan that has not been coordinated in advance with those who must implement it, especially when political obstacles have to be overcome to facilitate successful implementation.

- Third, it would be a drastic mistake to limit assumptions, discussion, and planning to a Korean scenario. There are myriad other scenarios that should drive planning. Some are less stressful than a war on the Korean Peninsula, such as a major Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) elsewhere in the region. Some are both operationally and politically much more demanding, such as a crisis with China over Taiwan.

- Fourth, there is a very broad range of quantitative and qualitative requirements that must be considered in advance if the goal of effective alliance response is to be achieved. Bilateral command and control arrangements and national command

responsibilities should reflect this range. For the U.S. side, it is unlikely that the capabilities of local commanders in Japan will be sufficient to plan or respond effectively, and CINCPAC will have to take a much more active and directive role.

- Fifth, it is impossible to anticipate every requirement in advance. In order to be able to respond flexibly, coordination mechanisms must be established that operate full time and with the resources and authority to facilitate rapid and effective alliance decision making and action.

Crisis Response: Reducing Uncertainty. During the Cold War, there was no clear certainty, or even reasonable assurance, that the United States could employ bases in Japan in a conflict with the Soviet Union. Over the last decade, alliance managers have worked very hard to achieve bilateral concurrence on potential American military responses to a crisis on the Korean Peninsula from bases in Japan. Explicitly expressed in the Tokyo Security Declaration of April 1996, Japan's acceptance of limited direct responsibility for response to a Korean crisis was the point of the recent Defense Guidelines review, and represents a significant and rather explicit Japanese recognition of the importance to Japan of Korean stability.

This is important because the ability to respond quickly and effectively to a crisis on the Peninsula is so essential to regional stability and bilateral defense, and the alliance determination to do so had to be consciously asserted after the end of the Cold War. So far, the practical steps necessary to ensure readiness of the prefectural and municipal level civil response in case of a serious crisis on the Korean Peninsula have not been taken. This deficit will seriously undermine the utility of the American presence in Japan if not resolved.

More broadly, the national-level decision making process that currently exists is obsolete, whereby Japan would commit strategically both to the utilization of American bases in a crisis and to significant Japanese political and tangible support for alliance military operations. It is not sufficient to depend upon "just-in-time" decision making. If and when the time comes to commit the alliance and employ the bases, decisions will have to be well-informed and timely. Difficulties can be avoided by extensive discussions in the clarity of peacetime in advance of ultimate decisions at the time of conflict. Channels for the exchange of information and political discussions will have to be expanded and routines adopted beyond anything now envisioned. There are technical and organizational enhancements available to do so, but bureaucratic inertia will have to be overcome in order to implement them successfully.

Taiwan: An Unresolved Alliance Issue. So far the alliance has steered clear of the politically sensitive but strategically essential ability to respond in the defense of Taiwan. This is a strategic requirement that the alliance has not even been able to address, let alone agree upon.

From a U.S. military perspective, it probably is not possible to defend Taiwan without access to American bases in Okinawa and elsewhere in Japan. Certainly, American expectations of full-fledged Japanese support would be very high in a conflict with China over Taiwan. All of the foregoing observations concerning requirements in response to a Korean crisis apply. However, no effective bilateral understanding exists concerning this potential contingency, and the track record of the alliance underscores the presumption that use of Okinawan bases in this scenario would be severely limited by the Government of Japan.

Beyond the severe military consequences of base unavailability, the political ramifications for the alliance of failing to respond effectively would be drastic. As in the case of defending South Korea, the inability of the alliance to respond effectively would shatter carefully nurtured perceptions of mutual reliance and strategic value. This reality should begin to put the strategic importance of American bases in Okinawa in an additional China-Taiwan context. Resolving this important alliance issue should be a high priority.

Post-unification Korea. Whether through collapse, crisis, or consensus, the eventual re-unification of the Korean Peninsula looms on the horizon. The net strategic result will be to provide for significant, potentially drastic, withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Peninsula. This will exacerbate base issues in Japan, placing even more pressure on the alliance for mitigating solutions that accentuate the positive benefits of a strategic American capability in Japan while reducing the corrosive frictions of daily base management.

What's Different in Asia Now That Raises the Stakes for the U.S.-Japan Alliance? One could say that current circumstances are not new, that the alliance has always been buffeted, by challenges worse than base issues, and that the relationship runs too deep to prevent any serious derailment. However, the fundamentals have changed significantly.

The Cold War strategic triangle – the Soviets confronted by the United States and China – has been turned on its head, and Moscow and Beijing are now acting to constrain the United States, leaving Japan wondering where it fits in.

Japan herself has new options, opportunities, and concerns. Having concluded that Japan has no alternative to the alliance with the United States, Americans have stopped thinking about the issue.

The Cold War ended without resolving Russian, Chinese, Korean, or Japanese futures. There is a "New Great Game" underway, in which the powers of the region are readjusting relationships and re-calibrating rivalries. We failed to achieve real "war termination" at the end of the Cold War, and there are dragon's teeth of potential conflict sown throughout Eurasia.

China is working through what comes after "Red." In the meantime, apparently hardliners have won, Beijing has declared the United States its opponent, and planning appears to have begun for a military conflict over Taiwan.

Our notion of Chinese revanchism includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. What else does Beijing want to regain in the Russian Far East and Central Asia?

We have been afraid of Chinese weakness for the last eight years, instead of considering the possibilities of a strong China.

The Korean Peninsula – frozen by its division – soon enough will be "in play" once again.

In the Russian Far East, Moscow must consider the implications of further devolution of its former empire. Eight million resource-rich Russians are neighbors to 250 million poor Chinese. The future of Pacific Russia probably will not be decided by the Kremlin.

An American military buildup is by no means certain. For instance, significant post-Korean unification U.S. force reductions and base closures could be in store that will both reflect and prompt changed strategic circumstances.

Warfare is evolving. Allies generally and Japan in particular have not been able to keep up with U.S. military developments, and are being left further and further behind. Bases in Japan – if anything the underlying rationale for the alliance – may be less important militarily, and more difficult to defend.

Therefore, for the United States Asia will be more fractious, more competitive, more insecure, more unstable, and we will be able to do less about it.

Frankly, this will make our present squabbles look pretty insignificant in retrospect.

No "Free Ride" for Japan. Beyond the carefully constrained process of reversion and consolidation underway on Okinawa, if bases in Okinawa are further reduced or eliminated something will have to take their place. New American defense technology could in part make up for force reductions. Theoretically American military capabilities could shift to other locations in Japan, or perhaps elsewhere in the region, but doing so would be no less difficult than relocating the Marine Corps base at Futenma elsewhere in Okinawa. Additional Japanese force structure and new roles and missions might take the place of diminished American capabilities. Not compensating in some way is not an option: there will be no free ride for Japan.

Dependence Upon *Gaiatsu* to Get Things Done in the Alliance Has Reached Unhealthy Levels. Dependence upon external events for resolution of issues has reached unhealthy levels in the alliance. *Gaiatsu,* or external pressure on Japan to get things done, is insufficient to describe this reality, for it just one example of a larger, increasingly unsustainable reality that includes the United States as well.

Fundamentally, neither side has been willing to approach Okinawa or other key base issues as if change were necessary. This is a recipe for failure in the face of overall change.

The G8 Summit in Okinawa was emblematic of the tendency of both the U.S. and Japanese governments to take an episodic rather than a systemic approach to base problems and other issues in the bilateral alliance. Over the years, both countries, not just Japan, have tacitly agreed to depend upon *gaiatsu*. This is not the way to run the relationship, especially when the long-term future viability of American engagement in Asia is at stake. This approach becomes especially problematic when outside pressure comes from a third source, such as in the Okinawan rape crisis of 1995 or the launch of a North Korean missile over Japan.

What's wrong with this picture? There is an unhealthy dependence on external events to decide policy, and neither side has been willing to approach Okinawa as if change were inherently necessary. The requisite bilateral institutions and mechanisms for resolving these issues simply do not exist – nor does it appear that they will develop any time soon.

One way to explain the present deficiency is to recognize that the structures and mechanisms of the alliance may have been sufficient for the Cold War, during which avoiding change was a virtue. During this earlier period, both sides accommodated the bilateral disparities between national internal decision making processes.

Since then, however, Japan's central government security policy decision making has not been able to come to grips with the inherent tension between national priorities and local Japanese domestic interests. Nor has the alliance developed the structures and mechanisms to deal with issues such as these bilaterally. There is no prospect of this situation improving any time soon, either.

Nevertheless, the alliance [and the United States] is confronted by the clear necessity of preserving those bases that we need, and in my opinion by embracing change in order to do so.

Time for Strategic Dialogue on American Bases in Okinawa. By any practical measure, American bases in Japan are of exceptional strategic value militarily. They are of profound strategic political importance to the alliance. And they play a fundamental role in preserving the strategic stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Without de-emphasizing local efforts, it is time that the Japan-U.S. alliance began a serious dialogue designed to highlight and preserve the strategic importance of these American bases.

It is time to raise the discussion of American bases to the strategic level. Treating these bases as "someone else's problem," merely as a means by which to facilitate American operations from and around Japan, is a reflection of the failure to integrate the alliance. This segregation is in itself becoming a strategic issue for both Japan and the United States, and one reason for the observation that the alliance has been adrift for over a decade.

In the United States a tentative discussion has begun over bases in Japan. It is not yet a debate and by no means has been elevated to a policy priority. Still in a very early stage and completely unofficial, this discussion is starting to consider future security challenges, alternative American security strategies, and the potential for a changed U.S. military posture in the Pacific. The American discussion is being shaped by expectations concerning the availability and utility of bases in Okinawa and elsewhere in Japan. It is beginning to consider new strategic drivers, such as energy supplies and proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles; the implications and potential outcomes of emerging political, economic, and military competitions between nations in the region; and the effect of new military technologies on U.S. capabilities and requirements.

This sort of fundamental, objective, future-oriented discussion will be necessary for consensus on whether American bases are strategically important to Japan rather than a local issue to be managed. To be effective, this discussion must occur independently in the United States and Japan, and then be addressed bilaterally as an alliance issue. American thinking might provide the structural basis for Japan's own strategic debate over American bases in Okinawa, but Japan will have to conduct its own internal dialogue – re-oriented to address strategic considerations – and then the alliance will have to resolve the differences. Unless Tokyo and Washington undertake a serious effort to reach strategic agreement on what should change and why, and the strategic and military operational rationale for base consolidation and reversion, further changes in Okinawan base structure beyond the SACO agreement will impose severe political costs on the alliance.

For the United States this process must determine the importance of American access and influence in Asia, and the future of bilateral relations with Japan.

Japan must decide on its security role, nationally and within the alliance. American thinking may or may not provide the structural basis for Japan's own strategic debate, but realistically Japan will have to conduct its own internal dialogue – re-oriented to address strategic considerations – and then the alliance will have to resolve the differences.

This sort of fundamental, objective, non-partisan and future-oriented discussion will be necessary for consensus on how to proceed. To be effective, it must occur independently in the United States and Japan, and then be addressed bilaterally as an alliance issue.

Tokyo and Washington will have to undertake a serious effort to reach strategic agreement on what should change in the alliance, why those changes are necessary, and then how to achieve them. Otherwise, the geostrategic and military rationale for the alliance will continue to wither and failures of preparation will result in failures of fact.

Analysis of Options

Bearing in mind the prescription to provide solutions rather than simply describe problems, there are a number of key alliance actions necessary.

Revamping the alliance's consultative mechanisms into a practically oriented decision making relationship is a first priority, and is the preferable approach, but we are

so far from even recognizing the deficiency that waiting for progress is not a viable approach. The United States is going to have to look to its own interests, and act unilaterally to the maximum extent possible. Fortunately, those interests largely parallel those of Japan in an objective, rational sense, albeit not always in a local domestic context.

Recommendations

The alliance [and the United States] is confronted by the clear necessity of preserving those bases that we need, and in my opinion by embracing change in order to do so.

Action Items: Alliance Actions. Under the best of circumstances, the alliance would conduct individual national studies that led to a bilateral strategic dialogue on bases, focusing at a minimum on the following key issues:

1) The implications and consequences of the emergence of China.

2) The potential for a near-term Sino-American confrontation over Taiwan, and alliance implications and requirements.

3) Geostrategic outcomes of Korean unification, and political and military implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance and its bases.

4) Anticipating changing Japanese roles and missions:
What is likely to change?
How far might change extend?
What are the implications for the American force posture in East Asia?

5) The costs and benefits of integrating American bases:
Economically with local communities.
Militarily with the Self-Defense Forces.

6) Alternatives to the current base structure:
Technical solutions.
Diversification beyond Japan.
New deployment schemes.

7) Redressing the dependence upon short-range operational systems and logistics that drive base structure.

Limitations of this approach.

Action Items: Unilateral American Actions. While a strategic dialogue and working through specific challenges bilaterally is preferable, it may not be realistic. It is more likely that the United States will have to move ahead unilaterally on a range of issues, concentrating on those things that can be achieved unilaterally to affect change. This is necessary because alliance mechanisms are so weak and the two sides in the bilateral security relationship are talking different bureaucratic languages, at cross purposes.

The United States should consider unilateral action, depending only upon permission rather than agreement from the Government of Japan. Without doing so, the United States risks putting the force structure that it will need in Japan for the long haul at considerable and unnecessary risk.

There are several significant unilateral actions that the U.S. could take, without having to wait for public opinion or extensive bilateral consultation. Their implementation will require breaking down resistance to change in the U.S. military. Here are some specific suggestions, representative rather than exhaustive, that describe the range of relatively unilateral actions possible with relatively little effort:

- Move large C-135 class aircraft from Kadena Air Base on Okinawa to Misawa in northern Honshu;

- Transfer the headquarters of the U.S. Air Force Special Operations and Search and Rescue squadrons to Korea;

- Consolidate U.S. Army facilities on Okinawa with U.S. Marine Corps facilities.

More generally, there is a broad range of base integration measures that should be pursued. One example would be to exploit the potential for changes within the limits of existing SDF bases and facilities, such as by co-locating U.S. P-3 squadrons with their JMSDF counterparts at bases such as Naha.

This must work in reverse as well: the U.S. should insist upon joint use of essential facilities such as Yokota Air Base with the SDF, establishing the combined rationale for their longevity. This formula should include civilian presence as well.

Overcoming the legal obstacles to permitting civil-military use of heretofore exclusive U.S. military facilities should be a high priority.

Other examples of procedural priorities would be the implementation of effective civil-military access sharing beyond the examples that already exist. To start, the issue of sharing pier facilities in Sasebo should be resolved to set a clear and useful precedent for effective time sharing. Making the new civilian port at Urasoe a priority, and including a replacement for Naha military port should be another alliance priority that establishes a new approach to problem solving and base consolidation.

Conclusion

"Pay Now or Pay Later." Adjustments within the theater and throughout Japan are far preferable to redeployment of forces back to the United States. Such withdrawals may become necessary, but they should come only as a result of a deliberate planning process that involves every aspect of the bilateral alliance. It would be a drastic misstep for the alliance to allow such changes to occur either unilaterally, as the result of external action-forcing events, or as the result of preconceived notions that fewer American troops benefit the alliance.

Prudent action in advance is not only beneficial for its own sake in strengthening alliance mechanisms, but also has the added advantage of being able to consider a broader context for prudent and deliberate change, before circumstances force the alliance to react spontaneously under pressure.

Chapter 7: Complication: American Military Presence in Okinawa and Enhancing the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Iguchi Haruo

Introduction

Okinawa is important to Japan and the U.S. because of its geostrategic location. When thinking about potential northern and particularly southern destabilizing factors surrounding Japan, Okinawa is one of Japan's most valuable military assets and its bilateral security relations with the U.S. Given the Bush administration's move toward focusing its strategic world view on Asia, in particular China, the strategic value of Okinawa has increased. Without the American military presence in Okinawa, Japan not only would have to increase the Self-Defense Force (SDF) presence in Okinawa but would also have to significantly increase its military budget. Should the U.S. decrease its military force in Okinawa without prior extensive consultation with Japan, this could potentially undermine the enhancement of the Japan-U.S. alliance that has been a crucial factor for the security of the two nations as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere. Furthermore, if the presence of the American military in Okinawa decreases with or without prior consultation with Japan, Okinawa may face dire economic consequences when considering the fact that (1) about 5 percent of the Okinawan economy continues to be dependent on the presence of American bases for employment, land revenues, and subcontracting;[1] (2) Okinawa's per capita income remains the lowest in the country; (3) unemployment is about twice the national average; and (4) in 1998, 77.1 percent of the Okinawa Prefectural Government's revenues were subsidized by the Japanese central government compared to the national average of 49.9 percent.[2] This grim economic situation would be far worse if the size of American forces in Okinawa suddenly decreases while Okinawa struggled to find ways to diversify its weak economic structure in the midst of Japan's economic restructuring. This paper will make suggestions about what can be done in Okinawa to reinforce security relations between Japan and America.

---

1. *Okinawa Times*, April 9, 2001; Okinawa Development Agency, *Okinawa Economic Situation*, June 1999, p. 13; "Asia: The New U.S. Strategy," *BusinessWeek*, May 28, 2001, p. 20; *Asahi Shimbun*, May 8, 2001, p. 7.

2. Okinawa Development Agency, *Okinawa Economic Survey*, December 1999, p. 5; Okinawa Development Agency, *Okinawa Economic Survey*, December 1999, p. 70. Unemployment in 1999 was 8.3 percent in Okinawa compared to the national average of 4.7 percent; see www2.cao.go.jp/2/2-3-9.htm.

Basic Rationale of the Alliance

In order to preserve and expand Japan's influence in the international political economy, Japan should not take its current security arrangement with the U.S. for granted. It should strive to reinforce this bilateral security relationship by providing laws and legal interpretations that sanction collective self-defense, including possibly changing Article 9 of the constitution so that Japan can exercise, at least to some degree, the right to collective self-defense, the limits of which should be decided in the Diet. Japan should also participate more fully and actively in collective security-related activities of the United Nations, such as U.N. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Finally, depending on whether Japan can politically settle in an adequate way the right to exercise collective self-defense, it may be able to effectively assist the U.S. in organizing a security network in Southeast Asia and Oceania for dealing with piracy, terrorism, and contraband. Okinawan bases provide an important launch pad for these kinds of operations.

Potential sources of regional instability continue to exist in areas north and south of Japan. In the north, political and social instability in the Russian Far East may cause future regional instability in addition to exacerbating current problems in Russo-Japanese relations (e.g., the dispute over Japan's northern islands under Russian occupation and the smuggling of illegal arms and drugs from the Russian Far East into Japan by criminals and terrorists). While Japan and America should welcome and encourage the positive developments on the Korean Peninsula, the two nations should use their security treaty as a tool that, along with the U.S.-South Korea security treaty, contributes to the transition process leading up to and after reunification. This process is encumbered by far greater political, social, and economic problems than the two German states after their reunification. This transition on the Korean Peninsula can be made easier with an American military presence not only in South Korea but in Okinawa and other parts of Japan. (The author hopes that the Japanese-Korean dispute over Takeshima/Tokdo can be avoided during this transition period.)

Southern sources of regional instability may have far greater consequences for Japan's political economy because they involve Japan's sea-lanes and air routes, vital for Japan's access to foreign markets and raw materials, especially oil.[3] The 1996 Taiwan

3. Other examples of potential threats to Japan's sea-lanes are the Chinese and Taiwanese dispute with Japan over the Senkaku Islands; the domestic turmoil in Indonesia, which might pose a danger to ships passing through the Straits of Malacca and other nearby areas; piracy in Southeast Asia as well as in the South and East China Seas; and the territorial disputes over the potentially oil-rich Spratly Islands. Finally, Japan's continuing dependence on Middle Eastern oil makes it imperative that peace and stability be achieved in the Middle East and South Asia where India and Pakistan continue a buildup of nuclear and non-nuclear arms.

Strait crisis, when Chinese missiles landed near Japan's shipping lanes near Okinawa, serves as a clear reminder of the potential impact of cross-Strait instability on Japan. Furthermore, the Japanese public has learned the importance of Okinawa in gathering military intelligence on China through media coverage in April of the collision between the U.S. Naval reconnaissance plane EP-3E Aries II from Kadena Air Base and a Chinese F-8 fighter. As a recent *BusinessWeek* article points out, various "U.S. military studies suggest China is making progress in developing more sophisticated nuclear warheads and missiles – and in turning its huge but antiquated army into a modern high-tech military force capable of regaining Taiwan and spreading its power to every corner of the South China Sea within a few decades."[4]

Although Japan and America should strive to avert China's isolation and to maintain cooperative relations through dialogue on security and economic issues, the recurrent tensions between Taiwan and China (that may lead to a credible Chinese threat to Taiwan in 2005-2007)[5] also require that the alliance act as a counterweight to the rise of such tensions. This does not preclude, however, Japan and U.S. long-term cooperation to create a multilateral framework for addressing security and economic problems in Northeast Asia.[6]

Under the current security arrangement between Japan and the U.S., the latter has protected Japan's sea-lanes in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Taiwan Strait, and has thus contributed in a major way to secure Japan's access to Middle Eastern oil. The American military presence in Japan has contributed to creating a level of regional stability in the Asia-Pacific (and other parts of the world) without which Japan's prosperity in the post-1945 years would have been impossible.

---

4. "Asia: The New U.S. Strategy," *BusinessWeek*, May 28, 2001, p. 20. With regard to how the U.S. should engage with China, see, in addition to this *BusinessWeek* article and footnote 5 the following: Richard K. Betts and Thomas J. Christensen, "China: Getting the Question Right," *The National Interest* (Winter 2000/01): pp. 17-29; and David Shambaugh, "Facing Reality in China Policy," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2001): pp. 50-64.

5. David Shambaugh, "Sino-American Strategic Relations: From Partners to Competitors," *Survival* (Spring 2000), p. 106; William S. Cohen, "The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait," Report to the Congress pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1999) cited in Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Living with China," *The National Interest* (Spring 2000), p. 14.

6. On the future possibility of a multilateral framework in Northeast Asia, see Dennis C. Blair and John T. Hanley, Jr., "From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangement," *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 2001).

Recent Japanese and American Public Sentiments Toward U.S. Military Presence in Japan

Although Japan is currently prevented legally from exercising the right to collective self-defense, Japan has strived to preserve its alliance with America by providing host nation support for U.S. bases in Japan, which in 1999 covered about 58 percent of the annual cost of stationing U.S. forces. In addition, the SDF provides logistical and rear area support for the U.S. military in Japan, although questions remain regarding the extent to which the SDF can render support in case of an emergency due to collective self-defense issues.

But putting aside the issue of collective self-defense, the two nations need to reassert the importance of having U.S. military bases in Japan, particularly in Okinawa, where 75 percent of American bases (in acreage) are located in a prefecture that accounts for only 0.6 percent of Japan's territory. (About 10.4 percent of Okinawa's land is used by U.S. bases compared to the national average of 0.02 percent.) Okinawa hosts about 25,000 out of 51,500 U.S. military personnel (excluding civilians and including Navy personnel on off-shore duties), about 15,500 are Marines (about 3,000 to 4,000 on a six-month rotational training and the remainder on assignment for two to three years).[7]

On Dec. 29, 2000, the *Yomiuiri Shimbun* reported the results of a public opinion survey jointly conducted with Gallup Poll. Although the majority of both Japanese and Americans in this survey thought that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty contributed to security in the Asia-Pacific region, only 28.6 percent of Japanese respondents supported the idea of maintaining the current level of U.S. forces in Japan in comparison to 63.6 percent of American respondents. There were other stark contrasts between the two publics' attitudes toward American bases in Japan: 12.6 percent of American respondents thought that the current level of U.S. forces should be strengthened in comparison to 1 percent of Japanese respondents; 52.5 percent of Japanese respondents thought that the current level should decrease compared to 15.4 percent of American respondents.[8]

---

7. See the home page of United States Forces Japan (USFJ), www.yokota.af.mil. Personnel strength figures are based on USFJ Web page that showed the figures for January 2001 at www.yokota.af.mil/orgs/usfj/perstabl.htm.

8. According to this *Yomiuri*-Gallup survey, 14 percent of Japanese and 6 percent of American respondents thought that the U.S. forces should completely withdraw from Japan; only 4 percent of Japanese and 2.4 percent of American respondents did not answer this question regarding the current level of American force in Japan. With regard to the question concerning the contribution of the bilateral security treaty to the security of the Asia-Pacific region, the result is as follows (translation into English by the author):

	Japanese	Americans
Contributing Greatly	19.2%	24.3%

Japanese inhabitants living near U.S. bases, such as Yokota (Tokyo), Atsugi (Kanagawa Prefecture), Misawa (Aomori Prefecture), and Kadena and Futenma (Okinawa Prefecture), have been battling in Japanese courts protesting noise pollution, inadequate safety measures, and environmental concerns. Recently, Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro, a populist and nationalist, has been arguing for the complete return of Yokota Air Base's air space to Japanese jurisdiction, though discussions at the working level have resulted in incremental returns over the years.

Finally, according to a public opinion survey reported by *Asahi Shimbun* on May 2, though 70 percent of those surveyed affirmed that Japan's alliance with the U.S. has been contributing to peace and stability of Japan and Asia and 74 percent of respondents indicated their continued support for this bilateral alliance, 63 percent thought that the U.S. bases in Okinawa should be gradually downsized compared with 14 percent who preferred maintaining the status quo, 8 percent who supported relocating the bases to other parts of Japan, and 11 percent who wanted an immediate and complete removal. Even 65 percent of those who support the bilateral security alliance wanted a gradual decrease of U.S. bases in Okinawa.[9]

The attitude among Okinawans toward American bases is much more complex. According to a 1998 survey conducted by *Okinawa Times* shortly after Governor Ota Masahide's rejection of moving the U.S. Marines' helicopter facilities to a facility off the coast of Nago, 55 percent of the Okinawan respondents supported the governor in comparison to 21 percent who disagreed. In addition, 49 percent wanted the Futenma Marine base to be moved to the U.S., and 13 percent wanted it to be moved elsewhere in Japan, while 14 percent supported building a new facility off the coast of Nago and 6 percent supported relocation within Okinawa. When *Okinawa Times* asked about Ota's proposal to eliminate all U.S. bases by 2015, 30 percent supported the proposal, 40 percent wanted a 50 percent reduction, and 12 percent wanted to maintain the status quo. Based on these results, *Okinawa Times* concluded: First, compared to a 1997 survey in which 49 percent of respondents expressed "hope" for the aforementioned proposal by Governor Ota, in 1998, Okinawans had become more "realistic" about the overwhelming presence of U.S. bases in Okinawa. The newspaper also concluded that Okinawans are ambivalent about U.S. military bases in Okinawa because of fear of losing jobs on those

Somewhat Contributing	42.9	55.7
Not much Contributing	15.9	9.4
Not Contributing at All	7.7	4.1
Unanswered	14.2	6.4

9. A survey by *Asahi Shimbun* in April 1997 showed that 76 percent supported the continuation of the alliance; see the above May 2, 2001 article.

bases and the loss of payments to those who own land in the American military facilities. Even though a survey reported in December 1999 by *Okinawa Times* noted that more Okinawans opposed the current plan to relocate Futenma to Nago, [10] it is most likely that Okinawans continue to have ambivalent feelings about the reduction of U.S. military bases in Okinawa.

Because of the concentrated series of crimes and incidents by U.S. military personnel and their dependents against Okinawans from January to spring of 2001,[11] there now exists a resurgence of Okinawan anger toward the American military presence in their islands, a situation that should not be ignored as mere political rhetoric to win economic aid from Tokyo or as political maneuvering for upcoming local elections. (These include this year's mayoral election in Ginowan, where the Marine Futenma Air Base is located; next year's mayoral election in Nago, where the Futenma facility is scheduled to be moved; the gubernatorial election in 2002; and the Upper House Diet election in 2001 summer in which former Governor Ota will run as a Socialist candidate.) This increased anger, if mishandled, has the potential to destabilize the Japan-U.S. security alliance.

This anti-military base perception, particularly toward the U.S., is reflected and reproduced in the editorial policy of two major local papers, *Okinawa Times* and *Ryukyu Shimpo* that are very influential in forming public opinion in Okinawa – and in many instances influential in the mainland media as well. Despite the local newspapers' editorial bias, they have recently reported on the petition movement led by the Japanese labor union *Rengo* to downsize the U.S. military presence, among other measures.[12] The

---

10. Seventy-eight percent of those who supported Governor Ota's proposal wanted the proposed helicopter facility be moved outside Okinawa (61 percent wanted it to be moved to the U.S. and 17 percent to somewhere else in Japan). For surveys conducted by *Okinawa Times*, see www.okinawatimes.co.jp.

11. See the following articles in *Okinawa Times* at www.okinawatimes.co.jp for examples of crimes and incidents by American military personnel and their dependents, and responses to them by Okinawans: April 16; April 1 and March 2; March 22 (evening edition) and March 23; March 29 (evening edition), March 30 April 3; February 16, February 25; January 13, January 18 (morning and evening editions), January 19 (evening edition), January 20, January 23; and January 15.

It should be noted that since 1972, when the U.S. returned Okinawa to Japan, there has been a declining trend until recently (in terms of cases and numbers of people) of police arrests in Okinawa of American military personnel, American civilian employees in American bases, and the dependents of these Americans; however, when one looks at this record for the last several years, 1995 was the lowest in terms of numbers of Americans arrested and 1998 was the lowest in terms of numbers of cases involving Americans. Both categories have rebounded since 1995 and 1998 respectively. See these crime statistics on the home page of the Okinawa Prefectural Government, www.pref.okinawa.jp.

12. The petition calls for action in four areas: (1) downsize American military personnel and bases in Okinawa; (2) fundamentally revise the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA); (3) ensure the reemployment

petition did not achieve the stated goal of 1 million signatures nationwide by April 20. As of April 17, 800,000 signatures were collected, out of which Okinawa was supposed to provide 500,000, but only achieved 90,000; after extending the deadline for nearly a week, the final count did reach 1 million (1,000,044), though the numerical target for Okinawa was never realized (290,000). This outcome further reflects the ambivalent feeling among Okinawans toward U.S. military bases.

Furthermore, on May 20, the Japanese government announced the results of a fourth government public opinion survey on Okinawan attitude toward base issues conducted from February 8 to 18. Out of 2000 Okinawans (aged over 20) polled, 1,374 responded. According to this survey, when asked about whether American bases in Okinawa were necessary for the security of Japan, 9.8 percent actively supported them and 35.9 percent passively supported them, whereas 20.6 percent responded they were unnecessary and 23.8 percent responded they actually endangered Japan. This survey was noteworthy because for the first time since this survey began in 1985, those tolerating the presence of U.S. military bases in Okinawa gained a slight lead; compared to the previous survey conducted seven years ago, active and passive supporters increased 6.8 points whereas the two categories of opponents dropped by 9.9 points.[13] In spite of this outcome, the survey did not investigate why the respondents responded in the way they did. Furthermore, no question was asked about the level of American military presence in Okinawa that could be tolerated.

Indeed, Okinawa's ambivalence toward the American military presence does not necessarily translate into political support for the current level of U.S. troop deployment. On January 19, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly unanimously passed a resolution calling for the downsizing of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa; soon afterward, municipal assemblies in Okinawa, such as those in Naha and Nago, also passed similar resolutions.[14] On Feb. 26, 2001, Okinawan Governor Inamine Keiichi, speaking before the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly, indicated for the first time since assuming office in 1998 that he was considering requesting that some of the U.S. Marine drills conducted in

---

of Okinawans who will lose their jobs at American military bases, provide compensation to landowners for last revenue of leasing land to the U.S. military, and provide needed actions for the use of returned land (e.g., environmental cleanup); and (4) adapt preventive measures, including education on human rights, in pursuing disciplinary measures for American military personnel and their dependents. See *Ryukyu Shimpo*, www.ryukyushimpo.co.jp.

13. *Asahi Shimbun*, May 20, 2001, p. 3; *Okinawa Times*, May 20, 2001; and *Ryukyu Shimpo*, May 20, 2001.

14. *Okinawa Times*, Jan. 19 and Jan. 25, 2001.

the prefecture would be relocated to Guam. General James Jones, commandant of the Marine Corps, had indicated that he gave orders to study that possibility. Later, on March 15, *Okinawa Times* reported that the Prefectural Government of Okinawa had received news from the U.S. government via the Japanese Foreign Ministry that the U.S. was considering moving some Marine drills in Okinawa outside of Japan.

As a Kyodo News report observed on February 26, "Many of the Marines who participate in the rotation exercises are young, often new high school graduates. It is said they tend to cause problems in the local community as a result of alienation because they are only exposed to the local culture for such a short period of time and cannot adapt themselves to it." However, during my visit to Okinawa in early April, I heard from various sources in the American military that those causing problems are those assigned to Okinawa for more than a year rather than those on a six-month rotation, because the latter are too busy training.

Nevertheless, under the perception that those on the six-month rotation are the main source of the problem, Governor Inamine had indicated in late February that he was thinking of requesting the Japanese government that (1) the U.S. forces in Okinawa be downsized; (2) the Marines drill outside of Okinawa; (3) the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) be revised; (4) a 15-year limit be put on the use of the proposed new facility for the Marines in Nago; and (5) Japan demand that the U.S. prevent crimes and incidents by American military personnel and their dependents. Governor Inamine made these requests to officials in the central government during visits to Tokyo in early and mid-March, including to Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo, Foreign Minister Kono Yohei, Cabinet Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro, and officials in the Defense Agency.[15]

---

15. With regard to Inamine, see the March 6, March 15, and March 16, 2001 articles in *Okinawa Times* at www.okinawatimes.co.jp; with regard to *Okinawa Times* report on remarks made by General Jones to a Lower House Representative (Liberal Democratic Party) from Okinawa Shimoji Mikio during their meeting in Washington on February 12, see the February 17 edition. There is an argument that American servicemen commit far less crime against Okinawans than Okinawans do against fellow Okinawans, and hence Okinawans as well as Japanese in general should look at this issue in a non-discriminatory way. But this argument is moot because in these circumstances American servicemen and their dependents are protected by the Status of Forces Agreement. In addition to incidents caused by American military personnel and their dependents, a Japanese Air Self-Defense Force officer raped a junior high school girl on March 16, 2001, which soured relations between the SDF in Okinawa and Okinawans; this was the first major violent crime committed by an SDF officer since the SDF was stationed after the American return of Okinawa to Japan. For articles related to this incident, see the *Okinawa Times* after March 17 [www.okinawatimes.co.jp] (articles are archived for six months). It is noteworthy that the aforementioned February public opinion survey conducted by the Japanese government disclosed in May showed that 70 percent of Okinawans who responded supported the presence of SDF in Okinawa, a level unchanged from the previous survey seven years ago. There is no way knowing, of course, how this outcome would have differed had the survey been conducted after the rape.

Japan and the Bush administration may not necessarily need to placate the neoisolationist tendencies in the U.S. when it comes to the issue of American bases in Japan, though neoisolationism may return depending on the extent of the current economic slowdown in the U.S. The new administration, however, is reassessing the overall global American military commitment, including in the Asia-Pacific region. This is happening at a time when the last annual Pentagon report submitted by the Clinton administration eliminated the wording used in past reports that the U.S. was committed to maintaining 100,000 military personnel in this region.[16] Prominent American security specialists, such as Joseph Nye, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, are arguing for downsizing the Marine presence in Okinawa and redeploying them outside Japan and Korea, an issue that has also been debated among prominent Japanese scholars.[17] In an interview with *Asahi Shimbun* on March 28, then-U.S. Ambassador Thomas Foley stated that some of the training exercises conducted in Okinawa by American forces have already been redirected to the U.S.[18] These thoughts and statements are the continuation of a discourse from last year reflected in Kurt Campbell's report[19] and a report issued by the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS).[20] The former report stated that redeployment would be aimed at improving the situation in the Korea Peninsula and avoiding concentration of the bulk of the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region in Northeast Asia. Both reports emphasized the need to ease anti-American base sentiment in Japan, particularly in Okinawa, and stated a willingness to support the redeployment of the Marines in Okinawa elsewhere in the region for political reasons. From a military perspective, the INSS study group would have preferred to avoid redeploying American forces from the geostrategically useful Okinawa.

For Japanese who are concerned with reinforcing bilateral security relations with the U.S., the current bilateral military capability must not be sacrificed – at least not until

16. *Japan Economic Newswire* (Kyodo), January 16, 2001.

17. Joseph S. Nye "The 'Nye Report': Six Years Later," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* Volume 1, No. 1 (2001), p. 102; Michael O'Hanlon, "Come Partly Home, America: How to Downsize U.S. Deployments Abroad," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2001), p. 6; *Gaiko Forum* (April 2001), pp. 12-22; *Sekai* (April 2001), pp. 209-234.

18. *Asahi Shimbun*, March 29, 2001.

19. Kurt Campbell, "Energizing the U.S.-Japan Security Partnership," *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 2000, Volume 23, No. 4, pp. 133-34.

20. Joseph S. Nye and Richard Armitage, "The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership," INSS Special Report, National Defense University, Oct. 11, 2000, p. 7.

further stability is achieved throughout the Asia-Pacific region. But given the fact that Okinawa bears a disproportionate burden by hosting American bases and personnel in Japan, there still exist strong voices in the two countries that argue against maintaining the status quo in Okinawa, even if policymakers are able to more quickly implement the recommendations by the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) to reduce, realign, and consolidate military installations in Okinawa.

Policy Recommendations

Regardless of the future size of the American forces in Okinawa, the Japan-U.S. alliance must be strengthened. Japan and the U.S. should seriously discuss how to establish clear lines of authority in a crisis situation and the ways in which Japanese forces are integrated into American military operations in the Asia-Pacific region for logistical and rear support. As a means to this end, Japan and the U.S. should consider establishing SACO II, not only to accelerate the reduction, realignment, and consolidation of American military facilities in Okinawa, but to have serious discussions on five issues that I believe are most important.

One: Possibility of Marine Redeployment. First, the two sides should discuss the possibility of downsizing American troops in Okinawa without sacrificing the overall American military capability in Japan, including discussing the timing of redeployment. Retaining the current capability of the Marines in Okinawa is important; the Marines in Okinawa have not only contributed to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region through their physical presence with amphibious and flexible capability, but they also have an impressive history of providing important humanitarian assistance (e.g., the 1992 Bangladesh disaster relief and in the aftermath of the 1995 earthquake in Korea). And given that no transportation revolution has occurred to enable the Marines to be deployed at a far greater speed than they can today, it would be ideal to retain the current number of Marines in Okinawa.[21] If Japan is going to have more active involvement in U.N.-related PKOs and humanitarian missions, Japan ought to consider greater coordination with the American military in Japan in the future. Nevertheless, in discussing redeployment, both sides will face the difficult issue of how much each would be paying for the overall costs involved in the redeployment of the Marines from Japan. Considering that at least several thousand Marines on an average day are outside

21. For the arguments against the removal of the Marine presence in Okinawa, see Yamaguchi Noboru, "Why Should Marines in Okinawa Remain? A Military Perspective," in *Restructuring the U.S.-Japan Security Relations: 1997 Conference Papers* by the Japan team, Nichibei Domei Project Ronbunshu Volume 7 (Tokyo: The Okazaki Institute, 1997).

Okinawa on some type of training, the actual downsizing of American military personnel may not be a practical option in terms of deterrence for Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. As House Representative Shimoji Mikio stated in a May 1 *Okinawa Times* interview, a *de facto* reduction of the Marines may be feasible if the Marines in Okinawa constantly drill outside of Okinawa in such places as Guam and Hawaii. During Governor Inamine's visit to the U.S., American officials in the State Department and the Defense Department gave indications of possible further increases in Marine military drills outside Okinawa.[22]

Two: Joint Use of Military Facilities. Japan and the U.S. should assess the feasibility of mutually using at least some of the Japanese and American military installations in Okinawa and pursue joint military training primarily outside Okinawa. The joint usage of Japanese and American military facilities in Okinawa provides the following advantages: (1) the symbolic effect in reinforcing the Japan-U.S. alliance in Okinawa, a Japanese prefecture considered to be one of the most important military areas for this bilateral alliance; (2) an opportunity for Japanese troops to get access to facilities that do not exist in any of their training facilities, a situation that creates envy in Japan, particularly when considering that those facilities are financed by Japan's host nation budget; and (3) swift and efficient bilateral military cooperation in such cases as those concerning U.N. PKO and conflict in areas surrounding Japan. The latter point assumes the need for changes and modifications in the relevant Japanese laws to not only allow Japan's greater participation in PKO but also to permit Japan's exercise of the right to collective self-defense. Okinawa has three of the seven American bases in Japan that function primarily as Korean Peninsula-related U.N. military bases (Kadena, Futenma, and White Beach) and these three installations, in addition to other American bases in Honshu and Kyushu that also serve U.N. purposes (Yokota, Yokosuka, Camp Zama, and Sasebo) can function as facilities for Japan's participation in U.N. PKO-related activities. Japan and the U.S. should discuss the possible circumstances in which Japan can use these military facilities.

One possibility for joint use of military facilities is Kadena Air Base. Joint training sessions by the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) with the U.S. Air Force and Marines would greatly enhance the ASDF's capabilities. But it might also prove desirable for ASDF to move into Kadena with its America counterparts. Since the sole runway at Naha is also used by the private sector and jurisdiction for air traffic control falls under the Ministry of Transportation, not SDF, the ASDF would not have to face the current everyday hassle of dealing with private sector airplanes if it were based at

22. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, May 17, 2001, p. 2; *Ryukyu Shimpo*, May 16, 2001, May 25, 2001, May 26, 2001; and *Okinawa Times*, May 16, 2001.

Kadena. This measure would also ease the serious demand for runway availability in the adjacent Naha International Airport and could contribute to Okinawa's economic development. However, several questions need to be considered in assessing the feasibility of these proposals. First, the possibility of extending the existing runway at the Naha International Airport to the sea, which might lead to the ASDF's full control over its own runway. Second, the mayor of Irabu in Shimoji island, which is part of Okinawa's southernmost Miyako and Yaeyama islands (and hence near Taiwan), announced on March 15 that he would like to have the ASDF use their underutilized runway (about 3,000 meters and used for training private sector pilots) for ASDF training so as to avoid the closure of the town's airport, a wish unanimously supported by the local council and taken up for consideration by Defense Minister Nakatani Gen in late May, including the mayor's recent statement of possibly permitting some level of ASDF deployment. Third, the Japanese government may not be enthusiastic about establishing a major international airport that could effectively compete with Narita and Kansai airports. Fourth, even if Japan and the U.S. manage to agree on ASDF access to Kadena, they still need to address the tensions with local residents regarding noise pollution and safety.[23]

Three: Implementing SACO. Japan and America should explore how further reduction, realignment, and consolidation of American military facilities in Okinawa are feasible, including the possibility of having Kadena jointly used by the Air Force and the Marines,[24] at least during non-emergency situations when there is enough room at Kadena. This should be considered, particularly if the decision to move the Marines from the center of Futenma (where a near collision of two Marine helicopters in February 2001 resulted in vigorous protests by citizens in Futenma and elsewhere in Okinawa)[25] to a

23. With regard to the town of Irabu offering their runway to ASDF, see the March 16, 2001 *Okinawa Times* [www.okinawatimes.co.jp] and the April 18 *Ryukyu Shimpo* [www.ryukyushimpo.co.jp]. In addition, see: *Ryukyu Shimpo*, May 23, 2001; *Okinawa Times*, May 25, 2001. The Okinawa press reported Okinawa's (including Governor Inamine's) negative response to Rand Corporation's report co-authored by Zalmay Khalizad, who is now a senior director in the National Security Council, because the report suggested that in return for downsizing the Marines and American military bases in Okinawa the U.S. Air Force should have the right to access the airport in Irabu, the Marine air base in Futenma and the ASDF air base in Naha. See: *Ryukyu Shimpo*, May 16, 2001; *Okinawa Times*, May 16, 2001. Later, *Ryukyu Shimpo* on May 18 quoted an American security specialist who stated that the Rand report is just a report and is not official policy. *Asahi Shimbun* on May 17 published an article that quoted an official in the Pentagon who made a similar statement.

24. See an opinion piece by Robert Eldridge in *Nikkei Shimbun*, April 11, 2001.

25. See the article in the March 11-14 editions of *Okinawa Times* [www.okinawatimes.co.jp].

new site under consideration in Nago is delayed.[26] The ongoing discussion regarding a new site in Nago face many obstacles, such as the possibility of imposing a 15-year limit on use of the new site after the Marines move in, environmental assessment, the construction method, and the possibility of downsizing the Marines. If a 15-year limit and downsizing of the Marines are to occur, policymakers should consider the timing of actual implementation so as to avoid sending the wrong signal to countries in Northeast Asia. Furthermore, conditions should be attached to the 15-year limit so that use can be extended if the fluid international situation makes that necessary. This is very important given the possibility that China might pursue aggressive power projection throughout the South China Sea in the 2020s, when the 15-year limit for Nago is up.

Four: Improvement in Handling of Crimes by American Military Personnel. Japan and the U.S. should discuss improving the administration and interpretation of the SOFA in cases involving serious crimes committed by American military personnel so that a speedy hand over to Japanese authorities of American military personnel suspected of committing a serious crime can be achieved, even prior to indictment. Although both countries agreed in 1995 that the American military could hand over to Japanese authorities American military personnel suspected of committing murder and rape before indictment, other serious crimes such as arson and kidnapping are dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Even if there are improvements in the operation of the SOFA articles on these issues, the current record shows that during the 29 years since the return of Okinawa to Japan, of the 19 cases that the Okinawa police categorize as violent crimes (including murder, rape, arson, and robbery), only once did the U.S. military hand over the suspect, even though arrest warrants were issued in all 19 cases prior to requesting hand over.

Resolution of this issue, however, might require a change in Japanese laws to match international standards of criminal justice for suspects' rights to have unrestricted access to lawyers while in police custody. Securing highly qualified translators is another important issue.[27]

---

26. In that case, one might consider other potential sites that had been considered before Nago was chosen, including Chiken island off the coast of Katsuren, an island on which a much cheaper 2,000-meter runway can be built. But this alternative is politically impossible right now, not to mention the potential divisiveness of the issue at the local level.

27. On SOFA, see March 26, 2001 special report in *Asahi Shimbun*; see another article in this newspaper on February 18, 2001. In addition, see the February 26 edition of *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, and February 15 *Asahi Shimbun*. With regard to suspects having limited access to lawyers under the Japanese criminal justice system, see the *Okinawa Times* March 31, 2001.

Five: Engagement with the Local Community. Finally, the following suggestion by Kent Calder should be considered by American and Japanese policymakers in thinking about American bases in Japan:

Continued and intensified efforts to broaden the perceived benefits U.S. bases give to local communities are a crucial priority. Facilities made more available for joint civilian-military use, disaster-relief cooperation, international education centers, on-base internship program, and efforts to reduce tensions between base personnel and the community are all helpful. So is cultivating a deeper, more balanced sense of partnership with local military units.[28]

Engagement with the local community through public relations, community outreach, volunteer activities, and media relations remain very important for both Japanese and American forces in Okinawa.

In order to address the above five issues, the allies need to establish a central mechanism; if SACO II proves unfeasible, then they should be addressed in the Joint Committee on Japan and the U.S., the Security Consultative Committee, or the Sub-Committee on Security Cooperation.

Conclusion

In addressing issues concerning the American military presence in Okinawa, the Japanese government has to deal with the predominant view in Okinawa that the Japanese government is not doing anything about these problems. The above cited 1999 survey by *Okinawa Times* indicates that in contrast to only 22 percent who believed the government's handling was satisfactory, 61 percent of respondents in Okinawa did not feel that the government's response was adequate. Of course, bilateral security relations should not be determined by the needs of Okinawa alone, and hence the above suggestions are made by keeping in mind the need for ways to enhance overall bilateral security relations. But given the overwhelming burden of Okinawans in hosting the American military, the Japanese government – though naturally cautious about providing further economic aid to Okinawa – needs to clearly demonstrate that it is doing something constructive about addressing Okinawa's problems in hosting the American

28. Kent Calder, "The New Face of Northeast Asia," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2001), p. 118. In addition, see the public relations activities as well as volunteer activities that the American military personnel are doing in Okinawa by checking the home pages of the American forces in Okinawa [www.yokota.af.mil].

military. In this context one might welcome a comment by Minister Omi Koji, who is in charge of Okinawa affairs in the Koizumi Cabinet. He said that he is trying to include the minister in charge of Okinawa affairs, a Cabinet position that following the executive branch reorganization in January has the authority to address base issues concerning Okinawa, in the current Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee.[29] Also helpful is Deputy Minister Nakamura Masaharu's idea of creating a task force among the deputy ministers to address issues concerning the American military presence in Japan and a consultative channel for Japan's deputy ministers and America's deputy secretaries to address issues concerning diplomacy, security, and economy.[30]

How and to what extent will Okinawa in the coming years be used as a military installation for Japanese security? What is the proper mix of American and Japanese military presence in Okinawa and elsewhere in Japan? Answering these questions will depend not only on shifts in America's global military strategy[31] but also on what kind of national security strategy Japan hammers out during the first decade of the 21st century, a strategy that should be created through strong leadership and wide public discussion. The following questions are key: (1) whether to establish a more equal partnership in Japan's bilateral alliance with the U.S. through domestic legal reforms and changes in legal interpretations; (2) whether to yield to nationalistic and unilateralist sentiments, which would mean more defense expenditures that would easily surpass 1 percent of Japan's GNP, as well as an increased SDF presence in Okinawa to take over the American military presence; (3) whether to become more actively involved in U.N.-related military and humanitarian activities with or without an eye on winning a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council; (4) whether to achieve peace and security in Northeast Asia by primarily relying on the Japan-American alliance, or to contemplate the creation of a multilateral framework for the region, or a combination of the two; and (5) whether to redefine the general geographical extent in which Japan should be primarily concerned for its security needs and in cooperating with the United States.

29. *Okinawa Times*, May 8, 2001.

30. *Ryukyuu Shimpo*, May 18, 2001, May 25, 2001. In the latter article, Nakamura also proposed creating a similar committee with China and South Korea.

31. Tensions among Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, the military and Congress over Rumsfeld's ongoing reassessment of America's global military strategy, are discussed in *Asahi Shimbun*, May 24, 2001, p. 6.

Chapter 8: Armaments Cooperation in U.S.-Japan Security Relations

Gregg A. Rubinstein

Overview

Defense acquisition and industrial cooperation are no longer a by-product, but a driver of U.S.-Japan security relations. However, collaboration on armaments matters continues to lag behind other areas of defense cooperation. The U.S. and Japan need to develop an approach to armaments cooperation based not on procurement or research and development (R&D) opportunities of the moment, but on an understanding of defense requirements that can identify common interests in future defense systems. Cooperative programs developed in this manner will not only support real operational needs, but benefit the defense industrial and technology bases of both countries.

An Outmoded Framework

Mature alliance relationships rest on three pillars: strategy/policy, operational, requirements, and the network of industrial and technology linkages known as armaments cooperation. The structure of all these pillars can readily be seen in the institutions developed under NATO. In the case of Japan, the situation is somewhat different. Strategic and policy concerns are taken up under various groups that report to the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC). Interaction on operational concerns have recently been given a major impetus through the recently revised Guidelines for Defense Cooperation.

On the other hand, the armaments cooperation pillar remains relatively weak and disconnected from the rest of the U.S.-Japan security relationship. This is not for lack of activity in defense industrial and acquisition issues. As Department of Defense (DoD) officials frequently point out, there is no ally with whom the U.S. has more commonality in defense hardware than Japan. Numerous personnel in both governments are focused on the details of U.S. foreign military sales (FMS) and licensed production programs in Japan, while a variety of joint R&D projects are carried out under the U.S.-Japan Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF).

However, these programs function in a manner largely detached from any real vision. Transfers of leading edge U.S. systems (coproduction of the F-15 fighter, the sale of Aegis-equipped warships, even the recent transfer of 767-based AWACS early warning aircraft) have been carried out in an episodic, disjointed manner. The basic rationale behind these programs has changed little from the beginning of security assistance programs in the 1950s – strengthen an ally and promote interoperability through Japanese use of U.S. systems. Meanwhile, S&TF activities have amounted to little more than school science fair projects – interesting technology demonstrations, but seldom with any connection to tangible applications. The dialogue on common interests in defense requirements and cooperation on future acquisitions evident in NATO has been all but absent between the U.S. and Japan.

This model of "U.S. as patron/supplier-Japan as client/recipient" for defense acquisition matters reflects the general character of U.S.-Japan security relations. Like NATO, the U.S.-Japan security structure has both political and military dimensions, but constraints on Japanese defense activities have hindered the development of operational military alliance activities typical of NATO. (Rare exceptions, like that seen in collaborative tracking of Soviet submarines, only prove the rule.) In the hothouse atmosphere that often characterizes U.S.-Japan defense dialogues, real-world considerations like interoperability have been reduced to simplistic arguments of "buy U.S." versus "independence and sovereignty" in defense acquisitions for Japan.

Attempts to develop a more comprehensive approach to armaments matters have also had to contend with a negative bias widespread among policy officials in both countries. Misguided attempts in the 1970s and 1980s to link trade problems to security relations encouraged a denial of any connection between defense and economic issues, despite the obvious fact that armaments programs are by definition economic as well as defense concerns. A tendency to view all armaments issues as complicated and troublesome distractions – as problems for the security relationship rather than opportunities to strengthen it – remains evident today.

Changing Conditions

Sometimes the security assistance framework met interests on both sides. Japan acquired advanced U.S. defense systems and technologies, and U.S. defense contractors prospered. The "half loaf" argument for such transfers endured (if Japan would not "buy U.S." off the shelf, then better for Japan to license U.S. systems than pursue its own

projects). Other times the security assistance rationale has proved double-edged. U.S. advocacy of interoperability often carried a not-so-hidden agenda of discouraging indigenous Japanese defense programs. Japanese government and industry officials would in turn go to extreme lengths to shelter pet defense projects from U.S. interference. The growth of such posturing in the trade-fractious atmosphere of the 1980s all but ensured an explosive confrontation over Japan's planned FS-X fighter program.

Among the lessons of the FS-X controversy, perhaps the most basic has been the need to take a more constructive approach to U.S.-Japan interaction on defense programs. While frustrations and resentments over FS-X obscured this lesson for some time, recent changes in conditions that affect defense industrial programs are overtaking the conflicting "security assistance versus Japanese autonomy" attitudes that marked FS-X, notably:

- Expanded defense cooperation, as embodied in the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation and a growing Japanese presence in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations, has brought a real-world meaning to interoperability – in terms of software as well as hardware – between U.S. and Japanese forces.

- Marked declines in defense budgets rule out the ability of any country to be completely autonomous in defense acquisitions. Cooperative development and production programs have become a necessity rather than an indulgence.

- Major changes in defense industry structure and activities – industry consolidations, the growing commercialization of defense procurement and business practices, and a trend toward globalization marked by the increasingly transnational character of defense programs. All of these developments, clearly established in the U.S. and well underway in Europe, are inevitably affecting Japan's isolated defense acquisition base as well.

Both the U.S. and Japan face difficult, resource-driven trade-offs in the acquisition of future defense systems. Effective defense cooperation will depend to great extent on determining and developing common interests in equipment and technology. Early in the postwar period such cooperation could be satisfied through the supply of U.S. arms to Japan. In the 1970s and 1980s the balancing point of complex security, political, and economic interests in defense programs came to focus on licensed production of U.S. defense systems. Over the past decade this balance has been shifting toward cooperative development and acquisition.

Changing conditions in both U.S.-Japan relations and defense acquisition practices argue for an approach to U.S.-Japan collaboration on armaments issues that goes beyond the limits of security assistance to cover a full range of R&D and acquisition activities. Armaments cooperation is no longer the by-product of a security relationship, but a shaper of the future U.S.-Japan alliance. Cooperative efforts should not be based only on research or procurement opportunities of the moment, but on a deeper understanding of operational requirements that identifies common interests in defense acquisitions. As suggested in the diagram below, this level of cooperation requires a strategic vision that has been largely lacking to date.



U.S.-Japan cooperation at present

Toward Effective Armaments Cooperation

There is already evidence of evolution toward a more comprehensive vision of U.S.-Japan armaments cooperation. The S&TF recently agreed on a Statement of Purpose and Principles goes some way toward embracing a broader concept of collaboration on equipment and technology. Exploratory R&D on missile defense technologies could lead to collaboration in full-scale systems development and production. Current U.S.-Japan exchanges on common interests in the development of future Maritime Patrol Aircraft is the first real example of a requirements dialogue between the U.S. and Japan.

However, further steps toward armaments cooperation must contend with several long-standing problems and misperceptions – some generic, some unique to U.S.-Japan interaction. These steps are detailed as follows.

Absence of an armaments cooperation dialogue. Effective collaboration on defense systems based on operational needs requires a channel for discussion of future requirements and identification of opportunities for cooperation in acquisition. This channel would engage appropriate policy and operations as well as acquisitions and R&D officials, and also have direct links to industry – in short a channel similar to the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) (though hopefully without the elaborate bureaucracy that burdens CNAD). Discussion of defense programs would have to begin at an early stage of each country's acquisition programs, before commitment to program decisions that cannot easily be changed.

No such dialogue channel exists between Japan and the U.S. Despite the expansive intentions expressed in the statement of purpose, the S&TF remains rooted in small technology projects that may or may not lead to tangible products. Armaments issues have seldom figured in policy dialogue under the SCC framework. (There is a basic mismatch between the U.S. and Japanese defense bureaucracies that has never been bridged. Senior U.S. acquisitions officials can decide both the "what" and "how" of defense procurements; Japan Defense Agency (JDA) counterparts in the S&TF are focused on the acquisition process and R&D efforts. JDA policy officials who formulate acquisition plans are not really engaged in either S&TF or SCC channels. Efforts to bring policy and acquisition officials on both sides together have been frustrated by internal bureaucratic rivalries as well as mutual suspicion of intent.)

The myth of defense technology cooperation. It has been fashionable to portray U.S.-Japan interaction on future defense systems as a matter of development and exchanges of technology (a view abetted by the narrow technology-only focus of S&TF activities). Concern with apparent threats to the U.S. industrial and technology base in the 1980s also encouraged an exaggerated perception of the importance – and/or danger – of defense-related technology activities with Japan, leading to such misguided efforts as the "Technology-for-Technology" (TfT) initiative of the mid-1990s.

Any effort to build defense cooperation based on technology alone will fail, as TfT did. As true elsewhere, technology is an often intangible collection of data and know-how that does not lend itself to commodity-like evaluation. Defense technology cannot be a

stand-alone issue in any security relationship. If paybacks are ever to be more than data from small-scale science projects, collaboration in defense technology development must evolve in a broader framework of armaments cooperation that can justify the commitment of substantial resources on both sides. (Current U.S.-Japan efforts to develop technologies for the Navy Theater Wide missile defense system are of limited value in themselves, but of much greater significance as a first step toward broader cooperation in the development and acquisition of missile defense systems.)

The shadow of FS-X. Every attempt to engage Japanese government and industry officials on armaments cooperation eventually stumbles over the FS-X controversy that became a flash-point in U.S.-Japan relations in the late 1980s. U.S.-Japan engagement on the development and production of Japan's FS-X (now F-2) support fighter aircraft has become a case study on how not to handle an armaments cooperation program, notably in:

- The lack of a requirements dialogue that could have established common interests in providing both a suitable aircraft for Japan and substantial improvements to an existing U.S. fighter (in this case the F-16).

- Conflicting – and equally unrealistic – U.S. and Japanese agendas for FS-X/F-2 (a U.S. approach of "coproduction-plus" vs. Japanese emphasis on autonomy in development and production) that remain unreconciled today.

- Trade friction-generated controversy that first made use of a U.S. airframe for FS-X a "litmus test" of the security relationship, then exploded over contrived fears of a U.S. technology "giveaway" to Japan.

Despite earnest efforts on both sides to develop a viable F-2, the program remains burdened by disputes over work share and technology sharing (see below). Determination to prevent another FS-X experience clearly affects Japanese reactions to expressions of U.S. interest in closer armaments cooperation, even when clearly based on current-day needs of interoperability and growing dependence on international collaboration.

F-2 is by no means a closed chapter in U.S.-Japan programs. In fact, DoD and JDA are already discussing terms for production of an "improved F-2." Continuation of existing FS-X/F-2 terms into this new phase of F-2 work will not only aggravate existing tensions over this program, but undermine progress toward more comprehensive

armaments cooperation and almost certainly impact the entire U.S.-Japan security relationship.

Disclosure and releaseability, defense program management, and export licenses. U.S.-Japan problems in these areas partly reflect much wider concerns. Controversy over FMS and export licensing practices have generated widespread debate and ongoing efforts at reform. Japan, with its enormous volume of U.S.-purchased or licensed defense systems, has a particularly long list of problems and grievances (justified or otherwise) on U.S. actions concerning FMS cases and export licenses. Though largely procedural matters that seldom seem worthy of policy concern, accumulated dissatisfaction with problems of data disclosure, FMS case management, and export licenses have eaten away like dry rot at mutually beneficial armaments cooperation efforts. Even Japanese officials who lean toward collaboration with the U.S. are wary of further entanglements in DoD-managed programs.

On the other hand, the reluctance sometimes evident among U.S. officials in disclosing sensitive data to Japan is based in part on the continued lack of a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan. Earlier attempts to conclude such an agreement stalled over concern in Tokyo that GSOMIA provisions could generate controversy over the enforcement of Japanese security laws. In the absence of a GSOMIA, U.S. and Japanese officials have been obliged to continue time-consuming and often contentious negotiations of information security agreements for each defense project. More seriously, the lack of a GSOMIA inhibits the exploration of potential areas for defense cooperation. Engagement with Japan on increasingly complex and sensitive issues (missile defense, C4I, etc.) makes conclusion of a GSOMIA an increasingly urgent concern.

Protection of intellectual property. Of all the Japanese concerns underlined by the FS-X experience none is perhaps more pervasive, or harder to nail down, than the protection of intellectual property and access to technologies in any cooperative program on defense systems. Disputes over the terms of Japanese access to and use of technologies developed in the course of the FS-X program have lingered for 10 years. U.S. government interpretations of what constitute “derived” (from the U.S.) and “non-derived” (developed in Japan) technologies in cooperative efforts vary among offices and even individual officials. Japanese officials continue to express fear (usually unsubstantiated but also unrefuted) that DoD classification actions could deprive them of access to commercially-derived technologies used in joint defense programs.

Japanese industry and Japan's ban on arms exports. Japanese defense acquisitions and defense industrial base policy have been based on:

- Promotion of indigenous R&D/production capabilities through government subsidy and allocation of major defense contracts among a handful of designated contractors;

- Import substitution efforts that have steadily reduced Japan's reliance on foreign sources for defense acquisitions to a small range of high-end items and technologies; and

- Policy restrictions on defense exports that have come to be interpreted as an all but complete ban on arms transfers.

Though Japan's once open drive for autonomy in defense acquisitions (as embodied in the original plans for FS-X) has been blunted by recession, Japanese officials have striven to preserve a defense industrial base that covers a broad range of indigenous capabilities in hardware and electronics. As in other countries, the great cost inefficiencies of maintaining such an indigenous base, especially in the absence of opportunities for exports, have been rationalized as meeting national security interests. Even so, tight budgets, pressure for acquisition reform in the wake of JDA procurement scandals, and concern over continued competitiveness in systems and technology development have underlined the need for significant changes in Japan's approach to defense acquisition and industrial base support. As part of this reconsideration, Japanese officials seem more willing to recognize that joint development projects with U.S. partners are a means of sustaining, rather than threatening, indigenous defense industrial capabilities.

Any discussion of Japanese industry participation in international defense projects soon becomes stuck on Japan's arms export policy. Originally formulated in the 1960s as "Three Principles" blocking arms exports to the communist bloc, countries under U.N. sanctions, and areas of known tension, Japanese policy has subsequently been interpreted to mean an all but total ban on defense exports. The only exception to this policy is agreement to transfer "military technologies" to the U.S. through a mechanism known as the Joint Military Technology Commission (JMTC).

Growing interest in joint development, and potentially production, of future defense systems makes some adjustment in the application of Japan's Three Principles policy a real rather than merely conceptual concern. This point should not be misunderstood – Japanese restrictions on defense exports have generally served the

interests of both countries, and no responsible party advocates a general relaxation of the Three Principles policy. The issue is a need for a more flexible Japanese approach to its arms export policy that will support closer armaments cooperation with the U.S.

Policy Proposals

The problems discussed above are not amenable to "quick-fix" solutions. Some reflect policies and procedures that are not just U.S.-Japan issues, others are aggravated by deep-seated attitudes fixed on past problems rather than future opportunities. Still, the U.S. and Japan can improve prospects for closer, alliance-strengthening armaments cooperation in the following areas:

1. Establish a more comprehensive armaments dialogue. DoD and JDA officials are currently exploring ways to develop more productive dialogues on defense requirements and acquisition planning. There has been some progress toward expanding the scope of S&TF dialogue, but parochial bureaucratic posturing remains an impediment. Efforts to overcome such obstacles require policy-level direction and encouragement.

2. Base future F-2 efforts on the principle of armaments cooperation. The U.S. and Japan must approach continuing F-2 collaboration on terms that, to the extent possible, leave behind the acrimonious framework inherited from the original FS-X controversy. Future F-2 arrangements cannot ignore legacy issues like industry work share and technology flow back, but the one-sided emphasis on such matters that still characterizes F-2 program management must be balanced by efforts to encourage real, mutually beneficial collaboration in F-2 systems and technology development.

3. Conclude a General Security of Military Information Agreement and thus plug an increasingly conspicuous gap in U.S.-Japan security arrangements. Improvements in other areas of defense program development and management (releaseability decisions, case management, and export licenses) will, like work with other U.S. friends and allies, depend on how seriously the new U.S. administration pursues the implementation of procedural reforms in DoD and Department of State. (The same holds true for current efforts in Japan to make defense procurements more transparent and less collusive.)

4. Negotiate an agreement on intellectual property protection for joint defense programs to resolve inconsistencies over the application of property rights and technology access for U.S. and Japanese participants. Progress on this issue would not only resolve a major obstacle to U.S.-Japan collaboration, but would benefit work with other U.S. partners – if in no other way than by imposing some degree of uniformity on action concerning intellectual property rights across Office of the Secretary of Defense, agency, and service lines.

5. Implement more flexible export procedures in support of joint U.S.-Japan programs. In addition to more forthcoming U.S. positions on releaseability and export licensing, the exception to Japanese export policy on military technology transfers to the U.S. should be broadened to cover the export of Japanese hardware components to the U.S. and transfer of jointly developed defense equipment to selected third countries. This would provide an important incentive for government and industry collaboration, while use of JMTC procedures would ensure that exports of military items from Japan remain under well-defined, case by case controls.

Chapter 9: TMD and Japan: The First Stage of Integrating TMD and NMD into Alliance Missile Defense

Shibayama Futoshi

Overview

The threat of ballistic missiles from so-called "rogue" states and irresponsible powers has become the foremost challenge to American national security, as well as to the unity and credibility of Western alliances, most notably the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. In 2001, the regions covered by those alliances are the most democratic, prosperous, and technologically advanced in the world. In the 1995 report, "A New Strategy for a New Era," then U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry stressed the post-Cold War significance of the alliances for an establishment of a new world order.

> "The security relations that the United States and its allies and friends have inherited from the Cold War are key to advancing the post-Cold War agenda. It is difficult to imagine that progress toward a more peaceful and prosperous world would not be impeded by a weakening of this security framework. The top priority must be to strengthen and adapt U.S. partnerships to meet post-Cold War challenges."[1]

He also realized that the possible failure of America or its allies to maintain strong alliances would invite international chaos and a decline of American influence. "The alternative – an erosion of U.S. alliances and trading partnerships -- would lead to widespread instability and diminished U.S. influence over international events and decisions that affect the everyday lives of Americans."[2] Six years later, in 2001, the U.S. and its allies still share Mr. Perry's view.[3] After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the allies' victory in the Persian Gulf War, Western alliances successfully established

1. William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress, February 1995* (Washington D.C., 1995), p. 3. Hereafter, this series will be referred to as *Defense Secretary Annual Report.*

2. *Ibid*., p.3.

3. During the Clinton administration, the Japanese occasionally felt that the U.S. did not give Japan sufficient diplomatic respect, especially in the context of building a so-called strategic partnership with China. See Yoichi Funabashi, "Tokyo's Depression Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 6 (November/December 1998), pp. 32-33.

international military dominance as a result of their lead in the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). To potential challengers, the remaining means to undermine this dominance are ballistic missiles, possibly armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, and other minor actions. The *Defense Secretary Annual Report 2000* warned about the proliferation of ballistic missile technology and WMD:

> "The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and the missiles that can deliver them pose a major threat to the security of the United States, its allies, and friendly nations. Over 20 countries possess or are developing NBC weapons, and more than 20 nations have theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) or cruise missiles to deliver them."[4]

This paper will examine how Japan and the U.S. should cope with the threat of ballistic missiles with WMD, and focus on the possible introduction by Japan of a theater missile defense (TMD) system and Japanese cooperation in American national missile defense (NMD).

TMD is directly linked to the future vision of the Japan-U.S. alliance and a future vision of East Asia. Japan is seriously studying the American strategic posture in this region. Will the U.S. choose Japan or China as its strategic partner? Will it choose neither? Unless the U.S. chooses to promote the Japan-U.S. relationship to a level like that of the Anglo-American special relationship, Japan may withdraw from the alliance and the U.S. may find itself isolated power in the Pacific. Only a strong Japan-U.S. alliance can guarantee a peaceful, prosperous, and peaceful order in East Asia. Any scheme that disrespects Japan's power and status will invite international upheaval. Just as Japan helped contain Soviet power in Asia, it can help block a rogue state. Only a strong Japan-U.S. defense bond can provide a reliable East Asian order.

NMD is directly linked to an American vision of providing a missile defense for Western alliances. *As long as this system depends on American allies' participation, NMD is not an appropriate term; alliance missile defense (AMD) is probably a better term*. In this paper, AMD is used as a term for the evolutionary integration of TMD and NMD, and possible additional defense systems. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is reported to be considering a version of NMD that would cover the entire problem of ballistic missile defense, including TMD. His approach indicates the possibility that comprehensive missile defense system might end – or at least undermine

4. *Defense Secretary Annual Report 2000*, p. 73.

– the longstanding dominance of strategic nuclear deterrence, which is symbolized by the system of mutual assured destruction (MAD).

This formulation of AMD will dictate who will be an American ally in the 21st century and at what level. This will provide a great opportunity to reorganize a U.S.-centered defense system, which will promote more military integration and cooperation among the U.S., NATO allies, and Japan, and could invite Russia to participate as a new Western ally in this system. Regardless of whether NMD will be effective, the rearrangement of an America-led defense system for AMD will secure a stable military relationship among the participants. Most certainly, the successful arrangement of this system will guarantee a stable military order by providing a formidable deterrent system against any challenger. To Japan, this type of American proposal would be most welcome not just in terms of promoting more active U.S.-Japan alliance, but to realize a long-held Japanese dream, i.e., the elimination of the fear of nuclear destruction for all mankind.

Japanese Objectives for Promoting TMD and AMD

First, Japan has to maintain a peaceful strategic environment in the region so that the country can concentrate on recovering from an economic slump and reforming its state and industrial structures. The combination of ballistic missiles and WMD is one of the few visible threats that could prevent Japan from realizing this objective.

Japan and the U.S. have already established military dominance in Japan, and nearby areas, as far as conventional weapons systems are concerned. Russia is rapidly shrinking the size of its conventional forces, and it now depends on its nuclear arsenal for territorial defense. North Korea is still suffering from a severe economic crisis, so it cannot afford to modernize its old-fashioned conventional forces. China is gradually catching up to the level of Western military technology, but its conventional forces are still far behind in quality and quantity. It has to spend more money and it will need more time to reach this level. At this time Japan and the U.S. can count on South Korean military might as a formidable shield for the defense of Japan.[5] Thus, for the next 25 years, there is no foreseeable conventional threat to Japan, as long as Japan and the U.S. continue to spend appropriate amounts on defense and both countries maintain their technological advantages.

5. On South Korean military superiority, see Michael O'Hanlon, "Stopping a North Korean Invasion: Why Defending South Korea Is Easier than the Pentagon Thinks," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 135-170.

The remaining threats to Japanese security include ballistic missiles with WMD as well as massive domestic terrorism. In May 1993, North Korea launched its first theater ballistic missile, the Nodong, which landed in the Japan Sea. To Japan, this news was enough to consider the possibility of introducing an anti-ballistic missile system, a combination of the Aegis system and an improved version of the standard missile. In August 1998, North Korea without any prior notice launched the Taepodong-1, a medium-range missile, which can reach every part of Japan. The Japanese Aegis destroyer Myoukou tracked its flight, but it was obvious that the Japanese defense system was unable to intercept any ballistic missile.[6] Given the fact that North Korea is allegedly developing weapons of mass destruction, this flight was doubly shocking. Despite South Korean President Kim Dae-jung's dramatic visit to North Korea in 2000, David Reese's 1998 conclusion on the prospect of North Korea's survival is still reasonable: "It is difficult… to see how Kim Jong-il's authoritarian regime can implement changes on the scale necessary without bringing about its own downfall. Until domestic forces in North Korea shift, the U.S. and its allies should expect a protracted phase of desultory and sometimes destabilizing diplomatic maneuvers."[7]

Second, Japan needs to secure a credible U.S.-Japan defense alliance, which is one significant pillar of world security. There is a possibility that the increasing threat of ballistic missiles with WMD will undermine the alliance's credibility, and Japan has to discover ways to cope with a possible decline of the American deterrent.

Apart from the two nuclear powers, the United Kingdom and France, other U.S. allies must ask these related questions: if a challenger poses a serious atomic threat to American targets, can the U.S. still provide a dependable nuclear deterrent? Moreover, if a challenger uses conventional warheads against American allies and maintains a nuclear threat against American targets, can the U.S. sustain a dependable nuclear deterrent or can it present an alternative? The U.S. has not yet proven that it will retaliate against a challenger with atomic weapons, given the risk of receiving a limited atomic strike on major American major cities. These questions naturally lead to another set of questions. Will U.S. allies continue to trust the U.S. nuclear deterrent in these situations? Should they take a different path? The U.S. Defense Department has already realized that any failure to provide dependable ballistic missile defense will encourage U.S. allies "to produce their own offensive WMD" and discourage "their willingness to act

6. On a successful tracking by the Myoukou's tracking, see Iwao Ishikawa, "Taepodong Hassha: 'Myoukou' Otegara," *Gunji Kenkyu*, No. 393 (December 1998), pp. 28-43.

7. David Reese, *The Prospects for North Korea's Survival*, *Adelphi Paper* No. 323 (London, 1998), p. 84.

conventionally with the United States in any conflict."[8] To preserve the unity of its alliances, the U.S. has shared "early warning data" on launches of theater-range ballistic missiles with allies and friends" since 1996.[9]

To illustrate the weak position of America's allies, note that the U.S. enjoys a comprehensive package of deterrence against the threat of ballistic missiles with WMD, but its allies, apart from the U.K. and France, do not. First, according to Dean A. Wilkening, U.S. diplomacy and its scheme for arms control "may halt, or at least delay, the proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs)."[10] The U.S. has already achieved some diplomatic success in controlling North Korean ambitions to produce a large number of nuclear weapons, and, to some extent, developing intercontinental ballistic missiles. Second, Wilkening underlines the fact that "if diplomacy fails to prevent the spread of ICBMs, the U.S. has an overwhelming deterrent force, both conventional and nuclear." [11] Third, he indicates that "if U.S. leaders believe that deterrence might fail, they can authorize conventional pre-emptive counterforce attacks against fixed ICBM sites." [12] Fourth, according to David C. Wright, there is a possibility of a so-called "Scud wall": in other words, any ballistic missile, developed from Scud missile technology, can not reach targets in continental U.S.[13] In short, the U.S does not need to introduce a defense system against most ballistic missiles from rogue states. (This does not mean that the U.S. can ignore the threat posed by Russian and Chinese ICBMs and submarine launched ballistic missiles.) However, *The Defense Secretary Annual Report 2000* highly evaluated the capability of Taepodong-2 (TD-2). "A two-stage TD-2 will have the range to reach Alaska, while a three-stage variant could bring most of the lower 48 states within range of North Korean ballistic missiles."[14] According to the intelligence community, TD-2 is "a derivative of TD-1 [Taepodong-1] technology,

---

8. *Defense Secretary Annual Report, 1994*, p. 51.

9. *Defense Secretary Annual Report 2000*, p. 76; *Defense Secretary Annual Report, 1997*, p. 216.

10. Dean A. Wilkening, *Ballistic-Missile Defence and Strategic Stability, Adelphi Paper 334* (London, 2000), p. 12.

11. Wilkening, *op. cit*., p. 13.

12. *Ibid*., p. 13.

13. David C. Wright, "An Analysis of the North Korean Missile Program" pp. 349-351 in *Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers, Pursuant to Public Law 201, 104th Congress* (July 15, 1998). Hereafter, this series will be referred to as the *Rumsfeld Report*.

14. *Defense Secretary Annual Report 2000*, p. 73.

employing a larger first stage and the Nodong theater ballistic missile as the second stage."[15] This description of the TD-2 means that North Korea intends to overcome the "Scud wall," but, it has to develop a new first stage and a capable third variant. It is unimaginable that North Korea will have the financial resources and technological capabilities to do this without outside assistance. It is very hard for any challenger to ignore these American advantages. (Some argue that there is no "Scud wall," and North Korea can deliver a small warhead to the U.S. with minor changes to the TD-1.[16])

However, U.S. allies do not have the same diplomatic "punch" as the U.S. First, it is obvious that Japan and Germany, the most economically powerful American allies, can play only minor roles in controlling "rogue states." Second, they do not possess nuclear arsenals or a dominant conventional military, which means they lack a credible deterrent. Japan continues its longstanding policy of "defense only" (*senshu bouei*) for the purpose of relaxing military tensions in the Far East and fulfilling an alleged purpose of the Japanese Constitution. But, this policy has now become questionable in terms of maintaining Japanese security and prosperity. Without a successful American deterrent, the Japan does not have the military means to retaliate against challenges. Third, they did not have any pre-emptive attack capability. For Japan, "defense only" precludes the possession of reliable offensive capabilities by the Japanese Self-Defense Force. Fourth, there is no "Scud wall" for geographically exposed U.S. allies, including Japan. Moreover, fifth, for some challengers, Japan is a politically convenient target. Since they argue that Japanese invasions of the past have not yet been avenged, they might use the threat of ballistic missiles to win public support. This possibility is more likely in the event of domestic crises to their own political regime and legitimacy. For them, launching a dozen ballistic missiles with conventional warheads could achieve satisfy nationalist sentiment or divert public attention from domestic crises.

Neta Crawford emphasizes that traditional (rational) deterrence theory has failed to consider the significance of emotional aspect of fear.[17] This theory has also failed to evaluate the significance of the hunger for revenge. To Japan, this kind of threat is the most difficult to deal with since the U.S. cannot start an all-out war against challengers in response to a small-scale attack. What about when chemical warheads are used? It is hard to believe that the Japanese people will be satisfied with a token American offensive

15. *Ibid*., p. 73.

16. Cited in Daniel Goure, *Charting a Path for U.S. Missile Defenses: Technical and Policy Issues, CSIS Report* (Washington D.C., 2000), p. 12.

17. See Neta C. Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships," *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 146-149.

action against a challenger. This might be part of a new deterrence system, which deserves more scrutiny in developing a new deterrence theory. Thus, to U.S. allies, the introduction of an anti-ballistic missile system is indispensable for securing alliance systems.

Third, as a member of the international community, Japan has to contribute to the maintenance of a peaceful and stable international environment by promoting an international anti-ballistic missile regime.

To Japan, war and any international crisis are to be avoided. Its economic prosperity depends on stable international flows of money, goods, and people. Japan should be prepared to assist any country, that is suffering or will suffer from the threat of ballistic missiles with WMD. Both Japan and the U.S., possibly with other American allies, should present the United Nations with a plan to establish an international anti-ballistic missile system.[18]

The threat of ballistic missiles with WMD is a dangerous challenge to mankind. In a recent monograph, Lawrence Freedman warned of the rise of "asymmetric wars."[19] He refers to Saddam Hussein's warfare in the Gulf War and the Bosnian-Serb warfare in the mid-1990s, which undermined "the political cohesion of the coalition," encouraging "wishful thinking on the scope for a diplomatic compromise," promising "the mother of all battles" or Tito-style partisan warfare, threatening "a campaign of terror against the coalition's home populations," and indicating a use of WMD.[20] He conceptualizes the nature of new warfare and new strategies as follows:

> "These alternative strategies reflect those that the weak have consistently adopted against the strong: concentrating on imposing pain rather than winning battles;

18. As early as 1994, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin warned that traditional nuclear deterrence theories from the Cold War would not function in the new age: "Deterrence approaches designed for the Soviet Union might not be effective against new possessors of WMD for two reasons. First, they can be expected to have different doctrines, histories, organizations, command and control systems, and purposes for their unconventional military forces. In addition, proliferators may have acquired such weapons for the express purpose of blackmail or terrorism and thus have a fundamentally different calculus not amenable to deterrence. For these reasons, new proliferators might not be susceptible to basic deterrence as practiced during the Cold War. New deterrent approaches are needed as well as new strategies should deterrence fail." *Defense Secretary Annual Report, 1994*, p. 35. During the Cold War, there was a stable deterrence system by responsible powers, and there were reliable deterrence theories, which sustained the system itself. There is not yet any dependable deterrence theory for explaining the new situation.

19. Lawrence Freedman, *The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper 318* (London, 1998).

20. *Ibid*., pp. 40-41.

> gaining time rather than moving to closure; targeting the enemy's domestic political base as much as his forward military capabilities; relying on his intolerance of casualities and his weaker stake in the resolution of the conflict; and playing on a reluctance to cause civilian suffering, even if it reflects military options. In short, whereas stronger military powers have a natural preference for decisive battlefield victories, the weaker are more ready to draw the civilian sphere into the conflict, while avoiding open battle"[21]

This conceptualization is attractive, but it is also possible to explain these phenomena from a different perspective.

American dominance in RMA, particularly after the Gulf War, has become so obvious that challengers to the American world order shifted their strategy from winning a "real victory" from an ordinary frontal confrontation to seeking "another kind of victory" by adopting a new style of warfare and a new romantic "military philosophy." The former was based on the introduction of Soviet or Chinese weapon systems and the maximization of numerical advantages. This strategy became obsolete after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which meant the end of communist ideology and the disappearance of economical – sometimes free – arsenals for those challengers. Moreover, the allied victory in the Gulf War discredited the quality of Soviet and Chinese conventional weapon systems and tactical doctrines. At the same time, the challengers were freed from any ideological bond, which was usually required for access to Soviet weapons (although this was not necessarily true for Chinese weapons). This meant that the challengers did not have to consider lives of the proletariat of their enemy, and did not have to consider international public opinion or their international reputation. (Even then, international reputation mattered, since the Soviets could not openly supply weapons to notorious countries or groups, mainly for political and propaganda reasons.)

The quest for the "other kind of victory" means that challengers now intend to achieve "a kind of victory," not a real victory that is understandable in the Western political vocabulary. Once challengers are freed from ideological bondage, they become more nationalistic, "super-religious," and ethnic. They have to re-establish their political legitimacy by using or inventing different political vocabularies and new nationalistic or religious myths. Challengers change their philosophy of military strategy from an ideological or pseudo-ideological nature to a super-nationalistic, super-religious, or even a romantic one. Freedman's simplistic dichotomy that poses the "Western Way of War" against other ways of war is misleading, but this new trend reminds us of Hitler and

21. *Ibid*., p. 41.

Mussolini. It seems that the only difference is the fact that the *Luftwaffe* and the powerful German Army no longer exist. The only available means for them are ballistic missiles, WMD, and terrorism designed to exploit the vulnerability of non-combatants. In short, this style of warfare is terroristic and does not aim at world conquest; rather ballistic missiles, possibly armed with WMD, are the foremost weapon systems and threaten the well-being of mankind.

Saddam Hussein's Scud attacks on Israel, Oman, and Saudi Arabia were the only highlight in Iraqi war efforts. Eighty-eight Scud missiles greatly undermined the unity of the U.S.-led alliance against Iraq. Without vigorous Scud hunting and the creation of the Patriot myth, the Iraqi scheme might have succeeded. Gen. Chuck Horner of the U.S. Air Force, who was in charge of air war in the Gulf War, regretted that American air dominance failed to stop the Scud threat.[22] Scud hunting was possible only after the U.S. established air dominance through the massive destruction of Iraq's air defense system and air power. It is easy to imagine how difficult this hunting will be for the U.S. and its allies, particularly when they have to simultaneously destroy a challenger's air defense system and air power.

In sum, for neutral countries outside the network of American-led alliances, the threat of ballistic missiles is very serious. First, without the alliance network, they cannot diplomatically control rogue states, apart from desperately asking for help from the United Nations and/or international public opinion. Second, very few countries possess nuclear deterrents or a credible conventional offensive capability for possible pre-emptive strikes against rogue states. Third, being militarily weak and lacking international assistance means that rogue states can use weak countries for "proving" their strength and "winning prestige." Fourth, some of these countries, as a result of their geographic location, do not enjoy the "Scud wall." They might become the first victims of a missile threat, and their desperate military situation will invite the collapse of a stable world order. The internationalization of TMD and NMD – or AMD – might avert the possible decline of the world order.

Practical Obstacles to the Realization of TMD

To Japan, the establishment of AMD is most desirable, but this is a long-term project. Due to the North Korean missile threat, the immediate introduction of TMD is indispensable and will provide necessary and valuable lessons for realizing AMD. Thus, this paper covers TMD first.

22. See Tom Clancy with General Chuck Horner, *Every Man A Tiger* (N.Y., 1999).

TMD is not just about anti-ballistic missiles, but consists of five major components: diplomatic measures; command, control, communication, intelligence, and operational integration; anti-ballistic missile systems; a minimum attacking capability against a challenger's ballistic missile systems; and civil defense. This section examines the problems Japan and the U.S. face in promoting each of these parts of TMD. At the same time, Japanese financial problems also have to be considered in promoting TMD. Moreover, these component parts have to be linked and coordinated.

Diplomatic Measures. The prospect of Japan-U.S. economic assistance for North Korea is a powerful bargaining chip in controlling North Korean adventurism. Cultural and information exchanges will certainly convince the North Korean leadership that any military option, including missile threats, will invite Japan-U.S. military counter-measures. Even China now knows that Japan-U.S. economic cooperation is indispensable for further economic success and modernization, and the Chinese leadership realizes that the failure to satisfy the Chinese people's desire for economic success will invite the downfall of the regime. Japan and the U.S. should link their economic power with diplomatic measures to control Chinese exports of missile technology and any possible Chinese decision to start a strategic nuclear arms race.

Japan-U.S. promotion of TMD is also a great diplomatic asset that can undermine North Korean attempts – or those by any other country – to use missiles for purposes of diplomatic blackmail. Until Japan and the U.S. complete an effective TMD system, American diplomacy has to depend on its nuclear and conventional offensive capabilities as deterrents. However, K. Scott McMahon points out the limit of this deterrent in the Gulf War and other situations.[23] If the U.S. and Japan introduce TMD and offer economic assistance, they might be able to control North Korean ambitions or desperate attempts at brinkmanship. They could also persuade China to abandon military options to solve Asian problems.

The prospect of NMD and AMD give Japan and the U.S. a great chance to integrate NATO allies and Russia into a global scheme to contain ballistic and cruise missile threats. With Russian cooperation, Japan and the U.S. could ignore the longstanding system of world-wide nuclear deterrence, which has been functioning since the 1950s. Japan and the U.S. should present TMD as the first step toward the liberation of mankind from the fear of nuclear holocaust. North Korean and Chinese opposition will constitute a challenge to this liberation. Russian cooperation in AMD, if not outright

23. K. Scott McMahon, *Pursuit of the Shield: the U.S. Quest for Limited Ballistic Missile Defense* (Lanham, 1997), pp. 63-68.

participation, will pave the way to a nuclear power *de facto* non-aggression arrangement consisting of the U.S., the U.K., France, and Russia, and the world will become free from the threat of mutual assured destruction.

Furthermore, these four countries already possess enough ICBMs and/or SLBMs with enough nuclear warheads to devastate any country, and they are capable of overcoming any advance in anti-ballistic missile defenses by developing more sophisticated delivery systems. In other words, four-power cooperation in nuclear offensive capabilities and AMD can guarantee the most formidable deterrent against any challenger. Even now, the Chinese nuclear deterrent against the U.S., the U.K., and France is still nominal rather than substantial; its deterrent is functional only against Russia. It is doubtful that China can catch up with a rapid advance in RMA, and its failure to keep up might lead to a *de facto* loss of any nuclear deterrent even against Russia.[24] Japan and the U.S. should start persuading North Korea to abandon any thoughts of missile adventurism and concentrate on economic recovery. They should also convince China to cooperate in the realization of a MAD-free world.

The introduction of TMD might undermine the new South Korean engagement policy toward North Korea, although the U.S. and Japan openly support the policy. Despite the dramatic South Korean presidential visit to Pyongyang, it is hard to imagine that North Korea will eliminate deployed Nodong missiles and stop its development of WMD. Without the promotion of TMD and American nuclear and conventional deterrence, the new South Korean policy will not become effective. Moreover, TMD is for defense, not for offense.

We must acknowledge the outstanding contribution of international regime to controlling the spread of missile technology, specifically the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Since the MTCR was established in April 1987, it successfully presented "criteria for national export controls to prevent the spread of ballistic and cruise missiles," i.e., those "inherently capable of delivering a 500 kilogram payload (the weight of a relatively unsophisticated nuclear weapon) to a range of at least 300 km (the strategic range in the most compact theatres in which nuclear missiles might be used)."[25] The

24. Gerald Segal argued that Chinese military potential should not be overestimated even in the context of introducing TMD and NMD, and he underlined that "China is less a global rival like the Soviet Union than a regional threat like Iraq." Gerald Segal, "Does China Matter?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 5 (September/October 1999), p. 30.

25. Alexander A. Pilayev et. al., *Russia, the U.S. and the Missile Technology Control Regime, Adelphi Paper* No. 317 (London, 1998), p. 10.

Scud missile is "the only widely exported missile that exceeded this range/payload threshold."[26] It is easy to point out the regime's failure in some cases, but Japan and the U.S. have to continue to promote this regime. In the Far East, North Korean participation and a strict Chinese commitment are indispensable to the future success of this regime. (In 1994, China made a written pledge to America that it "would abide by MTCR rules."[27])

Command, Control, Communication, Intelligence, and Operations. In promoting an effective anti-ballistic missile defense, Japan and the U.S. should agree to establish a bilateral common command and operational center for ballistic (and cruise) missile defense. After the launch of a ballistic missile near Japan, Japan will have only five to 10 minutes, or even less, before it must take substantial counter measures. TMD requires a complex integration and coordination of command, control, communication, intelligence, and operation systems between the two countries. First, a capable command and operational center is needed to quickly analyze information and decide on appropriate measures; second, before any contingency, the center should undertake all necessary operational planning and analyze operational and intelligence information; third, the center should collect and analyze necessary intelligence information from Japan-U.S. satellites, radar sites, AWACS aircraft, and other sources. It is desirable that this Japan-U.S. center be located inside a Japan Self-Defense Forces base.

To promote effective Japan-U.S. defense cooperation, Japan should establish a Japanese Joint Services Mission, similar to the Joint Services Mission of Great Britain and a Japanese Joint Intelligence Committee in Washington, D.C., and the U.S. should provide an office inside the Pentagon. This will become a cornerstone of the effort to strengthen the Japan-U.S. defense alliance so that it reaches the level of the Anglo-American special defense relationship. It is desirable that the size of the two missions be equivalent to that of its British counterparts, say about 100 personnel.

The U.S. must supply necessary technological data and information for realizing Japanese intelligence satellites. At the same time, Japan and the U.S. should share information on ballistic and cruise missile threats and related operational information for meeting these threats. While Japan and the U.S. quickly establish the center and integrate command, control, communication, intelligence, and operational systems, both countries

26. *Ibid*., p. 10.

27. *Ibid*., p. 11.

should select appropriate weapons systems for these threats and take necessary measures for deploying them.

To promote these measures, guaranteeing information security is critical. Japan is far behind in terms of enacting necessary laws for information security. Without these laws, the U.S. cannot wholeheartedly cooperate with Japan. The absolute minimum for satisfying American standards of information security will be the introduction of a strict anti-spy act with severe punishment provisions and a rigorous law for regulating military information management. Japan should start this legislative process as soon as possible. The absolute minimum is an information security law on TMD and AMD.

Technical Problems in Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. An anti-ballistic missile system is indispensable for TMD. Wilkening categorizes TMD "by the altitude at which they make their intercepts. Systems that intercept targets above altitudes of 80-100 km are called exoatmospheric defenses. Those that intercept below this altitude are endoatomspheric defenses."[28] According to him, "below 40 km aerodynamic forces are appreciable, potentially causing warheads to maneuver, thus making them hard to intercept."[29] *The Defense Secretary Annual Report 2000* reports that lower-tier systems "remain the top priority to defeat short-range ballistic missiles," and the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) and the Navy Area Defense (NAD) are "the key lower-tier systems" for the TMD mission.[30]

PAC-3 developed from a combination of "an improved version of the PAC-2 used during the Gulf War" and "the new *Erint* hit-to-kill interceptor designed to hit targets up to an altitude of 30 km."[31] PAC-3 is expected to provide "air defense of ground combat forces and defense of high-value assets against high-performance, air-breathing, and theater ballistic missiles."[32] This system will give "defended footprints [defended areas] of approximately 40-60 km in diameter."[33] The U.S. government already started to

28. Wilkening, *op. cit*., p. 46.

29. *Ibid*., p. 46.

30. *Defense Secretary Annual Report 2000*, p.74.

31. Wilkening, *op. cit*., p. 46.

32. *Defense Secretary Annual Report 2000*, p. 74.

33. Wilkening, *op. cit*., p. 46.

procure PAC-3 missiles, "with the first unit equipped (FUE) projected for FY 2001."[34] With two successful tests, this system is promising. The U.S. government allegedly intends to procure "1,012 *Erint* missiles, enough to outfit approximately 20 *Patriot* batteries with 48 missiles each," which is estimated to cost $10.1 billion.[35] It is possible to imagine that a program of this scale will provide a sufficient footprint to cover the Tokyo area, the Osaka area, the Nagoya area, and the Fukuoka area against any attack of 50 hostile ballistic missiles with conventional and chemical warheads on one major cosmopolitan area.

The Navy Area Defense (NAD) program consists of "a reconfigured SPY-1 phased-array radar and upgraded version of the Standard Missile (Block IV A) on Aegis-equipped ships," and it intends to provide "U.S. forces, allied forces, and areas of vital national interest at sea and in coastal regions with an active defense against theater ballistic and cruise missiles."[36] Wilkening argues that this system "may be less lethal because it employs a blast-fragmentation warhead instead of a hit-to-kill interceptor."[37] This program is now delayed, "with the first flight test against a target missile scheduled for 2001," and the "total planned missile inventory has fallen to 872 from the original estimate of 1,500."[38] From a Japanese perspective, this program needs careful scrutiny. On the one hand, this system is mobile and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces already possesses the Aegis system, though some modifications are necessary. For Japan, these aspects are definitely helpful. On the other hand, this blast-fragmentation warhead, used in PAC-2 during the Gulf War, may not be powerful enough to kill a Scud warhead, and this system has not yet succeeded in interception tests. Moreover, Wilkening evaluated the PAC-3 as "more mature technically and, unlike NAD, can defend inland targets."[39] However, it will be a mistake to ignore this system in terms of fleet protection, and it may work as a supplementary weapons system to other anti-ballistic missile systems.

---

34. *Defense Secretary Annual Report 2000*, p. 74.

35. Wilkening, *op. cit*., p. 46.

36. *Defense Secretary Annual Report 2000*, p. 74.

37. Wilkening, *op. cit*., pp. 46-47.

38. *Ibid*., p. 47.

39. *Ibid*., p. 48.

The Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) is still alive, but this joint program of the U.S., Germany, and Italy might yet be canceled.[40] This system was originally designed to replace the Hawk system, and it is expected to defend "military forces in the field from air and tactical ballistic missile attacks."[41] In other words, this system is for NATO, which needs to defend an army force maneuvering in a large and open field. This does not fulfill Japanese requirements, i.e., the defense of large civilian populations, military bases, nuclear power plants, and industrial centers. Despite rumors of possible cancellation, the U.S. Defense Department reports that the "NATO MEADS Management Agency awarded a contract to MEADS International (comprised of Lockheed Martin, Damiler Chrysler Aerospace AG, and Alenia Marconi Systems) in November 1999 to begin work on the next phase of the program," and the Defense Department "fully funded the MEADS program by adding $721 million from FY 2002 to FY 2005."[42]

In terms of upper-tier systems, the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and the Navy Theater Wide (NTW) system are now being developed to "intercept incoming missiles at high altitudes in order to defend larger areas, defeat medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and increase theater commander's effectiveness against weapons of mass destruction."[43] In short, only these systems, if successfully developed, could defend the Japanese civilian population from the threat of nuclear missile attack, while the lower-tier systems are still useful in terms of ensuring the survival of Japanese state institutions and military forces. The THAAD system can become a powerful system: according to Wilkening, this system is designed to "engage ballistic-missile warheads at altitudes of between 40 km and 150 km. It is based on a hit-to-kill interceptor using an infra-red seeker, and has a flyout speed of approximately 2.5 km per second. Depending on the incoming missile's speed and the sensor support, THAAD can defend several hundred kilometres in diameter."[44] Moreover, a THAAD ground-based radar could allegedly cover up to 500 km, which "can discriminate simple decoys from warheads, based on their size and radar cross-section."[45] This U.S. program

40. *Ibid*., p. 47.

41. *Ibid*., p. 47.

42. *Defense Secretary Annual Report 2000*, p. 75.

43. *Ibid*., p. 75.

44. Wilkening, *op. cit*., p. 47.

45. *Ibid*., p. 47.

consists of 14 radars and 1,233 missiles, which will probably cost $17.9 billion.[46] From a Japanese perspective, it is possible to knock down the cost by reducing the size of program by half or even more. Japan is small in size and, as long as this system can cover several hundred kilometers in diameter, Japan needs only four to six THAAD bases with 600 missiles or less.[47] This system is quite promising, but Japan needs to make sure that it will work as expected. The U.S. Defense Department expects that "an FUE of FY 2007 is anticipated for THAAD," which means that Japan has enough time to monitor development of this project.[48] It is reasonable for Japan to gradually introduce PAC-3 as a replacement of PAC-2, while carefully watching the progress of THAAD. Only after successful development of the THAAD system, should Japan shift its priority from PAC-3 to THAAD. (THAAD's weakest point is flight speed: 2.5 km/second is too slow to intercept an ICBM launched about 1,500 miles away. It will be necessary to introduce a more advanced missile system than THAAD.)

The Navy Theater Wide (NTW) system originated in the Aegis Combat system and the Navy Area Defense system, and "Aegis Leap Intercept (ALI) flight testing is continuing through FY 2002."[49] Although the Japanese Self-Defense Forces is reported to be interested in this project, Wilkening judges that among "all the core systems, NTW is the least mature."[50] The Block I interceptor will be a Standard Missile-3 (a boosted version of the Block IV A), whose flyout speed will reach about 3 km/sec. The Block II interceptor is expected to acquire a speed of 4-4.5 km/sec and, subject to a target's speed, the location of the platform, and sensor support, this system can cover footprints "with diameters of several hundred kilometers to nearly 1,000 km."[51] NTW's most probable hit-to-kill payload is the Lightweight Exo-Atomospheric Projectile (LEAP), which reportedly "uses long-wave infra-red homing sensors, and can only operate above altitudes of approximately 70 km."[52] Although research and development is still in progress, Wilkening evaluates that this system is the most effective for Japan:

---

46. *Ibid*., p. 47.

47. Wilkening reports that the U.S. Defense Department "estimated in May 1999 that, with a barrage-firing doctrine, four THAAD batteries would be needed to cover South Korea, either four or six to cover Japan, depending on whether additional radars are included." *Ibid*., p. 49.
48. *Defense Secretary Annual Report 2000*, p. 75.

49. *Ibid*., p. 75.

50. Wilkening, *op. cit*., p. 47.

51. *Ibid*., p. 47.

52. *Ibid*., pp. 47-48.

> "NTW would be most effective for defending Japan because it can be stationed between the threat (North Korea) and the territory being defended. In fact, NTW ships stationed in the middle of the Sea of Japan might be able to engage North Korean missiles as they ascend, thereby giving large defended footprints. For example, a single NTW ship should be able to protect almost all of Japan if the Block II interceptor is used, whereas four would be needed with the slower Block I."[53]

This dream still depends on complete success of its development. *The Defense Secretary Annual Report 2000* fails to mention the FY year of FUE.[54] Some sources indicate that the U.S. was not so behind schedule in developing this system. If Japan is serious about TMD, a combination of NTW and THAAD is the most desirable. However, if Japan is forced to choose either system for financial reasons, NTW might be better, although introduction of this system might invite serious diplomatic and political problems.

In the March 1999 report, the Heritage Foundation's Commission on Missile Defense accused the Clinton administration of intentionally retarding development of the NTW system, and it recommended that the U.S. government should "stop constraining the Navy Theater Wide missile defense system" and "end the self-imposed restraints of the now-defunct ABM Treaty."[55] It suggested that the NTW system is more advanced than "ground-based defenses": "Contrary to conventional wisdom, advances in technology have been flowing from research on space-based systems to ground-based systems, not the other way around. As discussed in the 1995 'Team B' report [of the Heritage Foundation], sea-based and space-based defenses would be far less expensive and more effective in providing the needed wide-area defensive coverage."[56] The Commission concluded that the U.S. could possess "an effective and affordable global missile defense system" within "four years" and "for less than $8 billion," based on a combination of NTW and "the Space-Based Infra-Red Sensor system."[57] This

---

53. *Ibid*., p. 49.

54. *Defense Secretary Annual Report 2000*, p. 75. Wilkening reports that the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) is planning to deploy NTW around FY 2010. Wilkening, *op. cit*., p. 48.

55. Report by the Heritage Foundation's Commission on Missile Defense, *Defending America: A Plan to Meet the Urgent Missile Threat* (Washington, D.C., 1999), pp. 2-3.

56. *Ibid*., p.44.

57. *Ibid*., p. 4. Michael O'Hanlon indicates that Russia might agree to a revision of the ABM Treaty in exchange for a clear-cut U.S. abandonment of "the pursuit of nuclear superiority." Michael O'Hanlon,"Star Wars Strikes Back," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 6 (November/December 1999), p. 81.

calculation is still too optimistic, but once the Bush administration adopts this approach, Japan should take advantage of it.

According to some reliable sources, the Heritage Foundation's Commission's report is misleading. The U.S. has maintained the development schedule as planned, and it has reached a satisfactory level of research and development in NTW. This system does not violate the terms of the ABM Treaty. It might violate the so-called TMD demarcation, but the U.S. has not committed itself to the Russian interpretation that NTW violates the ABM Treaty. Robert Bell, then National Security Council Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control, reportedly stated in 1997, "The United States has determined that the present NTW system is Treaty compliant, together with the use of CEC [Cooperative Engagement Capability] for cueing," although he did not answer the question "as to whether CEC can also be used for NTW, Guidance and Control, and still be Treaty compliant."[58]

If Japan intends to introduce NTW, it should encourage the U.S. to overcome three problems. First, the U.S. must get Russia to agree to the U.S. interpretation of the ABM Treaty to allow deployment of NTW. Second, the U.S. must deploy NTW before Japan does. This will undermine China's hysterical reaction to Japanese deployment. Although deployment is likely to invite harsh Chinese reaction, diplomatically Japan cannot afford to be exposed to Chinese criticism without American support. Third, the U.S. must fund the necessary research and development of NTW, and it must finish the development process. While Japan waits for America to solve these three issues, it can examine and possibly introduce NAD.

Only after the U.S. overcomes these issues can Japan proceed to the next stage: solving its own problems. First, Japan has to provide necessary air cover for the Aegis-equipped destroyers in charge of NTW. Second, NTW must work even in rough weather conditions. Third, any platform for NTW will be exposed to an opponent's heavy air and/or missile attacks, and an escort fleet for the platform will be required. This means that this project will not be as economical as hoped, but it still has a huge potential and operational flexibility.

Wilkening recommends so-called boost-phase ballistic missile defense programs, based on "a high-speed airborne interceptor (ABI) launched from fighter aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); a high-power airborne laser (ABL) carried aboard a

58. Memorandum from W. Stephen Piper, "ABM Treaty and the Helsinki Accord" (May 19, 1997), Piper Pacific International.

Boeing 747-400F; or a space-based laser."[59] However, these weapon systems are still far off. According to *The 1999 Defense Secretary Annual Report*, the U.S. intended that ABL development be paced to "accomplish a lethality demonstration against an in-flight ballistic missile in FY 2003."[60]

With AMD becoming a reality, Japan as well as NATO allies should start introducing NMD weapon systems, i.e., ground-based interceptors (GBIs), advanced GBIs, ground-based radars (GBRs), satellite tracking system, and other systems. The U.S. should assist these efforts.[61]

Minimum Attack Capability Against Ballistic Missile Systems

No matter how effective anti-ballistic missile systems can be, they are not magic shields that will provide a perfect defense. Without advanced warning, they cannot successfully shoot down a majority of first-wave ballistic missiles. Even worse, Japan and the U.S. may not react in time to the first wave, probably as a result of Japan's slow reaction in command, control, and communication. However, it must prevent or destroy a second wave of ballistic missiles at any cost. From this perspective, destroying hostile missile launchers and related systems is as significant as, or more important than, shooting down ballistic missiles with anti-ballistic missiles. Japan and the U.S. must secure a means for eliminating the threat of the second wave and successive attacks. More significant, Japan's lack of retaliatory power will surely encourage a rogue leader to start a missile attack. This isn't the Cold War: a rogue state is unlikely to respect the Japanese people and proletariat. (North Korea did not care for its people's hunger, instead concentrating its limited power on developing ballistic missiles.)

In this context, conventional deterrence is necessary as the second level of deterrent, after America's nuclear deterrent. (In view of the possible establishment of a Japan-U.S. common command and operational center, this deterrent should be under the command of this organization.) Any challenger will seriously consider the American nuclear deterrent if it considers a nuclear missile strike against any American ally. The threat of using nuclear warheads will probably only be used for political blackmail, due to the obvious American superiority in nuclear warfare capabilities. But it is much easier

59. Wilkening, *op. cit*., p. 60.

60. *Defense Secretary Annual Report 1999*, p. 72.

61. On the historical development of NMD, see McMahon, *op.cit*.

for a challenger to use non-nuclear warheads in a ballistic missile attack than it is to use nuclear warheads. What kind of counter-measure is then necessary?

If a challenger uses conventional warheads or a small number of biological/chemical (BC) warheads in a ballistic missile attack against a U.S. ally, it is unlikely that the U.S. will use nuclear warheads in a retaliatory strike. It is also difficult to expect that the U.S. forces, deployed in one region, can attack a challenger on short notice. For example, the U.S. Air Force and/or the U.S. Navy in the Far East cannot immediately organize a concerted retaliatory attack in one week or so without pre-attack reinforcements from the U.S. continent. A retaliatory strike against this level of attack should do more than hunt rocket launchers and damage symbolic targets. Rogue states, due to the nature of their political regimes, are much more capable of enduring a symbolic conventional retaliatory strike than democratic states. A retaliatory strike must be substantial and more damaging than they can stand. Launching dozens of cruise missiles from air and/or sea platforms will never suffice as a retaliatory strike. In short, if the retaliatory strike fails to be impressively powerful, there is the possibility that the challenger can "win" this "show window" war. The minimum requirements of a retaliatory strike are a complete elimination of the missile threat and devastation of the challenger's political targets of high value.

Moreover, before hunting missile launchers, the U.S. Air Force and/or the U.S. Navy have to destroy the challenger's air defense system and air power, so that air dominance enables the hunt by air of the missile launchers and facilitates substantial destruction of high-value political targets. Scud hunting in the Gulf War was possible only after the U.S. established air dominance over Iraq, which took about a month. Even after this, the coalition forces had to use as many as 48 jet fighter-bombers each day for Scud hunting. This was a special case, and it will be very difficult for the U.S. military to achieve this level of success. No one expects the U.S. Air Force to be able to afford to use three fighter-bomber squadrons for hunting in an early stage, say the first week of a crisis, while destroying the challenger's air defense system and air power. Suppose that a challenger continues to launch 10 missiles with conventional warheads each day, and, at the same time, it demands political concessions from Japan and/or South Korea. In that case, the challenger might win a political "victory." At the same time, U.S. failure to start hunting immediately and the ally's inability to retaliate will greatly undermine the ally's confidence in American credibility and military power and damage the ally's political prestige and perhaps even its legitimacy.

Japan and the U.S. should, at least, start joint planning on how to establish a necessary conventional deterrent against this threat. This action itself will become a

strong bond between the two countries. Sharing information on American offensive plans will be encouraging for the Japanese. Japanese participation in U.S. military planning for hunting the challenger's missile launchers is the most reasonable first step toward this goal.

Civil Defense. Civil defense should not be overlooked. As is commonly known, anti-BC warfare training for a civilian population and supplies of necessary equipment for anti-BC warfare will considerably reduce the number of victims and the damage level. As long as there is the possibility that a challenger will either use a small number of biological/chemical warheads in a ballistic missile attack or intends to intimidate U.S. allies with the bluff, the existence of anti-BC capabilities can become critical for the functioning of any new deterrence system. This capability serves not only to maintain high morale among the population, but it also contributes to the ability of the ally's government to stand tough against a bluff or an actual attack. Encouraging every ordinary family to purchase the necessary minimum equipment for anti-BC warfare is an economical and effective measure for reducing the magnitude of the BC threat. Even in a case of a missile attack with conventional or atomic warheads, minimal pre-attack training or the minimum orientation of the civilian population as well as the introduction of an appropriate warning system will reduce the number of victims, which the Japanese government can not ignore.

Japan should learn from Israel's civil defense efforts. Israel established the Home Front Command in the early 1990s which is in charge of "passive defenses."[62] Israel has also invested in "civil defense, such as public and residential bomb shelters," and it has improved "intelligence and early-warning of missile attacks" and "upgraded passive defenses against non-conventional threats," i.e., "sealed shelters, detectors, gas masks, and chemical antidotes."[63] Israel's success can be measured in these terms: Iraqi's 42 Scud missiles killed only one person "as a direct result of these attacks, although several others died from heart attacks, or as a result of the improper use of gas masks and chemical antidotes."[64]

This civil defense capability can be used against any terrorist-type threat that employs WMD. Despite the Aum Shinrikyo incident in March 1995, Japan has failed to

62. Mark A. Heller, *Continuity and Change in Israeli Security Policy, Adelphi Paper 335* (July 2000), p. 50.

63. *Ibid*., pp. 49-50.

64. *Ibid*., p. 30.

develop this capability. It is ironic that Richard Betts now warns of the possibility of similar terrorist acts with WMD inside the U.S.[65] By developing this capability, Japan can prepare for two types of military contingencies.

Financial Problem. How much should Japan have to spend on TMD to sustain U.S.-Japan military dominance in RMA? Japan is now suffering from a huge budgetary deficit, and it will experience a population decrease for the next 30 years. Japanese national power might decline. Japan should seek American understanding on this, and the U.S. should not expect a huge financial commitment to research and development in TMD systems.

Planning AMD and Possible Practical Problems

U.S. discussion of NMD started only several years ago and the U.S. Congress has not committed itself to NMD, so any discussion on AMD might be premature. But AMD can become the most reliable and desirable defense arrangement for insuring world peace and prosperity. AMD should be intended to liberate Western nations from all threats of ballistic and cruise missiles and bomber attacks. At the same time, this system could create a global shield against missile threats to secure peace and stability anywhere in the world. More than coping with rogue state missile threats, the process of establishing AMD will guarantee a trust-building process among the U.S., its allies, and its future allies. With Russian participation, AMD will become global in nature, and Russia will not be suspicious of the West. An effective and cooperative defense system will eliminate any possibility of Japanese or German introduction of nuclear arms. In addition, no country will dare challenge this defense arrangement.

Japan and the U.S. should start TMD and NMD without waiting to launch AMD. AMD is an evolutionary integration of TMD and NMD. At first, Japan and the U.S. should start a TMD system in East Asia, and the U.S. and NATO allies, with possible Russian consultation, should start another TMD system in the Mediterranean area. The U.S. should also continue its efforts to develop an NMD system. Only after the U.S. and its allies become confident about the effectiveness of the NMD system and the feasibility of expanding its geographical coverage should they begin integrating TMD and NMD into AMD. Establishing a global missile defense "belt," which will take at least 10 to 15 years.

65. Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January/February 1998), pp. 26-41.

Before this integration, it is necessary to establish the intellectual foundations for AMD, and it is reasonable to organize international conferences to promote AMD. This huge intellectual project has to mobilize defense specialists and national security experts of the U.S., its allies, and Russia. These conferences should be comprehensive in nature, cover everything from hardware to international values and cause, and, at the same time, they should provide precious opportunities for informal discussions and exchanges among defense officials, military officers, diplomats, and intellectuals. After this, the U.S., its NATO allies, Japan, and Russia should start formal military and diplomatic talks to found military institutions for AMD.

A sketch of the possible organization of world-wide AMD system is as follows. The top administrative organization would be an AMD council of top governmental leaders and defense ministers (possibly with foreign ministers), though this organization will make no operational decisions and take no operational command. It will simply manage an organization and coordinate the whole AMD system. Below this, a global headquarters for intelligence and information, regional command and operation centers, and regional headquarters of intelligence and information will be in charge of daily operational and intelligence activities. Any information related to missile threats has to be collected and analyzed at the global headquarters for intelligence and information, but it will not organize any specific operation. Due to the limited time before deciding to shoot down ballistic and cruise missiles, a regional command and operation center should make decisions on whether to shoot them down. From this perspective, regional headquarters for intelligence and information must be established for collecting necessary operational information and supplying it to the regional command and operational center.

AMD should also introduce the notion that a regional command and operational center should be in charge of operating conventional alliance offensive capabilities for attacking threatening missile launchers and related air offense and defense systems. Certainly real-time agreement of the AMD council is desirable, but, in an emergency, the center should follow an offensive plan, regulated and approved by the council. As for nuclear retaliatory capability, the AMD council should make the final decision on whether and how it should be used.

Civil defense is also significant in AMD. A global headquarters for civil defense is unnecessary, but a regional arrangement is possible and desirable in terms of promoting a sense of solidarity and comradeship among nations participating in AMD. From this perspective, either a regional command and operational center will be in charge of this mission or a regional center for civil defense could be established.

Since this AMD project is global in nature, some arrangement with the United Nations is inevitable. AMD's international legal status is justified by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, but AMD participants should reserve room for accepting a possible U.N. mandate to defend any country under an obvious missile threat.

Recommendation--Introduction of the TMD Package and Immediate Start of Planning AMD

Japan and the U.S. should immediately start TMD as the first stage of integrating TMD and NMD into AMD. Japan and the U.S. must make immediate efforts to integrate command, control, communication, intelligence, and operational systems for denying the threat of ballistic and cruise missiles. A reasonable goal is the establishment of a Japan-U.S. common command and operational center for ballistic (and cruise) missile defense. To promote this integration, Japan should establish the Japanese Joint Services Mission and Japanese Joint Intelligence Mission in Washington, D.C., and it is desirable that the U.S. accept them and provide an office inside the Pentagon.

Japan and the U.S., with the possible cooperation of NATO members and Russia, should promote diplomatic means for arms control, i.e., not just MTCR but the possible introduction of an international anti-ballistic missile regime in the United Nations. In addition to these diplomatic measures, Japan should immediately introduce civil defense.

When developing Japan-U.S. anti-ballistic missile systems, Japan should be careful in choosing the appropriate anti-ballistic missile systems. Japan should make sure that the first to-be-deployed anti-ballistic missile system, the PAC-3, can complete its assigned mission before it is actually deployed. It must use the same approach when introducing THAAD and NTW systems. It will be three to five years before Japan deploys the first PAC-3 battalion near the Tokyo area.

A successful TMD deployment in East Asia can become a model for introducing TMD arrangements in other areas, as well as AMD arrangements in the future. Japan and the U.S. can propagate and present a plan for the AMD force based on Japan-U.S.-NATO forces, possibly with Russian forces, too. This international force can contribute to international peace and stability.

At the same time, the U.S. and Japan should cooperate to develop a formidable conventional deterrent. Since no anti-ballistic missile system is leak-proof, a capability for destroying ballistic missile launchers is an indispensable component of TMD. It is suicidal to limit Japanese defense space to its territory and nearby sea-lanes. Japanese

participation in U.S.-Japan joint planning for hunting ballistic missile launchers should be the first step toward the establishment of the necessary conventional deterrent.

In a recent article, Kenneth N. Waltz wonders how long Japan can continue its nuclear inhibitions arising from the Second World War:

> "Increasingly, Japan is being pressed to enlarge its conventional forces and to add nuclear ones to protect its interests. India, Pakistan, China, and perhaps North Korea have nuclear weapons capable of deterring others from threatening their vital interests. How long can Japan live alongside other nuclear states while denying itself similar capabilities?"[66]

This view is not acceptable for most Japanese people, and, the easy choice of introducing nuclear weapons might not be reasonable in view of the remarkable success in RMA. However, closer U.S.-Japan military cooperation and Japanese participation in planning to destroy any hostile delivery system of WMD might become a final alternative to Japanese possession of nuclear weapons.

In detail, the following measures should be taken:

1. The immediate promotion of Japan-U.S. integration (or at least close cooperation) of command, control, communication, intelligence, and operational systems against the ballistic missile threat. (In the near future, this integration must cover the threats posed by stealth and fast cruise missiles.)
2. To promote and maintain this integration, the immediate establishment of a Japanese Joint Services Mission and the founding of a Japanese Joint Intelligence Committee, which will be stationed in Washington, D.C., preferably inside the Pentagon. (It is recommended that the size of both organizations be equivalent to their British counterparts.)
3. The immediate promotion of civil defense and the immediate establishment of a Home Front Command.
4. Japan should immediately start the legislative process to introduce a strict anti-spy act with severe punishment provisions and a rigorous law for regulating military information management. The U.S. is required to share its legal know-how to facilitate this process.

---

66. Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), p. 34.

5. The incremental introduction of the PAC-3 system, if this system works, and the promotion of comprehensive Japan-U.S. cooperation in research and development of the PAC-3 system.
6. The U.S. should encourage Japan to participate in operational planning for hunting of a challenger's missile launchers. This could become the first step toward the establishment of a formidable joint conventional deterrent, which would supplement the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
7. Japan should be careful in its cooperation in developing THAAD and NTW systems: it must limit its financial commitment as much as possible, though technological assistance must be provided to the maximum extent.
8. Japan should be careful and circumspect regarding the actual deployment of a NTW system. Japan should encourage the U.S. to solve three difficult issues: U.S.-Russia agreement on the status of NTW, coping with the possible Chinese reaction, and the NTW development problem. It should then proceed to solve other problems. (In terms of introducing THAAD, Japan should give it secondary priority, but, if the NTW system faces insurmountable difficulty, it should seriously consider deploying the THAAD system.)
9. Japan should encourage China and North Korea to fully accept and observe the MCTR. In doing so, Japan should take advantage of the time that will pass before possible deployment of a NTW system.
10. Japan and the U.S. should promote AMD, while promoting an international anti-ballistic missile regime in the United Nations, and they can present a plan to establish Japan-U.S.-NATO anti-ballistic missile forces, possibly with Russian participation. Japan should welcome and support American attempts to integrate TMD and NMD into AMD, a shield for Western democracy.
11. Japan and the U.S. should organize international conferences for establishing the intellectual foundations of AMD.

Chapter 10: TMD, East Asia, and the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Michael O'Hanlon

Overview

This paper addresses the following questions. Given the likely budgetary and diplomatic costs, is missile defense in East Asia really needed? If so, is it possible for the United States and Japan to deploy theater and national missile defenses (TMD and NMD) while avoiding a major diplomatic row in the region with North Korea and China? What technologies should they deploy, and on what scale?

The Strategic Need for TMD

North Korea remains the most important potential threat justifying TMD in East Asia. While all hope for a continuation and acceleration of the promising process of détente on the Korean Peninsula, security planners and officials cannot yet assume that the process will continue. It has not yet resulted in any diminution of the existing North Korean conventional or missile threats. Engagement makes good sense – and perhaps should even include more substantial incentives for Pyongyang. But at the same time, deterrence should be sustained. Given how much North Korea has increased its missile threat to Japan over the last decade, particularly with its Nodong missile, it is only appropriate that Tokyo as well as Washington take steps to defend their territories, populations, and forces against such weapons.

Chinese scholars and officials frequently question whether the United States and Japan really should fear a North Korean missile attack. In my view, the clear answer is yes. That is not to say that North Korea will irrationally launch a volley of missiles. But it could well strike in the context of possible war on the Peninsula, a scenario that has become less likely in recent years but that is hardly implausible.

The United States lost 28 soldiers to a single Scud missile launched by Iraq during the Persian Gulf War, while defending oil supplies upon which both the United States and Japan depend. And that missile carried only a conventional warhead. Moreover, North Korea's missile capabilities are superior to Iraq's.

In the unlikely but hardly inconceivable event of another Korean war, a North

Korea armed with missiles and weapons of mass destruction could be extremely dangerous. It might well threaten parts of Japan hosting U.S. bases, in an early effort to dissuade Tokyo from supporting the war effort. Even if that attempt failed, North Korea might again rattle its missile saber later in the war. For example, if U.S. and South Korean forces decided to respond to a North Korean attack with a counteroffensive to overthrow the regime in Pyongyang, North Korean leaders might be sorely tempted to threaten missile strikes against U.S. or Japanese targets as a deterrent. It is even possible that North Korea might actually launch such missiles, with nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads atop them. Such actions would not necessarily be irrational under such extreme circumstances; if North Korean leaders believed that they were about to be overthrown in a conflict, they might consider such threats – and even such attacks – their last hope of convincing the invading powers to stop their invasion and negotiate terms. Or if Kim Jong-il had lost power to one or more internal commanders with a visceral hatred of Japan or the United States, these rogue leaders might be tempted to launch attacks simply for vengeance's sake. Most Chinese officials and scholars do not find these arguments persuasive – but it is easier to trivialize threatened attacks when one is not the potential victim.

There may also be some situations in which limited defense against possible Chinese missile strikes would make sense. In particular, defenses for U.S. military forces and Japanese bases against conventionally-armed missile attacks may be important in a future war over Taiwan. If, despite the best efforts of all parties to prevent conflict, war should occur between China and Taiwan, the United States might be drawn in. In that event, China might fire missiles against U.S. ships, aircraft, and regional bases – possibly including those on Japan. Tokyo might elect for that reason not to allow U.S. combat operations to proceed from Japanese bases. But, as we all recall from the ambiguous nature of the 1997 Defense Guidelines, Japan might also wish to support a U.S. military role, depending on the circumstances. So Japan should probably preserve all options, and acquire TMD to improve its defensibility in any such scenario.

If China really wanted to strike the Japanese homeland with missiles, it could probably do so, despite the best efforts of advanced TMD systems. As will be discussed in more detail below, decoys could fool systems such as the Clinton national missile defense system and Navy Theater Wide (NTW); saturation attacks could overwhelm defenses in any one part of Japan; short-range missiles or depressed-energy missiles could underfly defenses like NTW. China, with its extensive resource base and technological capabilities, could almost certainly take advantage of these options to defeat TMD and NMD.

These facts also argue in favor of boost-phase national missile defense. Boost-phase defense attempts to destroy an enemy missile early in its flight, while it presents a hot and large target, and before it has had the opportunity to release decoys. Such boost-phase defenses, based on land, at sea, or in the air (during crises or wartime in the latter event), are more technologically promising than midcourse interceptors. They are also more likely to be consistent with good relations with China, since they could not shoot down inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) launched from China's interior.

What would China really do about deployments of TMD and NMD? That all depends. If leaders in Beijing were only moderately upset, they might simply increase and upgrade their missile force somewhat – a plan they may have anyway. This reaction might ensue if Japan and the United States deployed TMD and NMD – but focused the TMD on limited strikes, most probably from North Korea – and if Washington restrained transfers of advanced TMD to Taiwan while also focusing on boost-phase NMD. If Beijing felt that Tokyo and Washington had fundamentally ignored its security interests, however, it might take steps with more serious consequences. Those steps could include everything from selling North Korea more sophisticated missile technology, such as decoys that could fool missile defenses, to suspending cooperation with Japan and the United States and South Korea in their efforts to make peace on the Peninsula, to resuming nuclear testing, to becoming more aggressive toward Taiwan. Some of these latter steps might leave the United States and Japan less secure and less well off than if they had never deployed missile defenses in the first place.

In short, Tokyo and Washington should avoid the dangerous and futile illusion that they could achieve reliable and robust TMD against a Chinese threat. They should pursue limited TMD (and NMD, for the United States), regardless of Beijing's objections, against the real North Korean threat and a potential limited Chinese missile strike. With their aspirations limited in these ways, China would probably object, but would probably stop short of resorting to extreme responses. Limited missile defense is the best way to balance various types of security concerns, and to recognize the potential as well as the limitations of technology, for the East Asia region.

In regard to Taiwan, against which China already has 200 missiles deployed in its southeastern coastal regions, a balanced strategy is also required. Both China and Taiwan need to be reassured – and both also need to be constrained. China should not be given free rein to threaten the people of Taiwan with missiles: if it gains confidence that it is in a dominant position, it may become impatient about timetables for reunification. By the

same token, Taiwanese leaders should not be led to believe that they have defenses large and capable enough to thwart any Chinese attack – such confidence could increase the chances that they would move toward declaring independence, thereby provoking war. Creating a reliable defense for Taiwan will prove impossible in any event, since China can build decoys and increase the size of its missile force. So Washington should help Taipei improve its defenses, but not so much as to encourage an arms race. Specifically, U.S. TMD sales to Taiwan should be modest, especially if China agrees to slow its missile buildup near Taiwan.

An Overview of TMD Systems and Development Schedules

Since the Gulf War, the United States has significantly improved its only existing missile defense system, the Patriot. Patriot's radar now has greater range and can track more objects simultaneously. Starting in 2001, the Pentagon is to deploy a further-improved version of the Patriot. That is later than initially expected – another reminder of the difficulty of developing even relatively simple missile defense systems –but the new Patriot is likely to work with high effectiveness. It will have the ability to identify warheads so that it will not be fooled by an enemy's use of simple decoys or the breakup of a missile's body during atmospheric reentry (as early vintages of Patriot were in Desert Storm). It will also possess a new hit-to-kill interceptor missile that achieved a completely successful test in early 1999. Whereas the existing Patriot system, known as PAC-2, can defend an area with a radius of some 10 to 15 kilometers, the new PAC-3 will triple that coverage. The PAC-3 interceptor has its own self-contained radar for homing in on a target. It also features 180 small thrusters for fine steering in the final phases of intercept (earlier Patriots have fins for steering and blast-fragmentation warheads).[1] Estimated acquisition costs for this program are roughly $7 billion.

The Pentagon is also continuing to develop a low-altitude theater defense based on Navy Aegis-class ships that uses a modified form of the standard antiaircraft missile. Known simply as the Navy area defense system, it is designed to have a coverage zone somewhat larger than that of the Patriot PAC-3. Recent tests to validate the capabilities of the system's individuals components – the missile and the ship radars – have been

1. Bradley Graham, "Army Hit in New Mexico Test Said to Bode Well for Missile Defense," *Washington Post*, March 16, 1999, p. 7; James Glanz, "Missile Defense Rides Again," *Science*, April 16, 1999, p. 417; David Hughes, "Patriot PAC-3 Upgrade Aimed at Multiple Threats," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, February 24, 1997, pp. 59-61.

successful.[2] The Navy hopes to deploy this system by 2003 and to install it on at least 40 ships. Estimated costs are again roughly $7 billion.

Less advanced are other programs designed to provide defense against theater missiles over regions of a few hundred kilometers' width – a much more difficult task than lower-tier local defense, but also one that must be mastered if one is to protect large regions affordably. The key programs are known as THAAD (for Theater High-Altitude Area Defense) and the Navy Theater Wide system. THAAD had testing difficulties a couple years ago, but they were more the result of shoddy workmanship than the viability of the hit-to-kill concept.[3] In any event, THAAD finally scored a direct hit during a test in June of 1999 and another hit in August of that year. The interceptions, using THAAD's infrared seeker to guide the missile's final approach, occurred at a much higher altitude and greater distance from base than Patriot is capable of.[4] Whichever of these programs, THAAD or NTW, turns out to advance more rapidly is to be fielded in 2007, the other sometime thereafter – though THAAD enthusiasts, only recently on the ropes after six straight test failures, have been talking about speeding up the program in light of the pair of successes in 1999. Estimated costs for THAAD approach $15 billion; those for NTW are roughly half as much, given the fact that the system's radar capabilities are already largely paid for (since they are already in place for air defense purposes).

Another possible TMD system is the airborne laser program (ABL), which would weaken an offensive rocket's outer surface, causing it to rupture while burning. In other words, it would destroy the missile in its boost phase. In theory it could work against any missile, medium-range or long-range, with a boost phase long enough to give the ABL time to shoot at it. The ABL system would work as follows. Two aircraft, each carrying a laser capable of firing 20 shots before returning to the ground for more chemical fuel, would operate near the likely launch points of enemy missiles and above the clouds at about 40,000 feet altitude. In principle, it could be deployable by the end of the decade as well – or at least so the Pentagon hopes. Specifically, the laser is supposed to be flight-

2. Robert Holzer, "U.S. Navy Missile Defense Effort Wins Support," *Defense News*, July 26, 1999, p. 3.

3. Bradley Graham, "Low-Tech Flaws Stall High-Altitude Defense," *Washington Post*, July 27, 1998, p. 1.

4. The first intercept occurred at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, at an altitude of just under 60 miles, with both target and interceptor traveling at about 1.5 kilometers per second on impact. The second occurred a few miles higher, but at considerably higher interceptor speed (2.5 kilometers per second), and against a reentry vehicle descending from 300 kilometers' altitude. See "World News Roundup," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, June 14, 1999, p. 56; Robert Wall, "THAAD at Crossroads After Intercept," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, August 9, 1999, pp. 29-31.

tested in 2003. If that test is successful it will enter into engineering manufacturing and development the next year; initial operating capability would be in 2007 and the full capability of seven aircraft would be available in 2009, with a total acquisition cost around $7 billion. The ABL program schedule seems likely to slip, however, given the fact that high-powered lasers are a fundamentally new type of technology. The program remains essentially in the laboratory experimental stage today, a point emphasized by the Pentagon's director for operational test and evaluation Philip Coyle and director of defense research and engineering Hans Mark.[5]

If and when the ABL is available, it would likely have a capability against any ballistic missile within a range of several hundred kilometers. That would give this system the same advantage that other boost-phase defenses would have in not threatening the Russian or Chinese deterrent. However, it is not clear if countermeasures, such as reflective coatings on offensive missile bodies, could defeat such a laser. And again, most fundamentally, it is not yet clear that the basic concept of an ABL will prove workable within the next decade.[6] The space-based laser may require two decades to develop.[7]

Navy Theater Wide

Given Japan's preference for the Navy Theater Wide TMD system, greater detail is warranted on this technology. The Pentagon is developing the NTW defense system as a TMD system, but some have proposed expanding it to have NMD capability as well. Either way, it would use the Aegis radar deployed on about 60 U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers as its engagement radar. In TMD mode, it would employ a modified form of the Standard Missile as its interceptor, with a hit-to-kill final stage atop it.

An important and often overlooked point about NTW is that, like the Clinton administration's proposed NMD system, it is also an exoatmospheric defense that cannot

---

5. Kerry Gildea, "Theater missile defense programs in trouble, top Pentagon official warns," *Aerospace Daily*, May 25, 1999; Geoffrey E. Forden, "The Airborne Laser," *IEEE Spectrum* (September 1997); John Donnelly, "Basis for Pentagon Approval of Airborne Laser 'Questionable,' " *Defense Week*, March 15, 1999, p. 1.

6. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: *DoD Efforts to Develop Laser Weapons for Theater Defense*, GAO/NSIAD-99-50 (March 1999).

7. The space-based laser program is probably at least another decade in the future; see General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: *DoD Efforts to Develop Laser Weapons for Theater Defense*, p. 20.

work within roughly 100 kilometers of the surface of the Earth. It is not truly a "boost phase" system, since many shorter-range and intermediate-range missiles burn out before reaching an altitude of 100 kilometers, and since the NTW interceptor missile probably lacks the speed and maneuverability to collide with an accelerating rocket in any event. It would work after boost phase and before reentry – the phase of flight that can be described as midcourse, including both ascent and descent phases.

For these reasons, NTW is limited. It would not work against short-range missiles – those with ranges of less than 500 kilometers – because they would generally never reach high enough altitude to leave the atmosphere. It also would not work if confounded by simple, light decoys that resembled real warheads in the vacuum of outer space. Although some Department of Defense scientists claim that more advanced sensors will gradually be deployed, and have the capacity to tell decoys from warheads so that NTW or the Clinton NMD system could defeat the decoys, basic physics argues the opposite. North Korea and China may not have such decoys on their theater missiles at present, but North Korea might be able to develop them, and China almost certainly could. The kill vehicle now envisioned for NTW does not have outstanding sensors or maneuverability – meaning that it would have a harder time coping with even the simplest decoys than the Clinton NMD system.

Of all TMD programs, NTW is the only one that raises any Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) compliance issues. (It is possible that someday the airborne laser will cause concerns as well, but to date it has not.) The treaty permits theater missile defenses without restriction, but does not clearly define the demarcation point between theater and strategic missile defenses. The United States and Russia reached an accord in 1997 that defined as unambiguous TMD any system using interceptors that do not exceed speeds of 3 kilometers per second, and that are not tested against incoming warheads with speeds greater than 5 kilometers per second or ranges greater than 3,500 kilometers. The accord has not been submitted to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent but nonetheless has a certain *de facto* status. The NTW program is to stay below the two latter thresholds, but its "Block II" interceptor will someday have a maximum speed greater than 3 kilometers per second, making its status ambiguous.[8] The current U.S. intent is to test anyway, without restriction, so disagreements over the demarcation agreement are unlikely to affect U.S. TMD capabilities. (The NTW missile that would exceed 3 kilometers per

8. Lisbeth Gronlund, Letter to the Editor, "Taking a Close Look at the 'Demarcation' Agreements," *Arms Control Today*, vol. 28 (June/July 1998), p. 36; and John Pike, "Ballistic Missile Defense: Is the U.S. Rushing to Failure?" *Arms Control Today*, vol. 28 (April 1998), p. 10.

second has not yet even been developed, much less tested; meanwhile, the Block I missile does not exceed the 3 kilometers/second threshold.[9]) But the dilemma remains in the NMD context. The NTW interceptor's speed is sufficient to raise concerns that, if tied in with advanced sensors and tested in an NMD mode, it could theoretically have some NMD capability.[10] The Heritage Foundation has proposed such an NMD system, arguing it would be inexpensive and quickly deployable. More persuasively, however, the Pentagon estimated that the system's total cost would range between $16 billion and $19 billion. That estimate included the costs of advanced land-based radars, since the Pentagon determined that the Aegis radars would not be sufficient by themselves to provide early tracking and discrimination information. It also included the costs of several dedicated ships (since defenses could be badly needed in wartime – when most of the Navy's Aegis warships could be deployed), as well as upgraded missiles with enough range, maneuverability, and nuclear hardness to provide reliable nationwide defense.[11] The Pentagon claimed that the planned standard missiles could not do the NMD job adequately, and that larger, faster missiles would be required as well.[12]

Budgetary Issues for Japan

If Japan buys NTW as it currently seems on track to do, its costs would probably total $3 billion to $5 billion, judging by the estimated NTW cost for the United States. If Japan were to acquire THAAD to provide primary defense of its home islands, a recent Pentagon report estimates that it would require six defensive batteries – in contrast to a likely requirement for 4 NTW assets.[13] Scaling by comparison with the total projected cost of THAAD for the United States, but operating under the assumption that Japan would not need to contribute proportionately to research and development costs, its

9. Tanks, *National Missile Defense*, pp. 5.6 through 5.7.

10. See Harold A. Feiveson, ed., *The Nuclear Turning Point* (Brookings, 1999), pp. 86-89.

11. See Rodney W. Jones, *Taking National Missile Defense to Sea: A Critique of Sea-Based and Boost-Phase Proposals* (Washington, D.C.: Council for a Livable World, 2000), p. 19.

12. Walter Pincus, "Estimate Skyrockets for Expanding Navy's Ship-Based Missile Defense," *Washington Post*, March 5, 1999, p. A4; and Statement of Lt. Gen. Lester Lyles, Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 24, 1999, pp. 11-14.

13. That Pentagon report notes that NTW with a fast interceptor might allow Japan to defend its entire island with just one system, though that assessment hinges not only on development of the faster interceptor but on optimal positioning of the Japanese ship in question. See Department of Defense, *Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense Architecture Options for the Asia-Pacific Region* (1999), available at www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/tmd050499.htm.

expenditures might then total $5 billion to $8 billion over a period of perhaps five years (starting late this decade). Alternatively, Japan could hedge its bets, buying fewer THAAD interceptors but adding NTW to Aegis ships it already possessed. That approach might increase costs slightly, but they would remain below $10 billion. Were Japan also to add lower-tier capabilities on its ships and on shore, costs might grow $5 billion more, in rough terms. Such capabilities would be particularly necessary if NTW were the preferred upper-tier TMD, and THAAD were not purchased, since Japan would in that case remain vulnerable to decoys and to missiles that never left the atmosphere – including both shorter-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

My recommendation would be for Japan to emphasize THAAD, with several localized Patriot PAC-3 batteries for site defense deployed near critical assets and cities as well, rather than to emphasize NTW. Acquisition costs could reach about $10 billion – a higher price than NTW, in all likelihood, but better capability as well. Alas, that price tag is quite significant, since it translates into perhaps $2 billion a year toward the end of the decade – and affects the Air Self-Defense Force budget (a service that has not been as enthusiastic about TMD as the Maritime SDF). Nonetheless, the idea should be considered seriously, given its advantages.

Summary

TMD is needed in East Asia for the United States and Japan. It is not the paramount security issue that some allege, but it is important, most notably because missiles are the most credible way for North Korea to threaten either Japan or U.S. bases in Japan in a future war on the Peninsula. In the interest of fair burdensharing, Japan should probably provide most TMD for the defense of its own islands while the United States should focus on defenses for its deployed forces in the region. But both countries should be careful in their choice of technologies. Navy Theater Wide may be highly vulnerable to simple decoys, and may not provide the best solution for the defense of Japan; THAAD may prove a more robust, though also more expensive and bureaucratically problematic, technology.

Although some defense against a possible Chinese missile threat may be appropriate, given the potential for conflict over Taiwan, a leakproof shield will not be attainable. Hence it is rather pointless to engage in an offense-defense arms race with the PRC, given the advantages that the attacker possesses under such circumstances. The allies should strive for defenses that would accomplish damage limitation – or complicate

Beijing's calculus in any attempt to carry out limited strikes for coercive effect – without harboring any illusions that they could robustly defend Japanese territory against concerted PRC missile strikes. Likewise, while Taiwan merits improved TMD – if for no other reason than to counter any perception that Beijing is gaining the upper hand in terms of coercion and cross-Strait diplomacy – it is unrealistic to think that TMD sales to Taiwan can make the island safe from PRC missile attack. Future sales of TMD should be made with an eye toward maintaining a perceptual balance, rather than with a hope that reliable protection against missile attack is feasible.

Chapter 11: The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Taiwan

Murata Koji

Overview

The Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula are the most serious security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region. While the latter is moving toward peaceful dialogues, at least on the surface, the former remains in a state of high tension. Furthermore, one of the parties that is directly involved in this case is a rising great power: China. The Taiwan Strait will continue to be a hotspot in the foreseeable future.

This paper aims at 1) confirming the importance of Taiwan for the U.S.-Japan alliance; 2) examining domestic politics of Taiwan, China, Japan, and the United States; and 3) providing some policy recommendations for strengthening stability in the Taiwan Strait.

The Importance of Taiwan

The importance of Taiwan for the U.S.-Japan alliance should be considered from three aspects: values, strategy, and economics.

First, Japan and the United States share basic values such as liberal democracy and a free economy. The preface of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1960, for example, expresses the two countries' desire "to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law." In a volatile post-Cold War world, value sharing is especially important for sustaining alliances. The U.S.-Japan Joint Security Declaration of April 1996 also notes: "The benefits of peace and prosperity that spring from the alliance are due not only to the commitments of the two governments, but also to the contributions of the Japanese and American people who have shared the burden of securing freedom and democracy."

It is very difficult, of course, to define democracy in a widely acceptable way. Nonetheless, it may be safe to say that democracy includes, at minimum, the free election of government and freedom of speech. Without any doubt, Taiwan satisfies these qualifications. And it is quite inconceivable for Taipei to abandon democracy through unification with China. If the security of democratic Taiwan is threatened by others, especially by non-democratic

forces, it will not be ignored by Japan and the United States. It is a matter of the values that the two countries share.

As is well known, Japan abandoned any territorial claims over Taiwan in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951. Also, the Japanese and the U.S. governments have repeatedly acknowledged the Chinese government's position that there is one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. Tokyo and Washington, therefore, have no position that encourages the independence of Taiwan. (If China and Taiwan should reach a peaceful agreement on independence, of course, Japan and the United States will surely accept it.) At the same time, however, the two governments have repeatedly expressed in strong terms that the Taiwan issue must be solved peacefully. In spite of the distinct security commitments to Taiwan between Japan and the United States (the latter has the Taiwan Relations Act), this is the bottom line for the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Second, Taiwan is strategically very important for the U.S.-Japan alliance. Should China take military actions against Taiwan, one of the most plausible actions is an embargo. Taiwan almost fully relies on sea lines of communication for international trade, with the largest ports in Kao-hsiung and Cui-lung. The former is close to the Senkaku Islands and Yonaguni Island, both of which are Japanese territories, and the latter is near the Bashi Channel, an area of strategic importance for Japan's sea-lanes. In a contingency, these ports may be blocked by Chinese submarines and mines. Should China attempt air raids against military bases and facilities on the east coast of Taiwan, Chinese fighters and bombers may have to pass through the Okinawa Islands to avert Taiwan's radar networks. Military conflict over Taiwan is a clear security concern for Japan.

Furthermore, should Taiwan be annexed by China, it will drastically change the military balance in East Asia. The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) will be freed from the mission of coping with the highly modernized Taiwanese armed forces, and will instead be strengthened by integrating them. Even if China and Taiwan are peacefully unified, they should take appropriate arms reduction measures for regional security.

In addition, Taiwan has a strategically symbolic implication. Should Taiwan be forcefully unified with China, as Ambassador Okazaki Hisahiko points out, many Southeast Asian countries will perceive it as a U.S. military retreat from Asia. This will severely undermine the credibility of the U.S. defense commitment in the region.

In the economic arena, both Japan and the United States have substantial trade relationships with Taiwan as well as direct investments. The U.S. and Japan are Taiwan's largest trade partners. Even a small-scale military conflict over Taiwan will greatly damage the Taiwanese economy, and would affect the regional economy, especially in Southeast Asia.[1]

In sum, although decisions about the future relationship between China and Taiwan should be made between the two entities, political, strategic, and economic stability on Taiwan is a serious and legitimate concern for Japan and the United States.

Domestic Politics in Taiwan, China, Japan, and the U.S.

Taiwan. In Taiwan, the leadership of President Chen Shui-bian and his concept of a bipartisan government are in crisis. Of course, it is too early to judge his political future. As he approaches major elections, President Chen may become more flexible politically and his power may increase. If the Democratic Progressive Party (DDP) can win legislative elections in 2001, he will recover his authority and his ability to lead. And, if the DDP can win mayoral elections in Taipei and Kao-hsiung in 2002, the possibility of Chen's re-election may increase.

So far, the opposition parties are more active and successful than Chen's government in making contacts with Beijing. The Mainlanders in the opposition parties seem to utilize their channels with Beijing as a tool to attack President Chen. In this sense, he suffers from political attacks on the China issue internally and externally. In addition, it is becoming more difficult to deal with Taiwan's emerging nationalism.

China. In China, President Jiang Zemin's term of office ends in 2002, and he will likely become more concerned about his influence upon his successors and his political achievements.[2] When combined with nationalistic popular sentiment in Chinese society, his Taiwan policy might become more assertive. In fact, the Chinese government recently announced the defense budget for FY 2001, which is a 17 percent increase from the previous year, the largest in the past 20 years. Still, China's figures for defense spending seriously underestimate reality, by

1. As of 1998, Taiwan was the fourth largest investor in Thailand, second in Malaysia, fifth in the Philippines, sixth in Indonesia, second in Vietnam, and third in Cambodia. See Lee-in Chen Chiu, "Taiwan's Economic Influence: Implications for Resolving Political Tensions," in Gerrit W. Gong, ed. *Taiwan Strait Dilemmas: China-Taiwan-U.S. Policies in the New Century* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000), p.139.

2. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "Looking Ahead: Major Events That May Affect Cross-Strait Relations," ibid., p. 165.

excluding army pensions, the cost of running the 600,000-strong People's Armed Police, and military research and development (R&D).[3]

On the other hand, China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) will increase its sensitivity to the international economy. Even now, up to 200,000 Taiwanese businessmen work in mainland China, and Taiwanese investments there are well in excess of $20 billion. Also, the rapid development of telecommunications will facilitate informal and direct dialogues between younger intellectuals and elites in China and Taiwan. As Zbigniew Brzezinski points out, "the existing political elite–itself not so young–will soon be replaced by a generation that came to political maturity neither during the Great Leap Forward nor during the Cultural Revolution, both epiphenomena of communist doctrinal exuberance." He continues, "the emerging political elite matured during Deng Xiaoping's pragmatic upheaval in the Chinese economy, and hence may be more inclined to correct the political trajectory of China's evolution, bringing it closer to the economic trajectory."[4] These factors could work to prevent China from taking unilateral and assertive actions against Taiwan.

Japan. Japan's politics and economy are still very fragile. Bureaucrats are no longer powerful enough to handle policies and politicians are not yet capable enough to do so. On the one hand, the Japanese government fails to set a political agenda for security affairs that is required to resolve issues created by the new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. On the other hand, the Japanese public, as a result of political and economic frustrations, is showing nationalistic sentiment.

Nonetheless, more people have become interested in reviewing the Constitution in accordance with changes in the international and domestic environments. Younger politicians in particular have become more international and policy-oriented and less factional politics-oriented.

It should be also noted that after the Tiananmen incident and the more recent Chinese missile tests, the Japanese people have tended to become less and less pro-Chinese. The older pro-Chinese and pro-Taiwanese generations have disappeared in the Japanese political circles. Thus, Beijing can no longer expect to manipulate them.

---

3. *The Economist*, March 17-23, 2001, p. 22.

4. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Geostrategic Triad: Living with China, Europe and Russia* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2001, p. 5).

United States. In the United States, the new administration of President George W. Bush has expressed its determination to commit itself to the defense of Taiwan and to strengthen security ties with Japan. It has also adjusted its rhetoric regarding China, calling it a "strategic competitor" vice the "strategic partner" label of the Clinton-era, and is eager to develop a missile defense (MD) program.

Given Mr. Bush's controversial victory in the presidential election and the weak political base in the Congress, the administration needs to cultivate wider domestic support. As is usual, political rhetoric during the campaign may be modified. If the United States suffers from a serious recession, the public will become more inner looking. As for its China and MD policies, the Bush administration needs not only domestic support but international support from its allies in Europe and Asia.

In sum, each country is hindered by its own domestic issues. Should one try to manipulate the domestic political cleavages in others for its own domestic advantage, it will surely lead to a vicious circle. Each government needs to establish its domestic political leadership and increase its sensitivity to domestic political concerns in others.

Policy Recommendations

As mentioned, the bottom line of the Taiwan issue for the U.S.-Japan alliance is peaceful resolution between China and Taiwan. There must not be any ambiguity about this. Further policy developments in the U.S.-Japan alliance depend heavily on Chinese and Taiwanese behavior, and that will be ambiguous enough.

Realistically speaking, China will not be able to abandon its official policy that it will exercise military force against Taiwan should Taipei declare independence. Therefore, the most probable and desirable situation in the foreseeable future is the coexistence of Taiwan's *de facto* independence and China's repeated declarations of its policy without giving it substance. In other words, the status quo should be maintained.

In this sense, the United States should confirm new three no's: no unilateral independence of Taiwan; no unification by force; and no U.S. diplomatic mediation between China and Taiwan in peacetime. The last point is important because Beijing and Taipei have

competed for Washington's support over the cross-Strait problem and this has increased tensions between them.[5]

Of course, the United States should try to maintain the cross-Strait military balance, especially in the air, providing necessary defensive weapons to Taiwan. Then U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen, in an assessment issued in February 1999, concluded that "by 2005, the PLA will possess the capability to attack Taiwan with air and missile strikes, which would degrade key military facilities and damage the island's economic infrastructure."[6] In particular, the number of Chinese M-9 and M-11 short-range ballistic missiles on the Fujian coast has increased from 20 to 300 in a decade.

Because the Bush administration is vigorously promoting the MD program, it should be careful not to provoke China. The decision to defer the sale of Aegis-equipped Arleigh Burke-class destroyers to Taiwan was a wise one. The sale of Kidd-class destroyers with advanced ship-to-air missiles to Taipei was certainly not welcomed in Beijing, but did not produce the negative reaction an Aegis sale would have. Aegis vessels can be used as a future bargaining chip with China. Furthermore, Washington could propose a nuclear reduction plan aimed at slowing Beijing's expansion of its nuclear capabilities. Also, the passage of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act will be unnecessary. Avoiding such legislation, the Bush administration could take substantive measures with more freedom of actions. The less provocative and more careful U.S. policies toward China are, the easier it will be for Japan to support them.

In order to maintain its ambiguity regarding the policy ramifications of the Taiwan issue, the U.S.-Japan alliance must be strengthened in every aspect.

In particular, the continuing use of the Kadena Air Base in Okinawa is essential for the security of Taiwan. The Japanese government will have great difficulties in conducting Taiwan contingency studies with the United States officially. Japan and the United States should promote these studies at the non-governmental level, based on full examination of the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996.[7] Legislative dialogues between the two countries on the Taiwan issue in the

---

5. Andrew J. Nathan, "What's Wrong with American Taiwan Policy," *Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2000 (Vol. 23, No. 2).

6. William S. Cohen, "The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait," Report to the Congress pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1999). Also, see David Shambaugh, "A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage," *Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2000. (Vol. 23, No. 2)

7. Nakai Yoshifumi, "Policy Coordination on Taiwan," in *The Japan-U.S. Alliance: New Challenges for the 21st Century*, Nishihara Masashi ed. (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000), p. 95. Nakai says, "Unless

broader regional security context are possible and necessary. Also, the two governments need to agree, at least informally, on what contingencies in Taiwan mean. Feasibility studies on Theater Missile Defense should be further promoted. As a March 2000 report by the Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies noted, "it is not acceptable that [China] criticizes a country which possesses no ballistic missiles for conducting research on TMD."[8] Intelligence sharing on regional security issues between the two countries should be also facilitated.

Furthermore, to increase mutual reliance on the alliance, the United States should consult more with Japan over regional security issues, and Japan should be prepared for such consultations.

When President Bill Clinton visited China in June 1998, he did not visit Japan, and criticized Japan's economic policies with Jiang Zemin in Beijing. The problem was not what Clinton said in China but what he did not say there. The president should have emphasized the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance in China. When the discussion turned to the adoption of the new Defense Guidelines, China strongly criticized Japan alone. Strengthening security consultations with Japan would help send the message that the United States will not be manipulated by China over the U.S.-Japan alliance.

The Japanese government must change its interpretations on the right of collective self-defense. The current interpretation causes many problems for promoting security consultations and defense cooperation between Japan and the United States. Nonetheless, two points should be considered on this issue. First, the United States should not publicly urge Japan to change its interpretation of the right of collective self-defense. That will be unproductive. Washington should clearly convey the roles and missions that it expects of Japan as a reliable ally and the imagined consequences and costs if Japan does not meet them. Second, Japan should not consider this issue only from the perspective of cooperating with the United States. This is a matter of domestic legitimacy and political accountability for Japan's defense policy. Japanese politicians and security specialists must be courageous enough to educate the public on this issue.

The U.S.-Japan alliance does not aim at containing China. China is a great power and should be treated accordingly. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz notes, "Despite the challenges that China's increasing strength will pose to the United States and its allies, it

---

all the details of the crisis are revealed, not necessarily to the general public but to policy experts, the lessons of the crisis are likely to remain murky and uncertain."

8. East Asian Strategic Review, National Institute for Defense Studies, March 2000.

would be a mistake to treat China like the Soviet Union in the Cold War, restricting trade in order to deliberately weaken it or using trade as human rights leverage. A China weakened by such policies might take longer to become a military competitor, but what we might gain in that respect would be canceled out in enmity."[9] Brzezinski also notes, "China is too big to be ignored, too old to be slighted, too weak to be appeased, and too ambitious to be taken for granted … [and China] could become an antagonist … if either China so chooses or America so prompts."[10]

Japan and the United States (and, of course, Taiwan), therefore, should try to increase China's sensitivity to international norms and expectations through economic and cultural exchanges and various international organizations and meetings. They should also pay enough consideration to satisfy China's national pride.

Taiwan should do its best for its own defense. As Ambassador Okazaki warns, if Taiwan should fall into defeatism, the security of Taiwan cannot be maintained by any international effort, and the "Finlandization" of Taiwan will be unavoidable. As military specialists of the Okazaki Institute point out, lessons from World War II will be useful. Britain defended London from German air raids in the Battle of Britain. With effective civil defense systems, Taiwan should not be overly concerned about the impact of Chinese missile attacks. (Even Israel's casualties by Iraqi missile attacks were minimal during the Gulf crisis.) Even Chinese SU-27 Russian-built fighters might not be effective without skilled Russian engineers.

In the Normandy landing, the United States and its allies mobilized 10,000 airplanes, 1,200 gunboats, and 5,000 other vessels against only 500 airplanes and 15 destroyers on the German side. Taiwan should be more confident about the defense of its territory against a Chinese cross-Strait amphibious invasion over 120 miles. Given the importance of offshore defense, then, Taiwan should increase budget allocations to its navy and air force, rather than its army.

Finally, Taiwan should become more active in international humanitarian activities. Douglas H. Paal, president of the Asia Pacific Policy Center states, "The energies and resources that are wasted, in my opinion, in diplomatic competition should be devoted to making Taiwan indispensable to the world's humanitarian agenda, such as in medical research, disaster relief,

9. Brzezinski, op.cit., p.3, p.7.

10. Brzezinski, op.cit., p.3, p.7.

and economic and political modernization assistance."[11] Japan and Taiwan both suffered from grave earthquakes in 1995 and 1999, and they could cooperate in natural disaster relief activities, for example, through which more Japanese people will become aware of the importance of Taiwan. Such efforts by Taiwan to accumulate virtues could not be ignored by anyone in the international community.

11. Douglas H. Paal, "The Regional Security Implications of China's Economic Expansion, Military Modernization, and the Rise of Nationalism," Hung-mao Tien and Tun-jen Cheng, eds., *The Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), p. 91.

Chapter 12: The China Problem, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security of Taiwan

Benjamin L. Self[1]

The China Problem

The U.S.-Japan alliance faces a twofold regional security challenge stemming from China's increasing military power. First, the allies must somehow lead the process of adjusting the framework of international relations in the region to accommodate the shifts in relative power occasioned by China's increased strength. The partners must do so without provoking fears of appeasement elsewhere in the region, without stoking the current security dilemma so that it flares into an arms race, and without compromising their vital interests or sacrificing their core values.

As if this were not hard enough, they must cope with this structural adaptation while confronting the potentially explosive situation involving Taiwan. The confluence of four factors – democratization, economic development, generational change, and the intensification of the China-Taiwan dynamic (explained further below) – has exacerbated the volatility of Sino-American relations and the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations. Taiwan has become more than a major regional security issue; how the powers handle the Taiwan issue is now a litmus test for the future of security cooperation.

Taiwan

The stated policy of the U.S. government regarding the Taiwan problem has long been the call for "Peaceful Resolution," a position broadly matched by Japan. Although this is a sound and wise policy, at present peaceful resolution seems like a very long-term prospect at best. Resolution by means of a declaration of independence by Taiwan would almost certainly lead to war – at least the PRC makes every effort to demonstrate the credibility of its threat to use force in such circumstances. On the other hand, reunification without force will almost certainly require democratization of the PRC, as it is nearly

1. This paper reflects the personal views of the author and should not be interpreted as the institutional views of the Stimson Center. The author would like to thank participants in the September workshop at Johns Hopkins-SAIS, the December workshop at CSIS, and the January workshop in Tokyo, especially Dr. Michael Green, for helpful comments on an earlier draft. The author also thanks Mr. Alan Romberg and Ambassador Hisahiko Okazaki for extremely valuable comments. Any errors of fact or failings of interpretation are the author's responsibility alone.

inconceivable that Taiwan will submit to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government's "one country, two systems" formula.

Therefore, in the short to medium term, the main task for the alliance is to help maintain the current separate status[2] of Taiwan ***at minimal cost***. Potential costs include increased military expenditures arising from an open commitment to defend Taiwan, expenditures that would increase continuously over time. Costs would also include a breakdown of the cooperative relationship with China that promotes regional stability and non-proliferation. The maintenance of order within China, absent massive oppression, is another common political and economic interest of the alliance partners. For these reasons, support for formal independence for Taiwan, including defense from Chinese attack, fails the minimal cost test, and should be rejected as sacrificing allied interests to benefit Taiwan.[3]

In the long term, the allies seek promotion of change within a stable China, via a strategy of comprehensive engagement, to achieve eventual "peaceful evolution" into a democratic polity that respects human rights and will sustain, rather that subvert, the regional order. Such a China might be appealing enough for Taiwan to rejoin of its own free will; such a China might also be willing to respect the wishes of the people of Taiwan if they decided to seek a formal recognition of their separate status.

Four Dimensions of Change

Democratization. Democratization on Taiwan has led not only to free elections for the legislative Yuan and even the presidency, it has even brought about the end of Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) rule. This process traces back to the reforms of Chiang Ching-kuo in the mid-1980s, gathered pace with the emergence of Lee Teng-hui as the first Taiwanese (i.e., native) president and his popular election in 1996, and culminated in

2. This is most emphatically NOT an official U.S. position, but in this author's view does represent a strong belief among a significant and growing proportion of both the American public and U.S. government officials, particularly in defense. By its supporters, Taiwan's "separate status" is sometimes called "*de facto* independence" to imply that the actual condition of Taiwan would not change, merely the formality of changing its name from Republic of China. Of course since states exist only as social constructs, any change in the recognition or definition of a state is in fact of tremendous significance.

3. This argument can easily be taken too far, as when the interest in cooperation with China is used to justify abandoning Taiwan completely. Strategic interests, as well as commitment to common values of democracy and respect for human rights, call for the United States and Japan to sacrifice some benefits of pleasing the PRC in this area.

the election of Chen Shui-bian as president in 2000. Lee's commitment to a higher international profile for Taiwan, in whatever form, was seen as a threat by China, but Chen's background as an active campaigner for independence painted the situation in far starker terms. Chinese rhetoric and threats surrounding his election brought great concern in Washington and Tokyo that the alliance might have to play an active, rather than a deterrent, role in supporting Taiwan's security.

The other face of democratization in the China-Taiwan relationship is of course its absence in China. Since the violent suppression of popular protests in June 1989, public opinion in Taiwan has viewed the Beijing regime as dangerous and prone to the use of force. China's subsequent use of military exercises, including ballistic missile launches, to menace Taiwan have only reinforced this concern.

Economic Development. Increased wealth in both Taiwan and in China has been a major factor in the cross-Strait relationship, but contrary to most thinking on this point, its influence has been less than positive. While common economic interests have bolstered incentives for cooperation on both sides, this is often limited to a small part of the business elite. More broadly, greater wealth can have a deleterious effect on public perceptions generally, especially as basic needs are satisfied. In the case of Taiwan the achievement of wealth has brought about a search among the populace for commensurate respect and international standing, especially in the context of its post-Cold War diplomatic decline.[4] There is also a sense of having much more to lose, especially considering the vast income and wealth differential vis-à-vis the mainland. As for China, increased wealth following the success of Deng Xiaoping's "Opening and Reform" policy has strengthened the military substantially and the bellicosity of public opinion even more – there is a mood that the greatness of China can no longer be denied. Furthermore, China's choice of a capitalist road has eroded the ideological justification for CCP rule, leaving nationalism (and such specific manifestations of nationalism as demands for the recovery of Taiwan) to bear much more weight in sustaining the party.

Generational Change. The essence of such matters as national identity and popular sovereignty resides in ideas. Regardless of how well these are institutionalized into the political order through a constitution or even a political culture, ideas change over

4. The normalization of relations between South Korea and the PRC cost Taiwan its only substantial diplomatic tie in East Asia in 1991; South Africa's decision to switch recognition to the Beijing government in 1996 was also a painful blow for Taipei, as it lost its last industrialized diplomatic partnership.

time. In fact, while an individual's ideas can be particularly resistant to change, generational change is a major engine of change in thinking on subjects like identity and on processes like democratization or economic modernization.[5] In both China and Taiwan the generation that fought the civil war is being replaced by those who only know the status quo, and particularly in Taiwan the result is a much weaker sense of a national identity inextricably linked to the mainland.

It should be added that this generational change and the ideational change that parallels it are also major factors in the Japan-China relationship and play some role in the U.S.-China relationship as well. The leadership generation that oversaw the rapprochement with China in the 1970s has either passed away or lost influence on policy.[6] In both Tokyo and Washington, the view of Beijing is increasingly colored by rivalry.

Intensification of the China-Taiwan Dynamic. The end of the Cold War imposed two new major pressures on China-Taiwan relations, one structural and one ideational. From the structural perspective, the end of the Soviet threat permitted a profound shift in China's strategic thinking, reinforcing a new focus on littoral security. This has implications for many other neighbors of China, including those with competing claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea, but perhaps for none more than Taiwan. Simultaneously, the United States began a substantial reduction of its forward-deployed forces in both Europe and Asia, the latter causing concern among those countries around China about the U.S. commitment to regional stability.[7]

From the ideational perspective, the end of communism as a global ideology has had no less profound an impact. The most prominent element of this was, as mentioned, the increased dependence on nationalistic behavior to prop up the CCP regime. China's 1992 Territorial Law, for example, demonstrated the power of this nationalism to upset relations with surrounding countries. Other factors to consider in this light are the success

5. See Goldstein and Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, 1993; and Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, 1976.

6. Despite the expectation in Beijing that "old friends" like Henry Kissinger and Alexander Haig might positively influence the George W. Bush administration's approach to China, this is considered unlikely in Washington. In Tokyo, the disappearance of the old China hands (especially those in the Tanaka faction associated with the Normalization breakthrough) is widely remarked upon. The younger generation of political and bureaucratic leaders is somewhat more positively inclined toward Taipei, and more sensitive to China's relative gains.

of the Jiang Zemin-led government in regaining Hong Kong and Macao for China, the harsh response from Beijing toward ethnic separatist movements in Tibet and Xinjiang, and the continual reliance on historical issues in political struggles with Japan. These forces redoubled Chinese attention to and sensitivity to political trends in Taiwan. But the increase in concern on one side of the Taiwan Strait produces feedback on the other, and so Taipei has engaged in an ever more desperate search for security, including efforts to strengthen its security guarantee from the United States and to enhance its political relationship with Tokyo. These efforts further compound Beijing's fears, sustaining a vicious cycle. This intensification effect has amplified the strategic, economic, ideational, and political factors causing friction.

Outside involvement during the 1990s generally contributed to the vicious cycle, rather than damping it. Political and military steps by the United States to support Taiwan in 1995 and 1996 inflamed Chinese concerns and led to a concerted push for a more balanced U.S. position. The subsequent posture taken by President Clinton during his June 1998 visit to China (including the "Three No's" remark), however, were seen in Taiwan as dangerously undermining its position – and also irritated Tokyo as evidence of "Japan Passing." The statement the following summer by President Lee Teng-hui characterizing the cross-Strait relationship as "special state-to-state relations" can be seen as a response to this U.S.-China deal on understandings regarding Taiwan's international status. The Bush administration has backed away from the "Three No's" and from strategic ambiguity in favor of a more robust position against the use of force under any circumstances, but whether this will help break the cycle or only intensify it remains unclear. Should this lead toward a more confrontational U.S.-China relationship, the implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance are great indeed.

Alliance Interests and Resources

As discussed above, the United States and Japan share a basic interest in preserving the status quo regarding Taiwan itself, pending the emergence of an environment more conducive to "Peaceful Resolution." Thus, the number one priority for the two countries in regard to Taiwan is to:

Preserve separate status of Taiwan at minimal cost. "Minimal cost" means more than the costs associated with direct military deterrence of China, to say nothing of

7. The draw-down of U.S. forces in Asia after the Cold War also strengthened Chinese expectations for the emergence of multipolarity.

actual military conflict with China. It must also include avoiding a breakdown of cooperation with China in areas of vital interest. The U.S. and Japan share vital interests in several areas of cooperation with the PRC. To be brief, these are:

- Supporting a constructive regional role for China on the Korean Peninsula and in the South China Sea.
- Avoiding turmoil or oppression within China.
- Preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced military technologies (AWACS, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, encryption, etc.)

The allies also share interests and values that impel them to seek some transformation in the character of the PRC regime:

- Advance the rule of law in both economic and political arenas.
- Promote respect for human rights.
- Support the rise of pluralism and gradual democratization.

Policy Tools for Maintaining the Security of Taiwan

The allies have available to them a wide range of tools with which to advance these interests. Typically these are considered in two groups: military options for deterrence or defense; and economic, cultural, and other interactions for "engagement." Diplomacy straddles the divide, as it can either signal to China that military pressure on Taiwan will lead to confrontation or assure China that the allies have no intention to support Taiwan's independence. The alliance itself, properly understood as a broad-based partnership rather than a purely military one, can serve as an umbrella to approach China. In particular, it can contribute to stability in the area around Taiwan, embodying both the deterrence function and the reassurance function.

The following elements include those that are traditionally considered alliance functions as well as those that have in the past been conducted outside the rubric of the alliance but could conceivably be folded in.

- U.S. forward-deployed forces
- U.S. use of SDF bases and Japanese civilian facilities
- Joint operations with Japan Self-Defense Forces
- Support for Taiwan's defense capability through arms sales and cooperation
- Strengthening Taiwan's economic and political development

- Confidence-building measures, including military-to-military dialogue
- U.S.-based forces
- Trilateral or multilateral dialogue, including political exchange
- Arms control
- Trade and investment agreements, especially the World Trade Organization (WTO)
- Scientific, cultural, and other cooperation, including peaceful space development

Recommendations for Advancing Alliance Interests in China/Taiwan

Always place them in the context of broader regional interests. A narrow focus on Taiwan leads to simplistic linkage of tools to aims without sufficient consideration of larger but "extraneous" factors. The alliance is clearly the greatest interest of the United States and Japan in the region, and although defense of Taiwan is also a major interest, it would be a mistake to unnecessarily put the alliance at risk for the benefit of Taiwan. The U.S.-Japan alliance is our strongest asset, but a clear and direct role for it in defense of Taiwan may not be the best solution to the military threat to Taiwan's security. Establishing such a role would overlook the second-order ramifications, such as increased politicization of defense policy in Japan at a time when Tokyo is finally overcoming decades of stagnation and "defense allergy." Because Japan is largely unwilling to sacrifice relations with China over this issue, it may be impossible to make the alliance stronger if it is seen as only "for Taiwan's defense." While we should be confident that Japanese national interests are much more clearly in maintaining the alliance if push comes to shove, we should also recall Tokyo's "deer in the headlights" response to the Persian Gulf crisis. Hoping to minimize damage to Japan-China relations, Tokyo may dawdle even in the face of disaster. Again, although the political elite strongly supports the alliance, there is probably enough caution to cause paralysis.

If Japan does make China angry – and Tokyo must not be afraid to do that – might not the deterioration in ties with China embolden Taiwan to move even more briskly toward solidifying its separate status, enabling the very crisis we are hoping to prevent? The point here is emphatically not to argue against using the alliance as the basis for approaching China. In fact, the very opposite is intended. The U.S.-Japan alliance must come first in our regional policy formulation, and then a strong, common U.S.-Japan posture can assert control over the flow of events and policy positions. What this means to argue against is the notion that Japan can be used, after policies are decided in Washington, as an adjunct to U.S. power. This is the tradition and it has been easy to do

in the past. It may indeed be possible in the future, but at unforeseeable and possibly enormous cost.

Expand consultation and coordination within the alliance. Several areas are promising in this regard. First, the institutional expansion of the alliance relationship beyond security authorities should be pursued. The Foreign Ministry, Defense Agency, and SDF are good partners to the State Department, Pentagon, and U.S. forces. They can be better, and much of the other work of this project focuses on how. But the alliance needs to be expanded. The White House and *Kantei*, the Congress and the *Kokkai*, the citizenry and the *kokumin* need to become closer. The two legislatures should establish a bi-national, non-partisan East Asian Security Caucus, to help provide political civilian oversight to a host of strengthened alliance institutions. Last but not least, the people of both countries remain unfortunately ignorant of our cooperation and our shared interests. Americans remain far too likely to view Japanese as "them" rather than "us," and vice versa.[8]

Also, the internal expansion of the alliance can compensate for domestic diversity of views by bringing more players into the consensus-building process. The Clinton administration is seen as having alienated Congress and opened the door to having its policies undermined (most notoriously in the case of Lee Teng-hui's Cornell University visit in 1995). We can prevent mistakes like that. As each government moves forward with internal policy formulation, greater cross-border dialogue (both governmental and non-governmental) could help smooth the process of eventual coordination.

Second, the two countries should strengthen intelligence-sharing and strive toward joint contingency planning. There are obstacles, especially the matter of a robust security-clearance and classification system in Japan, but the carrot of greater cooperation in this area should prompt legislation even from the currently struggling coalition government. The specific problem of planning U.S. operations in response to a Taiwan contingency, complicated by the extremely sensitive nature of such plans and Japan's legal constraints on participating, calls for extremely delicate handling. This paper cannot cut this Gordian knot, but the problem of lack of correct mutual understanding and clear expectations

8. The point is not to cause both Americans and Japanese to view China as the "other" but to rectify the mistaken impression that "triangularity" is the salient characteristic of this relationship. In security terms, the alliance as an entity has a relationship with China, and just as we understand NATO's ties with Russia as bilateral, U.S.-Japan alliance-China ties should be seen as basically bilateral. Kissingerian notions of America as an offshore balancer (flawed in both historical and contemporary contexts) must be strenuously opposed; Kato Koichi's suggestion of ideal relations as an "equilateral triangle" must be bluntly rejected.

between Washington and Tokyo in regard to Taiwan is too big to be left unattended. In the past the typical process involved strong pressure from Washington leading to minimal concessions from Tokyo, which backed away as quickly and quietly as possible. There may have been shared strategic interests, but these never supported a common approach to Taiwan. Instead, Tokyo remained unwilling to commit itself, in part to preserve its autonomy. Now is the time for Japan to transcend notions of entrapment, and to help to steer the alliance's role in the region in a way that reflects Japanese views.

Resolve the "dual ambiguity" problem. The U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity and the Japanese policy of "situational" rather than "geographic" interpretation of the Defense Guidelines have developed into a morass that can be described as dual ambiguity. The allies must repair this. This does not mean adopting a policy of choosing Taiwan or Beijing; neither one extreme of "One China, One Taiwan" nor the other of "Finlandization" would be appropriate. The problem is that Tokyo does not know what to expect from Washington, and Washington cannot count on Tokyo. Even without instituting precise, specific joint responses to any imaginable situation, the two allies can go far toward resolving each other's doubts. The point is not to send the signal to China that the Guidelines do apply to Taiwan, or that Tokyo has veto power over U.S. decisions to use force in a Taiwan crisis (since it is the U.S. Congress that holds the power to declare war). Instead, the goal is to institute bilateral mechanisms that can be relied upon to produce a coordinated allied response to whatever situation arises. This is hard enough to do within one government, of course, but the effort must be made to do so as allies. Overcoming this self-imposed handicap will allow the alliance to reassert leadership of the regional security dynamic.

Reassert control over the regional security process. In terms of military and economic power, the United States and Japan are an extraordinary combination even on a global scale. Within Asia, there is no good reason for the two to be reacting to, rather than controlling, events. Of course smaller and weaker states will attempt to surprise the allies to reshape the agenda, as in the case of North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs, but it is really the failure of alliance coordination that allows other states to disrupt stability and undermine allied interests. Clearly, the United States and Japan are worse off if either China or Taiwan is able to control the regional security agenda. Although it is difficult to do so, the partners need to work on every level – strategic, operational, and tactical – to establish one unshakable stance.

Support Taiwan's self-defense efforts. One of the most effective tools for enhancing deterrence and preserving peace and stability is the strengthening of Taiwan's

own defense capability in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act. This is a sufficient basis for U.S. support of Taiwan. The so-called Taiwan Security Enhancement Act will only increase the cost to the United States of maintaining the status quo and may perversely weaken Taiwan's security.

In terms of aiding Taiwan, Japan cannot at present play an active role, both because of the Arms Export Ban and the "One China Policy," but Japan can provide indirect support. First, Tokyo should reject Chinese claims that these arms sales are destabilizing and instead point to China's own arms build-up as a cause. This holds true for theater ballistic missile defense as well; China needs to recognize that others do not see its position as legitimate.

Second, Japan can intensify pressure on China on the non-proliferation and disarmament front, to undercut China's linkage strategy (which asserts that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are "proliferation" and remove constraints on China's own military sales abroad).

Reduce offensive ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads as part of the nuclear strategy review. This step can both placate domestic opposition to nuclear weapons in the United States and Japan and simultaneously reassure China about allied strategic intentions while the United States and Japan pursue missile defenses. If we maintain our nuclear arsenal and develop NMD, thereby enhancing our strategic dominance over China, the Chinese will continue to see nuclear weapons the ultimate political/military tool, and will almost certainly respond in ways that intensify rather than lessen the security dilemma. The point is not that China's reaction should be sufficient reason to prevent U.S. pursuit of missile defense, but that making any strategic move without thinking several steps ahead is foolish. In this case, the point is that missile defenses are incompatible with missile offenses and stability. If we are not willing to reduce ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads, and we insist on acquiring NMD, we should not be surprised by intensified Chinese efforts to expand their ballistic missile force and overall nuclear capability. It would be both conducive to peaceful coexistence and strategically effective (for the technologically advanced United States and Japan) to shift any military competition with China towards conventional weapons. One might add that WMD, which target civilian populations, are also inherently immoral; if war is a sphere of human activity susceptible to moral considerations, and not purely amoral, we should confront this aspect of WMD as well.

Resist temptation. Given that Taiwan is China's most sensitive spot, it can be very tempting to give it a poke now and then, to get (or distract) Beijing's attention. This can be particularly troublesome from outside the national administration, whether from national legislatures or from other authorities. Since a basic rule of the Taiwan issue is that more attention makes it worse, we should maintain quiet and friendly relations with Taipei but should also avoid provoking a crisis.

Accommodate Taiwan's need for an international profile. Without going so far as to incite violence from China (see previous point), both the United States and Japan should seek ways to enhance Taiwan's sense of an international profile. Clearly, economic bodies provide the greatest hope for this approach at present, since Taiwan is an APEC member and should soon join the WTO. Working with forces of globalization to transcend the Westphalian notion of nation-state sovereignty, we can push to include the people of the PRC and Taiwan alike within a global (not international) community. The establishment of the mini-three links is encouraging, and should proceed to the full three links promptly.

Build confidence and reassurance through expanded alliance-based dialogue and exchange. As we strengthen the alliance, we must be careful to balance a stronger deterrence function with a stronger reassurance function. Certainly, we must try to instill in China the firm belief that it cannot improve its position by opposing the alliance, while offering a persuasive alternative of security cooperation. We should promote the long-term goal of building an Asia-Pacific security community, but must assert that this is feasible only if it incorporates, rather than attempts to supplant, the current hub-and-spokes framework of alliances centered on the United States. If Beijing argues that U.S.-Japan alliance is an obstacle to trust, it may be impossible to develop a relationship of true trust with China. On the other hand, if the Chinese accept the alliance as a positive contribution to regional and global order, rather than a tool of containment, there will be much greater hope of building patterns of security cooperation. The habits of cooperation can eventually accrue into a paradigm of behavior that can be institutionalized and entrenched, and even empowered with control over other components of the international system. It will be a great challenge for defense leaders in the United States, Japan, and China to overcome the jealous sovereignty of states over security issues.

About the Authors

Ralph A. Cossa is President of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu. He manages Pacific Forum's programs on security, political, economic, and environmental issues. He sits on the steering committee of the multinational Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and serves as Executive Director of the U.S. Committee of CSCAP. He is also a board member of the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies. Mr. Cossa is a political-military affairs and national security strategy specialist with over 25 years of experience in formulating, articulating, and implementing U.S. security policy in the Asia-Pacific and Near East-South Asia regions. He is a retired USAF Colonel and a former National Security Affairs Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He holds a B.A. in international relations from Syracuse University, an M.B.A. in management from Pepperdine University, and M.S. in strategic studies from the Defense Intelligence College. Recent works include "The Bush Presidency: Prospects for Sino-U.S. Arms Control," *Disarmament Diplomacy*, Jan. 2001; "U.S.-China Relations under the Bush Administration," *Gaiko Forum*, Jan. 2001; "Potential Reduction Measures in Cross-Strait Conflict," *Panorama*, Vol. 4/2000; "U.S.-ROK-Japan: Why a 'Virtual Alliance' Makes Sense," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Summer 2000; and "U.S.-Korea Alliance" in Robert Blackwill and Paul Dibb (eds.), *America's Asian Alliances* (MIT Press, 2000).

Paul Giarra is a Senior Analyst responsible for the Strategic Assessment Center's Office of Global Strategies. He supervises and conducts long-range planning and strategic assessments of regional political, economic, technological, energy, and security trends for domestic and international government and commercial clients. During his 24 year career as a naval aviator, naval strategic planner, and political-military strategic planner for Far East, South Asia, and Pacific issues, Mr. Giarra served in two ships, two P-3 squadrons, on two major staffs, and attended two war colleges. On the Navy Staff, he was instrumental in re-orienting Navy strategic and programmatic priorities at the end of the Cold War. During his final Navy assignment, he served as Senior Country Director for Japan on the staff of the Secretary of Defense. Mr. Giarra received a B.A. in history from Harvard College and an M.A. in International Relations from Salve Regina College. He graduated with Highest Distinction from the U.S. Naval War College's Command and Staff course, and attended the U.S. National War College-equivalent Japanese National Institute of Defense Studies.

Michael Jonathan Green is currently Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council. Previously (and during his participation in this project), he was Olin Fellow for Asian Security at the Council on Foreign Relations, and acting director of the Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at the Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Dr. Green has served as a research staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses, as a special advisor to the Office of

Asia Pacific Affairs in the Pentagon, and as a special assistant to a member of the Japanese Diet. He received a B.A. in history from Kenyon College, and an M.A. and Ph.D. from SAIS. He also studied at Tokyo University as a Fulbright Fellow. Dr. Green's most recent publications include co-editor of *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, President, and Future* (Council on Foreign Relations, 1999); author of *Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics and the Postwar Search for Autonomy* (Columbia University Press, 1995); *State of the Field Report: Research on Japanese Security Policy* (National Bureau of Asian Research, 1998). Dr. Green was also project director for the Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force Report, *Managing Change on the Korean Peninsula* (May 1998).

Iguchi Haruo is Associate Professor at the Center for American Studies and Graduate School of American Studies at Doshisha University in Kyoto, Japan. His area of expertise includes U.S.-East Asia relations, American diplomatic history, and Japanese diplomatic history. He received a Ph.D. in history from the University of Chicago in 1995 and was a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard University's Edwin O. Reischauer Institute from 1995 to 1996. His academic works include *An Unfinished Dream: Yoshisuke Ayukawa's Economic Diplomacy Toward the U.S., 1937-1940* (*The Journal of American and Canadian Studies,* 1998) and *A Quest for Peace: Ayukawa Yoshisuke and U.S.-Japan Relations, 1940* (*The Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, 1996). Dr. Iguchi is currently revising *Unfinished Business: Ayukawa Yoshisuke and U.S.-Japan Relations, 1937-1953*, (Harvard University Asia Center, 2002).

Murata Koji is Associate Professor of Diplomatic History, Department of Political Science, Doshisha University in Kyoto, Japan. Previously, he was Associate Professor of American Studies at the School of Integrated Arts and Sciences at Hiroshima University in Higashi-Hiroshima, Japan. Professor Murata's areas of expertise include the history of the U.S.-Japan security relationship, U.S. foreign policy, and Japan's defense policy. He has received the Yomiuri Merit Award for New Opinion Leadership, the Shimizu Hiroshi Award from the Japan Association for American Studies, the Suntory Academic Award, and the Yoshida Shigeru Award. Professor Murata received a B.A. in political science from Doshisha University, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from Kobe University. He also obtained a M.Phil. in political science from the George Washington University where he studied as a Fulbright Scholar. Professor Murata is the author of several books and many articles both in Japanese and English, and a frequent contributor to monthly magazines and newspapers in Japan.

Nishimoto Tetsuya (General, Ret.) is currently Adviser to the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and to the Toshiba Corporation. He graduated from the Defense Academy and joined the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) in 1959. He served as Professor at the Defense Research Institution, JDA, Chief of the Operations Division, Director of Plans and Operations Department, and Vice Chief of Staff of the JDA Ground Staff Office. He also served as the Commanding General of the 7th Division and Middle Army, as well as the Chief of Staff of GSDF, and Chairman of the Joint Staff Council. General Nishimoto

retired from the SDF in 1996. In addition to his advisor position at JDA and Toshiba Corp., he also served as Chief of Japan Observer Group for the Cambodian Election in 1998. General Nishimoto is a graduate of the U.S. Army Armor School, the U.S. Army War College, and the Defense Research Institute.

Michael E. O'Hanlon is a Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. His areas of expertise include arms treaties, Asian security issues, civil warfare, European security issues, military technology, missile defense, peacekeeping operations, and U.S. defense strategy and budget. He is currently working on a project on the defense budget and national missile defense to be completed in 2002. He is an Adjunct Professor at Columbia University and Georgetown University. He previously served as a Defense and Foreign Policy Budget Analyst in the National Security Division of the Congressional Budget Office, and as a Research Assistant at the Institute for Defense Analyses. Dr. O'Hanlon received A.B., M.S.E., and M.A. degrees from Princeton University, and a Ph.D. from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University. His most recent publications include *Defending America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense* (2001); *Defense Policy Choices for the Bush Administration, 2001-2005* (2001); *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (2000), and *Technological Change and the Future of Warfare* (2000).

Gregg A. Rubinstein is Director of GAR Associates. During 12 years as a Foreign Service Officer, he worked on U.S.-Japan defense and trade issues in the U.S Embassy in Tokyo, in the State Department's Office of Japanese Affairs, and at the Defense Security Assistance Agency at the U.S. Department of Defense. He then returned to Tokyo as Deputy Director of the embassy's Mutual Defense Assistance Office. After leaving government service, Mr. Rubinstein became Director of Policy and Planning in the Washington office of Grumman International. He has written numerous articles on U.S.-Japan security relations and recently co-authored a study for DoD on armaments cooperation with Japan. Mr. Rubinstein continues to serve as an adviser to DoD on Japan programs and works on government-industry projects concerning defense acquisition policies, foreign military sales procedures, and export control issues. He received a B.A. from the University of Chicago, an M.A. from the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, and also attended Jochi University in Tokyo.

Sakamoto Kazuya is Professor at the Graduate School of Law at Osaka University. His areas of expertise include international politics and diplomatic history. He has also taught law at Kyoto University and Mie University, and served as a Research Fellow at the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. His books include *Nichibeidomeino Kizuna – Anpojoyaku to Sogosei no Mosaku (The Bonds of the Japan-U.S. Alliance: The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Search for Mutuality)* (Japan 2000); and is co-author of *Sengo Nihon Gaiko-shi (The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan)* (Japan 1999). His articles include "Advancing the Japan-U.S. Alliance," (Japan Quarterly, April-July 2001). He received L.L.B and L.L.M. degrees from Kyoto University and an M.A. degree from Ohio University.

Robin "Sak" Sakoda established a consulting company, Sakoda Associates, in Arlington, VA after retiring from U.S. government service in February 1999. He also joined Armitage Associates in the same month and is a Senior Associate. He is also a guest faculty member of the Center for Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, and Senior Associate with the Pacific Forum CSIS. During the last five years of his U.S. Army career, he served as Country Director for Japan, Asian and Pacific Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and was then assigned Senior Director. Secretary of Defense William Perry awarded him the Defense Meritorious Service Medal for his work on the security relationship with Japan as well as the Paul Nitze Award for outstanding service. Mr. Sakoda graduated from The Military College of South Carolina, The Citadel and was commissioned Infantry in May 1978. He attended Airborne and Ranger schools, and the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Command and General Staff College in Ichigaya, Tokyo. Mr. Sakoda was a foreign area officer and studied Japanese language at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California and the Foreign Service Institute in Yokohama, Japan. He received an M.A. in National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School in June 1998.

Benjamin L. Self is a Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, D.C., where he directs projects on Japanese security issues. These include a project on the U.S.-Japan Alliance and Security Relations with the PRC, Confidence Building Measures in Japanese Security Policy, and a Japanese Visiting Fellows Program. Mr. Self is also an adjunct professor in the School of International Service at American University. Previously, Mr. Self was a Fulbright Graduate Research Fellow at Keio University in Tokyo, and was Asia Program Associate at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He earned a B.A. in political science from Stanford University, and an M.A. in Japan studies and international economics from The Johns Hopkins Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, where he is a doctoral candidate. Mr. Self is author of "Confidence-Building Measures and Japanese Security Policy" and "CBMs and the Three Pillars of Japanese Security Policy," both published by the Stimson Center, and co-author of "Japan's Changing China Policy: From Commercial Liberalism to Reluctant Realism," *Survival* (Summer 1996).

Shibayama Futoshi is Associate Professor at Aichi Gakuin University in Tokyo, Japan. His areas of expertise include U.S.-Japan relations in the 20th century, U.S. military history, and modern Japanese history. He has served as a visiting instructor at Connecticut College and as Assistant Professor at Drew University. He received a B.A. in law from Doshisha University, an M.A. in political science from Doshiha University, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in history from Yale University. His dissertation, published by Yale University in 1994, was entitled "Coping with the Anglo-American World Order: Japanese Intellectuals and the Cultural Crises of 1913-1953." Other publications include "A Study of U.S. National Strategy, 1945-50" in *The Doshisha Hagaku* (1982); "The U.S. Military and American Presidential Decision of Rearming Japan Between September 1951 and August 1952," in *The Journal of Information and Policy Studies*, Aichi Gakiun University

(December 1999); and "Nihon Bouei wo meguru Amerika Gunnaibu deno Senryaku Ronsou – 1946-1949" (The U.S. Military's Strategic Controversy on the Defense of Japan, 1946-1949), in Yukio Ito and Minoru Kawata, editors, *Kan-Taiheiyou no Kokusai Chitsujyo no Mosaku to Nihon* (Tokyo 1999).

Mark Taylor Staples is currently a Mansfield Fellow in Tokyo, Japan conducting research on Japan's Crisis Management System at the Japan Defense Agency, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in the National Diet. Previously, he served as the Country Director for Japan at the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Commander Staples graduated with a B.A. in political science and Asian studies from the University of Colorado and was promoted to Boatswain's Mate Second Class in the USNR. His first sea assignment included duty as Boat Group Commander and Boilers Officer on the USS St. Louis, the first amphibious ship homeported in Sasebo, Japan, and he subsequently served as Communications Officer, Combat Information Center Officer, and Navigator in USS Reeves, homeported in Yokosuka, Japan. Commander Staples received an M.A. in National Security Affairs from the Monterey Institute and graduated from the Japanese language course at the Defense Language Institute. Promoted to the rank of Commander in June 1998, he was the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) action officer during his tour as an analyst for the Chief of Naval Operations, Strategic Planning Branch.

Pacific Forum CSIS
The Policy Study Group
The Okazaki Institute

United States-Japan Strategic Dialogue: Beyond the Defense Guidelines

May 10 – 11, 2001

Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C.
Room B1 - B

AGENDA

Wednesday, May 9

Informal Opening Dinner for Paper Writers

Thursday, May 10

8:30-8:45AM	Continental Breakfast
8:45-9:00AM	Opening Remarks Ambassador Okazaki Hisahiko Ralph A. Cossa
9:00-10:30AM	Session I: Roles and Mission Sak Sakoda Nishimoto Tetsuya
10:30-10:45AM	Break
10:45-12:15PM	Session II: Taiwan and China Issues Ben Self Murata Koji
12:15-1:45PM	Lunch
1:45-3:15PM	Session III: Bases and Okinawa Paul Giarra Iguchi Haruo
3:15-3:30PM	Break

3:30-5:00PM	Session IV: Theatre Missile Defense Michael O'Hanlon Shibayama Futoshi
5:00PM	Adjourn
6:30PM	Working Dinner for Paper Writers

Friday, May 11

8:30-9:00AM	Continental Breakfast
9:00-10:15AM	Session V: Japanese Legal Issues Sakamoto Kazuya Mark Staples
10:15-10:30AM	Break
10:30-11:15AM	Armaments Cooperation Gregg Rubinstein
11:15-12:00PM	Korean Peninsula Okazaki Hisahiko
12:30-2:00PM	Working Lunch
2:30-4:30PM	Public Panel Session

Pacific Forum CSIS
The Policy Study Group
The Okazaki Institute

United States-Japan Strategic Dialogue: Beyond the Defense Guidelines

May 10 – 11, 2001

Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C.
Room B1 - B

PARTICIPANT LIST

Co-chairs: Mr. Ralph A. Cossa, President, Pacific Forum CSIS
Ambassador Okazaki Hisahiko, President, Okazaki Institute

Mr. David Asher
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI)

Mr. William Breer
Japan Chair
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Mr. Jeffrey Bloom
Japan Desk Officer
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)

Dr. Kurt Campbell
Senior Vice President and Director
International Security Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Ms. Eun Jung Cahill Che
Research Associate
Pacific Forum CSIS

Mr. Richard A. Christenson
Senior Fellow
United States Institute of Peace

Dr. Patrick M. Cronin
Director, Research and Studies
United States Institute of Peace

Major Stephen Fowler, USA
Political Military Analyst, Asia
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Directorate for Intelligence, J2

Mr. Paul Giarra
Senior Analyst, Strategic Assessment Center
Center for National Security Issues of the Science Applications International Corporation

Mr. Brad Glosserman
Director of Research
Pacific Forum CSIS

Dr. Michael J. Green
Director for Asian Affairs
National Security Council

Mr. William Heinrich
Foreign Affairs Analyst
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Mr. John Hill
Senior Country Officer, Japan
Office of East Asia & Pacific Affairs
U.S. Department of Defense

Professor Iguchi Haruo
Associate Professor
Center for American Studies
Doshisha University (Kyoto)

Mr. Christopher B. Johnstone
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Ms. Mindy Kotler
Director
Japan Information Access Project

RADM Michael McDevitt, USN (Ret.)
Senior Fellow
CNA Corporation

Mr. Derek Mitchell
Senior Fellow
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Professor Mike Mochizuki
Sigur Center for Asian Studies
George Washington University

Professor Murata Koji
Associate Professor, Diplomatic History
Department of Political Science
Doshisha University

General Nishimoto Tetsuya (Ret.)
Former Chief of Joint Staffs
Advisor, Toshiba Corporation

Mr. Ogawa, Akira
Head Researcher
The Okazaki Institute

Mr. Michael O'Hanlon
Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution

Mr. Douglas H. Paal
President
Asia Pacific Policy Center

Mr. W. Stephen Piper
President
Piper Pacific International

Dr. James J. Przystup
Institute for National Strategic Studies
National Defense University

Mr. Gregg A. Rubinstein
Director
GAR Associates

Ms. Ferial Ara Saeed
Japan Country Officer
East Asian and Pacific Affairs
U.S. Department of State

Professor Sakamoto Kazuya
Professor
Osaka University

Ms. Marlene J. Sakaue
Office of Japan Affairs
East Asian and Pacific Affairs
U.S. Department of State

Mr. Robin "Sak" Sakoda
Associate
Armitage Associates L.C.

Mr. Benjamin Self
Senior Associate & Director, Japan Portion of the Project on CBM's in Regions of Tension
The Henry L. Stimson Institute

Professor Shibayama Futoshi
Associate Professor
Aichi-Gakuin University

Ms. Jane Skanderup
Director of Program Development
Pacific Forum CSIS

Mr. Mark Staples
Mansfield Fellow
Japan Defense Agency

Professor Tanaka Akihiko
Institute of Oriental Culture
Tokyo University

Ms. Yuki Tatsumi
Research Associate
The Henry L. Stimson Center

Observers

Mr. Edward Bristol
Ph.D. Candidate
Georgetown University

Mr. Peter Ennis
Editor
The Oriental Economist

Mr. Katsu Furukawa
Research Associate
Council on Foreign Relations

Mr. John W. Mentz
Scientific Advisor for Arms Control
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Arms Control Implementation and
Compliance

Mr. George R. Packard
President
U.S.-Japan Foundation

Mr. James L. Schoff
Senior Program Officer
U.S.-Japan Foundation

Ms. Miki Watanabe
MA Candidate
SAIS, Johns Hopkins University