



Responding to a
Changing Security Environment

By Carl W. Baker

Issues & Insights
Vol. 8-No. 21

Honolulu, Hawaii
October 2008

Pacific Forum CSIS

Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate areas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

American Studies Center, Fudan

The Center for American Studies (CAS), established in 1985, is one of the major research institutions for American studies in China. In December 2000, the CAS was designated by the Chinese Ministry of Education as one of the key research institutes of the Humanities and Social Sciences in China, focusing on American studies. The Ministry of Education and Fudan University have provided financial support to the CAS ever since. The CAS has been greatly facilitated by support from the American Schools and Hospitals Abroad (ASHA) program. This support has been applied through the Fudan Foundation in Washington, D.C., which has also established a "Xie Xide Scholarship", in memory of her tremendous efforts for friendship between China and the United States.

Table of Contents

	Page
Acknowledgements	iv
Executive Summary	v
Conference Report	I
Developments in Regional Security and Bilateral Relations	1
Energy and Environmental Issues	5
Developments and Prospects in Cross-Strait Relations	6
Korean Peninsula Issues	8
Northeast Asia Security Architecture.....	10
China-U.S. Relations and the Next U.S. Administration.....	11
Looking ahead.....	13
About the Author	17
Appendix A	
Conference Agenda	A-1
Participant List	A-5

Acknowledgements

The Pacific Forum CSIS would like to thank Fudan University's Center for American Studies for its support of this initiative. This year marks the eighth round of the China-U.S. Security Seminar since it was initiated in 2000. Its longevity reflects the Center's commitment to building better relations with the United States. Dr. Wu Xinbo, deputy director of the Center for American Studies and our partner throughout this project, has provided leadership and intellectual direction; this program would not be possible without his hard work.

The CNA Corp. deserves special recognition for financial support for this seminar, as well as the individuals from its staff that have attended our meetings over the years and contributed to their success. Pacific Forum is also grateful to the Institute for Defense Analyses for its generous financial and substantive support of the seminar.

Executive Summary

Some 28 scholars and analysts, all participating in their private capacity, met in Honolulu Aug. 13-15, 2008 for the eighth dialogue on Sino-U.S. relations and regional security. The seminar examined how the relationship has evolved over the two years since the group last met in Shanghai. Occurring during the 2008 Olympic Games, there was great admiration among participants regarding the success of the event.

A common assessment of the bilateral relationship between the United States and China is that it has become the key to virtually all aspects of security in Asia and the world. Common interests and concerns are readily acknowledged, yet the two countries struggle to deal with more traditional security issues that have hampered more extensive cooperation both between them and in the region. With the emergence of new challenges such as energy security and climate change, the need for cooperation has become more apparent, if not more urgent. Cross-Strait relations, the Korean Peninsula, rapid social change in China and the change in administration in Washington remain important factors in shaping the future of the relationship.

Despite persistent tensions, bilateral relations have improved over the past two years. A wide range of senior-level dialogues has helped create a sense of common purpose and stability that has served to improve the regional security environment. While the North Korean nuclear issue remains an important challenge, close cooperation between the U.S. and China in sustaining dialogue through the Six-Party Talks has avoided a crisis and kept North Korea engaged in the process. Improved relations between Japan and China have also been instrumental in easing regional tensions and have facilitated improved U.S-China relations as well.

Two issues that continue to be the source of tension in the bilateral relationship are Tibet and cross-Strait relations. Both sides remain sensitive to fundamentally different perspective on these issues. U.S. analysts tend to see the issues through the lens of human rights, freedom, and democracy while Chinese analysts tend to focus on the issues of sovereignty, social control and international image.

The growing importance of energy and environmental security were a central theme of the seminar. Given the rapid economic development in China, access to energy supplies has become a critical element of its foreign policy as it has been for the U.S. for the past several decades. There is some recognition that cooperation in controlling energy supplies would be useful along with a common acknowledgement that energy prices really are driven by consumption and increasing demand rather than manipulation by the other country. However, a fundamental difference remains in their goals for cooperation. Whereas the U.S. wants transparency of energy stockpiles, China's primary interest is in transfer of expertise and technology to increase local development of energy resources. Meanwhile, the simple fact is that at least in the short term, demand seems to be outpacing supply. Therefore, the key to energy security in the region is to create the political will to reduce demand through more efficient use of existing resources and the development and exploitation of alternative energy sources.

There was a great deal of optimism about improved cross-Strait relations. With the inauguration of Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan's new leader, the prospects for resuming cross-Strait dialogue under the 1992 consensus have dramatically improved. Although obstacles remain, there seems to be a new willingness to establish the institutional framework to address them in a cooperative way. Three disconnects that need to be openly discussed include the political goals of each side (reunification or de facto independence), the role of the two militaries and military modernization, and the growing difference in the political cultures on opposite sides of the Strait. Meanwhile, the issues of international space for Taiwan and the reliance on economic cooperation as the best means to build confidence between the mainland and Taiwan also need careful consideration in the immediate future.

Differences in perspective between the U.S. and China were apparent in the discussion regarding the Korean Peninsula. Whereas Chinese analysts tend to view relations on the Peninsula as a vestige of the Cold War, U.S. analysts tend to articulate dissatisfaction with North Korea's willingness to proceed with denuclearization. While agreeing that denuclearization of the Peninsula is a shared interest, China is concerned that the U.S. will push North Korea too hard while the U.S. is concerned that China will not be forceful enough in demanding a verifiable dismantlement of its nuclear programs.

In the discussion on the security architecture in Northeast Asia, the dilemma between the need for cooperation despite the persistent tensions was highlighted. The lack of an acceptable institutionalized security mechanism has made efforts to resolve territorial disputes and other traditional security issues difficult to resolve. The tendency is for security frameworks to be either too narrow (bilateral) or too broad (ASEAN Regional Forum). Since Southeast Asia has taken the lead on developing cooperative security relationships, the countries in Northeast Asia have been in the position of engaging each other on the margins of multilateral forums that are led by the smaller states of ASEAN. While the Six-Party Talks represents an excellent vehicle for advancing further cooperation, it remains to be seen if the six members will be able to translate cooperation on the Korean nuclear issue into the broader context of other Northeast Asian security issues.

Looking ahead, there was agreement that with the improvement in bilateral relations over the past two years, the prospects were good for a positive start to the next administration in Washington. However, there was also a general acknowledgement that the U.S. and the region would benefit greatly from a coherent Asia strategy that built on the cooperative atmosphere that had been created. Understanding and addressing one another's expectations are the key to a successful relationship and a frank dialogue is the best way to ensure each side knows what to expect. Building trust remains one of the primary objectives of the continuing Pacific Forum CSIS-American Studies Center, Fudan University seminar series.

Responding to a Changing Security Environment: Eighth Dialogue on Sino-U.S. Relations and Regional Security Conference Report

Security relations between the United States and China have matured over the past two years. A common assessment is that the bilateral relationship has become the key to virtually all aspects of security in Asia and the world. Common interests and concerns are readily acknowledged, yet the two countries struggle to deal with more traditional security issues that have hampered more extensive cooperation in the region. With the emergence of new challenges in the areas of energy and environmental security, the need for cooperation has become more apparent and urgent. Cross-Strait relations, the Korean Peninsula, rapid economic growth in China, and the upcoming elections in the U.S. remain important factors in shaping the future of the relationship, as do events beyond the boundaries of Asia, such as in Iran, Sudan, Latin America, and elsewhere.

Some 28 scholars and analysts, all participating in their private capacity, joined the eighth dialogue on Sino-U.S. relations and regional security. Co-hosted by Fudan University's Center for American Studies, the CNA Corporation, the Institute for Defense Analysis, and Pacific Forum CSIS, the dialogue was held in Honolulu Aug. 13-15, 2008 to examine how relationship has evolved over the past two years and consider prospects for its future. They were joined by 11 Pacific Forum Young Leaders who provided the next generation's perspective on the issues. All agreed that the U.S.-China relationship is critically important to the region and the world and that it had matured in a positive way since the seventh dialogue, which was held in Shanghai in May 2006. Nevertheless, it was also clear from the discussions that mutual suspicions continue to inhibit cooperation on traditional and emerging security issues.

Developments in Regional Security and Bilateral Relations

Despite persistent underlying tensions, U.S.-China bilateral relations have been relatively stable over the past two years. *Wu Xinbo*, deputy director of the Center for American Studies and professor at Fudan University, noted that bilateral relations have improved. A positive turn in China-Japan relations and extensive coordination in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue have facilitated growing cooperation, intensive senior-level dialogue, better military-to-military relations, and better understanding of the Taiwan issue. Wu highlighted the contrast with the first four years of the Bush administration when relations were more confrontational and little attention was given to managing the relationship.

The North Korean nuclear issue remains a very important challenge. Despite assumptions that the October 2006 nuclear test by North Korea would kill the Six-Party Talks and ruin U.S.-China relations, China was pleasantly surprised when the U.S. chose a more flexible and pragmatic approach to the problem. With the revival of the Six-Party Talks, there has been remarkable coordination between the U.S. and China on managing the crisis and cooperating to keep North Korea engaged in the process. Wu argued that this

represented an excellent opportunity to build trust and extend bilateral relations. More importantly, both sides have benefited by finding new ways to influence North Korean behavior. By providing a clearer sense of what it can and should do regarding denuclearization, they have reduced North Korean concerns for its security and helped integrate Pyongyang into a discussion on regional security issues. There has also been a significant evolution of China's role in the process. By examining its interests and active engagement in sustaining the dialogue, China has acquired a stake in the process. At this point, failure to keep the process alive would damage China's image and reputation.

Meanwhile, relations between China and Japan have improved security relations in the region. While the U.S. was criticized for its reluctance to create momentum in the relationship, improved senior-level dialogue between the U.S. and China and a change in domestic Japanese politics made the improvement in Japan-China relations possible. As a result, the two recently made progress on the East China Sea dispute and both sides were trying to rethink the relationship and take a more productive approach. Wu argued that Japan should be more responsible on the history issue and more accommodating to a rising China while Beijing should give Tokyo more respect as a contributor to China's economic growth and global prosperity.

Regional and global security cooperation has also improved. Contrasting the experience from the late Clinton and early George W. Bush administrations, Wu noted a conceptual shift within the U.S. from a focus on the rise of China to how China uses its capabilities. This has resulted in a more accommodating stance by the U.S., which has begun thinking about how it will live with a rising China and has made China more aware of its international responsibilities.

The development of multiple official dialogue mechanisms provides channels to express opinions and concerns, creates impetus to take action, and serves to offset domestic pressures for both sides. In military-to-military relations, these mechanisms have promoted mutual understanding and reduced the chance of strategic misjudgments. In the case of Taiwan, they have helped successfully complete what has been perhaps the most difficult two years in cross-Strait relations. The U.S. has shown respect for China's national interests and demonstrated a newfound appreciation for the significance Beijing attaches to the issue. Both sides better appreciate the significance of the relationship and have found ways to manage it better. Now, there is a need to continue to build confidence and find ways to express the goodwill that has been developed.

Phillip Saunders, a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, provided a U.S. perspective on the impact of regional developments on the U.S.-China bilateral relations. The most significant development has been the slowdown in the global economy, particularly in the United States. The rising costs of energy, food, and other commodities have led to criticism of China, which has had a surge in resource-intensive growth over the past five years. These trends have produced new pressures to reduce or abolish energy subsidies, increased international competition for access to energy resources, led to calls by some to control energy supplies and distribution routes, and created imbalances in the world economy. This has resulted in a new backlash

against globalization and will create political pressure in the U.S. to aggressively deal with economic issues. Saunders warned that China's economy has been a large beneficiary of globalization, but it may now have to pay the price.

Economic issues have also been at the center of attention in the recent election of new leaders in Taiwan and South Korea. The election of Ma Ying-jeou in Taiwan has greatly improved cross-Strait relations. While this should be seen as a positive development, some analysts feel that the improvement may diminish U.S.-China cooperation due to less concern with the need to contain Taiwan and U.S. concerns about the impact of unification. Saunders felt that the more important question is whether the improvement in cross-Strait relations may stall before the issues relating to improved security relations and the creation of international space for Taiwan are fully addressed.

The election of Lee Myung-bak, heralding the return of a conservative to power in South Korea, has had mixed results. Because North Korea has responded negatively to Lee's shift from the accommodative policies of previous administrations toward the North, there are renewed concerns that the Six-Party Talks will breakdown over the deterioration in intra-Korean relations. Meanwhile, U.S.-South Korea relations have also hit a rough patch following the election. Although there has been a big improvement in the tone of the relationship and the Lee-Bush summit served to stabilize the alliance relationship, nagging problems continue to exist in economic relations.

In terms of U.S.-China relations, there has been significant progress in improving cooperation through the Six-Party Talks. However, the shift in the U.S. approach to North Korea could create tensions with South Korea and Japan. Until North Korea is willing to accept a verification regime that satisfies the U.S. and there is progress on the Japanese abductee issue, the success of the process will remain in doubt.

Regional security was also impacted by the natural disasters and domestic protests in China and Burma. The significant difference between the Chinese government's response to the winter snowstorms and the recent earthquake in Sichuan and the Burmese government's response to Cyclone *Nargis* reflects China's growing maturity and confidence in its ability to deal with domestic social issues. China quickly mobilized government agencies and accepted international assistance while Burma's government denied any problems and repeatedly refused assistance despite clear indications of suffering. Even though the natural disasters drew attention from the domestic unrest in both countries, underlying tensions remain and will continue to influence relations with other countries in the region.

There has been significant progress in "re-normalizing" Sino-Japanese relations. With the resumption of summit visits, the agreement on joint development of resources in the East China Sea, improved military-to-military relations, and the acceptance of Japanese assistance for earthquake victims, relations between the two have improved and the leaders seem determined to prevent any backsliding. Yet, there has been no breakthrough on key structural issues such as perceptions regarding military threats, leadership in Asia, maritime sovereignty disputes, and history issues.

Saunders argued that official relations between the U.S. and China generally are in better shape than they were two years ago, with ongoing cooperation on a range of important economic and security issues. The leaders have built a good working relationship and a wide range of strategic dialogues have been established. However, underlying tensions remain: mutual suspicions especially about military intentions, contaminated food/toy issues, mutual criticism about Tibet and the Dalai Lama, arms sales to Taiwan, and economic relations. Formal dialogues and frequent high-level visits have improved the level of understanding and enhanced cooperation in several areas, but process is not enough. Eventually, the U.S. will look for tangible results and demand more transparency. Perhaps the biggest challenge will be to sustain the dialogue through the transition to the new government in Washington. It is unlikely that the new administration will scrap the existing framework of talks, but it is likely to review it to evaluate whether the framework is addressing the key issues and whether the talks are being held at the right level with the right people.

The discussion session began with the moderator suggesting that improvement in Sino-Japanese relations was the key in the changing security environment. He suggested that the improvement has facilitated the broadening of U.S.-China relations and opened the door for better and more extensive cooperation in the future.

Tibet and the Dalai Lama was a focus of discussion. An American suggested that Beijing's villainization of the Dalai Lama played well internally, but that approach isn't well received in the rest of the world. A Chinese agreed that it was not helpful to blame the Dalai Lama for everything wrong in Tibet and that much of the violence and dissatisfaction comes from poverty, noting that China has been making efforts to improve economic conditions in the region. It was suggested that because the riots in Tibet had gotten the attention at the highest level in Beijing, there would be a concerted effort to improve conditions after the Olympics. Accordingly, China had convened two rounds of talks with the Dalai Lama's representatives since the riots occurred, but the Dalai Lama needs to be realistic about autonomy and give up demands regarding greater Tibet. Another Chinese noted that since local unrest had violated the law, the crackdown was warranted. However, because it is a complex issue with international implications the government response was too late and too slow. He agreed that there is a big difference between perceptions of the Dalai Lama, especially among the younger generation in China, and international perceptions of him and that this has damaged China's image. Nevertheless, major diplomatic partners should deal with Chinese domestic issues carefully and be more deferential to China's sensitivities.

The North Korean nuclear crisis was another topic of discussion. While one U.S. participant noted there was no chance of military action by the U.S. in response to the nuclear test, another noted that it would be difficult for the next U.S. administration to make any concessions to North Korea. While China has celebrated early successes in dealing with the North Korean issue, there remained a great deal of skepticism in the U.S. regarding North Korea's willingness to follow through with the agreements already reached.

Energy and Environmental Issues

The second session dealt with perspectives on energy and environmental issues, their role in shaping regional security relations, and the prospects for related security cooperation. *Zha Daojiong* of Peking University began by outlining recent developments that would help improve the supply of energy. While he characterized development of biofuels as a “mirage” that ultimately pushes up the price of food, the U.S. contemplations of opening up new drilling areas, the potential return of Iraq as a major oil supplier, and the recent announcement by Japan and China to begin joint development in the East China Sea are positive trends. He was not so sanguine about developments in Russia primarily because disagreements between China and Russia limited the ability of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to do anything positive to increase the supply of oil. Meanwhile, Central Asian countries do not want to be in the middle of disagreements. Further, the efforts through the East Asia Summit and other regional meetings to address energy security have provided few if any solutions to the problem.

In China there is a growing recognition that oil prices are being driven by consumption and not because of some trick by the U.S. to hinder Chinese development as some cynics have suggested. As subsidies are removed, prices have been rising and new policies are being put in place to encourage conservation and allow the market to determine prices. U.S.-China cooperation on energy and the environment has not been forthcoming. While there are numerous programs at all levels, the two have different goals. The U.S. wants transparency of stockpiles through Chinese participation in the International Energy Agency and regularly offers China policy advice. China’s primary interest is in free transfer of expertise and technology to increase local development of energy resources. As a result, while there has been good interaction with the U.S. Treasury under the Strategic Economic Dialogue framework, Zha believed that the U.S. Department of Energy has shown little interest in cooperating with China.

Chris McNally of the East-West Center argued that energy and environmental issues represent a huge basket of complex issues. The best approach to structural problems is not exploration or drilling, but seeking improvements in energy efficiency and stringent environmental safeguards.

Environmental degradation is a gigantic problem for China. In particular, it faces challenges with water pollution and shortage, air pollution, land degradation and desertification, and high levels of greenhouse gases caused by its reliance on coal. The human and economic impacts of these problems are increasing in China and there are global implications. If China continues on its current trajectory, the world will simply run out of resources. McNally suggested that a major part of the problem is the current incentive system in China which emphasizes economic growth at all costs. While there has been recent progress in some environmental efforts such as reducing air and water pollution and reforestation efforts, the biggest problem remains the availability of water, energy, and other resources to sustain economic development.

Global energy challenges are “simple”: at least in the near term, supply seems to be outpacing supply. Even though there has been a drop in U.S. consumption, global demand continues to increase because of the rapid development of China, which continues to be the driving force in the Asia-Pacific region, accounting for 75 percent of the net incremental oil demand growth in Asia over the past three years. The key to energy security in the region is not foreign policy maneuvers or military threats, but development of the political will to reduce demand. In other words, energy efficiency will be the critical component to energy and environmental security in the future. Given the realities of U.S. politics, McNally saw little prospect for fast action on the part of the U.S., but held out hope that China could generate the political will to create more stringent energy efficiency standards in the near future.

During the discussion, several participants lamented that both the U.S. and China seemed unable to take effective political action to deal with energy and environmental issues. Individuals noted that both sides were more inclined to talk, but neither was willing to take the first step to address the problems. A Chinese participant felt that “cap and trade” systems to reduce carbon emissions have not worked and that we should look for better solutions. A theme throughout the discussion was the lack of incentives to shift consumption patterns in the face of ever increasing demand for carbon-based energy.

Developments and Prospects in Cross-Strait Relations

The discussion then turned to cross-Strait relations with the moderator introducing the idea of “one China” and “one Chinese nationality” as a starting point for thinking about how to move the relationship forward. *Xin Qiang* of Fudan University then explained his views about the People’s Republic of China (PRC) new approach to the Taiwan issue. He suggested that the current framework is based on the “one China” principle, emphasizes “people first,” and advocates unification through peaceful development. China accepts the idea of the 1992 consensus, which means the two sides have different definitions of what “one China” means and different focuses on the level of consensus. Beijing has learned that unification must be based on “people first” because no Taiwan politician can accept unification without a majority of people on Taiwan embracing the idea. This contrasts with the previous approach that put the government or the Kuomintang first. Ma’s “three noes” (no unification, no independence, and no use of force) was seen as a signal that China must change its approach and do practical things to foster the empathy of the people of Taiwan, demonstrate how they will benefit from unification, and create confidence in the mainland.

There remain obstacles in the path to unification and a need to establish institutions to deal with a range of issues. While China recognizes that international space for Taiwan is important, a first step is to separate cross-Strait issues from the international context. A major difficulty with permitting membership in international organizations and allowing the maintenance of diplomatic missions is the possibility of a shift back to the strong independence sentiments of past administrations in Taiwan. Similarly, Xin asserted PRC missile deployments target Taiwan independence, not Taiwan people. Until that threat is eliminated, it will be difficult for the PRC to remove the missiles.

Nonetheless, the prospects for change are positive. Based on the 16-character guideline “establish mutual trust, shelve disputes, seek common ground while reserving differences, and together create a win-win situation” outlined by President Hu Jintao and recognizing that “haste makes waste,” mainland leaders will promote compromises that lead to progress. The PRC recognizes that Taiwan desires a dignified international profile and will make delicate policy changes to accommodate that desire. This more flexible and self-contained foreign policy will respond to diplomatic trust and will reflect better coordination among the various ministries in Beijing. Xin concluded by warning that U.S. arms sales should be avoided as they serve to strengthen the more hawkish elements in Taiwan.

In his presentation, *Denny Roy*, a senior fellow at the East-West Center, characterized cross-Strait relations as exhibiting both change and continuity which has resulted in several disconnects. The changes include Taiwan’s embrace of economic integration while shifting its focus to concern about the growing threat powered by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) modernization program to Taiwan’s military security. Perhaps the most significant and obvious change over the past two years is that with the election of Ma Ying-jeou, the government in Taipei is no longer dominated by individuals with strong separatist sentiments.

Despite these changes, there remains a great deal of continuity in the relationship as significant differences between the two political systems are firmly entrenched. There is a growing divergence in political cultures as the vibrancy of Taiwan’s democracy stands in stark contrast to the growing complacency with central control on the mainland. Meanwhile, the militaries on both sides of the Strait have not perceived any change in their basic missions, a large number of people in Taiwan have not accepted the idea of eventual unification, and China continues to worry about a re-emergence of a strongly separatist government in Taipei.

There are three major disconnects that emerge from the current relationship. First, there is no agreement between the two sides on the eventual goal. Is it reunification or is it de facto independence? Second, the issues of military modernization and the role of the two militaries remain uncertain. What is the impact of the rapid military modernization and expansion on the mainland? What does the future hold for U.S. arms sales to Taiwan? What is the appropriate balance between the two sides? Third, while Taiwan’s political culture demands answers soon to sustain public support for the current administration, the political culture on the mainland demands caution to avoid instability. Ultimately, these tendencies need to be reconciled to prevent a return to more belligerent policies on both sides.

In a lively discussion that followed, exchanges confirmed that these issues remain central to the discussion on cross-Strait relations. In response to a comment on the political role of the PLA in unification policies, a Chinese participant assured the group that stability is the cornerstone of Beijing’s reunification policy and that this was a prerequisite for pursuing “one China” or reunification. Another stated that the leadership is deeply committed to maintaining civilian control over the military and that the military leadership is committed to creating a professional service that avoids political activity. Another commented that the U.S. should help shape the PRC’s perceptions regarding civil-military relations.

Challenging Roy's assessment that the militaries have not changed their basic mission, a Chinese participant stated that, in fact, the PLA has changed its mission and function. He asserted that there is a growing recognition in China that the military faces a multifaceted threat from diverse sources that requires a much broader perspective on security than just military confrontation across the Taiwan Strait. For China, the most critical aspect of cross-Strait relations is to understand the long-term view of the United States. While a majority in the U.S. may view the developments since Ma's election in March as favorable, there remains a very vocal minority that is wary of any move toward cross-Strait reconciliation. According to your Chinese colleague, they appear to be caught up in the "old-thinking" of Taiwan as a strategic U.S. asset in the region and should get over it.

Americans responded that the PRC appeared to assume that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan served to prolong the status quo and prevent unification. Historically, the U.S. presence in the region, not arms sales to Taiwan, has frustrated Chinese efforts to reunify. The end of arms sales will not change Taiwan's thinking or speed reunification. Instead, arms sales assuage Taiwan fears of abandonment. There is rapprochement today because both sides of the Strait see it in their interest, which has nothing to do with arms sales.

One U.S. participant suggested that the PRC viewed the situation as an opportunity to consolidate advances of the past decade in limiting Taiwan's international space. Because it saw no real downside to doing nothing, Beijing appeared willing to wait for others to take the lead in defining progress in the relationship. Disagreeing with the assessment, one Chinese pointed to the fact that economic cooperation was the best way to build confidence in cross-Strait relations. Talk about joint exploration of oil and gas offshore with Taiwan was offered as evidence of one opportunity being pursued. Another Chinese noted that it was important to be clear about the process and goals of cross-Strait relations; actions by the U.S., especially proposed arms sales, raised doubts and undermined U.S. credibility in the eyes of the Chinese people.

One U.S. participant argued that the U.S. strategy was straightforward: ensure stability and promote a peaceful solution between the two sides. Another said that any China that Taiwan would join willingly was a reunification scenario that the U.S. could accept. The real challenge was for both sides of the Strait to make it clear how they wished to proceed and then decide who would go first with a "military gesture" that showed a commitment to reduce tensions. Soft power was more important than missiles in moving forward.

Korean Peninsula Issues

Xia Liping, deputy dean and professor of law and politics at Tongji University, began the session by pointing out that the Korean Peninsula was the only place in the world where the Cold War framework still exists and attributed the ongoing nuclear crisis to that framework. Even though China and Russia have established diplomatic relations with South Korea, the U.S. and Japan have not established relations with North Korea. He felt that the creation of a peace mechanism on the Peninsula would have major implications for multilateral security in Northeast Asia.

To move the process forward, Xia argued that the U.S. and North Korea must make strategic decisions. The U.S. must decide to resolve the matter peacefully. It must abandon its hard-line policy and pursue engagement with North Korea. North Korea must make the strategic decision to give up all its nuclear programs. He gave a positive assessment of Six-Party Talks, noting that the process has led to North Korea releasing its nuclear records, formally submitting a declaration on its nuclear programs, and taking steps to disable its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. Because the denuclearization process will be slow and complicated, we should pay more attention to the actual number of weapons North Korea possesses and encourage its leaders to make a full declaration of all nuclear programs and to rejoin the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Xia felt that the establishment of a peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula would be a first step in creating a framework for security cooperation in Northeast Asia. The peace mechanism would require a treaty to end hostilities and war on the Peninsula between North and South Korea, the U.S., and China. Additionally, there should be an agreement to normalize relations between North and South Korea accompanied by confidence-building measures between the U.S./South Korea and North Korea. The denuclearization of the Peninsula would be a prerequisite for the establishment of the peace mechanism. When compared to the situation in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, the conditions for the creation of a security cooperation framework in Northeast Asia were actually better. Given that most countries in the region are market economies with extensive economic interdependence and there is no confrontation between military blocs, the conditions for security cooperation are already in place. Therefore, if the Six-Party Talks can resolve the nuclear issue, it is natural for the process to evolve into a security cooperation mechanism.

In his presentation, *Scott Snyder*, a senior associate with the Asia Foundation and Pacific Forum CSIS, focused primarily on current developments in the Six-Party Talks and their implications for future relationships on the Korean Peninsula. The key to the current impasse over the draft verification protocol is closing the gaps between the U.S. and North Korean position. There remains a great deal of ambiguity whether the verification process should be part of the current disablement phase or if it would be better to view it as belonging in the implementation of the dismantlement phase. Regardless, it has become clear that achieving full denuclearization will fall to the next U.S. administration that takes office in January 2009. Although the sense of crisis over the issue has passed in the U.S., it is important for the incoming administration to recognize the urgency of the situation, set clear priorities, and maintain the strong support of North Korea's neighbors to ensure that a nuclear North Korea is not accepted as the new regional status quo.

Snyder felt that the lack of government capacity and the increasingly visible vulnerability of the leadership in North Korea are creating multiple dilemmas on the Peninsula. Although the topic of North Korean political stability remains too sensitive for official discussion among other countries in the region, it is clearly a subject that requires deeper understanding and consideration. Efforts to continue that dialogue at the private level should be actively and responsibly cultivated.

Ironically, one of the unanticipated impacts of the second North Korean nuclear crisis has been an improvement in U.S.-China cooperation on issues related to the Peninsula. While differences persist, both have recognized that managing the crisis requires cooperation. The U.S. needs to avoid giving North Korea the opportunity to play China and the U.S. against each other. China must take special care to manage its relations with North Korea in such a way as to avoid inciting strategic anxieties in South Korea regarding its long-term intentions on the Peninsula. Meanwhile, the Lee Myung-bak administration in the South has sought to establish a “strategic alliance for the 21st Century” with the U.S. while calling for a “strategic cooperative partnership” with China. In a recent poll, South Koreans confirmed that both countries are important and that China’s influence had increased. It remains to be seen how either of Lee’s terms will be defined and the extent to which South Korea can serve as a bridge for improving U.S.-China relations in the process.

Discussion centered on the perceived success in resolving the nuclear issue on the Peninsula and the growing concern with the potential for instability in North Korea. A U.S. participant opened the comments with the observation that the Six-Party Talks have never been even-handed, characterizing them as more like five plus one. In his eyes, China has been proactive because it feared instability on its border given the likelihood of serious change in North Korea at some point. A Chinese participant agreed with that concern and suggested that it might be time for serious consultations between China, South Korea, and the U.S. on a North Korean contingency, while cautioning that the U.S. should avoid provoking the North. Another felt that the Korean Peninsula was now part of China’s sphere of influence, but that the significance of China for South Korea was falling. It was also noted that Xia’s recommendation that Washington “abandon its hard-line policy and pursue engagement with North Korea” had already been adopted; in fact, there were now complaints in some quarters that Washington was now being too soft on Pyongyang.

There was general agreement that denuclearization of the Peninsula was a goal shared by the U.S. and China. While several Chinese expressed concern that the U.S. would push North Korea too hard, they agreed that a verification regime was necessary to remove suspicions regarding North Korea’s decision to abandon its nuclear programs. There was also support for Lee Myung-bak’s move to link continued aid to progress in denuclearization. A U.S. participant felt that China should be more vocal in supporting the verification regime to avoid sending mixed signals to Pyongyang. Another noted that while denuclearization was important, the real key to deterrence on the Peninsula was North Korea’s conventional military posture, which dramatically increased at the end of the Soviet era.

Northeast Asia Security Architecture

Xu Hui, from the College of Defense Studies at National Defense University, began the session making an argument for a regional security mechanism. Northeast Asia is the only sub-region in Asia without a security mechanism and still has a “semi-Cold War” framework. As a result, security frameworks are either too narrow (bilateral) or too broad (ASEAN Regional Forum). While it may be useful to manage traditional security disputes such as territorial disputes in this framework, nontraditional security issues such as energy security and economic cooperation require a more multilateral approach. Now is the time for

a regional security mechanism because it will promote peace and development. Countries have expressed interest in developing such a mechanism, and economic integration provides a good incentive for improving such cooperation. He concluded by suggesting that while the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is too far from Northeast Asia to play a substantive role in creating this mechanism, its principles could provide a model. The natural mechanism is the Six-Party Talks framework, especially its working group scheme that allows for incremental growth and specific focus on issues of shared concern.

Mike McDevitt, of the Center for Naval Analysis, then offered his perspective on the current security environment in Northeast Asia. Noting that the geostrategic predictability in the region that had lasted for nearly 50 years was coming to an end, he argued that China has the potential to change the strategic balance in the region. While China wants stable borders, its continuing military modernization, its maintenance of force as an option in dealing with Taiwan, and its efforts to protect its maritime claims to the east are creating insecurity among its neighbors. As Japan looks for normalcy, South Korea looks to become more engaged globally, and the U.S. seeks to maintain its influence in the western Pacific, there is a natural clash of interests with China.

Meanwhile, Southeast Asia has taken the lead on developing cooperative security relationships, largely because nontraditional security issues dominate the agenda in that sub-region. Over the last decade, economic integration, improved communication, and social linkages among countries in Northeast Asia have increased interest in cooperative security arrangements. McDevitt agreed with Xu that the framework established by the Six-Party Talks offered the best opportunity for multilateral cooperation. But he insisted it would be a mistake to broaden the focus of this mechanism until the group had worked out a verifiable solution to the North Korean nuclear issue. In the interim, a set of trilateral relationships (U.S.-Japan-China and U.S.-Korea-Japan) may provide a better framework for cooperation on regional issues beyond North Korea.

During the discussion, there was a wide range of commentary. One Chinese participant asserted he had the impression that the U.S. could only maintain its credibility through military means. That same individual felt that the real security challenges facing East Asian countries were nontraditional and that ASEAN had the right focus in promoting cooperative approaches to these issues. Other commentary focused on the threat posed by the growth of Chinese maritime military power and perceptions of a growing security dilemma in Northeast Asia. Other participants felt that the Six-Party Talks represented an excellent vehicle for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia while agreeing that the likelihood of quick progress in integrating North Korea into the existing framework of economic relations in the region was not very great. Finally, one U.S. participant said that the U.S. does not necessarily want to link alliances, but does recognize the value in combining the capabilities inherent in individual alliances. A Chinese participant suggested that China would not insist that the U.S. alliances be terminated, but felt that the U.S. was resistant to seeking inclusive relationships in the region.

China-U.S. Relations and the Next U.S. Administration

Offering a Chinese perspective, *Tao Wenzhao*, a senior fellow at the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, anticipated more continuity than previous political transitions in Washington. He attributed this to the fact that the two countries have become more comfortable with each other as their economic fortunes have become closely entwined and to the observation that U.S.-China relations are not the main focus of the current presidential campaigns. For that matter, both sides are distracted by other issues.

Tao offered his assessment of the two candidates' views on China and make several suggestions for the next U.S. president. Obama, who he called a very "liberal" senator, was seen as being committed to multilateralism on security issues and more interested in trade and employment issues. Given that the gravity of the world was moving toward Asia and that China's rise was irreversible, Tao felt that Obama would ultimately see China as an economic competitor of the United States. McCain, on the other hand, was seen as more focused on security issues and a strong supporter of Japan and more generally of U.S. alliances in the region. While acknowledging that McCain accepted the "one China" policy and was more favorably disposed to free trade, he felt that McCain's focus on China as the "biggest potential threat to the U.S.," would ultimately constrain relations. Tao concluded with several suggestions for the next U.S. president:

- Keep the momentum of good relations by continuing existing consultative mechanisms, especially high-level dialogues;
- visit China and invite Chinese leaders to Washington as soon as possible;
- develop a relationship with the next generation of Chinese leaders;
- appoint an Asia/China expert to a top-level post such as secretary of state, secretary of defense, or national security adviser;
- avoid using policy reviews for the sake of opposing a predecessor's policies;
- resist the temptation of a value-based alliance as this is neither practical nor reliable;
- be careful when dealing with Taiwan to avoid giving the impression that the U.S. supports independence; and
- strengthen military-to-military exchanges.

Robert Sutter of Georgetown University provided a U.S. perspective on the current status and outlook for U.S.-China relations. He argued that developments over the past years have created a positive stasis in the relationship. Growing engagement coupled with structural constraints and a preoccupation with other matters has led to this positive state, which makes it difficult for either side to advance or reverse the current equilibrium.

Accordingly, we should expect continuity in the short term, especially since the U.S. is focused on domestic issues in the run-up to the presidential election.

Even though China's image has improved significantly in the U.S. since the early days of the Bush administration and is increasingly seen as a "responsible stakeholder," there are still areas that could lead to new spikes in antipathy toward China. First, there is the belief that China's economic policies are responsible for the massive U.S. trade deficit. This could create a backlash similar to the one against Japan in the 1980s. Second, climate change and environmental protection could become contentious issues. While the Bush administration's lack of initiative on the issue has been the main target of criticism over the past several years, China could very quickly become the object of criticism once the U.S. faces up to its responsibilities in this area. Other areas that could create tensions include arms sales to Taiwan and a breakdown in the Six-Party Talks. Sutter recommended that those interested in improving U.S.-China relations should not overemphasize the negatives in the relationship and should be aware of conditions that make contention likely. Even though the two countries have become economically interdependent and should have many opportunities to cooperate, spikes in mutual antagonism will continue for the foreseeable future.

After those sobering assessments, the discussion began with a U.S. participant emphasizing the need for the next U.S. administration to develop a coherent Asia strategy. Another pointed out that as China becomes an increasingly powerful international actor, the current dynamic where the U.S. has been able to put pressure on China will shift and China will put pressure on the U.S. A Chinese responded that given the shrinking planet, no rising power would have as much influence as before. What was really needed was the rejuvenation of existing international institutions and leadership.

The roles of Russia and Pakistan were also raised. One American felt that China would benefit from the deterioration in U.S.-Russia relations. Someone else highlighted a key difference between China and Russia: whereas Russia had left a negative impression by working outside the system, China had created a more favorable impression by working to become a "responsible stakeholder." Regarding Pakistan, a Chinese felt that it was important for the U.S. and China to cooperate in maintaining stability.

The danger of domestic dissatisfaction with the relationship remains a concern for both sides. A Chinese participant worried that an economic slowdown would greatly reduce the incentive to cooperate with the U.S., while another expressed concern about rising U.S. nationalism. Another noted that Chinese are less swayed by the media and more interested in studying the U.S. than vice versa: this could create new antagonisms. The session concluded with an American noting the different constraints that each government faces. China is constrained by U.S. power, but China's government retains more flexibility because it is capable of manipulating people and limiting social protests. In contrast to the U.S., if the Chinese government says trade issues are under control the people will accept that assessment. This difference can create unanticipated and perhaps undesirable animosity on both sides.

Looking ahead

The final session explored the outlook for U.S.-China relations. *Shen Dingli* of Fudan University began by noting that U.S. women's volleyball team had just beaten the PRC national team in the Olympic Games even though the contest was held in Beijing. He went on to lament the fact that much of China still lives in relative poverty with a per capita GDP of \$2,500 and an estimated 80 million living in extreme poverty. More optimistically he stated that on its current trajectory, the PRC could catch up to U.S. output by the year 2020. But wealth generation is not enough – fair distribution and improving energy efficiency to sustain economic development are needed. The good news is that the leadership recognizes these problems and wants to fix them, although fundamental political limitations remain and will limit progress.

Turning to international issues, Shen felt that because the importance of Taiwan in defining relations with the U.S. was diminishing, China could play down arms sales as long as it had confidence Taiwan would not use the issue to promote independence. He was pessimistic that the Six-Party Talks would succeed in convincing North Korea to eliminate its nuclear weapons. Although China would not take preemptive action, neither would it accept a nuclear-armed North Korea. Because North Korea would never accept the “complete, verifiable, irreversible disarmament” that the U.S. is demanding, the talks would ultimately fail. Nevertheless, the talks have helped establish the framework for a Northeast Asia security mechanism, which should be pursued to enhance U.S.-China relations and create regional stability.

Ralph Cossa of Pacific Forum agreed that bilateral relations have improved over the past two years, but was uncertain where they would go. While noting that there were a lot of similarities in agendas over the past decade, he acknowledged several challenges had been identified during the conference that could create difficulties. His major concern was that both sides needed to be careful in managing expectations. He speculated that Russia might bring the U.S. and China closer again. Alternative scenarios on the Korean Peninsula could also become a major influence in the future contours of U.S.-China relations. He concluded by encouraging participants to envision an ideal Northeast Asian region for 2020.

The discussion opened with a U.S. participant expressing optimism about China. Citing the continuing demand for more infrastructure and the imperative to stimulate domestic demand, he felt that China would continue to serve as an engine for economic growth. With cross-Strait relations moving in a direction Beijing considers positive in its interest and continued growth, China is developing a stronger sense of responsibility regarding influence issues such as the North Korea nuclear issue and climate change. The real danger to U.S.-China relations is “wild cards.”

Several Chinese suggested issues that would influence the future of the relationship. One felt that China's major challenges were internal and that because U.S.-China relations were deeper and more important than any other for China, they would have a positive influence on domestic issues. Another warned that the U.S. should avoid playing the “Russia card” or using smaller countries such as Pakistan or Sudan to drive a wedge into the bilateral

relationship. Further, both sides should avoid making energy or climate and environmental issues an ideological dispute. Instead, the focus should be on per capita energy consumption, improving energy efficiency, and making production processes more efficient. Another pointed to the increasing importance of the bilateral relationship in addressing international issues. Noting the decreasing asymmetry, he argued that both sides have a growing capability to better manage the relationship. One participant argued that the two should work toward creating a “concert of powers” that could address the multitude of global issues such as sustainable economic development, environmental protection, climate change, and other issues that transcend national borders.

In evaluating the progress over the past years, a Chinese participant noted that the U.S. and Chinese cooperation over Taiwan during the waning days of the Chen Shui-bian administration demonstrated the value of better relations. The fact that Hu Jintao and George W. Bush had established a strong personal relationship was very beneficial and was personally acknowledged by Hu after the elections in Taiwan. This led to the observation that the media in both countries tend to be very critical of the other side and that this slants opinion and encourages unwanted nationalism on both sides.

An American responded that it is important to recognize that criticism in the media is often about the leadership’s policies and not about the country or its people. Just because a majority of U.S. people do not like the Bush administration’s policies does not make them anti-American. There is a need for candid discussions and healthy criticism is part of that process. The willingness to understand the partner’s needs and to do more to meet them will determine whether the U.S. and China continue to develop a positive relationship.

Our discussions made clear that there is an underlying recognition that cooperation is necessary, but the lack of trust and suspicions regarding the other’s intentions remain major obstacles. Continued dialogue at all levels remains critical to the constructive and cooperative relations that both sides profess to seek.

About the Author

Carl W. Baker is the director of programs and co-editor of *Comparative Connections* at Pacific Forum, CSIS. Previously he was on the faculty at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies where he lectured and conducted seminars on a variety of security-related topics. He has extensive experience in Asia, having served with the UN Military Armistice Commission and as a political and economic intelligence analyst in South Korea. He also served for seven years in a variety of military staff assignments in Japan and worked for extended periods in the Philippines and Guam. A graduate of the Air War College, he has an M.A. in public administration from the University of Oklahoma and a B.A. in anthropology from the University of Iowa.

APPENDIX A

**Fudan University
Pacific Forum CSIS
The CNA Corporation
Institute for Defense Analyses**

The 8th dialogue on
“Sino-U.S. Relations and Regional Security”

**August 13-15, 2008
DoubleTree Alana Waikiki Hotel, Honolulu, Hawaii**

AGENDA

Wednesday, Aug. 13

6:30PM **Opening reception/dinner – Hotel Pool Deck (Mezzanine Level)**

Thursday, Aug, 14

8:30 AM **Continental Breakfast – Room 303**

9:00AM **Introduction and Opening Remarks**
Presenters: Wu Xinbo, Ralph Cossa

9:15AM **Session 1: Developments in Regional Security and Bilateral Relations**

This session provides an overview of developments since we last met. What events and trends are shaping the regional security outlook? How does each country interpret and assess them? What is the status of Sino-Japanese dialogue and overtures? What has been the impact of the Beijing Olympics? What is the status of the bilateral China-U.S. relationship? How successful has the Strategic Dialogue process been? How can it be improved? How have these talks influenced regional dynamics? What is the relationship between strategic economic and military dialogue? Has there been any progress on the military transparency issue?

Moderator: Tao Wenzhao
Presenters: Wu Xinbo, Phillip Saunders

10:30AM Coffee Break

10:45AM **Session 2: Energy and Environmental Issues**

How does each side assess recent developments related to energy and environmental security? What are the key issues in regional energy security? How are the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the East Asia Summit addressing energy security? What are the implications of increased reliance on nuclear power for proliferation of fissile material? How does each side assess the prospects for cooperation on the Bali Roadmap on climate change? What are prospects for cooperation in energy and environmental security?

Moderator: Michael McDevitt

Presenters: Zha Daojiong, Chris McNally

12:00PM **Lunch – J Bistro (Lobby Level)**

1:30PM **Session 3: Developments and Prospects in Cross-Strait Relations**

How does each side assess recent developments in cross-Strait relations? What are the prospects for reducing political tensions over the next several years? What practical steps can be taken to re-invigorate cross-strait dialogue? Are cross-Strait confidence building measures possible? Desirable? What role can and should the U.S. play in the cross-Strait dialogue? How does each side define “status quo”? Is it realistic to maintain a “status quo” strategy?

Moderator: Shen Dingli

Presenters: Xin Qiang, Denny Roy

3:00PM Coffee Break

3:30PM **Session 4: Korean Peninsula Issues**

How do the two sides view developments on the Korean Peninsula? What are the desired outcomes for the Six-Party Talks? What are the prospects for continued cooperation on the denuclearization issue? What does Washington expect from Beijing? What does Beijing expect from Washington? Are these expectations realistic? Do we have a common definition of what constitutes success or failure? How has the change in governments in South Korea affected the Six-Party Talks? How does each side view recent developments in U.S.-South Korea military cooperation?

Moderator: Ralph Cossa

Presenters: Xia Liping, Scott Snyder

5:00PM Adjourn

6:30PM **Reception/dinner – Hotel Pool Deck (Mezzanine Level)**

Friday, Aug. 15

8:30 AM **Continental Breakfast – Room 303**

9:00AM **Session 5: Northeast Asia Security Architecture**

How do the two sides assess the current security architecture in Northeast Asia? What's the impact of China's growing influence in the region? How does the Japanese effort to become a "normal country" affect the regional architecture? What are the implications of East Asian economic integration? What role should the U.S. bilateral alliances play in the security architecture? What role should the Shanghai Cooperation Organization play in the regional architecture? What are the prospects for the development of a regional peace and security regime emerging from the Six-Party Talks?

Moderator: Ding Xinghao

Presenters: Xu Hui, Mike McDevitt

10:15AM Break

10:30AM **Session 6: The Next U.S. Administration and Its China Policy**

What are the respective positions of the Democratic and Republican candidates on China? What are their major concerns and priorities in relations with China? Is it possible to avoid the usual turbulence in bilateral relations at the beginning of the new administration? How can we secure a smooth transition of China policy to the next administration?

Moderator: Scott Snyder

Presenters: Tao Wenzhao, Robert Sutter

12:00PM **Lunch - J Bistro (Lobby Level)**

1:30PM **Session 7: Looking Ahead**

This session will look at the future of the relationship. What are the major challenges? What are the prospects and avenues for future cooperation? Attention should be given to issues that will unite or divide the two countries and examine ways both sides can build a more solid relationship. What can track two do? Where should this dialogue go?

Moderator: Yu Bin

Presenters: Shen Dingli, Ralph Cossa

3:30PM Adjourn

4:00PM Young Leaders Session

**Fudan University
Pacific Forum CSIS
The CNA Corporation
Institute for Defense Analyses**

The 8th dialogue on
“Sino-U.S. Relations and Regional Security”

**August 13-15, 2008
DoubleTree Alana Waikiki Hotel ♦ Honolulu, Hawaii**

Participant List

People’s Republic of China

Dr. DING Xinghao
President
Shanghai Institute of American Studies
Email: xhdng@sh163.net

Dr. SHEN Dingli
Professor, International Relations
Fudan University
Email: dlshen@fudan.ac.cn,
shendingli@yahoo.com

Dr. TAO Wenzhao
Senior Research Fellow
Institute of American Studies
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Email: taowz@cass.org.cn

Dr. WU Xinbo
Professor and Deputy Director
Center for American Studies
Fudan University
Email: xbwu@fudan.edu.cn

Professor XIA Liping
Deputy Dean and Professor of School of
Law and Politics, Tongji University
General-Secretary, SIISS
Email: Xialp@hotmail.com

Professor XIN Qiang
Deputy Director and Associate Professor
Center for American Studies
Fudan University
Email: xinqiang@fudan.edu.cn

Sr. Col. XU Hui, Ph.D.
Director of the Teaching and Research
Department
College of Defense Studies (CDS), NDU
Email: cassxuhui@yahoo.com

Dr. YU Bin
Professor, Department of Political Science
Wittenberg University
Email: byu@wittenberg.edu

Dr. ZHA Daojiong
Professor, School of International Studies
Peking University
Email: zha@pku.edu.cn

United States

Mr. Carl BAKER
Director of Programs
Pacific Forum CSIS
Email: cbakerpf@hawaii.rr.com

Mr. John J. BRANDON
Director of International Relations
Programs, Asia Foundation
Email: jbrandon@asiafound-dc.org

Mr. Ralph A. COSSA
President
Pacific Forum CSIS
Email: RACpacforum@cs.com

Mr. Brad GLOSSERMAN
Executive Director
Pacific Forum CSIS
Email: Bradg@hawaii.rr.com

Mr. James A. KELLY
President
EAP Associates
Email: kellypacf@aol.com

RAdm. Michael MCDEVITT, USN (Ret.)
Vice President
Center for Naval Analyses Corporation
Director, Center for Strategic Studies
Email: mcdevitm@cna.org

Dr. Christopher MCNALLY
Fellow
East-West Center
Email: mcnallyc@eastwestcenter.org

Dr. Denny ROY
Senior Fellow
East-West Center
Email: royd@eastwestcenter.org

Ambassador Charles B. SALMON, Jr.
Foreign Policy Advisor & Member
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
Email: salmonc@apcss.org

Dr. Phillip SAUNDERS
Senior Research Fellow, INSS
National Defense University
Email: saundersp@ndu.edu

Mr. Ed SMITH
Special Assistant to the Commander
Institute for Defense Analyses
Email: esmith@ida.org

Mr. Scott SNYDER
Senior Associate
Pacific Forum CSIS/Asia Foundation
Email: snyderSA@aol.com

Lt. Gen. H. C. STACKPOLE,
USMC (Ret.)
Email: hcstackpole@yahoo.com

Dr. Robert SUTTER
Professor of Asian Studies
Georgetown University
Email: sutterr@georgetown.edu

Dr. Murray "Scot" TANNER
Center for Naval Analyses Corporation
Email: TANNERM@cna.org

Observers

Mr. Christophe BOSQUILLON
Managing Director
Dai Nippon Kali Kaisha, Limited
Email: cbosquillon@dnkali.co.jp

Mr. Mike COULLAHAN
Joint Intelligence Center Pacific
USPACOM, China Division
Email: abcoulmj@pacom.osis.gov

Lt. Col. Phil DUPONT
Army FAO, China Specialist
U.S. Pacific Command

Mr. Ian FORSYTH
Intelligence Analyst, USPACOM, JIOC
China Division
Email: ian4forsyth@yahoo.com