Relations at Sea:
The U.S.-Japan Alliance on the Oceans

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Pacific Forum CSIS

Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate areas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

Ocean Policy Research Foundation

The Ocean Policy Research Foundation was established as the "Japan Foundation for Shipbuilding Advancement" in 1975. At the outset, it promoted the shipbuilding industry and related manufacturing industries through activities such as conducting management analysis, financing business operations, supporting technology development, and taking measures to prevent marine oil pollution. Subsequently, in response to ocean problems relevant to the shipbuilding industry, the Foundation's activities expanded to include research into and study of maritime affairs overall.

In 1990 the name of the Foundation was changed to the "Ship & Ocean Foundation." It organized within itself the "Institute for Ocean Policy, SOF" in 2002. This transition shows the process by which the Foundation functions as a Think Tank on ocean matters. At present, in recognition of its dual roles as a foundation as well as an institute, and as it is currently engaged on studies over the whole range of maritime affairs, the Foundation is operating under the name of the "Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF)".

Japan's Basic Ocean Act came into effect from July 2007. OPRF had played an important role on the introduction of the Act. In accordance with this, a Comprehensive Ocean Policy Headquarters was established within the Cabinet Secretariat for the purpose of implementing a comprehensive and systematical ocean policy.

Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA

The Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA (SPF-USA) was incorporated on September 24, 1990, in Washington, D.C., as a not-for-profit foundation under clause 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Service Code with a €3 billion endowment from the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Japan. The Foundation's initial mission, to promote understanding between the United States and Japan, was carried out by opening an art gallery and a library in December 1992.

In 1997 the Foundation decided to broaden its mission and focus on the Asia-Pacific region as well as Japan. The Foundation closed the art gallery and developed projects to increase awareness of the Asia-Pacific region in the United States.

Currently the Foundation maintains a library open to the public, sponsors seminars and conferences on the US-Asia relationship, and supports Asia-related projects.

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Foreword

When human beings ceased to regard the seas as barriers and learned to enjoy the mobility they make possible, we made a big step toward civilization. Sea commerce came to have a profound influence on the wealth and strength of nations. Recognizing this fact in the late 19th century, Rear Admiral Alfred Mahan advocated the concept of seapower to promote and protect seaborne commerce. The historical development of this concept has greatly affected our world.

Given the fact that over 90 percent of global commerce travels by sea, Mahan's concept of seapower is still relevant. Just as the seas are avenues for global commerce, they are also highways for the import and export of illegal commodities. Piracy and other violence at sea restrict freedom of navigation. There is a strong call for preserving "good order at sea." The seas are also important as a supplier of such resources as minerals, energy, and food. We thus need to promote sustainable development of the seas, while studying and responding to the impact of climate change on them. Today, no nation can deal with these old and new challenges at sea alone.

As the world's two largest economies, the United States and Japan heavily depend on the seas for their prosperity and security. After fighting with each other across the Pacific Ocean, they became close allies and have worked closely to keep their vital sea lanes open. But there is now an urgent call for the United States and Japan to transform their cooperative relations into a "seapower alliance," to address the new challenges at sea and to constitute the core of a "consortium of seafaring nations."

Motivated by this belief, the Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF) conducted a series of U.S.-Japan Seapower Dialogues with its American counterparts – the first dialogue with the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) in Washington, D.C. in March 2008, the second with the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) in Tokyo in July 2008, and the third with the Pacific Forum CSIS in Washington, D.C. in April 2009. At the third dialogue, OPRF, compiling the results of the dialogue, made public a proposal –"The United States-Japan Seapower Alliance for Stability and Prosperity on the Oceans" – which was endorsed by both U.S. and Japanese participants. I sincerely hope that this proposal will generate positive momentum among American and Japanese citizens as well as their governments.

On behalf of OPRF, I would like first of all to acknowledge the work of the Pacific Forum CSIS itself, which resulted in the sharing of many new insights among policy makers from both countries. I would like to thank Mr. Ralph Cossa especially for leading the efforts to make the third dialogue a reality. Mr. Brad Glosserman also deserves our gratitude for his tireless efforts in preparing our common texts. I am also grateful to Ms. Desiree Fernandez for her hard work behind the scenes and Ms. Ana Villavicencio deserves special thanks for bringing the dialogue to a successful conclusion.

Masahiro Akiyama
Chairman
Ocean Policy Research Foundation

Executive Summary

The core components of the U.S.-Japan security alliance – power projection, control of the seas, and deterrence – are intrinsically related to sea power. Yet even though maritime cooperation is part of a larger framework of security collaboration, there is little spillover from the two countries' joint efforts on nontraditional security issues to conventional security concerns. This could change as two new traditionally land-based powers – China and Russia – begin to turn their attention to the seas. The prospect of a melting Arctic Ocean, creating new sea routes, makes such efforts even more compelling.

It is unclear how some countries, China in particular, will act as they move to the maritime domain. For some, it is a hegemon in waiting, preparing to supplant the U.S. as the leading power in the western Pacific. For others, China is focused on development and will not risk upsetting the status quo.

No matter what Chinese intentions are, this is an important moment for Japan. Not only are new powers beginning to encroach on the seas, historically Japan's domain, but new maritime opportunities – such as the opening of Arctic trade routes – are presenting themselves. Japan should reach out to other partners to help secure sea lanes. A critical need is institutionalizing cooperation. Various forums for this exist, but these should be expanded and strengthened. They are laying a foundation for cooperation that is key to regional and global security and prosperity.

Coast guards will play a key role in protecting the oceans. This poses new challenges since coast guards are very different from navies, both in how they act and how they are structured. Ensuring cooperation between countries and between services requires ongoing effort. A "whole of government" approach is needed.

While multilateral cooperation is vital, U.S-Japan maritime cooperation should remain the cornerstone of both countries' efforts. It is an indispensable element of U.S. national security strategies and has helped provide Japan with a platform for its own international ambitions. Bilateral cooperation was much in need and very successful in the response to the December 2004 tsunami that hit Indonesia. Considerably more can be done, however.

Equally important are national strategies to ensure safe and environmental smart exploitation of the oceans. All nations need a better grasp of the harmful effects of environmental degradation on the seas and marine resources. Better protection against piracy is needed. All governments need to be alert to and prepared to resolve tensions created by national efforts to protect ocean resources and international rights of navigation and free passage.

Japan and the U.S. must establish a genuine partnership on the high seas, one that responds to new and traditional security threats. The U.S. must have faith in and be ready to rely on Japanese maritime assets. The Maritime Self-Defense Forces will be at the center of that effort, but this strategy will rely on all of Japan's maritime related agencies

and assets. This strategy should “maintain and strengthen the existing infrastructure of Japan-U.S. security cooperation in the western Pacific” and develop a “new infrastructure for cooperation in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. Japanese experience and knowhow can be applied to future SLOCs in the Arctic Ocean. Japan must assume key roles and missions in theaters to which Japan can apply its capabilities, resources, and expertise.

For that to happen, Japan should state clearly its right to exercise collective self-defense. The existing limits make the least effort to contribute to regional or global security initiatives an almost Herculean task. This undermines Japan’s international image, contributes to political divisions, and harms it own security.

The two nations should promote a “global ocean regime of peace and stability” and organize a loose-knit “Union of Seafaring Nations” composed of nations who support the tenets of the alliance to help safeguard an increasingly vital resource and ensure the health and security of the world’s oceans.

Conference Report

Brad Glosserman

The oceans have long been recognized as mankind's common heritage. Yet, despite the growing interests of all states in the maritime domain – its vast supply of natural resources, its central role in a global economy, its critical role in maintaining ecological balance on our planet – we take the seas for granted. Japan and the U.S., two nations that find their fates increasingly linked to each other and to that of the seas, have a special role to play in safeguarding that heritage.

On April 17, 2009, the Pacific Forum CSIS co-hosted, with the Ocean Policy Research Foundation and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, the third annual Sea Power Dialogue. At that meeting, experts from the United States and Japan held intense discussions about the importance of the oceans as well as the roles that their countries could play alone and as allies to secure their respective national interests in the ocean domain. In addition to the experts, ranking politicians from Japan joined the discussions to lend their views as well as signal the priority that Tokyo attaches to this endeavor. (The remarks of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and the Hon. Maehara Seiji are available in another document, "Continuity and Change in Japan-U.S. Relations: Lectures by Shinzo Abe and Seiji Maehara," part of the Pacific Forum CSIS *Issues & insights* series, online at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/issuesinsights_v09n07.pdf) This report attempts to capture the views that emerged from that meeting. This is not, however, a consensus document. If such a document exists, it is the Proposal for a "United States-Japan Seapower Alliance for Stability and Prosperity on the Oceans" that was agreed by the participants (and is attached as Appendix A).

Moreover, as this meeting was conducted under Chatham House rules to ensure a full and frank discussion, no speakers are identified in this report.

An historical overview

A keynote speaker, a former Japanese ambassador, provided an historical overview of the relationship between Japan, the United States, and the seas. He noted key similarities between the two countries: both were and are merchant powers, dependent on trade for their growth and prosperity; both employ the rule of law, which ensures the protection of individual rights and the pursuit of free trade. In short, they share interests and values, which provide a foundation for joint action.

Our speaker warned, however, that other nations, which do not share those values, are beginning to encroach on the seas. He highlighted Chinese behavior – evidenced in a string of incidents ranging from incursions by Chinese submarines into Japanese waters to the failure to observe international rules and norms on the seas – which is a source of great concern to Japan. While insisting that he is "not particularly critical of or pessimistic about China," he also warned "Japan cannot continue to be hostage, pretending there are no problems before us." This bleak assessment provided the context for the discussions that followed.

Traditional security at sea and the U.S.-Japan alliance

Our analysis began with a Japanese perspective on the U.S.-Japan maritime strategy. As our speaker, an ocean policy researcher, noted, the core components of the U.S.-Japan security alliance – power projection, control of the seas, and deterrence – are intrinsically related to sea power. And even though maritime cooperation is part of a larger framework of security collaboration, our speaker bemoaned the fact that there was little spillover from the two countries' joint efforts on nontraditional security issues to conventional security concerns. This could change as two new traditionally land-based powers – China and Russia – begin to turn their attention to the seas.

Chinese reforms have obliged that country to focus on the maritime domain. Our speaker argued that the PRC has "full-scale maritime ambitions for the first time in history." As proof, he noted that the Chinese economy is dependent on inputs – especially energy – delivered by sea, which it processes and exports to the world, overwhelmingly by sea. Many of its national assets are located in coastal provinces and its primary security concern, the reunification of Taiwan, is in many ways a maritime problem. Eager to assert sovereignty over resources and protect its southern flank, Beijing seeks to turn the South China Sea into a Chinese lake. To that end, it's attempting to renegotiate international norms regarding rights of passage for warships through territorial waters and airspace over its exclusive economic zones (EEZ). It has embraced anti-access and area-denial strategies that, while defensive in nature, nonetheless clash with U.S. and Japanese interests in freedom of navigation and sea lines of communication. Finally, some observers – but not our speaker – see Chinese acquisition of aircraft carriers as a threat to the regional balance of power.

Russia also has a new perspective on the maritime domain. Its newfound interest is a result of the rising energy prices that have revived its fortunes. In fact, throughout its history Russia has sought warm water ports and this hunt has shaped world history. Today, global warming is creating new opportunities for Moscow: melting ice in the Arctic Ocean offers Russia a new way to extend its reach. Our speaker warned that geography could turn the Arctic Ocean into "a Russian lake." When combined with ambitions to build five to six nuclear aircraft carriers and the intention to extend its presence into all seven seas, Russia could threaten the maritime status quo.

In the Cold War, Japan and the United States employed a maritime strategy that exploited Japan's geographic location to help contain the Soviet Union. This strategy focused on maintaining control of the waters surrounding Japan, a critical choke point for the Soviet Union's eastern fleet, and the homeporting of a U.S. aircraft carrier in Japan. That strategy remains relevant today. The prospect of a melting Arctic Ocean, with new sea routes, makes that strategy even more compelling by adding the Bering Sea as a focus for the two countries' strategic planners.

Our speaker outlined the core components/enablers of the Japan-U.S. maritime strategy. They include: carrier strike groups, air defense, antisubmarine warfare, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities (ISR); unmanned air and

underwater vehicles (UAVs and UUVs, respectively), reinforced Japanese air bases on the Ryuku and Bonin islands, and strategic submarines. He urged the two governments to forge a consortium of sea-faring nations, as the project proposes, to help support this strategy.

Such a coalition requires a foundation of cooperation. He worried that Japanese capabilities might be eroded as the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) attempt to do more with less ships. While he applauded attempts to get more nations to deal with regional security challenges – counter-proliferation work is an especially fruitful area for cooperation – he questioned the utility of counter-piracy operations as a building block for cooperation, at least when engaging China. He argued that such efforts use coast guards, not navies, and would provide an excuse for the PLA Navy to begin blue-water training. In addition, he noted that littoral states in the region prefer to police their waters themselves.

The U.S. perspective that followed demonstrated the convergence of the two countries' thinking about the maritime domain. The U.S. analyst noted the centrality of seapower to U.S. security and the protection of its national interests. Indeed, he argued that the U.S. is unique in this respect: it is the only country with a global presence. Other countries have maritime interests, but they are not global naval powers.

The western Pacific is a critical theater for the U.S.: the presence of a continuous combat presence there (along with the Arabian Gulf) is proof of its significance. The problem for our U.S. speaker is that too often the stability of and access to Asia are taken for granted, rather than seen as the result of a deliberate strategy. He wondered whether the U.S. has a strategy to ensure that stability. The "Global Maritime Partnership" that is often mentioned is, for him, "an approach, not a strategy."

A strategy forces decisions regarding resources and will. The Obama administration's new defense budget raises questions about the former and it isn't clear how the U.S. will distribute its maritime assets. Resources are tightening, which raises questions whether the U.S. can maintain its maritime supremacy. The much-bruited "1,000 ship navy" is an aspiration, "not an instrument of national power." Alliances can help, but historically they have been ad hoc and temporary, subject to shifting national interests.

The key issue then is whether rising powers with new maritime interests – in other words, China – will be content to partner with the U.S. or will they assert their own interests. And how will their policies affect other nations and U.S. partners, real or potential?

Our U.S. speaker confessed to uncertainty about China's ultimate goals. (He wasn't sure if the Chinese themselves knew.) But he suggested that Beijing sought the freedom and ability to do what it wants, when it wants. Given its dependence on maritime trade, that thinking makes sense. The problem for the rest of the world is that China's

tactical developments are clear, but its strategy isn't. That leaves considerable room for misinterpretation.

Discussion explored several topics. The first was how to conceptualize this issue. Most basically, how should governments think about the maritime domain in the western Pacific? Are the core concerns governments (at least potentially hostile ones) or regions and their vulnerabilities? How should we calculate the balance of power, particularly as the significance of underwater activities rises?

For several participants from both Japan and the U.S., the answers to these questions are easy: China is a threat as it seeks to recalibrate the regional balance of power, replacing the U.S. as the regional hegemon and subordinating Japan. This intent is clear from its activities and its strategies.

Others are not so sure. They see Chinese intentions as opaque; for one Japanese participant, the overriding Chinese concern is "not to make trouble." Some episodes of "bad behavior," such as the last-minute denial of a port visit by the *USS Kitty Hawk*, were the product of local decisions, not part of a master plan. Equally significant, as one Japanese academic noted, China's economy is deeply intertwined with that of the U.S. and Japan. Its interdependence means that it cannot be too assertive for fear of sparking a backlash.

There was agreement that no matter what Chinese intentions, this is an important moment for Japan. A Japanese participant insisted his country "is at the crossroads of its rise or fall as an influential power." Not only are new powers beginning to encroach on the seas, historically Japan's domain, but new maritime opportunities – such as the opening of Arctic trade routes – are presenting themselves. He believes Japan needs new hardware – submarines and destroyers – to maintain its status in the region. Those acquisitions impose difficult choices for a country whose defense budget is shrinking and whose political system is divided. Other participants worried that more robust capabilities could alarm some of Japan's neighbors.

The obvious alternative is for Japan to reach out to other partners, in addition to the U.S. As a Japanese noted, powerful though they are, the two allies cannot defend the SLOCs alone; they need to partner "with reliable maritime countries" such as Australia, India, and Taiwan. While seconding that list, another participant suggested adding South Korea. He also pressed Tokyo to seize opportunities for cooperation with African nations.

Once partners are identified, the focus becomes how to institutionalize cooperation. A Japanese Young Leader – one of the group of next-generation security specialists attending the meeting as part of the Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders program – argued that the temptation to settle for military-to-military discussions or joint operations should be resisted. Rather, governments should be more ambitious. They should consider ways to cap or limit naval forces as well as crisis management and prevention techniques. A U.S. participant seconded that opinion, warning against

substituting dialogue for strategy. Neither Japan nor the U.S. should lose sight of the real objectives of outreach and cooperation.

In an age of shrinking resources and more challenges, it is vitally important that Japan and the U.S. use their limited assets wisely. Investments must focus on the biggest payoff. ISR is the starting point. Ultimately, however, as one U.S. participant noted, to nodding heads around the table, the goal is to maintain the asymmetry of power that favors the Japan-U.S. partnership.

Challenges for Coast Guards

A second keynote speaker, a senior U.S. Coast Guard official, focused on future challenges for coast guards, an increasingly important component of national power in the maritime domain. He began by applauding the work of the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, which has fostered operational cooperation among national coast guards in the north Pacific. The forum has "focused on taking conversations out of the board room and onto the water."

He then explained the 21st Century Strategy for Maritime Security, a joint approach worked out by the Chief of Naval Operations, the head of the Coast Guard, and the top brass of the marines. This strategy focuses on transnational threats, which he noted tend to be coast guard, rather than navy, missions. He also explained that the move toward a more expansive coast guard mission has profound organizational implications. Most significantly, he pointed out that coast guards don't work for defense ministers. More often they are parts of the interior ministry or even a component of homeland security. This means that international cooperation among coast guards "is a very different type of conversation." Efforts to expand these dialogues have to account for different bureaucratic styles and priorities.

Our speaker outlined the national fleet agreement between the U.S. Navy and the Coast Guard. While both operate in the maritime domain, the two services have very different needs and priorities. While the two strive to ensure that there is no duplication of resources, they do want to have needed redundancy and commonality so that cooperation is not impeded. Most significantly, he endorsed a "whole of government" approach to the maritime services and the global commons to ensure that all of a nation's resources are effectively utilized.

He concluded with a brief mention of – and applause for – regional frameworks being used to tackle common problems. He underscored the importance of joint operations, to which each country contributes assets and highlighted the presence onboard of foreign officials ("ship riders") to communicate with lawbreakers from their countries as well as to build confidence regarding missions and purpose. Of particular value are multilateral exercises that prepare for natural disaster relief or search-and-rescue operations.

A lively question and answer session followed. When asked what he considered the greatest threat to the maritime domain, our speaker argued it was "governance in the global commons." In the past, the high seas were relatively opaque: that can no longer be permitted given today's transnational threats. He called for legal regimes, maritime domain awareness, and a real-time capability to respond to threats.

When asked for the most important advice he could offer Japan as it attempts to strengthen coordination among its coast guard and the Maritime Self-Defense Forces, he urged them to recognize the fluidity of maritime situations and the need for lots of information. After acquiring intelligence-gathering capabilities, they should establish a doctrine that allows forces to flow from one service to the other.

Finally, he suggested that Japan and the U.S. consider development of a polar fleet to prepare for the opening of Arctic trade routes. The two countries need to be ready for catastrophic events in that area; severe conditions there mean that equipment will be expensive. Cooperation between the two nations could help defray costs.

Global Maritime Partnership and the U.S.-Japan alliance

Discussion then turned to ways Japan and the U.S. can cooperate in the maritime domain. A former senior JMSDF official started the session with a Japanese assessment of opportunities and obstacles. He reviewed the "Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower" that was referred to in the previous keynote speech, noting that its concepts were valid not just for the U.S but for all seafaring nations.

He then turned to the U.S-Japan alliance. He emphasized that it is a means "to assure the most important two elements of U.S. strategy, i.e., capabilities to 'access' and 'influence' the widely spread area of strategic importance, starting from Southeast Asia via the Middle East and then to East Coast of Africa," and defined it as an "indispensable element" of U.S. global and national security strategies. Our speaker distinguished the Japan-U.S. bilateral alliance from other such alliances, including NATO, explaining that "is not only a simple security mechanism of Japan and the Asian region, but also allows our two nations to flexibly act and react to dynamically changing international situations, on a global scale." The alliance not only provides for Japan's security, but it has provided Tokyo "a membership card or passport to the values and benefits of the free world."

Our speaker illustrated ways the alliance has worked in the maritime domain, pointing to the global partnership and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR) components. Echoing comments of the previous speaker, he explained how new transnational security threats oblige component services, especially the MSDF and the Japanese Coast Guard, to forge new types of cooperation. Those threats and the responses they require were evident in March 1999 when North Korea spy ships encroached in Japanese waters and again in March 2009 when Japan dispatched MSDF vessels for antipiracy patrols off the coast of Somalia: Coast Guard members are working on those ships, a demonstration of the need for inter-service coordination. Fortunately,

"cooperation between JMSDF and JCG has been improved and enhanced rapidly in last several years."

Bilateral cooperation was much in need and very successful in the response to the December 2004 tsunami that hit Indonesia. As a result of close interaction between Japan and the U.S., "the first large-scale HADR operation of the JSDF in foreign soil and waters, went extremely well."

Our speaker noted that multilateral cooperation is moving forward too, pointing to the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum (already mentioned), the International Seapower Symposium, and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium. These efforts are laying a foundation for ongoing cooperation that "will be a key mechanism for the security and prosperity of the region as well as the world."

Our next U.S. speaker, a retired flag officer of the U.S. Navy, agreed with many of those views. His presentation explored U.S. thinking behind the Global Maritime Partnership (GMP), noting its focus on three security threats (hostile states, terrorists, and criminals), its emphasis on peacetime maritime cooperation, and that it is not intended to violate the sovereignty of any state. The successor to "the 1,000 ship navy," the GMP is designed to be flexible, strictly voluntary, self-organizing according to partner or regional requirements, and will therefore look a lot like the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), sometimes referred to as a "coalition of the willing." He emphasized that the GMP is *not* an attempt to contain China and the organizers are happy to have Chinese participation in its work.

He provided suggestions for Japan as it seeks ways to increase its participation in alliance activities at sea. First, he suggested another look at JSDF roles, capabilities, and missions within the alliance, with an eye to expanding Japanese responsibilities from the current limit to the Gulf of Aden. Second, he urged Japan to join CTF 151 (the operation off the coast of Somalia) without a terminal date. Third, he urged Japan to think hard about new threats and concerns, and focus on improving intelligence collection capabilities. Fourth, he endorsed the standardization of maritime commercial practices associated with more transparency in the registration of vessels and identifying owners, cargoes, and crews. Fifth, Japan should be working to improve maritime domain awareness, an overarching concern.

Sixth, he urged Tokyo to adopt the U.S. policy of establishing Global Fleet Stations, oriented around the twin elements of training and information-sharing to help partner countries improve their ability to contribute to the maritime strategy. The U.S. deployed ships to serve as Global Fleet Stations, by which they travel to regions on a rotational basis to provide tailored assistance to individual countries. Japan could and should do the same in the Pacific. Seventh, Japan should be working to expand its ability to provide HADR. And, finally, it should work to develop a shared agenda with the U.S.

Discussion revealed uncertainties about the GMP, which implies that the U.S. has to do more to explain the concept. That could facilitate "buy-in" from other countries. As in other sessions, China's role was a source of considerable concern, with some participants arguing Chinese attempts to join such programs are merely cover for Beijing's attempts to extend its influence. (And, as before, others argued that Chinese intentions were benign.)

This is a particular concern in the South Pacific and Micronesia for one Japanese speaker. A U.S. participant countered that if the concern is real, then that provides incentive for Japan to embrace the fueling station concept as suggested by the U.S. presenter. Yet even before that, the prospect of instability in the South Pacific, with or without Chinese involvement, is reason for Japan and the U.S. to engage allies such as Australia to deal with shared problems.

It also became clear from the discussion that the world lacks a set of internationally accepted principles governing interdiction on the high seas. The PSI provides some guidance, but it relies on existing international law, which can be murky. Several speakers urged Japan and the U.S. to press for codification of principles that would increase transparency on the high seas and ensure that they are not used to threaten peace and stability.

Exploitation of the oceans and national interests

We then turned to ocean use and how that serves the national interest. A Japanese analyst emphasized the "three dimensional" context of the high seas: much of the "value" of oceans is underwater and governments need to understand and respond to that reality. Japan has done just that. Its EEZ is 4.47 million sq km, making it sixth largest in the world. To manage that area, Japan enacted a Basic Act for Ocean Policy on April 20, 2007. This led to development of the basic plan for ocean policy that includes 12 basic measures for ocean development, including maritime safety, marine environment protection, resource development, and other measures, which was codified in the National Plan for Ocean Energy and Mineral Resources Development (adopted March 24, 2009).

The National Plan has targets for the development of resources such as methane hydrate, oil and gas, hydrothermal deposits, and other mineral resources, including cobalt-rich crust and manganese nodules. The conditions for commercialization should be in place within a decade. The speaker emphasized that successful exploitation of these resources will require development of new technologies, and will necessitate cooperation among the U.S. and Japan and other countries.

A U.S. speaker followed, picking up where the Japanese speaker left off. He emphasized the need for competition and cooperation in the exploitation of marine resources. He seconded the need to understand and fully appreciate the value of EEZs. He urged all governments to better grasp the harmful effects of environmental degradation on the seas and marine resources. As he noted, "Reliance on fossil fuels is changing our

climate and threatening to devastate the global ecosystem. This is not necessarily global warming tomorrow, like some people would like us to believe, but it certainly is affecting the oceans, and the oceans' ability to provide food. These issues weaken the foundations of our society and are altering the geopolitical landscape."

He urged the two governments to do more to fight piracy. "Pirates are just terrorists. They are just criminals and thugs." Pirate attacks have tripled from 2007 to 2008. He emphasized that "they are the largest single threat to safe passage on the high seas. They're an economic burden across the entire logistics chain, which means they affect every country, every company involved, and all the consumers of the world." To deal with piracy, he suggested going after their ports, targeting mother ships, and putting trained security teams on ships.

Our speaker encouraged Japan and the U.S. to focus on energy security. In the maritime domain that includes ensuring passage through choke points around the globe. Development of nuclear energy is part of this equation, but it raises new challenges too. He emphasized the need for Japan-U.S. cooperation on the oceans, but to frame policy expansively – to incorporate energy and the environment into thinking and planning.

A Japanese discussant reiterated concerns about the melting of Arctic ice. The ice cover there has decreased about 40 percent over the last two decades. According to some estimates, summer ice could disappear by 2037; other estimates put that deadline as much sooner. New icebreakers are needed now, and Japan and the U.S. and other concerned countries should begin their joint research on prospects, problems, and opportunities in the Arctic now.

A second Japanese discussant focused on the exploitation of EEZ resources. He noted the need to develop new industries in those areas. Japan and the U.S. should be sharing their expertise – which is among the best in the world.

Discussion honed in on the tension between national rights to control the exploitation of EEZ resources and the rights of maritime powers to free passage. There is an uneasy compromise in international law and several countries – China among them – are eager to see it upended to give coastal states more control over activities in its EEZ. At this time, that is a revisionist position, but debate continues.

Climate change and maritime security

We then turned to the implications of climate change on maritime security. A U.S. presenter began by explaining the parameters within which decision-making about climate change must occur. This is important as there is a feverish debate about this phenomenon, its causes, and how to respond. But, as our speaker noted, militaries never make decisions with 100 percent certainty; there are always unknowns. Prudence means that decisions must still be made and policies adopted. Climate change is no exception.

Our speaker then identified the threats caused by climate change: water will be denied to areas by changing precipitation patterns, drying soil, and glacial melt. Agriculture yields will in many cases diminish and shift. Human populations will suffer heat-related stress, lose water, and be threatened by new disease vectors. Coastal populations will be threatened by flooding and more severe weather patterns. In short, climate change "is a threat multiplier for volatility around the world."

This will have a profound impact on militaries. They will have more missions, especially as they embrace HADR efforts; new missions (as for example the Arctic opens up or islands and low lying areas are inundated); experience reduced ability to move and exercise forces; and perhaps lose forward bases, many of which are deployed on islands.

At this session, another of the Pacific Forum's Young Leaders commented, providing a next generation perspective on these issues. The commentator, an American, argued that the next generation sees security through a wider lens. "Instinctively, we include nontraditional security and human security issues within our security framework." Thus, this generation is more inclined to accept climate change as a security problem. He added to the list of potential threats, including human migration resulting from climate change and fishery depletion. And, like our senior presenter, he sees climate change as an opportunity for both the Japan-U.S. alliance as well as global cooperation.

Our discussion focused on one real issue: whether climate change should be considered a national security threat. This was not a debate over whether climate change is real or whether a reaction is required, but reflected a much narrower concern: is climate change too attenuated to be considered a national security threat? We reached no definitive answer, but the prospect of relocating 1.7 billion people – the number that would be displaced globally by a 1-meter rise in sea levels – and the need to rethink northern Pacific security if a new Arctic route opens, seems to suggest that it is. But, as one American participant noted, we cannot wait for a 1-meter rise in sea levels to take action. Indeed, as another U.S. participant explained, climate change should be seen as an opportunity to expand global cooperation and work with nations that have not hitherto been partners of Japan and the U.S., either alone or as allies.

Visions for a U.S.-Japan maritime alliance

The final panel explored visions of the U.S.-Japan maritime alliance. A Japanese academic who had served in the Foreign Ministry, began by asking a fundamental question: is Japan really a maritime power? While the participants in this meeting would agree without question, he believes that a majority of Japanese would question that assertion. And that reality must be considered as the two nations chart the future of their alliance as it is a real bound on its potential.

Yet that majority cannot escape the fact that Japan's future is inextricably linked to the seas, both as a source of protection and as a lifeline to the rest of the world. It is incumbent upon Japan to develop a strategy that protects its national interests as they relate to the oceans.

For our speaker, the cornerstone of that strategy is the U.S.-Japan relationship and their bilateral security alliance. The strategy must be rooted in an understanding of and appreciation for the maritime domain. The two countries must establish a genuine partnership on the high seas, one that responds to new and traditional security threats. The U.S. must have faith in and be ready to rely on Japanese maritime assets. The Maritime Self-Defense Forces will be at the center of that effort, but this strategy will rely on all of Japan's maritime-related agencies and assets.

This strategy should "maintain and strengthen the existing infrastructure of Japan-U.S. security cooperation in the western Pacific" and develop a "new infrastructure for cooperation in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea." Japanese experience and knowhow can be applied to future SLOCs in the Arctic Ocean. Japan must assume key roles and missions in theaters in which Japan can apply its capabilities, resources, and expertise. The speaker suggested using the Africom model to integrate a wide range of military and civilian capabilities.

Our American speaker agreed that U.S Navy-Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force cooperation is "very good," but he admitted that Japan "is not indispensable because of the limits on what the JMSDF is permitted to do." To make Japan indispensable, he offered two suggestions.

First, Japan should state clearly its right to exercise collective self-defense, a move that "will render obsolete a myriad of laws and policies which make bilateral defense cooperation extremely difficult if not impossible, and which make Japanese qualification as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council seriously deficient." The existing limits make the least effort to contribute to regional or global security initiatives an almost Herculean task. This undermines Japan's international image, contributes to political divisions, and harms its own security.

Second, he urged Japan to join the U.S. "as a leading Pacific-nation proponent of the Global Maritime Partnership and to support creating Maritime Domain Awareness." The two nations "as true maritime nations with the world's two largest economies, which rely on ocean commerce to prosper, can logically and naturally step up to lead the ocean going world as leaders of a Japan-U.S. Ocean Alliance, promoting a "global ocean regime of peace and stability" and organizing a loose-knit 'Union of Seafaring Nations' composed of nations who support the tenets of the alliance." Such an initiative would help safeguard an increasingly vital resource and ensure the health and security of the world's oceans.

Two Young Leaders again provided commentary. A Japanese analyst focused his comments on the significance of constitutional change in Japan and the need for the country to develop a broad consensus on the nation's role in the world. He suggested that his generation is freer to discuss these issues and more flexible in its thinking. Yet he also conceded that budget constraints will be increasingly severe no matter what the country decided on the constitutional issue.

An American Young Leader followed, and his comments focused on China and its relationship to the alliance. He acknowledged the potential threat, but he highlighted the fact that increasing PLA capability also creates opportunities for cooperation with the alliance. He sees greater mil-mil exchanges among China and both countries and believes greater interaction among the three can reduce the potential for accidents. Hedging is required, but suspicions should not dominate the relationship.

The final discussion amplified the key points of the opening speakers. There was a debate about what the Japanese public is prepared to support and how far Japan can go to support multilateral security operations, no matter what the constitution permits. This raises basic questions about what the U.S. can expect from Japan – and, by extension, what serves as glue for the alliance.

On the one hand, there is a utilitarian explanation for the alliance. It works as long as it *works* – in other words, it has to provide public goods. Most recently, that question is rephrased as, "does Japan pull its weight and defend ships from other countries threatened by pirate attacks?" For some, that invites questions about the scope of Japanese interests: are they truly global? Is Japan merely a regional power? If so, what does that mean for its partnership with the U.S.?

Alternatively, some insist that the alliance is based on values and this makes for a truly equal partnership. Their commitment to similar values and norms, and support for certain types of behavior, is what makes their alliance meaningful. The actions to support or spread those values are secondary – as long as both countries seek the same outcomes, they can contribute in the manner most appropriate to their circumstances.

Ultimately, this is, as one speaker acknowledged, "not an alliance of equals." That does not mean that it is not a partnership, or that the two nations cannot be indispensable to each other. The challenge today, and in the future, is creating a relationship that serves both countries' national interests. The Seapower Dialogue moved that process forward and can continue to play a vital role as they modernize their alliance to surmount the pressing challenges of the maritime domain.

Appendix A

A Proposal
based on the results of the U.S.-Japan Seapower Dialogue

United States-Japan Seapower Alliance
for Stability and Prosperity on the Oceans

Foreword

While oceans have the potential to aid mankind's development and prosperity, they also contain many problems in such areas as security, development, and the environment. Should not the United States and Japan, the two major seapowers, standing on the foundation of security cooperation on the sea created by the United States Navy and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, firmly build a "seapower alliance" that incorporates a daring new concept, and offer it to the world as a global commons, thereby contributing to peace and prosperity via the ocean?

Motivated by these ideas, the Ocean Policy Research Foundation, in conjunction with the Pacific Forum CSIS, the Center for a New American Security and the American Enterprise Institute, organized the U.S.-Japan Seapower Dialogue, at which experts from both countries came together over a series of three meetings in March and July of 2008 and April of 2009.

Through the Dialogue, which has facilitated discussion of issues facing the U.S. - Japan Alliance and the status of initiatives to deal with ocean problems, many constructive opinions have been presented. The Ocean Policy Research Foundation compiled the fruits of these discussions and submitted them to the 3rd U.S.-Japan Seapower Dialogue in the form of a draft proposal. Participants of the dialogue agreed that there was value in making a proposal that reflects carefully and across a broad range the outcome of the dialogue.

With the endorsement of participants of the U.S.-Japan Seapower Dialogue, Ocean Policy Research Foundation publishes hereupon United States-Japan Seapower Alliance for Stability and Prosperity on the Oceans as a proposal.

Ocean Policy Research Foundation
April 17, 2009

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1. U.S. - Japan Seapower Alliance Ushering in a New Era

The oceans hold the possibility for solving many of the issues facing mankind, such as the problems of energy and resource shortages, and climate change, as well as how to create future development and prosperity.

* * * *

Hopes for Development

The oceans cover 71 percent of the surface of the planet on which we live. In the future as in the past, the sea lanes will continue to bring prosperity to society. Unexploited resources beneath the seabed have also been confirmed, including oil, natural gas, manganese modules, and methane hydrate, and advanced exploration and exploitation technologies are being developed. A continuing decrease in frozen sea areas in the Arctic Ocean will make transit throughout the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route more feasible, thereby significantly reducing travel time between Europe, Asia, and North America. And, melting sea ice may make accessible the seabed of the Arctic Ocean, which has resources such as crude oil.

The Ocean as a "Critical Infrastructure" for Mankind

When we look at conditions on the ocean however, we find the sea lanes are threatened by piracy and maritime terrorism, overt tensions between states over marine jurisdictional areas and rights to ocean resources, and extreme instability in the security environment due to a lack of transparency in the rapid build-up of naval forces by emerging maritime powers. Should global shortages of resources and energy arise in the future, armed conflicts could erupt between states over maritime rights and freedoms.

At the same time, indiscriminate development and pollution are endangering marine ecosystems and environments, and further aggravating climate change. Global warming leads to the problem of sea level rise, which threatens island states and areas at low sea levels. In addition, it is feared that climate change will lead to new security problems. Amidst these conditions, entities among many developing and less developed coastal states lack the financial and enforcement resources to effectively manage their jurisdictional waters, which results in havens for illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing, piracy, and maritime terrorism, and an inability to protect living and non-living marine resources and the ocean environment. Also, while development of technologies for seabed resource extraction continues apace, environmental impact assessment often lags. Due to the bounty it provides, the ocean is often called the "Common Heritage" of mankind. In light of these essential qualities, it might now be more aptly termed mankind's "Critical Infrastructure," which we must cooperate to preserve and protect.

The Ocean for Japan and the United States

The United States and Japan are the world's two largest economies and leading seafaring nations, as more than 30 percent of each country's GDP depends on maritime commerce. The two countries are also the world's largest importers of oil. The ocean is a lifeline for their economies, whose importance will no doubt increase in future. Development of seabed resources will also become indispensable for both countries. Both nations enjoy expansive coastlines, so security in the oceans is essential to their national security. The oceans are the largest maneuver space on the globe, providing the first line of defense against attack and enabling swift and flexible responses to distant crises. The U.S.-Japan alliance is, if we look only at its significance through the lens of mutual security, substantially a maritime defense alliance in the sense of using the sea to protect common national interests.

Leadership Needed for the Ocean

Leadership by the leading seafaring nations is indispensable for stabilizing the security environment on the ocean, promoting marine technology, revitalizing industry, advancing sustainable development, and establishing international order. The United States and Japan should restructure their seapower in strengthening their alliance arrangements, make it the common basis for international cooperation, and grapple with the problems involving ocean development and security.

Changes in the Concept of Seapower

At the end of the 19th century, Admiral Alfred T. Mahan observed a history through which the fate of nations was inextricably bound up with their control of the seas, and the Admiral described "seapower" as the application of a state's strength in maritime transport, navigation, experienced seafarers, and a capable navy in order to achieve greater prosperity through maritime trade via "the great common of mankind" or the "great highway." He urged America to build its power in this regard. The development of Mahan's concept has had far-reaching effects on world history, and, in the current age of a global economy, has yet to lose its validity.

In today's world, all countries seek to increase their access to the ocean in pursuit of a variety of rights and interests. The great highway of mankind is now the great commons, essential for global mobility and trade, and a rich source of both living and non-living resources. A variety of management regimes have been created, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which gives sovereign rights and jurisdiction to coastal states for the development of resources and protection of the environment. Under these conditions, we must therefore add such capacities as scientific research and technology, resource development, and environmental protection management as important elements of seapower.

In this way, the concept of seapower must be grasped in a refined and broadened way and with expanded significance.

The New Concept of Seapower Arising From the U.S.-Japan Alliance

The seapower we propose to build through the U.S.-Japan Alliance is characterized by such a broad definition. The process of building the new seapower alliance will also serve as a new challenge for the U.S.-Japan Alliance that some suggest is beginning to waver. Recognizing the great changes that have taken place on the ocean, there is a need for the United States and Japan to establish and exercise a new seapower throughout the world. The spread of this concept would become an attempt to connect the Pacific and the Indian Oceans with peace and stability.

2. Development of the U.S.-Japan Alliance on the Ocean : A Proposal

We offer the following proposal to the governments of the United States and Japan so that both countries may work together to create an accessible "new seapower" that will promote freedom of navigation and stabilize the security environment of sea lanes, and will deter armed conflict over maritime interests while promoting sustainable ocean development.

As the seas are interconnected and comprise one "world ocean", solutions to ocean problems call for comprehensive responses. For a Consortium of Seafaring Nations, cooperation on resource and environmental protection issues and promoting science and technology, in addition to cooperation on military and security issues, is more important than ever. Joint effort in these areas is now called for.

a. Ocean Based Defense and Security

a-1. Promotion of a Global Maritime Partnership in the Indian and Pacific Oceans

- Japan should support the Global Maritime Partnership (GMP) being advanced by the United States, which calls for mobilizing the seapower of different nations for disaster relief, prevention of maritime terrorism, piracy, and transport of weapons of mass destruction, and, in cooperation with the United States, help strengthen GMP in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

- The United States and Japan should work to create Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) as the global commons, while ensuring MDA is not misused by state and non-state actors to impede freedom of navigation.

- The international cooperative activities being carried out by Coast Guards from several countries that began as a result of such Japanese initiatives as the "Northern Pacific Coast Guard Forum Principals' Summit" and similar gatherings focused on Southeast Asia, are appreciated. Likewise, the "Western Pacific Naval Symposium" (WPNS) provides a great contribution by promoting confidence building and transparency as well as mutual understanding toward stabilizing the maritime security environment. The United States and Japan should cooperate in promoting

the regional expansion of these international activities and the creation of multi-layered regimes.

- The navigational safety support activities Japan conducts in the Malacca and Singapore Straits and surrounding areas should, in conjunction with India, be extended into the Indian Ocean. Japan also should promote cooperation with the United States on the support activities it carries out on the East African coast. It should be noted that the participation of Japan in international frameworks to suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia may succeed in promoting directly or indirectly cooperation among various countries including the EU, Russia, and China on the basis of U.S.-Japan cooperation, and will create an opportunity for the establishment of a multinational system to secure the safety of sea lanes that are the great commons.

- The roles of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which has grappled with global maritime security issues, are appreciated. With regard to the piracy problem, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia（ReCAAP) is a welcome framework for regional cooperation for information analysis and sharing and capacity building, and we recognize that it is proving an invaluable model for international cooperative activities for the problems of piracy off the coast of eastern and western Africa. The governments of the United States and Japan strongly hope that Indonesia and Malaysia will join ReCAAP soon. At the same time, this “ReCAAP model” should be adopted for other regional concerns, as well as those on the maritime security agenda.

- The United States and Japan should expand their diplomatic efforts toward developing states, including support for coastal zone development and safety, security, and environment protection in international straits, education, and training programs for coast guards, and the sharing of information related to maritime security.

- The United States together with Japan should promote the “Cooperative Mechanism” that was established for Safety of Navigation and Environmental Conservation in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, and pursue measures for gaining cooperation of civil sectors such as the shipping industry.

- From the perspective of maritime security, Japan should ease the restrictions of its Three Principles on Arms Export in order to give more effective support to developing countries and to promote U.S.-Japan cooperation in technological development.

a-2. Establishment of Joint Response Readiness for Situations of Armed Conflict

- The United States and Japan, in order to prepare for and prevent conflicts that are feared likely to arise in the near future over the struggle for resources and energy or

- The two nations should seek to cooperate with all nations opposing the emergence of any aspiring hegemonic state that could disrupt the balance of power on the seas and create instability in the security environment. The United States and Japan should be ready for contingencies by maintaining and demonstrating strong naval capabilities as an indication of the strength of their alliance and by arranging a standing posture of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).

- The roles, missions, functions, and refinement of base facilities of Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force and Japan Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard, all of which are involved in developing naval strategy for deterrence, forward presence, sea control, power projection, and sea lane defense, need to be examined. Japan is being called upon to resolve various problems concerning the transformation of U.S. bases in Okinawa and implement the plan as quickly as possible. Also, Japan should realize the relocation of the Fifth U.S. Aircraft Carrier Air Wing to Iwakuni and landing and takeoff training facilities for it needs to be secured near the Japanese mainland at an early date.

- As regards seaborne operations of Critical Maritime Infrastructure Protection involved with the sea lanes and Missile Defense (MD), the C4I system, which makes use of the global commons – the oceans, outer space, and cyberspace ― is indispensable. Maritime Security, Outer Space Security, and Cyber Security need to be integrated into a unified approach that preserves these domains for the free enjoyment of all states. U.S.-Japan interoperability must also be considered in this regard. A concert of interested nations on a global scale is needed to provide for the security of sea lanes. For this, initiative by the U.S.-Japan alliance is imperative.

- In addition, we must be prepared to consider how climate change could worsen the security environment and lead to conflict. The United States and Japan, in conjunction with other countries and international organizations, must carry out research in advance and make preparations to respond to a variety of situations, including disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, management of an influx of refugees created by rising sea levels, conflict created by depletion of fish stocks, large-scale natural disasters, the spread of epidemics, and significant retreat of coastlines.

- To carry out the above activities in a responsible manner, Japan should move urgently to reach a solution to security related constitutional issues so that Japan can exercise the right of collective self-defense, and participate more actively in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and other international collective peace activities.

a-3. Consortium of Seafaring Nations Concept

- In order to secure maritime security in international coordination, the U.S.-Japan Seapower Alliance should be open to expansion, rather than remaining an exclusive partnership. We therefore propose that a loose-knit Consortium of Seafaring Nations be established, composed of nations that endorse the tenets of this Seapower Alliance. From the Western Pacific region, therefore, the Republic of Korea and Australia should first be invited to join and cooperate.

- In the Indian Ocean, the United States and Japan should make efforts to secure the sea lanes from the Indian Ocean to the Asian Pacific. This requires active participation in multinational anti-terror operations and international anti-piracy measures. Cooperative relations with India should be sought.

- To establish a loose-knit Consortium of Seafaring Nations, it is essential that the participating countries fulfill fundamental conditions, such as the observance of international rules, including freedom of the global commons, as reflected in the Charter of the United Nations and UNCLOS, and international coordination. Russia, as an historic sea power with compelling interest in freedom of the seas, and China, an emerging maritime power with an interest in worldwide mobility, are not to be excluded from this union. Rather, these states should be urged to reaffirm their commitments to the principles of the union, with the possibility that the two nations eventually would participate.

b. Toward Sustainable Development of the Ocean

b-1. Development of Marine Resources, Marine Technology, and Research Study

- To provide against shortages of resources, energy, and food supplies likely to occur on a global scale, the major seafaring nations of the United States and Japan should play leading roles in the development of living and non-living resources in the seabed and continental shelves, as well as in the development of ocean energy resources and seawater potential. Both countries can and should help battle the global economic crisis by demonstrating their commitment to a “Blue New Deal” policy based on these precepts and by promoting development of the oceans on the condition of sound environmental stewardship in the maritime domain as well as increasing job creation.

- The United States and Japan need to cooperate with each other where possible in the development of technologies and funding for the exploration and exploitation of seabed resources and marine energy development in order to bring these industries into active production.

- Research on the oceans, the accumulation of data, its use and sharing, and human resource exchanges are important for the effective promotion and development of technology. To facilitate this, the establishment of a joint data center and R&D

center for research and development of marine resources, as well as joint construction and use of a marine scientific survey ship and platform for exploration and exploitation, are desirable. Furthermore, opportunities for the exchange and publicizing of technologies between the two countries should be created in maritime industries, which support such research and development.

- As new marine technologies are developed, transfer to developing countries should be considered. The United States and Japan should play a leading role in this area.

- We recognize the fine work done by the "Marine Resources and Engineering Coordination Committee" (MRECC) of the U.S.-Japan Conference on Development and Utilization of Natural Resources (UJNR), but further revitalization and the improvement of information sharing between the United States and Japan should be considered in this area.

b-2. Conservation of the Marine Environment and Response to Climate Change

- Given the pressing issues facing the oceans, along with efforts to conserve the marine environment and maintain biological diversity, the maritime powers of the United States and Japan should demonstrate leadership in international initiatives. While recognizing the achievements of the U.S.-Japan Common Agenda in this regard, we would like to see more steady progress in these areas.

- The Integrated Ocean Drilling Program (IODP), a sophisticated ocean monitoring system with a global development of temperature/salinity profiling floats (Argo Project), and the International Coral Reef Initiative (ICRI) are highly regarded programs that have been developed at the initiative of the United States and Japan. Further development of such marine science research projects is important for conservation of the marine environment and ocean use. The activities of the U.S.-Japan joint research center, begun 10 years ago, hold similar promise.

- Development of ocean resources, including exploitation of seabed resources, requires environmental impact assessments, formulation of manuals for environmental conservation, and development of conservation technologies and methods. These are difficult but vital.

- U.S.-Japan cooperation and effective responses are needed in these areas.

- U.S.-Japan initiatives are needed to investigate and promote an ocean version of the "Green Revolution," an energy revolution, CO2 capture and sequestration technologies, reduction in CO2 emissions from ships, and development of responsive technologies to address global warming.

c. Establishment of an International Regime based on UNCLOS and Related Conventions

- UNCLOS, which came into force in 1994 and has 157 parties to the Convention as of the end of 2008, serves as the fundamental legal basis for the international order on the oceans. The United States, the world's largest maritime nation, has made great contributions to the creation and development of the international ocean regime, but has yet to accede the Convention. This reluctance not only weakens Washington's position and reduces America's potential for exercising leadership in the oceans, but also reduces the trust of other nations and undermines U.S. economic interest and national security. In this regard, we welcome recent movements toward U.S. accession. The United States and Japan should cooperate in the establishment of an international ocean regime based on UNCLOS and related conventions created after the adoption of UNCLOS.

- Recognizing that freedom of navigation and overflight is the fundamental principle in the international waters, the United States and Japan should endeavor to shape an international order in the oceans by addressing these issues, which include problems associated with exploitation of area resources, coordination of user states' activities in the EEZs and coastal states' interests, restraint of excessive claims by coastal states, boundary delimitation of EEZ and continental shelf, realization of sustainable development, and the protection of biological diversity.

- To promote effective responses to the problems of piracy and maritime terrorism, the United States and Japan should quickly ratify the 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation（SUA 2005). The two states should at the same time urge all countries in the Asia-Pacific region to ratify the Convention itself.

- As for the Arctic Ocean, many interrelated issues within the purview of UNCLOS have accumulated, including resource development, ocean use, navigation, boundary delimitation, maritime security, environmental conservation, and climate change. Japan has an interest in using the Arctic Ocean as a transpolar route between Asia and Europe, and the United States also has economic and military interests in a free Arctic Ocean. There are possibilities for the United States, as a coastal state, and Japan, as a user state, to cooperate in addressing these issues on the basis of their alliance by sharing information and ideas.