Dynamics of the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Next Generation Perspectives

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Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate arenas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

The Young Leaders Program

The Young Leaders Program invites young professionals and graduate students to join Pacific Forum policy dialogues and conferences. The program fosters education in the practical aspects of policy-making, generates an exchange of views between young and seasoned professionals, promotes interaction among younger professionals, and enriches dialogues with generational perspectives for all attendees. Fellows must have a strong background in the area covered by the conference they are attending and an endorsement from respected experts in their field. Supplemental programs in conference host cities and mentoring sessions with senior officials and specialists add to the Young Leader experience. The Young Leaders Program is currently supported by Chevron, the Henry Luce Foundation, and the Yuchengco Group, with a growing number of universities, institutes, and organizations also helping to sponsor individual participants. For more details, see the Pacific Forum CSIS website, www.pacforum.org, or contact Brad Glosserman, director of the Young Leaders Program, at brad@pacforum.org.

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The views expressed here represent personal impressions and reflections of Young Leader program participants; they do not necessarily represent the views of the relevant governments, or the co-sponsoring or parent organizations and institutes.

Introduction

For more than a decade, the Pacific Forum CSIS, in conjunction with the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and the Consulate General of Japan in San Francisco, has hosted a bilateral security seminar. The 15th annual Japan-U.S. Security Seminar, held March 27-28, 2009, brought together a select group of experts to explore the prospects and problems that this partnership faces in coming years. Participants are united in their belief that this alliance is vital to the security interests of both nations and serves as a cornerstone of regional stability and prosperity. That by no means guarantees its survival, but it does provide a firm foundation for action.

A select group of 11 Japanese and U.S. next-generation specialists were in attendance as well. This group of "Young Leaders" is getting an intimate look at the issues that they will face later in their careers. Young Leaders bring a different generational perspective to the alliance. They are quick to challenge the assumptions that guide the alliance and the priorities that guide decision makers. That doesn't mean that they are any less committed to the alliance. Rather, it means that they look at this vital relationship through a different lens.

In the report that follows, three groups (each comprised of U.S. and Japanese Young Leaders) explored issues that will dominate the alliance and the outlook for this critical relationship. One group examined potential obstacles to efforts to strengthen and reform the alliance; another looked at the assumptions that support this partnership, and the third examined foreign policy visions within the Democratic Party of Japan – a particularly timely project given the party's victory especially in the summer's election. These papers should build confidence in the next generation of U.S.-Japan security specialists; they are already demonstrating the critical and forward-looking thinking that is essential if this alliance is to continue and prosper.

Conference Summary and Young Leader Program Report

By Arthur Lord

I. Introductory Session

Mr. Glosserman welcomed the Young Leaders (YLs) to the 15th Annual Japan-U.S. Security Seminar and requested that over the course of the next two days the YLs consider whether the U.S.-Japan alliance is in a crisis or at a crossroad, and why.

Initial conversation among YLs revealed consensus that the alliance is not in crisis, although there was no agreement on whether the alliance was at a crossroad. Although all YLs agreed that the alliance is in a period of transition, with a majority arguing that there is a lack of clarity on roles and no shared vision, some argued that this doesn't constitute a crossroad since crossroads imply a distinct decision that must be made by a certain point. One YL pointed out that the only true crossroads for the alliance were in 1970 and 1991-1996. YLs considered framing their discussions in alternate paradigms, such as whether the alliance is achieving its potential, asking what it could do and how, were it to do more.

YLs were challenged to think more expansively about the bilateral security relationship, and to consider how issues such as cybersecurity, critical energy infrastructure, and climate change can be venues of cooperation within the U.S.-Japan alliance.

II. Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Briefing – Business Executives for National Security (BENS) Northern California

Kathy Denzer, regional director of BENS Northern California, welcomed the group and provided a brief introduction to the structure and activities of BENS, a nonprofit organization of business executives interested in national security issues working with the federal government in partnerships based on information sharing.

Ms. Denzer provided an overview of cybersecurity and critical infrastructure threats, emphasizing that as the digital revolution progresses, national security professionals increasingly need to shift their focus from physical security to information security and the infrastructure – networks and servers – on which information is stored. Citing the CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency (http://www.csis.org/tech/cyber/), she underlined that cybersecurity has become a major national problem and needs a comprehensive response that balances security concerns with civil liberties. She stressed the importance of effective public-private partnerships in dealing with the myriad challenges related to the protection of critical areas such as finance and banking, energy, communications, and government services.

John Mullen, president and CEO of Promia, gave an overview of his company, a government contractor that provides security network hardware. He briefed the group on the state of cybersecurity threats, stressing that taking advantage of vulnerabilities in network systems is a low cost way to cause big disruptions, and therefore an effective means of

asymmetric warfare. For example, the Navy operates approximately 40,000 small remote network facilities worldwide, and given the volume of hacker attacks, automatic response capabilities are increasingly necessary to protect network integrity. Cybersecurity threats are inevitably transnational, with potential adversaries not bound by geography or nationality. Hugh McDermott, senior vice president of Nexant, gave an overview of the energy sector's critical assets in the United States and the vulnerabilities of these assets. Ray Granvold, vice president of Analytic Development at Promia, demonstrated the notebook software developed by his company to counter network attacks. The panelists noted that a critical factor in responding to these threats is cooperation between international stakeholders, which requires a certain level of trust. They added that trust is elusive even between agencies or between the public and private sector within a country.

Our discussion revealed that many YLs were unaware of the breadth and depth of threats to cybersecurity and energy critical asset infrastructure. Even those YLs who had been briefed on these issues acknowledged that the technical nature of the threats made it hard to understand in detail. It was suggested that cooperation on cybersecurity and energy critical infrastructure should not be seen merely as a bilateral security issue but rather as a venue in which the two countries' scientific communities can cooperate in the shaping of global regulations. As a speaker noted, "we talk about building a stronger alliance for 21st century concerns, but most of our discussions revolve around where we send aircraft carriers and political sensitivities in Japan."

YLs noted the value of expanding stakeholder communities involved in U.S.-Japan security dialogues, particularly as expanding definitions of security cooperation provide opportunities for enhanced partnership without constitutional revision in Japan. In addition to cybersecurity and energy critical infrastructure security, YLs identified other threats such as pandemic security, trade security, food security, and preventing/responding to national disasters.

On the second day of the meeting Young Leaders had a breakfast with Dr. Joseph Nye, University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and chairman of the Pacific Forum CSIS Board of Governors. At this off-the-record session, YL's discussed the role of extended deterrence in the U.S.-Japan relationship in light of evolving shifts in the U.S. nuclear posture, U.S. base posture in Okinawa, political changes in Japan, broadening the U.S.-Japan alliance, and regional developments.

The YL wrap-up session, which follows every conference, began by reexamining our opening question: is the U.S.-Japan alliance at a crossroad or in a crisis? YLs continued to maintain that the alliance is not facing a crisis, but not all agreed that it was at a crossroad. Some questioned whether the crossroad analogy captures the state of the alliance, as all alliances are always evolving, but not always at a crossroad.

YLs discussed the purpose of the alliance, with some arguing that the U.S.-Japan alliance has evolved into an alliance designed to counter the China threat. Others disagreed, noting that the rise of China has influenced the alliance but it has not replaced the USSR as the object of the alliance. YLs also discussed whether the Bush administration reached too

far in pushing the alliance forward, with expectations now higher than what can be achieveed.

YLs acknowledged that there are a number of debates regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance, including whether the alliance should be a regional or global and whether it should be broadened geographically or functionally. Some argued for moving from burden sharing to power sharing, keeping the alliance as a primary provider of a public good. YLs noted the possibility of a new U.S. administration providing new opportunities for cooperation. One participant highlighted the need to consider differences between elite and popular views regarding the alliance.

Obstacles to Efforts to Strengthen and Reform the U.S.-Japan Alliance

By Tobias Harris, Adam P. Liff, and Wakana Mukai

As an expanding chorus of voices calls for reform and strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance to better confront 21st century challenges, policymakers and intellectuals on both sides of the Pacific are searching for a way forward, a new "vision" for U.S.-Japan cooperation on the global stage. This paper aims to identify three key potential obstacles to expanded cooperation between the United States and Japan. We urge alliance handlers in both nations to take notice of them as they move forward.

Obstacle 1: Japanese Public Opinion

The first factor that could complicate efforts to reform and strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance is Japanese public opinion. The extent to which this becomes an obstacle will hinge largely on the direction in which U.S. and Japanese leaders aim to take the alliance.

U.S. alliance handlers often afford insufficient attention to the Japanese public's views of Japan's role in the world. Instead, many are wont to mistakenly assume that the views of outspoken conservative Japanese politicians reflect popular sentiment. The ascension of several of these politicians to key Cabinet posts – including the premiership – over the past decade, coupled with the widespread perception that Japan's security policy is in the midst of a rapid transformation, have led many to argue that Japan is "normalizing" and suggest that it is on course to adopt a much more assertive role in global affairs. By extension, these individuals also assume that Japan is ready and willing to make a greater military contribution to the U.S.-Japan alliance.

The accuracy of this claim hinges largely on what is meant by "normal." All too often, references to Japan becoming a normal nation are (mis-) understood as suggesting that Japan is taking on a role in global affairs commensurate with that of another key U.S. ally, the United Kingdom, and will offer increasingly active military support to U.S. global security missions near and far. The reality is, however, that public views of Japan's role in the world have not changed as much as many expect; change has occurred at the margins and has been largely circumstantial.

Much of the recent change in public opinion regarding Japan's security policy is a direct response to the threat posed by North Korea, and to a much lesser extent, concern about China's military buildup. While the North Korea threat may have allowed for cooperation with the United States on ballistic missile defense (BMD), this support is not generalizable; it does not reveal a readiness on the part of the Japanese public to support strengthening the SDF's global military role. Rather, it is a reaction to a very specific threat. It does not extend to support for "boots on the ground" in high-risk combat zones far beyond Japan's shores.

A close look at public opinion on the North Korea threat is enlightening. According to Cabinet survey data from December 2008, even when it comes to the clear and present danger posed by North Korea, more Japanese citizens are concerned about the abductees issue (88 percent) than the dual threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons (70 percent) and missile program (52 percent). These data, coupled with extensive anecdotal evidence from Japanese media reports and conversations with Japanese from all walks of life, reveal the highly emotive nature of the Japanese reaction. It will be much more difficult to convince the Japanese people to support strengthening the SDF's capability to participate in distant missions that have no easily observable connection to Japan's national interests or the safety of its people.

Take, for example, two examples of Japan's newly "assertive" global role. Japan's contribution to Iraqi reconstruction was a humanitarian mission to Samawah from 2004 to 2006 that involved around 600 SDF personnel. Samawah was chosen because it was widely regarded as the safest and most stable location in Iraq. While there, SDF personnel were unable to defend themselves (that task fell to the British, Australian, and Dutch military forces), much less retaliate in the event that non-Japanese coalition forces came under fire. A second much-heralded mission, logistical support for *Operation Enduring Freedom*, consisted mainly of non-combat operations refueling coalition ships in the Indian Ocean. Even this mission proved controversial at home and was stopped at one point due to strong opposition from political parties outside the ruling coalition. Indeed, both SDF missions were valuable contributions to international peace and stability. However, they fell short of the contributions provided by several other major U.S. allies and were probably not on par with the actions hoped for by those in Tokyo and Washington, D.C. calling for a more "equal" and "global" alliance.

In sum, one of the most important factors in determining how successful efforts to reform and strengthen the alliance will be is the degree to which U.S. expectations of Japan's contributions are realistic. At the same time that the SDF has gradually expanded its overseas role over the past two decades, Japan's defense expenditures have *declined* in recent years and now account for little more than 0.9 percent of GDP. Japan, only a few years ago the world's top ODA donor, has seen its ODA budget drop by nearly 40 percent since 1997. Polls attempting to reveal the degree of public support for revision of the Japanese constitution's Article 9, which renounces war and forbids Japan from acquiring a full-fledged military, are inconclusive. Even with constitutional revision, less than 1 in 7 Japanese support the use of force outside of Japan's immediate surroundings. Tellingly, Cabinet surveys from March of this year found that the Japanese public sees natural disaster relief, *not* national defense (which ranked second), as the SDF's primary *raison d'être*.

It is imperative that policymakers in the United States – particularly those whose primary or only interactions with Japanese are at the elite level – make a greater effort to learn about the Japanese people's vision for their country's role in the world. Japanese public opinion will undoubtedly play a central role in defining the scope of reforms to the alliance that are possible. All available data show that the path of least resistance, which would make a very significant – and necessary – contribution to regional and global peace and stability in the 21st century, may be in those nontraditional security areas that already enjoy widespread

support in both nations: nonproliferation, disarmament, counter-piracy, energy security, countermeasures against global warming, overseas development assistance, natural disaster relief, and peace-keeping operations. Alliance handlers would be well advised to take notice.

Obstacle 2: disputes over the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent

A second potential hindrance to closer alliance relations relates to the "nuclear umbrella" provided by the United States. The nuclear issue has always been one of the main issues between the United States and Japan. What follows are four possible scenarios related to the U.S. nuclear deterrent that could pose problems for the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Discarding the nuclear umbrella

U.S. nuclear deterrence is an essential link that binds the United States and Japan. What would happen if either side (or both sides) decided that the nuclear umbrella was no longer necessary?

If Japan ended the nuclear umbrella the alliance would probably not fall into crisis. However, because of the regional security environment and the alliance's dependence on the nuclear deterrent, the allies would have to develop a strategy to replace the deterrent provided by U.S. nuclear weapons. A certain change would be inevitable.

The situation would change, however, if the United States decided to abandon the nuclear umbrella. Since the alliance is asymmetric, requests from the stronger side can make the weaker side vulnerable. Fear of abandonment has troubled Japan for decades. In short, a unilateral removal of the deterrent by the United States would have undesirable consequences for the alliance.

Promoting disarmament

As a strong supporter of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, Japan should welcome U.S. movies toward disarmament. The situation, however, has changed recently. Since the Obama administration came to power, the United States appears to be seriously considering reducing the size of its nuclear arsenal. This proposal has alarmed many Japanese security specialists, who have argued that reducing the number of U.S. nuclear weapons to less than 1,000 would seriously affect Japan's security vis-à-vis China.

A possible solution to this dilemma would be: a) for China to work in parallel with the United States to reduce the number of weapons in its nuclear arsenal; or b) for Japan to place less weight on the U.S. nuclear umbrella when thinking about its security. A Chinese decision to reduce its nuclear arsenal cannot be forced by the United States or Japan; it is China's alone to make. On the other hand, Japan must take responsibility for its security strategy and can make whatever changes it deems necessary. Japan has long relied on the nuclear deterrent and its security policies are heavily dependent on the United States. Japan could make up for a diminished U.S. nuclear umbrella with conventional deterrent capabilities. Abandoning the umbrella would not mean that Japan is leaving the alliance. The

key here is how Japan perceives U.S. nuclear disarmament. To perceive disarmament as a threat to Japanese security is mistaken – nuclear disarmament does not mean that the United States will abandon Japan.

Acquiring nuclear weapons

It has long been recognized that Japan is technically capable of developing nuclear weapons. Although this is an unlikely scenario in the near future, the impact of Japan "going nuclear" on the alliance is worth asking. The conventional wisdom suggests that this would be a serious blow to the alliance, perhaps destroying it.

The case of U.S.-India relations suggests that an alternative outcome is possible. When India conducted its nuclear test in 1998, the United States implemented strong economic sanctions to express its displeasure. However, the sanctions were lifted as the United States came to recognize the importance of closer relations with India. Eleven years after the nuclear test, the United States has implicitly acknowledged India as a "nuclear weapon power" through the Indo-U.S. deal on nuclear cooperation. Since relations between the United States and Japan are much stronger and closer than those between the United States and India, a similar outcome can be expected. In the short run, strong condemnation and severe sanctions would be possible, but in the long run, the degree of interdependence between the two countries would prevent the United States from abandoning Japan.

Rethinking the nuclear principles

Some security experts have proposed that Japan revise the three nonnuclear principles into "2.5" principles – i.e., revise the introductory clause banning the introduction of nuclear weapons on to Japanese territory – to strengthen the nuclear deterrent. If the Japanese government enacted this revision, strong opposition from the United States is unlikely. Such a revision would make it easier for the U.S. to pursue its security strategies in Asia. For Japan, it would provide strong reassurance of the nuclear umbrella. In other words, revision would strengthen rather than damage the alliance.

The Japanese public is likely to strongly oppose revision of the nonnuclear principles. Since the Japanese government and ruling parties are focused on upcoming elections, politically sensitive security issues have been taken off the table. Hence, strong anti-U.S. sentiment in response to a proposal to revise the principles could put the government in a difficult position. However, if certain domestic issues occur as the government considers revising the nonnuclear principles, then it is possible that revision could succeed. For one, the tendency in Japan is for domestic issues to overshadow international issues. Furthermore, a charismatic leader might be able to overcome resistance to revision of the non-nuclear principles.

Obstacle 3: A Distracted United States

Many analysts have blamed Japan's chaotic political situation for retarding progress toward a more normal security posture and a more robust U.S.-Japan alliance – and anticipate that political instability will remain a significant brake on alliance cooperation for the foreseeable future. But if the alliance has stalled, the United States bears at least some responsibility.

As the stronger of the two allies, the United States has been indispensable in expanding the alliance's roles and missions. The U.S. government has not been able to act alone, of course, but little would have happened without U.S. leadership.

Successful reform of the alliance has historically depended on four factors: personnel, politics, presidential leadership, and perceptions. Each of these factors has been problematic since the start of the Bush administration's second term, a trend that Japanese elites have viewed as signaling a worrying lack of attention from Washington. There is little reason to expect that these conditions will change in the short- to medium-term.

Change in Washington

Personnel refers to the degree of Japan expertise among officials in the State Department, the Defense Department, and the National Security Council. Japan expertise among senior officials is imperative if the alliance is to be a U.S. foreign policy priority. Personnel changes explain, at least in part, the Asia policy shift that occurred during the Bush administration's second term. At both the working and senior levels, "Japan hands" were replaced with personnel less familiar with Japan. The most notable example was Christopher Hill, who was overwhelmingly focused on the Six-Party Talks and North Korea.

In foreign policy, **presidential leadership** determines how much priority is placed on a given foreign policy issue, i.e., whether it will be handled at the working level or whether it will be a top priority. President Bush entered office determined to reorient U.S. Asia policy away from China and toward Japan and for the first six years of his administration he devoted considerable attention to the alliance. Later presidential leadership worked against Japan, as Bush gave Hill latitude to push for an agreement with North Korea. As a result, alliance transformation was made a lower priority.

Politics refers to domestic politics and the extent to which the administration is able to focus on particular foreign policy issues. Only rarely – most notably during the late 1980s and early 1990s – has the U.S.-Japan relationship been the subject of direct public scrutiny that hindered alliance cooperation. Of greater importance for the alliance is the general public mood. What does the U.S. public expect from the administration? What is the administration's relationship with Congress? How much leeway does the administration have for creativity in foreign policy? The importance of politics as a constraint can be seen in an example from the mid-1990s: the growing U.S. economy and economic slowdown in Japan gave Joseph Nye, then the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, the

freedom to prioritize alliance transformation and directly involve President Clinton. This resulted in the 1996 joint security declaration and the 1997 revised defense guidelines.

Perceptions refers to U.S. perceptions of the East Asian security environment. U.S. perceptions have remained fairly constant since at least 1996: the United States has viewed the rise of China as a source of uncertainty, prompting an approach to China that features both hedging and cooperation, and been concerned about the North Korean nuclear and missile programs, leading it to seek to strengthen its preparedness for contingencies on the Korean peninsula. Since 2001, terrorism has become a priority and has provided new opportunities for cooperation with states in the region (and added a new dimension to the North Korean threat). This ambiguous regional security environment may hinder alliance transformation because the United States must avoid giving the impression that it is trying to encircle or contain China by strengthening its alliances.

The Obama administration

While it is too early in the new administration to conclude definitively how these four factors will combine to promote or hinder alliance transformation, there are early indications of the shape the Obama administration's Japan policy will take.

It is clear that **politics** will dominate and the Obama administration's energy and political capital will be devoted to addressing a growing list of domestic and foreign challenges. The economic crisis guarantees that the president's top priority is fixing the economy. On foreign policy, the administration is problem solving-oriented, hence the new diplomatic initiatives to improve relations with Russia, Cuba, and Syria. Since the U.S.-Japan alliance is not broken, the administration will not expend too much time and energy to reform and strengthen it. If anything, the state of the U.S. economy will mean greater pressure on Japan to contribute money and/or manpower to U.S. initiatives overseas, especially in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Consequently, politics will nullify the impact of **personnel**. While the Asia portfolios at the State and Defense departments have been given to officials intimate with the alliance, the low priority assigned to the alliance because of the current political climate will prevent them from being intensely engaged in alliance issues. That said, the global economic crisis could serve as an opportunity to bolster U.S.-Japan economic cooperation, particularly since Treasury Secretary Geithner once served as attaché at the U.S. embassy in Tokyo.

If senior officials have little time to spare for the U.S.-Japan relationship, there is little hope for **presidential leadership** on alliance transformation. Given the long list of critical foreign policy concerns facing the new president, it is doubtful that Prime Minister Aso's invitation as the first head of government to visit the White House was a sign that the Obama administration views strengthening bilateral ties as a top foreign policy priority.

Rather, as U.S. **perceptions** of its global environment change, it would not be surprising if Japan comes to be seen in Washington as one partner among many. While the Obama administration is likely to remain concerned about the implications of China's rise for

Asia, the growing list of foreign policy problems demanding solutions may soften the hard edges in the U.S.-China relationship. The United States will increasingly view a more assertive China as a partner in solving regional and global problems. President Obama and other administration officials have repeatedly stressed the importance of cooperating with any country that can help the United States tackle global challenges.

This does not mean that the United States will ignore Japan. If anything, the Obama administration will challenge Japan to do more. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has signaled that security cooperation – and alliance transformation – will carry less weight than before. During her visit to Japan, Clinton focused on Japan's civilian contributions, saying, "We anticipate an even stronger partnership with Japan that helps preserve the peace and stability of Asia and increasingly focuses on global challenges, from disaster relief to advancing education for girls in Afghanistan and Pakistan to alleviating poverty in Africa." In short, the new administration will place less emphasis on the typical alliance transformation agenda, which has traditionally pressured Japan to revise its constitution and play a more assertive security role regionally and globally.

Japan's Foreign Policy and the Alliance: Transcending Change with Trust

By Leif-Eric Easley, Tetsuo Kotani and Aki Mori[1]

An unprecedented change in government has raised speculation about the direction of Japan's foreign policy. The Aug. 30, 2009 legislative elections allowed the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) to take control of government for the first time from the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Japan's democracy is poised for change, but drastic revision of the Japan-U.S. alliance is not in Japan's national interest, is not what the Japanese people voted for, and would seriously distract the new government from other priorities.

The DPJ won a 308-seat majority in the 480-seat Lower House of the Diet, but lacks an outright majority in the Upper House. To enact legislation smoothly, the DPJ decided to form a coalition government with two minor parties: the pacifist Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the People's New Party (PNP), known for its skepticism of economic liberalization. The coalition is set to govern at least until the Upper House election in July 2010.

In forming the coalition, the DPJ reached agreement on five foreign policy goals: (1) increasing contributions for U.N. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), disaster relief, environmental diplomacy, and free trade; (2) pursuing a more sustainable and equal alliance with the U.S. by reviewing existing agreements out of concern for the Japanese taxpayer and citizens of Okinawa Prefecture; (3) expanding cooperation with Asian neighbors and developing an "East Asian Community"; (4) advancing nuclear disarmament; and (5) directing foreign aid toward the alleviation of poverty and post-conflict reconstruction, including in Afghanistan.

These policy visions are in line with the DPJ election platform, but the inclusion of the SDP could constrain Cabinet decisions on security policy. The SDP has strongly opposed international activities of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). However, the SDP and PNP did not gain additional seats in the recent election and account for only 2.5% of the Lower House. This certainly does not indicate their policies enjoy broad support among Japanese. Nonetheless, the appointment of PNP leader Shizuka Kamei as Financial Services Minister signals a dramatic break with former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's attempts at economic reform.

Even more important in terms of personnel decisions, DPJ leader and now Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama appointed Katsuya Okada as Foreign Minister and named Ichiro Ozawa Secretary General of the DPJ. Ozawa, the veteran politician instrumental in the historic transition from LDP to DPJ-centered government, wields considerable power behind the scenes. Many DPJ lawmakers owe their positions to Ozawa, who will oversee not only

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[1] *This article originally appeared as PacNet #64 on Sept. 22, 2009, and draws upon a longer article published in* Asia Policy *(www.nbr.org/Publications/Asia_policy/AP9/AsiaPolicy9_DPJ_AdvanceDraft.pdf).*

party but also legislative business since his closest aide, Kenji Yamaoka, chairs the Diet Affairs Committee. An open question is how Hatoyama will coordinate policy among Ozawa, Okada's Foreign Affairs Ministry, and the newly-established "National Strategy Bureau" headed by Naoto Kan.

Hatoyama chose Toshimi Kitazawa as defense minister, a senior lawmaker not expected to take a transformative role. As the DPJ is without governing experience, it may be putting its most senior faces in the cabinet to inspire public confidence. This appointment might also indicate the DPJ's intention to play down defense issues ahead of the Upper House election. The tight election cycle puts pressure on the DPJ to demonstrate progress on economic and social issues. Japanese public surveys suggest that people voted against the LDP's domestic failures rather than in favor of the DPJ's international agenda.

With domestic politics demanding economic recovery and an improved social contract, and security concerns including a threatening North Korea and rising China, it makes sense for the new government to focus its efforts on the former and keep the U.S.-Japan alliance strong to cope with the latter. The DPJ will have its hands full redefining the interaction between elected officials and bureaucrats while pushing through reforms. Political battles will ensue, involving the DPJ, its coalition partners, the bureaucracy, LDP opposition, and investigative media reporting. It is in the interests of both Japan and the U.S. that the alliance does not become a political football in the process.

The new government in Tokyo and relatively new government in Washington should thus proceed on alliance-related issues with care. Foreign Minister Okada emphasized to Ambassador John Roos that the DPJ wants to strengthen relations for the long-term and step up cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation and the environment. However, the handling of four issues – the Indian Ocean refueling mission, troop and base relocation, historical accounting of a tacit nuclear agreement, and the legal status of U.S. forces in Japan – will determine whether the DPJ government manages to "build trust" with the Obama administration as promised, or whether the new government undermines the alliance.

First, it appears the DPJ will allow the JSDF Indian Ocean mission to expire. This is regrettable since the mission is not symbolic "alliance dues," but a substantive contribution to global security. The main task of CTF-150, which Japanese refueling supports, has shifted from interdiction of terrorists and weapons to countering drug trafficking – a major source of terrorist financing. Cancelling Japan's refueling support would make operations difficult for CTF-150 partners, particularly Pakistan. The DPJ should consider renewing the mission with increased parliamentary oversight, a compromise that would likely have the support of the Japanese public. Meanwhile, it would be counterproductive for Washington to consider the refueling mission a litmus test for the alliance. The U.S. should leave the door open for creative Japanese contributions to Afghanistan and elsewhere on nontraditional security issues.

Second, existing U.S.-Japan agreements on troop and base relocations are critical for the alliance goals of defending Japan and ensuring regional stability. While the U.S. should fully engage in consultations about DPJ concerns, the margin for adjustment is small.

Implementing existing agreements is less a matter of negotiation between Japan and the U.S. than between Tokyo and Okinawa. The DPJ naturally wants to advance the interests of all its constituents, but it must ultimately show leadership to implement the plan to relocate Futenma airbase, which will reduce the U.S. forces footprint while maintaining the presence needed for Japan's security.

Third, the DPJ appears intent on reviewing a historical "neither confirm nor deny" (NCND) policy about U.S. nuclear weapons passing through Japan. This is part of the DPJ's campaign promise to increase government transparency and clean the slate from LDP rule. However, since the U.S. no longer introduces nuclear weapons into Japan, the issue is one for historians, not for today's policymakers. Moreover, the origin of the decades-old agreement was a request by the Japanese for political cover, so enshrining the non-nuclear principles into law over this issue may appear hypocritical and damage trust in the alliance.

Fourth, on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which provides the legal parameters for U.S. forces in Japan, it is important to note that the U.S. has over 100 SOFAs all over the world. While revising the SOFA may appear to be a bilateral issue to Tokyo, it has multilateral implications for Washington. If Tokyo seeks SOFA revision, to include an environmental clause for example, it should take a gradual and multilateral approach, possibly involving fellow host countries South Korea and Germany.

The DPJ leadership has signaled it will avoid drastic moves on the alliance, instead pursuing policy reviews, consultations with the Obama administration, and government reforms ahead of the Upper House election. But other public statements by DPJ officials suggest the new government will demand change on the above four points within months. For instance, Okada has a personal passion for nuclear issues, such as exposing the NCND policy and calling for the U.S. to declare a no-first-use (NFU) nuclear posture. However, he no longer speaks for himself, but for the Japanese government, and Japan's national interests include maintaining the alliance and the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell struck a helpful tone ahead of Hatoyama and Okada's visit this week to the United States. He said that Japan is an "equal partner" and that the U.S. has "patience, a commitment to listen, and to work closely" with the new government in Tokyo. The Obama administration has reacted calmly to Hatoyama's suggestion in a pre-election op-ed that Japan should position itself carefully between the U.S. and China. The U.S. could go further in encouraging Japan to reach out to its neighbors, as an improved Japanese regional profile would be an asset to the alliance. The DPJ proposal of a Japan-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is constructively bold, but for efficiency and to avoid undue bilateral friction, Washington may encourage Tokyo to show greater leadership in the Doha round instead. There is also room for increasing U.S.-Japan coordination on North Korea, Iran, and Burma.

For Japan's new government, there is an opportunity in offering continuity with the Security Consultative Committee statements, and taking steps forward rather than back on international cooperation in the upcoming revision of Japan's National Defense Program Guidelines. The DPJ must be a good steward of the Japan-U.S. alliance – building upon

existing agreements, and seeking adjustments via consultations rather than politically-charged negotiations. Doing so will allow the DPJ to focus on pressing economic and domestic issues. It is also important for the LDP to be a faithful opposition – looking after Japan's national interests rather than focusing on trying to topple the DPJ. On the eve of the security treaty's 50th anniversary, both the Hatoyama and Obama governments need to demonstrate that the alliance is not merely a partnership between particular political parties. The alliance should transcend changes in government because it is based on shared interests, values and trust, making possible deeper cooperation on major global challenges.

Assumptions of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

By Catherine Boye, Arthur Lord,
Tomoaki Murakami , and Kenta Watanabe,

The U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of the U.S. security strategy in Asia. This alliance has lasted despite the disintegration of its primary object: the Soviet Union. Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, it is time to assess assumptions that underlie the alliance. This paper examines four assumptions that gird of the alliance to discover if they are still relevant.

Assumption #1: Problems created by China's rise will strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance, but managing the alliance will be complex.

A rising China is one of the most serious and long-term challenges for the Japan-U.S. alliance. China's peaceful development is key to maintain stability in East Asia and worldwide. The alliance must be able to prevent a growing China from straying from the path of peaceful development. Many U.S.-Japan watchers believe that problems created by China's rise will strengthen the alliance.

Managing China's rise and making sure it develops peacefully will be difficult. While much work will need to go into creating a close, enduring relationship with China in diplomatic and economic arenas, the U.S. and Japan will need to be prepared for all eventualities. Working to create a unified position vis-à-vis China in all of these areas – diplomacy, economics, and defense – will improve the U.S.-Japan relationship and likely force closer cooperation in the alliance's security structure.

The assumption that the rise of China will cause the alliance to become stronger is true only if China appears to be moving from the path of peaceful development. If China's economy recovers quickly and China appears to become more open and liberal, then the closeness may not appear. Japan must feel a bit threatened by China to draw closer to the U.S. If China and Japan become closer then the alliance could suffer.

Policymakers working on the U.S.-Japan alliance must understand that the strengthening of the alliance is not assured and that depending on Chinese actions to provide the glue for the alliance the alliance may not succeed.

Assumption #2 Japan does not contribute enough to the U.S.-Japan alliance

Japanese realize the U.S-Japan alliance plays a vital role ensuring their security. After the end of the Cold War, Japan was at a loss over its position in international society. This indecisiveness was revealed during the first Persian Gulf War, after which many Japanese people were shocked to be accused of foot-dragging and criticized for 'too little, too late' despite a $13 billion contribution to the war effort. Actions such as this led some alliance watchers to conclude that Japan does not contribute enough to the bilateral security partnership.

Many Japanese politicians and bureaucrats believe that greater proactive cooperation is needed, not just besides paying money or accepting U.S. bases in Japan. This led to the PKO Law, passed by the Diet in 1992, to establish a clear legal basis for sending Self-Defense Forces overseas. After the deployment of SDF to Cambodia in 1993, the Japanese public has gradually changed its thinking about international affairs, especially about international cooperation, and accepted increased commitments. This change led to the deployment of the SDF as part of UN peacekeeping operations in Mozambique, Somalia, Bosnia, and other regions. Furthermore, under newly enacted special anti-terror legislation, Japan sent naval vessels and airplanes to the Indian Ocean from November 2001 as cooperation in the 'fight against terrorism.'

The Japanese people's resistance to sending SDF troops into combat zones encourage the belief that Japan is not contributing enough to the alliance, and that it remains asymmetrical. Those who criticize Japan's contributions should remember the great strides that have been made in recent years in Japanese efforts to play a larger part in international security and the alliance.

Today, an increased threat from North Korea and potential threat from a rising China necessitates the strengthening and broadening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The U.S. and Japan should use the 50-year anniversary of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty next year or wide and serious national debate about the future of their relationship.

Assumption #3: The U.S.-Japan alliance is mutually beneficial, but needs to be broadened to remain relevant.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, debates over security policy shifted from how to prevent the spread of communism to how to maintain security "after victory." As calls for a peace dividend rose, U.S. policy-makers reassessed the role of Cold War alliances in a post-Cold War world. During this period, two competing assumptions regarding national security posture arose: first, that times of peace should see military drawdowns and second, that times of transition require demonstrations of commitment to regional stability. In the post-9/11 world, some have questioned whether alliances are beneficial. When it comes to the U.S.-Japan alliance, however, most assume that it continues to be mutually beneficial.

Debates over the alliance are most often framed in terms of whether it is achieving its potential, not whether the alliance should exist. Analysis suggests that this assumption is valid. The primary benefit of the alliance to the U.S. is forward deployment of versatile military forces. Unlike forces stationed in South Korea, forces in Japan are mobile and expeditionary; instead of primarily serving as a physical deterrent, U.S. forces in Japan allow the U.S. to respond to diverse threats across a region central to U.S. economic, political, and security interests. In addition to the physical deterrent that they represent, therefore, U.S. forces in Japan demonstrate American willingness and capability to exert influence across the region as a Pacific power.

The primary benefit of the alliance to Japan, on the other hand, is a guarantee of U.S. extended deterrence. Although Japan has a sophisticated and advanced military – the seventh

highest funded military in the world (this is according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in 2008) – it does not have to spend as much on defense as it would without the security guarantee. Furthermore, although Tokyo has developed relatively robust defense systems, it does not have the same pressure to develop certain capabilities – namely, nuclear – it otherwise might. In the U.S.-Japan alliance, Tokyo can, and has, focused its energies on complementary force development. As long as U.S. extended deterrence remains credible, Tokyo gains in exchange the "burden" of housing bases. Recognition of this fact can be seen in Tokyo's level of host nation support.

Despite the assumption of the alliance's mutually beneficial nature, however, there is an interconnected assumption that the alliance must broaden to remain relevant. Calls for deepening the two allies' commitment to the alliance seem perennial – with calls for a broader geographic scope of cooperation now being replaced with calls for a broader functional scope of cooperation. Upon analysis, the underlying assumption here, too, seems valid – relationships must evolve or stagnate. This assumption, however, can lead to poorly founded conclusions. Although change may be necessary, if the alliance is to remain strategically relevant, that change must be linked to an accurate assessment of the external environment to which the alliance must react. Moving too far or too fast in the wrong direction under the banner of "evolve or die" may be based on a valid assumption but result in a weaker, not stronger, alliance.

Assumption #4: There is no better ally in Asia for the U.S. than Japan/ There is no better ally for Japan than the U.S.

The assumption that Japan and the U.S. provide each other with the best possible alliance partners is one of the most basic assumptions in the alliance. If this assumption is false, it would likely signal the end of the alliance because each would move to align with the country that is the better partner. It is because of these consequences that this assumption is rarely discussed.

With six countries in Northeast Asia – the U.S., Japan, China, South Korea, North Korea, and Russia – the U.S. and Japan each have five possible other partners. One of the greatest difficulties Japan and the U.S. would face with a new alliance partner would be building rapport and trust between the two governments and militaries.

From Japan's perspective the U.S.-Japan alliance provides a nuclear umbrella, the support of a powerful country with a seat on the UN Security Council, and a confluence of values. A new ally would need to provide these three things to be of use to Japan. Both China and Russia are large, influential countries with nuclear stockpiles, enabling them to in theory provide a nuclear umbrella to Japan. China has a no first use policy for its nuclear weapons which could be a detriment. North Korea has nuclear weapons but is unable to deliver them with any accuracy. South Korea and Mongolia don't have nuclear weapons.

Russia and China are both veto-holding members of the UN Security Council though both have used their vetoes and power in ways that appear inimical to stymie Japanese interests. South Korea, while not a permanent member of the UN Security Council, does

work closely with the UN. North Korea has an antagonistic relationship with both the UN and the UN Security Council and would be unable to promote Japanese interests there. Mongolia while a member of the UN has little power there.

Values are harder and more difficult to measure. Japan shares more of its history with Asia than the U.S., but little of that history could be considered good. China, South Korea, and North Korea are intimate parts of this history, which could cause serious trust issues to arise. Tokyo has better relations with Russia but little shared history or culture. Mongolia shares little history or culture with Japan.

The U.S. gains much from the U.S.-Japan alliance that would be hard to get from another Asian power. The U.S. gains forward bases, a rich, willing partner that shares the values of an open society and free market. The U.S. already has a useful alliance with South Korea. If the U.S. decided to end its alliance with Japan, the ROK would be required to provide a great deal more assistance to the U.S. South Korea would probably not appreciate this.

It is unlikely that China, Russia, or North Korea would be amenable to the U.S. stationing troops on their soil as part of an alliance. Mongolia might be willing but given its location it is uncertain if this would be as useful as bases in Japan.

Japan is one of the world's largest economies and thus it would be hard for other countries to match the money it puts toward the U.S.-Japan alliance. The aging of Japan's population and the slowing of its economy create doubts about whether this situation will continue. China is the third largest economy and could support a U.S.-China alliance. North Korea's economy is sick and would be unable to provide significant support. Russia's economy while large is not in good shape and would be able to provide funds but probably not on the same level as Japan. Mongolia's economy is quite small compared to its neighbors (with the exception of the DPRK), and would thus be unable to provide support on the same level as Japan.

The U.S. thinks a great deal of its ideals and values. Many of these ideals have been embraced by Japan, making the alliance a good fit. South Korea also shares many of these values. China shares the U.S. enthusiasm for a capitalist economic system, but lacks many of the values that the U.S. finds important, such as human rights and democracy. The DPRK shares neither the U.S. enthusiasm for capitalism nor its values. Russia while nominally democratic and capitalist does not give them the same importance. Mongolia has a burgeoning capitalist economy and democratic system of government but has few cultural ties or shared history with the U.S.

After reviewing the alternative alliance partners, the U.S. is the best alliance partner for Japan and Japan is the best alliance partner for the United States. While the U.S.-Japan alliance often confronts problems with its dynamics, the alliance is the best option for achieving the security goals of the two countries.

Appendix A

About the Authors

Ms. Catherine BOYE recently completed her internship as a research assistant at the Center for Strategic and International Studies Pacific Forum in Honolulu, HI. She received a BA in Political Science and a BA in International Studies from the University of Utah in 2006. Catherine is currently pursuing a MA in International Policy Studies with a specialization in international security in Asia at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Her research interests include Chinese military policy, Chinese energy policy, and East Asian Security.

Mr. Leif-Eric EASLEY is a Ph.D. candidate at Harvard University's Department of Government and a Visiting Scholar at the UCLA Department of Political Science. His dissertation examines national identity, bilateral trust and security cooperation among Japan, South Korea, China, and the United States. Leif has served as a teaching fellow for Asian International Relations and American Foreign Policy at Harvard. He led the security workshop of the Harvard Project for Asian and International Relations and was an editor for the Harvard Asia Quarterly. Leif has published journal articles and book chapters on the U.S.-Japan alliance, U.S.-South Korea alliance, and Chinese foreign policy. He also writes a monthly column on East Asian security politics for newspapers in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.

Mr. Tobias HARRIS is a Ph.D. student in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). He is the author of Observing Japan, a blog focused on Japanese politics and East Asian international relations. He has been published in, among other publications, *The Wall Street Journal Asia* and the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, and has appeared as an analyst on CNBC Asia's "Asia Squawkbox." From 2006-2007 he worked in the office of a member of Japan's House of Councillors. He holds a BA in politics and history from Brandeis University and an M.Phil in international relations from the University of Cambridge.

Mr. Tetsuo KOTANI is a Ph.D. candidate at Doshisha University and is currently a research fellow at Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF). His dissertation focuses on the strategic implications of homeporting U.S. carriers at Yokosuka. Other research interests include U.S.-Japan relations and international relations and maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region. His English publications include "Reaffirming the Taiwan Clause: Japan's National Interest in the Taiwan Strait and the U.S.-Japan Alliance" (co-authored with Dr. Jim Auer) (NBR Analysis Vol. 16 No. 1, 2005) and "Presence and Credibility: Homeporting USS MIDWAY at Yokosuka" in the Journal of American-East Asian Relations (Vol. 15, forthcoming). He was a visiting fellow at the U.S.-Japan Center at Vanderbilt University. He received a security studies fellowship at Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), 2006-2008. He won the 2003 Defense Minister Prize for his essay.

Mr. Arthur LORD is an adjunct fellow at the Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies. Arthur received a master's degree in international relations from Johns Hopkins SAIS, graduating with distinction in strategic studies and international economics. At SAIS,

Arthur conducted research on the U.S.-Japan alliance for Kent Calder. He has previously served as a foreign affairs researcher for Yoichi Funabashi, Editor-in-Chief of the *Asahi Shimbun,* and as an intern at the Henry L. Stimson Center.

Ms. Aki MORI is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at Doshisha University. She researches the implication of the rise of China, including the strategic linkage between military modernization and military operations other than war of the PLA, and the U.S.-China relations. She published two papers on China's energy security policy and the role of the PLAN in it. She will publish a new paper on Beijing's diplomacy in the financial crisis, which is scheduled for publication in 2009. She studied U.S.-China relations at the School of International Studies in Renmin University of China during 2007-2008. She received a B.A. from Waseda University and her M.A. from Doshisha University.

Ms. Wakana MUKAI Wakana is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Tokyo, majoring in International Politics, focusing on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. She has worked as an intern and a Research Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Nonproliferation (October 2004-March 2008). Wakana has a B.A. from Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, and a M.P.P from the University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Public Policy.

Dr. Tomoaki MURAKAMI is a lecturer at Osaka City University.

Mr. Adam PHAIL-LIFF is a research associate at the Japan Center for International Exchange. From 2006-2008 he was a MEXT research scholar affiliated with the University of Tokyo's Graduate School of Law and Politics, where he studied international politics and Sino-Japanese relations. In fall 2009 he begins a Ph.D. in Political Science.

Mr. Kenta WATANABE finished his MPP at the Graduate School of Public Policy, University of Tokyo in March 2009. He graduated from the Faculty of Law (Politics) at University of Tokyo in 2003 and worked for four years as a journalist at the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun.* He will start working as a diplomat in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in April.

Appendix B

PACIFIC FORUM CSIS

YOUNG LEADERS

15TH ANNUAL JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY SEMINAR

March 27-28, 2009
J.W. Marriott Hotel • San Francisco, CA

Agenda

Friday, March 27

8:30AM	Meet at Lobby for Young Leaders Program Introduction
10:00AM	Meeting at Business Executives for National Security (BENS) **BENS Northern California:** 160 Spear Street, c/o Promia, Suite 320 San Francisco, CA 94105
12:00PM	Working Lunch
3:00PM	**Welcoming Remarks** ***Skyline Room B & C, 21st Floor*** Yoshiji Nogami, JIIA President Ralph A. Cossa, Pacific Forum CSIS President
3:30-5:30PM	**Session I: Strategic Priorities at 50** *U.S. Presenter*: Michael Armacost *Japan Presenter*: Masashi Nishihara

The opening session explores the two allies' strategic priorities. As in previous years, speakers will focus on global and regional concerns, highlighting areas where interests and approaches overlap or diverge. Most important, the discussion should hone in on each partner's priorities and the degree to which they do or do not match. How will the current financial crisis affect the two governments' security policy? How will it affect countries and relationships in Asia more broadly? Can the U.S. sustain the current level of its force posture overseas? What is the impact of Japan's budgetary constraints? Are both countries thinking globally or is a regional focus more appropriate? How should the two governments balance traditional and nontraditional security threats? Topics could include the status of and prospects for the Six-Party Talks and other Korean Peninsula developments; China's rise and status as a "responsible stakeholder"; the cross-Strait relationship after the election of Ma Ying-jeou; ASEAN Plus Three and Japan-China-ROK cooperation; and attempts to find energy and environmental security. This overview will help set the stage for subsequent in-

Friday, March 27 (cont'd.)

depth discussions of U.S. and Japanese security policies and our individual and bilateral efforts to address these challenges. This session can also address regional reactions to the Obama administration, but an assessment of any policy changes (or continuity) will be deferred to the next session.

6:00- 9:00PM Reception and Dinner ***Skyline Room A, 21st Floor***
Keynote Address: Hon. Richard Armitage

Saturday, March 28

8:00-9:00AM YL Breakfast meeting ***Salon I*, 2nd floor**

9:00-10:15AM **Session II: Domestic Politics and the Japan-U.S. Security Alliance: Part A: Japan's Political Turmoil**
Presenter: Sheila Smith

This session will focus on the political tumult in Tokyo. How will Japanese politics develop in the next year? What are the prospects for the government of Prime Minister Aso Taro? What is the outlook for the 2009 general election in Japan? What role will security issues in general and the alliance in particular play in Japanese politics and that election? What should the U.S. expect from Tokyo during this time and in the aftermath of the election? What can we expect from the current review of security policy and the next National Defense Program Outline? What are the prospects for implementing the roadmap outlined in the May 2006 Security Consultative Committee statement?

10:15-10:30AM Break

10:30-12:00PM **Session II: Domestic Politics and the Japan-U.S. Security Alliance Part B: The Obama Administration and a Democratic Congress**
Presenter: Fumiaki Kubo

This session examines the security policy of the administration of President Barack Obama. What are its guiding principles, its primary objectives, and how will they likely be achieved? How will it differ from its predecessor? Has the administration adopted an Asia strategy and how will it be implemented? What role will alliances play and what does it expect of those allies, Japan in particular? What problems in the Japan-U.S. relationship will this administration inherit and how can it fix them? What is the impact on the alliance of a Democratic majority in the Congress? Will economic issues assume a new significance in the relationship?

12:00-1:30PM Lunch - ***Skyline Room A, 21st Floor***

2:00-3:30PM **Session III: Future Visions of the Alliance**
Japanese Presenter: Yukio Okamoto
U.S. Presenter: Dr. Joseph S. Nye Jr.

Saturday, March 28 (cont'd.)

This session will focus on how Japan and the U.S. see the alliance evolving. Do we have a common vision regarding future security challenges and preferred responses? How should the 50th anniversary of the alliance be commemorated? What are the future challenges that will affect the alliance? How should the alliance engage other U.S. alliance partners and allies? How can and should the two governments balance their alliance and multilateral security mechanisms and initiatives? How can the alliance tackle nonproliferation challenges; in particular how can the two countries work together to bring about a successful conclusion to the 2010 NPT Review Conference?

3:30-3:45PM Break

3:45-5:00PM **Session III: Conclusions and Wrap Up**

This session provides participants an opportunity to make overall observations or to focus further on specific issues. The chairs will make concluding remarks.

5:15 PM-6:45PM Young Leaders wrap-up session

7:00 PM Young Leaders Farewell dinner (optional)