High Seas and Rising Tides:
U.S.-Japan Maritime Cooperation

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Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate arenas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

The Young Leaders Program

The Young Leaders Program invites young professionals and graduate students to join Pacific Forum policy dialogues and conferences. The program fosters education in the practical aspects of policy-making, generates an exchange of views between young and seasoned professionals, promotes interaction among younger professionals, and enriches dialogues with generational perspectives for all attendees. Fellows must have a strong background in the area covered by the conference they are attending and an endorsement from respected experts in their field. Supplemental programs in conference host cities and mentoring sessions with senior officials and specialists add to the Young Leader experience. The Young Leaders Program is currently supported by Chevron, the Henry Luce Foundation, and the Yuchengco Group, with a growing number of universities, institutes, and organizations also helping to sponsor individual participants. For more details, see the Pacific Forum CSIS website, www.pacforum.org, or contact Brad Glosserman, director of the Young Leaders Program, at brad@pacforum.org.

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Introduction

For trading nations like Japan and the United States, the high seas have a special significance. Oceans do not just provide "moats" that protect the homeland from foreign enemies, but are vital highways for the commerce upon which their prosperity depends. It is not surprising that these two nations have made securing and protecting the maritime domain a top priority in their national security strategies and in their alliance. The growing interconnectedness of the global economy has triggered a shift in thinking about the oceans in other nations. While they acknowledge the increasing significance of the maritime domain to their national interest, they have been less quick to see the high seas as a "global commons." Too often, national maritime policies are all too national and parochial in their approach.

For several years, the Ocean Policy Research Foundation, working with U.S. dialogue partners, has held a seapower dialogue that explores the two nations' perspectives on the maritime domain. This effort has examined the importance of the oceans and their role in creating security and prosperity, changes in the maritime domain that our two governments need to prepare for, and ways to maximize efforts to ensure that this global commons remains available to all humankind. The third Seapower Dialogue, cosponsored by the Pacific Forum CSIS, was held in Washington D.C., April 16-17, 2009.

As part of its ongoing efforts to develop the next generation of security specialists, the Pacific Forum CSIS brought a small group of Young Leaders to that meeting. This group enjoyed two days of discussions on a topic of growing importance that has managed, in many ways, to remain under the radar. While there have been considerable fanfare regarding challenges created by China's military modernization program, in particular its efforts to develop a blue-water navy, less attention has been devoted to other maritime concerns, such as the implications of the Arctic ice melt and the prospect of a year-round passage through that forbidding region. (A summary of the discussions can be found in "Relations at Sea: The U.S.-Japan Alliance on the Oceans," by Brad Glosserman, Pacific Forum CSIS Issues & Insights, vol. 9, no. 9, June 2009.)

In addition to the conference itself, the Young Leaders – along with other conference participants – heard the views of notable experts, including Adm Thad Allen, commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, Richard Armitage, the former deputy secretary of State, Maehara Seiji, a leading figure in the Democratic Party of Japan, Abe Shinzo, former prime minster of Japan, and VADM William Crowder, the deputy chief of naval operations. (The speeches by the two Japanese speakers are available in "Continuity and Change in U.S.-Japan Relations," Pacific Forum CSIS *Issues & Insights*, vol. 9, no. 7, May 26, 2009.) Their unique insights informed the Young Leaders essays that follow, and which explore the most important issues that the two countries face as they deal with the myriad challenges of the maritime domain.

The Value of the U.S.-Japan Sea Power Alliance

By Lindsey Ford

The most important issue the U.S. will face in the Asian maritime domain in the coming years will be the growing assertiveness of regional powers over maritime territories and resources, most notably in the South China Sea. Continued disputes over small islands and their accompanying territorial waters present a challenge to regional stability and cooperation and will require the U.S. to play a delicate balancing role between firm deterrence and studied neutrality.

Although many territorial disputes in Asia are deeply rooted in historical claims, the assertiveness with which Asian nations are protecting these claims underscores a more important point about the shifting nature of the maritime domain. The maritime domain is now longer primarily used for the transportation of commerce, but is increasingly a *source* of commerce as well – as evidenced by the growing drive to obtain energy and mineral resources from the oceans. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Asia-Pacific region. The rapid development of Asian economies in recent decades has been accompanied by an equally remarkable surge in the need for new energy resources for the region. Recently, Asian nations have begun looking to the oceans for their energy potential through exploration for resources such as oil, gas, and methyl hydrates.

The energy vulnerability of the major Asian nations and their competing searches for new potential sources of maritime energy resources has perpetuated and intensified existing maritime territorial disputes in the region. Competing claims to territory and maritime EEZs (exclusive economic zones) are further exacerbated by the weakness of international laws policing and adjudicating these disputes. As one of the leading international powers in the region, it will be essential for the U.S. to maintain a sufficient deterrent presence to dissuade potential aggression over resources that might spark a larger regional confrontation or crisis. At the same time, in order to promote regional stability, the U.S. will be forced to continually demonstrate and reiterate its neutrality in territorial disagreements. Given the limited dissuasive power of international legal mechanisms, and America's continued commitments to its allies and partners in the region, the U.S. will be challenged by the difficult balance between deterrence and neutrality.

The harassment of the *UNSS Victorious* by Chinese sailors this past spring highlights the challenges the U.S. will face. China's interpretation of its international rights within its EEZs is inconsistent with the internationally accepted interpretation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Adherence to China's alternate interpretation would significantly reduce the freedom and flexibility of U.S. maritime forces in the strategically and economically vital South China Sea. Yet at the same time, the U.S. does not actively support any one nation's territorial claims within the South China Sea, limiting our ability to take a stronger deterrent stance to prevent China's growing aggressiveness in the area.

The rapid military buildup of maritime forces in the region will only intensify the challenge of maintaining stability and openness of the seas. The aggressive modernization plans of China's naval forces are the most notable, and most troubling, development on this front. China's growing naval might is an essential part of its broader efforts to develop anti-access capabilities, including space and cyber capabilities that could be used in an attempt to deny U.S. forces access to the region.

In recent years, Asian powers both large and small have moved to bolster their maritime presence. Although not directly correlated to the search for maritime energy resources and ongoing territorial disputes, growing naval capabilities of Asian powers provide them with a new ability to protect territories and waters in response to China's growing power. The U.S. should welcome the ability of Asian nations to play a more significant role in their own defense and in promoting regional stability. Unfortunately, increased international patrols and maneuvers within a small area increase the likelihood of miscommunications, misunderstandings, and accidents between military forces.

The U.S.-Japan Seapower Alliance can combat these challenges in a number of ways. First, the U.S.-Japan alliance serves as a force multiplier for U.S. power projection in the region. Due to our treaty alliance and the forward-deployed presence of U.S. forces in Japan, the U.S. Navy and Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Forces have our closest, most interoperable maritime relationship. Our two nations hold over 100 joint exercises every year and the new Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center serves as an invaluable hub for all U.S. and Japanese forces, which will promote prompt and coordinated responses in a crisis. Additionally, the combined power of the U.S.-Japan alliance is a powerful deterrent to any regional powers considering an overly aggressive stance vis-à-vis ongoing territorial disputes. The U.S.-Japan Seapower Alliance can also promote greater regional exercises and maritime coordination mechanisms that can help minimize the risk of conflict or miscommunications associated with increasingly crowded regional waters.

Second, the U.S. and Japan should be able to provide a coordinated front to proactively support and promote a unified interpretation of the UNCLOS provisions. Japan is a direct participant in maritime territorial disputes. By making a proactive effort to encourage peaceful resolution of these disputes, Japan can provide an example for the rest of the region that will help promote stability. Additionally, Japan has a vested interest in developing the energy and mineral resources in its EEZs. By working together to encourage multilateral discussions and agreement on acceptable rules and standards for exploration of these resources, Japan and the U.S. can help minimize the likelihood of disputes and conflicts.

The U.S.-Japan alliance remains the cornerstone of America's engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. Although long-standing territorial disputes and contested maritime resources will increasingly challenge the region, the U.S.-Japan Seapower Alliance is well poised to address these problems. As two of the world's most powerful economies, like-minded democracies, and leading naval powers, together the U.S. and Japan can play a leading role in ensuring the Asian region remains peaceful and prosperous.

U.S. Port Security and the U.S.-Japan Alliance

By Brian Harding

The principal security responsibility of the U.S. government is to protect the U.S. homeland. Therefore, the primary maritime security interest of the United States is to protect its ports. While this is primarily a task that the United States must do itself, the importance of international trade necessitates international cooperation. As one of the United States' most important and reliable partners, Japan should be engaged in this area. It is also an area that can provide new scope for the alliance.

The Problem

The United States learned on Sept. 11, 2001 that asymmetric attacks on the United States constitute a clear and present danger to the security of the nation as well as the U.S. economy, as demonstrated by the near collapse of the U.S. aviation industry in the following months. Post-mortem studies of vulnerabilities of U.S. homeland defense concluded that an attack on a U.S. port is among the most likely and damaging asymmetric threats the country faces. Meanwhile, with over a billion dollars worth of goods moving in and out of U.S. ports in 7 million containers everyday – often close to major population centers – the importance of keeping U.S. ports safe is self evident. However, even with new attention to port security since the founding of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002, the U.S. remains vulnerable, precisely because it must remain open to be prosperous.

The most significant initiative to enhance port security since 9/11 has been the Container Security Initiative (CSI). Created in 2002, CSI allows U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), an agency within the Department of Homeland Security, to examine shipping containers in 58 foreign ports, from which over 85 percent of U.S.-bound maritime cargo originate. They do this, primarily, by 1) identifying high-risk containers through automated targeting tools; 2) prescreening and evaluating containers before they are shipped; and 3) employing high-tech processes to screen goods quickly to limit disruptions to trade flows.

U.S.-Japan Cooperation

Japan is a key partner in CSI, with ports in Yokohama, Tokyo, Nagoya, and Kobe currently participating, more than any country in Asia and third in the world after the United Kingdom and Italy. Since CSI is intended to be a reciprocal program, foreign customs officials are permitted to be stationed at U.S. ports to inspect cargo bound for their own countries. To date, Japan and Canada are the only countries participating in this manner.

There remains room for the United States and Japan to increase their bilateral cooperation in port security matters through technology and intelligence sharing. In particular, the two countries should work together on supply chain security to better understand where goods transported through Japan, and to the United States, originate.

However, the focus of U.S.-Japan cooperation in this field should be cooperation to assist third countries. The two countries should coordinate international homeland security policy, particularly regarding capacity-building assistance for countries with large – but relatively insecure – ports, such as Indonesia and the Philippines. Cooperation and coordination would serve the interests of Japan, the U.S., and the recipient countries, meanwhile creating synergy between U.S. and Japanese efforts in assistance to third countries.

Japan and the United States should also encourage more countries to join the Container Security Initiative. There are many countries with which Japan and the United States have relatively stronger and weaker relations, and they should leverage their comparative advantages in securing broader international participation in CSI. This will require a regular dialogue between senior leadership at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and an appropriate figure in the Japanese government.

Impediments

The United States is hamstrung by an underdeveloped bureaucracy for international cooperation in homeland security. Assessments of the Department of Homeland Security have concluded that it should develop formal mechanisms for international cooperation and assistance along similar lines of those funded by the State Department and administered by the Department of Defense to assist foreign security forces (Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, etc.). Overall, the Department of Homeland Security remains a work in progress and establishing effective bureaucratic channels to maximize cooperation with foreign countries – including allies – will take time.

Aside from ongoing political difficulties in Japan that constrain policy formulation, Japan is unconstrained in its ability to offer nonmilitary cooperation. A new focus on port security would build on ongoing efforts for building maritime security capacity worldwide. Japan has been very successful in assisting Southeast Asian nations in this area. However, in order to coordinate activities with the United States, Japan will need to designate an appropriate counterpart to the U.S. assistant secretary of homeland security for international affairs.

Conclusion

Japan and the United States face a host of challenges in the maritime domain, but, in terms of national interest, nothing is more important to the United States than the security of its major ports. This is an area in which international cooperation is critical. Fortunately, it is also an area ripe for quiet, constructive U.S.-Japan cooperation. It also presents a new arena to expand the scope of the alliance to achieve common interests globally, something that our partnership must do to modernize itself for the 21st century.

Japan's Paramount Concerns in the Maritime Domain

By Kazuyo Kato

As an island nation surrounded by the oceans and dependent on outside resources for survival, the most important issue for Japan in the maritime domain is the maintenance of security and the freedom of navigation. While the development of ocean resources, conservation of marine environment and consideration of the effects of climate change are all important, security and the freedom of navigation are preconditions to progress in other areas. Without those two things, Japan cannot maintain its economic power and prosperity.

Specifically, Japan's main security challenge in the maritime domain is evaluating and dealing with the rise of China as a maritime power. China is increasing it presence in the East and South China Seas and enhancing its power projection capabilities by developing naval facilities along the Chinese coast. China is strengthening its ballistic and cruise missile systems, procuring submarines and advanced mines.

Unlike the Cold War era Soviet Union, China's intentions and objectives are unclear and its military modernization efforts lack transparency. It is thus necessary for Japan to carefully analyze and assess China's steps toward development. If one takes a historical perspective, China's investment in the modernization of its naval capabilities is a reflection of efforts to regain its status as a leading power and recover its national pride after years of humiliation. From this perspective, it is not surprising that China is pursuing anti-access and area denial capabilities with an intention to compete with the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. If left unchecked, China's military rise could shift the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. While China may not attack Japan, China could use increased maritime power as leverage to prevail in its claims over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands with Japan. It would be irresponsible of Japan to not take into consideration China's rise when making strategic calculations to protect the safety of Japan's sea lines of communication (SLOC) and secure supply of energy sources.

But how should Japan maintain security and freedom of navigation? The U.S.-Japan Sea Power alliance is an essential part of that answer. Today a country cannot maintain its security alone; it needs allies and partners to help protect its security. For Japan, the only realistic and viable option is to maintain its alliance with the United States. Given the U.S. position as the world's strongest military and economic power, not to mention the relatively greater attention the United States gives to Japan and the common values they share, the credibility of the U.S. deterrence capability is greater than what Japan can expect from relying on the United Nations or establishing an alliance with China, Russia, or Europe. This condition last forever, but it is unlikely to change for many years.

The challenge for Japan, then, is to find out how to combine the deterrence capabilities of Japan and of the United States, and U.S.-Japan joint deterrence capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region. Examples of efforts to enhance U.S.-Japan joint deterrence include strengthening interoperability, conducting joint-training and exercises and pursuing

standardization of equipment. As for Japan's own deterrence capabilities, although there has been debate over easing restrictions imposed by the Three Principles on Arms Export and re-interpreting the Constitution to allow Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense, it could take a long time for these changes to take place. And even if they do occur, Japan would have to establish appropriate and concrete laws and regulations to make those changes effective and executable. As such, Japan must think of other ways to strengthen its deterrence capabilities – while relying on U.S. nuclear deterrence and offensive capabilities – such as enhancing its network of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and anti-submarine surveillance capabilities. The United States and Japan must both maintain a technological edge vis-à-vis China. At the same time, the two countries should work with other countries to awaken China to common interests such as free sea lanes and economic interdependence.

While the U.S.-Japan alliance is the optimal option for Japan, the alliance is not on auto-pilot, and the divisions of roles and missions under the alliance must be adjusted according to the requirements of the times. Japan must consult with the United States closely regarding the two countries' respective roles, missions, and capabilities, and assess how best to share the burden and responsibility of maintaining stability in Asia as well as contribute globally. This does not mean Japan would join in combat missions with the United States. But Japan can make more contributions militarily by providing logistical support. Japan's Defense Ministry's recent decision to dispatch over 100 SDF personnel to Djibouti to conduct anti-piracy surveillance activities with the two P-3C surveillance aircrafts is a positive example.

Ultimately, the largest impediment to maximizing the deterrence capabilities of the U.S.-Japan Sea Power Alliance is Japan's lack of confidence and failure to understand what it wants for itself. The Three Principles on Arms Export and the exercise of the right of collective self-defense are manifestations of Japan inability to come to an internal consensus about the kind of a country it wants to be. Japan must ask not what the United States wants or expects Japan to do, but what Japan wants to do and consult the United States with the mind to protect Japan's national interests. Regarding China too, Japan should consult the United States.

The topics of U.S.-Japan consultation should go well beyond bilateral concerns to include issues related to the rest of the world including Africa, Afghanistan/Pakistan, India, Russia, ASEAN, and the Korean peninsula. Japan's initiative would be particularly valuable as the United States struggle with financial difficulties and the myriad domestic issues it faces. Such is the vision of the U.S.-Japan alliance that the two governments have been aiming for, and U.S.-Japan cooperation in the maritime domain should embrace this vision of the alliance. For Japan to achieve that vision would require imagination, creativity, and confidence, but the road is not hopeless, and current developments in Japan's domestic politics may force the Japanese people to think harder about the future they want.

The U.S.-Japan Sea Power Alliance: Evolving Roles and Future Challenges

By Kei Koga

Change in the International Security Environment and Japan's National Interests

Japan currently faces two security challenges: traditional and nontraditional. Traditional security issues, which is defined here as state-to-state security, involves military threats from North Korea in the short-term and China's growing military capabilities in the long-term. Nontraditional security issues, which is defined as transnational security, involves such issues as piracy, terrorism, and smuggling.[1] Indeed, this is well-illustrated by the final report of the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities (CSCD), the so-called "Araki Commission," and the 2004 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO). These documents were produced in 2004 after North Korea's ballistic-missile test in the late 1990s and recognized the rise of nonstate actors as was made clear by the Sept. 11 terror attacks. This broad recognition of the international security environment is still valid and has become the basis of Japan's security strategy. In other words, as the concept of security has expanded since the end of the Cold War, the scope of Japan's security strategy has broadened, and the role and missions of Japan's Self-Defense Force (SDF) have altered. This grand design for Japan's security strategy needs to be reflected in its strategy in the maritime domain.

The nature of these threats diverge greatly however. For example, it is true that nontraditional security issues, such as terrorism, are important for Japan and can have a serious impact on social stability if ignored. Accordingly, Japan needs political and military cooperation with the international community, including cooperation for state-building in failed states. However, these threats are not comparable to other security issues, which are clearer and have potential immediate military consequences, such as North Korea's ballistic missile threats, which require the improvement of the Ballistic Missile Defense system to ensure Japan's security. There are other security concerns that Japan has faced due to its geostrategic location, such as the protection of sea lines of communication (SLOC), which requires constant monitoring. The multi-dimensional nature of security threats and the conceptual framework for security, albeit with different degrees of intensity, can be seen in Figure 1.

[1] The concept of security can be divided into six categories: 1) national security, 2) international security, 3) transnational security, 4) global security, 5) human security, and 6) domestic security. See Richard Shultz, Roy Godson, and George Quester, *Security Studies for the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1997), pp. 1-12. The concept of national security and international security are more state-centric, while transnational security involves non-state actors. Since the scope of this paper is security issues relating to the maritime domain, I focus on national security, international security, and transnational security.

Figure 1. Nature of Security Threats



From the traditional security perspective, which is linked to Japan's national security, the most important security issues are North Korean threats, the protection of SLOCs, and China's growing military capabilities. These threats are also interconnected as SLOCs would be disrupted by North Korea's military maneuvering and China's increase in power projection capability. Concerns over China are especially important for Japan because these involve a number of issues, such as disputes in the East China Sea as well as the *Senkakaku/Diaoyutai* Islands. For the nontraditional security issues which are indirectly linked to Japan's national security, the most salient issues are international crimes, failing and failed states, and low-intensity conflicts.

It is necessary for Japan to become comprehensively involved in all these issue areas. Japan needs to defend and deter the immediate and potential threats based on the concept of traditional security to protect its homeland. Even for nontraditional security issues, which do not have a direct impact on Japan's own national security, Japan would face serious international pressures if it does not cooperate with the international community to deal with them. Nevertheless, there are dilemmas. With its limited political and military resources, it is inconceivable for Japan to put the same amount of resources into each category. One vital tool to deal with this dilemma is the U.S.-Japan sea power alliance. Recognizing the changes in the international security environment, the 2005 Security Consultative Committee (SCC), the so-called "2+2 Meeting" where Japanese ministers of foreign affairs and defense and U.S. secretaries of state and defense consult, set the "common strategic objectives" in the regional as well as global spheres.[2] These objectives include the issues of North Korea and China as well as international peace cooperation activities.

[2] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee," (Washington D.C., Feb.19, 2005). http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html

The Functions and Roles of the U.S.-Japan Sea Power Alliance

In the maritime domain, the U.S.-Japan sea power alliance contributes to dealing with both traditional and nontraditional security issues.[3] For traditional security issues, the U.S.-Japan sea power alliance has deterrent effects against North Korea and China. China has triggered security concerns in neighboring states due to its lack of military transparency, its rapid increase in the military budget, and its ambition to enhancing its power-projection capabilities to protect its territory (including disputed territory) and SLOCs. Nevertheless, the alliance still possesses a military advantage over China for the foreseeable future.[4] North Korea, although North Korea is developing ballistic missiles and nuclear capabilities, it can also be deterred by U.S.-Japan military capabilities. Successful tests of the missile defense undertaken by the United States increase its credibility and the Japanese Aegis destroyer, *Kirishima*, has shown the capability to monitor the missile launched by North Korea in April 2009.

With the introduction of the concept of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), the U.S.-Japan alliance has been ready to deal with issues such as disaster management and peace operations. The 2007 SCC highlighted the "redefinition of the SDF's primary mission to include peace-keeping operations, international disaster relief operations, and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan," and it emphasized the importance of Japan's contribution to the international security environment.[5] The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) has been playing an important role especially since 9/11. It has undertaken refueling missions for allied forces operating in the Indian Ocean since 2001, has participated in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) since 2003, and was dispatched to Indonesia for the disaster relief caused by the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake.[6] More recently, two MSDF destroyers were dispatched on an anti-piracy mission to the Gulf of Aden in March 2009. As such, the U.S.-Japan alliance is recognized as a pivotal security asset for both the United States and Japan. Although the demand for alliance improvement has yet to be achieved considering the implementation of base relocations and the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreements, strengthening its functions will enhance the alliance's capability to deal with traditional and nontraditional security issues.

Ideally, enhanced cooperation under such means as the joint declaration by the SCC for national security and "Global Maritime Partnership" (GMP) for international security will

[3] I define "Sea Power" as a major power that has extensive military functions and capability in the maritime domain. In this paper, this definition specifically focuses on "Military Operations Other than War" (MOOTW) in the nontraditional security field and "defense" and "deterrence" in the traditional security field as the function of military power. See Robert Art, "The Role of Military Power in International Relations," in B. Thomas Trout and James Harf, eds., *National Security Affairs* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1982), pp. 13-53.
[4] Christopher Pherson, *String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China's Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral*, (Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), pp. 4-7; Richard Samuels, "New Fighting Power! Japan's Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security," *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Winter 2007/08), p. 111.
[5] U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, "Joint Statement: Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation," Washington, D.C., May 1, 2007.
[6] Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, "Japan's Emerging Maritime Strategy: Out of Sync or Out of Reach?" *Comparative Strategy* (January, 2008), p. 31.

enrich cooperation and responding to multi-dimensional threats by the United States and Japan. To this end, Japan needs to enhance its own capability by adjusting its defense budget and no longer be bound by "the 1 percent ceiling" and increasing SDF manpower. At the same time, the United States needs to maintain its rigid commitment to Asian security.

Future Challenges to the U.S.-Japan Sea Power Alliance

However, even with such functional improvements, the U.S.-Japan alliance is not always effective. United States and Japanese efforts maintain the current level of strategic advantage over China could create a security dilemma between them and trigger not only an arms race between China and the U.S.-Japan alliance but also a regional arms race. Furthermore, deterrence against North Korea may fail since it is not the mutual assured destruction (MAD) of the Cold War. In this sense, as the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Report suggested, deterrence needs to be tailored,[7] and the function of military power needs to be embedded in political objectives. In the case of the U.S.-Japan sea power alliance, as the current "hedging" strategy illustrates, it is necessary to pursue both diplomatic and military means, including military-to-military dialogues with China and improvement of BMD, to ensure regional stability.

Moreover, political ambiguity exists in the U.S.-Japan alliance. It is unclear whether the U.S.-Japan sea power alliance can be applied to Japan's territorial disputes with China and South Korea. While the "Armitage Doctrine" says that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty covers "all territories under the administration of Japan," United States policy remains ambiguous. Although these disputes have yet to increase military tensions between disputing states, it is necessary to consider contingency plans, especially potential U.S. behavior.

For nontraditional security, Japan has expanded its role and missions without modifying the "1 percent ceiling" and as a result, the MSDF faces an overstretched budget and capacity. In the worst case scenario, in which there are several contingencies, the MSDF will become dysfunctional.[8] To overcome this difficulty, Japan has attempted to improve its Coast Guard's capability. Using Japanese ODA's new category of "security assistance," the Japan Coast Guard has committed to Southeast Asian security through capacity-building; it has yet to include "power projection assets that could challenge foreign naval forces, however" [9] Thus, although the Coast Guard would help tackle several regional and international security challenges, the MSDF remains important.

Finally, Japan's constitutional issue remains a potential obstacle to the effectiveness of the U.S.-Japan sea power alliance. Although the UN Charter does recognize the use of collective defense for all sovereign states, the Japanese government's interpretation of Article 9 of the constitution bars exercise of the right to collective self-defense. This has been

[7] The U.S. Department of Defense, "Quadrennial Defense Review Report," Feb. 6, 2006.
[8] Yoshihara and Holmes, p. 39.
[9] Samuels, pp. 102-103.

debated since the end of the Cold War when a number of international peace operations were undertaken. Moreover, the concept of security has expanded and international cooperation, ranging from military to civilian cooperation, is required more than ever. Japan needs a nation-wide debate over the use of the right of collective self-defense.

Dealing with a Rising China on the Seas

By Shoko Kohama

This essay addresses the rising *bargaining* power of China and its consequences, rather than the expanding *forcible* power of China. Disputes over the implication of rising China persist in policy circles and in academia: some predict an inevitable confrontation between U.S.-NATO-Japan vs. China; others anticipate China's peaceful integration into the international order. Both are two extreme scenarios and fail to capture the realistic consequences of a power shift. Neither war nor harmonious corporation among major powers is likely in the foreseeable future. Rather, a shifting power balance will result in peaceful but coercive transformation of the status-quo in favor of China through bargaining. In other words, a rising China is troublesome for Japan "not because it fears being attacked in the future but because it fears the peace it will have to accept after the rival has grown stronger."[10] China's triumph in territorial disputes in the South China Sea and its expanded control over the Southeast Asian sea lanes will pose the most serious threat to Japanese security and economy.

The increasing power of China should be considered in terms of *bargaining* power rather than forcible power.[11] Considering the disastrous consequence of war for both winners and losers, bargaining is *always* favorable to war for both sides. In fact, war between major powers is clearly an outlier, and hence, war is highly unlikely in the Asia-Pacific region. Among the 1,538 military interstate disputes after the World War II, merely 30 disputes (2.0 percent) escalated into war. History has witnessed only one case of major-power war (Korean War) in the nuclear age[12]. Likewise, complete harmony is also unlikely given the competition over finite resources. Thus, the most probable scenario is neither pure conflict (a zero-sum game) nor complete harmony. Rather the scenario would be *bargaining* in which states agree on the necessity of settlements and the undesirability of war while they fail to agree on *what* settlement is favorable to each of them. Without doubt, increasing military and economic capability will favor China in future bargaining by enabling it to force others to compromise.

Among the issues in the Asia-Pacific region, the increasing power of China matters most in territorial disputes over the South China Sea, which may cause serious trouble for Japan. Since the early 1990s, the Chinese government has demonstrated its ambition in the South China Sea, such as the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands. States involved in these disputes presumably agree on the necessity of settlement and the undesirability of war, but they cannot agree on where borders should be drawn since all want to maximize its gain. Therefore, the growing power of China may favor its bargaining position against disputing

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[10] James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* 49(3), (Summer, 1995), pp. 379-414.

[11] Bargaining power is capability to coerce the opponent to give what one wants while forcible power is capability to forcibly take what one wants, say territory.

[12] MID 3.0 data from the *Correlates of War Program.* http://www.correlatesofwar.org/; Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer, "The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21(2004): pp.133-154.

states in Southeast Asia. In particular, non-nuclear states are quite vulnerable to China's demands for compromise. Though Japan is not directly involved in the disputes over the Paracel and the Spratly archipelagoes[13], those disputes have significant implications Japanese security and economy.

Common Interests in the South China Sea

Countries in Southeast and East Asia share security and economic interests in open sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the Eastern Pacific, which includes six vital chokepoints of the Strait of Malacca: Sunda Strait, Lombok Strait, Luzon Strait, Singapore Strait and Makassar Strait. On the security side, states transport oil from the Middle East and access the Indian Ocean and the Gulf region via these sea lanes. On the economic side, according to one estimate "one quarter of the world's total shipping trade passes through this …area every year."[14] In fact, the six biggest container ports in the world lie along these sea lanes: Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Shenzhen in China, Busan in Korea and Kaohslung in Taiwan.[15]

Japan and the United States share common interests in secure access to sea lanes in the South China Sea. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, whose security and economy are highly dependent on oil from the Middle East, import approximately 80 percent of the crude oil through the South China Sea. In the mid 1990s, about 40 percent of Japanese trading commodities were transported through Southeast Asian sea lanes[16]. Similarly, U.S. naval forces navigate through Southeast Asian sea lanes to access the Indian Ocean and the Gulf region. If the waterway in Southeast Asia is closed, vessels have to get around "Australia… adding some 5.800 nautical miles and 15 days to the trip (assuming a speed of 15 knots). Additionally, restrictions on transit through Malacca would add millions of dollars to the cost of shipping between Australia and Japan."[17] Stability of maritime transportation in this area is critical to the U.S. economy since top five U.S. cargo trading partners (China, Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan in order) are in Asia.[18]

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[13] Japan and China have a dispute over the Senkaku Daiyutai Islands.

[14] Danna J Nincic, "Sea Lane Security and U.S. Maritime Trade: Chokepoints as Scarce Resources," Sam J. Tangredi ed, *Globalization and Maritime Power* (Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University), Ch.8. Available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/books_2002/Globalization_and_Maritime_Power_Dec_02/01_toc.htm.

[15] The size of ports is measured in terms of a ship's cargo carrying capacity (TEUs) in 2006. *Maritime Trade & Transportation 2007* (Research and Innovative Technology Administration, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, U.S. Department of Transportation). Available at http://www.bts.gov/publications/maritime_trade_and_transportation/2007/pdf/entire.pdf.

[16] The figure was estimated in terms of dollars in 1994. The Southeast Asian sea lanes include 4the straits of Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok, and that portion of the South China Sea to the east and west of the Spratlys. Hanry J. Kenny, *An Analysis of Possible Threats to Shipping in Key Southeast Asian Sea Lanes* (Center for Naval Analysis, February 1996). Available at http://www.cna.org/documents/4500002000.pdf.

[17] Nincic, "Sea Lane Security and U.S. Maritime Trade"

[18] The size of trade is measured in terms of a ship's cargo carrying capacity (TEUs) in 2005. Steven Beningo, *U.S.-China Trade Growth and America's Transportation System* (Research and Innovative Technology Administration, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, U.S. Department of Transportation, April 2008). Available at http://www.bts.gov/publications/bts_special_report/2008_007/pdf/entire.pdf.

China also has an interest in the secure access to Southeast Asian sea lanes. According to the U.S. Defense Department, "[s]ecuring adequate supplies of resources and materials has become a major driver of Chinese foreign policy."[19] Its growing demand for energy has enhanced the importance of the sea lanes. Figure 1 indicates that China's consumption of petroleum has expanded since the mid-1980s. In 2008, China's petroleum consumption exceeded that of Japan and China became the second largest petroleum consuming country after the United States.[20]

As a consequence, China is dependent on Southeast Asian sea lanes. Although it has abundant domestic energy resources such as coal, China has to import fuel to meet growing demand for energy and most external fuels are imported through sea lanes in Southeast Asia. For example, it purchases about 46 percent of oil from the Middle East and 32 percent from Africa.[21] Therefore China imports 80 percent of oil via the Strait of Malacca.[22] And China like Japan and the United States, shares an interest in access to open sea lanes.

Figure 1: Petroleum Consumption, 1980-2006



Conflicting Interests: Control over Southeast Asian Sea Lanes

While open access to the sea lanes is in the interest of all states in Asia as well as the United States, the issue is not undisputed since control over sea lanes can be a strong bargaining card. In 1996, Indonesia announced that it would restrict external access to the

[19] *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2006* (Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, 2006). Available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China%20Report%202006.pdf.
[20] *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2009* (Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, 2009). Available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf.
[21] *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2009.*
[22] *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005* (Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, 2005). Available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf.

vital three lanes of Sunda Strait, Lombok Strait and Moluccan Sea, which caused an adamant American reaction. Though this incident was eventually settled, it shows how a coastal state may be tempted to close sea lanes and use it as a bargaining card. Thus, the question of who controls Southeast Asian sea lanes has strategic implications for all countries using the sea lanes.

Several countries claim control over parts of the South China Sea and the situation surrounding the sea lanes is unstable[23]. These disputes may cause serious trouble for Japan in two ways. In the first scenario a serious military crisis in this area, even short of war, prevents Japan's commercial cargos from passing the straits, which would impose huge costs on the Japanese economy. Another scenario predicts the political settlement of these territorial disputes in favor of China. This leads to the expansion of China's influence over the sea lanes, which will undermine Japanese and U.S. security and economy. The possibility of the second scenario has increased as Chinese power has developed.

Before addressing the affects of the increasing power of China, let's note the consequences of expanded Chinese control over the sea lanes. China's influence over vital sea lanes will enhance China's bargaining power against Japan in cases of crises by enabling China to cut off energy supplies to Japan. The 2009 U.S. Defense Department report states that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) "Navy doctrine for maritime operations" involves campaigns of "anti-sea lines of communication."[24] Additionally, China may attempt to amend the rules of freedom of navigation as it has challenged current norms by claiming control over the airspace above its EEZ and so forth.

China's Ambition in the South China Sea and Its Growing Bargaining Power

What will happen in the South China Sea? This essay anticipates intensive disputes and eventual settlements that are advantageous to China. Generally, bargaining power requires both capability and credibility, i.e., strong motivation to prevail in the issue at stake. In both capability and credibility, China's position has rapidly improved.

Presumably, China is highly motivated to acquire control over this area. China has publicly claimed sovereignty over the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands in order to ensure access to the sea lanes, as a base for naval forces and to claim maritime resources. According to the U.S. Defense Department, President Hu Jintao has stressed the importance of secure sea lines of communication.[25] As Chinese power has developed, it employed more aggressive policies. For example, "[i]n December 2007, China announced the establishment of a city administration, "Sansha City," to assert "indisputable sovereignty" and jurisdiction over the islands of the South China Sea "and the adjacent waterways," prompting street protests in Vietnam.[26]

[23] Disputes have persisted among China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia.
[24] *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2009*
[25] *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005.*
[26] *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2009.*

Such ambitions in the South China Sea primarily revolve around the growing demand for natural resources. The area in dispute includes not only the key waterway but also vast amounts of maritime resources. Therefore, control over the South China Sea is indispensable for China's growth. Over several decades, the demand for resources including fuels has rapidly increased and this trend is likely to persist. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) in the U.S. Department of Energy forecasts that China's demand for energy will continue to expand at an annual rate of 3.2 percent until 2030 (Table 1). This forecast is not surprising, considering the fact that the amount of petroleum consumption per capita remains low in China.

Table 1: Total Primary Energy Consumption 1990-2030 (Quadrillion Btu.)

	History			Projections					Average Annual Percent Change, 2006-2030
	1990	2005	2006	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	
United States	84.7	100.5	100.0	99.9	102.9	105.4	109.1	113.6	0.5
China	27.0	66.8	73.8	90.5	105.9	124.0	140.7	155.8	3.2
Japan	18.7	22.7	22.8	21.9	22.9	23.4	23.2	23.0	0

Data: *International Energy Outlook* (Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, May, 2009). Available at www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html.

Meanwhile, China has steadily expanded its operational capability in the South China Sea. As part of its "anti-access" operational idea, "the PLA Navy's South Sea Fleet, which has operational responsibility over the South China Sea has been assigned more capable surface combatants and submarines and has increased the power to envision this goal."[27] China constructed a new underground submarine base on Hainan which "would provide the PLA Navy with direct access to vital international sea lanes, and offer stealthy deployment of submarines into the deep waters of the South China.[28]" Though the PLA Navy currently lacks operational experience and communication capabilities, its operational capability has readily increased. The annual reports of the U.S. Defense Department show this development. Up to 2008, it concluded that "as China's current ability to project and sustain power at a distance remains limited, the PLA, at least for the near and mid-terms, will face an ambition-capability gap. Currently it is neither capable of using military power to secure its foreign energy investments nor of defending critical sea lanes against disruption.[29]" In contrast, the report published in 2009 dropped references to limitations in Chinese naval capability.

[27] *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005.*
[28] *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2009.*
[29] The same analysis is also contained in the reports in 2005, 2006 and 2007. *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008* (Office of the Secretary of Defense at U.S. Department of Defense, 2008). Available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Report_08.pdf.

Expanding demand and growing capability will favor China in territorial disputes over the South China Sea. China has enhanced its capability to seize sea lanes in the area and has demonstrated a strong intent to reaffirm its territorial rights. Non-nuclear states in Southeastern Asia are vulnerable to such a power-shift when compared with the U.S.-Japan alliance which possesses nuclear deterrence capability that can marginalize the impact of a power-shift on bargaining. China can threaten and coerce Southeast Asian countries with its growing military and economic capability to abandon their claim in disputed areas. Few restraints will be placed upon China's coercive action since nations in Southeast Asia are not covered by America's nuclear umbrella. Hence, those countries may be forced to accept an undesirable "peace" in the face of growing Chinese power. Thus, it is probable that China will expand its control over the Southeast Asian sea lanes given its increasing stakes in the area and its improving bargaining position.

Conclusion: Propositions for the future U.S.-Japan Alliance

I conclude with several suggestions for the U.S.-Japan alliance to help ensure access to the open sea lanes.

1. Extend of U.S. extended deterrence: One option involves the extension of America's nuclear umbrella to ASEAN countries. This may cause more serious tensions and with China declining U.S. power may not present it from doing so.

2. Mediation of territorial disputes: Japan and/or the United States can mediate negotiations among disputing countries. Japan and/or the United States can mitigate two obstacles to potential settlements. First, their enforcement capability can mitigate the weaker parties' fear of China's noncompliance. Second, they can provide positive inducements to encourage China to participate in negotiations.

3. Establish an institution to negotiate freedom of navigation: Japan and/or the United States can deter China from violating existing rules by linking that issue with other issues.

4. Reaffirm the commitment to freedom of navigation: Japan and/or the United States can prevent China's violation of rules by reaffirming its commitment to freedom of navigation and by explicitly announcing that it will take action in the case of a violation.

A New U.S.-Japan Maritime Strategy

By Tetsuo Kotani

Warships of major maritime nations are now gathering in the waters off the Horn of Africa to combat the common enemy of piracy. However, as the recent U.S.-China confrontation in the South China Sea shows, we see little spillover effect from cooperation in nontraditional security issues to cooperation on traditional security issues. On the contrary, the rise of Chinese naval power and the resurgence of Russian naval power pose new challenges to the U.S.-Japan alliance. Deterrence, power projection, sea control and forward presence – these are still important components of sea power. This paper discusses a new U.S.-Japan maritime strategy in terms of traditional security.

Two Sea Changes

China became a net oil importer in 1993 and its rapidly growing economy has turned Chinese eyes toward the seas. Relieved of the Soviet pressure across land borders after the end of the Cold War, China has invested a lot of resources to build up sea power for energy and SLOC security. Throughout its long history, the Chinese showed little interest in the seas. An exception is Zheng He's voyages in the 15th century but that administration did not last. In other words, due to a lack of Chinese maritime ambitions, Japan enjoyed security until the mid-19th century, when Western powers knocked at Japan's door. However, we are now facing full-scale maritime ambitions for the first time in history. This is literally a sea change.

Two factors enabled the resurgence of Russian naval power. One is high oil prices. Russia could not afford to maintain its strategic forces in the 1990s, but thanks to high oil prices, Russia has revived as a resource-rich country. The current financial crisis and the decline of oil prices will have a negative impact on Russia's economy. The other and more important factor is melting ice in the Arctic Ocean. As exemplified by the planting of a platinum national flag under the North Pole in July 2007, Russia is increasing its presence in the Arctic. The Arctic ice cap is melting much faster than any scientific model has predicted. Scientists have revised predictions for an ice-free Arctic from 2100 to 2050. The most radical figure is 2013 (The U.S. Naval Postgraduate School). Russia's search for warm-water ports has shaped world history. The frozen Arctic has been a barrier between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans but an ice-free Arctic will become a shortcut between the two. If Russia can make part of the Arctic a Russian lake, that will bring about another sea change in global relations.

The Rise of Chinese Naval Power

Chinese maritime ambitions began with encircling the South China Sea to make it a Chinese lake. After the Philippines unwisely kicked out the U.S. Navy from Subic Bay in 1991, Beijing reasserted territorial claims over the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos as well as the Senkaku islands. Then, China seized Mischief Reef in the Spratlys in 1995.

Chinese maritime strategy has two pillars: anti-access/area denial in the East and South China Seas and the "string of pearl" along its sea lanes, thereby pressing on vital straits connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

China has been creating a wider strategic buffer in the western Pacific vis-à-vis the U.S. Seventh Fleet. Chinese strategy conceived two "island chains" as China's maritime defense barrier: the "first island chain" along the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo and the "second island chain" along the Bonin and Mariana islands. The "first island chain" is no more than 200 nautical miles from the Chinese coast and, unless Taiwan is unified with the mainland China, the "first island chain" would virtually "blockade" China during a crisis. Therefore, China has enhanced area denial/anti-access capability up to the first island chain by purchasing from Russia Su-30 ground-attack aircraft, *Kilo*-class attack submarines, *Sovremmeny*-class destroyers with SS-N-22 missiles – all of which the Soviet Union developed to target U.S. carrier strike groups. China is also introducing *Shang*-class ultra-quiet nuclear-powered attack submarines. China conducted an A-sat test in January 2007. China's navy has expanded operational areas into the high seas toward the "second island chain."

China is also conducting legal warfare or "lawfare" as part of an anti-access strategy. China persists in a series of excessive maritime claims by renegotiating the very foundation of navigational freedom by requiring Chinese approval for innocent passage in territorial seas by foreign warships or by failing to recognize the airspace above its exclusive economic zone as international airspace. The U.S. Navy has challenged Chinese "lawfare" under the Freedom of Navigation Program, which led to the Hainan *E-P3* incident in 2001 and the recent USS *Impeccable* incident.

While encircling the South China Sea, China is developing naval facilities (or "pearls") in and diplomatic ties with countries such as Pakistan (Gwadar), Burma (Sittway) and Bangladesh (Chittagong) for sea lane and energy security. These Chinese efforts to press on both sides of the Malacca Straits, is clearly against strategic interests of Tokyo and Washington.

The Resurgence of Russian Naval Power

In July 2007, Russia announced plans to build new warships including 5-6 nuclear aircraft carriers to be based in the Northern and Pacific Fleets – ocean-going elements of the Russian Navy. The Russian Navy also announced that it would increase its presence worldwide and actually has showed its presence in the Seven Seas. In July 2007, Russia sent two combatant warships to the Arctic. In December 2007, Russia dispatched a carrier task force to the northwest Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Last year, Russia dispatched another naval task force from the Northern Fleet to the Western Hemisphere. After conducting joint naval exercises with the Venezuelan Navy in the Caribbean Sea, part of the Russian naval task force entered the Pacific via the Panama Canal, for the first time after World War II.

Russia has also exercised large military exercises in the western Pacific and Indian Oceans. Russia is sending warships for counterpiracy missions off the coast of Somalia.

Coupled with the rise of Chinese naval power, the resurgence of Russian naval power complicates strategic calculations for Tokyo and Washington, especially if the Russian Northern and Pacific fleets are linked by the melting Arctic.

A New Maritime Strategy

During the Cold War, the core mission of the alliance was control of Japan's surrounding seas to restrict the operations of the Soviet fleet from Vladivostok to the Indian as well as the Pacific Oceans. The key enabler of this strategy was the homeporting of a U.S. carrier task force in Yokosuka augmented by a high-technology air defense and anti-submarine warefare network around the Japanese archipelago. This U.S.-Japan maritime strategy worked quite well and virtually contained the Soviet fleet within the Sea of Japan, restricting Soviet operations in the Indian as well as the Pacific, which contributed to ending the Cold War.

This maritime strategy is still relevant. U.S.-Japan allied sea power can prevent Chinese and Russian naval power from reaching the Indian Ocean by restricting Chinese and Russian fleets in the northwestern Pacific, or west of Guam and north of the Philippines. This may not be enough if the ice cap in the Arctic continues to melt. If the melting Arctic encourages Russian fleet activities in the north Pacific, the defense of the Bering Sea may become another area to be covered by the new U.S.-Japan maritime strategy.

This new maritime strategy requires an enhanced network of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and ASW capability is still the key to protect U.S. carrier strike groups. The JMSDF submarine fleet needs to be reinforced to deal with Chinese submarines in the East China Sea and with cruise missiles-equipped submarines to enhance blue-water operations. The introduction of P-X should be steadily implemented. Given the vastness of the areas to be covered, introduction of UAVs and UUVs should be encouraged as well.

Cooperation with other friends and allies should be promoted, especially ASW cooperation with South Korea and Taiwan in the western Pacific and strategic cooperation with India and NATO in the Indian Ocean. Australia is an important partner both in the Pacific and India Oceans. It will be necessary to promote strategic partnership with NATO in the Arctic as well.

China's possession of carriers would be symbolic rather than substantial in peace time. In wartime, Chinese carriers would just be easy targets of U.S. forces in the Far East. The possession and operation of carrier strike groups would cost a lot of money and time. China needs to give up some submarine construction to accomplish this. Therefore, let have carriers. Even if China possesses some carriers, Japan does not need carriers. More

appropriate countermeasures include buildup of the JMSDF submarine fleet and reinforcement of air bases along the Ryukyu and Bonin islands.

One of the challenges Japan confronts is how to allocate scarce naval assets between traditional and nontraditional security operations. Currently, three JMSDF destroyers are in the Indian Ocean for nontraditional security operations – refueling CTF-150 and escorting merchant ships in the Gulf of Aden. Three destroyers need to be replaced every six months there. So at one time, there are six destroyers out of Japanese waters. There is no denying the importance of nontraditional security operations, but this is a huge burden for the JMSDF. Although international cooperation has been upgraded as one of the JSDF main missions, the JMSDF force structure does not reflect this new mission. Given a shrinking defense budget, aging population, and expanding missions, JMSDF force structure should be reconsidered. Introduction of more sophisticated destroyers with less personnel like the Zumwalt-class destroyers may be a solution. Utilization of Coast Guard cutters for brown-water operations will be controversial but necessary.

Lastly, is U.S.-Japan-China trilateral naval cooperation for counterpiracy in East Asia a good idea? No. First, in counterpiracy measures, coast guards have primary responsibility and the three coast guards have relatively good relations. They are members of the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum. Second, coastal countries will be worried about a trilateral approach. Asian piracy hot spots are within territorial waters of coastal countries and those coastal states have primary responsibility to deal with the problem. Lastly, if Washington and Tokyo encourage Beijing to join counterpiracy efforts too much, that will give the Chinese navy a good excuse to develop its blue-water capability. Of course cooperation with China in nontraditional security is important, although we see little spillover effect between nontraditional and traditional security spheres. Counterproliferation is a more appropriate area of cooperation for nontraditional security.

Japan's Agenda in the Maritime Domain

By Aki Mori

Japanese interests and international responsibility in international waters

To preserve economic prosperity and security, Japan needs to assure freedom of use of sea lanes that are critical infrastructure of a globalized economy. Simultaneously, Japan has to develop arrangements to prevent armed conflicts in the seas surrounding Japan by the maintenance and exercise of a maritime defense posture. The most important agenda for Japan in the maritime security environment is an approach that balances these two concerns. The Japan-U.S. Sea Power alliance provides an indispensable backbone for Japan in dealing with the two projects since multilateral cooperation in securing the sea lanes can be conducted through the Japan-U.S. alliance and the alliance remains the most reliable stabilizer in East Asia.

Because Japan's food and energy sources rely on maritime commerce, securing sea lanes is a vital interest for Japan. The safety of sea lanes can be secured through multilateral efforts. Open sea lanes are a common interest among nations that depend on maritime commerce and provides opportunities for Japan to work with allies and friends ready to cooperate on preventing maritime terrorism, piracy, and transport of weapons of mass destruction.

Securing the safety of the sea lanes is critical to the realization of Japan's security objectives, which is to prevent conflicts that could pose direct threats for Japan, through improving the international security environment. This is a responsibility for Japan as a member of the international community.

Possible accidental, limited, and short-term armed conflict in the seas of East Asia

There are many unresolved disputes involving the exhibition of military power in areas around Japan, including the disputed territorial claim over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, concerning the determination of the maritime border as it relates to the development of natural gas and oil resources in the East China Sea, and the rapid military development across the Taiwan Strait. Given conditions in the seas in East Asia, the prospect of a security dilemma arising from competition among states remains a major concern.

States in East Asia are interdependent and depend on maritime commerce. The regional conflicts in the waters of East Asia escalate to armed conflict which undermines the safety of sea lanes, it could damage economic activities throughout the region. Hence, war with other nations carries an extremely high cost for states. In this situation, when we look at conditions in the seas of East Asia, we find militarized interstate disputes, including impeding freedom of navigation and overflights that display military capability in peace time. In sum, accidental, limited, and short-term armed conflict is possible in East Asia.

Possible accidental, limited armed conflict for short-durations may occur between China and other states because China has been developing anti-access capability to deny or impede access of other states into disputed waters. A good example is the People's Liberation Army (PLA) attempts to control military activities of the U.S. in and above its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). China insists that freedom of navigation and overflight in the EEZ does not include the freedom to conduct military and reconnaissance activities in that area, although this is clearly not a mainstream view.

Chinese strategists insist that China must achieve two political objectives by utilizing comprehensive national power. First, to achieve territorial integrity, China needs to secure sovereignty over Taiwan, the Senkakus (Diaoyu diao), and islands in the South China Sea. Some Chinese strategists state that this is a way China can dispel unresolved historical grievances. They also emphasize that China needs to limit and control freedom of navigation and overflight in the seas surrounding China.

Second, Chinese strategists state that securing Chinese economic interests in disputed waters is an important part of military security policy. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) allows coastal states to claim territorial seas up to 12 nautical miles in breadth. China attempts to deny access of other states to these waters by displaying its military capability in order to claim maritime resources exclusively.

From Chinese perspectives, political objectives to achieve territorial integrity and preserve economic interest itself do not mean ambition to alter existing international order. However, China is challenging the existing order in the oceans that is protected by U.S. military presence in East Asia by trying to limit freedom of navigation and overflight of the United States. Currently it is well controlled not to escalate to a major armed conflict by the U.S. superior military capability, but competition in the oceans reflects that the maritime security environment in East Asia has become unstable.

Getting ready to work with the United States to uphold the existing security order and create opportunities to cooperate with China

Given the maritime security environment in East Asia, the Japanese security agenda is to avoid direct threats to Japan and to minimize damage of it in case of occurring armed conflict. Therefore, Japan needs to strengthen its defense posture to secure Japanese interests in the areas around Japan through cooperation with the United States in the maintenance and exercise of a combined maritime deterrence posture.

The most important for Japan is to avoid getting nervous about the development of U.S.-China relations. Some observers insist that there is a possibility that the United States will reduce its commitment in East Asia. Rapid improvement of cross-Strait relations since Ma Ying-jeou came to power supports an optimistic view that the United States may avoid being entangled in conflict over the Taiwan Strait. However, it remains unclear whether the United States can entrust regional security in East Asia to China. In the mid-term, it is likely

that many frictions will continue to arise from competition between the United States and China as Beijing attempts to alter the U.S.-centered security order.

Given the maritime security environment, Japanese efforts to make the alliance a "public good" in regional security is required. To keep sea lanes open and to preserve a stabile maritime security environment in East Asia, Japan needs to put efforts into creating opportunities for the Japan-U.S. alliance to work with China on issues of mutual interest.

Three Questions for Expanding Security Interests into the Sea

By Ryo Sahashi

We are observing the shift of interest among policy makers into the sea. It is especially important for us to recognize that the regional security complex is expanding; the Northeast Asian security complex is going to be enlarged, to include the Indian Ocean, the Arctic, and Southeast Asia. During the Cold War the security complex, at least for Japan, was confined within Northeast Asia, or Japan's neighboring sea areas. When mentioning "the rise of China," we are likely to see China's capabilities. However, considering the enlarged geographical scope of great naval powers, we have to acquire a new angle. Here, I want to raise three questions for Japanese and U.S. policy makers and planners for that purpose.

The first question concerns naval forces. One speaker was alarmed by increasing underwater activities, while the other responded to the Chinese plan of acquiring aircraft carrier construction with "Let them have it." The questions to be answered are first, how can we calculate the power balance in the future? Which area of weapons should be prioritized? After calculating the new balance of power and capabilities, we have to think about how to prepare, in this bilateral alliance, unilaterally, or perhaps with potential collaborators, such as Australia, Republic of Korea, and India. Moreover, how can Japan strengthen capabilities with the strict ceiling on the defense budget? Since the action space for Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force is enlarging, as we now observe Japanese activities in Indian Ocean and Somalia, how can Japan achieve the dual mission of maritime activities in Northeast Asia and out-of-area zones? The discussion in the committee for reviewing defense guideline might discuss resource allocation, since the last committee for this purpose in 2005 led by Mr. Araki discussed the same question.

Second, it is worthwhile to consider the role of security institutions. Since Australia, South Korea, Japan, and the United States have enhanced their bilateral and mini-lateral cooperation, as seen in security declarations between Australia and Japan and between Australia and South Korea, and trilateral security dialogues (TSD), we can envision enhanced naval cooperation among these countries for nontraditional security item such as disaster relief to traditional security collaboration. Singapore and India are also playing important roles in such cooperation. The first question is how can we envision security arrangements through a new networking of states. How much potential is there for security cooperation in each dyad or triad? Since India is the only non-allied state among these states, what possibility does India have for security cooperation? How do Southeast Asian countries see these networked collaborations?

Reportedly, China, Japan and the U.S. have agreed to convene official trilateral dialogues at the director-general level, which has been postponed. If such a trilateral framework emerges, it would be a new type of security institution since the three countries are not allies and have mistrust for the other bilateral relationships. This triangular cooperation could enhance regional stability- and help diminish opposition to the other deepening dialogues. Japan can expect more Chinese high-level interests in military

confidence building with Japan, while China can expect it to pave the ways for Sino-American military cooperation and the U.S. can expect more Chinese collaboration for counter proliferation and nontraditional security issues. Militarily, naval cooperation might be most feasible and practical. However, there are fears that trilateral cooperation among Japan, China and the United States will trigger worry among littoral states. This raises a question: do littoral entities in Southeast Asia, South Korea, and Taiwan worry about trilateral security cooperation, especially on the sea? Should such fears prevent the three countries from starting discussions?

The final question concerns the possibility of crisis management and arms control. If China or other military powers increase their naval forces and activities, we need to expect some crisis between naval forces. How can we avoid a crisis from escalating? We need to think about militaries passing over the EEZ: how can we have a better arrangement for activities in these areas? I heard no clear answer at our conference.

The same can be said on the possible role of military-to-military cooperation and dialogue with China. With the rise of the Chinese, Russian, and Indian naval forces, the value of dialogue increases. Finally, we should strive for a major power dialogue on limitations of each country's power and naval forces because, without it, there is no way to increase capabilities by increasing arms and/or balancing acts with other states. Discussions in the conference tended to emphasize deterrence and dissuasion against China. I acknowledge the value of such perspectives, but it is also important to have a liberal approach that uses institutions and diplomacy. Therefore, this paper's final question is, do we hope for a discussion among major powers on the Asia-Pacific to Indian Ocean on ways to relinquish mistrust and cap arms? In the beginning of the 1990s, the U.S. Navy was very negative about security multilateralism, which resulted in the ASEAN regional forum (ARF) because it might lead to discussions of arms control. This stance might not change. However, if U.S. hegemony cannot be sustained, a deterrence strategy may no longer suffice, because it presumes America's advantageous position. This is one intellectual exercise for the very long-term future but as always, it is not too early to construct a vision for peace.

The Challenge Within

By Zachary Wasserman

It is time to consider the possibility that the most serious long-term security threat to American and Japanese interests in the Pacific may not be the rise of China as a powerful competitor per se, but rather the decline of cogent strategic thinking at home. Today, the U.S.-Japan alliance faces no existential threats because no country, or theoretical combination of multiple countries, can challenge U.S. military primacy in the maritime domain (Japan plays an important ancillary role as the junior partner in the alliance). My fear is that as younger Americans gradually assume positions of leadership in the foreign policy establishment, their strategic choices may be driven by wishful thinking about the origins of war and the sources of peace, and inadvertently facilitate the emergence of China as a dangerous competitor.

The rise and fall of the great powers over the past 500 years indicates that over the long-term a country's strategic significance is generally dictated by its economic capacity. In the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, this insight seemingly validates the widely held assumption that as China's economy grows during the following decades, Beijing will ultimately supplant Washington as the lynchpin of the international system. Since this process seems so organic to many people, it is often viewed as part-and-parcel of America's so-called relative decline, something that is purportedly inevitable and not necessarily undesirable. In fact, however, the growth of Chinese power at America's expense is neither inevitable nor desirable – how successfully Americans and Japanese are able to protect their interests over the next few decades will largely be determined by whether rising leaders appreciate the inescapability of great power rivalries, the profound importance of domestic political culture and national identity, and the disappointing limitations of 'global citizenship.'

The Persistence of the Cold War

Contrary to what many people in their 20s and 30s seem to believe, the global cold war did not end with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991; it simply morphed into a new, less combustible form. The world may no longer be publicly divided into antagonistic blocs, but international relations are still largely defined by the mutual suspicion and mistrust that continues to exist between the United States and its 'former' Eurasian adversaries, Russia and China. Despite the high hopes of internationally educated young Americans, the Chinese and the Russian governments do not subscribe to progressive, idealistic notions about global governance and international cooperation. From their perspective, these concepts are useful only insofar as they can be used to tap into global anti-Americanism and counterbalance U.S. power.

Chinese foreign policy tends to be animated by *realpolitik* considerations – three decades of growing economic interdependence between China and the United States have not begotten strategic alignment. Though China marginally supports international efforts to

dismantle North Korea's nuclear program, it plays a far less constructive role on a variety of other security and human rights issues that are important to the United States: China supports the Burmese junta; it interferes with efforts to stop the genocide in Sudan; and, it appears largely indifferent to the fact that Iran is close to acquiring a nuclear weapon – something that could arguably portend the most dangerous strategic reconfiguration in the world.

Nor have expanded military-to-military exchanges and other forms of security cooperation between China and the United States alleviated tensions in the Pacific. The Chinese continue to cling to a uniquely aggressive legal definition of what constitutes their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), they periodically deny U.S. warships access to Chinese ports, they occasionally harass U.S. vessels in the South China Sea, and most importantly, they have been increasing their annual military spending by double-digit percentages (a fact that is profoundly significant but is generally whitewashed by the mainstream American media). As its wealth grows, it is only natural that the most populous state in the world should seek to expand its strategic purview and position itself to claim a central position in the international order; these actions are reasonable and understandable in the context of China's own security interests. That said, they are not compatible with American and Japanese interests – unless the United States is willing to cede its hegemony in the Pacific over the next few decades. 'Engagement,' the bipartisan gospel on American policy toward China, cannot guarantee American and Japanese interests on its own no matter how 'robust' or how 'aggressive' it is. The rising generation of American leaders ignores this unpleasant reality at its own peril.

The Enduring East-West Ideological Antagonism, or the Myth of Cosmopolitanism

The Sino-American rivalry also has an important ideological dimension. Today, it is unfashionable to speak about ideology as a legitimate force in U.S. foreign policy. President Obama has promised that his approach to China in particular, and international relations in general, will be informed by a sensible 'non-ideological pragmatism.' This new tone is largely a reaction to the Bush administration and its emphasis on democracy promotion, something that many people, particularly younger people, consider to be at odds with the American diplomatic tradition. What these observers overlook is that even if the Bush years were a terrible aberration because liberal ideology supposedly exerted little influence on U.S. foreign policy in the past (incidentally, this is a belief that is simply historical), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) actually espouses its own ideological philosophy of development.

While China has taken steps in recent years to consolidate the credibility of its so-called 'peaceful' rise,' the CCP is an illiberal political organization that supports odious regimes abroad and stomps out dissent at home. Preserving its own power is the CCP's primary objective, and to do so it follows a program of economic modernization without genuine westernization (that is to say, political liberalization). One needs to look no farther than Hu Jintao's speech in December 2008 on the 30th anniversary of Deng Xiaoping's watershed economic reforms. Hu waxed lyrical about the importance of hoisting the "great flag of socialism with Chinese characteristics and push[ing] forward the Sinicization of Marxism," while affirming that China, "would never copy the political system and model of

the West." The current global economic crisis will probably ensure that the CCP continues to disappoint those foreign observers who are waiting for more openness and expanded political freedom within China; Hu and his colleagues will be loath to provide the Chinese people with more outlets for expressing their grievances in the context of rising domestic unemployment and the specter of social instability.

It would be easy to make too much of this so-called 'Beijing Consensus'; there is no compelling reason to expect that other less developed countries will ultimately prefer the Chinese combination of economic growth with authoritarian politics to the free market/open society model embraced by the United States (and Japan). Democracy and capitalism have created the richest societies in history. That said, George Bush's deeply unpopular presidency and the current economic crisis have undermined many Americans' faith in the primacy of the Anglo-American-Japanese model.

Moreover, the people who will lead the United States two or three decades from now will have largely been educated in universities that refuse to endorse normative distinctions between different types of political systems. In the name of political correctness, young people are taught that it is impossible to judge the legitimacy of other countries' domestic institutions – "We, as Americans, have no business criticizing the way the Chinese government treats dissidents because we cannot understand the unique challenges that China faces," etc. Over the long-term, this sort of attitude may eviscerate the healthy national self-confidence that is the precondition to advancing American interests abroad. One need not wish to foist democratic capitalism on unreceptive people, or believe in exporting the American model through war, to appreciate that it remains an excellent way of organizing human societies.

This enduring importance of domestic political institutions is tied to the limitations of 'pragmatic international cosmopolitanism,' a concept that is currently en vogue, particularly amongst younger people. The underlying logic is that tomorrow's world leaders will be less likely to resort to violent conflict because so many of them will have been educated abroad and will therefore enjoy close ties with their foreign counterparts. While no one would doubt that expanded educational and cultural exchanges help people understand foreign customs, the idea that cosmopolitanism will play a substantive role in staving off conflict between the United States-Japan alliance and China is flawed on two levels.

First, the thousands of Chinese students coming to the United States every year for college and graduate school do not generally seem to become liberal converts. For example, last year during the CCP's crackdown in Tibet, Chinese students in the United States tended to support the government's harsh measures (there are no hard number to confirm this; the impression is based on anecdotal evidence from college campuses across the United States). While is it reasonable to make room for the possibility that some Chinese students disagreed with their government's policies, the general impression was certainly that most endorsed them. Second, and most important, faith in the pacific powers of cosmopolitanism is nothing new; it is a relatively old and discredited idea. If economic integration can be taken as a barometer of globalization and cosmopolitanism, it is worth remembering that international

trade as a percentage of global GDP was higher in 1914 on the eve of WWI than it was as recently as the early 1990s. Clearly 'flattening' is not the panacea that its most famous spokesmen suggest.

Three Recommendations

- The United States and Japan should consistently signal their commitment to preserving the alliance's military dominance for the long-term. For over half a century, Washington has maintained bilateral defense agreements with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. By deepening and expanding the strategic relationships with these partners, particularly Japan and South Korea, the United States will remind both the Chinese government and the American people that American military strength is the cornerstone of peace in the Pacific. Senior American leaders should also encourage aspiring policy makers to acknowledge the centrality of conventional threats (as opposed to nontraditional ones) in the Pacific theater.

- While recognizing that cultural and educational exchanges may have some efficacy, the United States and Japan should enhance their counter-intelligence capabilities to ensure that Chinese nationals studying in the United States do not acquire sensitive scientific information that can be applied to Chinese weapons programs. It is noble to make room for the talented students from China, but it is naïve to forget that in doing so the United States is also educating its own competitors.

- Since this memo focuses on long-term challenges, it is appropriate to mention the importance of educating future leaders. The United States government would do well to offer a substantial grant to the first university or advanced institute that designs an international relations/grand strategy curriculum that balances historical analysis with topical policy studies. Today's top IR graduate programs tend to focus on *either* history *or* policy; none of them offer a program that effectively integrates these two dimensions. If the next generation of American leaders are able to preserve American and Japanese interests in the Pacific while avoiding violent conflict with China, their success will not come from superior intelligence, nor their enlightened world-view, but rather from their willingness to take the lessons of history seriously.

Ironically, one of Sun Tzu's ancient disciples alluded to the overarching challenge most memorably: "When the world is at peace, a gentleman keeps his sword by his side." Preserving the peace requires effort and discipline, and the process must begin at home.

Appendix A

About the Authors

Ms. Lindsey FORD is a research associate at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), where she specializes in Asian security issues and recently co-authored a study on the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Lindsey completed a Master of Public Affairs and an MA in Asian Studies at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas in August 2008. Previously, she worked as a consultant for the United Nations in Bangkok, Thailand where she assessed governance and rule of law in China and Southeast Asia. Prior to her work with the UN, she consulted with the Congressional Research Service, for whom she co-authored a 2006 study, Port and Supply-Chain Security Initiatives in the U.S. and Abroad, and served as the project lead for Hong Kong and China. While completing her studies, Lindsey served as an assistant to Dean James B. Steinberg, as a research assistant to the Director of Studies at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, and as a Legislative Intern with the Texas State Legislature. Lindsey speaks French and Mandarin Chinese and has also studied at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China.

Mr. Brian HARDING is a research associate in the CSIS International Security Program (ISP), where he focuses on Southeast Asia. Prior to joining CSIS, he was a Fulbright fellow in Indonesia, where he studied the significance of Chinese Indonesians in the China-Indonesia bilateral relationship and served as codirector of the Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation's Indonesia initiative. Previously, he was a research assistant for the project "Improving the Nation's Security Decisions," a research assistant at the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), an intern with ISP, and a volunteer English teacher in Nong Khai, Thailand. His writings have appeared in *China Brief, World Politics Review,* and the Indonesia-based *Jurnal Nasional*. He holds a B.A. in history and Japan studies from Middlebury College and an M.A. in Asian studies from the Elliott School at George Washington University.

Ms. Kazuyo KATO is an Associate of Armitage International, L.C., an international business consulting company led by former U.S. government officials. From 2003-2007, she was a research associate in the CSIS International Security Program, where she worked on Asia projects. Prior to that, she was an analyst at an international tax consulting firm in Tokyo. Kazuyo is a native of Japan but spent a substantial amount of time in the United States. She received both her B.A. in international relations and M.A. in international policy studies from Stanford University in California.

Mr. Kei KOGA is the 2009-2010 Vasey Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS. He is a Ph.D. candidate in international relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. His research interests include international relations theory, international security, low-intensity conflict, East Asian regionalism, U.S.-Japan relations, and ASEAN. Before attending the Fletcher School, he served as Research Fellow at the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) and as assistant executive secretary at the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC), where he researched political and security cooperation in East

Asia on traditional and non-traditional security issues. He received an M.A. in international affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, and a B.A. in international affairs at Lewis & Clark College.

Ms. Shoko KOHAMA is a Ph.D. student at the Graduate Schools of Law and Politics, University of Tokyo and at the Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics, University of Virginia. Her research interests involve security studies, U.S. foreign policy, and coercive strategy. Research projects in progress include the effectiveness of multilateral coercive strategy and the rise of taboos in the security field. She received her M.A. degree at the University of Tokyo with her thesis, "Unsettled Designs for Peace and Order in the Middle East: U.S. Policies toward the Arab-Israel Conflict, 1963-70," which was published in *Kokka Gakkai Zasshi* Vol.121, No. 9-10 (2008). She also published a peer reviewed article "Dealing with Precarious Democracy: Arms Sales to Israel in Johnson Years, 1963-1966," in *Pacific and American Studies* Vol.7 (2007).

Mr. Tetsuo KOTANI is a Ph.D. candidate at Doshisha University and a research fellow at the Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF). His dissertation focuses on the strategic implication of homeporting U.S. carriers in Japan. Other research interests include U.S.-Japan relations and international relations and maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region. His English publications include "Reaffirming the Taiwan Clause: Japan's National Interest in the Taiwan Strait and the U.S.-Japan Alliance" (co-authored with Dr. Jim Auer) in *NBR Analysis* Vol. 16, No. 1, 2005, and "Presence and Credibility: Homeporting USS MIDWAY at Yokosuka" in the *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* Vol. 15, Spring 2009, forthcoming. He was a visiting fellow at the U.S.-Japan Center at Vanderbilt University. He received a security studies fellowship at the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), 2006-2008. He won the 2003 Defense Minister Prize.

Ms. Aki MORI is a Ph.D. candidate at Doshisha University and a research fellow at the Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF). She researches the implications of the rise of China, including the strategic linkage between military modernization and military operations other than war of the Chinese army (PLA), and U.S.-Japan-China trilateral relations. She published two papers focused on China's energy security and the role of the Chinese navy. She will publish a paper on Beijing's diplomacy in the financial crisis in 2009. She studied U.S.-China relations at the School of International Studies in Renmin University in China during 2007-2008.

Mr. Ryo SAHASHI is an Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy (GraSPP), University of Tokyo. He also serves as a Research Fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE) and as a Senior Research Fellow at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF). He concentrates in international politics, currently focusing on security architecture in Asia, and is a recipient of both the Minister of Foreign Affairs Award and the Japan Association of Taiwan Studies Distinguished Paper Award. Mr. Sahashi received his LL.M. and Ph.D. (with distinction) from Faculty of Law, University of Tokyo and his B.A. in Liberal Arts from the International Christian University after studying at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Mr. Zack WASSERMAN graduated from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service in 2003. From 2003 through 2006, Zack managed an international steel firm with offices in the United States, China, and the Philippines. Currently he is an M.A. candidate in international relations at Yale, where he has focused on the history of American foreign policy with an emphasis on security and strategy in East Asia. After graduating in 2009, Zack plans to pursue his Ph.D. in American diplomatic history at the University of Pennsylvania. In 2008, he won the American Academy of Diplomacy's annual award for creative thought and writing on American foreign policy.

Appendix B

PACIFIC FORUM CSIS

YOUNG LEADERS

USCSCAP Meeting and 3rd U.S.-Japan Sea Power Dialogue

AGENDA: April 15-17, 2009

Wednesday, April 15

Venue: CSIS, 1800 K St. NW, Floor B-1, Washington, D.C.

USCSCAP General Membership/Board Meeting

08:30	Continental Breakfast (***Young Leaders*** meet at CSIS at 8:30am)
09:00	General Membership Meeting
10:15	Panel Discussion: Obama and Asia: The First 90 Days
12:30	Lunch Administration Speaker (TBD)
14:00	***Young Leaders*** meet with Pacific Forum staff for administrative briefing
14:15	Meeting Adjourns

Young Leaders Panel: "Next Generation Thinking about America's East Asia Strategy"

15:00	Presentation of Young Leaders East Asia Strategy Report *Chair:* Ralph A. Cossa *Pane:* Arthur Lord, Shanshan Wang, Stephanie Young
15:30	Open Discussion
17:00	Meeting Adjourns

The 3rd US-Japan Sea Power Dialogue

Venue: Residence of Japanese Ambassador

18:00	Opening Reception

Thursday, April 16 ***(Closed)***

Venue: CSIS Conference Room

0830 **Breakfast**

0900 **Opening Session**
Keynote Speaker: Dr. Shinichi Kitaoka, Professor, University of Tokyo

0925 **Session I: Traditional Security at Sea and the U.S.-Japan Alliance**
Co-chaired by Kazuya Natsukawa and Ralph Cossa
Presenters: Tetsuo Kotani and Michael Auslin
Discussant: Ryo Sahashi

How can Japan and the United States develop a new maritime strategy to address traditional security challenges such as the rise of Chinese naval power and the resurgence of Russian naval power?

1045 **Break**

1100 **Keynote Address: The Power of Regional Partnerships**
Keynote Speaker: ADM Thad Allen, Commandant of the United States Coast Guard

1130 **Session II: Global Maritime Partnerships and the U.S.-Japan Alliance**
Co-chaired by Kazuya Natsukawa and Ralph Cossa
Presenters: Yoji Koda and Michael McDevitt

Under the concept of Global Maritime Partnerships (GMP), set forth by the three U.S. sea services in 2007, how can Japan and the United States promote bilateral and multilateral cooperation for non-traditional maritime security challenges such as piracy, terrorism, proliferation, smuggling and trafficking, and disaster relief?

Thursday, April 16 (cont'd.)

1245 **Luncheon: Challenges for the U.S.-Japan Alliance**
Keynote Speaker: Hon. Richard Armitage, Former Deputy Secretary of State, President at Armitage International

1415 **Session III: Exploitation of the Oceans and National Interest**
Co-chaired by Koji Murata and Ralph Cossa
Presenters: Hiroyuki Nakahara and Richard McPherson

What interests do Japan and the United States have in maritime development? How can these two countries cooperate in developing technology, in revitalizing maritime shipping and other industries, in conserving marine environment?

1530 **Session IV: Climate Change and Maritime Security**
Co-chaired by Koji Murata and Ralph Cossa
Presenter: David Catarious
Discussant: Brian Harding

How does climate change affect international security environment at sea? What measures are necessary to address this new challenge?

1615 **Break**

1630 **Session V: Visions for a U.S.-Japan Maritime Alliance**
Co-chaired by Koji Murata and Ralph Cossa
Presenters: Naoyuki Agawa and James Auer
Discussants: Kei Koga and Brendan Kelly

How do new factors such as the inauguration of President Obama and the deepening global financial crisis affect the U.S.-Japan alliance? How should Japan and the United States envision a new partnership to promote cooperation at sea to address those challenges to be discussed in the previous session? This session will also discuss the content of policy proposals to be presented to the governments of Japan and the United States.

1800 **Adjournment**

1830 **Dinner – *Smith & Wollensky, 1112 19th Street NW***
Hosted by Masahiro Akiyama

Japan's Role in the U.S.-Japan Alliance
Keynote Speaker: Hon. Seiji Maehara, Member of the House of Representatives, Chairman of the Special Committee on Okinawa and Northern Problems, Vice President, Democratic Party of Japan

Friday, April 17 ***(Open)***
Venue: The Willard InterContinental Washington

0900 **Opening Remarks**
Keiji Iwatake, Director of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA
Ralph Cossa, President of the Pacific Forum CSIS
Masahiro Akiyama, Chairman of the Ocean Policy Research Foundation

0920 **Greetings from the Japanese Government**
Message from Prime Minister Taro Aso
Shotaro Yachi, Japanese Government Representative

0930 **Keynote Address**
Keynote Speaker: Hon. Shinzo Abe, Member of the House of Representatives, Former Prime Minister of Japan

0955 **U.S.-Japan Maritime Alliance: A Proposal**
Speaker: Masahiro Akiyama
Commentators: Naoyuki Agawa and Michael Green

1030 **Break**

1040 **Panel Discussion: The Alliance and the Asia-Pacific**
Moderator: Ralph Cossa (A message from Dr. Joseph Nye)
Panelists: Shunji Yanai, Koji Murata, Yoshimasa Hayashi, James Kelly

1200 **Lunch**

1300 **Luncheon Address**
Keynote Speaker: VADM William Crowder, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations

1400 **Adjournment**

1415 ***Young Leaders*** meet with Brad Glosserman for post-conference discussion

1530 Discussion meeting adjourns

1800 Dinner for Young Leaders Participants