



**Regional Security and Global Governance
10th Dialogue on US-China Relations
and Regional Security**

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Rapporteur

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Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate areas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

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The views expressed here do not necessarily represent the views of the US or Chinese governments, the co-sponsoring institutes, or the group of workshop participants as a whole. The statements attributed to individual presenters are my interpretation of their comments and should not be directly attributed to the individual.

Executive Summary

The 10th Dialogue on China-US Relations and Regional Security was held at Fudan University's Center for American Studies in Shanghai May 26-27, 2010. Co-sponsored by the Asia Foundation, the Center for American Studies, and the Pacific Forum CSIS, the dialogue examined recent developments in the bilateral relationship and perspectives on global governance issues, including opportunities for increased cooperation on foreign aid policies, anti-piracy, and climate change. Seventeen Pacific Forum Young Leaders and nine fellows from the Asia Foundation's 2010 Study Tour joined the discussions and provided the next generation's perspective on the issues.

There was general agreement that relations over the past year had been excellent; in fact, some felt maybe too good. For China, the joint statement issued during President Obama's 2009 visit to Beijing was an important historical document that framed the bilateral relationship within the global context and recognized the principle of mutual respect for the other's "core interests." US participants argued that the intended meaning of "mutual respect of core interests" was acknowledgement that the countries had different core interests. Chinese argue the US should better accommodate Chinese concerns if it expects Beijing to take up a larger share of the burden.

Japan is becoming an important factor in evolving regional dynamics. If Japan continues to move toward a more balanced approach in its relations with East Asian countries, there are bound to be more tensions in the US-Japan relationship. Any discussion of US-Japan relations will include the emerging role of China in defining regional relationships. Nevertheless, even though the US and Japan may see Chinese military modernization as a basis for maintaining the alliance, neither country sees improved relations between China and Japan as threatening the alliance itself. In this context, the US-Japan alliance serves as either a moderator of the power transition in the region or as the bulwark against a rising threat.

The anticipated approval and implementation of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between the mainland and Taiwan is viewed as a positive step in cross-Strait relations. US arms sales to Taiwan remain a major point of disagreement. While the US sees arms sales as a means of preserving Taiwan's ability to make choices about its future free of coercion, Chinese experts see arms sales in terms of damaging China's "core interest" of preventing Taiwan independence.

The sinking of the ROK Navy corvette *Cheonan* has exacerbated tensions on the Korean Peninsula, led some to question China's proclaimed interest in "stability," and cast a shadow over the Six-Party Talks. While the general conclusion of the group was that it was still too early to provide definitive answers to questions about the meaning of the *Cheonan* incident, it is also clear that the incident has created a fundamental shift in the way South Koreans view their security, creating new impetus to strengthen defense capabilities through improved ties with the US, and creating doubt about the "strategic partnership" with China.

On the second day of the dialogue, we shifted to global governance issues, focusing first on foreign aid. Much remains to be done to promote better understanding about how assistance fits into the common goal of creating a more stable international system that promotes sustainable development for all countries and regions.

Climate change is perhaps the most challenging global issue and the US and China have emerged as leaders of the developed and developing countries in addressing the issue, as was evident in Copenhagen. The next step in reducing mistrust and demonstrating good faith is to help developing countries establish plans for addressing mitigation and reduction measures through financing agreements for measurable, reportable, and verifiable (MRV) mechanisms. While bilateral cooperation with the US on climate change is important, there must also be collective action at the global level that includes areas such as energy diversification and sustainable development. The need to create a sense of urgency is a challenge for both countries.

With ongoing operations in the Gulf of Aden, antipiracy is an important focus of multilateral maritime cooperation. Despite positive developments, there is a great deal of caution about how these experiences will translate into bilateral cooperation between the US and China in other parts of the world. Cooperation in areas of nontraditional security such as disaster relief and search and rescue should be pursued first to build confidence and demonstrate mutual benefit before proceeding to more sophisticated forms of cooperation. Maritime issues are very sensitive, especially given tension between the US emphasis on freedom of navigation and the Chinese emphasis on territorial integrity.

Throughout our discussions, the meaning of “core interests” was unclear and it was difficult to distinguish between interests and objectives, or even tactics. Because these interests figure so prominently in the way each country views the other, it would be helpful to examine in-depth the extent to which these interests are mutually understood. Generally, China remains more inward focused and tends to define core interests narrowly; the US tendency is to be more outward focused and expansive in defining core interests. However, this is changing as China becomes more engaged in international norm-setting activities.

The addition of global governance issues is a positive and important step for the dialogue. Regional security issues continue to influence the pace and trajectory of the bilateral relationship, but gaining a better understanding of the range of global governance issues that are influenced by the two countries is also important. With the growing appreciation of the nexus between development and security, foreign aid policy helps define each country’s global interaction. Understanding the nature of global governance includes how bilateral cooperation can influence institutional decision making and how interaction in global institutions such as the G20 and the UN influences security cooperation. To this end, it will be useful to explore other transnational issues such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), peacekeeping, and WMD proliferation.

Sino-US Relations: Regional Security and Global Governance

Carl Baker
Rapporteur

Scholars, officials, and policy analysts from the US and China, all participating in their private capacity, joined the 10th Dialogue on China-US Relations and Regional Security at Fudan University's Center for American Studies in Shanghai on May 26-27, 2010. Co-sponsored by the Asia Foundation, the Center for American Studies, and the Pacific Forum CSIS, the first day of the dialogue examined the impact of recent developments in the bilateral relationship. Developments on the Korean Peninsula, cross-Strait relations, and the US-Japan alliance were focal points of the discussion. On the second day, focus shifted to an examination of perspectives on global governance issues including opportunities for increased cooperation on foreign aid policies, anti-piracy, and climate change. These topics produced a lively discussion that reflected both the growing interdependence between the two countries and the growing influence the bilateral relationship has on defining multilateral interaction at the global level. Seventeen Pacific Forum Young Leaders and nine fellows from the Asia Foundation's 2010 Study Tour joined the discussions and provided the next generation's perspective on the issues.

In opening remarks, *Shen Dingli* from Fudan's American Studies Center, *Ralph Cossa* from Pacific Forum CSIS, and *Jonathan Stromseth* from The Asia Foundation all highlighted the significance of the shift in emphasis after 10 years from the study of regional security issues to the exploration of opportunities for bilateral cooperation in global issues. Each recognized the growing importance of the China-US relations in influencing the trajectory of multilateral institutions and the merging of interests as both sides address transnational security issues and seek to better manage those interests at the global level. As always, the discussion was open and frank and offered a variety of opinions on the bilateral relationship.

Developments in Bilateral Relations and Regional Security

In the opening session, designed to provide a context for the remainder of the dialogue, *Tao Wenzhao*, a senior fellow at the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, began by suggesting that bilateral relations in 2009 had been very good – in fact, maybe the transition under the Obama administration had been too successful. The joint statement issued during President Obama's 2009 visit to Beijing was highlighted as an important historical document because it was the first time the bilateral relationship was framed within the global context and recognized the principle of mutual respect for other's "core interests." Cooperation had improved significantly in several areas and the relationship had become more balanced. Despite these strong beginnings, the relationship hit a "small bump" in early 2010 as the US went ahead with arms sales to Taiwan and Obama met the Dalai Lama. His claim that nothing had changed in the bilateral relationship did not convince many Chinese because these incidents indicated that the US did not recognize a "new era" in the relationship, lacked

respect for China's core interests, and was not committed to seeking a "balance" in the relationship. Tao argued that the early success associated with the transition including a productive start to the Strategic and Economic Dialogue and the Obama visit to China spurred expectations to outpace reality – China had expected more from the US.

By the time of our dialogue in mid-2010, relations rebounded with a relatively productive second round of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue: 26 agreements were signed covering a wide range of issues. Again, Hu Jintao emphasized the importance of mutual recognition of the other's "core interests," which was meant to send a clear signal to the US that China continues to expect a modification in Washington's stance on arms sales to Taiwan. From China's perspective, bilateral issues that remain unresolved include recognition of China's status as a market economy and better acceptance of Chinese investment in the US. The RMB-dollar exchange rate and China's trade surplus with the US would also have a significant influence on the bilateral relationship over the coming year. Tao felt that the Obama administration understood the importance of carefully managing the issue of the exchange rate, but feared the Congress could force the issue, which could trigger a trade war. A second issue that could test the bilateral relationship is the situation on the Korean Peninsula, especially if it would lead to an increased US force presence in the region.

Tao concluded with a brief analysis of other issues affecting regional security. Regarding Thailand, he argued that while former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra had drawn media attention, the underlying problem was the growing income gap and a fundamental split between the rural and urban populations. The other significant event was the establishment of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, which took effect at the beginning of 2010 and would continue to create economic expansion and improved trade relations in the region.

In his presentation, *Michael Glosny*, research fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, began by suggesting that US foreign policy in Asia has increasingly recognized that cooperative solutions are needed to address global and regional security issues. Given the transnational nature of these issues and the diffusion of power in the international system, the US has encouraged greater participation and invited all countries to do more. Along with that participation, these countries deserve and should expect a greater voice in creating and maintaining international order.

The global financial crisis of 2009 sped up the process of reforming global financial institutions and US-China cooperation in implementing stimulus packages and blocking trade protectionism has allowed the global economy to recover. The current challenge is lingering global imbalances. Significantly, this process has increased China's status as a global financial power, which has created new challenges as China attempts to define its place in the emerging international order. While China sees its actions as defending its core interests, others, especially in Europe and the US, see them as overly assertive and even challenging the US for global leadership. Therefore, the two should

initiate a dialogue on how best to articulate those core interests in the context of the international order.

Meanwhile, there has been a growing interest in regional integration. ASEAN remains the logical choice to lead this process, although there is also growing pressure to perform as Northeast Asia becomes the focal point for regionalism with trilateral dialogues among China, Japan, and South Korea becoming more frequent and increasingly separate from ASEAN. This is despite the emergence of different visions for regional identity from Japan and Australia. Through pronouncements and active engagement, the US has emphasized over the past year that it is “back in Asia” and wants to help shape any regional architecture.

Turning his attention to the two hotspots in Northeast Asia, Glosny noted that while the US is committed to better cross-Strait relations, it sees continued arms sales as the basis for the Ma Ying-jeou government’s willingness to continue engagement with the mainland. Discussing North Korea, Glosny argued that the US is dissatisfied with progress being made in the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and increasingly sees Chinese actions as enabling and supporting the regime in Pyongyang. The recent sinking of the ROK Navy corvette *Cheonan* has exacerbated the problem and has led some in the US to question China’s proclaimed interest in “stability,” as the incident was very destabilizing. Further, if no action is taken in response to this “clear act of aggression,” it would send a bad signal that serious provocations by the North would be overlooked in the future.

The US-China relationship over the past year has benefited from the recognition that both countries share an interest in addressing global security issues. By encouraging China to play a greater role and emphasizing that common interests and positive relations would pay benefits, the Obama administration had hoped to build a strong foundation for cooperation. The downturn in relations in early 2010 and China’s harsh rhetoric about the “US feeling the pain and paying the price” following the financial crisis has not been helpful and is at odds with Chinese talk of win-win opportunities for the two countries. While some damage seems to have been repaired following the visit to Beijing by Deputy Secretary James Steinberg and National Security Council Advisor Jeffrey Bader, stalled military-to-military relations remains a disappointment as this inhibits mutual trust and creates a negative image of the Chinese military in the US. Finally, Glosny warned that there was a growing sense that China’s renewed emphasis on “indigenous innovation” represents a mercantilist attitude and a basic hostility to foreign investment, which would alienate the business community in the US.

Discussion focused on two related issues: causes and consequences of the downturn in bilateral relations that occurred in early 2010 and implications of the emerging gap between US and China on the issue of US arms sales to Taiwan. Several Chinese participants cited US arms sales to Taiwan as the source of soured relations in early 2010. The US decision to proceed with the sale after including the reference to “mutual respect of core interests” in the Joint Statement issued at the end of the Obama visit was described by one participant as a very “cynical move.” China was “baffled” by

US motives since the US had worked closely with China to prevent further moves toward independence at the end of the Chen Shui-bian administration. The Chinese military was hurt and betrayed by the US decision. Others argued that the US should not let the Taiwan issue stand in the way of improved cooperation on global security issues. While China recognized that the US had made arms sales and supported the Dalai Lama for decades, it was time for a change in policy. China's support for the US in its global agenda was now more critical and the US should accommodate a more activist China if it expects Beijing to take up a larger share of the burden. Several US participants countered that the intended meaning of "mutual respect of core interests" was acknowledgement that the US and China had different core interests.

A critical issue is differing interpretations of the Obama-Hu Joint Statement. One argument was that the US had been consistent in its call for multilateral cooperation while recognizing differences over Taiwan, Tibet, and other territorial claims. The US specifically included the reference to "mutual respect of core interests" in recognition of those differences. This led to an exchange on the difference between interpretations of core interests and the ability to interpret strategic intentions of the other side. A general tendency that has created tension in the relationship is that while China is more focused on traditional sovereign interests, the US is more focused on systemic interests. In this context an important distinction was offered. Emphasizing "core interests" leads to competition and encourages "trading off" respective interests; focusing on "common interests" leads to a recognition of growing interdependence between the two countries and encourages mutually beneficial approaches.

US-Japan Alliance

In his presentation, *Wu Xinbo*, Professor and Deputy Director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University, argued that the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has demanded more equality within the US-Japan alliance while seeking better accommodation of Japan's interests and shifting the focus to comprehensive global challenges. Acknowledging that the DPJ leadership was experiencing a steep learning curve after taking power, Wu felt that this approach reflected Japan's aspiration to become a "normal country" and a shift in how the alliance is perceived even though the structure would remain unchanged. Hence, the demand by Japan for more equality and a greater willingness to take the initiative in setting the bilateral agenda.

While Washington will continue to rely on its alliances as the basis for its interaction in the Asia-Pacific, the changes taking place in the US-Japan relationship will result in both sides seeking to expand relations with other countries. For the US, this is seen in attempts to focus more on partners (especially China, India, and Indonesia) rather than just its allies and efforts to broaden the scope of security cooperation. For Japan, this means a growing willingness to say "no" to the US and the introduction of a more balanced approach to its relations in East Asia. This could result in Northeast Asian countries assuming the "driver's seat" in promoting further integration in East Asia.

Brad Glosserman, Executive Director at Pacific Forum CSIS, began his presentation by suggesting that it was important to remember that despite the change of government, the US-Japan alliance remained both essential and indispensable for Japan. Essential in that as long as Japan remains committed to not becoming a military power or acquiring nuclear weapons, it relies on the US for deterrence. Indispensable not only for the defense of Japan but also for the region as the treaty-based presence of US forces is a public good that creates a strong sense of security for countries in the region. Glosserman acknowledged moves in the US-Japan relationship to correct imbalances: they reflect the relative decline in US power and influence and efforts to accommodate a rising China. But public opinion in Japan continues to show strong support for sustaining the alliance, suggesting that the contratemps over the relocation of the US Marine facility at Futenma appears to be “glitch.” However, there is also a view that structural problems in Japan – evident in demographics, economy, and social services – will diminish Tokyo’s influence in the region and the world no matter what the government does.

The US and Japan will continue to broaden the relationship by seeking greater links with other alliance partners and expanding the scope of cooperation beyond militaries to other areas of where interests overlap. This will help leverage allies’ assets and create new opportunities for regional cooperation. One of the big unknowns in this process will be the extent to which economic difficulties in the US will limit its future military capabilities. This shift means that Japan will need to take a more prominent role in the defense of the homeland and possibly a greater emphasis on collective defense to address regional security concerns. Meanwhile, relations between Japan and China seem to be at a crossroads. The recent comment by Foreign Minister Okada regarding the need for more transparency by China is indicative of a growing sense in Japan that China is seen as a threat. In this context, the US-Japan alliance serves as either a moderator of the power transition in the region or as the bulwark against a rising threat.

The discussion began with a Chinese commentator noting the similarity between the analyses of the presenters. However, where Wu saw national interest in Japan’s actions, Glosserman saw public good. Japan’s actions have become fairly predictable: when there is peace and stability in the region, Japan emphasizes equality and balance; when there is instability, Japan reverts to greater reliance on the US-Japan alliance. However, if Japan continues to move toward a more balanced approach in its relations with East Asian countries, there are bound to be more contradictions between the US and Japan. It is to be expected that any discussion of US-Japan relations will include the emerging role of China in defining regional relationships. With the emergence of improved trilateral cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea, there is a greater pressure on the US-Japan relationship. In this context, Japan remains very wary of China in the near term and will continue to rely on its alliance with the US as a central element of its security policy. The response of Japan to the recent sinking of the South Korean Navy ship served to reaffirm that fact.

From a Chinese perspective, the US-Japan alliance is fine as long as it is a defensive mechanism that promotes regional stability. According to one Chinese participant, such an alliance relationship makes China feel more secure. A test of US

intentions would be a demonstration of its willingness to use the alliance to prevent Taiwan from becoming more independent. It was also argued that the US was not interested in attempting to contain China because it would be a strategic mistake given the strongly intertwined interests that have emerged between them. Conversely, while the US and Japan may see Chinese military modernization as a basis for maintaining the alliance, it does not mean that either country sees improved relations between China and Japan as threatening the alliance itself. As one US participant put it, the US has done everything it can to encourage better bilateral relations between China and Japan; no one “loses much sleep” over the prospects of better relations between the two. Instead, the key to the US-Japan relationship is the ability of both sides to manage domestic expectations regarding the other.

Cross-Strait Relations

In his presentation, *Huang Renwei*, vice president at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, argued that cross-Strait relations have reached a new stage with the three links (trade, tourism, and transportation) now occurring in both directions, the negotiation of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), and the reduced threat of a successful independence movement in Taiwan. However, several issues are unresolved: there is no consensus on the political and international status of Taiwan, political divisions in Taiwan remain a concern, and there is no agreement on the meaning of the one-China principle. The US role has become more positive by encouraging dialogue and helping find “non-official international space” for Taiwan. However, problems remain due to uncertainty over the direction of US-Taiwan economic talks and continuing US arms sales to Taiwan.

Huang was fairly optimistic about the future, suggesting that public opinion in Taiwan seemed to be moving to the middle-ground and that the people of Taiwan were likely to realize the benefits of improved relations with the mainland. This would lead to additional cultural linkages in areas such as social security and health maintenance. With the implementation of the ECFA, Taiwan would also likely be able to increase economic interaction and sign free trade agreements with other countries. Increased political and security dialogue between Taiwan and the mainland was also a likely follow-on activity that would occur in the second term of a Ma administration – something that is much less likely if the Democratic Progressive Party regained power in the next election. Finally, Huang was hopeful that if the US continued to sell arms to Taiwan that they would decrease in scope and that the US would consult closely with China before finalizing any decision.

Bonnie Glaser, senior fellow at the Center for International and Strategic Studies and Pacific Forum, began her presentation by agreeing that there has been a fundamental change in cross-Strait relations. In her view, it is not US policy to maintain the status quo, keep the two sides separate, or play the “Taiwan card” in its relations with China. Instead, the US wants peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait while preserving Taiwan’s ability to make choices about its future free of coercion. The US does not benefit from cross-Strait tensions, has been a long-time supporter of increased dialogue and sees the ECFA as a

positive development because it will increase Taiwan's competitiveness, help integrate Taiwan into the process of regional trade liberalization, and pave the way for progress on other issues.

Arms sales will remain a fundamental part of US relations with Taiwan. From the US perspective, they are necessary to help Taiwan defend itself and counter the growth in the mainland's military, which has continued despite the dramatic improvement in cross-Strait relations. They also provide the Ma Ying-jeou government with the reassurance needed to proceed with confidence in negotiations with Beijing and help ensure US credibility as a security partner. That does not mean that the Obama administration is not mindful of Chinese interests; it has in fact, carefully calibrated its actions to avoid sending a wrong signal to either side.

Glaser argued that the most important achievements in improving cross-Strait relations over the past year have been the establishment of reliable communication and negotiating channels that have helped minimize the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation. Now that most of the "easy" things have been accomplished, progress will be more difficult. Both sides should avoid directly challenging the other's sovereignty claims or pushing hard in sensitive areas because it will lead to increased dissatisfaction and setbacks. A major factor in determining the pace of progress will be public sentiment and the domestic political situation in Taiwan – in this context, emphasis on "one country, two systems" by the mainland will not be helpful.

The US believes that it can play a constructive role in promoting better cross-Strait relations, but the problem must ultimately be resolved by the mainland and Taiwan. With its enduring interest in Taiwan, the US does not see direct talks with China on the topic as a viable alternative because that would be tantamount to "going over Taiwan's head." Further, the US is unlikely to go back to the August 1982 communiqué statement on eliminating arms sales to Taiwan since the sentiment in Washington is that China has not abided by its pledge in that same communiqué to rely solely on peaceful means to solve cross-Strait differences.

Glaser concluded that in the near-term it was likely that the US would continue to see arms sales as beneficial to the improvement in cross-Strait relations because they help ensure Taiwan remains confident as it negotiates with the vastly more powerful mainland. If the US froze arms sales, Taiwan would be forced to re-evaluate its political and defense strategy and might even reconsider the value of a nuclear weapons program. Therefore, the key to reducing US arms sales to Taiwan lies with Beijing: by reducing the military threat to Taiwan, building mutual trust, negotiating confidence-building measures that reduce the possibility of an accident, and winning the confidence of the people in Taiwan. In this context, it is correct for Chinese experts to say that Taiwan is a core interest of China, but it is incorrect to say that stopping US arms sales to Taiwan is a core interest – the distinction matters.

A Chinese commentator opened the discussion by pointing to the similarities in the presentations: cross-Strait relations have improved, both recognize the importance of

promoting peace and stability, and dialogue is essential. However, there is less agreement on the way forward. Despite the apparent changes in public opinion in Taiwan and the improvement in both cross-Strait relations and US-China relations, there does not seem to be any change in how the US approaches arms sales and the Taiwan issue more broadly. Given that the improvement in cross-Strait relations occurred with Chinese missiles directly across from Taiwan, it can be concluded that they have acted as a deterrent to Taiwan independence. Therefore, removing them would send a wrong signal.

The remainder of the discussion focused primarily on the independence movement in Taiwan and the impact and implications of US arms sales. Several Chinese participants argued that as the strength of the independence movement lessened and the people in Taiwan felt less threatened by China, the emergent issue is now the likelihood of economic absorption given the rapidly growing cross-Strait economic ties. Given this shift, they expressed frustration over why the US has not changed its policy on arms sales. With one participant characterizing the US practice as a form of “blackmailing” Taiwan, one of the general arguments was that arms sales actually served US interests more than the true interests in Taiwan. Another argument put forward was that Glaser’s distinction between Taiwan and stopping US arms sales as a core interest of China is a false one because they are different aspects of the same problem – US support is delaying the inevitable reintegration of Taiwan with China. Therefore, the US should expect an even stronger response from China the next time arms sales are announced.

US participants countered by pointing out that the arms sales were a continuation of US policy and reiterating the argument that they allowed the Ma administration to improve economic and trade ties with the mainland. Given that China continued to modernize its military for the ostensible purpose of preventing Taiwan from declaring independence, there was no basis for reducing arms sales. While the US appreciates the resentment expressed by China, there is no indication that the US will back away from its commitment. As long as Taiwan makes the requests – and US presenters reminded the group that Taiwan always initiates the sales with its requests – the US will respond, and both sides should accept that this may create turmoil in US-China relations.

Korea Peninsula Issues

Ralph Cossa, president of Pacific Forum CSIS, led off the session by offering his perspective on South Korean views of the situation on the peninsula in the aftermath of the sinking of the ROK Navy corvette *Cheonan*. His four takeaways from recent meetings with South Koreans suggested a significant shift had occurred in South Korean thinking over the past two years. First, US-ROK relations have never been better. While there was initial concern in Seoul that the Obama administration might be “too soft” on North Korea, those fears have been dispelled as the “strategic patience” strategy by the US has played itself out. The favorable view of the alliance has been bolstered by the signing of the US-ROK Joint Vision, which many see as a strong basis for a continuing US commitment to South Korea and an opportunity for South Korea to leverage its relationship with the US in its efforts to “globalize” Korea. The close coordination and

strong support shown to Seoul by Washington following the *Cheonan* incident reinforced these trends.

A second feature of the current security perspective in Seoul is a growing concern over the asymmetric threat from North Korea, leading many South Korean analysts to conclude that the North Korean threat has become more serious over the past years. The primary fear is that the North will attempt to use nuclear blackmail as a means of deterrence. The sinking of the *Cheonan* brought this fear to the forefront.

Third, South Koreans are convinced that North Korea was responsible for the *Cheonan* incident and that it represents an unacceptable escalation in tensions. Therefore, the response must be firm and swift to send the clear message that this will not be tolerated. Otherwise, the North will believe they have attained a deterrent capability and will continue to increase the level of provocation with impunity.

More importantly for US-China bilateral relations, Cossa suggested that there was a growing sense among South Koreans that China had become a part of the problem for Korean security. Even before the *Cheonan* incident, South Koreans had complained that Chinese assistance packages to the North violated the spirit of UNSC Resolution 1874. Kim Jong-il's visit to Beijing immediately following Lee Myung-bak's request to China to not allow the visit was seen as an insult and reinforced increasingly negative sentiment toward China. This has led to new questions in the South about China's commitment to promoting peace and stability on the peninsula. With Beijing acting as the North's defense attorney, South Koreans are increasingly coming to the conclusion that China and the ROK may have divergent security interests. Given that South Korea has "won the war" on the peninsula, Cossa suggested that China was making a strategic mistake by showing strong support to the North at this juncture as this has pushed South Korea to a greater reliance on the US and created a great deal of mistrust about China's motives.

Liu Ming, senior fellow at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, began his presentation by arguing that the second nuclear test by North Korea represented military, political, and technological milestones and led to a shift in its strategy to mitigate the pressure created by the imposition of sanctions. While China has supported sanctions and applied pressure on North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks in response to demands from other members of the talks, its primary concern is to prevent a collapse in the North. China recognizes that the talks have no meaning for the North as Pyongyang has no intention to give up its nuclear weapons program. Accordingly, the North has set the preconditions of eliminating sanctions and concluding a peace treaty with the US before it considers denuclearization – effectively reversing the order demanded by the US. Liu argued that this position is designed to soften the US stance, extract some concessions, and create leverage to initiate bilateral talks with the US under the cover of the six-party framework. Despite these efforts at reconciliation, the US and South Korea have shown no interest in re-engaging the North in dialogue, which has complicated China's efforts at seeking a compromise among the parties.

The *Cheonan* incident has greatly increased tensions on the peninsula. While South Korea is demanding action, it is unlikely that the UNSC will increase sanctions as long as North Korea denies involvement. While Seoul has a number of options, including military retaliation, it is unlikely without explicit support from the US as it would create a crisis. In this context, the Six-Party Talks won't resume any time soon and all parties should avoid overreaction and miscalculation while seeking to prevent a similar incident from occurring again. To resolve the immediate situation, all scientific evidence should be made public to be evaluated by international experts and North Korea should be allowed to make explanations before neutral judges.

A Chinese commentator opened the discussion, agreeing with Liu that it had become very difficult to convince North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program. Chinese efforts to convince them otherwise and return to the Six-Party Talks had failed, which yielded a loss of confidence in the process. Because it was hard for China to admit failure, it had invited Kim Jong-il to visit Beijing as one last effort. This commitment made it almost impossible for China to cancel the trip. China's dilemma was exacerbated following the *Cheonan* incident as it caused the US and South Korea to lose trust in China when it accepted Kim Jong-il's visit despite the ongoing investigation. Therefore, the best way to proceed is with caution and to conduct a careful investigation of the incident.

Given that China's fundamental interest is unification of the two Koreas, the commentator agreed that good US-South Korea relations and the US presence on the peninsula were positive to the extent that they did not promote permanent division on the peninsula. Sharing Liu's disappointment that China had not been able to do a better job shaping opinions in the North to deter irresponsible behavior, he felt it was important to respond calmly to the *Cheonan* incident and work carefully to remove all doubt by ensuring that China and North Korea are included in the investigation. Nevertheless, he conceded that it would have been in China's best interest to express condolences for the sailors who lost their lives in the incident rather than being overly passive in its immediate response to the incident.

We then discussed motivations if North Korea was, in fact, responsible for the sinking of the *Cheonan*, the implications of China's decision to delay offering condolences after the incident, and the rationale for allowing Kim Jong-il to visit Beijing despite President Lee's request to cancel or delay the trip. Several agreed that if the North was responsible for the sinking, it was done in retaliation for the killing of North Korean sailors in late 2009, when South Korea fired on a North Korean vessel that crossed into waters south of the Northern Limit Line. However, there was speculation that the crisis was created by the North Korean leadership as part of the succession process or in the hope of forcing action in response to its "bad behavior" as a tactic to counter the current "strategic patience" strategy employed by the US and South Korea. While the general conclusion of the group was that it was still too early to provide definitive answers to these questions, it is also clear that the incident has created a fundamental shift in the way South Koreans view their security, creating new impetus to strengthen their defense

capabilities and leaving significant doubt about the feasibility of a “strategic partnership” with China.

There was agreement that it would have been better for China to express immediate condolences to South Korea before the North was specifically accused of being responsible for the sinking. Explanations for the failure ranged from indecision at the Foreign Ministry to a desire to avoid creating instability in the region. There was also agreement that expressing condolences earlier would have allowed China to show sympathy for the families of the dead sailors and avoided having to choose between showing support for either side.

Foreign Aid Policy and Global Governance

To gain better insight into how the US and China view their role in shaping how the world works, the second day of the dialogue focused on issues related to global governance. The organizers intend to make this aspect of the bilateral relationship a regular part of the dialogue in the future. This shift reflects not only the growing influence of the relationship on international institutions but also the increasingly global nature of security issues. Respective approaches to foreign aid, climate change, and antipiracy were the inaugural issues addressed.

He Wenping, professor and director of African Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, outlined three major characteristics of China’s aid programs. First, there is a strong tendency to provide aid with “no strings attached” and to adhere to a non-interference aid policy. Second, most aid has been focused on bilateral projects rather than on multilateral initiatives as this is considered to be the most efficient and practical way of delivering assistance. Third, there has been a strong preference for “hardware” projects such as physical infrastructure rather than “software” projects, such as research or capacity-building projects often favored by Western countries. While these characteristics evolved from unique historical circumstances and are consistent with Chinese preference for non-interference, they also reflect China’s competitive advantage in exporting cheap labor to support the projects.

Acknowledging that Chinese assistance programs have been harshly criticized by mostly Western critics, He maintained that the facts do not support claims of “rogue aid” or that Chinese aid represents a new colonialism in Africa. Instead, the focus should be on results, which indicate that economies in Africa have improved for at least the past decade, with China-Africa trade improving 40 percent annually since 2000 and trade providing at least 20 percent of growth in African economies. Chinese assistance has encouraged others to provide aid to African countries, has helped African countries consolidate and speak with one voice, and, most importantly, has been viewed by Africans as part of the solution and has led to rejuvenation on the continent. Despite these accomplishments, He recognized that challenges such as harmonizing aid programs, increasing transparency, and streamlining the foreign aid bureaucracy remain and must be addressed as China moves forward with individual aid projects in Africa.

Carol Lancaster, dean at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, agreed with He's assessment of China's shortcomings regarding transparency and the need for a better institutional framework for administering aid. She also noted that it was necessary to be careful in assessing the causal relationship between Chinese assistance and the growth in African economies and felt that improved governance in China was the most critical need.

The US approach to foreign aid is in the midst of a significant transition as the volume of aid has expanded dramatically, sources have become much more diverse, provision of aid is becoming more conditional, and modes of evaluating the effectiveness of aid are changing. While much of the increase in aid can be attributed to ongoing stabilization and recovery efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the large number of donors from the private sector, especially large foundations, has also changed the focus of assistance. These factors have triggered reform in the way aid programs are administered, especially the increased emphasis on public-private partnerships. Another important feature of the transition is that healthcare has become a significant category of aid along with more traditional categories of development, disaster relief, and diplomacy.

Arguing that the changing landscape of US foreign aid is being driven by a range of domestic policy issues including the ballooning federal budget deficit, a growing sense of social responsibility, and affluence among private foundations, Lancaster felt that the shift from needs-based to a performance-based approach is likely to become a permanent feature of US aid policy. She also anticipated organizational restructuring to reflect the growing influence of the private sector and need for better evaluation methods to determine the effectiveness of aid programs.

A US commentator responded to the presentations by asserting that foreign aid and poverty reduction should be seen as a shared bilateral interest of the US and China. Since the US has acknowledged that it does not have all the answers, there is ample room for China to maintain its own definitions and approaches to addressing the aid issue. The potential mistake of correlating growth in Africa with effectiveness of Chinese aid was again noted and the commentator also warned that while Chinese rhetoric supports a "no strings attached" foreign aid policy, in fact, strings such as non-recognition of Taiwan or favorable access to resources are often at the core of China's foreign aid decisions. Whatever differences exist in how aid is delivered, it is crucial to better understand how aid fits into the bilateral relationship and seek opportunities to better harmonize aid programs.

Another commentator responded that much of the perceived difficulty with transparency in Chinese foreign aid could be explained by the fact that the foreign aid system is complicated and that there are significant differences in the definition of foreign aid. The US focuses on good governance and China focuses on development; the US promotes "software" solutions and China promotes "hardware" solutions; the US emphasizes the use of the private sector and China uses a government-to-government approach. While most of these differences could be attributed to the two countries' different stages of development and globalization, they also reflect differences in

attitudes toward work and the fundamental difference between activist and non-interventionist approaches to foreign aid.

This exchange highlighted another major difference in the respective approaches to foreign aid. While China operates under the assumption that development programs lead to the creation of institutions, the US operates under the assumption that an institutional framework and established policies are necessary to ensure effective delivery of aid. The discussion made clear that foreign aid is an important feature of the foreign policy of both the US and China. As the amount of aid has increased, it has become increasingly clear that assistance is undertaken to promote development in other regions of the world as well as to promote national interests. Plainly, much remains to be done to promote better understanding about how assistance fits into the common goal of creating a more stable international system that promotes sustainable development for all countries and regions.

Climate Change: Challenges and Opportunities

Bo Yan opened the session with her views on lessons learned at the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference held at the end of 2009. Critical of the inefficiencies in the process, Bo argued that too much time was wasted on procedural issues and allowing all participants to have the opportunity to present views. As a result, there was too little time to discuss substantive aspects of the agreement. Beyond these problems, the significant trust deficit between developed and developing countries also led to the near-total failure of the conference. While all parties seem to appreciate the global aspect of the problem, decisions continue to be based primarily on domestic considerations. The developed countries' demand for measurable standards for mitigation and reduction standards burdened developing countries with mitigation measures and made them vulnerable to restrictions over carbon levels. The Copenhagen Conference also made clear that the European Union has lost its leadership role on climate change as it has become too passive while the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) countries were able speak with one voice, gaining significantly more influence in the process.

Bo was skeptical about the prospects for any future agreement under the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Although the Copenhagen agreement was a step in right direction – it was driven from the bottom up rather than top down – it was a political compromise with no binding targets. Given the trust deficit and the lack of any legal standing, it seems almost impossible to reach an enforceable agreement. If a deal is reached in Mexico in 2010, at a minimum it would have to include quantified reduction targets for developed countries and technical and financial assistance for developing countries to help them achieve “nationally appropriate” reduction goals. She concluded by suggesting that a more realistic goal would be to put an appropriate architecture in place before proceeding with specific reduction measures.

The significant potential for cooperation between China and the US was evident in Copenhagen as their willingness to work together at the last minute made an agreement possible. Given the EU's greater passivity, the US and China have emerged as the

principle actors in reducing the trust deficit between developed and developing countries. While there are significant competitive elements in the process, there are opportunities for better cooperation in issues such as the measurable, reportable, and verifiable (MRV) mechanisms needed to move forward. Instead of focusing on targets, the emphasis should be on actions. Since it is well-known that China will not agree to binding commitments, the first step should be to work on financing agreements for MRV mechanisms. This would help reduce mistrust and serve as a demonstration of good faith to help developing countries begin to establish plans for addressing mitigation and reduction measures. Increased interaction between the US and China in the UN and through the Major Economic Forum (MEF) process would also improve coordination in setting the future agenda for global governance of climate change.

The presentation by *Alvin Lin* of the Natural Resources Defense Council focused on the significance of the Copenhagen Conference and the prospects for US-China cooperation on climate change and clean energy. He argued that the Copenhagen agreement focused countries on the need to commit to actions to address carbon emissions. Countries set out carbon reduction goals for the first time, major developed countries (US, EU and Japan) committed to provide \$10 billion per year for “fast-start” financing between 2010-2012 to assist developing countries to address climate change, and the major developing countries (the BASIC countries) committed to more frequent national communications and reports on their emissions. While it was unlikely to complete the process before the Cancun meeting in late 2010, there was renewed progress toward a sustainable treaty. A lesson learned in the process was that it was important to work through smaller groups to reach some level of consensus ahead of the plenary.

Lin was optimistic about the potential for improved US-China bilateral cooperation, especially in green energy initiatives. With the common goal of a low-carbon development model, both countries can focus on reducing dependence on imported oil. For the US, the immediate benefit is found in exporting green technology while China seeks to develop a manufacturing capacity in clean energy. Although implementation of carbon reduction mechanisms will remain a major challenge, cooperation in clean energy initiatives will help reduce the current trust deficit.

A Chinese commentator began the discussion by suggesting that the primary problem with the Copenhagen Conference was more attitude than details. A balancing point between developed and developing countries must be found. In simple terms, the US is not going to give up its high-carbon-use lifestyle and China is not going to easily give up its reliance on coal as a primary source of energy. Meanwhile, it is important to recognize that even though a lot remains to be done, as the presenters pointed out, the developments in Bali and Copenhagen are important steps in the process.

The climate change issue is especially important for China because it is at a critical intersection in its development process. As a rising power, it needs to create a new path in the international system while creating a new pattern of sustainable development to allow continuation on that path. This is an unprecedented problem. While bilateral cooperation with the US on climate change is important, there must also be

collective action at the global level that is extended to include areas such as energy diversification and sustainable development.

Discussion of the Copenhagen Conference showed a deep frustration over the UNFCCC approach to climate change. With 192 voices all wanting to be heard, progress was nearly impossible, especially when each country has different problems and issues that they believe need to be addressed. The fact that the US and China emerged as leaders of the developing and developed countries respectively should be taken as a positive sign that bilateral cooperation on the global level could pay dividends for both countries – if pursued in a consistent and constructive manner. However, global action, especially on building capacity to monitor carbon emissions, remains a critical feature of future cooperation. The challenge of finding an equitable mechanism for sharing the costs of collective action remains at the center of the climate change debate. The need to create a sense of urgency about the consequences of not acting in timely fashion is a domestic challenge for both countries.

Antipiracy Cooperation and Global Governance

In his presentation, *Yang Yi* of the National Defense University addressed US-China cooperation in antipiracy operations. Although the decision by China to engage in international antipiracy operations was a political rather than an operational decision, it has had a major impact on both the PLA Navy's (PLAN's) ability to operate over long distances and its modernization drive. Prior to the deployment of the task force to the Gulf of Aden, the PLAN lacked experience in long-range deployment and the basic navigational and command and control equipment needed for these types of missions. These operations have provided invaluable training and a better understanding of the equipment needed to sustain a task force for periods of extended deployment.

The joint operations in the Gulf of Aden have also been valuable learning opportunities for the PLAN. The opportunity to improve sea fellowship and engage in professional exchanges with the US and other navies operating in the region has led to improved trust and better communication – the fundamental basis for increased cooperation in the future.

Despite these positive developments, Yang remained cautious about how well these experiences will translate into bilateral cooperation between the US and China in other parts of the world. The two navies continue to prepare to fight rather than to cooperate. He argued that a multilateral context, especially under the auspices of the UN, was better and easier than a bilateral one because it was less fragile. Furthermore, cooperation in areas of nontraditional security such as disaster relief and search and rescue should be undertaken first to build confidence and demonstrate mutual benefit before proceeding with more sophisticated forms of cooperation. Ultimately, this can result in burden-sharing in providing a public good in the region – which should not be misinterpreted as seeking to divide the Pacific into spheres of influence but as a means to create a safer maritime environment for everyone.

Next, *Kim Hall*, a research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses who had recently been involved in the antipiracy operation in the Gulf of Aden, offered her perspective on Chinese participation in the operation and the implications for US-China cooperation. She argued that China's participation in combating maritime piracy in the region was driven by basic foreign policy interests. These included economic interests by safeguarding Chinese ships, protecting trade links with the Middle East, Africa, and Europe; military interests by contributing to international maritime security, demonstrating and developing a long-range operational capability; and diplomatic interests by showing support to the international community as a responsible stakeholder in providing a public good.

In discussing operations of the Chinese contingent in the Gulf of Aden, Hall noted that the Chinese were not actually fully integrated into the joint operation since they focused primarily on escorting Chinese vessels and had established a separate sphere of influence by initially establishing a separate transit corridor. Recently, the PLAN indicated that it was interested in integrating its operations into the transit corridor protected by other navies in the region, but had not taken action to complete the transition. The initial reluctance to integrate into the main operation was attributed to the fact that China was a latecomer to the operation. Hall agreed with Yang's assessment that the PLAN had benefited from its decision to engage in the operation by gaining valuable experience in long-range deployment and increased interoperability with other navies. The decision to participate reflects China's expanding view of national interest, a shift to longer-term security priorities, and its desire to be an active participant in global governance.

Despite the generally positive assessment, Hall did not believe the experience necessarily would translate into better US-China cooperation in East Asia or in the Malacca Strait. China's territorial disputes with its neighbors and the fact that navies of Southeast Asian countries bordering the Malacca Strait are capable of patrolling the region would limit the application of the model to that area. She concluded by suggesting that the most likely area of bilateral cooperation would be in counter-proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative or counter-narcotics operations.

The discussion opened with a Chinese commentator acknowledging that maritime issues are a very sensitive area for the US and China, blaming the fundamental difference between the US emphasis on freedom of navigation and the Chinese emphasis on territorial integrity. This made maritime cooperation in East Asia almost impossible even when there is a common interest such as antipiracy. As an alternative, pursuing US-China cooperation in the Indian Ocean, where both are relative newcomers, might have a better chance of success. Others disagreed, insisting that the fundamental difference over rights at sea would be difficult to overcome no matter where they are applied. Moreover, while antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden have reduced the number of hijackings, piracy is a difficult issue because the source of the problem is poverty on land and jurisdiction over the pirates rests with officials on shore and not with the ships' crews. The fact is that the Gulf of Aden operation is protection of shipping rather than antipiracy.

Wrap-up

A major theme that emerged in the wrap-up session is the importance of gaining a better appreciation of core interests. Throughout the discussions, the meaning of “core interests” seemed unclear and was difficult at times to distinguish between interests and objectives, or even tactics. Because these interests figure so prominently in the way each country views the actions of the other, it would be helpful to examine in depth the extent to which these interests are mutually understood and to think more widely and deeply about where there is agreement or disagreement. There was a general sense that the Chinese are more inwardly focused and tend to define core interests narrowly while the US tendency is to be more outward focused and expansive in defining core interests. However, this is changing as China becomes more engaged in international norm-setting activities and its economic ties expand across the globe.

Participants also agreed that the addition of global governance issues was a positive and important step for the dialogue. Regional security issues will continue to influence the pace and trajectory of the bilateral relationship, but gaining a better understanding of the full range of global governance issues that are influenced by the two countries is also important. With the growing appreciation of the nexus between development and security, foreign aid policy clearly play as important role in defining each country’s global interaction. An equally important component of understanding the nature of global governance includes how bilateral cooperation can influence institutional decision making and how interaction in global institutions such as the G20 and the UN influences the ability to improve security cooperation. To this end, it will be useful to further explore other transnational issues that are more directly related to security such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), peacekeeping, and WMD proliferation.

It is important to keep this dialogue relevant and meaningful. This can be done by promoting new ways of thinking about traditional security and being willing to examine new perspectives on emerging developments. Maintaining objectivity while recognizing mistakes and learning from them is a fundamental part of intellectual integrity. By cultivating the spirit that the dialogue is a learning process whereby participants are able to expand their horizons and gain a new appreciation for the other’s perspective, everyone is enriched by participation.

Appendix A

About the Author

Carl BAKER is the director of programs and co-editor of *Comparative Connections* at Pacific Forum CSIS. He is also an adjunct professor at Hawaii Pacific University. Previously he was on the faculty at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies where he lectured and conducted seminars on a variety of security-related topics and led an advanced study course in conflict and negotiations. He has extensive experience in Korea, having served as an international political-military affairs officer for the UN Military Armistice Commission and as a political and economic intelligence analyst for US Forces, Korea. He also lived for extended periods and served in a variety of military staff assignments in Japan, the Philippines, and Guam. A graduate of the US Air War College, he also has an MA in public administration from the University of Oklahoma and a BA in anthropology from the University of Iowa.

Appendix B

The 10th dialogue on

“Sino-U.S. Relations, Regional Security and Global Governance”

Sponsored by

Center for American Studies, Fudan University

Pacific Forum CSIS

The Asia Foundation

May 26-27, 2010

Fudan University

Wednesday, May 26

- 9:00AM **Introduction and Opening Remarks**
Wu Xinbo, Shen Dingli, Ralph Cossa, Jonathan Stromseth
- 9:15AM **Session 1: Developments in Regional Security and Bilateral Relations**
What are the major developments in regional security in the last year?
What are the implications? How have the bilateral relations evolved since last May? How should we interpret the turbulence in bilateral ties earlier this year? Is there a new pattern of interactions between China and U.S.?
- Chair: Ding Xinghao
Presenters: Tao Wenzhao, Michael Glosny
- 10:15AM Coffee Break
- 10:45AM **Session 2: Views of the U.S.-Japan Alliance**
How should we understand the DPJ’s approach to Japan-U.S. alliance?
How will the alliance evolve down the road? What are the implications for U.S. regional security strategy?
- Chair: Ralph Cossa
Presenters: Wu Xinbo, Brad Glosserman
Commentator: Guo Dingping
- 12:00PM Lunch
- 1:30PM **Session 3: Views of Cross-Strait Relations**
Where do the cross-Strait relations stand today? What are the implications of ECFA? How should the two sides address political and security issues? What is the US reaction to progress in cross-Strait relations?

Chair: Ni Shixiong
Presenters: Huang Renwei, Bonnie Glaser
Commentator: Yu Bin

3:00PM Coffee Break

3:30PM **Session 4: Korean Peninsula Issues**

How can the process of denuclearization on the peninsula be restarted?
How does the nuclear issue relate to other concerns on the peninsula?
Should there be broader goals and more comprehensive approaches to the Korean peninsula?

Chair: Chen Dongxiao
Presenters: Liu Ming, Scott Snyder
Commentator: Shen Dingli

5:00PM Adjourn

6:30PM **Welcome dinner at hotel restaurant *HuiXian Room* on the 3rd floor**

Thursday, May 27

9:00AM **Session 5: Foreign Aid Policy and Global Governance**

What are the respective foreign aid policies of China and the U.S.?
Where do they converge and diverge? What are their respective strengths and weaknesses? How should foreign aid help promote global governance?

Chair: Jonathan Stromseth
Presenters: He Wenping, Carol Lancaster
Commentator: Michael Glosny

10:15AM Break

10:30AM **Session 6: Climate Change: Challenges and Opportunities for Cooperation**

What lessons can be drawn from the Copenhagen conference? Is a deal at the Mexico conference still possible? What would a satisfactory deal look like? How should China and the U.S. work to promote global cooperation on climate change?

Chair: John Brandon
Presenters: Bo Yan, Alvi Lin
Commentator: Lu Jing

12:00PM Lunch

1:30PM

Session 7: Antipiracy Cooperation and Global Governance

How should China's efforts in international antipiracy be interpreted?
What are the implications for Sino-U.S. security relations? How can we
build on the joint efforts in the Gulf of Aden to facilitate international
cooperation on antipiracy in other parts of the world?

Chair: Zhu Mingquan

Presenters: Yang Yi, Kim Hall

Commentator: Yuan Peng

3:00PM

Wrap-up

Wu Xinbo, Ralph Cossa

Appendix C

The 10th dialogue on

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