Anchors for an Alliance Adrift:
The Third US-Japan Strategic Dialogue

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Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate areas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

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Key Findings

The Pacific Forum CSIS brought a small, select group of Japanese and American security specialists together for the third time to discuss Japanese threat perceptions and concerns about the changing strategic environment in East Asia and the nature of extended deterrence. The following are the key findings from this off-the-record dialogue:

– The anxiety expressed about the new US administration's Asia policies at the second session (Feb. 2009) has been replaced by anxieties about the policies and practices of the (relatively) new administration in Japan. None would brand the Hatoyama government as "anti-American," but the general feeling was that the "alliance is not in the DPJ's DNA," i.e., that the alliance is not universally accepted as a "normative good" or as a given upon which to base future policy: "nothing goes without saying in the alliance anymore."

– There was no consensus as to whether the current alliance tensions were structural vice personality-driven or if the Futenma issue was the problem or merely a symptom. It was clear, however, that the Okinawa base issue was "sucking the oxygen out of the alliance" and that a failure to successfully resolve this issue would make it difficult to focus on more important long-term issues of alliance management. Both Japanese and Americans expressed concern about Prime Minister Hatoyama's personal credibility in Washington, especially if his self-imposed end of May deadline arrives before a successful resolution of the issue.

– The emphasis placed on the "centrality" of the US-Japan alliance by President Obama, Secretary of State Clinton, and Defense Secretary Gates during their visits to Tokyo and subsequent public statesments has decreased Japanese anxiety, as has the patience generally exhibited by US alliance managers as the DPJ-led administration explores various alternatives to resolve the bases issue. Not sufficiently highlighted has been the broadening level of governmental and private sector cooperation between Washington and Tokyo over the past year.

– Japanese participants expressed increased confidence in America's extended deterrence as a result of the recently-released US Nuclear Posture Review Report (NPR), which has been generally well-received both by the Japanese security community and the Japanese public. This is attributed in large part to the concerted effort made by the Obama administration to consult closely with Japan during the preparation phase.

– While some in the Japanese disarmament community were disappointed that the NPR did not go far enough, security specialists were generally relieved that it did not make a

"no first use" or "sole purpose" declaration since these could potentially weaken deterrence against a North Korean chemical or biological attack.

– One "strategic disconnect" remains between the two sides' nuclear threat perceptions. While Washington, as evidenced by the NPR and President Obama's subsequent Nuclear Security Summit, places the greatest emphasis on the threat posed by non-state actors, the Japanese remind us that their greatest nuclear threat comes from neighboring states that possess nuclear weapons. Without demeaning the non-state actor threat, North Korea's nuclear threat and, to a lesser extent, Chinese and Russian nuclear capabilities, remain Tokyo's primary nuclear concern.

– Increased US reliance on conventional weapons could be problematic for Japan on two counts. First, it raises concerns about the credibility of the US response: would it be sufficient to deter potential adversaries? Second, Japanese might think that they could provide that capability themselves. In addition, many noted that potential adversaries are unlikely to share a vision of a nuclear free world that would be dominated by US conventional power.

– One new source of Japanese anxiety was the presumed "elevation" of China in the NPR. This was generated in part by a misinterpretation of the NPR's call for "strategic dialogue" with China. Some feared that this implied the initiation of arms control talks between Beijing and Washington with an aim at achieving some level of "strategic parity" (as currently exists with Russia), a prospect our Japanese colleagues (and most Americans) would find particularly disconcerting. A dialogue aimed at promoting greater Chinese transparency and increased understanding of nuclear doctrines, aimed at ensuring China's nuclear arsenal would not achieve parity (a concern expressed at last year's dialogue), would be seen as more constructive, although any "strategic dialogue" between Washington and Beijing tends to make Tokyo nervous.

– Although attempts by the Hatoyama government to further improve Sino-Japanese relations are welcomed and applauded, both the Japanese security community and general public continue to view a rising and increasingly confident and assertive China as the primary long-term threat (which makes the maintenance of a strong, viable US-Japan alliance correspondingly essential). Removal of the US security umbrella would more likely result in a Japanese drive for military "self-sufficiency" (i.e., an independent nuclear weapons capability) than a drive toward deeper accommodation with Beijing.

– Japanese concerns expressed last year that the Obama administration would be "too soft" in dealing with North Korea have subsided. Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo all appear to be generally in synch in not wanting to "reward bad behavior" or "pay for the same horse twice." The Obama administration's insistence on denuclearization (and the specific exclusion of North Korea from the NPR's "negative security assurances" pledge) were welcomed, even as the prospects for Six-Party Talks resumption, much less success, appear in question. Concerns were raised about the appropriate response to the Cheonan incident if it was proven, as is generally assumed, that the ROK Navy ship was attacked by a North Korean torpedo. While there was little support for an overt military response,

a failure to pursue punitive measures, preferably via the UNSC, could have a negative impact on the credibility of US extended deterrence, especially if it was perceived that the ROK was not being fully supported (or being held back) by Washington in preparing its response.

– Japanese security horizons are retreating to defense of the homeland and the immediate neighborhood. Out of area activities will be less likely in the future (if they occur at all). There was, however, broad support for increasing links between US alliances in Asia, although the specific form those ties should take is not clear.

Recommendations:

– The generally favorable Japanese response to the NPR shows that a little coordination goes a long way. But it should not stop here. The US and Japan should conduct an expanded dialogue on nuclear security issues, perhaps along the lines of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (despite obvious differences between Japan and NATO), to include details as to the objectives and outcome of any strategic dialogue between the US and China.

– The current US-Japan dialogue on extended deterrence should continue and be expanded to include a discussion of Japanese contributions to deterrence, especially as the role of nuclear weapons is reduced or downplayed in US security strategy.

– Washington and Tokyo both need to lay out their respective visions for East Asia and the role of the alliance in this broader regional vision. Japanese and US security specialists alike remain uncertain as to what the Hatoyama government's foreign policy objectives and priorities are. A new U.S. East Asia Strategy Report (last published in 1998) is also needed to further define and reaffirm the centrality of the US-Japan alliance.

– As we continue to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the alliance, the US and Japan should reaffirm the Common Security Objectives laid out in the 2005 Security Consultative Committee Joint Statement. A quiet review of this document could underscore the continuity of objectives despite changes of government in both countries or at least highlight those areas in which differences now exist and must be resolved.

– There is also a clear need for more education of the Japanese public regarding the utility of the alliance and how it works. The two countries also need a shared definition of "more equal."

– Broader formal trilateral and multilateral cooperation among US allies and like-minded states aimed at promoting regional security and denuclearization would be welcome, including broader cooperation among Japan, South Korea, and the US (beyond Korean Peninsula denuclearization cooperation, which should continue) and India-Japan-US dialogue. Many saw the merits of bringing South Korea and/or India into the current Australia-Japan-US dialogue.

– There was broad general support for a more formal China-Japan-US trilateral dialogue and for the need to keep South Korea fully informed of the proceedings.

For more information, please contact Ralph A. Cossa, President, Pacific Forum CSIS, 808-521-6745, or pacificforum@pacforum.org. These findings reflect the view of the seminar chairman; this is not a consensus document. A full summary of the workshop proceedings is being prepared and will be available upon request.

Third U.S.-Japan Strategic Dialogue
April 26-27, 2010, Maui

Conference Report

This year – 2010 – was supposed to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the US-Japan Security Treaty. Instead, the bilateral relationship has been overwhelmed by the repercussions of the coming to power last year of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The transition to DPJ government was fraught with uncertainty, but most specialists initially saw it as an opportunity to rejuvenate an exhausted polity and inject new energy and ideas into the alliance.

It hasn't worked out that way. Instead, the bilateral relationship has been consumed with one detail of the Okinawa base realignment plan – in the words of one security specialist, "perhaps the least relevant element of the US presence in Asia" – and the failure to move forward darkens prospects for bilateral cooperation on a host of other issues. Doubly frustrating, the problems in Tokyo have materialized as questions about the Obama administration's commitment to the alliance have diminished, and as US policy appears to move closer to long-held Japanese positions. The pendulum has swung.

Nuclear policy is central to alliance concerns. Nuclear weapons are part of the extended deterrent that is at the heart of the US-Japan alliance. North Korea's nuclear program is considered a direct threat to Japan's security and other more broadly defined security interests of the US. China's nuclear weapons are part of the regional and strategic balance of power. The Japanese public is deeply committed to the idea of nuclear disarmament and its politicians have wrestled – with varying degrees of success – with the contradiction between that belief and the centrality of nuclear weapons to the country's security.

For three years, the Pacific Forum CSIS, with support from the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), has held a strategic dialogue that brings together a small, select group of specialists from the United States and Japan to explore the two nations' thinking about nuclear weapons and nuclear policy, to understand each country's concerns, to see where their thinking diverges, and to develop recommendations that help move the relationship forward on these issues. (This is part of a series of strategic dialogues with Northeast Asian allies and partners; the ability to compare and contrast conclusions from the meetings is invaluable.) The third meeting was held in Maui, Hawaii on April 25-27. The senior specialists were joined by 12 Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders to provide a next generation perspective on the issues under consideration.

National Perceptions of International Security Concerns

We began by contrasting perspectives on security concerns. A US presenter argued that the Obama administration was developing a security policy framework that

went beyond the global war on terror, but it had yet to articulate a genuine strategy. The result was an instrumental approach to security policy that had not yet coalesced into a single doctrine. In this mindset, Afghanistan is a challenge in its own right, divorced from Iraq and more than a battlefield in the global war against terror. While nonstate actors are critical in this new approach and nonproliferation is one of the administration's foremost concerns, states are no less vital, which creates an emphasis on engagement. When scanning the globe to see how this approach has been applied, no single trend emerged. This new mindset also emphasizes nontraditional security concerns, such as climate change, which have potential spillover effects. Finally, it isn't clear how the administration will reconcile the twin demands – deterrence/defense and disarmament – of the president's thinking about nuclear weapons.

In Asia, the Obama administration appears largely satisfied. There is sufficient stability to allow it to focus on other more pressing issues. The long-time US goal of maintaining a presence and balance of power favorable to its national interests endures. Our presenter argued that many in the administration see China as the region's eventual leader and, as a result, US policies reflect a desire to maintain a positive relationship with Beijing. Taiwan, a longstanding problem in US-China relations, is less of a concern, the result of improved cross-Strait relations.

The US is still struggling to figure out how it can accommodate rising states and the growing emphasis on multilateral organizations. Washington is engaging regional organizations and institutions and forging more durable relationships with rising powers in the region, such as Indonesia and Malaysia. Our presenter was less impressed with engagement with allies and the administration's assessment of how they fit into a broader strategy: politics seems to prevail over strategy. He suggested that this led to benign neglect of allies.

Our Japanese presenter used the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to frame his comments, arguing that Northeast Asia is a showcase for its four-prong methodology. The region has conventional threats, such as the prospect of war on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait; irregular threats, such as those posed by North Korean special forces; catastrophic threats posed by the presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and disruptive threats emanating from the prospect of a shift in the balance of power caused by Japan's decline and the rise of China.

China's rise throws the longest shadow over security calculations in Northeast Asia, although our presenter argued – only half in jest – that the most serious security concern in Japan right now is the administration in Tokyo. A recent study by the Foreign Ministry concluded that by 2040 the Chinese economy would be comparable to that of the US and its defense spending would be close to US levels, although qualitative differences would remain. In this environment, the most pressing issue is shaping Chinese policy and its security posture. Our presenter was not optimistic about Japan's ability to respond. He sees a nation disinclined to increase defense spending to needed levels and forced to make increasingly sharp choices.

Our presenter concluded by noting that the most recent QDR was encouraging in its focus on regionalism and working with allies, but worried about Japan's ability to meet those demands. For him, the alliance may be going "back to basics," a reversal of the last 15 years of expansion of bilateral security relations.

Several themes dominated discussion. First was concern over the degree of US engagement with the region and its ability to lead. Participants from both countries noted that Washington is seemingly preoccupied with issues elsewhere in the world – or by events in the capital – and worried about "benign neglect" of regional problems: US policy makers were often described as "distracted." Even if this isn't true – and frequent visits by top decision makers to the region along with meetings with their counterparts in the US should discredit that notion – the perception remains.

China's rise and role in the region consumed considerable time. China's growth anticipates and enables a shift in the balance of power, but *within* the region, not necessarily across the Pacific. Thus, a Japanese speaker highlighted the power transition in Japan-China relations, not in US-China relations. This obligates Japan to do more to maintain balance within Asia and to ensure the alliance's significance and utility. A central question – left unanswered – was how China's growing power will impact US thinking about its forward presence in the region. Will the US rely more on long-range capabilities or "harden" local assets? Another participant reminded the group that China's quantitative advantages will be balanced by quality problems. Chinese capabilities will depend on the battlefield; the closer to China's home territory, the more effective the PLA will be.

North Korea continues to be a problem, but US participants insisted that policy is unchanged: Washington remains committed to the denuclearization of North Korea. Fears that the US is content to "manage" a nuclear North Korea or settle for nonproliferation (rather than rollback) are misplaced. A US participant did observe that the US considers Iran a more pressing issue now and will be focusing on that problem. That does not signal a diminution in concern about the North Korean threat, however.

The third topic was the Japanese outlook. Japanese participants agreed with the Japanese presenter that their nation's security horizons are shrinking. Several cautioned against expecting much from Japan when it comes to out-of-area security operations. That does not mean that Japan won't do anything, but we were told that the Iraq deployment was a one-off. (Primarily because Japanese policy makers recognize the drain on other nation's resources created by the SDF's requirement that they provide for its security.) One Japanese speaker noted that such operations have other benefits for the Self-Defense Forces: they build confidence among neighbors, spur networking among militaries, and build the SDF's confidence. Japanese speakers conceded that most Japanese don't see their national interests threatened by developments so far from home; they are inclined to see Japanese actions as a response to pressure to act on behalf of the alliance. This, it was argued, is not a strong foundation for action.

Japanese participants flatly denied any "tilt" toward China. While there is a desire to forge a more cooperative relationship with China, there are no illusions about the ability to overcome longstanding obstacles in that relationship. The recent joint history study underscored the inability of the two sides to agree on many issues; the recent transit by the largest Chinese fleet ever near Okinawa was a signal to Japan that such differences are not abstract. One Japanese highlighted the disconnect between the security and political communities: despite a decade of warnings about rising Chinese capabilities, there has been no increase in Japanese defense spending. There is little indication of "balancing" in Japanese defense policy.

One 'Cassandra' argued that this implied the Japanese think about "threats" not power, and they are inclined to think those "threats" won't materialize. This raised a broader issue: should the appropriate focus of security planning be on the US-Japan *alliance* or the US-Japan *relationship*? This is more than a semantic distinction. A focus on a new and expanded set of security concerns engages different actors, and draws on different skills and national assets. This process could occur outside the traditional alliance framework and could strengthen and reinvigorate the relationship.

This presents problems as well, however. The alliance is the product of a legal document – the US-Japan Security Treaty – that creates a military relationship. The broader "relationship" is more encompassing and far less rooted institutionally. It isn't clear how to coordinate the new actors that would be engaged in this expanded framework, or if they are even interested in being involved. (A Japanese participant noted that the enthusiasm for working with the US that animates the Foreign Ministry's North American Affairs Bureau is not shared throughout the building.)

Two issues were noticeable by their absence in the discussion. The first was Russia. No one challenged the proposition that Russia is an increasingly marginal force in Northeast Asia. Even the melting of the Arctic ice and the prospect of a trade route that is open year round from Asia to Europe did not change our thinking.

A second topic that got short shrift was the economic environment. The global downturn has shaped perceptions of the US – it has weakened the US image and distracted Washington – and diminished the resources the US and its allies can devote to security issues. Japan's enduring slump feeds a hostility to defense spending in general, and several participants noted that the country cannot stave off the "rebalancing" of Asia if current trends continue. One Japanese speaker said that reducing inefficiencies in procurement can provide marginal gains, but he insisted that only long-term commitments will sustain Japan's defense posture. Payoffs come only after decades; he is not optimistic about his country's readiness to make those down payments.

Security Dynamics in US and Japan

The second session explored security dynamics in Tokyo and Washington – the forces shaping security policy and the institutions "processing" the threats identified in the preceding discussion. For our Japanese presenter, the key concern is not the viability

of the nation's security policy, but the capabilities of the current political leadership. He didn't have to review the problems that have surfaced in the alliance since the coming to power of the new government headed by the DPJ. The complaints are familiar, as are the explanations for the seeming inability of the alliance to move beyond its current difficulties. The failings of the country's politicians obligates other policy makers – bureaucrats in particular – to step up and keep the alliance focused and functioning.

The key challenge is mustering shrinking resources to face growing threats. For our presenter, both Japanese and US resources are dwindling. The alliance remains strong but the gap between it and its challengers is shrinking. In keeping with a theme heard throughout our meeting, our speaker urged the two countries to focus on the defense of Japan and the stability of the region, as opposed to having a higher security profile elsewhere in the world.

Japan needs to think creatively about security. One way to increase its options is tackling "taboos": the restriction on collective security activities, the ban on arms exports, restrictions on defense spending. Tokyo needs to ask questions about and begin discussions of issues that have previously been off the table. One such topic is deterrence. Without going into operational details, the two countries need to talk about threats, targets, and options. Japan should also be exploring ways to leverage its relations with US allies. He urged the two countries to think about "networks," not just "hubs and spokes." Finally, Japanese politicians need to do more to make the case for the alliance to the Japanese public. They need to sell the alliance to their constituents.

He also endorsed the two allies reaching out to Asian nations. They should be both engaging with and hedging against China. Our two nations, along with China and the ROK, should be preparing for a contingency involving North Korea. Other US allies and partners should be sitting with Japan and the US to talk about common concerns, problems, and complaints. (He noted that it would be good for the Japanese government to hear other Asian nations making the case for the US-Japan alliance.) India is another target for US-Japan engagement, as is Indonesia and ASEAN as a whole. The latter raises another topic: the evolution of regional architecture. There are a plethora of institutions and their sheer multiplicity is becoming an issue. US engagement is welcome but Japan and the US should be working together to develop a strategy that addresses coherently and consistently the full range of options and ensures that time and resources are used well.

Our US presenter worried that the alliance is being taken for granted. He warned that there is nothing in US-Japan relations "that goes without saying anymore." That said, the bilateral alliance continues to be strong and is a vital institution. He identified the two countries' shared values as "the keel" of the relationship and the extended deterrent the US offers Japan as the superstructure.

That raises a question that is at the heart of this dialogue: how comfortable is Japan with US nuclear policy and the US desire, as articulated in the new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), to decrease its reliance on nuclear weapons in its deterrent? While the

Obama vision of a world without nuclear weapons has been well received in Japan, our speaker sensed uneasiness with the NPR. He believes that concerns about a diminution of the US commitment to Japan's defense should be muted: there was a great deal of consultation (the word he used was "unprecedented"); Japanese views were considered in the drafting process; and the declaratory language doesn't rule out nuclear retaliation against North Korea or concede strategic vulnerability to China, the two worries made most forcefully during the consultation process.

Nevertheless, the alliance is in a period of transition. The changes in Japan are part of this process, but so too is the thinking articulated in the NPR. Yet against this backdrop of change are enduring security challenges: his list looked a lot like those identified in the first session. Within a "nuclear context," the two biggest concerns are China and North Korea. Both need to be tackled nationally, from an alliance perspective, and from a larger regional perspective. Our presenter argued that China's growth is a reason for Japan to engage more deeply in Asia. He reminded the group that expanding US-China ties will not come at the expense of the US-Japan relationship. He also reminded Japanese participants that there is concern in China about long-term Japanese intentions.

He agreed with speakers in the previous session who urged the alliance to get back to basics and focus on fundamentals. The two countries need to consolidate political ties and build support for the alliance among both publics. The foundation of the alliance needs to be strengthened.

The bulk of our discussion explored issues in Japan as its changes seem more jarring and harder to understand. Japanese were sympathetic to US complaints about a lack of transparency about decisionmaking in Tokyo; they bemoaned the fact that even they couldn't assess what was going on. Several highlighted the disconnect between the political and security communities; there was "a sense of helplessness" even among individuals identified as part of the government's policy process. Several Japanese participants experienced difficulty engaging politicians on these issues.

There was virtual unanimity among our Japanese participants that the decision-making process in Tokyo has changed and there is no going back. It isn't clear how future decisions will be made, but several speakers warned that politicians are going to be in charge; bureaucrats will play a critical but more subordinate role than in the past. (One Japanese participant countered that view, insisting few Japanese politicians are interested in security issues, the controversy surrounding relocation of the Futenma air facility being an exception. Another Japanese analyst agreed, calling for perspective: there may be frustration with Japanese politicians today, but there were frustrations aplenty with their predecessors as well.)

Yet another Japanese cautioned against painting too dark a picture, arguing that a DPJ government can be innovative in ways that LDP governments could not. They can challenge the left and take on the unions, groups traditionally hostile to the alliance. He urged the US to look more closely at some Japanese decisions and note that they open the

door to important shifts that help the alliance. For example, the conclusion of the controversy surrounding the "secret nuclear agreements" might open the door to a more flexible policy regarding transit of such weapons. Cooperation with Australia in preparation for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference led to a call by the two countries for all nations to cut production of nuclear arms – a position that explicitly criticizes China, something that hasn't been done before.

Alliance Dynamics

This led to a discussion of alliance dynamics. For our Japanese presenter, the first decade of this century was a steady march toward a deeper and more equal partnership. This yielded a declaration of common strategic objectives and a roadmap that would help the allies realize those aims. Yet, in December 2009 that process was reversed, "and we have no clear answers why."

He blamed "excessive self-congratulation and complacency" among alliance handlers. The two countries developed new responsibilities, new capabilities, and new ways of burden sharing, but throughout the process there was little explanation to the Japanese public about their impact. The result was a Japanese public uninformed about the nature of their relationship with the US and sympathy for the DPJ call for a "more equal" relationship.

Moreover, he complained that the Japanese public draws an unrealistic line between security cooperation and military cooperation. While there is recognition of the need for the former, most Japanese don't appreciate that the military can be used to keep the peace rather than make war. Our presenter argued that Hatoyama wants to pursue security cooperation, not military cooperation. He isn't anti-American, but he does want to limit military cooperation to the minimum possible, promoting bilateral cooperation on nontraditional security issues instead.

Repeating a theme that had surfaced previously, our speaker blamed confusion in Tokyo for poor relations between the US and Japan (despite general agreement among the two on regional and global issues). He highlighted a lack of coordination within Tokyo regarding the alliance and foreign and security policy in general, pointing to rhetoric that seemed devoid of content, such as "the East Asian Community" and "deepening the alliance."

Still, our Japanese presenter professed himself optimistic in the medium- to long-term. He conceded that it was only natural for a new government to take time to find its feet and applauded the continuation of a robust debate among foreign and security policy experts. Finally, and most significant, all Japanese political parties support the alliance. He recommended that once the confusion in Tokyo ends, the two countries should return to the basic objectives identified in the 2005 Security Consultative Committee statement and use that as a guide to chart the future of the alliance. He endorsed modifying the alliance in two ways: paying more attention to and putting more emphasis on soft power and preparing for an international environment in which the distribution of power is

changing. He urged the US and Japan to identify theirs as "an alliance of status quo powers."

Our US presenter echoed much of that assessment. Most Americans characterize the state of the alliance as precarious in the short term but solid overall. There is agreement that the alliance plays a critical role in US foreign policy, is the cornerstone of US engagement with the region, and that Japan is a key partner for US foreign policy. While most Americans would seek a greater Japanese role in regional and global security management – this is how Americans describe a "more equal" alliance – there is the fear that previous Japanese governments promised more than they, or the country, could deliver.

Looking ahead, our speaker identified four key challenges for the alliance. The first is the role of public opinion; to remedy this, both countries need to do more to educate publics about the value of the alliance. The second is disagreements about what constitutes an ideal alliance, and the appropriate roles and burdens assumed by each country. The third is developing honest and open communications between the two. Japan needs to rely less on gaiatsu as motivation for doing its part. Finally, the alliance needs to be looking ahead to see how it will deal with changing regional dynamics. The alliance has to anticipate and adapt to a future that will look considerably different from the present. Fortunately, our speaker pointed out that those changes are unlikely to be any more striking than those that characterize the first 50 years of the alliance. All four are difficult in the best of times; they will be even more so after the acrimony of recent months.

While all the participants shared the view that the US-Japan alliance is vital to both countries and can and should be maintained, there was a robust discussion of ways to make that happen. The first order of business is stopping the damage that is being done – gratuitously – to the alliance. Participants from both countries decried leaks that characterize Prime Minister Hatoyama as "loopy," saying they do the relationship a disservice and their impact may linger long after the prime minister's term in office. Beyond that, however, the two have to ensure that we have a common understanding of key concepts: not just about strategy, but even basic themes like "equality" and "assurance." It appears that the two sides use the same words to mean different things.

This reflects a lack of understanding about the role of the alliance and how it contributes to national security in both nations. While the US seems concerned first and foremost about the threat posed by non-state actors that might get their hands on nuclear weapons, Japan worries about state actors as well. As one Japanese participant bluntly explained, Japan is surrounded by states with nuclear weapons. "The US is our best partner and ally to guarantee our autonomy in this situation." Another Japanese participant noted that more surrounding states have ballistic missiles and the US plays an equally important role in protecting Japan from them.

Once again, the need for education surfaced, but this time there was some push back: participants from both countries argued that education can only go so far in

countering deeply held beliefs. One Japanese participant suggested finding constituencies that have a stake in the alliance but may not know or fully appreciate it, and explaining to them its advantages in specific terms. Another Japanese participant highlighted the need to reach out to young Japanese politicians; this is increasingly urgent if, in fact, procedures have changed and politicians will play an increasingly central role in foreign and security policy decision-making.

A Japanese participant disagreed strongly with the idea that redefining the alliance meant scaling back Japanese contributions on military issues and thinking about security more broadly. He insisted that even a global alliance must have a military core. After all, that is the purpose of an alliance. Alliance supporters should not provide political leaders a way to sidestep key issues, especially given the centrality of the military to regional challenges.

We debated again the nature of those challenges. One US participant disagreed with the Japanese presenter's call for "an alliance of status quo powers," argued instead that the alliance should aim to manage the power transition that is occurring in Asia. Maintaining the status quo isn't an option. Another American challenged that conclusion, saying that China is growing in size, but the US continues to be the overwhelming presence – and argued that we (both Americans and Japanese) should not be encouraging the perception that China is in a position to overtake the US. Other US participants chimed in, noting that the US (with allies and partners) was in a position to shape Chinese behavior in positive ways. One suggested that it was US influence that has declined, not its power, and that is because Washington has not punished states that misbehave. From his perspective – and it was not his alone – alliance fundamentals haven't changed because the security situation in the region has not changed: there continues to be significant external threats to the security of countries that require a strong US presence to counter.

Perhaps it was the lateness of the day, but more pessimistic views surfaced at this point. One Japanese speaker noted that agreement on goals and objectives is nice, but a failure to agree on priorities can render that consensus empty. A US participant explained that shared goals are meaningless in the absence of meaningful cooperation to achieve them: working toward the same end is not genuine partnership.

Another US participant laid out a harsh critique of the alliance, suggesting that many of the premises that supporters rely on are false: Japan is not seeking to lead on international issues but merely seeks status; the government has no international vision and that failure reflects a more general uncertainty in the country as a whole. The prospect of taking "a time out" while Japan sorts out new political realities is unrealistic as the pace of change accelerates in the country and the region: demographic changes, along with other economic and social trends will leave Japanese leaders with fewer choices. Our dissenter argued that Japan was not experiencing a moment of difficulty but was moving the ship of state closer to the real sentiment of the Japanese public and no amount of education would change that fundamental outlook. Finally, he pointed to rising frustration in the US with Japan and suggested that the US lower its expectations to

reduce the prospect of a break if there is a crisis and Japan does not respond as anticipated.

That screed prompted some push back as well. One US participant suggested that there has been more cooperation than many observers want to acknowledge – ironically, it has been in Japan's interest to keep a low profile. Education should alert the public to those facts as well.

Nuclear Dynamics

In our second day, we burrowed in on nuclear issues. We began with a *US presentation on nuclear dynamics*, which commenced with a look at the recently concluded US-Russia New START agreement. This deal cuts the number of strategic warheads to 1,500 and holds launchers at 800. This is an important step in the rejuvenation of arms negotiations and opens the door to future cuts in strategic arsenals as a way of making credible President Obama's commitment to disarmament.

He then turned to the newly released NPR. Its five objectives include: preventing nuclear terrorism, reducing the salience of nuclear arms in US doctrine and strategy, maintaining strategic deterrence and stability, strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring partners, and ensuring that the US has a safe and secure nuclear arsenal. He then showed how each of those goals applies to Northeast Asia.

The US intends to prevent North Korea proliferating its nuclear knowhow (especially to the Middle East). He flatly denied – as do all official US documents and official comments – that the US would ever accept Pyongyang as a nuclear weapon state, although the Ballistic Missile Defense Review "assumes that sooner or later North Korea will have a successful missile test and mate a nuclear warhead to a proven delivery system."

Reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in US security strategy is a multifaceted task, employing increased reliance on missile defense – and this is especially noteworthy given the traditional Democratic Party resistance, if not hostility, to the program – and increasing resort to conventional capabilities. This raises a host of concerns, many of which are taken up later, regarding Japanese comfort with this shift, especially if the country is attacked with weapons of mass destruction. This relates to the third objective, maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at a reduced level, especially since other nations seem to be building up their nuclear arsenals (China, India, North Korea) or appear to be relying more heavily on nuclear weapons in their national security strategy (Russia).

This goes to the heart of the debate concerning objective four, maintaining regional deterrence and assuring partners. Our presenter noted the US has been withdrawing its forward-based nuclear weapons for some time. Japan may worry about the decommissioning of the TLAM-N, but he suggested that the weapon is not especially effective in the current operating environment. Nonetheless, the changes do create

uncertainty and they focus on one simple question: can forward deployed forces and missile defense assure allies and deter adversaries as the nuclear umbrella has done for the past 50 years?

Our discussion began with a simple reminder (from the NPR): "as long as our adversaries have nuclear weapons, deterrence requires a nuclear component." That was intended to allay concerns that have surfaced in previous strategic discussions about the ultimate goal of a US policy to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and head toward genuine disarmament. In other words, it will be a long journey, during which the US will harbor no illusions about what is needed to protect itself and its allies and to maintain security and stability. The "carve out" in the NPR regarding US readiness to use nuclear weapons against states not in compliance with their NPT commitments – North Korea and Iran – is an attempt to address that issue directly.

Overall, Japanese participants gave the NPR high marks. (Their comments indicated that the New START treaty had little impact on the extended deterrent.) They applauded the process itself, which included extensive consultations with allies, the Japanese in particular, and felt their views had been considered and incorporated into the final product. (This consultation even extended to the New START treaty.) They acknowledged the consistency with the previous NPR: continuation of the new triad (even if that phrase wasn't used) and the decreased reliance on nuclear weapons. They were especially pleased to see that the US did not abandon its previous reluctance to adopt a "no first use policy" or even "a single purpose" policy. One Japanese participant did note that the latter is an interesting idea, worthy of more discussion.

There was extended discussion of the decision to cancel the TLAM-N. A Japanese participant noted that Japan was not opposed to that step; reports to that effect were wrong. Another Japanese explained that their concern is not operational – he suggested the weapon was not part of the extended deterrent but is part of the strategic arsenal – and Japanese worry about the degree to which eliminating the program reduces US leverage in a crisis.

Once again, linguistic precision is important: the adequacy of a deterrent depends on what precisely is being deterred. Are we talking about the use of nuclear weapons or conflict in general? Several participants noted that the US arsenal had failed to prevent North Korea from taking any number of actions that the US, its allies, and the international community did not like. Ominously, our meeting occurred shortly after the *Cheonan* incident. If, as suspected, North Korea was responsible, then it wasn't deterred from an act of war (the sinking of an ROK Navy corvette) by the US nuclear arsenal. One US participant suggested that nuclear weapons in fact have no military utility and are at best symbols of political commitment; another US participant noted with some alarm that the US may well be deterred from responding to North Korean acts because of its nuclear capabilities. If Pyongyang thinks this to be the case, then it could become increasingly reckless and aggressive. (Others noted that the US was deterred from responding militarily to North Korean acts of aggression long before the North had a bomb, given its conventional artillery and rocket threat to Seoul.)

One Japanese participant was almost dismissive of the new NPR, pointing out that it is really a policy review, not a posture review; as declaratory policy, it can be changed at any time. For him, there are real concerns about the commitment to maintaining the US nuclear weapons complex. He pointed out, to nodding heads around the table, that this is a generational task and one to which much more attention must be paid. Once knowledge is lost or programs lag or fail, it is difficult if not impossible to compensate.

Japanese participants did question the meaning of the phrase "strategic stability" in the NPR, particularly in reference to China. Beijing has sought "mutual vulnerability" with the US for years and US interlocutors insist use of that phrase by a US policy-maker is politically impossible.[1] "Strategic stability" may offer that assurance without uttering the forbidden phrase. Japanese are concerned that this reduces US leverage and could lead to Washington decoupling itself from Tokyo in the event of a crisis. One US participant only half jokingly labeled the term the equivalent of "MAD lite," while another US speaker pointed out that some sense of US vulnerability is going to be required if China is ever to join multilateral arms negotiations.

The US plan to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its military raises important questions of its own. First, do potential US adversaries agree that this is a good thing? As one US participant noted, it is unlikely that they will agree to a policy "that makes the world safe for US conventional power predominance." And, most indications are that they do not; as noted, Russia is increasing its reliance on nuclear forces as its conventional capabilities erode and China is building up and modernizing its strategic arsenal, very much independent of US policy. In fact, one Japanese participant suggested that rising US conventional capabilities – a direct result of a diminished reliance on nuclear weapons – might drive opponents to rely *even more* on their nuclear arsenals.

Second, do US allies share that goal? One Japanese participant flatly denied it. He argued that his country's enthusiasm for disarmament is naïve and that the strategic community is deeply divided: "Don't take a Japanese consensus on nuclear weapons for granted." He also questioned whether Japanese would support greater reliance on conventional capabilities, in theory or in practice. That objection takes on additional significance since greater resort to conventional capabilities means that allies can (or would be expected to) contribute more to the deterrent. It was suggested that Japan can provide air and missile defense in the area southwest of Japan, or enhanced submarine and antisubmarine capabilities. Another Japanese speaker worried however that this might create tensions in the alliance and prompt Japanese to ask why they had to rely on the US at all.

We then heard a *Japanese perspective on nuclear dynamics*. He noted that it is truly a dynamic situation, with developments on multiple levels, all of which interact. There is the bilateral US-Russia relationship; relations among the NPT nuclear weapon states (and the key question is how to engage them in multilateral talks); the non-NPT nuclear weapon states (India, Pakistan, Israel); rogue states within the NPT (North Korea

[1] For more on this, see reports from US-China Strategic Dialogues, at which this has been a regular bone of contention.

and Iran); and nonstate actors and terrorists. Each requires a different deterrence calculus and a "fitted" response. No "one size fits all nuclear doctrine" can address them all.

Japan can play a role in tailoring deterrence to each situation. As two examples, it can provide diplomatic assistance or can help build nonproliferation and counterproliferation capacity in other nations. Our speaker called for a comprehensive review by both governments of ways Japan can contribute and the two nations can work together. This will require more cooperation between arms controllers and alliance managers, two constituencies that have not historically engaged each other. He also suggested this might provide an opportunity for a joint statement or action plan when President Obama visits Japan in the fall.

He again applauded the goal of the NPR but noted that no policy can be static given the (deteriorating) situation in Northeast Asia. The US, with its allies, needs to continually assess the regional situation and adjust its response. He endorsed the deployment of missile defense; use of conventional power projection; development of an integrated command and control system; the maintenance of nonstrategic nuclear weapons for reassurance; and flexible deployment of nuclear-capable bombers in Asia and their forward deployment in crisis to provide reassurance of the US commitment to Japan's defense.

Japan also very much appreciates that the NPR didn't adopt a "sole purpose" policy. Japanese strategists believe that the threat of a nuclear response deters CBW attacks. As our speaker put it, "US nuclear weapons simplify North Korean calculations."

As noted, China's quest for "mutual vulnerability" worries Japanese strategists. The key question is very simple: what strategic relationship does Washington seek with Beijing? This invites a host of other questions. What is the meaning of the US desire to open a strategic dialogue with China? How will missile defenses impact Chinese capabilities? According to our speaker, Japan wants enduring US dominance over China in the region. Any prospect of balance could spark decoupling. While our speaker conceded that US-China strategic talks have value, he would feel better if they were trilateral (and Japan was at the table). Some Japanese participants feared that any discussion with Beijing would "elevate" China and send the wrong signal.

Most of the discussion focused on ways of reassuring Japan of the ongoing US commitment to its defense. The results were, well, not reassuring. Ultimately, we agreed that this is the realm of psychology and credibility depends on the context in which a commitment is demanded and offered. As noted, the consultative process that was incorporated into this NPR worked well. But that process cannot end merely because the NPR is complete. If Japan's concern with "equality" within the alliance is real, then an ongoing consultative process is essential.

But as several participants pointed out, there are few models available for nuclear consultations. Several individuals referenced the Nuclear Planning Group in Europe, but in the next breath all conceded that it couldn't be applied to Japan. One Japanese said

even a dual key arrangement is irrelevant when the real issue is credibility. Another Japanese participant noted that what is needed is discussion of how deterrence works; there is no desire to know the specific circumstances of nuclear use. (He is well aware that the US won't share that information anyway.)

A US participant asked how Japan would respond if Korea asked for the deployment of nuclear-armed bombers to Kadena as a signal to North Korea. The consensus response was it should be done – quietly. And all other options should be explored first.

We devoted considerable time to the prospects for arms control discussions with China. The conclusion was not good. China has shown little inclination to join arms controls, insisting that the US and Russia must act first since they possess the overwhelming majority of the world's nuclear weapons. Beijing says it will join multilateral talks "when the time is right," suggesting that time will have arrived when those two countries' arsenals approximate that of China. The fear that China might "build up" when the US and Russia get in range is dismissed as groundless by Chinese interlocutors. And, Chinese strategists have made it clear that they see multilateral talks as a device to halt or reverse their military modernization programs.

An American participant suggested that a US-China arms control agreement will be very different from deals the US struck with Russia. He proposed that a new concept for negotiations might be needed, and that the initial focus will be political relations (which if successful might eliminate the need for an actual arms agreement). Another US participant noted that Japan shouldn't be alarmed by any strategic dialogue that Washington holds with Beijing since Japan is threatened by medium-range ballistic missiles, not the ICBMs that would be the subject of any such dialogue. A Japanese participant countered that Japan's leverage may be increasing as its improved missile defense capabilities may be able to intercept China's medium-range missiles. Another Japanese participant urged both the US and Japan to focus on South Asia, as its rivalry with India is an increasingly important part of Beijing's strategic calculus. This should spur US-Japan cooperation to halt nuclear trafficking in that region.

A Japanese speaker reminded us of the stakes involved in reassuring the Japanese. He argued that his nation's commitment to a nonnuclear status reflected a cost-benefit calculus; part of the calculus is the belief that no other country in the region can become a nuclear weapon state. North Korea has the potential to change that calculus. We were also reminded repeatedly that there is a "disconnect" between US and Japanese views of the nuclear threat. Indeed, one of the key takeaways from this discussion was that the US is giving more attention to the prospect of nonstate actors gaining access to WMD, while in Northeast Asia the overriding concern remains states with nuclear weapons.

Enhancing Collaboration

In the final session, speakers tried to chart a course for the future of the alliance. Our Japanese speaker focused on the political dimension of the relationship, "which is

increasingly in question." Despite the priority both governments ascribe to the alliance, the considerable attention that has been given to it, and the resources both nations devote to it, our speaker could still ask if both countries know what the alliance is for or against. The nuclear debate goes to the heart of this relationship as the partners have to balance the need to maintain a credible deterrent with the move toward global zero. A constant dialogue between the US and Japan is needed as both countries work through the implications of regional developments and changes in each country. The current dialogue is good but it isn't enough.

Japan has its own agenda to sort through. It needs a national security strategy, one that explains its role in the region, the role of the alliance in promoting Japanese national interests, and what Japan can do to promote those interests in the security field. It should work with other US allies to build better relations between and among them. There should be a general security dialogue, in which policy toward China is an integral part of that agenda. First, however, Japan has to sort out its political situation.

Our US presenter painted a much darker picture, arguing that the foundation of the US-Japan alliance "is crumbling." The new US administration had a rosy vision of Asia and events have quickly changed its thinking: China has not proven to be ready to be a responsible stakeholder, Japan's election results created more confusion than anticipated, and North Korea has proven determined to reject the US's outstretched hand.

In this environment, the alliance is more important than ever, but the allies can't agree on what their partnership is for and what the alliance will do until the DPJ answers those questions for itself. As he warned, "Tokyo used to view the alliance as an intrinsic good; now it's being taken for granted." Until that mindset changes, all the opportunities for cooperation – humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, interdiction of illegal activities, trilateral meetings – will be on hold. Our speaker worried that the US won't wait for Japan to make up its mind and will try to work around an unreliable ally. He is especially concerned about personal chemistry between the two countries' top leaders, noting that this is particularly important when trying to hold tri- and multilateral meetings.

Participants provided a long list of ways to move forward. One suggested that the two governments revisit the 2005 SCC joint declaration and agenda and "reaffirm" that vision when the two leaders meet in the fall. To raise awareness of the importance of the alliance to Japan, it was suggested that security experts in both countries reach out to new and younger politicians. More delegations from the US should visit Japan to send a signal of its importance to the US; governments in Asia should also be encouraged to tell Tokyo how important they consider the alliance.

Several US participants agreed with the US presenter that the alliance is in trouble. They suggested that the prevailing vision for US-Japan cooperation, institutionalized in the Nye-Armitage reports, is outdated and unrealistic. The continued existence of the alliance will depend on scaling back US expectations. The focus should be on developing options that are fiscally and politically sustainable in Japan.

As noted, several Japanese participants concurred with that conclusion even if they shied away from the logic that led to it. They believe Japan should go back to basics when considering roles and missions. But Japan should embrace more transparency as it does so, so that Japanese citizens, allies, and potential adversaries can see what the country is doing and appreciate the importance of the alliance to the country's national security. One Japanese participant argued that a deterrence dialogue can be a vehicle to push for a bigger role for Japan and to lay out what more it can do to contribute to the alliance and its mission to deter adversaries. While conceding that these are tough times, he pushed back against the notion that political difficulties are preventing all cooperation. (There was at least one dissenter among the Japanese who believes that the alliance can return to the higher levels of participation and contribution of the past.)

Considerable attention was devoted to ways to galvanize the alliance. Speakers from both countries agreed that the bilateral agenda should be broadened to bring more constituencies into the relationship and recognize its value. One US participant dismissed the idea that education – which was endorsed throughout the meeting – would have a profound impact; he, along with others, said it would take an external crisis to change thinking in Japan. While the *Cheonan* incident apparently didn't do the trick, another US participant noted that an internal change – such as the decision to transfer war-time operational command of military forces back to the ROK – might prove a forcing event.

Japanese were also closely watching how the US and ROK responded to the *Cheonan* incident. No one was pushing for a military response but all understood the need to send Pyongyang a strong message. Most important as far as US credibility was concerned was the extent to which Washington firmly stood behind whatever course of action Seoul recommended. If Washington were seen to be not fully supporting or holding back the ROK, it would cause many in Japan to doubt the credibility of the US defense commitment in the face of North Korean aggressive behavior (which, next time, could just as easily be directed to Japan).

Still other participants suggested that strategists should focus on the threat posed by China and use it to provide new glue for the alliance. One US participant called for an official dialogue that focuses on China as a source of regional instability and insecurity. This could be accomplished, one argued, by focusing security planning on "the area surrounding Japan." He even proposed the development of a combined forces command to deal with "the area around Japan." A Japanese participant thought that proposal a bit ambitious. Another Japanese participant offered that a joint Japan-South Korea security declaration would make the same point without explicitly targeting China.

Discussions concluded where they began: bemoaning the confusion in Tokyo, wondering how long it would last, and still uncertain about whether the contretemps over the relocation of US bases in Okinawa is the result of the transition difficulties or symptomatic of a deeper problem in US-Japan relations. We took considerable solace in the fact that support for the alliance remains high in Japan and will act as a brake on any actions that might do irreparable harm to the alliance.

One speaker noted, however, that high public support for an alliance has not stopped politicians from doing great damage to a bilateral relationship. The New Zealand government's decision in the 1980s to ban US ships carrying nuclear weapons ruptured that alliance, and the split endures two decades later. That should be a real warning to decision-makers and alliance supporters in both countries that complacency carries real risks. This alliance needs tending.

Recommendations:

This report is filled with policy recommendations generated by individual speakers or commentators during the discussion. No attempt will be made to summarize all of them here. Instead, a few key policy-related suggestions will be highlighted for further consideration:

– The generally favorable Japanese response to the NPR shows that a little coordination goes a long way. But our Japanese colleagues insisted it should not stop here. The US and Japan should conduct an expanded dialogue on nuclear security issues, perhaps along the lines of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (despite obvious differences between Japan and NATO), to include details as to the objectives and outcome of any strategic dialogue between the US and China.

– The current US-Japan dialogue on extended deterrence should continue and be expanded to include a discussion of greater Japanese contributions to deterrence. As the role of nuclear weapons is reduced or downplayed in US security strategy, this should open the door for a greater Japanese contribution to mutual defense and deterrence.

– Washington and Tokyo both need to lay out their respective visions for East Asia and the role of the alliance in this broader regional vision. Japanese and US security specialists alike remain uncertain as to what the Hatoyama government's foreign policy objectives and priorities are. A new U.S. East Asia Strategy Report (last published in 1998) is also needed to further define and reaffirm the centrality of the US-Japan alliance.

– As we continue to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the alliance, the US and Japan should reaffirm the Common Security Objectives laid out in the 2005 Security Consultative Committee Joint Statement. A quiet review of this document could underscore the continuity of objectives despite changes of government in both countries or at least highlight those areas in which differences now exist and must be resolved.

– While some disputed how successful such an effort would be, most agreed there is also a clear need for more education of the Japanese public regarding the utility of the alliance and how it works. The two countries also need a shared definition of "more equal."

– Broader formal trilateral and multilateral cooperation among US allies and like-minded states aimed at promoting regional security and denuclearization would be welcome, including broader Japan-ROK-US cooperation (beyond Korean Peninsula denuclearization cooperation, which should continue) and India-Japan-US dialogue.

Many saw the merits of bringing South Korea and/or India into the current Australia-Japan-US dialogue.

– There was broad general support for a more formal China-Japan-US trilateral dialogue and for the need to keep South Korea fully informed of the proceedings.

U.S.-Japan Strategic Dialogue
April 26-27, 2010

AGENDA

April 25, 2010 - SUNDAY

6:30 PM Welcome Reception and Dinner – ***Gazebo Lawn***

April 26, 2010 - MONDAY

8:30 AM Continental Breakfast – ***Oahu Room***

9:00 AM Opening Remarks

9:30 AM **Session I: National Perceptions of International Security Concerns**
US presenter: Michael Auslin
Japan presenter: Noboru Yamaguchi

This session explores each country's view of the international and regional security environment, to identify issues, and highlight shared and divergent concerns. What are the principal security concerns of each country? How does each country see the Asian balance of power? What could change that balance? Why? Topics could include China's growing status and influence; relations with Taiwan and the cross-Strait relationship; North Korea and prospects for relations with Pyongyang; relations with South Korea; the Middle East, Central and South Asian challenges. This overview will set the stage for subsequent discussions of US and Japanese security policies and efforts to address these challenges.

11:00 AM Coffee Break

11:15 AM **Session II: Security Dynamics in Tokyo and Washington**
Japan presenter: Masafumi Ishii
US discussant: Robert Gromoll

The governments in both Japan and the US are relatively new. What is each government's national security strategy? What are the timelines for new documents on strategy and defense? What are key elements of continuity and change in the new governments' policies? How does each country see its role in Asia? How does each government see its partner's role in Asia – political, social, and military? What role does each envision for the alliance and its role within the alliance? (Assessments of the state of the alliance will be taken up later)

12:30 PM Lunch – ***Villas Lawn***

1:30 PM **Session III: Views of the US-Japan Defense Relationship: Understanding Alliance Dynamics**
Session IIIA: Japan's Perspective
Japan presenter: Matake Kamiya

This session focuses on views of the bilateral security alliance. How does Japan characterize the state of the alliance? What are the characteristics of the ideal Japan-US alliance? What are the major challenges? How can they be addressed? What role does Japan envision for the alliance with the US in its national security strategy? How does Japan see the alliance functioning? Is extended nuclear deterrence still desired? Will a nonnuclear security umbrella suffice? Are the right topics being addressed?

3:00 PM Coffee Break

3:15 PM ***Session IIIB: US Perspective***
US presenter: Andrew Oros

How does the US characterize the state of its alliance with Japan? What are the characteristics of the ideal US-Japan alliance? What are the challenges in alliance relations (such as desired national roles and each nation's alliance objectives) and how can they be addressed? What are the key issues in and obstacles to future development of the alliance and the realization of those roles and objectives?

5:00 PM Session adjourns

6:30 PM Reception and Dinner – ***Gazebo Lawn***

April 27, 2010 - TUESDAY

8:30 AM Continental Breakfast - ***Oahu Room***

9:00 AM **Session IV: Nuclear Dynamics**
Session IVA: US Perspectives
Presenter: Michael McDevitt

This session explores US perspectives of nuclear dynamics. What are the key features and forces driving the Asian and global nuclear regimes? What can be done to reinforce positive change and minimize the negative effects? How does the Obama administration understand the influence of nuclear weapons (American, Chinese, Russian, and DPRK) on alliance relations? How does America envision the role of nuclear weapons in extended deterrence and in Asian security strategy? How might these roles of American and other nations' nuclear weapons evolve; why and to what effect?

10:30 AM Coffee Break

10:45 AM ***Session IVB: Japanese Perspectives***
Presenter: Ken Jimbo

How does Japan analyze the nature and impact of Asian and global nuclear dynamics (including vertical and horizontal proliferation, nonproliferation regimes and activities, and sensitive technology transfer)? How could, and why should Japan respond to and shape these dynamics? How does Japan understand the role of the alliance in responding to and shaping Asian nuclear dynamics?

12:30 PM Lunch – ***Royal Ocean Terrace Restaurant***

2:00 PM **Session V: Enhancing Collaborative, Cooperative Strategic Security Activities**
Japan presenter: Yuki Tatsumi
US presenter: Victor Cha

This session will focus on the future of the alliance and ways to make it more effective. What specific joint and unilateral activities would help achieve the ideal alliance described in Session III? How can we balance our respective interests and concerns relating to extended deterrence and movement toward zero nuclear weapons? Is the current US-Japan security and extended deterrence dialogues sufficient? How can the two countries ensure that the alliance contributes to national defense and regional security? How can the alliance work with other US allies – the ROK, in particular, but also Australia – and partners, such as India? How can it engage China? How can both countries influence the outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference?

3:30 PM **Session VI: Conclusions and Wrap Up**

4:00 PM Conference adjourns

U.S.-Japan Strategic Dialogue
April 26-27, 2010

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