Japan-U.S. Security Relations Post 9/11: Maintaining the Momentum

A Conference Report

Jane Skanderup
Rapporteur

Cosponsored by
The Japan Institute of International Affairs
and the
Pacific Forum CSIS

Co-hosted by
Hisashi Owada and Ralph A. Cossa

Issues & Insights
Vol. 2 - No. 4

Pan Pacific Hotel
San Francisco, California, USA
March 2002

Japan Institute of International Affairs

The Japan Institute of International Affairs (www.jiia.or.jp) is a private, non-profit research institution specializing in international affairs. Based in Tokyo and founded in 1959, it conducts research and fosters international exchanges designed to help formulate Japan's foreign policies. JIIA helped found and serves as the secretariat for the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council's Japan National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation. It publishes a variety of periodicals and books in Japanese and English, and convenes a number of annual symposia with research institutes throughout the world.

Pacific Forum CSIS

Based in Honolulu, Pacific Forum CSIS (www.csis.org/pacfor/) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate areas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments

The Pacific Forum CSIS wishes to thank the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division in the North American Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Consulate General of Japan in San Francisco for their support and guidance in this project. Additionally, we are grateful to the many security specialists, in and out of government, both in Japan and the United States, who took time out of their busy schedules to join us in San Francisco to discuss, and develop recommendations for improving, the vital U.S.-Japan security relationship.

The views expressed here do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. or Japanese governments, the co-sponsoring institutes, or the group of workshop participants as a whole. The Pacific Forum CSIS apologizes in advance for any misreading of the views of participants.

Foreword

The Japan Institute of International Affairs, the Pacific Forum CSIS, and the Consulate General of Japan in San Francisco have jointly sponsored the San Francisco seminar on U.S.-Japan security relations annually since 1995. The themes have changed over the years to reflect the ever-changing nature of "the world's most important bilateral relationship bar none" and the varying challenges that it faces. One thing has not changed: the commitment of the three sponsors to revitalizing and enhancing the security relationship. The progress and development of the alliance can be charted in our joint bilateral dialogue from year to year.

There has not been any year in the past that has witnessed as dramatic a change as the last one, given the events of September 11, 2001 and the truly unprecedented, "magnificent" bilateral security cooperation it generated between our two countries. Many of the initiatives that we were promoting, pursuing, or predicting in previous years have come to pass, and at a speed which few could have imagined. No one could have forecast the horrendous event that provided the catalyst for this accelerated deepening of defense cooperation. But national leaders on both sides had already expressed a mutual commitment toward building a robust, more equal alliance prior to 9/11. Their response to the events of that day demonstrated the sincerity and courage of their commitment.

At the March 2002 San Francisco meeting – our first since the terrorist attacks – participants gathered with renewed energy to examine and propose effective new ways to maintain this momentum. During our two days of deliberations, specialists from both countries assessed the impact the war on terrorism has had or could have on traditional East Asian security concerns, including the challenges associated with an emerging China, the continued stalemate on the Korean Peninsula, and weapons proliferation. We also examined how Japanese security thinking has evolved on both a political and a public level, and how Washington's East Asia strategy has evolved in the first year of the Bush administration. Regional and global economic challenges and opportunities were also discussed, with particular emphasis on how a decade of Japanese economic stagnation has impacted Tokyo's regional and global role.

Most importantly, participants evaluated the changes of the past year with an eye toward "what's next?" … what more would/should Washington expect of Japan? ... what more was Japan willing/able to do? Future courses of action were carefully examined, not just in support of the war on terrorism but for alliance maintenance as well. This volume provides a summary of the discussions, with due attention to the off-the-record, not-for-attribution nature of the dialogue. Several selected conference papers are also included.

While there are many forums on U.S.-Japan relations, with each being useful in its own way, we believe the annual San Francisco dialogue is unique in that people with great expertise and commitment to the alliance, including former, current, and some presumed future senior government officials and a carefully selected group of non-governmental

experts, talk with each other in a very candid, focused, off-the-record manner on timely issues and developments affecting the U.S.-Japan security relationship. This year, as in the past, the workshop involved a sizable portion of alumni (some in new, more senior positions) as well as some new faces, to provide an important blend of continuity and fresh perspectives.

We take pride that this is one of the most candid, forward thinking conversations on U.S.-Japan relations. Participants may at times disagree, not on the overall objective, strengthening and promoting the U.S.-Japan alliance, but on the best way to achieve it. Today the alliance relationship is as strong and solid as it has been since our series of meetings was initiated. The challenge now is to build upon this firm base. That will be the continuing goal of future meetings.

Hisashi Owada
President, Japan Institute of International Affairs

Ralph A. Cossa
President, Pacific Forum CSIS

Opening Remarks
Ambassador Hisashi Owada

The present state of the U.S.-Japan security relationship clearly needs to be examined in the context of new developments. Naturally, in the mind of everyone here lies the impact of September 11; this is the focal point from which all relevant issues flow. I would like to raise three or four of these issues – some can be provocative or controversial, but it is in the spirit of this forum to raise such issues, and to discuss in a focused way the implications they cast for the future of our relationship. So let me immediately jump into this terrain, even though all of you are more expert than I am on these issues.

To my mind, it is not an exaggeration to say that September 11 has challenged us to think in new ways about the range of security issues that we have traditionally addressed in this forum. I think that President Bush made a fundamental and important statement immediately after the attacks, when he said that "a new war of the 21st century has been waged." I believe the attacks were not just against the United States. This is a new type of war which we have to deal with in common, as we think about and plan for our security – whether unilateral, bilateral, or global.

The first issue I would like to raise in this context is the significance of this event on our security, and especially its impact on the concept, perception, and strategy for national security. What is most fundamental to my mind is that the traditional distinction between national defense in relation to outside threats and national police action in relation to domestic disturbances has disappeared. In the past, there had been a clear dividing line between what constitutes an internal versus an external threat, but these two aspects now need to be thought through as one problem. The new challenge is how to deal with the issue of a security threat in this more expanded context in an integrated way.

In particular, we need to consider the new relevance of a non-state entity as an external source or actor to a threat to national security. The fact that non-state entities have become major players in international relations is nothing new; this has been happening in different facets of international relations for some years, including in the economic sphere and in social areas. Yet this is the first time that a non-state entity has become a principal focus of attention as an external source of threat or actor affecting international relations. I think we need a fairly radical change of thinking about this problem.

What are the implications of this new challenge for U.S.-Japan security relations? I think that security relations have two aspects: one is the traditional aspect of safeguarding the security of a nation against an external threat, and this aspect remains unchanged. But there is now a new aspect to our security relationship in relation to the

problem of safeguarding against "what." Before September 11, the focus of the alliance and of the global community was on external threats from state entities – enemies which are states. But now we in our alliance relationship need to talk about the external threats which are not states. And yet the framework to think about this new aspect of our security relationship still remains the state mechanism, and the framework based on bilateral, multilateral, and global relationships, including the alliances of states. How Japan and the United States will apply the Japan-U.S. security relationship to this new threat is the first issue that I wish to state here.

The second issue I would like to raise is the impact of September 11 in relation to the defense posture of the United States. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was published on September 30; naturally, this report had been developed before September 11, although there may have been modifications in certain respects after that event. In spite of this, the priority emphasis of the QDR was already on homeland defense, which represented a shift in emphasis in strategy from the Cold War era. During the Cold War days, the enemy was predictable and it was easy to create a framework of maintaining stability based on confrontation in an agreed way. This constituted the basis of the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), in that the basic factor that ensured the validity of the MAD doctrine was the premise of predictability and rationality on the part of the two sides in the strategy involved.

Even before September 11, this basic premise had begun to falter due to the emergence of so-called rogue states. Regardless of the appropriateness of this term, it is undeniable that coming into the picture were states that are much more unpredictable and do not fit into the framework of a rational institutionalization of the MAD doctrine. September 11 has had a significant implication in this context because first, it has expanded the sphere of application of this new concept of "rogue actors" and second, it has brought to the scene a tighter linkage between the state actors that are more unpredictable and irresponsible within the world public order and the non-state entities that behave in very much the same way.

This could have a serious implication for the basic strategy that the U.S. carried out during the Cold War and is even now practicing – i.e., the strategy based on the doctrine of forward deployment. I am not saying that the doctrine of forward deployment is no longer valid, but the strategy based on the doctrine of forward deployment would seem to presuppose that a homeland attack is not the main focus of attention. Now the event of September 11 brought home the fact that the doctrine of forward deployment, like net-play in tennis, is not a panacea to a direct attack deep into the homeland. Now we have to think about the problem of security strategy from the viewpoint of the United States in terms of a combination of a strategy based on the doctrine of forward deployment, which continues to be valid in the traditional context, with a greater emphasis on homeland defense, which deals with a contingency that can not be covered by the forward deployment doctrine.

One illustration of the dilemma that this new development is creating is the European concern about the possible decoupling of Europe as a result of the national

missile defense plan of the U.S. as against the tactical missile defense plan. To the extent that the national missile defense plan as advanced by the U.S. has homeland defense much more clearly in mind, the fear of decoupling on the part of the Europeans becomes justified, at least as far as its psychological aspect is concerned. How this problem is going to be dealt with has direct implications for the management, not only of Europe-U.S. relations, but also of Japan-U.S. security relations.

This focus on asymmetrical threats or threats from non-state entities creates the problem of how effectively we can deal with such threats without being able to identify our target in the territorial sense. In the traditional thinking, there has always been a target in the territorial sense that forms the basis for a defense strategy. But with a mobile target, where terrorist activities move from one country to another, it is very difficult to focus on a particular territorial entity as the target of a common strategy within the framework of alliance partnership.

The third issue I would like to raise – and this is the main focus of my attention this morning – is the impact of September 11 on the domestic political environment in Japan in terms of the national defense strategy and of the national defense debate in Japan. I think the basic assumption of U.S.-Japan security arrangements has always been that they formed a framework in which the U.S. would come to the aid of Japan in the case of an armed attack on Japan, or in case of a situation in the surrounding area which could threaten the security of Japan. This second case, of course, has been broadly defined as common concern of Japan and the United States in the Far East, to the extent that a conflict in the vicinity of Japan could affect the security and stability of the region which, in turn, could affect the security of Japan. This somewhat complicated logic was made necessary at the time of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty because of the Vandenburg Resolution, which prohibited the U.S. to enter into an alliance based on self-defense, unless there was a principle of reciprocity incorporated in the arrangement. Because of this constraint, the original 1951 treaty contained a cover for its unilateral character in that while Japan had no obligation to defend the U.S., the U.S. had no legal obligation to defend Japan either. The 1960 revised treaty rectifies this by incorporating a limited degree of reciprocity, stating that an armed attack against either party in the area under the administration of Japan provides the basis for action. This meant that if the U.S. is attacked in Japan by an outside power – because of the U.S. bases in Japan – Japan would work together with the United States. This solution was designed to happily reconcile the constraint of Japan under Article 9 of the Constitution with the constraint of the United States under the Vandenburg Resolution.

Yet this was a fiction in that it did not change the basic nature of the treaty – that the treaty was meant to cover only a situation that would involve Japan directly or indirectly. It did not propose to address the question of what Japan would do when the United States was attacked. From this viewpoint, the NATO framework is and has always been different in its basic approach in the sense that the NATO framework is based on a full-fledged application of the mutuality of collective self-defense, with the result that when the event of September 11 took place, NATO immediately acted in the exercise of its own right of collective self-defense on the basis of Article 5 of the NATO

treaty, whereas the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty had no basis for such action by Japan. This distinction produces fundamental problems in relation to the scope of action from the Japanese point of view, as there is no clear part of the treaty that can be worked in determining what Japan is capable of doing in a contingency such as the event of September 11.

Under these circumstances, what should Japan's approach be to cope with such a situation? The Koizumi Administration managed to overcome the problem politically, but to my mind not legally. The administration has done an admirable job in crisis management as a political gesture toward the United States, but it has dodged the whole question of the relevance of Japan-U.S. security arrangements to the crisis. It could be said that the government of Japan took advantage of this environment of crisis, in which it could take such a bold measure on the tacit acceptance by the people about the new role against international terrorism, without going through the explanation of the relevance of Japan-U.S. Treaty. They had a good cause for action; everyone was agreed – or at least no one could dispute – that the new legislation was meant for a good cause. As a result, the administration did not have to get involved in the fundamental debate about the significance of the Japan-U.S. security relationship, and the treaty's relevance, to the new situation. To put the question differently, it was whether the U.S. was acting on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter – on the basis of the right of individual self-defense – and the European powers in NATO on the right of collective self-defense, as did Australia and New Zealand. In Japan's case, this course is not open in the context of the security treaty. Without specifying this point, the Koizumi government took measures in the name of maintenance of peace and security in the international context. This, however, is more along the line of the logic of the collective security system under the UN Charter, particularly its Chapter 7. The U.S. could have taken this position also; it would have been easy and even more legitimate for the U.S. to argue that what the terrorists had done was a threat to the peace – or a breach of the peace or even an act of aggression – under Chapter 7 of the Charter. If the U.S. had done that, the action would have been an international action within the purview of the international community as represented by the Security Council of the United Nations, versus an illegal activity which was threatening the public order of the international community. The U.S. did not choose that course of action for political reasons. I am not suggesting that resorting to the justification of Article 51 of the Charter in this case was not legitimate. It certainly was legitimate; one could explain the situation both ways. The basic difference is that the resort to the right of self-defense is more in line with the traditional framework which has always existed in the international legal order, that is, every country has a sovereign right to rectify or redress injustice done to it through the means of self-help, which has also been recognized under the UN Charter in its Article 51. On the other hand, the new framework that has emerged under the Charter system, although somewhat imperfectly, is the idea that certain actions are not only unjust to a particular country, but are a social injustice or a crime committed against the international community, and therefore the international community has to act against this. The United States relied upon the former logic, while Japan's action can only be explained by relying upon the latter logic. This would seem to be the only justification for the enactment of the new anti-terrorism Act and the dispatch of Self-Defense Forces to the area. I do not wish to get into a legalistic

argument of this problem too far, but I do wish to demonstrate how significant this point is to the future management of U.S.-Japan security relations. An alternative, of course, would be for Japan to revise Article 9 of the Constitution, so that Japan would be in the same position as the NATO countries, including Germany. If this is done, Japan could take the kind of action that it took on the basis of the treaty.

The fourth and final issue I wish to raise is that while September 11 demonstrated that we are in an era where the United States is the only super power, at the same time it also demonstrated that we live in a world order that is very different from a unipolar world, where the only super power can manage, control, and dictate according to its own preferences, values, and judgments. That there is only one global super power but not a unipolar world order is a dichotomy that creates many problems in managing our bilateral relationship. Going beyond that, the present situation of this dichotomy has deeper implications to the problem of how Japan and the U.S. should cooperate in strengthening the world public order. This leads us to the much broader field of what our two countries should do on some non-military aspects of international issues, including how we think about China or how we should think about economic development. I feel that economic development is one of the most urgent issues that Japan and the U.S. should address in this important area of the non-military aspects of international affairs. It is in this context that I was so happy to see President Bush make the comment in Monterrey, Mexico this morning, emphasizing the role of development in the broader context of peace and stability in the globalized world.

These are some of the principal issues that I believe are crucial for the participants of this conference to consider and discuss in great depth during the next two days. I look forward to hearing a diversity of views on these points from this distinguished group of officials and experts.

Luncheon Address
The Honorable James A. Kelly

A Momentous Time

"Momentous" is one of those words that can be applied to almost any situation, but I think it is the right word when we look at the U.S.-Japan alliance today, which is as strong now as it has ever been. Indeed, the alliance is one of the great diplomatic success stories of the post-war period and has ushered in an era of peace in the Pacific and helped the broad advance of prosperity and democracy in East Asia.

The alliance is in a new, dynamic, and encouraging phase, largely because it is taking on challenges that few in this room would have anticipated only a short time ago. The horrible events of September 11 have wrought great changes.

Today, Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force vessels are resupplying and refueling U.S. and coalition vessels in the Indian Ocean. Japanese Air Self Defense Force planes are helping transport coalition men and materiel. Ground Self Defense Force units are available to help protect U.S. forces and facilities in Japan. Moreover, Japan's generosity and leadership are helping us and other concerned nations rebuild a liberated Afghanistan.

Japan is actively engaged in the global war on terrorism. American officials from President Bush on down have repeatedly expressed our appreciation, but let me underscore again our gratitude for the very real contribution Japan is making to this crucial effort. As the President told the Japanese Diet in February, "(Japan's) response to the terrorist threat has demonstrated the strength of our alliance and the indispensable role of Japan that is global…" For those of us who have observed Japanese security policy over the years, Japan's engagement is truly remarkable, and was accomplished quickly and with determination.

Japan's resolve demonstrates that the Japanese people and their leaders appreciate the dangers posed to all of us by global terrorism. Japan understands as well the need to respond firmly and in a united manner to this threat to our well being and to the freedom and opportunities our peoples enjoy.

A Long Campaign

I believe that the Japanese people, as well as Americans, also understand that the campaign against global terrorism is likely to be a long and a difficult one. We are learning more about the scope and reach of global terrorism every day, and it is apparent that defeating our disparate and widely dispersed enemies will not be a simple task. It is a task, however, to which the United States and the American people are deeply committed. Inaction or a failure to act vigorously will not solve the problem but will only make it worse, leaving all of us more vulnerable.

We hope that our friends and allies will also remain committed to eliminating global terrorism and will make their best efforts to remain engaged. Continued engagement, in my view, means support that could extend beyond current operations in Afghanistan. Taking action in Afghanistan may have been our first and most immediate response to the September 11 attacks, but our leadership has long made clear that the counterterrorism campaign would not be limited to Afghanistan. There are terrorist threats in other places that we – and our friends and allies – cannot afford to ignore.

I am not in a position to say what form our campaign will take after or in conjunction with operations in Afghanistan. We have made it clear, however, that our pursuit of terrorists, and those who aid and protect them, will continue. To again quote President Bush in his remarks to the Diet: "Civilization and terrorism cannot coexist. By defeating terror, we will defend the peace of the world."

Japan's Engagement

We hope Japan will continue to support the coalition as the counterterrorism campaign goes forward. Japan's assistance so far has been invaluable, and the Japanese well understand that a world free of terrorism means a safer and more stable environment for Japan, for the Asia-Pacific region, and for the entire world.

We are well aware of the constitutional and legal factors that limit Japan's ability to carry out military activities, and we respect those limitations. We are encouraged that, despite those limitations, Japan was able to craft a rapid and significant response to the September 11 attacks that included the deployment of Japan's military forces and the provision of rear area support.

The measures Japan took in response to September 11 – the special measures laws and the Basic Plan – were predicated on supporting our efforts to respond to the September 11 attacks. As I have mentioned, however, our post-September 11 campaign against terrorism is not country-specific. It will involve a long-term, sustained, and indeed global effort that may take place in a number of areas around the world.

We very much hope that Japan will continue to provide the rear area support it is now providing in the Indian Ocean, as it looks to renew its Basic Plan. But Japan should not feel itself limited only to its present form or level of support – we hope that Japan will take a flexible approach towards contributing to the counterterrorism campaign as the campaign itself evolves.

Neither the purpose of our mission – to defeat global terrorism and to work against those who aid and abet it – nor the purpose of Japan's support would change if the United States continued the campaign in other places. Further, as Japan goes about revising emergency legislation to allow the Special Defense Forces (SDF) to deploy more readily in Japan in response to foreign aggression, the country may wish to consider making similar adjustments to allow U.S. forces in Japan to respond effectively as well.

Given the expanded scope of our operational cooperation, it may also be a good time to consider revising the U.S.-Japan Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA), to allow us to exchange services wherever we need to do so. Such a revision would certainly reflect more accurately today's realities in terms of the geographic scope of our cooperation.

I should also mention the revised Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) law, which allows Japanese peacekeepers more flexibility in exercising their functions. The deployment of 680 personnel to East Timor has already begun, and we laud Japan for taking on this responsibility. We hope this deployment bodes well for future Japanese engagement in peacekeeping operations, which are an important element of international stability.

Developing the Alliance

On September 8 in San Francisco, just days before the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, we commemorated the 50th anniversary of the signing of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The unfortunate events of September 11 have had one important effect on the U.S.-Japan security alliance. In undertaking the counterterrorism campaign, we have broadened and strengthened bilateral security cooperation. We would like to explore ways to enhance further our vital alliance.

As I have indicated, the practical benefits of our alliance are apparent. Japan is contributing to the global war on terrorism. Its forces are deployed and learning first hand the lessons to be gained from operational experience, for which there is no substitute. SDF personnel will emerge from this experience better prepared not only to perform their primary function, the defense of Japan, but also to respond to the kinds of asymmetric, unconventional threats likely to emerge in today's post-Cold War environment.

We hope that Japan will build on the lessons learned and the experience gained so far in the counterterrorism campaign to enhance cooperation with the United States within the framework defined by our alliance. Enhanced cooperation could take a number of forms: increased training activities, more frequent consultations on regional and global strategic issues, development of complementary policies on missile defense, and a review of force structures and missions as we move away from the Cold War period, to name a few areas for potential enhanced cooperation.

While the U.S. and Japan seek a peaceful Asia where the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction do not threaten our peoples, we must be prepared. Therefore, we will continue to work with Japan on our ongoing research program on missile defense. The U.S. is committed to developing a missile defense system that would help protect our friends and allies as well against the threats posed by those bent on developing weapons of mass destruction and ways to deliver them. There is little doubt, in my view, that the threat posed by ballistic missiles will only increase. There is ample evidence demonstrating that terrorists and those who support them are not

bothered by mass murder. We have the responsibility to develop defenses against the ballistic missile threat.

In this context, I would like to mention that there has been much discussion recently of the Administration's nuclear weapons policy. I would like to stress that President Bush is committed to reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons and reducing the size of our nuclear arsenal. We are cooperating with Russia to achieve these goals.

The post-September 11 experience shows that Japan can be an active partner militarily in addressing with the U.S. and our other friends and allies the kinds of threats we face today. Moreover, as Japan has demonstrated through its participation in Operation Enduring Freedom and its growing involvement in UN peacekeeping, it is increasingly comfortable operating in a multilateral setting. This experience also shows that, even within the limits imposed by the Constitution and its strictures against collective self-defense, Japan is capable of doing a great deal when it pursues creative solutions to real-world dilemmas that directly threaten Japan's own security interests.

We hope that Japan will continue to take a creative and flexible approach to its security policy, both in terms of its alliance relationship with the U.S. and as a member of an international community facing the kinds of new, unconventional, and unpredictable threats that are now so evident. We have learned it is better to meet challenges head on, rather than wait for events to impose themselves on us. We hope that Japan will take a forward-looking posture, one befitting our key regional partner.

> In the year or so since I took office, it strikes me that we have made significant progress, building on Prime Minister Koizumi's reaffirmation, shortly after taking office, that the U.S.-Japan alliance is the fundamental basis of Japan's foreign policy. Most notably, we have renewed our attention on improving, reinvigorating, and refocusing the U.S.-Japan alliance, one of the key recommendations of the Armitage Report. The fruits of that effort are obvious today. The alliance is moving in the right direction, in no small part because of the constructive policies Japan has followed in addressing today's security environment.

One final point: Japan is making its great contributions even during a time of economic uncertainty and transition. We remain concerned about the Japanese economy, not only in terms of purely economic factors but also in terms of our alliance and Japan's ability to play a leadership role in helping to ensure regional and global stability. We want to see an economically strong Japan, with the means and vision to "punch its weight" internationally. This would be in Japan's interest, as well as in the U.S. interest and in that of the rest of the world.

Some question whether Japan can sustain its efforts and maintain its leadership role in Asia and the world. I do not. I believe that Japan will take the steps necessary to revive its economy and continue to serve as a beacon of hope, opportunity, and

democracy in East Asia. Like the President, I remain confident that Japan's best days lie ahead. And so do the best days of our alliance.

Conference Summary

Jane Skanderup, Rapporteur

Introduction

On March 22-23, 2002, more than 30 current and former Japanese and U.S. government officials and security and economic specialists met in San Francisco for the Eighth Annual San Francisco Security Seminar. During a day and a half of intensive dialogue, the participants debated and exchanged views on a wide range of concerns and issues that the two countries face in the post-September 11 security environment, including at the bilateral, regional, and global levels. The conference theme of "Maintaining the Momentum" clearly derives from the positive direction the bilateral alliance has taken in the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, and participants were challenged at the outset to share views on exactly what has changed, and what has not. Readers will find that some of the issues raised by participants and outlined below are familiar ones – the problems associated with the relocation of the Futenma Marine Base in Okinawa and the steady rise of Japanese public opinion in shaping national security policy are just some of the issues that have arisen in previous meetings and continued in March 2002.

Yet the bulk of issues that sparked participants' interest focused on how the two countries can grapple with new security concerns in the post 9/11 world, and how this affects constructive management of the alliance. The sections below closely follow the conference agenda, concentrating on politico-military perspectives of East Asian security, the evolving security policy of both Japan and the United States, and the role of regional and global economic issues. A final section addresses future issues that both governments should be alert to as they consider how to improve alliance management. This summary reflects the rapporteur's impressions; it is not a consensus report. It also strives to respect the off-the-record, not-for-attribution nature of the conference.

Politico-Military Perspectives: Current Concerns in East Asian Security

Participants agreed that the prospects for conflict in the Asia-Pacific region remain as slim now as before 9/11, but they also concluded that Japan-U.S. bilateral cooperation on regional security issues has grown in importance given new challenges. The principal regional issues before 9/11 – particularly dealing with the recalcitrant North Korean regime as well as managing the rise of China – remain the same, but the parameters of the domestic policy debates and policy approaches in Japan and the U.S. have changed significantly.

China. Participants debated whether China's attitudes toward Japan becoming a "normal" country have become more casual and accepting. Some participants expressed the opinion that this is a change in attitude that is very recent; other participants argued that during the last two or three years, the younger generation of Chinese analysts and political leaders have expressed a more relaxed attitude about Japan, and the significant

change more recently is that this has become a more dominant attitude among more senior officials as well. Other participants disagreed, questioning whether the perceived attitudinal change about Japan is really more tactical than strategic: the tactical goal being to improve China's relations with the region, with their strategic concerns intact. The bilateral relationship is still very delicate, according to this view, and the traditional historical issues and Chinese official thinking about Japan's role in the region and the world is very much the same.

On U.S. China policy, U.S. President George W. Bush has added a third "c" of "candid" to the policy of "constructive and cooperative" relations being prescribed by both sides to keep relations on a steady course. Some participants expressed the view that senior Chinese officials are aware that they over-react to Congressional views; at the lower level, there is much debate about greater U.S. presence in Asia given post 9/11 concerns.

North Korea. There was a vigorous exchange of views about U.S. and Japanese policies toward North Korea after September 11. Some participants believed that the harsher tone adopted by both countries – for independent reasons and motivated by concerns both before and after 9/11 – only exacerbated North Korea's isolation in the world community in ways that could prove harmful to U.S. and Japanese national interests. Other participants believed that the seeming lack of willingness to return to the negotiating table by both the Koizumi and Bush administrations was a positive development, in that some "benign neglect" may not be so bad.

Japan's hardened attitude toward North Korea stems from a series of events during the past six months: the investigation in November 2001 into the misuse of funds at the Chogin Tokyo Credit Union, followed by Japan's Coast Guard sinking the alleged North Korean spy boat intruding into Japanese waters in the East China Sea in December, and finally the recent decision to toughen the approach to the alleged abduction cases by North Korea.

While the recalibration of U.S. policy towards the DPRK to emphasize reciprocity and verification may be legitimate, some participants expressed doubt that the new "policy of containment" will work. The U.S. was on the road toward building a consensus among major states on North Korea policy that emphasized evolutionary change. This is still necessary; the options of a collapse, a nuclear state, or open conflict are not desirable. There has been evidence of a recognition for change by Kim Jong-Il's remarks in Shanghai, Moscow, and to various EU leaders, some argued. In this view, the U.S. needs to stand by its principles while also promoting North Korea's interaction with the world. Although President Bush has stated that his team is ready to meet with North Korean officials "anytime, anywhere," this is often followed by volatile and volcanic remarks that more often shut the door to dialogue. This critique argues that it is time for a more sophisticated approach to North Korea, which emphasizes U.S. cooperation with Japan and China in order to be prepared to act on issues that loom on the horizon, such as requirements for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

An alternative view was expressed that North Korea's "collapse" may not produce the instability that some predict, provided it occurs without violence. U.S. policy should not be driven by a fear of alienating the North or risking the regime's failure. Partly what guides U.S. policy is President Bush's personal, gut feeling that DPRK President Kim Jong-Il violates the fundamental responsibility of a leader to feed and protect its people, and his failure to do this is immoral.

Some participants believed Japan may want more autonomy in its policy toward North Korea, despite a general consensus of the need to cooperate with the United States (and with South Korea as well). Participants also argued for a steady policy approach for both countries, emphasizing that predictability is far preferable to the swings toward either a forward-leaning or firm-stand approach. Neither the U.S. or Japan – independently or jointly – has laid out a game plan for dealing with heightened tensions with North Korea, some participants argued. One prevailing Japanese view seemed to argue that the Clinton administration became too eager to deal with Pyongyang toward the end and thus became too soft, while the Bush administration appears to have over-compensated and become too hard. The earlier bipartisan "Perry process" laid out by former Secretary of Defense William Perry appeared more balanced, with its dual deterrence and engagement approach.

War on Terrorism. The war on terrorism is superimposed on old problems. It has not changed the rationale for a continued U.S. military presence in East Asia or the need for strong bilateral alliances. Unless there is a significant change in the current security environment (especially on the Korean Peninsula), the composition of U.S. forward-deployed forces will likely stay the same. The temporary deployment of U.S. forces to the Philippines for counter-terrorism training and exercises is not likely to be permanent, but does demonstrate Washington's commitment to support friends and allies in their own struggle against terrorists.

In the post-9/11 world, how to deal with weapons of mass destruction has become more difficult; the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) is not as useful. The issue of non-proliferation between Pakistan and India has not become irrelevant post 9/11, and is very important to Japan. How to deal with Pakistan and India as de facto nuclear powers is a point of contention between the U.S. and Japan, participants agreed. As discussed in more detail below (see "Evolving U.S. Security Policy"), Washington recognizes that Asia is unique and that the most effective steps are those taken in cooperation with affected nations, preferably with them in the lead.

Evolving Japanese Security Policy

Participants recognized that the Special Measures to Fight Terrorism Bill, which passed the Diet in October 2001, was a remarkable achievement for Prime Minister Koizumi.[1] The prime minister's astounding popularity no doubt helped the law to be

[1] The Special Measures Bill is a seven-point package that enables the SDF to provide noncombat support to the U.S. coalition and to protect U.S. facilities in Japan. It also allows Japanese forces to fire against territorial violators. The bill has a two-year time limit, and requires the Diet to approve any deployment

easily passed. While some officials wanted the terrorism act to be broader, there was consensus that they needed to get the bill passed quickly, even if it meant compromising its breadth. The Koizumi government believed that lack of action would be damaging to the alliance, and there was a desire not to repeat the negative experience of the Gulf War. Participants pointed to another factor that helped the bill pass so quickly: the change in Japanese society's thinking during the past decade, since the Gulf War, reflected by the Japanese people's support of their government's involvement in the Cambodia PKO, for example. So it is too simplistic to say that the Japanese government acted solely in response to U.S. pressure; in the end, internal and external factors came into play in the passage of the new law.

Participants reflected further about Japanese society's thinking about its own security, particularly after September 11. Some believed the event awakened a new sense of Japanese self-interest in promoting their own security; other participants believed that the tendency to need to seek approval or admiration from the U.S. government for whatever effort they make is still dominant. Many participants expressed the hope that there would be a further evolution in Japan of the understanding that action needs to be taken for Japan's own sake and not just in response to the United States. It does not help that Japanese public opinion about the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is currently extremely low, but it is still important for MOFA to enlighten the media about the national security questions involved and the impact on society. (For further discussion of Japanese public opinion, see the paper by Yoichi Kato on page XX..

Partly due to globalization pressures, Japanese society has become more inward-looking, and anti-U.S. sentiment is more visible and widespread, coming not only from the traditional left and right wings but from the political center as well. Some in Japan argue that this reflects a growing pacifist sentiment rather than a direct anti-U.S. feeling. Nevertheless, there appears to be general agreement in Japan that it should not provide more support for U.S. bases than it currently does, even though there is broad support for the alliance.

Participants agreed that Japan's leadership in serving as host to the international conference on Afghanistan was extremely positive, and the hope was expressed that Japan will continue to play this kind of role in international security issues. It is positive that Japan-U.S. cooperation is improving in such matters as sharing of intelligence and stopping financial flows to terrorist groups.

How will Japan's security role evolve in the future? In the short term, participants were reminded that the new Special Measures Law will expire in October 2003, and the political equation at that time will determine how the government handles passage of either a renewal or a new law. The positive factors that enabled the legislation

---

within 20 days of the dispatch of the SDF; the transportation of ammunition and arms in foreign territory is not allowed. On November 9, the Japanese destroyers Kurama and Kirisame and the Hamana, a supply ship, left Sasebo for the Indian Ocean to support the coalition. See Brad Glosserman, "Making History the Hard Way," in *Comparative Connections* (Vol. 3, No. 4: Pacific Forum CSIS, January 2002) (http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/archive).

to pass so smoothly – such as Prime Minister Koizumi's popularity – may be missing, and the evolution of the public's thinking about its own sense of security will be crucial. Some participants believed the law passed not on the basis of national consensus, but consensus only at the official level, so a further evolution of the public's attitudes could be significant.

One factor that will affect this issue is how the U.S. and Japanese governments handle the relocation of the U.S. Marine air station at Futenma. One of the plans – to relocate it to the northern portion of Okinawa – seemed ideal in order to limit the footprint of the U.S. military within civil society, some participants argued. Both governments need to realize the importance in the public's eyes of resolving this issue, and soon. The more delay there is, the greater the danger that a serious mistake – such as an accidental helicopter crash into an elementary school, for example – could destroy public support for the alliance.

Some participants argued that Japan's priority in security policy should be to establish more stable and positive relations in Asia. This is indispensable for Japan, even more so than for the United States, given its geographic distance. A solid regional framework based on a multipolar system of trade and exchange should be one of Japan's basic purposes, rather than seeking to achieve its goals primarily through enhanced security cooperation.

U.S. and Japanese participants recognized that a cautious approach toward China invites it to be a responsible power in the international system. Participants agreed that there is a leadership competition between Japan and China in Asia, and actually this should not be feared or avoided, but permitted and encouraged. The competition and cooperation game should be conducted in the common interest of Japan and China, and both countries should attempt to define the grounds where common interests overlap, and try to minimize differences or "agree to disagree" where it is not feasible. Japan's foreign policy should also take special care and interest in the smaller countries surrounding China. In the history of East Asia, China was the "only sun" and others were subordinate to China's empire. This kind of international system should be avoided; when China suppresses the interests of neighboring small countries, the U.S. and Japan should support or empower them.

Japan should also expand its UN Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) activities, perhaps by establishing a PKO center – for the region and the world – focusing on the study, research, and practice of PKO. It is also critical for Japan to continue to assist poor countries in their development efforts to overcome poverty. Japan could further this goal by establishing a regional research institute for each developing country. Developing these kinds of institutions and infrastructure to assist the world community is very important to the future of Japan and should be a central tenet of foreign policy.

Some participants argued that Japan should create a Basic Security Law. Although changing the Constitution takes a long time, passing a Basic Security Law should be feasible. This law should underscore that Japan will forever abandon

aggressive war but that it also has a collective security right. Japan will still take part in international activities depending on its judgment, the situation, and due prudence, but legally Japan must be freed to act. An important element in a basic security law is preparing for what the government and SDF can do in times of emergency.

Evolving U.S. Security Policy

Discussion ensued about the changes in U.S. security policy for East Asia from the eight years of the Clinton administration to the Bush administration's first year and a half. It was noted that there has not been an East Asia Strategy Report since 1997, yet in practice the Clinton policy was based on four tenets: a commitment to 100,000 troops in the region; deterrence of conflict on the Korean peninsula; development of military to military contacts, particularly with China; and working within a multilateral framework. President Bush has adopted a different set of tenets, particularly that forward deployed troops in the region will be based on the capabilities they provide instead of a pre-set number. This means that forces will be tailor-made for each region, with enough forces to handle most contingencies without the need for outside reinforcements. The Bush administration seems to have rejected a blanket commitment to multilateral engagement, and instead is pursuing security cooperation in service of the objectives of maintaining access and inter-operability. Some participants expressed concern that the Bush administration's "*a la carte*" approach to multilateralism may be too narrowly defined and stressed instead the need to identify regional or global problems and then build coalitions of willing countries to address them.

Throughout the discussion, the importance of Japanese public opinion to the ability of the Japanese government to manage alliance issues domestically was raised again and again. The clear message was that the U.S. government needs to keep in mind that its words and actions help to shape the domestic political environment. For example, many participants expressed relief that Secretary of State Colin Powell's testimony to Congress clarified that there had been no lowering of the threshold for U.S. use of nuclear power, contrary to media reports claiming the contrary. Another example was the incident where the U.S. government produced a list of countries assisting in the war on terrorism and Japan was omitted. Many in Japan understand that it was a bureaucratic oversight, but some in the Diet remained concern that Japan's very active cooperation was being taken for granted. More broadly speaking, some participants stressed that the United States is the giant on the global stage and any step it takes is earth trembling, so steady moves with no surprises are appreciated.

In pursuing the war on terrorism in the Pacific theatre, it was noted that the U.S. recognizes that "there are no Afghanistans" in East Asia – in fact, the war in Afghanistan is an anomaly. The U.S. respects sovereignty in all countries and understands that the best approach is through cooperation in the hope that governments will undertake their own actions to combat terrorism. In terms of the kinds of cooperation the U.S. government seeks in Asia, there is more of a focus on old-fashioned police work, including intelligence sharing and stopping financial flows.

There is also a recognition at the senior-most levels of the U.S. government – civilian and military – that different countries have different combinations of "will and skill" to assist in combating terrorism. Japan and South Korea, for example, have both of these, while the Philippines possesses more will than skill, and the government has recognized that it needs U.S. help in training its military. Other states, such as Malaysia and Singapore, have demonstrated both "will and skill" with important cooperation in making a number of important arrests of terrorists that threatened to attack U.S. assets. The U.S. is also interested in cooperating with Thailand. So the measure of "will and skill" has become a kind of model for adopting different kinds of cooperation tailor-made to individual countries.

Indonesia presents special challenges, it was widely agreed. The country seems to have both less skill and less will to combat terrorism within its borders. While the terrorist connections in Indonesia may be loose ones, there is a concern that the country is serving as a *de-facto* sanctuary to terrorists fleeing Pakistan and Afghanistan. Yet Indonesia is a moderate Islamic nation, and the Bush administration has great support and respect for its democratization and multicultural society. So there is great incentive in the U.S. government to cooperate and, through diplomacy, to better explain what the U.S. military is doing in the Philippines as one illustration of the kind of cooperation that is possible. Even before 9/11, the Bush administration had wanted to improve ties with Indonesia, and policy thinking emphasized stability and border integrity as well as consolidation of democracy.

Yet reinvigorating U.S. relations with Indonesia at all levels is a slow and complex process, it was argued. The Bush administration is working closely with Congress to address human rights concerns – unfortunately the Indonesian military has only begrudgingly done anything about alleged human rights abuses in East Timor, for example – so that obtaining approval to reinstitute the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program in Indonesia is complicated. The fact that U.S. involvement in Indonesia has been so limited through the years, and that Indonesia is such a large, diverse country with a new political process – including new voices that were ruthlessly suppressed during the Suharto regime – makes it difficult for the U.S. to simply gear up its diplomacy as much as it would like. The result is a complicated paralysis in U.S.-Indonesian relations at the present time, some participants argued.[2]

The need for greater Japan-U.S. cooperation and coordination of policies vis-à-vis Indonesia was discussed, as was the possibility of trilateral U.S.-Japan-Australian cooperation, given the three countries' overlapping interests in keeping Indonesia stable while helping democracy take root and flourish.

On broader issues of evolving U.S. security policy, there is a fundamental question facing policy makers of how to reorganize the military to combat terrorism. For the Pacific theatre, an inter-agency coordinating group has been formed – including the

[2] For more on U.S.-Southeast Asia cooperation on terrorism, see Sheldon W. Simon, "Mixed Reactions in Southeast Asia to the U.S. War on Terrorism," in *Comparative Connections* (Vol. 4, No. 2: Pacific Forum CSIS, January 2002) (http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/archives).

FBI, CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Treasury Department, as well as transportation agencies – with the goal of forming more cohesive action among disparate parts of the government. Since 9/11 the culture has changed within the U.S. bureaucracy, it was argued; the FBI never appeared willing to share information and that has now become more crucial.

Some participants noted that the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that was issued on September 30, 2001 takes a more dire view of China than previous versions, stating that the United States "is more susceptible to large-scale military competition" from China. The QDR adopts a hedging strategy toward China in case this threat becomes real, but participants were reminded that this reflects the Pentagon's view toward China, and is not a comprehensive statement about U.S. policy. Nevertheless, participants expressed concern that some of the positive facets of the Clinton engagement policy with China are now seemingly being rejected with potential damage to U.S. interests. The military to military ties developed under President Clinton, for example, were very constructive, it was argued. The Chinese may have learned a few "secrets" from these exchanges, but the real risk is misunderstanding, especially regarding Taiwan, and the military contacts helped assuage this.

Beyond Asia, some participants noted that there has been a consensus in the U.S. administration that policies toward such key countries of Turkey and Pakistan need to be robust, and this is even more true after September 11. In addition, participants stressed that the war on terrorism has affected security policy in ways not seen yet, particularly the recognition that the U.S. needs to develop more agile forces.

Regional and Global Economic Challenges and Opportunities

Participants reached the common assessment that revitalization of Japan's economy is key to the health of the alliance. Prime Minister Koizumi needs encouragement from the international community, particularly the United States, participants recognized. The problems of globalization for Japan are tremendous; Japan is not as exposed to the world economy as even South Korea, and its huge trade surpluses make the transition very difficult.

There was considerable discussion about China's economic rise. While some estimates predict that China's purchasing power parity (PPP) will surpass that of Japan's by 2015, there are many challenges for China to overcome: the need for steady foreign investment, the rise in oil imports, stability of food prices, and servicing the debt, for example. Nevertheless, there is a major shift underway in patterns of regional production, trade, and investment. Ten years ago, the share of East Asian exports (from South Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia) to Japan comprised 20 percent of the total, while to China they compared only 1.2 percent. In recent years, the share to Japan has dropped to 14 percent, while the share to China has risen to 12 percent. What are the political and economic affects of this shift on U.S. and Japan's relationships in the region? Prime Minister Koizumi's trip to Southeast Asia in January was an attempt to strengthen relations, but China's involvement with ASEAN countries is extensive. Its aid to the region is not large, but is targeted for maximum political play. China's more

conspicuous presence makes Southeast Asians stop to consider in advance the weight of China on their decisions.

Yet there is ambivalence in Southeast Asia toward China, it was argued. The ASEAN states need to solicit trade and investment, but are worried that low-skilled manufacturing will overtake their export markets. Certainly China has tried to improve political relationships, but there remains a lingering concern about the once-imperial power. For this reason, Southeast Asian countries have expressed a desire for Japan to increase its economic role in the region and want Japan to play a role in security affairs as well. There is opportunity for Japan to take advantage of this if it can act quickly.

Participants raised the security implications of changing patterns of trade concentrations between China and the rest of Asia. The growing trade between Japan and China may eventually exceed Japan-U.S. trade, and South Korea's trade with and investment in China are also expanding rapidly. How will this affect alliance relations? And as Taiwan relocates its production base to China, its exports to the U.S. will increase and exacerbate the U.S. trade deficit with China. The business community provides a steady core of supporters for U.S.-China trade and investment due to cheap labor, but a growing political issue in the United States will be technology transfer to China through dual-use technology.

One participant brought perspective to the discussion with the reminder that ten years ago, the U.S. was jealous of Japan's economic strength and the region was concerned about a weak China. Now the whole world seems jealous of China's rapid economic development and concerned about Japan's weakness. Ten years from now, the situation may well shift again with new economic developments affecting political and security relations that we cannot foresee from the prism of today's realities.

Both Japan and the U.S. are seeking to make free trade agreements (FTAs) a more central part of their global economic strategies. Although some critics argue that the Japan-Singapore FTA was politically possible because agricultural trade between the two is so small, others countered that the agreement is less about trade and really focuses on cooperation on high-tech and financial issues. Some participants wondered whether Japan's shift from a pure multilateral economic approach to one that embraces bilateral FTAs is motivated by a need to find new ways to push forward on structural and regulatory reform. Some argued that this approach may not help recover momentum; Japan has been on a slow slide to economic irrelevance and there is nothing to stop this trend looking two to four years out. The tremendous internal opposition to structural reforms is largely an issue of domestic politics and political infighting, but can, in part, also be explained by Japan's continued relative prosperity which cushions the impact of the recent recession and deters fundamental structural reform.

Maintaining the Momentum

Japan-U.S. relations are exceptionally good right now, largely due to cooperation on combating terrorism. The fact that Prime Minister Koizumi supported the United

States without hesitation, and that the U.S. government strongly supported Japan's hosting of the international conference for Afghanistan, underscore this fundamental and positive shift. Some participants noted that international crises have sometimes served as opportunities for mutual criticisms (Japan is a free rider, America likes to make war) accompanied by a heightened sense of the differences in national character and purpose. But this time the two governments were supporting each other's specific roles. This is an exceptionally good situation, although a sudden or unexplained expansion of the war (e.g., against Iraq) could cause future strains.

Looking toward the future, what can or should Japan do, and what can or should the United States do, to keep the alliance relationship robust?

Some participants argued that the U.S. has to focus on *what* it wants in the alliance relationship, not *how* this can be accomplished. There is a tendency for the U.S. bureaucracy to get caught up in questions about why policy goals cannot be accomplished which constrains thinking and arriving at solutions. The U.S. needs to carefully articulate its current and future needs and the rationale behind them. It is then up to the Japan side to decide how to accomplish or address these requirements. Participants recognized that Japan needs to be forthcoming in telling the U.S. what it wants as well rather than just reacting to U.S. initiatives. Most importantly, more creative thinking is needed to address existing and emerging challenges to alliance solidarity. Both sides need to think "outside the box" and explore new solutions.

Some of the priorities for the United States might include the need for Japan to keep up militarily with the U.S. to maintain inter-operability. The U.S. should not be motivated by internal changes in Japan, others argued; should there be a need to restructure U.S. forces in Japan it will not be because of changes in Japan but due to a strategic shift in the region. Advanced thinking and debate over future force requirements and future basing alternatives are needed; many suggestions were offered during the conference that merit future consideration.

Japan should be the American ally who emphasizes peaceful development and constructive civilian development in the world. But the Japanese military security role should still be vibrant, both within the framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance and in support of UN and other multilateral peacekeeping initiatives.

One important issue for the future is how the U.S. and Japan jointly relate to the Middle East and the Arab world. Europeans complain that the U.S. is not dealing with root causes of terrorism, such as poverty, and this is an area that combined aid and diplomacy from the U.S. and Japan could address. Similar effort is needed in Southeast Asia, especially for Indonesia.

Participants noted the rise of nationalism in Japan, and some argued that this is natural and the U.S. and others should not over-react, even if rhetoric from elected politicians from time to time becomes more sharply keyed. Others observed that there

are also elements of populism and generational change in Japan, so the challenge is broader and more diffuse than nationalism.

A distinction was made between the U.S.-Japan treaty itself and the alliance or security relationship. The treaty provides the minimum basis for the alliance, but the broader scope of the alliance is overlapping interests, ideals, and objectives between the two countries. Japan's actions post-9/11 reflect this; Japan has gone beyond treaty requirements. If one measures Japan's response in timing and magnitude, it made a huge leap. As a result, the alliance appears on solid ground today. The challenge now is to maintain the momentum. This will require continued close coordination and cooperation and the type of candid, constructive dialogue and debate that continues to be the trademark of the annual San Francisco Security Seminar.

Politico-Military Perspectives:
Current Concerns in East Asian Security

Robert A. Scalapino

Introduction

As the year 2002 advances, attention in East Asia is focused mainly on domestic issues, with foreign policy generally a handmaiden to the more immediate challenges at home. Old issues with neighbors remain unresolved and relations between and among the major states continue to be complex, but there is no sense of imminent crisis. At the same time, however, with military budgets rising, the revolution in military affairs (RMA) producing new uncertainties, and regional as well as international security organizations faltering, virtually every Pacific-Asian nation views the future with a mixture of hope and apprehension.

Currently, each nation-state must deal with the semi-conflictual interaction of three powerful forces – internationalism, nationalism, and communalism. Internationalism, whatever its deficiencies, is advancing at an astonishing rate – economic, political, and strategic. In addition to its many institutional manifestations, it is evidenced by various concerts of nations, brought together to confront a specific issue or problem.

At the same time, nationalism is resurgent in many states whether as a substitute for declining ideology (as in China), a reaction against patron-client relations, or a response to the internationalist tides.

Yet a third force is in increasing evidence, namely, communalism. In this all-consuming revolutionary era, individuals everywhere are asking the questions "Who am I?," "What do I believe?," and "How can I find a community that provides psychological comfort?" For some, the answer is found in religion, especially fundamentalism or cults; for others, it is in intensified ethnic identification; still others root themselves more deeply in their local community, shunning outsiders. While communalism has always been an important political factor, a combination of troubled politics and modern military technology has given it increased salience.

The conflict among and interaction of these three forces have a profound influence upon both the foreign and domestic policies of every state. Yet as noted, security in its most basic sense tends to center upon the domestic front, as current events in such societies as Indonesia, the Philippines, Myanmar, and in South Asia, India and Pakistan illustrate.

Beyond national boundaries, the security concerns of East Asian societies often focus upon the two ascendant powers of this era, namely, the United States and China. With respect to the United States, two views stand in opposition to each other, especially

when articulated without nuance. The negative view is that the United States is a global hegemonist intent upon imposing its system and values on others, thus not hesitating to violate their sovereignty, arrogant in its posture and prone to rely upon military force or threat to impose its will. The U.S., it is asserted, eschews true partnership, insisting upon patron-client relations with those whom it terms allies, and setting the policies for them to follow. While it sought some degree of global support through a pursuit of multilateralism immediately after 9/11, it has now returned to unilateralism with redoubled intensity.

The positive view is that the United States as the world's strongest power has accepted the responsibility for upholding peace in diverse settings since no regional or international organization is currently capable of performing that task. Moreover, in East Asia, it is essential to have a balance of power, with the U.S. crucial in protecting the interests of various small and medium states. While the U.S. supports democratic, open societies, and criticizes violations of human rights, it has worked constructively with a variety of states, including some non-democratic nations, when common interests are present, thereby opening the doors to dialogue and the pursuit of peaceful approaches to problems.

This is to put attitudes toward the United States in their starkest, most simple form. In reality, various nuances exist in the evaluation of American policy. Even China, which frequently articulates the negative view, opts for a relationship with the U.S. which is on balance positive, seeing this both in its national interest, especially in economic terms, and in the interest of the peace and security of the region. Meanwhile, exponents of the positive view are currently concerned in many cases about American unilateralism, and the lack of a nuanced policy in dealing with certain states perceived to be a threat – from North Korea to Myanmar. "Axis of Evil" was not a welcome phrase for the current governments of South Korea and Japan or many others, stretching across the Eurasian continent to the European Union.

Thus, while it is recognized that the United States is a critical actor on the global stage, and without its active participation in efforts to resolve key issues and advance the cause of peace the prospects would be dim, concern has grown as to whether the U.S. can combine leadership and multilateralism, commitment and patience, military strength and a variety of alternative or supportive policies.

The other giant, very different in type and status, is China. Once again, one can discern two opposite views, stated in the most simple, unreserved terms. The negative view is that China represents an increasing threat, given its steadily growing military power, its militant nationalism echoing an imperial past, and unresolved territorial issues, foremost Taiwan. For certain countries, moreover, negativism regarding China now encompasses economic concerns – China as a foremost competitor in terms of export capacities, attraction to foreign investors, and labor supply. Will economic inroads into such societies as Myanmar, Mongolia, and Vietnam be followed by political-strategic pressures, as is evident with respect to Taiwan?

The positive view is that China, despite its major successes of the past two decades, faces huge challenges in modernizing its l.3 billion people, and thus domestic issues will take priority. On the economic front, unhappy farmers and unemployed workers are increasingly manifesting their displeasure, and a deficient banking system, faltering state owned enterprises, and East-West gap add to the problems.

On the political front, moreover, a major transition is underway, with the move from a traditional Stalinist state with Chinese characteristics to an authoritarian pluralist system, with politics still authoritarian, albeit somewhat more flexible; a civil society apart from the state is emerging, with diverse views and demands being articulated. Thus, party leaders are confronted with how to retain stability while promoting development. Moreover, a leadership transition is now underway, with a fourth generation, still untested, coming to power.

Further, while China's military modernization program is moving ahead, it cannot be considered in the same military category as the United States, now or for the foreseeable future.

Faced with these challenges, China, it is hoped, will adhere to its oft-repeated pledge to abide by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, eschewing tension and conflict abroad. And indeed, China's recent foreign policy has focused upon improving relations with all of its neighbors. High-level visitations and agreements pledging partnership have been exchanged with a great variety of states. Indeed, PRC relations with Russia, Korea – North and South – and Southeast Asia are generally better than at any time in the recent past. Relations with the U.S., moreover, demonstrate Beijing's desire for a positive relationship despite unresolved issues. Only with Japan is there wariness, despite major economic ties.

Yet China worries about American encirclement, especially since 9/11 with U.S. involvement currently not only in Afghanistan, but in diverse parts of Central Asia as well. Moreover, this involvement has had the support of Russian President Vladimir Putin as well as Pakistani President Musharaff, one of China's allies. Will the buffer state approach that was earlier applied in China's dealings with its neighbors suffice? Can American moves toward theatre missile defense (TMD) and national missile defense (NMD), along with the scraping of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, give that nation permanent strategic dominance?

On the other side, some Americans are concerned about the role that a militant Chinese nationalism might play in the future with respect not only to Taiwan, but also to relations with various other small neighbors where disputes persist.

The U.S-China relationship is likely to rest on two foundations in the decades immediately ahead: a concert of powers and a balance of power. On a number of issues on which the two nations have common interests, ranging from the Korean peninsula to drug trafficking, pollution control, and other measures to advance human security, coalitions can operate involving the U.S., China, and others. At the same time, both the

U.S. and China in their own fashion will seek to balance power through alliances, alignments, and "partnerships." Moreover, the issue of Taiwan – long proclaimed by China as the crucial issue – is no closer to solution, and such events as the visit to the U.S. of Taiwan's defense minister and his meeting with Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, naturally produced a very negative response in Beijing. China, like others, is also concerned about the Pentagon's Nuclear Posture Review. Is the U.S. widening the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons, some of a new type, and obscuring the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, as certain critics have claimed? Is the revolution in military affairs (RMA) increasing uncertainty and insecurity, as some maintain?

In sum, China's relations with the United States are likely to remain complex in the years ahead, and they may present a concern not merely to the two nations, but to other Asia-Pacific nations since this relationship is so critical to the region as a whole. However, with the complex domestic issues faced by both societies, their growing economic interaction, other U.S. commitments throughout the Eurasian continent, and the military imbalance, the risks of conflict in the foreseeable future are slight.

Other bilateral relations between the major Asian powers are in many cases equally complex. China and Russia have achieved a closer working relationship than at any time since the early Maoist era, and a "strategic partnership" has been proclaimed. Yet carefully scrutinized, that relation is far from an alliance. President Vladimir Putin aims at reestablishing Russia as a global power. To that end, he is seeking closer relations with the West, including the United States, as well as with the East. His support for the anti-terrorist campaign has included acceptance of U.S. forces in Central Asia, and his efforts to reach a compromise on the nuclear and missile issues, not without opposition at home, testify to a positive approach. Moreover, Moscow is seeking to reestablish close relations with New Delhi as well as Hanoi – raising questions privately in Beijing. In sum, Russia's relations with both China and the United States testify mightily to the importance of perceived national interests and a strong nationalist tide in the Russian Federation.

Among the major East Asian nations, Japan at present presents the greatest worries, not because of its strength, but because of its weakness. To be sure, Chinese critics are constantly warning of a restoration of Japanese militarism, and indeed, nationalism is on the rise in Japan, with the desire to be treated as "a normal nation." Japan wants to have a stronger voice and greater independence in foreign policy, and desires to move to full partnership with the United States. Yet there is no indication that Japan is interested in becoming a nuclear power or challenging others on the military front. Support for the alliance with the U.S. continues to be strong despite certain problems, and Japan has moved carefully in expanding its obligations under the Security Agreement.

Japan's relations with China, however, remain delicate despite extensive economic interaction. "The legacy of history" continues to color Chinese views of Japan, and criticisms of a wide range of Japanese policies dominate the media. With Russia

also, Japan has problems due primarily to the Northern Territory or South Kuriles issue. As recent negotiations have shown, neither party can overcome the strong nationalist feelings that inhibit an agreement on this matter. Hence, after more than half a century, a peace treaty between the two has not been achieved.

The primary concern regarding Japan, however, felt especially in the United States, is the economic malaise, now a decade old, and the dim prospects at present for basic reforms to end the impasse. Even Prime Minister Koizumi, who came to office with massive public support and numerous reform pledges, has been unable to break the stranglehold of those within his party and in the bureaucracy who are wedded to the old order. Thus, Japan, despite its importance to the region, remains a faltering state economically.

In summarizing major power relations, one fact should be emphasized. The risk of a major power conflict encompassing the region or the globe is minimal at present despite the complexities that exist. Such a conflict could not be won. The "victor" as well as the defeated would suffer massive economic and political damages, and this fact is known by leaders everywhere. Tensions, even crises, may ensue, but 20th century-type global wars are highly unlikely.

Two risks, however, must not be overlooked. One source of concern relates to the potentially incendiary problems of the Korean peninsula and China-Taiwan. There is no solution to these two issues at present. Dialogue between the two Koreas and between the U.S. and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has ceased, at least for now. Such issues as divided families, the severed railway line, and broader security issues remain unresolved. And the U.S. and DPRK are exchanging epithets rather than ideas.

While this picture is currently far from promising, various factors exist that make conflict unlikely. The U.S. security commitment to the Republic of Korea (ROK) is firm, unlike l950, and the Northern leaders understand this fact. Moreover, their quest is survival, not suicide. It is clear that should a conflict break out, whatever damage the North could do to the South initially, in the end it would be pulverized by U.S. and ROK military power. Further, the DPRK remains a failing state economically, and the indications are increasing that it is seeking assistance and training from a growing number of Asian and European states.

The Taiwan problem also warrants concern. However, at present, the PRC is pursuing a united front policy, convinced that time is on its side. It is interacting with a variety of Taiwan citizens, even members of the Democratic People's Party (DPP), while isolating President Chen Shui-bian. Meanwhile, Taiwan investment in and trade with the Mainland are expanding rapidly, testimony to Taiwan's economic difficulties at home. In the short term at least, a serious confrontation seems unlikely. In the longer term, many uncertainties exist, and it seems necessary for a new formula governing the relationship to be devised.

The broader issue causing concern in the Asia-Pacific, however, relates to the problem of failing and faltering states, with their problems spilling out on occasion into the region. Japan, as has been noted, constitutes a special case, being a major nation despite its problems. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia is a worrisome example, given its size and importance. Can this society become a true nation-state, and regain stability under a system fostering a more realistic mix of centralized authority and regional autonomy? Success or failure will impact on all of the surrounding states. Similarly, what is the future of Myanmar, both in economic terms and with respect to Burmese-ethnic minority relations? Thailand will be strongly affected by the answer to this question. Laos and Cambodia also represent fragile states. And the Philippines, while much stronger, now confronts terrorists with international connections, a symbol of our times.

Assistance of various forms can be and is being given most of these nations. Polices of engagement rather than containment are increasingly applied, since containment has rarely proven effective. Yet in the event of collapse or massive internal conflict, what is to be done? Should the situation be ignored whatever the bloodshed and turmoil? What form should "humanitarian intervention" take, if it is to be considered? These issues will be on the agenda of both nations and regional/international organizations for the foreseeable future.

In conclusion, the reasons for East Asian concern over the political and strategic future are numerous and understandable. However, given the primacy accorded to domestic issues, the rapid rise of globalization, and the extraordinary costs of massive conflict, the prospects are for a troubled peace, with fragile states and unresolved issues continuing, but with dialogue rather than conflict prevailing between and among states.

Impact of 9/11 in the Asia Pacific Region

Yoichi Kato

Introduction

My presentation will focus on some of the specific challenges that I believe the region faces in the wake of 9/11 and the subsequent war on terrorism.

The first point regards North Korea. The way that states in the region perceive the threat of North Korea changed after 9/11, with both Japan and the United States steering toward more hard-line approaches. These changes seem to have intensified the sense of isolation on the part of North Korea. Neither Japan nor the Untied States, however, has yet spelled out a clear game plan as to how to deal with this new environment of heightened tensions with North Korea, and how they might eventually turn it into an opportunity to improve security and stability in the region.

The change of threat perception seems most evident in the United States. Not only has President Bush included North Korea in the "Axis of Evil," but the U.S. now regards a North Korean attack on South Korea as a possible contingency, in which a military response with nuclear weapons by the U.S. may be required. This is, of course, based on the recent media reporting on the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).

It is clear that 9/11 made the United States realize that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) possessed by North Korea can find their way to the U.S. homeland or to vital U.S. interests abroad, including its allies, even without development of the long-range Taepo-dong 2 missiles. When the United States set the next objective of the war on terrorism after Afghanistan as preventing terrorists and rogue states from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, it is only natural that they turned to North Korea.

In terms of military strategy, it should not be any surprise for even North Korea that the United States is contemplating the use of nuclear weapons against them, if they think of their own possession of WMD, including biological, chemical, and possibly nuclear weapons, not to mention their hostile attitude.

But politically this revelation of a new nuclear strategy of the United States has had an enormous impact on the standing of North Korea in the region and the world, in addition to the designation as part of an "Axis of Evil." President Bush clarified that the United States does not have any intention to invade North Korea. And the Pentagon explained that the purpose of the NPR was not to specify targets, but to analyze nuclear weapons requirements. Yet it is apparent that the detrimental impact has been done in spite of those clarifications.

The Koizumi administration has been as eager as the United States to take a hard-line approach toward North Korea. A series of events have demonstrated a tough

approach toward North Korea, beginning in November 2001 with the investigation into the misuse of funds at Chogin Tokyo Credit Union, followed by Japan's shooting of the alleged North Korean spy boat in the East China Sea, and finally the recent decision to renew and toughen Japan's approach to the alleged abduction cases by North Korea.

None of these incidents has a direct connection with 9/11 or the war on terrorism, but they roughly coincide with the U.S. decision to apply more pressure on North Korea. The relationship between Japan and North Korea may become more strained, if the Koizumi administration decides to recover the sunken spy boat, possibly this summer after the World Cup soccer games. Of course one can justifiably put the blame on North Korea for these actions by Japan and the United States. But the apparent challenge for both governments is that there is no indication that North Korea will alter its basic stance in dealing with these issues in spite of a tougher approach by our two countries.

The other problem is that it is not very clear what kind of end-state Japan and the United States, individually or jointly, are trying to achieve with North Korea. The imminent challenge will be how the United States and Japan will react, if and when the connection between North Korea and terrorist groups is established, in terms of supply of WMD or transfer of critical technology.

Currently, though, the strained relationships deprive all parties involved of the political flexibility to reach a resolution and at the same time limits the options. In the case of the United States, since President Bush has already articulated in the State of Union speech a possibility of taking unilateral or even preemptive military action to deny terrorists access to WMD and to prevent their use, his policy direction is clear. It is only natural to assume that the United States would take decisive military action of some sort against North Korea, if connections with terrorists are in fact found. One possible response that experts have speculated is interdiction of North Korean shipments

Then how will and should Japan react? Will the Guidelines be applied? How will and should the alliance function in such a case? I will leave these as open questions, but I believe it will certainly present a serious challenge for both Japan and the Untied States.

The Nuclear Posture Review might put some strains on Japan-U.S. security relations as well. The significance of extended deterrence will substantially change if the threshold of using nuclear weapons is lowered. If the United States decides to resume nuclear testing, it will directly collide with the position the Japanese government has long had of trying hard to push forward the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It will force Japan to face a fundamental policy contradiction, which is to depend on the U.S. nuclear umbrella while advocating an eventual total ban of all nuclear weapons.

Next let me quickly touch upon China and Southeast Asia. A majority of China experts in Washington seems to believe that the warming of the U.S.-China relationship after 9/11 has virtually ended, and both countries have gone back to "business as usual." The impact of the Nuclear Posture Review seems to be significant; Beijing called in the

U.S. ambassador and reportedly told him, "China will not yield to foreign threats, including nuclear blackmail."

Another recent negative impetus may be the U.S. invitation to Taiwan's defense minister, Tang Yiau-ming, to the United States and his meeting with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz in Florida. China accused the U.S. government of breaching the three joint communiqués, in which Washington recognized Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. A diplomat from one Southeast Asian state commented to me regarding this seemingly changing approach of Washington vis-à-vis China, that U.S. strategic position toward China is now ambiguous.

Southeast Asian countries on the whole seem to welcome the increased attention and commitment by the United States to the region as a result of 9/11. But it is not because they share the perception of transnational threats with the United States but because the U.S. presence and assistance will enhance the stability of the region. Most of the Islamic activism in Southeast Asia is associated with local issues, especially political autonomy. Even some cells of al-Qaeda found in Singapore targeted Americans instead of locals.

The National Defense University recently sponsored a symposium, which dealt with transnational threats in the Pacific region. Let me share a couple of consensus views which emerged from the conference.

- 9/11 and the following war on terrorism have given an important additional basis for continued U.S. military presence in the Asia Pacific region.

- The concept of "security community" raised by Admiral Blair when he was U.S. CINCPAC, and which advocates building operational cooperation among militaries in the region, may provide some foundation for developing the kind of variable and flexible bilateral and multilateral relationships that will be critical to the next phase of the war on terrorism.

  Finally, I would like to look at the impact of 9/11 and the war on terrorism on public opinion in the region, as reflected in several opinion polls conducted by the *Asahi Shimbun* in December 2001 and January 2002 in four countries: Japan, the United States, China, and South Korea. The polls indicates that there has been an enormous deterioration in the public feeling of safety and security, yet there has not been much change in terms of how people perceive threats to their countries.

One poll measures Japanese perceptions of safety. As Figure 1 shows (see page 35), sixty percent of respondents said that their sense of security had changed because of 9/11, while half answered that they were now afraid to fly. Eighty five percent answered they were concerned about "war or terrorism." This is almost as high as the typical percentage of people concerned about "crimes and traffic accidents," so that now Japanese people feel as concerned about terrorism as they are about common traffic accidents. When asked if Japan is a safe place to live, the answers were evenly split: 47 percent said yes, 46 percent said no. Sixty three percent said that Japan would not be a

safer place in ten years, so it seems a majority of people have lost their confidence in the safety of Japanese society.

Even though Japanese people have grown pessimistic about their safety, threat perceptions in the region have not changed much. As Figure 2 shows, Japanese and South Koreans still see North Korea as their main threat instead of Iraq or Afghanistan, with 43 percent of Japanese and 50 percent of Koreans holding this perception of North Korea. For Japanese, the U.S. follows with 15 percent and China with eight percent. South Koreans view Japan as the second largest threat, with 30 percent of respondents holding this view, while 11 percent think the U.S. is the largest threat.

People in the U.S. and China see each other as the most serious threat, with 29 percent of Americans and 69 percent of Chinese viewing the other as the most threatening state. For Americans, Iraq was a distant second with 15 percent, closely followed by Afghanistan with 13 percent. For Chinese, Japan followed as the second perceived threat with 20 percent, and India with three percent.

These results indicate that 9/11 made the people in the region feel less secure in general terms, but the tangible threats they actually have in their minds are not necessarily the states harboring Muslim terrorists but those same old nation states they were concerned about before September 11.

The third question asked whether it was appropriate that the United States led the war on terrorism or if the United Nations should have taken the lead. As we can see in Figure 3, among respondents in Japan, China, and Korea, the expectation for a UN initiative was higher than that for the United States, showing a distinct difference with the way American people think. This result should bear some significance for future planning of the war on terrorism.

The fourth question asked whether each country should strengthen its cooperative relationship with the United States to deal with terrorism. As Figure 4 shows, almost half of Japanese think that the alliance should be enhanced but they are not so sure as Koreans are. Chinese are also ambivalent, but rather inclined toward a negative view.

Finally, respondents were asked their opinion on Japan legalizing the dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) abroad. As Figure 5 shows, not surprisingly an overwhelming number of Chinese felt it was either bad or very bad; an overwhelming majority in the United States felt it was either very good or good; and in Korea, a near majority (45 percent) felt it was either very good or good.

List of Contributors

Ralph A. Cossa is President of Pacific Forum CSIS. He is a specialist on political-military affairs and national security strategy with more than 25 years of experience in formulating, articulating, and implementing U.S. security policy in the Asia-Pacific and Near East-South Asia regions. He serves on the steering committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and serves as executive director of the U.S. Committee of CSCAP. He is also a board member of the Council on U.S.-Korean Security Studies. He is a retired USAF Colonel and a former National Security Affairs Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He has published numerous journal articles, books, as well as op-ed pieces in the international media. Mr. Cossa holds a B.A. in international relations from Syracuse University, an M.B.A. in management from Pepperdine University, and an M.S. in strategic studies from the Defense Intelligence College.

Yoichi Kato is a visiting research fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University and at CSIS in Washington, D.C. He is currently on leave from the *Asahi Shimbun* where he has been a staff writer for 20 years. His area of expertise is Japan's national security policy and the U.S.-Japan alliance. He has appeared on numerous American news programs - including CNN, ABC's Nightline, the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer and C-SPAN - to provide a Japanese perspective on political events in the United States. In 1991, he received the M.A. degree in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Prior to joining *Asahi Shimbun*, Mr. Kato graduated from Tokyo University for Foreign Studies.

James A. Kelly is Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and the Pacific Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. He is former President of the Pacific Forum CSIS. Previously Mr. Kelly served as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Ronald Reagan, and as Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council. He also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (East Asia and Pacific). From 1989 to 1994, Mr. Kelly was president of EAP Associates, Inc., an international business consulting firm. He is a former Captain in the U.S. Navy and is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, and the National War College.

Hisashi Owada is President of the Japan Institute for International Affairs. He also serves as Advisor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan and Senior Advisor to the President of the World Bank. Previously he served as Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations. Ambassador Owada has served in various posts in the foreign service of Japan, spending a large part of his career on legal as well as United Nations affairs, on the United States, and on the Soviet Union. Ambassador Owada is a graduate of Tokyo University and taught there for more than 25 years, as well as having taught at Harvard Law School, Columbia Law School and New York University Law School. He is the author of numerous books and articles on international legal, economic and political issues.

Robert A. Scalapino is Robson Research Professor of Government Emeritus at the University of California at Berkeley. From 1949 to 1990 he taught in the Political Science Department at the University of California at Berkeley. He was department chairman from 1962 to 1965 and Robson Research Professor of Government from 1977 until 1990. In 1978 he founded the Institute of East Asian Studies and remained its director until his retirement in 1990. He is the recipient of numerous research grants, medals, and awards, and has published some 500 articles and 38 books or monographs on Asian politics and U.S. Asian policy. He serves on the Board of Directors of Pacific Forum-CSIS among other organizations. He received the B.A. degree from Santa Barbara College and the M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from Harvard University.

Jane Skanderup is Director for Programs at the Pacific Forum CSIS. She specializes in comparative political economy in Asia, as well as international trade and investment issues. Current projects include an analysis of cross-Strait economic and political relations, particularly the new division of labor in the IT sector; editing a volume of papers on U.S., Japan, and China relations; and a co-authored monograph on regional economic trends and issues. She has published op-eds, journal articles and books on a range of Asia-Pacific economic issues. Ms. Skanderup received the MA degree from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies where she focused on international economics and Latin America.

Appendix A

EIGHTH ANNUAL U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY SEMINAR

"JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONS POST 9-11: MAINTAINING THE MOMENTUM"

Jointly sponsored by
The Japan Institute of International Affairs
Consulate General of Japan in San Francisco
and the Pacific Forum CSIS

March 22-23, 2002
Pan Pacific Hotel • San Francisco, California

Agenda

Thursday, March 21

all day	Participants arrive
7:00PM	Informal welcoming dinner (Pacific Restaurant – Lobby Level)

Friday, March 22

8:00AM	Continental Breakfast (Terrace Room, 21st Floor)
9:00AM	**Opening Remarks** *Ralph A. Cossa*
9:10AM	**Keynote Remarks** *Hisashi Owada*

Session I. Politico-Military Perspectives:
Current Concerns in East Asian Security

The first session will assess the seriousness of regional problems as a whole. We will also discuss what impact the war on terrorism has or could have on traditional East Asian security concerns, including the challenges associated with an emerging China, the continued stalemate on the Korean Peninsula, and weapons proliferation.

- U.S. Presenter: *Robert A. Scalapino*
- Japanese Presenter: *Yoichi Kato*
- General Discussion

11:15AM Break

11:30AM **Session IIA: Evolving Japanese Security Policy**

Tokyo's security strategy under Prime Minister Koizumi derives from long-time discussions on security issues from the 1990/91 Gulf crisis to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the U.S. This session will discuss how Japanese thinking on security has evolved on both a political and a public level, in addition to what was achieved and what should be achieved in the future under PM Koizumi.

- Japanese Presenter: *Ichiro Fujisaki*
- General Discussion

12:45PM Break for lunch

1:00PM Private working lunch
Luncheon Remarks: *James A. Kelly*

2:30PM **Session IIB: Evolving U.S. Security Policy**

How has Washington's East Asia strategy evolved in the first year of the Bush administration? In what fundamental ways have U.S. strategy and policy toward Asia changed, as compared with previous administrations? What has been the impact of September 11th on U.S. thinking and expectations for Asia? We will also discuss the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review and current missile defense-related issues.

- U.S. Presenter: *Michael McDevitt*
- General Discussion

3:45PM Break

4:00PM **Session III: Regional and Global Economic Challenges and Opportunities**

The focus here will not be on how to address or solve Tokyo's and Washington's current economic difficulties but rather on their impact on regional stability. More specifically, how has a decade of Japanese economic stagnation impacted Tokyo's regional and global role? Will states in the region look more toward Beijing than either Washington or Tokyo as the next engine of growth and, if so, what are the political/security implications? How will China's entry into the WTO and the growing movement toward more bilateral and regional free trade areas affect U.S.-Japan bilateral economic cooperation? Is collaboration or conflict more likely to characterize U.S. and Japan interaction in the WTO and APEC?

- Japanese Presenter: *Hisayoshi Ina*
- U.S. Presenter: *Kent Calder*
- General Discussion

5:30PM Session Adjourns

6:30PM Bus departs hotel for dinner

7:00PM **Reception and Dinner**
Residence of the Consul General of Japan

Saturday, March 23

8:00AM Continental Breakfast (Terrace Room, 21st Floor)

9:00AM **Session IV: U.S.-Japan Security Relations: Maintaining the Momentum**

Tokyo's quick and decisive response to Washington's call for increased cooperation in the war on terrorism has been unprecedented and has clearly raised the security relationship to a higher level. Can this be sustained? What more will Washington seek? What more is Japan prepared to give? What are the areas – political, economic, and security-related – where future cooperation will be most important? Where are the future trouble spots? Will currently dormant issues, such as Okinawa basing and host nation support, become problematic? Is closer U.S.-Japan trilateral cooperation feasible/desirable with Korea or with Australia? How can multilateral mechanisms and initiatives enhance future bilateral cooperation?

- Japanese Presenter: *Makoto Iokibe*
- U.S. Presenter: *Torkel Patterson*
- General Discussion

11:30AM Meeting Adjourns

Afternoon-evening Participants depart

Sunday, March 24

All day Remaining participants depart

EIGHTH ANNUAL U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY SEMINAR

"JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONS POST 9-11: MAINTAINING THE MOMENTUM"

Jointly sponsored by
The Japan Institute of International Affairs
Consulate General of Japan in San Francisco
and the Pacific Forum CSIS

March 22-23, 2002
Pan Pacific Hotel • San Francisco, California

Participant List

U.S. Participants

Ambassador Michael H. Armacost
President
Brookings Institution

Mr. William T. Breer
Japan Chair
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Mr. Peter Brookes
Deputy Assistant Secretary (DASD/AP)
U.S. Department of Defense

Professor Kent E. Calder
Director
Center for U.S.-Japan Relations
Princeton University

The Honorable Richard A. Christenson
Deputy Chief of Mission
U.S. Embassy – Tokyo

Ambassador William Clark Jr.
President
The Japan Society, Inc.

Mr. Ralph A. Cossa
President
Pacific Forum CSIS

The Honorable James A. Kelly
Assistant Secretary of State, EA/PA
U.S. Department of State

Mr. Christopher J. LaFleur
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
For East Asia and Pacific Affairs
U.S. Department of State

R.Adm. Michael McDevitt, USN (Ret.)
Director, Center for Strategic Studies
Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)

Mr. John F. Neuffer
Deputy Assistant USTR for Japan
U.S. Trade Representative Office

Mr. Torkel Patterson
Senior Associate
Pacific Forum CSIS

Professor Robert A. Scalapino
Robson Research Professor of
Government Emeritus
University of California – Berkeley

R.Adm. William D. Sullivan, USN
Director, Strategic Planning & Policy

U.S. Pacific Command

Dr. Ezra F. Vogel
Fairbank Center for East Asian Studies
Harvard University

LTG Thomas Waskow, USAF
Commander
U.S. Forces – Japan

U.S. Observers

Mr. Peter Ennis
Editor
The Oriental Economist

Mr. Brad Glosserman
Director of Research
Pacific Forum CSIS

Mr. John Hill
Senior Country Officer, Japan
U.S. Department of Defense

Mr. Robert J. Kaneda
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
U.S. Department of State

Col. Brian T. Kelly
Deputy Division Chief, NE Asia China
Joint Staff

Col. David J. Knack, USA
Director of Plans and Policy J-5
United States Forces Japan

Mr. Thomas J. Navratil
Deputy Chief of Security
American Embassy – Tokyo

Mr. Robin H. Sakoda
Senior Associate
AALC, Ltd. Co.

Mr. Christopher J. Sigur
Executive Director
The Japan Society of Northern California

Ms. Jane Skanderup
Director for Programs
Pacific Forum CSIS

Mr. Daniel Sneider
National/Foreign Editor
San Jose Mercury News

Lt. Col. Gerard Stolar
Japan Country Director
U.S. Pacific Command

Mr. William Usher
Northeast Asia Security Affairs Analyst
Central Intelligence Agency

Japan Participants

His Excellency Hisashi Owada
President
Japan Institute of International Affairs

Mr. Ichiro Fujisaki
Director General
North American Affairs Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Col. Keijiro Hata
J-5, Japan Defense Agency
Japan Self Defense Forces

Mr. Hisayoshi Ina
Nihon Keizai Shimbun

Dr. Makoto Iokibe
Professor
Kobe University

Mr. Yoichi Kato
Visiting Fellow,
National Defense University
The Asahi Shimbun

The Honorable Ichiro Komatsu

Minister
Embassy of Japan, D.C.
Col. Tadashi Miyagawa
Defense Attache
Embassy of Japan, D.C.

Dr. Koji Murata
Assistant Professor
Doshisha University

Mr. Shigeru Nakamura
Consul General
Consulate General of Japan
San Francisco

Mr. Nobushige Takamizawa
Director of Defense Intelligence
Division, Japan Defense Agency
Japan Self Defense Forces

Japan Observers

Mr. Tatsuya Horikiri
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division
North American Affairs Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Ken Jimbo
Research Fellow
Japan Institute of International Affairs

Staff

Ms. Christina Hatfield
Conference Coordinator
Pacific Forum CSIS

Ms. Yumiko Nakagawa
Vasey Fellow and Intern
Pacific Forum CSIS