The Six-Party Talks: Developing a Roadmap for Future Progress

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Executive Summary

The prospects for success in resolving the current North Korean nuclear crisis remain limited unless all six parties – and especially the other five, aside from the DPRK – have a clear, common understanding of desired outcomes and objectives, a common definition of what constitutes success (or failure) and a common roadmap for getting from where we are today to where we want and need to be. To help chart a course for the future, this paper reviews the origins of the ongoing North Korean nuclear crisis and the progress of the Six-Party Talks, analyzes areas of agreement and disagreement among the six parties, assesses prospects for the future of the Six-Party Talks, identifies technical issues, uncertainties, and information needs deriving from the talks that might enable the parties to address potential future issues on the agenda at the Six-Party Talks, and recommends practical steps to support the process, if it is to proceed and ultimately succeed.

The record casts doubt on whether the Six-Party Talks is up to the challenge of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. Efforts by all parties have fallen short of the rhetorical commitments to use the talks to resolve the second North Korean nuclear crisis. For this reason, the other five participants (less the DPRK) need to reach common understanding on what constitutes failure – on what the "deal breakers" might be. A firm common stance on such issues will reduce Pyongyang's ability to play at the fissures in their time-honored game of "divide and conquer." A clearer common definition of failure will help the Talks ultimately succeed since Pyongyang would be hard-pressed to ignore common stances, just as it finds irresistible the temptation to exploit the differences.

In the one instance where the other five have all spoken firmly and publicly on the same issue – in warning of the "severe consequences" that would result if the North were to conduct a nuclear test – Pyongyang appears to have heard and honored the message. The reverse can also be true: thus far only Washington seems to be speaking out firmly against allowing Pyongyang to have any form of "peaceful" nuclear energy program. Without a single voice on this issue, compromise on Pyongyang's part seems unlikely.

While the road ahead is sure to be bumpy, all remain committed to the diplomatic process; circumstances suggest that no member of the Six-Party Talks process favors military action as a vehicle for resolving the crisis, and there is little evidence that China or Russia is willing at this point to take the North Korean nuclear issue to the UN Security Council or to devise some other forum for addressing this issue. Therefore, the odds are high that some of six-way dialogue will continue after the August 2005 "recess."

A joint statement, if achieved, will represent only a modest step forward, however. Equally important will be an agreement to resurrect the six-party working-level effort both to more specifically identity the core problems, concerns, and points of concurrence and contention, and to start charting the course ahead. We suggest that the following issues and areas of research and dialogue be placed high on any working group

agenda, and on the agenda of other track one and track two efforts that seek to facilitate the six-party process.

Clearly Define Objectives and Criteria for Success/Failure and Coordinate Those Objectives With Other Participants in the Six-Party Talks. Many differences remain over the definitional issues associated with the common rhetorical goal of "the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." If the United States cannot gain support for its definition of comprehensive dismantlement from the other parties, this objective will likely prove unsustainable. The U.S. must hold further discussions with its counterparts outside the context of Six-Party Talks on the objectives of the talks and the specific measures that must be taken to fulfill those objectives.

Clearly Define Lessons from the "Libyan Model" for the Six-Party Talks. The U.S has commended the "Libya model" as a preferred approach to dismantling the DPRK's nuclear program. However, there is no comprehensive study of the lessons from the Libyan case that would be most applicable to the DPRK. There should be research to determine the aspects of the Libyan experience that are most applicable to North Korea.

Determine the Functions and Modalities of a Six Party Verification and Monitoring Regime for the DPRK. There is a need for meetings including participation from members of the six-party process (with or without North Korean participation) to examine comparative strengths and weaknesses of various approaches to verification and monitoring. Technical analysis and comparison of available inspections regimes should be pursued through workshops and research. This effort might also include an assessment of the skills and capabilities of potential participants in any multilateral verification regime, and the development of appropriate training materials for them.

Undertake a Comprehensive Post-Agreed Framework Assessment (including Lessons Learned from the First North Korean Nuclear Crisis). There is a need to examine the lessons from the first North Korean nuclear crisis and their implications for future verification efforts with the DPRK. This work should examine how technological advances may facilitate the use of more effective and less intrusive verification measures that might be more easily implemented as part of any final settlement. The goal is to develop a clearer understanding of how the DPRK views verification issues and whether there are technology or other applications that might assist in overcoming potential DPRK obstacles to an agreement.

Identify Future Needs and Next Steps Toward Nuclear Transparency in Northeast Asia. Establishment of the Six-Party Talks has revealed a new openness to consider an institutionalized dialogue on regional issues beyond the North Korean nuclear problem. A conference should be convened to discuss nuclear transparency issues and the development of regional institutions in Northeast Asia while also supporting any likely verification vehicle that might develop through the talks. This effort would be designed to build linkages between European officials and energy experts involved or familiar with EURATOM cooperative efforts and East Asian officials and nuclear specialists.

Prevent Illicit DPRK Procurement or Trade Activities. As diplomacy proceeds, there will be an ongoing need for measures to constrain DPRK alternatives and to curb its illicit procurement activities. There is a need for research to determine whether there are new monitoring technologies that might support the PSI. As Washington and Beijing agree that the transport of fissile or other illicit materials should be prevented, this also provides the basis for enhanced Sino-U.S. technical cooperation. Pyongyang has stated that it will not export nuclear weapons or fissile material; it should be offered the chance to demonstrate this commitment through an invitation to join the PSI and demonstrate transparency on this issue.

Beyond the Nuclear Issue: Addressing Security Assurances. All parties agree that multilateral security assurances will be part of the final settlement. While the focus of discussions has been on providing security assurances to Pyongyang, all six parties have legitimate security concerns that must be addressed. Regional security outlooks prepared by ARF governments could be studied to better identify the security concerns that must be addressed and set the stage for developing the confidence building measures and monitoring/verification mechanisms needed for any final agreement.

Beyond the Nuclear Issue: Addressing Missile Verification. We recommend a joint U.S.-Japan study of their concerns about DPRK missile capabilities. It would consider whether joint U.S.-Japan efforts on missile defense can fully respond to Japan's security concerns and the monitoring and verification measures necessary to enhance confidence in any deal with the DPRK to freeze its missile development and deployment activities. This research might also explore Japanese incentives that could induce the DPRK to give up its missile program and how the missile issue should be dealt with in relation to multilateral security assurances that might be offered as part of the Six-Party Talks.

The Six-Party Talks: Developing a Roadmap for Future Progress

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The Six-Party Talks – established by the People's Republic of China (PRC) government in August 2003, and including the United States, Republic of Korea (ROK), Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Japan, and Russia – has served as the main venue for discussion of solutions to the second North Korean nuclear crisis. Following DPRK Foreign Ministry's Feb. 10, 2005 statement announcing that North Korea had indefinitely suspended its participation in the Six-Party Talks, all parties subsequently redoubled consultations regarding the future of the talks and have reaffirmed their commitment to the talks as the most desirable vehicle for pursuing the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.[1]

Following a sporadic war of words in the media over North Korea's nuclear ambitions during a 14-month break in the dialogue, a series of diplomatic contacts, including PRC-DPRK high-level contacts in March and April and U.S.-DPRK bilateral meetings in New York in May of 2005, contributed to creating the conditions for the opening of a fourth round of six party dialogue. North Korean leader Kim Jong-il hinted during his June 17, 2005 meeting with ROK Minister of National Unification Chung Dong-young that the DPRK might be prepared to soon return to the talks and that one of his father's last wishes was for North Korea to forgo nuclear weapons development. The Six-Party Talks finally re-opened with a fourth round that began on July 27, 2005. The talks featured nearly two weeks of negotiations that included a series of intensive U.S.-DPRK bilateral contacts. However, the parties were unable to bridge their differences and PRC Vice Minister Wu Dawei declared a three-week recess on Aug. 6, 2005, announcing that the parties will reconvene for further negotiations on the week of Aug. 29, 2005.

The prospects for success in resolving the second North Korean nuclear crisis remain limited unless all six parties – and especially the other five, aside from the DPRK – have a clear, common understanding of desired outcomes and objectives, a common definition of what constitutes success (or failure) and a common roadmap for getting from where we are today to where we want and need to be. To help chart a course for the future, this paper will review the origins of the second North Korean nuclear crisis and the progress of the Six-Party Talks, analyze the areas of agreement and disagreement among the six parties, assess prospects for the future of the Six-Party Talks, identify technical issues, uncertainties, and information needs deriving from the talks that might enable the parties to address potential future issues on the agenda at the Six-Party Talks,

[1] See Appendix 1 for a chronological listing of key events regarding the current Korean Peninsula nuclear crisis.

and recommend practical steps that should be taken now to support the current or future needs of the process, if it is to proceed and ultimately succeed.

Anatomy of a Crisis: How We Got to Where We Are

Before discussing the six-party process, it is useful to briefly review how we got to this point. Complaints about the Bush administration's handling of events notwithstanding, it is important to remember that this is a North Korea-induced crisis. It came about because of a deliberate action on the part of Pyongyang: a decision to circumvent the 1994 Geneva U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework by pursuing a covert uranium enrichment program. The fact that Pyongyang's nuclear aspirations pre-date the Bush administration, much less President Bush's January 2002 "axis of evil" pronouncement or the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, indicates that these more recent events, while perhaps accelerating the North's clandestine nuclear activities, were not the primary catalysts for the crisis. While it can (and has) been argued that Washington's handling of the problem – characterized by initial inflexibility and by mixed messages – may have exacerbated the situation, the crisis has developed as a direct result of North Korea's nuclear weapons aspirations.

The infamous Kelly meeting. The crisis broke out in October of 2002 as a result of revelations made during a high-level visit to Pyongyang led by then-Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia James Kelly. At this first high-level meeting between a Bush administration envoy and senior DPRK officials, the Bush administration had stated that it was prepared to pursue a "bold approach" in its dealings with Pyongyang, but it insisted that North Korea first honor its previous commitments. Pyongyang reportedly responded to Kelly's allegations of North Korean cheating on its nuclear promises by defiantly acknowledging that it had a uranium enrichment program. (Pyongyang would later claim that it merely said it was "entitled" to have a nuclear weapons program, and remains deliberately vague as to what facilities or weapons it actually possesses.)[2]

Secretary Kelly reportedly accused the DPRK of procuring materials needed to pursue a covert uranium enrichment program as a potential alternative path to nuclear weapons development despite having supposedly abandoned those ambitions in the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework negotiated in Geneva in 1994. These revelations led to the suspension in November 2002 of activities of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), including a "temporary halt" in the delivery of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK as called for in the Agreed Framework. In rapid succession in December 2002 and early January 2003, the DPRK retaliated by kicking out inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at Yongbyon, loading new fuel rods into and restarting the DPRK's 5MWe graphite reactor, and announcing the DPRK's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Since January of 2003,

[2] For details on the nuclear crisis as it unfolds, please see the January 2003 and subsequent issues of *Comparative Connections*, a quarterly journal on East Asian affairs that provides a running commentary of significant political, security, and economic developments. *Comparative Connections* is available on the Pacific Forum website [www.csis.org/pacfor].

there has been no internationally verified mechanism or other safeguard in place to keep the DPRK from pursuing the development of either a uranium- or plutonium-based nuclear weapons capacity. Intelligence assessments estimate that the DPRK may have developed at least one to two nuclear weapons and may have sufficient fissile material to develop up to eight-nine nuclear weapons.[3]

The U.S. initially preferred quiet diplomacy, refusing to give details of the October 2002 talks (other than to describe them as "candid," which is diplomatic-speak for contentious). There was a two-week window between the visit and Washington's announcement of North Korea's "confession" when an opportunity for quiet diplomacy presented itself.

Unfortunately, Pyongyang immediately became publicly confrontational, condemning Kelly's "arrogant attitude" while declaring that the trip confirmed that "the Bush administration is pursuing not a policy of dialogue but a hard-line policy of hostility to bring the DPRK to its knees by force and high-handed practices."[4] Once the details of the Kelly meeting emerged, Pyongyang escalated the crisis, first rhetorically, and then after the announcement by KEDO that it was temporarily halting shipments of heavy fuel oil (following completion of a delivery then en route), by expelling International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors and removing IAEA monitoring devices and seals from its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon while announcing plans to restart its frozen nuclear reactor. When Washington refused DPRK demands for bilateral negotiations, the North (in early January 2003) announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It subsequently threatened to withdraw from the 1953 Armistice, while warning of "World War Three" if the UN Security Council (UNSC) or the U.S. attempted to enact sanctions or otherwise tried to coerce the North into curtailing its suspected nuclear weapons program.

Making matters worse, the North reactivated its five-megawatt nuclear reactor and other facilities at Yongbyon and, by its own admission, began reprocessing its spent fuel rods. There are apparently conflicting intelligence as to how much reprocessing has actually occurred. However, Pyongyang has officially announced that all 8,000 spent fuel rods at Yongbyon have been reprocessed and has claimed that the extracted plutonium has been "weaponized." If North Korean pronouncements prove true, this would be a dangerous escalation and a clear violation of the 1992 North-South Joint Denuclearization Agreement (which Pyongyang declared to be "nullified" after announcing that it had begun reprocessing).

It also adds an anti-terrorism angle to the nuclear crisis, given terrorist aspirations for a "dirty bomb" or worse and North Korea's demonstrated willingness to sell missiles to any buyer willing to pay the price. This is not to imply a link between North Korea and

[3] CIA Estimate of North Korean Nuclear Capability, Prepared for Congress, 2002. See http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/nuclearweapons/CIAEnrichmentNov-02.pdf, accessed on July 25, 2005.
[4] "Still a Long Road Ahead," *KOREA Now*, Oct. 19, 2002, pp. 16-17.

al-Qaeda or other international terrorist groups. To our knowledge, none exists. In the past, North Korea has not funded international terrorism. The terrorist acts it has been directly associated with date to the late 1980s and occurred in the context of a qualitatively different phase in the inter-Korean relationship. But it has also demonstrated a willingness to sell dangerous weapons to nations with dubious strategic aims and this fact alone makes it prudent to be concerned about worst-case proliferation scenarios.

Trilateral cooperation sets the stage for a multilateral approach. Although the Bush administration stressed that it was taking a different (and tougher) approach toward North Korea (as toward other areas of policy) than its predecessor, one Clinton-era initiative that fortunately survived and continues to play a crucial coordinating role in the nuclear crisis is the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), involving the U.S. and its two Northeast Asia treaty allies, Japan and the Republic of Korea. From the beginning, trilateral coordination has been successful in papering over many of the differences among the three partners, allowing Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo generally to speak with one voice, at least at the broad policy level, on the North Korea nuclear issue.

This was immediately evident when President Bush, then-ROK President Kim Dae-jung, and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro met along the sidelines of the October 2002 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders Meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico and issued a joint statement calling on North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons program "in a prompt and verifiable manner."[5]

The Japanese contribution to the statement was particularly strong, tying Japan-DPRK normalization talks to the North's "full compliance with the Pyongyang Declaration" (issued at the historic September 2002 Koizumi-Kim Jong-il summit meeting, which included a pledge by North Korea to honor all its nuclear treaty obligations).

The spirit of U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation was reinforced at the Jan. 5-7, 2003, trilateral coordination meeting in Washington when all three parties once again called on North Korea to take "prompt and verifiable action to completely dismantle its nuclear weapons program and come into full compliance with its international nuclear commitments." The joint pronouncement also included several Bush administration olive branches toward Pyongyang, first by noting, in writing, that the U.S. "has no intention of invading North Korea" and then by stating that "the U.S. is willing to talk to North Korea about how it will meet its obligations to the international community."[6]

[5] "Joint US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Statement," Oct. 26, 2002, as posted on the White House and State Department websites. The State Department site [http://usinfo.state.gov] is the best source for all U.S. official statements cited in here.

[6] Text of the Joint Statement by the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group, as released by the U.S. State Department, Jan. 7, 2003, posted on the State Department website.

The subtle difference between *talking to* as opposed to *negotiating with* the DPRK provided Washington with some breathing room in its dialogue with both Tokyo and Seoul. Washington also called for multilateral dialogue to address the nuclear situation (but with the promise of bilateral U.S.-DPRK consultations being permitted within this larger multilateral context). Given Washington's earlier inflexible stance, it is reasonable to conclude that quiet and effective ROK and especially Japanese diplomacy helped to bring about this more flexible approach.

Following the January 2003 trilateral coordination group pronouncement, the DPRK announced its immediate withdrawal from the NPT. Ironically, this hardline, openly confrontational approach by North Korea made the U.S. offer of multilateral dialogue more appealing to the other concerned parties (including China) and to the international community in general. This helped set the stage for the April Beijing "mini-lateral" meeting among the U.S., DPRK, and China – labeled by Washington as "talks about talks" – during which each side expressed its views on the issue and how it should be addressed. As expected, there was not much progress at the meeting, although there was considerable controversy over reported off-the-record comments made by the North Korean representative privately to his U.S. counterpart that the North did indeed have nuclear weapons and that it was prepared to further develop, produce, test, and/or export these weapons depending on Washington's responsiveness to Pyongyang's demands.

Following the April meeting in Beijing, Washington held firm in its demand for a broader multilateral gathering, insisting that the presence of South Korea and Japan at future talks was "essential." The May 2003 summit meetings between President Bush and new ROK President Roh Moo-hyun (in Washington on May 14) and Prime Minister Koizumi (in Crawford, Texas on May 23) reinforced this point. The two summits also closed many (but not all) of the remaining policy and perception gaps between Washington and its two key allies in dealing with North Korea. In both meetings, President Bush and his Asian counterparts reiterated that they "would not tolerate" nuclear weapons in North Korea, while demanding a "complete, verifiable, and irreversible" elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program.[7]

In Crawford, Bush and Koizumi warned Pyongyang that further escalation will "require tougher measures" against the North. The U.S.-ROK Joint Statement a week earlier was a bit more circumspect, merely noting that "increased threats to peace and stability on the peninsula would require consideration of further steps." However, this statement did constitute an ROK acknowledgment that other options might have to be considered in the event of continued North Korean escalatory actions. This represented a significant narrowing of one of the major gaps in the U.S. and ROK positions on dealing with Pyongyang.

The mutual recognition during both summits that the ROK and Japan were "essential" for a successful and comprehensive settlement also put Pyongyang on notice

[7] The July 2003 issue of *Comparative Connections* provides details on the various summit meetings and how they helped set the stage for the first round of Six-Party Talks.

that there would be no separate bilateral deal with Washington. The firm position taken by all three parties, and the belated support for this position first by Beijing and then by Moscow, resulted, finally, in Pyongyang's agreement to conduct six-party talks.

Establishment of the Six Party Process. The initial U.S. response to the DPRK's escalation was to develop a multilateral approach to dealing with the crisis that would ensure that the ROK and Japan, as well as China, were directly involved in developing a solution. (Russia was subsequently added at Pyongyang's insistence, but with no serious objection from the other parties.) While Beijing was initially cool to the idea, the Chinese agreed to support a multilateral approach to address the rapidly escalating crisis in the spring of 2003. Following several conversations between President Bush and then PRC President Jiang Zemin as the DPRK pursued escalatory actions following the demise of the Agreed Framework,[8] former PRC Foreign Minister and former State Councilor Qian Qichen made a quiet visit to Pyongyang in March 2003 for meetings with DPRK Chairman Kim Jong-il. Shortly after, the DPRK agreed first to attend a three-way meeting among the U.S., the PRC, and the DPRK in April 2003.[9] Although the three-way meeting made little progress, this meeting paved the way for the inauguration of the Six-Party Talks in August 2003.

The first round of Six-Party Talks served as an introductory session at which all the parties expressed their frustrations with the current situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula. From the second meeting of the Six-Party Talks in February 2004, the U.S. government demanded that the DPRK accept "comprehensive, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement" of its nuclear program based on precedents set by the "Libyan model," whereby Libyan leader Col. Moammar Khadafy made a strategic decision at the end of 2003 to give up Libya's nuclear program in exchange for a more normalized economic relationship with the international community. Potential lessons to be drawn from the "Libyan model" are still unfolding,[10] but the DPRK Foreign Ministry has publicly rejected the relevance of such a model for its own case.[11]

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[8] President Bush first discussed the DPRK's uranium enrichment efforts with President Jiang during the Crawford Summit in October 2002. Subsequently, Bush and Jiang held several telephone conversations to discuss the DPRK's escalation of the crisis in December 2002 and January 2003. President Bush continued to pursue this issue in telephone conversations with President Hu Jintao immediately following his succession to the PRC presidency from March 2003.

[9] Despite the PRC's host role for this meeting, it is notable that the DPRK expressed a preference for bilateral dialogue with the United States and did not welcome a participatory role for the PRC. Also, the U.S. consulted with the newly inaugurated Roh Moo-hyun administration during Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan's first visit to the U.S. Only after receiving the ROK's support for the meeting to go forward did the U.S. government agree to attend the meeting in Beijing. Author conversations with ROK officials, May 2003.

[10] See Mitchell B. Reiss, "North Korea's Legacy of Missed Opportunities," address to the Heritage Foundation, March 12, 2004, for an early attempt to draw implications from the Libyan model for North Korea.

[11] "DPRK Foreign Ministry Dismisses U.S. Proposal," Korea Central News Agency, July 26, 2004. See http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm. Accessed Oct. 27, 2004.

It was only at the third round of talks in June 2004 that the United States tabled a concrete proposal – in addition to proposals tabled by South and North Korea – that might be described as opening positions in a negotiation process. Despite agreement in principle to hold a fourth round before the end of September 2004, North Korea elected to at least temporarily reject further dialogue, presumably to await the outcome of the Nov. 2, 2004 U.S. presidential election. There were widespread expectations that the talks would resume following the election and transition to a new foreign policy team in the second Bush administration, two congressional delegations to the DPRK in January of 2005 led by representatives Curt Weldon and Tom Lantos, and notable restraint on the part of President Bush in his public references to North Korea. So the DPRK caught most observers by surprise when its Foreign Ministry announced Feb. 10, 2005, that North Korea is a nuclear weapons state and was indefinitely suspending its participation in the Six-Party Talks.

Even before the dialogue breakdown, the Six-Party Talks had little to show for themselves, and it is striking in light of the gravity of the issues involved how little time over the course of the past three years has been devoted to actual face-to-face meetings at which diplomatic tools might have been employed in pursuit of the implementation of a verifiable agreement – or even toward halting the slow but steady progress of nuclear proliferation activities in the DPRK. Nonetheless, in the absence of any other viable mechanism for addressing the North Korean nuclear issue, all participants in the talks redoubled their efforts to bring the North Koreans back to the dialogue table to discuss the proposals tabled in June of 2004. The extended pause in the talks reinforced the significance of the process both as a vehicle for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and as a way of bolstering a consensus among the participants in the talks on the importance of making every effort to address the issue peacefully through dialogue before considering alternative measures. In this respect, the Six-Party Talks served as a vehicle for closing gaps in the respective positions of participants on issues related to the DPRK's denuclearization.

The pause in the talks and North Korea's continuing crisis escalation efforts served to unify the efforts of other parties to bring North Korea back to the dialogue table. The PRC pursued sustained diplomacy with North Korea following the Feb. 10 statement, first by sending senior party official Wang Jiarui to Pyongyang in mid-February shortly after the announcement and subsequently by hosting DPRK Prime Minister Pak Bong-ju and Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju for additional consultations in late March and early April. The DPRK Foreign Ministry statement of March 31 was seen by many as a further effort to escalate the crisis and change the agenda of talks to mutual disarmament, rather than focusing solely on the North Korean nuclear issue, although some analysts also saw the statement as providing a face saving way for North Korea to return to the talks.

Although the Sino-DPRK talks of early April did not lay the groundwork for a visit to North Korea by Hu Jintao (a prerequisite for which would have been North Korea's return to the Six-Party Talks), they did apparently play an important role in

laying the basis for resumption of the "New York channel," a working-level dialogue between U.S. and North Korean officials in New York. At bilateral U.S.-DPRK meetings held in May and June, the United States and DPRK offered each other assurances designed to lay the groundwork for a return to the negotiating table, most notably including a public statement by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that the United States regards the DPRK as a "sovereign state." In mid-June, more promising signs came during a meeting between DPRK Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il and ROK Minister of National Unification Chung Dong-young, at which Chairman Kim reiterated North Korea's willingness to return to the six-party dialogue, consistent with the wish of his late father Kim Il Sung that the Korean Peninsula be denuclearized. Following a July 10 bilateral meeting between Assistant Secretary Christopher Hill and Vice Minister Kim Kye-gwan held in Beijing on the eve of Secretary Rice's visit there, the DPRK announced its return to the Six-Party Talks. The following week, PRC State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan held further consultations with Chairman Kim Jong-il prior to the July 27 resumption of the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks.

One key U.S. objective at the fourth round of Six-Party Talks was to begin a negotiating process by requesting that the North Korean side come prepared to give a response to its June 2004 proposal. While reaffiriming North Korea's commitment to the objective of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the North Koreans rejected the U.S. proposal, citing both the scope of the activities covered and the sequencing of the process by which denuclearization would unfold as unacceptable. The DPRK side also raised concerns about the U.S. nuclear threat at bases in South Korea and Japan, requesting that a mutual inspections process include the opening of some of those bases, but the core objective of the North Koreans remained the issue of diplomatic normalization as the only surefire way of protecting the North against the possibility of being targeted by U.S. nuclear weapons. Despite many hours of discussions among the various parties, including Chinese tabling of four successive drafts of a possible joint statement designed to capture a consensus among the six parties, it was impossible to find language or compromises designed to bridge the gaps on these issues. The recess now provides an opportunity for consultations in home capitals to identify potential new flexibility or formulas that might overcome these key differences.

Based on the record thus far, a critical unanswered question is whether the Six-Party Talks can actually accomplish their objectives or whether, in the end, the process will be viewed as a diversion, perhaps even helping to delay an effective response to a de facto nuclear DPRK unwilling to cooperate with any effort to reverse its progress in developing a "nuclear deterrent" to compensate for its diplomatic isolation and ongoing concerns about its security. In the next section of this report, we will more closely examine the respective and collective processes involved in the talks to date. For a more detailed step-by-step account of how we got to where we are today, please see the comprehensive chronology of events contained in Appendix A.

Six-Party Talks: Summary Overview of Process, Agreement, and Differences

The establishment of the Six-Party Talks process itself is evidence of strengthened cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue between the United States and the PRC, both of whom have viewed North Korea's nuclear weapons development efforts with increasing levels of concern. The PRC has been much more forthcoming in its efforts to contribute to a solution to the crisis than it was in 1993-94, at which time the PRC took a passive approach and used its own bilateral channels to express its concerns to Pyongyang but studiously avoided multilateral approaches that might appear to publicly pressure or isolate the DPRK. Despite heightened Sino-U.S. cooperation during the current crisis, however, the United States and PRC still have differing viewpoints and motivations for cooperation to achieve the objective of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.

China's decision to play a mediating role on this critical regional issue as broker of the Six-Party Talks process constitutes both a departure and a precedent for Chinese diplomacy. It is not a coincidence that this more proactive Chinese approach coincided with the coming to power of the next generation of Chinese leadership headed by President (and Party Chairman) Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. China's hosting role has heightened its diplomatic profile in the region and appears to have made it an indispensable player in any diplomatic effort to address North Korea's nuclear weapons development efforts. Chinese cooperation on the nuclear issue is a measure of the enormous progress that has been made in the development of a Chinese arms control community that understands the significance of the challenge to the international nonproliferation regime posed by North Korea's pursuit of nuclear development and breakout from the norms of the NPT. At the same time, latent suspicions remain in some quarters that past Chinese proliferation may have contributed to North Korea's weapons development efforts. Nonetheless, the PRC's heightened cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue has occurred as part of a broader set of cooperative efforts to work together on antiterrorism issues following 9/11. Strengthened Sino-U.S. cooperation across many sectors led then Secretary of State Colin Powell to claim in 2004 that the U.S.-PRC relationship was the "best ever."

Another motivation for China's increased diplomatic effort related to North Korea has been to prevent the escalation of a crisis with North Korea to the point of military conflict along the lines of what happened with Iraq. In essence, one of the central motivations catalyzing China's heightened involvement in brokering dialogue between the U.S. and DPRK was the desire to avoid the prospect of "failed diplomacy" on the Korean Peninsula. But the underlying motivations for the PRC's diplomatic efforts with the DPRK came from the PRC's desire to prevent the possibility of military conflict on its borders, to preserve China's stake in the peninsula, to forestall proliferation pressures on other countries in the region (namely South Korea and Japan), and to ensure that any solution to the Korean Peninsula issue is consistent with China's national interest.

Sino-U.S. cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue has been good for the bilateral relationship to the extent that the U.S. perceives the PRC as playing a more responsible role in addressing a key proliferation issue in Northeast Asia. By stepping up to the plate on this critical issue, the PRC has improved U.S. official perceptions of China as a responsible diplomatic partner. However, such partnership also has led to greater expectations in some quarters of the U.S. that the PRC should use its leverage to solve the problem of North Korea that may be beyond what the PRC is prepared to deliver.

For the U.S., China's hosting role in the Six-Party Talks has eased the immediate burden and risk of having to face a second crisis in Northeast Asia at the same time that it focuses on Iraq. China's heightened role enabled President Bush to emphasize that the North Korean nuclear issue is a regional problem and to stress that the United States is not the only country threatened by the DPRK's nuclear pursuits, although this problem has critical national security implications that require active U.S. involvement. In pursuing a diplomatic solution via the Six-Party Talks, the Bush administration is heeding two critical lessons from the negotiations surrounding the first North Korean nuclear crisis: a) avoid bilateral negotiations that cut out allies with their own critical security interests and who are also critical potential partners in financing the implementation of any agreement, and b) minimize DPRK efforts to play partners and allies against each other by forcing them to publicly address all parties transparently and simultaneously.

There have been hopes within some parts of the Bush administration that the Chinese might effectively restore a patron-client relationship with the DPRK and use China's leverage either to effectively rein in Kim Jong-il or to punish the regime for its bad behavior by bringing about regime change in the DPRK. However, it is unlikely that the PRC will take any action that reduces regional stability or induces regime change in the DPRK unless it becomes absolutely clear that a successor regime would be more effective than the current DPRK leadership in ensuring stability on the Korean Peninsula. The prospect of increased refugee flows from the DPRK or of heightened U.S. influence near China's borders are options the Chinese leadership is unlikely to choose if they can be avoided. Thus, the Six-Party Talks has thus far served Chinese and American interests well; however, differing perspectives on the relative priorities of maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula vs. the urgency of denuclearizing North Korea may surface in the near future. These differences are most likely to materialize over the question of how to determine when the diplomatic effort embodied in the Six-Party Talks has failed.

As the founder and host of the Six-Party Talks, the PRC has a stake in the success of this diplomatic effort, which has required significant PRC diplomatic resources and intermittent shuttle diplomacy to keep the talks moving thus far. Despite regular disappointments, PRC officials have worked to put their best face on the effort. At the first round of Six-Party Talks in August 2003, the United States and DPRK representatives held an awkward, tightly scripted encounter on the sidelines of the talks.

This conversation was held in a room with no tables to avoid the perception of a bilateral negotiation separate from the six-party plenary sessions.

Another obstacle has been that North Korean officials have intermittently embarrassed their hosts with threats that Pyongyang already has a "nuclear deterrent" and that it would provide a "physical demonstration" of its nuclear capability. As previously noted, there was even reference during the April 2003 three-way talks to the possibility that Pyongyang might transfer or sell its capabilities or weapons to others, but assurances have subsequently been given that such proliferation will not occur. It appears that Pyongyang understands that any offer to transfer its weapons capability would constitute a "red line" that would draw a severe political, economic, and perhaps even military response. Despite failed hopes for a joint statement at the first, second, and third rounds of talks, PRC officials have dutifully conducted background briefings at each round of Six-Party Talks and issued Chairman's Statements that are intended to summarize accomplishments and record gradual progress following each round.

Chinese mediation efforts and the six-party process. Following the first round of talks in August 2003, the PRC's senior negotiator Vice Minister Wang Yi took pains to emphasize a consensus on four points: 1) the need to seek a peaceful solution to the crisis through dialogue; 2) the need to realize a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and that the DPRK's security concerns and other areas should be considered and resolved; 3) that the parties should decide "on an overall plan for solving the nuclear issue in stages and through synchronous or parallel implementation in a just and reasonable manner"; and 4) that all parties should avoid actions or words that might result in an escalation of tensions.[12] The Chairman's Statement following the second round of talks in February 2004 reinforced the commitment of the parties "to a nuclear-weapon-free Korean Peninsula, and to resolving the nuclear issue peacefully through dialogue in a spirit of mutual respect and consultations on an equal basis," and announced that the parties had agreed to the establishment of working groups to be held alongside the plenary meetings.[13] The third round Chairman's Statement in June 2004 reports active "proposals, suggestions, and recommendations" that could form the basis for further dialogue.[14] Chinese Foreign Ministry officials at the fourth round of talks submitted at least four drafts of a possible joint statement and solicited all parties to give approval, although the unwillingness of the North Koreans to accept the latest drafts produced a deadlock that resulted in the three-week recess in the talks. Eager to avoid the prospect of "failed diplomacy" in the Six-Party Talks that would increase pressures to take the issue to the UN Security Council, the PRC continues to employ diplomatic efforts to keep the Six-Party Talks alive. Although the six-party process appears painstakingly slow,

[12] Chinese vice-foreign minister holds press conference after six-way talks, BBC Monitoring International Reports, Aug. 30, 2003.
[13] Chairman's Statement for the Second Round of Six Party Talks, Feb. 28, 2004. Accessed at PRC Foreign Ministry website: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t69590.htm on Oct. 26, 2004.
[14] Chairman's Statement of the Third Round of Six Party Talks, June 26, 2004. Accessed at PRC Foreign Ministry website: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t140647.htm Oct. 26, 2004.

participants report progress in the atmosphere and willingness of participants to engage in serious dialogue on the issues at hand.[15]

The six-party process has consistently faced scheduling delays that have affected the momentum of the talks. The second round of talks that originally was anticipated to occur in December 2003 was delayed until February 2004, largely over resistance by the United States and DPRK to aspects of Chinese mediating efforts. Chinese diplomats had tried to structure a joint statement in advance of the second round of the Six-Party Talks involving the outline of a deal between the U.S. and DPRK that might include the exchange of security assurances by the United States for a DPRK freeze of its nuclear program, but U.S. officials perceived the Chinese role as too even-handed and resisted Chinese attempts to take DPRK assertions at face value.

The Bush administration has expected the PRC to weigh in with the DPRK to pressure it to concede the necessity of rolling back its nuclear program rather than simply acting as an impartial host and moderator for the Six-Party Talks. Thus far, the PRC seems to have tolerated DPRK attempts to gain monetary benefits in exchange for its freeze and eventual denuclearization, which American officials have rejected as rewarding North Korea's past bad behavior. PRC Vice Minister Wang Yi publicly criticized the Bush administration's policy toward the DPRK as a primary obstacle in the talks following the first round of talks in early September 2003.[16] Similar criticisms were voiced by PRC foreign ministry official Yang Xiyu as reported by the New York Times in May of 2005.[17] U.S. officials have privately expressed frustration with the PRC for failing to reinforce to the DPRK the fundamental unacceptability of its nuclear weapons development efforts or for failing to properly pressure the DPRK by withdrawing some of the many oil and food benefits that the PRC provides to the DPRK.

Thus far, the PRC has used two primary tools in its diplomacy with the DPRK and as part of its strategy to facilitate Six-Party Talks. First, the PRC has considerably strengthened its bilateral diplomacy with the DPRK as a necessary prerequisite to support the six-party process. Since early 2003, senior PRC officials have stepped up visits to the DPRK on a quarterly basis. These party and other visits have been conducted at levels senior enough to require meetings with Chairman Kim Jong-il as part of the protocol for the visit. These visits have been critical prerequisites to furthering the Six-Party Talks and have also strengthened communication between the PRC and DPRK on a range of issues. For instance, one important reason for the Six-Party Talks staying on track in June 2004 was the PRC's ability to extract a commitment from Kim Jong-il during his April 2004 visit to Beijing to continue to seek a resolution of the nuclear crisis by sending a DPRK delegation to the Six-Party Talks. Following the DPRK's announcement of the "indefinite suspension" of its participation in Six-Party Talks last February 10th, the PRC sent CCP international liaison head Wang Jiarui to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Jong-il

[15] Author conversations with ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade officials, August 2004.
[16] Joseph Kahn, "Chinese Aide Says U.S. is Obstacle in Korean Talks," *New York Times*, Sept. 2, 2003.
[17] Joseph Kahn, "China Says U.S. Criticisms Impeded North Korea Arms Talks," *New York Times*, May 13, 2003, p. 12.

and ask the DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks. Most recently, State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan met with Kim Jong-il as a special envoy of PRC President Hu Jintao prior to the resumption of Six-Party Talks in July of 2005. Through the Chinese efforts, it has become clear that direct interaction with Kim Jong-il is a prerequisite for progress in the six-party process. The visits have the added benefit of strengthening the PRC's understanding of conditions in the DPRK and have provided an opportunity to broaden bilateral party and other contacts at many different levels. This broadened contact serves to deepen China's leverage and understanding of the internal decision-making process in the North Korean leadership and helps the Chinese to understand the extent to which there are divisions within North Korea's leadership.

Second, the PRC has used the provision of material benefits through enhanced assistance to the DPRK as an incentive for the DPRK to sustain participation in the Six-Party Talks. A good example of this type of incentive is the PRC's pledge to provide $50 million in assistance, including construction of a glass factory in Pyongyang.[18] However, the U.S. experience with provision of food aid to the DPRK in exchange for participation in the four party process in the late 1990s suggests that paying the North Koreans to participate in meetings does not guarantee that substantive progress will occur at the meetings themselves. In fact, it may make it easier for the DPRK to justify showing up for meetings without regard to perceived needs to make progress in the negotiation process. Aside from shutting down an oil pipeline to the DPRK under the pretext of "technical difficulties" in the spring of 2003,[19] the Chinese have preferred to use food assistance and oil supplies primarily as an incentive and have resisted suggestions that withholding of such assistance be used as a stick for compelling DPRK participation in the Six-Party Talks. More recently, the Chinese have used the withholding of benefits above and beyond normal levels or the potential promise of future additional benefits conditional upon DPRK action as a tool in its diplomacy in the context of March and April discussions with North Korean leaders about the timing of a visit to Pyongyang by PRC President Hu Jintao.

U.S. and DPRK Negotiating Positions at the Six-Party Talks. The objective of the United States at the Six-Party Talks as stated in its clearest form has been the pursuit of the "complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement" of North Korea's nuclear weapons programs, a process that has come to be known as CVID. Although this term has disappeared from the talks following the second round, it still represents the standard by which many in Washington will judge the success or failure of multiparty negotiations with North Korea. All members of the talks, including the DPRK, have endorsed the objective of the Six-Party Talks as a process designed to achieve North Korea's denuclearization; however, there are potentially significant differences regarding the methods proposed to achieve this objective, and there are doubts as to whether all parties are indeed committed to fulfilling these steps in practice. Moreover, significant

[18] Glenn Kessler, "Bush Signals Patience With North Korea is Waning; Directive Sent to Negotiating Team in Pyongyang," *Washington Post*, March 14, 2004, p. A4.
[19] Robert Marquand, "Watching Iraq, China Begins to lean on North Korea," *Christian Science Monitor*, April 8, 2003, p. 1.

disagreements remain over how to define what constitutes CVID and whether and in what forms such an objective is ultimately attainable. Nor has Washington been specific as to what CVID fully entails.[20] However, it is useful to consider each of these four terms as a way of determining American negotiating objectives and of discovering the areas where the United States differs from the other participants in the Six Party Talks

In initial explications of the CVID terminology, Washington made it clear that *"complete"* means both plutonium and uranium enrichment-based programs. However, despite the highly publicized confession by the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, A. Q. Khan, that he sold uranium- enrichment equipment to North Korea, Pyongyang continues to deny having a uranium-based weapons program and several other members of the six-party process seem openly skeptical of Washington's accusations (or more willing to disregard the evidence even if it might be true). In the latest round of talks, however, it appears that most if not all of the other parties are lining up with Washington on the need for the DPRK to acknowledge its uranium enrichment efforts, although there are differences over whether or not this is an issue that needs to be dealt with urgently as part of the DPRK's dismantlement process. From Washington's perspective, DPRK acknowledgment of a uranium enrichment program appears to be the first order of business if there is to be any hope for future progress. From a political point of view, it would be extraordinarily difficult to fashion a resolution of the current crisis that failed to address the nub of the problem that set off the dispute in October 2002.

"Verifiable" means just that. Devising a verification regime intrusive enough to satisfy hardline skeptics will be no mean feat. This is why the "Libyan model" is potentially so important. As Assistant Secretary Kelly told the Congress in April, 2004, "the DPRK needs to make a strategic choice for transformed relations with the United States and the world – as other countries have done, including quite recently [Libya] – to abandon all of its nuclear programs." As the failure of the Agreed Framework itself has shown, any verification process with North Korea is only likely to be successful if it takes place as a cooperative process vs. an adversarial process, if for no other reason than that there are too many places where nuclear programs or materials might be hidden inside North Korea to expect verification to be effective without active cooperation. Verification can only work if the North cooperates in turning in its hidden hardware (not to mentioned reprocessed plutonium). Taking an Iraqi-style "catch me if you can" approach seems unworkable.

The definition of *"irreversible"* remains subject to the most interpretation. At a minimum, it would seem to require an end to all DPRK nuclear energy (both production and reprocessing), as well as weapons programs, to guard against future backsliding. Pyongyang has at times intimated that its "peaceful nuclear energy program" might also be put on the bargaining table . . . if the price is right. Washington has made no secret of its desire to avoid an Agreed Framework II or a revival of any light-water reactor (LWR) programs. While Washington has yet to formally demand an end to all nuclear energy-related programs, it has come very close, specifically rejecting an LWR option (as

[20]Ralph Cossa, "CVID: Does Everyone Agree?" *PacNet* #20, May 6, 2004.

demanded by Pyongyang), as a "nonstarter." This issue has been featured in comments by principal negotiators during the fourth round of talks in Pyongyang as the most difficult stumbling block for reaching agreement on principles between the United States and the DPRK. Not coincidentally, it is also the American objective that enjoys the least support from other parties to the process, including the ROK, Russia, and the PRC.

Finally, Washington sees *"dismantlement"* as an action, not as a future promise. Previously, it had dismissed North Korean "freeze" proposals, saying it would not reward North Korea for merely honoring past (broken) promises. However, as will be discussed in more detail, a breakthrough seems possible in this area, depending on how Pyongyang defines its current "reward for freeze" proposal. While Washington continues to insist that U.S. incentives will only come after dismantlement begins – which is itself a step beyond the Bush administration's earlier "no rewards until dismantlement is complete" approach – Washington has stated that it would not object to others (South Korea and China) offering energy assistance to North Korea in return for a "complete and verifiable" freeze, as long as the freeze were identified as "a first step toward dismantlement."

Despite this limited degree of flexibility – and a willingness to avoid use of the CVID term, even while holding to the objectives outlined above – little progress has been made in reaching a common definition of this goal. Neither have the technical requirements for monitoring and verification of any inspections or an implementation regime been taken up in the official negotiations, raising further questions about the robustness of commitment of all the parties to the objective of achieving North Korea's denuclearization. Despite the establishment of the Six-Party Talks and the agreement among the parties on the objective of denuclearizing the DPRK, the talks themselves have made little progress.

Some in the Bush administration have felt that the most important potential outcome of the Six-Party Talks process has been that it gives the DPRK an opportunity to directly alienate other members of the Six-Party Talks with outrageous claims, demands, and threats. Such behavior by the DPRK in the early rounds of the Talks has had the effect of strengthening consensus and resolve among other parties that the DPRK should not be allowed to retain a nuclear weapons program.

However, the absence during the first two rounds of talks of a specific proposal outlining the means by which to achieve North Korea's denuclearization has come to be seen by several counterparts as evidence that the United States also did not take the process seriously. As other countries including Japan and South Korea became more active in pursuing their own bilateral dialogue and exchange relationships with the DPRK in the first half of 2004, the U.S. seemed to be isolated in practice in its rigid position toward the DPRK, despite the rhetorical commitments of all parties to the principle of the DPRK's denuclearization. Other members of the Six-Party Talks urged the U.S. to demonstrate seriousness by putting forward a concrete proposal designed to achieve the objective of the DPRK's denuclearization.

In this context, the United States put forward a formal proposal at the third round of talks based on extensive prior consultations with South Korean and Japanese partners. This proposal was derived from an earlier South Korean formulation, with some modifications. The proposal envisioned that the DPRK would commit to a freeze of its entire nuclear program (including both the DPRK's plutonium and uranium enrichment programs) as a first step toward dismantlement and within three months resume international inspections and monitoring to verify the freeze. (This process was described as "comprehensive dismantlement," rather than the "CVID" term that the DPRK had rejected strongly during the second round of Six-Party Talks.)

The proposal anticipated that the ROK would resume shipment of heavy fuel oil and other energy supplies to the DPRK, that the United States would provide provisional security assurances to the DPRK, and that the United States and DPRK would begin discussions on removing the DPRK from the U.S. government list of state sponsors of terror. In the second phase, the DPRK would receive multilateral security assurances as it implements dismantlement, the United States and DPRK would address other issues on the bilateral agenda including missile production, conventional weapons drawdowns, and human rights as part of a process leading in the direction of more normal relations, and there would be an exploration of practical measures to supply some of the DPRK's basic infrastructure needs as the DPRK moved toward dismantlement of its nuclear facilities.

The DPRK also presented a formal "freeze for compensation" proposal at the third round of Six-Party Talks. This proposal envisages a limited freeze of North Korea's nuclear program with no preconditions in return for 2 million kilowatts of electricity and a lifting of the U.S. economic sanctions on the DPRK. Inspectors would be drawn not from the IAEA but from the six parties participating in the Six-Party Talks. The DPRK proposal limits the freeze to materials generated after its withdrawal from the NPT and does not include the North's suspected uranium enrichment program – it continues to officially deny the existence of such a program despite its October 2002 reported private acknowledgement to Secretary Kelly and considerable evidence (including testimony from Pakistan arms merchant A.Q. Khan) to the contrary – or any weapons the DPRK might have assembled from plutonium gained prior to signing the Agreed Framework.

Roles and Contributions of Other Participants in the Six-Party Process. A number of divisions have emerged among the participants in Six-Party Talks over what it would take to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, as well as the scope of demands that the DPRK would have to satisfy in order to resolve the issue. These perceptions were magnified by the reluctance of U.S. officials to engage directly with the DPRK in bilateral talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

These views are significant because South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia are not only participants in the Six-Party Talks but also serve as de facto jurists in the talks, assessing the relative positions of the United States and DPRK and effectively isolating either the United States or the DPRK in varying degrees as the most effective way to pressure each party to move forward in the negotiating process. One U.S. objective in the

Six-Party Talks should be to develop a strong consensus among the other four parties to pressure the DPRK into understanding and accepting that premise that pursuit of nuclear weapons is indeed deleterious to the North's security and that denuclearization would provide the best survival option for North Korea. However, this strategy requires the United States to show sufficient cooperation that the other parties are satisfied that the United States has done its best to resolve the issue through the diplomatic process. It is not surprising that in the primary areas where the United States and the DPRK failed to reach agreement on a joint statement of principles in the fourth round of negotiations, the key issues were the ones on which there was little or no prior consensus between the United States and the other parties to the negotiations.

The DPRK's counterstrategy is to foment divisions among the other five parties to preserve its own space and options for maneuver. To the extent that the DPRK discerns differences in the positions of the other five parties, it will manipulate its position to take advantage of the lowest common denominator and exploit alternatives to negotiation to maintain its independence of action. To the extent that divisions among the parties are visible, the DPRK will have room to manipulate them.

The fundamental underlying division that has become apparent as talks have proceeded is over whether a second, multilateral understanding with the DPRK along the lines of the Agreed Framework is politically feasible. While Asian participants in the Six-Party Talks may prefer a new agreement with the DPRK as a way of relieving the crisis and bounding some key aspects of North Korea's nuclear development efforts, American officials and many nongovernmental analysts remain doubtful that the DPRK will live up to any agreement that is not accompanied by a robust inspections regime. This fundamental difference in perspective over expectations for the talks may prove to be the most difficult one to bridge, and it is the difference that offers the DPRK the most opportunity to exploit as discussions proceed. These fundamental differences are most starkly illustrated in attempts to define the scope of North Korea's obligations and requirements for nuclear program dismantlement.

There are two sets of more specific divisions among the six parties that have been highlighted at the most recent round of talks. One is over how to determine the scope of North Korea's nuclear program that would be subject to inspections in any agreement. This is related to the question of whether the DPRK is required to admit that it has a uranium enrichment program, although there has been progress in achieving consensus on this point with Chinese and other counterparts. In the end, the existence of the DPRK's uranium enrichment efforts is not so likely to be a sticking point or area of disagreement among the six parties given the availability of proof that might be offered by Pakistani testimony and evidence of what it has provided, in combination with ongoing procurement efforts that point to the DPRK's continuing work in this area.

A more complex and indeed critical area of divergence among the six parties relates to whether the DPRK is entitled to maintain a nuclear energy program for "peaceful purposes" as part of the negotiation process. The DPRK's return to an IAEA

and NPT-consistent position would not alone deny the DPRK the right to use nuclear materials for peaceful purposes, an argument that the DPRK may bolster by pointing to the need for continued productive employment of scientists with nuclear backgrounds, not to mention its growing energy shortages. However, the Bush administration seeks a result that demonstrates the penalties of noncompliance with NPT obligations. One way of achieving that objective while also underscoring that the DPRK through its actions over decades has failed to draw an effective distinction between peaceful nuclear applications and nuclear weapons development is to deny the DPRK any involvement in nuclear-related research or applications. As long as nuclear production or research facilities, and hence access to spent fuel, exists in the North, the capability exists to easily reverse any denuclearization agreement. Thus far, the PRC, Russia, and ROK are not convinced that it is necessary to deny the DPRK an IAEA-compliant nuclear program for peaceful purposes.

Based on these broad differences in the positions of the six parties, it is reasonable to anticipate that there would be further divisions over what might constitute an effective verification regime and what types of monitoring activities might need to take place as part of that regime. Since these differences may exist quite apart from what the DPRK is likely to accept, it is easy to imagine that technical discussions over verification regimes and principles may require considerable time and effort to hash out in subsequent rounds of Six-Party Talks, if those talks are able to resume.

Prospects for the Future of the Six-Party Talks

In the final analysis, the talks will only succeed if all six parties, and particularly the two main protagonists – Washington and Pyongyang – truly want a negotiated settlement and possess and demonstrate the political will to see it through. The good news is that both profess to support a common outcome – denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula – and a commitment to pursuing a diplomatic process to achieve this result.

While questions remain about the willingness of the Bush administration to deal seriously with, and accept the survivability of, the current North Korean leadership, prior to his reelection, President Bush signaled his continued commitment to a diplomatic solution and an early resumption of the six-party process. This was underscored by Secretary Powell's trip to China, Japan, and the ROK in late October 2004, the absence of inflammatory rhetoric about the DPRK in President Bush's State of the Union and Inaugural addresses in January 2005 (despite many opportunities given the themes of freedom and democratic expansion that permeated those speeches), and two trips to the region by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in her first six months on the job. But it is also clear that Washington's definition of a diplomatic solution includes possible UN action.

Aside from the question of whether the UNSC could identify and implement effective alternative policy options, it is clear that the PRC and the ROK have not yet reached the point at which they are willing to say that the Six-Party Talks have failed. As

indicated above, there are real questions about whether the PRC can imagine admitting the failure of the Six-Party Talks since one of the key reasons behind the establishment of the talks was to prevent military conflict on the Korean Peninsula, and the PRC may see any referral to the UNSC as unnecessarily opening up such a possibility. On the other hand, it is possible to imagine that the PRC might accept the intervention of the UNSC for political or tactical reasons, as a means by which to send a signal to the DPRK that indeed there are worse alternatives to a negotiated settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue through Six-Party Talks.

Cost/Benefit Analysis. As each of the six parties considers the costs of failure and the benefits of the success of diplomacy, it becomes clear that a path of no negotiations and increased escalation will benefit no party to the talks. There is a limit to the amount of pressure that a weakened and paranoid North Korean leadership may be able to handle if it is truly isolated, regardless of tactical success in deferring pressure and avoiding strategic decisions. China runs the risk of facing both an unstable North Korea and a nuclear North Korea in the event of a North Korean nuclear test and an aftermath that includes further sanctions and isolation measures targeted at Pyongyang. South Korea also wants to avoid a military conflict by any means and cannot imagine the costs of North Korea's sudden destabilization. Japan and Russia gain nothing from failure and destabilization in Northeast Asia.

On the other hand, the benefits of pushing forward with the diplomatic process include the potential for further integrating North Korea into the international community, if only the nuclear issue can be fully and finally resolved. North Korea stands to gain tremendous economic and energy benefits from both South Korea through its "important proposal" (in the form of conventional energy and other elements of the South Korean "Marshall Plan") and China, in the form of greater trade and investment cooperation. A less contentious relationship between North Korea and the U.S. and Japan, respectively, is in the interests of all parties, even if full normalization between the United States and North Korea is politically impossible to envisage at this stage. The logic in favor of continuing the negotiation process – while doing everything possible to compel all parties that there is no alternative but diplomatic negotiations to resolve this issue – is powerful and on the merits should appeal to all participants in the process.

To date, there have been few if any consequences associated with Pyongyang's Feb. 10, 2005 decision to declare itself a nuclear weapons state. We would argue that both sweeter carrots and stronger sticks are needed to convince North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons. To get Pyongyang to seriously negotiate, it must be convinced that the benefits of cooperating outweigh the benefits of not cooperating and that the costs of not cooperating outweigh the costs of cooperating.

Washington and the others all seem to agree that rewards are in order if Pyongyang cooperates. As detailed earlier in this report, all have signaled their willingness to provide significant economic benefits if and when North Korea starts down the path toward nuclear disarmament. Less recognized is the benefit Pyongyang sees in

not cooperating. North Korea's stonewalling continues to create tension between Washington and Seoul, with South Korea continually calling for increased U.S. "flexibility," while generally resisting direct criticism of North Korea's actions. A side benefit (from Pyongyang's perspective) has been increased bickering between Washington and Beijing. As long as its stalling continues to drive a wedge between Washington and Seoul/Beijing, it is in the North's benefit not to cooperate.

The perceived cost of cooperating also needs to be lowered. Giving up its nuclear card deprives Pyongyang of its primary (perhaps only) bargaining chip – it will not do so without credible security assurances, including a U.S. commitment not to pursue regime change, since regime (read: personal) survival remains North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's number-one priority.

The area of greatest disagreement between Washington and the others (especially Seoul and Beijing) is over the costs (or lack thereof) of not cooperating. The prospects of even more benefits has not been sufficient to draw North Korea into an agreement, especially since many of the benefits that it enjoyed prior to walking away from the talks in June 2004 have been sustained (if not increased) despite a year of stonewalling and unilateral escalation. To date, there have been little if any costs associated with North Korea's egregious nuclear weapons declaration.

Sweeter carrots, by themselves, are not likely to persuade Pyongyang to give up its nuclear program, not when the benefits of not cooperating remain high and the costs of not cooperating remain so low. If the other five parties can agree both on sweeter carrots and stronger sticks, Pyongyang may finally conclude that it has more to gain from cooperating than from not cooperating . . . and something to lose if it continues to defy international norms of behavior.[21]

Next Steps: Recommendations for Future Dialogue and Research

The record thus far casts doubt on whether the Six-Party Talks is truly up to the challenge of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. Efforts by all parties have fallen short of the rhetorical commitments they have made to use the Talks as a process to resolve the second North Korean nuclear crisis. However, circumstances suggest that no member of the Six-Party Talks process favors military action as a vehicle for resolving the crisis, and there is little evidence that China or Russia is willing at this point to take the North Korean nuclear issue to the UN Security Council or to devise some other forum for addressing this issue. Therefore, the odds are high that some of six-way dialogue will continue after the August 2005 "recess."

Should the Six-Party Talks fail, however and the approach to the North Korean nuclear issue veers toward a more confrontational track, many of the technical needs surrounding monitoring and verification of North Korean nuclear activities – and the

[21] For a more in-depth discussion on this issue, see Ralph A. Cossa, "North Korea: Cost Benefit Analysis," *PacNet* No. 23, June 6, 2005.

requirements for technical cooperation with other partners either as part of or outside the six-party process – are likely to be similar in nature. Thus, while the rest of the paper will focus on the "next steps" necessary to support the Six-Party Talks, many of the same types of technical and coordination needs would apply regardless of the means by which this set of issues is addressed with the DPRK and other parties to the Six-Party Talks.

Recommendations. The signing of a joint statement, if achieved, will represent only a modest step forward. Equally important will be an agreement to resurrect the six-party working-level effort both to more specifically identity the core problems, concerns and points of concurrence and contention, and to start charting the course ahead. We respectfully suggest that the following issues and areas of research and dialogue be placed high on the working groups' agenda.

Clearly Define Objectives and Criteria for Success/Failure and Coordinate Those Objectives With Other Participants in the Six-Party Talks. Many differences remain over the definitional issues associated with the common rhetorical goal of "the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." To the extent that the United States cannot gain support for its definition of comprehensive dismantlement from the other parties, it is likely that such an objective will be unsustainable. Either the United States must redouble its efforts to convince other parties to support an expansive definition of comprehensive dismantlement or the United States must find other ways to achieve its objectives while managing the difficulties that will arise from failing to gain support from other parties to the talks. Ultimately, the consensus among the five parties (lowest common denominator) is the best that the United States is likely to achieve given North Korea's capacity to play off of differences in position among the various parties.

The U.S. has not yet pursued sufficient consultations to close the gap in positions among the other parties to the dialogue, aside from North Korea. Without a consensus on the specifics of what the other five are willing to pursue, it will be harder to achieve a negotiated settlement with the North Koreans. It will be necessary for the U.S. to hold further discussions with its counterparts outside the context of Six-Party Talks on the objectives of the talks and the specific measures that must be taken to fulfill those objectives. This may be a suitable task of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) to undertake in either its WMD nonproliferation or Northeast Asia-oriented study group.

Clearly Define Lessons from the "Libyan Model" for the Six-Party Talks. The Bush administration has actively commended to the DPRK the "Libya model" as a preferred approach to dismantling its nuclear program. However, there is not yet any comprehensive study of the concrete lessons learned from the Libyan case that would be most applicable to the DPRK. In fact, there are differing lessons that might be drawn from the Libyan model depending on one's perspective. James Goodby and Donald Gross argued in the *International Herald Tribune* that the key to the "Libya model" is the establishment of "reciprocal unilateral measures taken by parties independently to

achieve shared objectives."[22] Former Under Secretary of State John Bolton described the "Libya model" as renunciation of WMD on the basis of solid cost-benefit analysis.[23] Michele Dunne, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, questions whether the division between WMD and regime transformation is consistent with U.S. interests in democracy promotion.[24] Former Department of State Director for Policy Planning Mitchell Reiss outlines for North Korea what in essence would be a "Libya model plus," requiring the DPRK to give up WMD and institute reforms before the United States could truly accept the DPRK as a partner.[25]

Although the DPRK has dismissed any application of the Libyan model to its case, it is unlikely that DPRK officials have yet developed any understanding of what aspects of the Libyan experience might be particularly relevant to the Six-Party Talks, although some aspects of the Libyan model are reported to have been presented for consideration in Beijing. (There are also rumors that Col. Moammar Khadafy has expressed interest in personally briefing the North Korean leadership on his experiences as part of a possible set of visits to North and South Korea, and Congressman Kurt Weldon has recommended that Khadafy consider mediating the North Korean nuclear dispute.) Nor is it likely that counterparts in Six-Party Talks understand either the potential benefits or any limitations that might derive from the application of the Libyan model to the situation in the DPRK.

Beyond the fact that Col. Khadafy made a "strategic decision" to voluntarily open up his program to a "cooperative verification" process involving U.S., British, and IAEA inspectors, what lessons might be drawn from the Libyan model for the DPRK?[26] What are the key aspects of the Libyan experience that might be replicable to the DPRK, and in what ways is the DPRK situation different from that of Libya? Are there potential loopholes in the Libyan model that the DPRK might exploit?

It would be desirable to pursue additional research to determine the aspects of the Libyan experience that are most applicable to North Korea. This research should include an assessment of whether there are precedents in the experience with the DPRK that might lead to the easy adaptation of certain aspects of the Libyan model and what sorts of considerations motivated the Libyan leadership to take the path that it has taken in choosing this approach to dismantlement of its nuclear program. This research might serve to capture the experiences, shortcomings, and lessons learned from the Libyan case

[22] James E. Goodby and Donald G. Gross, "The 'Libya Model' Could Help Disarm North Korea," International Herald Tribune, Sept. 3, 2004.
[23] "Bolton Urges North Korea to Follow the Libyan Model on WMD," Press conference held in Tokyo, Japan, July 23, 2004. Available on the website of the Embassy of Japan, http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20040723-62.html. Accessed Oct. 28, 2004.
[24] Michele Dunne, "Libya: Security is Not Enough," Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief Number 32, October 2004.
[25] See footnote 10, see also Scott Snyder, "The Fire Last Time: Lessons from the Last North Korean Nuclear Crisis," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2004, pp. 144-148.
[26] The primary work on this issue thus far has been done by David Albright, Institute for Security and International Science. www.isis-online.org. See the following powerpoint presentations for greater detail:

for application to other cases. A joint research program should be undertaken including specialists involved with the Libyan case and other researchers from six-party member countries to discuss the potential application of the Libyan experience to the case of the DPRK.

Determine the Functions and Modalities of a Six Party Verification and Monitoring Regime for the DPRK. A major challenge as the Six-Party Talks proceeds will be to determine the verification priorities and modalities that all parties can agree upon. Because the DPRK has resisted returning to an IAEA inspection process, it may be necessary to develop an alternative inspections organization including technical specialists from the six parties involved in the talks, or some other "IAEA Plus" format by which inspections and monitoring may be carried out in North Korea.[27] Each of these formats may have positive and negative influences on the preferred priority and expertise that would be brought to bear as part of implementation of the verification process.

There is a need for workshops or other meetings including participation from members of the six-party process (with or without North Korean participation) to examine the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches. An examination of the regional and "IAEA Plus" formats might also include a preliminary feasibility component to examine the requirements, structure, and governance of a new regional organization designed to implement verification requirements of any agreement that might be achieved at the Six-Party Talks. Lessons might also be drawn from other efforts, including the bilateral U.S.-Russian threat reduction effort and the prior experience of KEDO as an international organization tasked to implement an agreement with the DPRK. Just as more detailed discussion of the definition of the goal of the "denuclearization" has revealed differences among the parties on the scope of dismantlement envisioned, there might be differing positions among governments on the scope of and methods for pursuing verification.

As a means of addressing these potential differences before they emerge as part of the Six-Party Talks, we recommend that further technical analysis and comparison of the various available inspections regimes be pursued as part of the six-party working group effort through a series of workshops and commissioned research. Specialists from each country might be invited to examine and further develop options papers for consideration of verification and monitoring requirements in North Korea. Such an exercise might be particularly useful in identifying differences in the positions of the parties that would likely be part of the verification process and could be used to develop consensus on these technical issues prior to their being taken up with the DPRK in the Six-Party Talks.

[27] See David Albright, Institute for Science and International Security, "Introduction to Verified Dismantlement of Nuclear Programs: Defining the Approach," ISIS project on "Verified, Irreversible, Cooperative Disarmament of North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program." See http://www.isis-online.org/dprkverification.html, accessed on Oct. 26, 2004.

Another aspect of this effort might include an assessment of the skills and capabilities of potential participants in any multilateral verification regime, and the development of appropriate training materials for inspectors to develop a rigorous approach that applies high standards to such a process.

Undertake a Comprehensive post-Agreed Framework Assessment (including Lessons Learned from the First North Korean Nuclear Crisis). There is a need to examine in greater detail the lessons learned from the first North Korean nuclear crisis and their implications for future verification efforts with the DPRK.[28] For example, there have been technological improvements that have enhanced remote monitoring and verification capabilities since 1994, when the Agreed Framework was negotiated, that might now be effectively applied to North Korea.[29]

Following the breakdown of the Geneva Agreed Framework in October/November of 2002, there has been little examination of the technical lessons learned from the DPRK's past experience regarding verification issues or of how technological advances in the interim may facilitate the use of more effective and less intrusive verification measures that might be more easily implemented as part of any final settlement. This work might also involve specialists from other members of the Six-Party Talks as a tool for broadening understanding of the verification challenges in implementing any future agreement with the DPRK on denuclearization.

This research should, to the extent possible, draw on the direct experience of IAEA officials, technical experts within the Department of Energy, and any qualified outside specialists on verification and its potential application to the DPRK to develop a clearer understanding of how the DPRK views verification issues and whether there are technology or other applications that might assist in overcoming potential DPRK obstacles to an agreement as part of the talks.

Identify Future Needs and Next Steps Toward Nuclear Transparency in Northeast Asia. In comparison with Europe, Latin America, or Southeast Asia, the lack of development of multilateral institutions in Northeast Asia is striking. There have been a variety of private efforts to establish multilateral dialogue vehicles in Northeast Asia over the past decade, including the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) and dialogue through CSCAP on confidence building, nuclear transparency issues, and the building of regional frameworks.

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[28] The best open-source effort to assess the verification requirements associated with the DPRK's nuclear development program is "Verifying North Korean Nuclear Disarmament: A Technical Analysis," Working papers from the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace and the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, Number 38, June 2003, based on a conference entitled "U.S.—DPRK: Next Steps," held Jan. 27, 2003. The papers are located at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1290.

[29] See Moon Duk-ho, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program: Verification Priorities and New Challenges," Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper/32, Sandia National Laboratories, SAND 2003-4558, December 2003. See http://www.cmc.sandia.gov/links/cmc-papers/sand2003-4558.pdf.

The establishment of the Six-Party Talks has revealed a new openness to consider an institutionalized dialogue on regional issues beyond the North Korean nuclear problem. Some envision the Six-Party Talks as the beginning of a Helsinki process for Northeast Asia, which might lead to comprehensive improvements and integration of the DPRK into the regional community, lay the basis for a comprehensive dialogue on security, economic issues, and human rights, and bring about political transformation on the Korean Peninsula and in the region.[30]

If the Six-Party Talks is able to make progress toward an agreement and if a regional verification institution is required for implementation purposes, these developments could support institutionalization in Northeast Asia. One possible vehicle for discussing nuclear transparency issues and the development of regional institutions in Northeast Asia while also supporting any likely verification vehicle that might develop through the Six-Party Talks would be a conference designed to build linkages between European officials and energy experts involved or familiar with EURATOM cooperative efforts and East Asian officials and nuclear specialists. Past participants in earlier "PACATOM" meetings conducted by CSCAP's Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) Working Group and its Nuclear Energy Experts Group would be particularly useful. (Details regarding CSCAP PACATOM deliberations, including several comprehensive studies, can be found on the CMC-developed East Asia Nuclear Transparency Website [www.cscap.nuctrans.org] and/or the Pacific Forum's website [www.csis.org/pacforum].)

Such a conference would follow along the lines of recently established dialogues between the OSCE and ROK and the OSCE and Japan, and might pave the way for discussion of how an effective regional institution would respond to the challenges of nuclear transparency in Northeast Asia. Although this recommendation may have a longer-term time frame than the others (which have been directly related to technical support for the Six-Party Talks), we believe it is consistent with the overall trends that are developing in Northeast Asia and with the propensity for institutionalization in Northeast Asia to be driven by the need to respond to an immediate crisis. This was the case with the first North Korean nuclear crisis and the formation of KEDO, as well as the Asian financial crisis and the development of emergency foreign exchange borrowing arrangements among Asian governments to prevent the region-wide recurrence of such a crisis. We should take advantage of the opportunity and consider whether the second North Korean nuclear crisis might be used to reinforce international norms and to develop regional institutions designed to support those norms.

Prevent Illicit DPRK Procurement or Trade Activities. As diplomacy proceeds through the six-party framework, there will be an ongoing need for measures designed to constrain DPRK alternatives and to curb its illicit procurement activities. Both the passage of UNSC Resolution 1540 and the development of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) are designed to strengthen the international focus on curbing illicit trade,

[30] See James Goodby, "The Six-party Talks: Opportunity or Obstacle?" unpublished draft presented at the Jeju Peace Forum, June 2005.

especially where the trade may involve transfer of fissile materials or other banned items such as drugs or other contraband. However, both of these initiatives are currently bound by limits on intelligence or other information that would lead to effective denial of such transactions.

In the case of the Proliferation Security Initiative, many of the early exercises focused on strengthening capacity to monitor and deny illicit transactions through sea and air channels. The success or failure of any interdiction effort will rely on the strength of intelligence about such activities and on the capacity of parties to monitor ships and cargo. The dangers of miscalculation based on faulty intelligence in this area were most dramatically illustrated a decade ago when the U.S. Navy pursued a Chinese vessel the *Yin He*, suspected of engaging in proliferation activities in the Middle East. By the time the ship was boarded, there was no sign of illicit cargo, however. It is easy to imagine that if a similar incident occurred with respect to the DPRK today, tensions would be raised and efforts to stem illicit trade through the PSI would face a significant setback.

There is a need for a strengthened program of research to determine whether there are newly available monitoring technologies that might be effectively applied to support the PSI. This research might consider whether confidence building measures in the area of maritime security might be applied in ways that would enhance the transparency of maritime activity in the seas immediately adjacent to the DPRK, indirectly supporting the aims of the PSI while also strengthening confidence building and trust with the DPRK. One analogous effort worth considering might be the DPRK's decision to cooperation with the IATA to allow overflight rights of the DPRK in exchange for fees and investment in the DPRK's air traffic control sector.

Preventing the transportation of fissile or other illicit materials is a common goal shared by Washington and Beijing and could provide the basis for enhanced bilateral Sino-U.S. technical cooperation beyond the six-party structure and despite Chinese hesitancy to become directly involved in the PSI effort. Beijing has stated, categorically, that it will not permit illicit DPRK materials to transit its borders and is also concerned about Muslim separatists obtaining a "dirty bomb" or other weapons of mass destruction.

For its part, Pyongyang has stated that it will not export nuclear weapons or fissile material. It should be offered an opportunity to demonstrate this commitment through an invitation to join the PSI and demonstrate essential transparency on this issue.

Beyond the Nuclear Issue: Addressing Security Assurances. One point that all parties agree upon is the need for multilateral security assurances as part of the final settlement. While the focus of discussions has been on providing security assurances to Pyongyang, all six parties have legitimate security concerns (like Tokyo's missile concerns) that must be addressed. Monitoring and verification will be essential elements in underwriting such assurances. The first step, however, must be a clear articulation of the respective security concerns of each participant so that a comprehensive settlement can one day be reached. Regional security outlooks prepared (on a voluntary basis) by ARF governments could be

studied (and with government agreement more focused) to better identify such security concerns. A CSCAP or other track-two effort to assist six-party working groups in identifying these concerns can set the stage for developing both the confidence building measures and monitoring/verification mechanisms needed for any final agreement. This could also be a suitable task for the ARF's Experts and Eminent Persons Group (EEPG) to undertake.

Beyond the Nuclear Issue: Addressing Missile Verification. Among the issues that are likely to emerge on the agenda with the DPRK beyond the nuclear issue, the two most prominent are North Korea's missile development program and conventional arms control. Under current circumstances, both of these issues may be regarded as mid- to long-term considerations, most likely to be taken up only after the nuclear issues currently on the agenda of Six-Party Talks are settled. However, both missiles and conventional arms control questions deserve mention since they were included in the Bush administration's priority list following the initial policy review completed in June 2001. Both of these issues are likely to entail extensive monitoring and verification efforts, but the conventional arms issue seems more likely to be a part of an inter-Korean discussion, while the missile issue is a matter of concern for Japan in connection with any multilateral security assurance that might be offered to the DPRK as part of the Six-Party Talks.

For this reason, we recommend consideration of a joint U.S.-Japan study of both country's mutual concerns about the DPRK's missile capabilities. Such a study would likely include consideration of whether joint U.S.-Japan efforts on missile defense are able to fully respond to Japan's security concerns and what sort of monitoring and verification measures would be necessary to enhance confidence in any deal with the DPRK to freeze its missile development and deployment activities. Such joint research might also explore in more specific terms what incentives Japan might offer the DPRK for it to give up its missile development program and how the missile issue should be dealt with in relation to multilateral security assurances that might be offered as part of the Six-Party Talks.

Conclusion

After a hiatus of over 14 months, many observers breathed a sigh of relief that the North Koreans had finally made the decision to return to the negotiating table, providing at least temporary relief from the prospect of further escalation of North Korea's nuclear weapons development. However, as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated in Beijing following the announcement that the talks were to resume, "It is not the goal of the talks to have talks. It is the goal of the talks to make progress."[31]

If the North Koreans indeed demonstrate that they are serious about making a deal, the United States and the other parties will find it necessary finally to address seriously many of the issues above. Just one example of the potential differences to be

[31] Joel Brinkley, "Setting the Table for North Korea's Return," *The New York Times*, July 10, 2005, p. 4.

bridged lies in the challenge of coordinating the new "important proposal" described by South Korea's Minister of National Unification Chung Dong-young in his meetings with Kim Jong Il on June 17. How the American proposal from June of last year and the new South Korean proposal are integrated will go far toward determining the opportunities and potential limits of U.S. and South Korean policy coordination in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue, which will in turn send the DPRK another message about the extent to which the two allies are serious about confronting North Korea's nuclear challenge.

In the run-up to the latest round of talks, many analysts have focused on process improvements, or adjustments that would introduce greater flexibility and opportunity for give-and-take into the Six Party process. However, the fourth round of talks has demonstrated thus far that all the flexibility in the world will not gain an agreement if the North is not prepared to resolve the issue through negotiations on the basis of the agreed objectives of the talks. One early indicator of whether there is hope for the latest iteration of this negotiation process will be whether all parties can flesh out a consensus framework (or set of principles) for how to address the issues on the table that would then allow for working group and technical discussions. Such discussions will be critical in demonstrating seriousness of purpose on all sides to address complex issues such as those listed above.

There is also room for supplementary efforts to explore and develop some of the longer-term issues and options where additional research or consultation might be desirable in a less formal setting, away from the spotlight of Six-Party Talks. Research institutions such as Pacific Forum CSIS have the capacity to carry out such research efforts in support of the process. In addition, track-two regional mechanisms such as CSCAP and NEACD can also provide opportunity for supplementary consultations among specialists to discuss some of the mid-to-long term technical and operational challenges that may face the six-party process down the road. The ARF's EEPG could also play a constructive role. Keeping in mind that the goal of such meetings is to make progress not just to talk, a challenging agenda of issues remains ahead, and will likely require concerted action by governments as well as the support of outside specialists to support the coordination and implementation necessary to respond fully and effectively to the challenge posed by nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula.

Hopefully, this study can contribute in some small way to better understanding how we got to where we are today, and provide some useful recommendations about where collectively we should go from here.

Appendix A
Chronology of the Current North Korea Nuclear Crisis

Oct. 3-5, 2002: Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly visits Pyongyang, North Korea.

Oct. 5, 2002: At Seoul press conference, Kelly describes meetings in Pyongyang as "frank" and "useful." North Korea broadcasts accuse Kelly of being "arrogant" and "high-handed."

Oct. 16, 2002: State Department reveals that Kelly accused the DPRK of pursuing a clandestine uranium enrichment program and Pyongyang acknowledged this program.

Oct. 17, 2002: South Korean presidential candidates unanimously call on North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program.

Oct. 26, 2002: At Los Cabos, Mexico APEC Leaders Meeting, President Bush, President Kim Dae-jung and Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro call on DPRK to dismantle its nuclear programs "in a prompt and verifiable manner."

Oct. 29-31, 2002: North Korea rejects international demands to end its nuclear weapons program during normalization talks with Japan.

Nov. 14, 2002: KEDO announces decision to halt future shipments of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK unless it takes verifiable steps to dismantle its uranium enrichment program.

Nov. 20, 2002: A South Korean warship fires two warning shots at a North Korean boat that crossed a disputed maritime border. The North Korean boat quickly retreats.

Dec. 9, 2002: A North Korean ship carrying Scud-type missiles is intercepted by the Spanish Navy and inspected by U.S. officials; ship is subsequently released when it is revealed the missiles are destined for Yemen.

Dec. 12, 2002: DPRK announces it will reactivate a nuclear power program that was suspended under the 1994 Agreed Framework in response to the U.S. decision to halt heavy fuel shipments.

Dec. 16, 2002: North Korea declares that only a nonaggression pact with Washington can prevent "a catastrophic crisis of a war."

Dec. 16, 2002: Secretary Powell states that the U.S. has no plans to attack the DPRK and rejects North Korea's demands for a nonaggression treaty, insisting that the DPRK fulfill its promises to forego nuclear weapons.

Dec. 21-25, 2002: DPRK begins dismantling IAEA monitoring equipment at nuclear facilities in Yongbyon.

Dec. 27, 2002: DPRK demands all international nuclear inspectors depart.

Dec. 28, 2002: U.S. official discusses "tailored containment" of North Korea, drawing ROK protests.

Dec. 31, 2002: Expelled U.N. IAEA inspectors leave North Korea.

Jan. 6, 2003: IAEA issues resolution calling on the DPRK to fully comply with its nuclear agreements.

Jan. 7, 2003: Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) meeting in Washington. U.S., ROK, and Japan call on DPRK to "come into compliance with its international commitments." U.S. states it has "no intentions of invading North Korea."

Jan. 10, 2003: North Korea announces withdrawal from the NPT, effective Jan. 11.

Jan. 10, 2003: President Bush and PRC President Jiang Zemin confer by phone regarding North Korea's NPT withdrawal.

Jan. 10, 2003: President Putin and PM Koizumi issue joint statement condemning North Korea's NPT decision.

Jan. 14-16, 2003: Asst. Secretary Kelly visits Beijing; China offers to host direct talks between the U.S. and DPRK.

Jan. 17-18, 2003: Russian Deputy FM Losyukov visits Beijing to discuss North Korean nuclear program.

Jan. 18-21, 2003: Deputy FM Losyukov visits Pyongyang, meets with Kim Jong-il.

Jan. 24, 2003: JDA Chief Ishiba tells Diet that Japan could launch a preemptive strike if Pyongyang begins preparations for a missile attack.

Jan. 27-29, 2003: South Korean envoy Lim Dong Won visits Pyongyang, meets with No. 2 Kim Yong-sun, but not Kim Jong-il.

Feb. 3, 2003: Defense Secretary Rumsfeld puts 24 long-range bombers on alert for possible deployment within range of North Korea to deter "opportunism."

Feb. 5, 2003: North Korea announces it has reactivated its Yongbyon nuclear plant to produce electricity.

Feb. 6, 2003: North Korea warns that a decision to send more troops to the region could result in a preemptive attack on U.S. forces.

Feb. 7, 2003: President Bush phones President Jiang to urge him to do more to help resolve the North Korean nuclear standoff.

Feb. 12, 2003: The IAEA declares the DPRK in breach of its nuclear nonproliferation commitments and refers the matter to the Security Council.

Feb. 13, 2003: China and Russia issue statement that the standoff over North Korea's nuclear program should be resolved through direct talks between the U.S. and DPRK.

Feb. 13, 2003: Japan urges the DPRK to reopen dialogue with the IAEA.

Feb. 13, 2003: Japanese DM Ishiba Shigeru announces Japan would launch a military strike if it had firm evidence that the DPRK was ready to attack with ballistic missiles.

Feb. 14, 2003: DPRK dismisses the IAEA decision to refer the nuclear crisis to the U.N. as "interference in [its] internal affairs," calling the IAEA "America's lapdog."

Feb. 18, 2003: DPRK threatens to abandon the 1953 Korean War armistice if sanctions are imposed.

Feb. 20, 2003: A DPRK MiG enters South Korean airspace (the first since 1983) for two minutes before being pursued across the border by South Korean fighters.

Feb. 23-24, 2003: Secretary Powell visits Beijing; urges China to do more to resolve the DPRK nuclear crisis.

Feb. 24, 2003: China rejects Secretary Powell's appeal for a regional approach; calls for direct talks between the U.S. and the DPRK.

Feb. 24, 2003: The DPRK fires antiship missile into the East Sea/Sea of Japan.

Feb. 25, 2003: Secretary Powell announces the U.S. will donate 40,000 metric tons of food to the DPRK.

Feb. 27, 2003: The DPRK restarts nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.

March 2, 2003: DPRK fighters intercept a USAF reconnaissance plane over the Sea of Japan about 150 miles off the DPRK coast.

March 3, 2003: Kim Jong-il warns of a possible nuclear war if the U.S. attacks the DPRK.

March 3, 2003: JDA head Ishiba tells Diet that the SDF cannot protect Japanese people from North Korean ballistic missiles and can only minimize the damage.

March 4, 2003: The U.S. and South Korea begin a month-long annual joint military exercise "Foal Eagle" on the Korean Peninsula.

March 4, 2003: U.S. deploys 24 B-1 and B-52 bombers to Guam to deter aggression by the DPRK.

March 8, 2003: DPRK rejects U.S. proposal for multilateral talks, reiterates demand for direct dialogue.

March 10, 2003: DPRK test fires antiship missile in the Sea of Japan; also accuses the U.S. of plotting an atomic attack.

March 10, 2003: Presidents Bush and Jiang have a phone conversation on North Korea and Iraq.

March 11, 2003: Washington issues protest against Pyongyang spy plane intercept.

March 11, 2003: UNICEF officials announces the DPRK will run out of food by June unless new aid pledges are given.

March 13, 2003: South Korea urges DPRK to enter into multilateral talks with U.S.

March 16, 2003: VP Dick Cheney says North Korea nuclear program could force Japan to "readdress the nuclear question."

March 27, 2003: JDA head Ishiba says Japan will not develop nuclear weapons even if North Korea does so.

April 2, 2003: ROK National Security Advisor Ra Jong-yil meets with Chinese counterpart in Beijing for talks on North Korea.

April 10-12, 2003: ROK and PRC FMs Yoon and Li meet in Beijing; agree to multilateral dialogue to resolve DPRK nuclear issue.

April 16, 2003: Australian Navy seizes DPRK vessel, the *Pong Su,* for smuggling illegal drugs.

April 18, 2003: U.S., Japanese, and South Korean officials meet in Washington to discuss impending North Korea talks

April 22, 2003: PRC President Hu Jintao meets with DPRK Gen. Cho Myong-rok.

April 23-25, 2003: Asst. Secretary of State Kelly in Beijing for trilateral talks with North Korea and China.

May 12, 2003: DPRK nullifies 1992 Inter-Korean Denuclearization Declaration.

May 12-16, 2003: President Roh visits U.S., meets President Bush; joint statement warns North Korea that escalation may result in "further steps."

May 31, 2003: ROK Navy fires warning shots at North Korean fishing boats.

June 1, 2003: South Korean Navy fires warning shots after North Korean fishing boats cross disputed maritime border.

June 3, 2003: DPRK warns naval clashes could trigger war. South Korean Navy fires warning shots at a North Korean fishing boat hours later.

June 4, 2003: South Korean police seize 50 kilos of meth-amphetamine from Chinese ship that had transited DPRK.

June 9, 2003: DPRK claims nuclear weapons needed to reduce costs associated with its conventional forces.

June 10, 2003: Japan detains two DPRK cargo ships.

June 12-13, 2003: Asst. Secretary Kelly hosts TCOG meeting in Honolulu; all agree that ROK and Japan participation in DPRK nuclear weapons talks is "indispensable."

June 18, 2003: DPRK announces it will "put further spurs to increasing its nuclear deterrent force."

June 18-19, 2003: U.S. presents draft UNSC resolution condemning North Korea's nuclear weapons program; Chinese diplomats say it's premature.

June 20, 2003: DPRK vows retaliation and "strong emergency measures" if U.S. formally presents resolution to the UNSC.

July 1, 2003: DPRK warns any U.S.-led naval or aerial blockade or sanctions against North Korea would be met with "merciless retaliatory measures."

July 2-3, 2003: China and Russia block a U.S.-proposed statement condemning North Korea for reviving its nuclear weapons program in a meeting of the UN Security Council's five permanent members.

July 3, 2003: U.S. announces sanctions on DPRK firm for sales of missile technology to Iran.

July 9-12, 2003: Eleventh Inter-Korean Ministerial Meeting in Seoul; both sides agree to pursue "appropriate dialogue" to resolve nuclear weapons dispute.

July 18, 2003: IAEA Chief ElBaradei says DPRK represents biggest nuclear weapons threat.

July 21, 2003: North Korea demands the U.S. drops its "hostile policy" and legally commit itself to a nonaggression pact.

July 24, 2003: Presidents Bush and Roh agree by phone to keep pushing for multilateral talks on DPRK's nuclear program.

July 30, 2003: President Bush speaks by telephone to President Hu Jintao and encourages Hu "to stay involved in the process of discussion" with DPRK leader Kim Jong-il.

July 30-31, 2003: Under Secretary Bolton visits Seoul, describes DPRK leader Kim Jong-il as a "tyrannical dictator."

July 31, 2003: The Russian Foreign Ministry announces the DPRK favors six-sided talks, with Russian participation, to ease tensions over Pyongyang's nuclear program.

Aug. 3, 2003: Pyongyang calls Bolton "human scum" for his criticism of Kim Jong-il.

Aug. 13-14, 2003: TCOG meeting in Washington. U.S., ROK, and Japanese officials have final coordination prior to six-party nuclear talks with the DPRK in Beijing.

Aug. 15, 2003: ROK President Roh, on the 58th anniversary of the Korean Peninsula's liberation from Japan, promises DPRK economic help for ending its nuclear program.

Aug. 26, 2003: ROK National Security Advisor Ra Jong-yil states that his government would stop all economic assistance to North Korea if "suspicions of nuclear weapons are confirmed."

Aug. 27-29, 2003: Six-party talks take place in Beijing.

Aug. 30, 2003: North Korea claims "disinterest" in future six-party talks; cites "practical measure to beef up nuclear deterrent force."

Sept. 15, 2003: North Korea calls PSI exercise "a prelude to nuclear war."

Sept. 27-28, 2003: Presidents Putin and Bush meet at Camp David, Maryland, issue joint statement calling on DPRK and Iran to end their development of nuclear weapons. Putin states that a negotiated settlement with North Korea should include security guarantees.

Sept. 29-30, 2003: TCOG meeting in Tokyo.

Oct. 2, 2003: DPRK claims to have successfully finished the reprocessing of some 8,000 spent fuel rods; states "We (have) no intention of transferring any means of that nuclear deterrence to other countries."

Oct. 13, 2003: North Korea strongly criticizes U.S. for efforts to impose international sanctions and maritime monitoring of North Korean shipments; U.S., Japan, and ROK meet to discuss future of KEDO.

Oct. 20, 2003: Pyongyang test-fires a short-range missile.

Oct. 21, 2003: North Korea rejects U.S. offer of written multilateral security assurances, calling it "laughable"; reportedly test fires another short-range missile.

Oct. 25, 2003: North Korea says it is willing to accept President Bush's offer of security assurances if they are based on the "intention to coexist" and the U.S. offers "simultaneous actions."

Oct. 26, 2003: DPRK ready "to consider" a U.S. proposal of written guarantees not to attack Pyongyang in return for Pyongyang ending its nuclear weapons program.

Nov. 17-18, 2003: Secretary Rumsfeld visits Seoul for U.S.-Korea Consultative Meeting. A joint communiqué affirms the solidarity of the alliance, calls on the DPRK "to completely, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle its nuclear weapons programs," and reaffirms the realignment of U.S. forces in the ROK.

Nov. 21, 2003: KEDO's executive board officially declares one-year suspension of $4.6 billion nuclear power plant project in DPRK beginning Dec. 1.

Nov. 29, 2003: DPRK describes the suspension of the KEDO project as overt defiance and demands compensation.

Dec. 3-4, 2003: TCOG meets in Washington to prepare for next round of six-party talks.

Dec. 7, 2003: North Korea demands that the normalization of its ties with the U.S. be included in the draft of a joint statement for the next round of six-party talks.

Dec. 9, 2003: KCNA: "What is clear is that in no case the DPRK would freeze its nuclear activities unless it is rewarded."

Dec. 15, 2003: North Korea formally rejects U.S., Japanese, and South Korean proposal for ending its nuclear program.

Jan. 6, 2004: DPRK offers to stop testing and producing nuclear weapons, as well as cease operating its nuclear power industry, if compensated.

Jan. 6-10, 2004: Stanford University Professor John Lewis leads delegation to Yongbyon nuclear facilities in the DPRK, including former Los Alamos Director Sig Hecker, former State Dept. negotiator Jack Pritchard, and Congressional staff members Frank Jannuzi and Keith Luse.

Jan. 21-22, 2004: TCOG meeting in Washington, DC.

Feb. 19, 2004: Under Secretary Bolton visits Tokyo, says the success of the upcoming six-party talks in Beijing depends on North Korea.

Feb. 25-28, 2004: Second round of six-party talks on the DPRK nuclear issue held in Beijing. ROK outlines a three-step proposal to resolve the standoff and offers "countermeasures" to reward the DPRK for compliance. U.S. hails the meeting as "very successful," but DPRK says there has been "no substantive and positive result." China states there is a "complete lack of trust" between the U.S. and North Korea.

March 2, 2004: Asst. Secretary Kelly tells Senate Foreign Relations Committee that six-party talks are "working to our benefit and are moving a serious process forward."

March 7, 2004: ROK FM Ban visits Tokyo, meets FM Kawaguchi. They agree to work closely to persuade the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons program.

March 8, 2004: IAEA chief ElBaradei tells IAEA's Board of Governors that North Korea's nuclear activities and withdrawal from the NPT "set a dangerous precedent and thus remain a threat to the credibility of the nuclear nonproliferation regime."

March 19, 2004: DPRK says U.S.-ROK joint military exercises show the U.S. is preparing to attack the North and is not serious about pursuing a peaceful solution to the nuclear standoff.

March 23-25, 2004: Chinese FM Li Zhaoxing visits the DPRK (the first Chinese foreign minister to visit in five years) and meets with DPRK leader Kim Jong-il.

March 31, 2004: FM Ban says a North Korean proposal for a nuclear freeze would be unacceptable unless North Korea commits to have all its nuclear-related facilities frozen.

April 7-8, 2004: TCOG meeting in San Francisco to discuss working-level talks on DPRK nuclear crisis.

April 15-16, 2004: VP Cheney visits South Korea, meets with Acting President Goh Kun and voices concern about North Korea's nuclear program.

April 19-21, 2004: DPRK leader Kim Jong-il meets with President Hu Jintao in Beijing.

May 12-15, 2004: Six-party working group meetings held in Beijing.

May 22, 2004: PM Koziumi visits Pyongyang for one-day meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il.

May 25-26, 2004: ROK and DPRK senior military officers hold talks to examine proposals to improve communications between their forces; agree to further talks in June.

June 4, 2004: ROK and the DPRK agree to measures to ease military tension along their border, agreeing to adopt standard radio frequency and naval signaling system, to exchange data on illegal fishing, to establish an inter-government hot line, and end the broadcast of propaganda along the border.

June 13-14, 2004: TCOG talks in Washington prepare for next round of six-party talks.

June 21-22, 2004: Six-party working group discussions held in Beijing.

June 23-26, 2004: Six-party talks held in Beijing; U.S. and Pyongyang put detailed proposals on the table, hold separate bilateral discussion.

June 28, 2004: North Korea says six-party talks made "positive progress," but rejects U.S. proposal to freeze its nuclear weapons program.

July 3-4, 2004: Russian FM Sergey Lavrov visits Seoul and Pyongyang.

July 21, 2004: Under Secretary of State Bolton, in Seoul speech, cites Kim Jong-il's decisions as "the primary obstacles to development and prosperity in North Korea.

July 22, 2004: PM Koizumi-President Roh hold one-day summit in Jeju, South Korea, and release statements calling for Seoul-Tokyo cooperation in resolving North Korea nuclear dispute.

Aug. 23-25, 2004: KCNA pronounces President Bush a "fascist tyrant" and "human trash," and says the DPRK "can no longer pin any hope on the six-party talks."

Aug. 23-Sept. 3, 2004: U.S. and ROK hold annual "Ulchi Focus Lens" exercises to test readiness for military emergencies on the Korean Peninsula; North protests.

Sept. 2, 2004: ROK discloses to the IAEA that government scientists enriched a small amount of uranium four years ago.

Sept. 9, 2004: South Korea admits to conducting plutonium research in the early 1980s.

Sept. 10, 2004: Under Secretary Bolton calls for a full international probe into Seoul's enrichment of nuclear material, "saying we will not allow a double standard in terms of how we treat the violations."

Sept. 11, 2004: South Korea confirms massive explosion in North Korea near Chinese border several days earlier but dismisses possibility it was a nuclear test.

Sept. 13-14, 2004: Asst. Secretary Kelly stops in Beijing after TCOG talks in Tokyo in an attempt to firm up dates for the six-party talks.

Sept. 16, 2004: North Korea says it will not attend new round of six-party talks until Seoul discloses details of its nuclear experiments.

Sept. 19, 2004: IAEA chief Elbaradei says explosion detected over the DPRK was probably not a nuclear blast.

Sept. 19, 2004: IAEA inspectors in Seoul to review ROK nuclear experiments.

Sept. 21-24, 2004: President Roh visits Russia, meets President Putin, says "South Korea sees no need to rush into a further round of talks on the North's nuclear weapons ambitions."

Sept. 23, 2004: DPRK *Rodong Shinmun* states that the DPRK would turn Japan into a "nuclear sea of fire," if the United States undertook a preemptive attack on the DPRK.

Sept. 24, 2004: IAEA issues statement urging the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons program and allow IAEA inspectors to return.

Sept. 27, 2004: At the UN, DPRK Vice FM Choe Su Hon warns the danger of war on the Korean Peninsula "is snowballing," tells press "we have already made clear that we have already reprocessed 8,000 wasted fuel rods and transformed them into arms."

Oct. 18, 2004: President Bush signs the North Korea Human Rights Act.

Oct. 25-27, 2004: Japan hosts PSI Maritime Interdiction Exercise.

Nov. 12, 2004: In Los Angeles speech, President Roh rules out military option for dealing with DPRK.

Dec. 4, 2004: DPRK says it will not return to Six-Party Talks until the new U.S. administration clarifies its position.

Dec. 16, 2004: DPRK warns Tokyo that sanctions would be "an act of war."

Dec. 20, 2004: President Bush says U.S. is not seeking regime change in North Korea and is committed to six-party dialogue.

Jan. 8, 2005: DPRK says it will not return to Six-Party Talks until U.S. drops its "hostile policy."

Jan. 19, 2005: At her confirmation hearing, Secretary of State-designate Condoleezza Rice terms North Korea an "outpost of tyranny."

Feb. 10, 2005: DPRK announces that is has nuclear weapons and will indefinitely suspend participation in the Six-Party Talks.

Feb. 12, 2005: U.S. rejects DPRK demand for one-on-one talks as a precondition for restarting the Six-Party Talks.

Feb. 22, 2005: Kim Jong-il tells visiting Chinese diplomat Wang Jiarui that talks could resume if the United States "would show trustworthy sincerity."

March 2, 2005: DPRK memorandum further asserts nuclear weapons possession; Pyongyang also says it has a right to test-fire missiles, despite a 6-year moratorium.

March 19-20, **2005**: Secretary Rice visits Seoul, emphasizes North Korea is a "sovereign state" but that the U.S. will not wait "forever" for North Korea to rejoin the Six-Party Talks.

April 1, 2005: DPRK says it wants Six-Party Talks to be regional disarmament talks now that it is a "nuclear state."

April 18, 2005: U.S. threatens to refer the nuclear issue to the UNSC should Pyongyang refuse to restart six-party process.

April 27, 2005: DPRK is kept on State Department's state sponsors of terror list.

April 28, 2005: In a press conference, President Bush calls North Korean leader Kim Jong-il a "tyrant" and a "dangerous person."

April 30, 2005: North Korea responds, calling Bush a "hooligan bereft of any personality as a human being."

May 9, 2005: U.S. negotiator for the Six-Party Talks Joseph DeTrani meets with North Korean officials at Pyongyang's mission to the UN.

May 11, 2005: DPRK spokesman states 8,000 fuel rods were removed at Yongbyon nuclear complex.

May 13, 2005: U.S. and North Korea meet for secret working-level talks in New York.

May 31, 2005: At a press conference, President Bush calls for peaceful solution to North Korea nuclear issue and refers to North Korean leader as "Mr. Kim Jong-il."

June 17, 2005: ROK Unification Minister Chung has unscheduled meeting with Kim Jong-il. The dear leader pledges to resume family reunions and military and maritime talks, and hints at returning to the Six-Party Talks.

June 29, 2005: U.S. authorities are given new powers to freeze assets of companies believed to be helping North Korea, Iran, and Syria pursue WMD programs.

June 30, 2005: North Korea restarts construction on two nuclear reactors halted under the 1994 Agreed Framework.

July 26, 2005: Fourth round of Six-Party Talks begin in Beijing.

Aug. 7, 2005: Fourth round of Six-Party Talks take a three-week recess after failing to produce a joint declaration. The talks are scheduled to resume the week of Aug. 29.

Appendix B
About the Authors

Ralph A. Cossa is President of the Pacific Forum CSIS. He is a political-military affairs and national security strategy specialist with over 35 years of experience in formulating, articulating, and implementing U.S. security policy in the Asia-Pacific and Near East-South Asia regions. He is the author of numerous books, journal articles, and op-ed pieces in *The Japan Times, Korea Times,* and the *International Herald Tribune.* He is a retired USAF Colonel and a former National Security Affairs Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum's Experts and Eminent Persons Group.

Brad Glosserman is the Director of Research for the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu and a contributing editor to *The Japan Times*, writing extensively on policy issues and international affairs. Previously, Mr. Glosserman was on the Editorial Board and the Assistant to the Chairman for *The Japan Times* concurrently. His comments and analysis appear regularly in newspapers throughout the Pacific Rim. Mr. Glosserman holds a J.D. from The George Washington University and an M.A. from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Scott Snyder previously he served as an Asia specialist in the Research and Studies Program of the U.S. Institute of Peace and an Abe Fellow, a program administered by the Social Sciences Research Council. While at USIP he completed a study as part of the Institute's project on cross-cultural negotiation entitled *Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior*. Snyder has written extensively on Korean affairs and has also conducted research on the political/security implications of the Asian financial crisis and on the conflicting maritime claims in the South China Sea. Snyder received his B.A. from Rice University and an M.A. from the Regional Studies-East Asia Program at Harvard University. He was the recipient of a Thomas G. Watson Fellowship in 1987-88 and attended Yonsei University in South Korea.