U.S. Alliances in Asia: Views of the Next Generation

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Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.csis.org/pacfor/) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate areas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

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Foreword

The Pacific Forum CSIS organizes and promotes regional security dialogue aimed at addressing and hopefully ameliorating East Asia security challenges and concerns. We regularly host conferences and seminars with like-minded institutes throughout the United States and Asia to explore contentious issues, share ideas, and build networks of individuals and institutions that can influence regional policy-makers.

In the past few years, we have noticed a common theme that emerges in our discussions: the impact of generational change, especially in democratic societies. The post-World War II/Korean War and colonial-era generations are being replaced by more nationalistic, less patient societies. These groups see the world and their place in it quite differently from their predecessors. Yet as we look around our conference tables, we have been confronted by a troubling fact: while a great deal of time is spent analyzing the new generation, few of its members are present at such gatherings. This is disturbing on two counts. First, it deprives these individuals of interaction with more experienced experts and analysts. Second, our discussions lack the insight of this younger generation, views that are becoming increasingly important, and increasingly divergent from those of their elders. The gap is especially evident among young professional women who are even less integrated into international policy debates than their male peers.

To help remedy this situation, the Pacific Forum CSIS founded the Young Leaders fellowship program in 2004, with the support of grants from the Freeman Foundation and the Hawaii-based Strong Foundation, plus in-kind support from the CNA Corporation's Center for Strategic Studies. The program aims to foster education by exposing Young Leaders to the practical aspects and complexities of policy-making, while also generating a greater exchange of ideas between young and seasoned professionals, thus promoting cross-cultural interaction and cooperation, and enriching policy research and dialogue. After nearly three years, the program has about 100 alumni, more than half of which have attended several of our conferences. They have a blog where they discuss current issues and events, and they have been energetic sales persons, finding new participants, and continually providing suggestions on how to improve the program. This is the sixth volume of Young Leaders' papers; others (and more information about the Young Leaders program) are available on our website, www.pacforum.org.

We hope the Young Leaders program will provide an extraordinary opportunity for networking and training for young professionals from the U.S. and Asia who would otherwise have only limited opportunities to be involved in senior-level policy research and debate. We believe this program provides unique benefits and opportunities not only to the upcoming generation, but to the deliberations of their senior colleagues as well.

Ralph A. Cossa
President, Pacific Forum CSIS

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The Young Leaders program has also benefited from the assistance of several individuals who support participation of their students at these conferences and others: Dr. James Auer of Vanderbilt University, Dr. T. J. Pempel of the University of California, Berkeley, and Dr. Ezra Vogel of Harvard University.

The views expressed here represent personal impressions and reflections of the Young Leaders program participants; they do not necessarily represent the views of the relevant governments, or the co-sponsoring or parent organizations and institutes.

Introduction

Long-standing security alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea have been a cornerstone of U.S. engagement in Northeast Asia and with the broader Asia-Pacific region. "Boots on the ground" ensured that Washington stayed deeply involved in Asian affairs and remained attuned to regional developments. Those alliances have come under increasing scrutiny as the regional security environment has evolved. Critics charge their raison d'etre has vanished with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and that their continued existence – as currently configured – is problematic for regional security: China fears that instruments once designed to deter a Soviet threat will be deployed against it. Beijing's antipathy to those alliances – its calls them "outdated relics of the Cold War" – influences the thinking of U.S. allies as they contemplate their relationships with Washington.

Change is also taking place within Japan and the ROK. While there are similar concerns – the size of the U.S. military footprint, the status of forces agreements that control legal questions, the amount of host nation support, and the "flexibility" of U.S. forces to respond to contingencies elsewhere in the region – each country takes a different approach. At the same time, they are keeping a close watch on how the U.S. engages the other and uses those agreements as benchmarks.

Underlying all these particular issues is a broader and more fundamental question: How will the two countries – the U.S. and each particular ally – engage each other? The senior-junior, superpower-client relationship of the Cold War has ended. Across the board, U.S. allies seek more equal terms for their partnership, more respect, and more latitude in conducting policy. The changing external environment has magnified the impact of these changes, highlighting divergences in perspective on key issues, such as North Korea and China, and underscored the need for "new glue" for old alliances. Analysts argue that interests – shared threats – are no longer the defining feature of these relationships; instead, the key is shared values, such as belief in democracy, human dignity, and free markets. Some commentators, such as Robert Scalapino wonder if the world has not moved from "an age of alliances" to one that will be defined by "alignments."

The centrality of U.S. alliances to its engagement with Asia has made those alliances a focus of the work of the Pacific Forum CSIS. Early in 2006, the Pacific Forum hosted two conferences that looked closely at the state of those alliances and their future. As those discussions focused on changing perceptions of the external environment, of domestic political priorities, of each ally's place in the world, and of the U.S. itself, it seemed particularly important to hear the next generation's thinking on those questions. The papers that follow examine those issues and provide those views.

Asia-Pacific Alliances, Honolulu, Hawaii, Feb. 3-4. 2004

Some 30 experts and Young Leaders met in Honolulu to examine the future of alliances in the Asia Pacific and, in particular, the U.S.-ROK alliance. The conference

was a festschrift to honor former ROK Foreign Minister and Ambassador to the U.S. Han Sung Joo. Participants included Minister Han's teacher, UC Berkeley Professor Robert Scalapino, one of Han's own students, Korea University Professor of Political Science Hyun In-taek, and one of *his* students, Young Leader Koh Ho-youn: four generations of scholars around one table. The Young Leaders also had a 10-on-one breakfast meeting with Minister Han, during which they peppered him with questions on all aspects of U.S.-ROK relations, ROK foreign policy, and other topics.

Conference discussions focused on the issues identified above, in particular the changing external environment and the transformation of domestic politics in U.S. allies. Perceptions of China and the U.S. were also key considerations.

Our Young Leaders agreed that they saw the region and their countries' alliances in fundamentally different ways than did their seniors. At the same time, however, most of them also believed that those alliances are still relevant. Relationships need to change, and the U.S. in particular must be prepared to engage its partners with more respect and to forge more equal alliances, but none of our participants wanted to end the alliances. Change was intended to modify and transform alliances, not end them.

Most of the Young Leaders called for broadening and deepening alliances, and moving beyond the current predominantly military focus. Echoing a message that has been sent at every Young Leader's session, participants called for greater grassroots exchanges to build understanding that would help get alliances through the inevitable crises. This understanding works both ways: Young Leaders said that Americans have to be more sensitive to local concerns, but they also agreed that U.S. partners, and in particular South Koreans, have to step up and recognize the U.S. contribution to their national security and understand that that incurs costs and obligations.

There was one important divergence in our discussions. Our Chinese participants acknowledged that U.S. alliances served an important purpose – one bluntly asked who else could provide security assurances – but they also cautioned the U.S. about becoming too deeply involved in regional affairs. As one explained, the U.S. should not expect to be included in the early stages of Asian community building. Instead, Washington should let Asian nations lead and join in at later stages of this process. This echoed the discussion about the U.S. engaging more as an equal and showing more respect for local values and preferences. The Chinese view is important as an informal survey of our participants revealed that all but two felt that China was going to be the most important country in the region.

U.S.-Japan Security Seminar, San Francisco, Feb. 23-24, 2006

The 12th U.S.-Japan Security Seminar brought together current and former ranking officials, experts, and supporters of the alliance from both countries for two days of expansive discussions about the future of the alliance.

As at previous Pacific Forum conferences, a special program was developed for our Young Leaders. In this case, our meeting was preceded by a roundtable discussion on "United States National Security: A California Perspective," at the Japan Society of Northern California hosted by President Christopher Sigur. Howard Schatz, research fellow of the Public Policy Institute of California, provided an overview of his project, "Seaport Security in the Post 9/11 Era." He examined the significance of ports to the U.S. economy, the impact of an attack that might close them, and challenges to improving seaport security. He was followed by Kenji Kushida, a PhD candidate at UC Berkeley and member of the Berkeley Roundtable for the International Economy (BRIE), who spoke on "Silicon Valley Cybersecurity and U.S.-Japan Relations." His talk highlighted the many questions surrounding his topic, not least of which is defining what "cybersecurity" is, how it can be ensured, and what is the best way to think about the issue. Both speakers covered ground that has been left unplowed in previous discussions (both among Young Leaders and the "grayhairs"); neither issue was taken up in the main conference either.

Young Leaders also had breakfast with another respected senior member of the policymaking community: this time, they met former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who took their questions and provided fascinating insight into ways to look at the region and the U.S. role in Asia and the world.

The Young Leader roundtable at the end of the U.S.-Japan Security Seminar focused on the base of the U.S.-Japan alliance. All participants called for deeper understanding between the two countries to more deeply root the alliance in both societies. A better appreciation of the other would reveal how similar the two countries are, the values they share, and the need to work together to accomplish shared goals. Better mutual understanding would eliminate many points of friction in the alliance, in particular questions about being a "free rider" or the appropriate sharing of burdens. It is notable that most of our Young Leaders have spent ample time in each country and have a nuanced view of the bilateral relationship. Young Leaders were more inclined to be critical of their own country and government than of their partner.

All agreed that Japan should play a larger role in the region and the world. Yet as Japan appears to be heading toward becoming a "more normal nation," there was little support for the idea that a leading role would be based on military prowess. Instead, Tokyo should rely on its economic success, its experience in tackling development problems – its role as "thought 0leader" as laid out by Foreign Minister Aso Taro – and its promotion of values.

The assumption of that role requires big changes in Japan. The government in Tokyo was criticized for being reactive and unable to take the initiative, even on important issues. While some Japanese said their country could speak for the U.S. in Asia, Americans argued that being too close to the U.S. is not in the Japanese – or the U.S. – interest. One Japanese Young Leader noted that Japan would have a hard time promoting democracy since "it doesn't know democracy."

This critique of Japan was stated more broadly by a Japanese Young Leader who argued that the country wasn't interested in the values that it was promoting or the responsibility that came with leadership. Rather, the issue was prestige, status, and "fairness" – Japan deserved recognition for its contributions to the global order over the last several decades. The new generation of Young Leaders is proving to be more vocal when making that case – but it also has firmer ideas about the way the world should look and appears more willing to take action to realize those ambitions.

Chapter 1:
Asia-Pacific Alliances in the 21st Century: Waning or Rising?

February 3-4, 2006

Co-hosted by
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A Northeast Asian Initiative on Counterterrorism

By P. Claire Bai

In international relations theory, the term "alliance" refers to "formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, intended for either the security or the aggrandizement of their members, against specific other states, whether or not these others are explicitly identified."[1] Alliances are a means to aggrandize power, influence, and security against existing or potential adversaries. In Northeast Asia, the U.S.-Japan alliance was created after World War II to prevent a resurgence of Japanese militarism and contribute to the stability of the region. The U.S.-ROK alliance is a legacy of the Cold War, designed to prevent communist expansion on the Korean Peninsula.

There is, however, a distinction between peacetime and wartime alliances. In the post-Cold War era, it is in peacetime that most countries in East Asia are building multilateral mechanisms for security cooperation. While the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) remains the most visible example, Northeast Asia has also been working toward an institutionalized arrangement. At the same time, the U.S. and its allies have been experiencing new security challenges in the region. As Washington reassessed its relationship with Japan through the 1997 defense guidelines and the "2+2" meetings in 2005, it has been emphasizing equal status and compatibility of their respective national interests. The U.S. has also been reassessing (somewhat unilaterally) its relationship with South Korea, following positive developments in South-North relations, anti-U.S. sentiment in the ROK, and the North Korean nuclear situation. The U.S. is emphasizing its overall military capability in Northeast Asia.

To other stakeholders in Northeast Asia, the ideal development of U.S. alliances in the next 20 years would be an evolution into a multilateral "alignment" that involves all regional players. Alignment is a broader concept, referring to "a set of mutual expectations between two or more states that they will have each other's support in disputes or wars with particular other states."[2] While it takes a multilateral effort to ensure peace and stability in the region, China, as a major regional power, does not enjoy being contained – which appears to be the purpose of U.S. alliances. Alignment has the advantage of greater flexibility. It produces political reality not through formal contract, but in the expectations that are supported or created. To start this process, it is critical not only to readjust U.S. alliance relationships with Japan and South Korea, but also to reassess multilateral security cooperation mechanisms in East Asia and reshape power relations in Northeast Asia.

There are three different types of multilateral security cooperation arrangements in East Asia: the ARF, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Six-Party Talks (SPT), each aimed at resolving concerns of their respective regions. None, however, is the perfect model for regional security cooperation, and problems of Northeast Asia are of particular concern. The ARF ambitiously focuses on broader security challenges throughout the Asia-Pacific but aims more to protect the national interests of smaller ASEAN states. The SCO, which complements

[1] Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," *Journal of International Affairs*, Spring/Summer 1990, Vol.44, Issue 1.
[2] Ibid.

the role of the ARF by narrowing its focus to counterterrorism and anti-secession, does not accommodate all stakeholders in the region. The SPT, on the other hand, is considered a more feasible model, as it successfully brought together all countries in Northeast Asia – especially U.S. allies and countries that are skeptical of such alliances – and thus realized a certain level of confidence-building. Potential problems with the SPT, however, are that it is not yet an institutionalized process and usually incurs high costs for coordination among nations.

This analysis leads us to conclude that in Northeast Asia 1) it is not yet possible to establish a large-scale regional security cooperation mechanism; 2) it might be more feasible to limit the participants and scope of a potential arrangement; and 3) dealings with the U.S. and its allies pose an important challenge for countries in the region. We can consider combining the positive experiences of the three existing security arrangements and be more creative in developing a new security initiative in Northeast Asia.

As a major stakeholder, China could help realize this objective by establishing a "Northeast Asian Initiative" (NEAI). This initiative could be built upon the framework of the SCO and share the same agenda of fighting terrorism. Unlike the SCO, NEAI participants should also include key participants in the SPT, i.e., Japan, the ROK, and the DPRK. Its main target should be terrorists or terrorist groups with weapons of mass destruction (or ambitions to get them). In this way, the NEAI would maintain the local, dynamic, and progressive characteristics of the SCO, while benefiting from the experience of the SPT on nuclear (and other) issues and ensuring that the DPRK would not feel left out (as a suspected supporter of terrorists). Since Japan feels uncomfortable with China's leading role in the SPT, China would need to be careful in accommodating Japan's interests and set aside the two countries' disputes in other areas.

It is in the interests of the ROK and Japan to participate in the NEAI. While maintaining their respective alliances with the U.S., the ROK needs a mechanism to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and ensure peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. Japan would receive regional support to combat domestic terrorist forces, such as Aum Shinrikyo, which used chemical weapons on Tokyo residents, as well as North Korean criminal activities that concern Japan, such as drug smuggling, counterfeiting, abduction, and other illicit smuggling. Given the changes in the China-DPRK alliance since the 1990s and China's new foreign policy objectives concerning its neighbors, China will be expected to play a critical role in monitoring and containing North Korean involvement in state-sponsored criminal and terrorist activities.

The key to the success of the NEAI is to ensure that it is an institutionalized arrangement, with stated principles, standard operating procedures, a code of conduct, and regular meetings and administrative affairs, which would help members set expectations for each other. Additionally, a new feature of international relations in Northeast Asia is that domestic factors are beginning to take on growing importance in a country's foreign policymaking. In this respect, the NEAI could provide opportunities for reciprocity by encouraging extensive intelligence-sharing regarding regional terrorism activities, as well as promoting agreements or treaties on extradition. It should also offer channels and procedures to settle differences of opinion among members, should disputes arise.

Initially, China could take the leadership in building the NEAI to maximize its effect. As with the SPT and the East Asia Summit, China should pay particular attention to the U.S. response and be careful about excluding the U.S. in the first stage of the arrangement. Meanwhile, the U.S. needs to be patient when participating in Northeast Asian affairs, and be more progressive in learning about Chinese cultures and the Chinese way of handling regional relations. Only with time will the initiative expand to incorporate other stakeholders in East Asia, and eventually, the U.S. Likewise, China could benefit from becoming more transparent about its benign intentions and lack of desire to be a regional power. China's ultra-cautious and covert foreign policy making sometimes backfires and "forces" other states to imagine China as a potential threat. By openly stating its military etc. budget, China could correct its international image and hope to better exert its influence in regional affairs. In this way, NEAI will be the first step to multilateralize U.S. alliances in the region, and it may be capable of bringing lasting peace and stability to Northeast Asia.

U.S. Alliances in Northeast Asia: From Leadership to Partnership

By Erik R. Henderson

The next 10 to 20 years will be critical for maintaining and enhancing alliances between the United States and the countries of Northeast Asia. By 2025, with cooperation and understanding, Northeast Asia has the potential to become a secure and thriving economic region, fully integrated into the global economy. Alliances between regional nations and the U.S. will play a large part in maintaining the security needed for growth and prosperity. In this century, our alliances will be affected far more by public opinion and domestic politics than in the 20th century. As such, there are several avenues the U.S. needs to focus upon, both formal and informal, to maintain and enhance its alliances in Northeast Asia. This discussion must be framed by a basic fact: in the 21st century, the U.S. must undergo a paradigm shift from being a superpower leading the way to an equal partner, willing to both lead and follow.

As part of this shift, the U.S. needs to recognize that World War II and Cold War-era thinking are outdated and of limited relevance to the new generation of Asian leaders. The peoples of Northeast Asia have long memories, and the U.S. needs to foster new concepts of partnership between nations where there may be long-standing distrust. In training a new generation of American political, business, and scientific leaders who will interact with their Asian counterparts, greater focus needs to be paid to regional culture. Ignorance of Asian culture and the mass export of U.S. culture could become the greatest inhibitor of U.S.-Asia relations. Therefore, future leaders must learn to balance the needs of their counterparts with their own national interests in negotiations and diplomatic dealings, with a clear understanding of culture and tradition, taking into account each nation's stance towards its neighbors. Likewise, they must also be willing to share the best of U.S. culture. If both are accepted with equal respect, our alliances will be stronger for it.

The first, and most critical step current and future U.S. leaders must take is to increase cooperation between the U.S. and regional nations within the framework of a peer-to-peer relationship. The first half of the 21st century will see most Asian nations collectively approaching parity with the U.S., and individually surpassing some of America's traditional allies in Europe. To foster strong alliances with those nations, the U.S. (including its business and military leaders) must treat these regional players as equals, recognizing that there is far more to be gained by collaboration and consultation than by directing. Security is built by progress, and the U.S. should gear its efforts toward being seen as a partner in that process, while allowing each country and culture to define its own method and timeline for its development. It should also engender the understanding that as an equal partner, U.S. goals must be recognized as equally important to their own.

Energy security will become the crux of international relations in the Asia-Pacific region. All nations have a common interest in maintaining energy security, and this common concern is key. Ensuring regional energy security is in the interest of the U.S. and cooperating to fulfill that goal will help ensure lasting alliances in the region. Washington must offer to collaborate scientifically, economically, and politically with countries desiring its partnership. Such an

Energy Alliance would share in developing existing energy sources (both on land and offshore), refining and enhancing existing technologies, working together to enhance the viability of alternative sources of energy, and in exploring future resources (i.e., flammable ice, fusion) that are unavailable due to technological challenges. By ensuring Northeast Asian energy security through honest partnership, one major source of instability in the region will be alleviated.

History shows that nations with strong business relations often make strong diplomatic partners. Economically, the U.S. should bolster its existing relations by offering to further assist Northeast Asian nations in the integration of their economies into the global economy. While many Asian cities are already significant contributors to the global economy, the speed of business innovation is increasing. By working with our alliance partners, we can ensure that both sides stay on the driving edge of innovation.

In keeping with this spirit of cooperation and partnership, the U.S. must look forward by growing its educational and business relationships with its Asian partners. By encouraging increased trans-Pacific academic interaction, we encourage a synergy of both economic and scientific innovation that will benefit both sides of the Pacific. Moreover, future business and scientific leaders who have studied, in either the U.S. or Northeast Asia, will be far more familiar with each other, bridging the culture gap and building a bridge of trust both sides can profit from. Encouraging cultural exchange through the internet via online universities or even online gaming will also help bridge the culture gap. Such interaction will act as a bulwark against isolationism, which as North Korea has shown, is a serious roadblock to national progress and regional stability.

From a military standpoint, the U.S. must continue to support the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula, preferably in the next 20 years. As the last vestiges of the generations that fought in the Korean War fade from public office and a new generation of leaders emerges with new attitudes toward U.S. forces in Korea, it is imperative that the U.S. military be seen not as a force to ensure U.S. hegemony in the region, or as a divisive factor that contributes to an already tense situation. Efforts must be made to ensure the Korean people, both in the North and South, see that U.S. forces are one of many stabilizing factors that will ensure the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula. However, the U.S. must make it clear that the unification decision and process is a matter for Koreans to decide, and that our only concern is that it be peaceful. We must be willing to accept the risk that peaceful reunification does not necessarily mean the South, or more importantly, a strongly pro-U.S. government will lead that effort.

Second, strengthening existing military alliances between the U.S. and its Asian counterparts will require continued interaction between military leaderships. Encouraging participation in training exercises between nations, multinational exercises, and participation in global peacekeeping missions must be a major goal in the coming decades. Such interaction should be stressed not only at the strategic level, but at the operational and tactical level where junior officers can become familiar with one another. Through this partnership, we can ensure familiarity between future military leaders. The relationships and goodwill we create today will pay dividends over the next two decades.

Finally, the U.S. lacks the attention span that our Asian counterparts possess. In order to foster strong alliances over the coming decades, the U.S. and its partners need to work to establish a long-term, consistent, and transparent policy that will remain in place regardless of elected leadership. Long-term policies and guidelines on security and economic cooperation designed to survive changes in leadership will act as a stabilizer for regional leaders. While the minutiae of international agreements will ebb and flow over time, the leadership of the region can rest assured that the U.S. will work with them to achieve the long-term goals they have set for themselves.

In conclusion, Northeast Asia has tremendous potential for growth and stability. New discoveries, international events, and generational changes will shape that potential. However, known and unforeseen dangers will challenge that growth and reinforce the necessity of alliances with the U.S. and its partners. By fostering a relationship of equals, engendering multifaceted cooperation, encouraging cultural awareness and long-term mutual transparent goals, U.S. alliances with its Northeast Asian neighbors will remain long into the 21st century.

The Future of U.S.-ROK Alliance: What Should South Korea Do?

By Ho-Youn Koh

There have been regular ups and downs throughout the history of the U.S.-ROK alliance: the alliance faced hard times during the U.S.-Sino détente, and under President Ronald Reagan strong ties were built and developed. From another perspective, we can say, the U.S.-ROK alliance suffered when Northeast Asia experienced great power détente and became robust when the region suffered. This pattern reflected the bipolar system. There is, however, a great difference between the dynamics of the Cold War and today's dynamics: both the ROK and the U.S. speak out almost equally – once impossible for the ROK under the bipolar system –- to adjust the alliance in each's own favor. Accordingly, more factors affect the relationship and these additional factors favor the ROK. This implies that the ROK can have a greater role and has more leverage on the U.S. Recent events within the ROK – the candlelight march to mourn the death of two schoolgirls by U.S. service personnel, the anti-U.S. attitude of pressure groups, the call by the "386 generation" for adjustment of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the alliance itself – show that the Korean public's view of its alliance with the U.S. is in transition. This paper, therefore, focuses on emerging factors – anti-American sentiment and the changing view of North Korea within Korea – and argues for steps to ensure the viability of the U.S.-ROK alliance.

Where does anti-U.S. sentiment come from?

Most people in the U.S. are not aware of the growth of anti-U.S. sentiment unless they are interested in international affairs. This is despite the fact that this antagonism is a social and political issue in Korea, that the U.S.-ROK alliance is deteriorating as a result, and that this will undermine Korea's security. A few TV images, such as radicals' denunciation of U.S. military forces in Korea or the burning of the U.S. flag, are the only indications of what is going on. The peak of anti-U.S. sentiment was triggered by the accidental deaths of two schoolgirls by U.S. Army personnel. After the accident, the call to adjust the SOFA became stronger than ever and was used by politicians for propaganda purposes. As noted at our conference, controversy at the Winter Olympic Games – many Koreans cried foul when a U.S. short-track speed skater bested a Korean for the gold medal – and the victory of the "386 generation" in the presidential campaign led the anti-U.S. sentiment. That antagonism against the alliance provoked a reaction: demonstrations of an almost scale were conducted by pro-U.S. groups. As a result, the conflict between supporters and opponents of the alliance, between generations, and between conservatives and reformists increased. This confrontation can bring about a chaotic outcome since the possibility of political polarization is increasing.

How to Deal with Anti-American Sentiment

How do we deal with this growing antagonism? First, we need to identify the real cause of anti-U.S. sentiment.

Many Koreans continue to support the alliance. Anti-American sentiment is an expression of the pluralism in Korean society. Some assert that the climax of anti-American sentiment – the candlelight demonstration to mourn the schoolgirls' deaths – brought about the Global Posture Review and the deployment of the Second Infantry Division to Iraq because the former happened right before the latter two events. The rearrangement plan, however, is part of the overall U.S. strategy after 9/11; unilateral foreign policy by the projection of force. Also, emotional and extreme anti-Americanism cannot survive. Rather, more moderate groups – "New Rights" and "New Lefts" – are evolving as a result of self-examination within Korean society. Furthermore, both sides cast doubt on the dichotomy of alliance or self-defense.

Second, we should make efforts to increase cultural and educational exchange between the two countries, especially by the younger generation. As mentioned at our conference, Americans know little about Asian countries' history. The same can be said for Korean knowledge of the world. Asian countries are becoming more nationalist in their view of history and Asian values. To build mutual understanding and respect, having common values or universal concepts is not enough. Rather, knowing each other is required. In this light, as suggested at the conference, visa waivers between the ROK and the U.S. should be considered.

Changing View of North Korea

The Korean people's view of North Korea has changed dramatically as a result of two factors: the Kim Dae-jung administration's "Sunshine Policy" and demographic change. The June 2000 North-South summit and the regular family reunions, the reconnection of inter-Korean railroads and the Mt. Kumgang tours have all shaped Korean perceptions of the North. President Roh Moo-hyun has maintained Kim's policy. These policies concentrate more on reconciliation and engagement than did the previous policy toward the North. As leadership in Korea is passed from the older generation to a younger generation that did not experience the Korean War, North Korea is no longer seen as an enemy, but as a nation or a brother. This new view of North Korea is inspiring: it sees that mutual recognition and trust must precede Korean unification.

There are two reasons for concern, however. First, a change in how North Korea is viewed should not lead to a downgrading of concerns about security. This is likely because in the past, when Korea was ruled by authoritarian regimes, anti-communism or anti-North Korea sentiment was considered to be essential to national security. As anti-communism has vanished and North Korea is regarded as a brother, national security might become less of a priority for the public. Second, engaging North Korea does not necessarily mean excluding foreign parties. The Sunshine policy aimed to create a peaceful Korean Peninsula by interchange and cooperation between the two Koreas. This purpose might yield, intentionally or not, the exclusion of foreign entities and insulating peninsula issues from neighboring countries.

The **North Korean issue and the ROK-U.S. alliance**

In spite of the changed view of North Korea, a majority of Korean people still regard the U.S. as their primary alliance to deter war on the peninsula. At the same time, the specific expression of the alliance and the details of executive procedures have changed. For example, the

president's right-hand man until the 1990s was from the Ministry of Defense or Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Unification seemed to take precedence in the 2000s. When South Korea was dealing with the North's nuclear crisis last year, it also addressed China more actively than before – and the PRC played a greater role than in the 1993-4 nuclear crisis. This is because the ROK is now putting a more explicit priority on "unification." But, Korea could not have chosen the China channel if it did not have an alliance with the U.S.

If a third North Korean nuclear crisis occurs, the ROK's best option is the existing framework, the Six-Party Talks. And unfortunately, the possibility of a third crisis is quite high. While the U.S.-ROK alliance was rooted in U.S. containment policy during the Cold War, it will more likely focus on the common interests of the U.S. and the ROK. Korea's stake may become larger: Korea needs the alliance to prevent any war on the peninsula.

Conclusion

The newly emerging factors in the U.S.-ROK alliance – the Korean people's anti-Americanism and their changing view of North Korea – should be examined more closely. What we need to see is not the sentimental aspect of the problem but the background or rationale for this phenomenon. "The newly emerging" Korean society has just turned the corner and become a democracy. Therefore, disagreements about the U.S., especially the presence of U.S. troops in Korea, are natural given pluralism and demographic change. Nonetheless, the Korean government needs to place more attention on and make more efforts to minimize potential conflicts, internally and externally.

Maintaining Asia-Pacific Alliances for Regional Stability

By Sun Namkung

To ensure the viability of U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia for the next 10 to 20 years, the U.S. needs to expand its definition of alliance to include nontraditional security matters. In other words, the alliances need to be deepened. The current U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia are with Japan and South Korea, and are represented by the mutual defense treaties. The treaties – though important – are not the sums of the relationships between the United States and Korea and Japan. During the Cold War, military alliances had to be central in state-to-state interactions. But with the fall of the Soviet regime, the primary relationship no longer warrants being based on military issues; governments are equally concerned with trade and new nontraditional security threats, such as epidemics. Man-made and natural events demonstrated that the alliance helped mobilize resources in Asia and the Middle East. It was the alliance as much as any persuasion by President George W. Bush that convinced Japan and South Korea to send forces to Iraq and Afghanistan. Even with the historical animosities in Northeast Asia, the region has not recently experienced war. Plainly, the U.S. presence and its Northeast Asian alliances have been a major source of stability in the region.

Tokyo and Seoul: Northeast Asian spokes

The U.S.'s bilateral relationships with Japan and South Korea have been changing to adjust to regional realities. The U.S. and Japan have "2+2" consultative meetings with defense and foreign ministers. An outcome of the meetings is the recent report, "U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future," which addresses security issues of mutual concern to both countries. These meetings should go forward, but also include working groups to address trade and commerce issues, such as creating common protocols for electronic tracking of merchandise in international trade, as well as addressing port security.

The U.S. and South Korea have started their own consultative process: the Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership (SCAP). Given the domestic situation in South Korea, as well as Japan, a purely military alliance is no longer politically feasible. The alliances need to shift to cover other areas of mutual concern. The SCAP meeting was less about the military alliance and more about security issues that concern both countries. Some of the initiatives in the discussion were efforts to promote democratic institutions and human rights, coordination in fighting terrorism and pandemic disease, collaboration in crisis response to natural and man-made disasters, and the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated, the U.S.-South Korea relationship should graduate to a partnership from its earlier patron-client relationship.

Alliance GPS

The alliances should evolve to look at nontraditional security threats. Endemic poverty and disease in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa is a breeding ground for terrorism. Japan and the U.S. launched the U.S.-Japan Strategic Development Alliance at the September 2005 United

Nations World Summit. It allows for humanitarian aid coordination, which has been lacking. Similar coordination could be done between the U.S. and South Korea.

Even though there is considerable dialogue between the U.S. and its allies, there are steps the U.S. can take to ensure that these alliances continue to be sustainable. These measures can be taken outside an alliance structure, but the rationale for taking these steps is stronger if tied to an alliance.

1. Policy coordination outreach

There should be more policy coordination among allies related to the security of international travel and trade. This could range from consultation on new regulations to the introduction of new technology. Securing ports served by container ships is a pressing issue because it is a key link in securing international trade. As a formal member of the alliance, a value-added benefit would be early consultation.

Policy coordination should extend to special negotiations like the Six-Party Talks. Without coordination, it will be difficult to move the talks forward. North Korea could easily drive a wedge among the other parties – as they have been doing.

The U.S. should broaden its SCAP talks with South Korea to include defense ministers and South Korea's minister of unification. It could be the "2+2+1" talks. The formulation needs to reflect the fact that the alliance is as much a foreign policy instrument as well as a military one. Many of the defense issues have a bearing on foreign policy and vice-versa. The ROK minister of unification needs to be included as policies toward North Korea come from this office. There could be another variation of the group to include U.S. special envoys to North Korea, which would make the talks "2+2+2."

2. Renegotiating status of forces agreements (SOFA)

The nature of SOFA is inherently "unfair" as the guest military force would want to ensure that service people enjoy the same legal protection as when they are in their home country. One of the sticking points of the U.S. SOFA for South Korea, at least from a South Korean standpoint, is that the arrangement between the U.S. and South Korea is perceived to be "unfair" compared to the U.S.-Japan SOFA. It might be time to create a "perceived" uniform SOFA for Northeast Asia. Though individual laws may differ, the basis for legal procedures is comparable. The South Korean and Japanese legal systems are based on German civil law.

3. Public diplomacy

In recent years, the U.S. image has taken a beating abroad and at home. The U.S. government needs to reach out to its citizens and educate them on the need for the Northeast Asia alliances. It is not enough to improve the alliance image abroad: U.S. citizens need to be convinced that these alliances are necessary for their own security. Establishing an Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy is a step in the right direction. The

under secretary should also be in charge of educating domestic audiences on the importance of U.S. alliances. The audience will want their congressional representatives to make sure that the U.S. Asia-Pacific alliances are healthy and maintained.

4. Educational and cultural exchanges

Finally, cultural diplomacy will ensure that the public diplomacy efforts of the State Department will be lasting. The U.S. should ensure that Northeast Asian students have access to U.S. schools and universities. Citizens of allied states should be issued fast-track visas and given priority to study at U.S. institutions. The more opportunities there are for educational and cultural exchanges, the better the alliance will be perceived by the citizens of both nations. Of course, allied states should also offer reciprocal arrangements.

Focus on security threats

Economic issues should not be codified in the alliance treaties. Though free trade agreements are believed to make the alliances more comprehensive, tying economics up in the alliance runs counter to the interests of the Doha Round of world trade talks. It weakens the World Trade Organization. Countries commit to free trade agreements, but it would send the wrong message to have trade and economics on an alliance agenda. It would be a return to the blocs of the Cold War. Alliances are most useful when focused on an outside threat such as terrorism or an epidemic rather than on broad interests such as trade and commerce that do not create a security threat.

It takes common interests to keep an alliance going, but shared values of alliance members are paramount in forming an alliance. As was stated during the conference, alliances based on common interests would be an alignment, which is more fluid and nonbinding. Therefore, the alliances should not be widened to include other nations like Mongolia or China. At this point, I can see the U.S. in alignment with China but not in an alliance. Nor should the alliances be merged: the bilateral interests that drive the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea alliances are different due to the character and focus of each alliance. Given the frosty relations between Japan and South Korea, the historical, territorial, and Yasukuni issues would immobilize the alliance. After all, three can be a crowd.

Still vital, and necessary

The consultative dialogs that the U.S. had with its alliances partners, Korea and Japan, are a start toward keeping the alliances relevant. The end of the Cold War – the demise of the Soviet Union, the rise of capitalism in China, and increasing North and South Korean interaction – means the *raison d'etre* for the alliances has gone. This does not mean that tensions are gone, but the need for ready military forces stationed in a host country to repel an invading army has abated. Washington also needs to keep in mind that domestic opinion regarding the alliances has evolved. Citizens on both sides of the Pacific are questioning the need for such alliances. Therefore, it is incumbent upon Washington to educate its citizens on the usefulness and need for these alliances, as well as to remind Seoul and Tokyo to educate their people, as well. It will take

the resources of all three governments to keep the alliances strong. With a peaceful “rising China” the nations in Asia are looking more to the U.S. and its alliances to keep the area balanced and stable for greater economic prosperity.

How to Save the ROK-U.S. Alliance
"Difficult" does not mean "Unrealistic"

By Jiyon Shin

The post-Cold War era witnessed rapid globalization fueled by the proliferation of information technology, creating a world in which everything is vulnerable to change: what is stagnant or falls behind quickly diminishes, and is soon replaced by a superior model of enhanced quality. The recently shaky alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States originally based on blood – shed during the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and now the post-Iraqi War construction – has reached a point of uncomfortable stagnancy and now runs the risk of diminution. Nevertheless, considering the value of this alliance in the Asia-Pacific region in the coming 10 to 20 years, it would be a myopic and senseless mishap if the alliance between the ROK and the U.S. were to break.

As long as these two countries share common interests and continue to take effective long-term measures, the alliance will remain strong. The Asia-Pacific region has tremendous potential in the 21st century. It rebuilt itself from the ashes of world and civil wars, and successfully endured the financial crisis in the late 1990s. Japan has maintained itself as the second largest economy in the world, while recently South Korea was ranked 11th, and most remarkably, China, once a developing communist country, has become a rising capitalist power in the Asia Pacific and the world. In this dynamic situation, it is vital for countries outside the Asia Pacific region – including the U.S. – to have more allies within the region.

The U.S. might be tempted to walk toward Japan for a solid, unwavering 21st century partnership, leaving South Korea behind. The U.S. should not feel compelled to choose between Korea and Japan; rather it should maintain sound relations with both countries. While Japan has its own global aspirations, there is no guarantee that Japan will follow the course of the U.S. for the rest of the 21st century. The dispatch of its Self-Defense Forces to Iraq might be a steppingstone toward its own bid to become another global power independent of the U.S. South Korea and the U.S. have sacrificed blood to salvage their alliance over the past 56 years; it is more plausible to solidify than abandon this relationship.

Nevertheless, whether it is due to the fact that South Korea has transformed itself into a burgeoning and prosperous democracy that perceives itself able to reject alliance (and the risk of entrapment), or that South Korea and the U.S. see the threat posed by a poverty-stricken North Korea in different ways, or that the U.S.-Japan alliance irks South Korean sentiment, it is clear that the alliance has reached a potential breaking point. Thus, it is timely to suggest that both countries make efforts to save this marriage.

Coordination on North Korea

Once the binding force in the U.S.-ROK alliance, North Korea has weakened, reaching the point where over 70 percent of its factories are malfunctioning, its people are starving, and it relies on international donations. It is easy to forego viewing North Korea as a threat. The June 2000 summit meeting between the two Kims, and South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung's

Sunshine policy, which has been continued by the current Roh Moo-hyun administration all made the South Korean public more hospitable toward its "departed brother." The Bush administration's reluctant, often disagreeable, attitude toward South Korean-led initiatives toward North Korea has made the South Korean public increasingly distant from the U.S. and perhaps even tilt toward North Korea. Although the Six Party Talks are a peaceful multilateral effort, the U.S. should be aware of the dangers of cornering the already wrecked garrison state, for that could result in a backlash, and provoke South Korean nationalistic sentiment. The U.S. needs a better understanding of this fickle and bipolar South Korean psychology of either inclining toward the U.S or North Korea and should support South Korea's policy of "Peace and Prosperity." Accordingly, Washington and Seoul should coordinate an approach toward North Korea with an engagement policy, based on multilateral efforts deriving from the Six Party Talks.

U.S. Mediation between Japan and the ROK

The triangular relationship between the ROK, the U.S., and Japan during the Cold War to deter North Korean infiltration (backed by the Soviet Union), has vanished. Japan and South Korea are both strongly challenged by their own nationalist tendencies, which have created mutual diplomatic enmity. The United States is awkwardly situated between the two countries. From the Korean perspective, the continued U.S. silence on the issue can be interpreted as a preference for the alliance with Japan over the alliance with South Korea. Given China's recent meteoric rise, the U.S. has much at stake. China is also frequently enraged by Japan's mishandling of its colonial history[1] and continued U.S. ambiguity could lead Korean sentiment to shift toward China. To prepare for a possible rivalry between China and the U.S., Washington must endeavor to make more allies rather than aligning with either South Korea or Japan.

There is no permanent ally or enemy in the geopolitical scene. Japan has its own global agenda, evident in its support for the UN (Tokyo is the second largest donor – and a loyal one). Japan's ambitions are reflected by its munificent official development assistance to third world countries. Although it seems that Koizumi and Bush are on the same track in the military field, it is difficult to determine whether Japan will continue to stay in the shadow of the U.S. while its own global influence is growing. Thus, while it is South Korea's (and also Japan's) task to use its nationalistic attitude for a productive cause, the U.S. must carefully manage the history issue, which is triggering hatred and stalling progress in the Asia-Pacific region.

USFK & SOFA; Hoping for the Best, Expecting the Worst

Fortification of self-defense capabilities, and agreement on a Joint Security Declaration

Although there are other complicating factors, anti-U.S. sentiment pivots around the seemingly permanent military presence of the U.S. military forces in Korea, and the Status of

[1] In the 2005 APEC meeting, Hu Jintao, in the wake of the Yasukuni Shrine visit by Koizumi, refused to meet the Japanese prime minister, rejecting the diplomatic tradition of having one-on-one meetings. Prior to the incident, anti-Japanese protests and riots had been a frequent occurrence, as in the riots following the Japanese victory at the Asian Cup 31 in 2004, the protests against Japan's UNSC bid in 2005, and the mass demonstration in the wake of the Japanese textbook controversy in April, 2005.

Forces Agreement (SOFA). Given the origins of the US-ROK alliance, it is dangerous for South Korea to hastily discard the USFK by echoing South Korean protests. Taking into account negotiations over troop relocations, reduction of soldiers, the revision of the SOFA, the worst to expect is that the USFK leaves with hard feelings on both sides; thus leading to losses for both countries. The solution for South Korea lies in reinforcing its self-defense capabilities to lessen the burden on the U.S., thereby elevating South Korea's appeal as a responsible ally, and simultaneously preparing for the worst. The best hope to avoid a negative scenario and reassure the alliance is to continue the productive negotiations on the USFK & SOFA, whilst establishing a Joint Security Declaration, which includes military aid if another Korean tragedy occurs. In that sense, the Joint Declaration on the ROK-US alliance and Peace on the Korean Peninsula in 2005 is a laudable move in that direction, which should be further actualized.

Willingness to understand both sides: educational, academic and cultural exchanges

In addition to institutional processes, both sides must try to comprehend each other and improve their relationship. This should not be perceived as a vague sense of compassion, but should be articulated with the use of educational, intellectual, and cultural exchanges. Education is the foundation for a long-standing strategy for a nation because it affects the next generation. South Korea is greatly influenced by specific unions of teachers (Jun Kyo Jo), or governmental policies, and as a result many South Korean history or social studies textbooks focus less on the contemporary world and Korean history. Because the latter part of history is in the very back of the book, Korean students end their year's studies by lightly gliding through (or even omitting) the last chapters that are mostly excluded from their finals. With less understanding of contemporary history, there is a higher probability that simple-minded and biased reactions to current issues will be swayed by shallow populism – such as in the wave of anti-Americanism that involved sensationalism led by leftist organizations as Han-Chong Ryun, Jo-Chong Ryun and Jun-Kyo Jo[2]. Also, the content in history books (even the "Yul-li" book – ethics) dealing with North Korea emphasizes historic moments of reconciliation which lead to the Nobel Prize winning summit meeting of the two Kims (never mentioning the Hyundai bribery scandal which was heavily related to the meeting), the reuniting of families divided during the Korean War. However the texts fail to touch upon North Korea's Northern Limit Line infiltrations that occurred in 1999[3] and 2002[4] during which South Korean navy military personnel were injured and killed. This sort of unbalanced education on North Korea should not be tolerated.

There needs to be active governmental and nongovernmental exchanges between both countries to elevate the understanding of each other through intellectual and cultural institutions. The post-Cold War epoch requires a new mindset. Neither party should have a mindset rooted in the Cold War period. Although the U.S. is an unimaginably large world with its vast resources and landmass, cultural ignorance should not be overlooked (an extreme, yet recurring case:

[2] Three famous left-winged organizations: the Student's Union of Korean Universities (Han-Chong Ryun), the People's Union of Josun (Jo-Chong Ryun), the Korean Teachers and Education Workers' Union (Jun-Kyo Jo)

[3] 연평해전, In the YunPyung Hae Jun (sea war) of 1999, the ROK navy had 11 injured, while the DPRK had 150 injuries and 95 deaths.

[4] 서해교전, In the Sea of West fire exchange in 2002, six South Koreans died, and 20 were injured. It was said to be the North's revenge for the 1999 fire exchange. (There were criticisms that the World Cup held in the same year — at the peak of nationalism – overshadowed the unfortunate event.)

bluntly asking a young Korean which part he or she came from – North or South Korea). The same goes for South Korea; an effort to view history with a fair, unbiased perspective is a responsibility. From numerous small-scale workshops to conferences with respected scholars from both countries, a level of understanding should be reached. The soft power of culture should not be neglected as movies, music, and art are also educational tools to create a better understanding of the other. Hosted by governmental or nongovernmental entities, the continuous flow of ideas is vital in stimulating interests in hearing each others' opinions, which will eventually shape public opinion. Ill-advised generalizations and oversimplification in both culture and politics, which creates misunderstanding, will be dismantled in the process.

The Young Leaders' program hosted by the Pacific Forum CSIS is an excellent model of a non-governmental academic exchange. By shedding light on the issues that need to be addressed in the Asia-Pacific region, it presumes that people from both sides are truly concerned about the alliance, and that both sides – whether young or old – are looking for genuine solutions. Instead of merely criticizing the causes of the fragile alliance, a common interest was present in finding ways to improve it for the future. While participating in the forum, I could not find any generation gap regarding alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, including the ROK-U.S. alliance. The participants, both old and young, were respectful toward each other while avoiding generalizations and sincere in their attempts to discuss problems so as to achieve a resolution.

With reciprocal appreciation, a keen understanding of core issues (yet being open to other ideas), and a willingness to find congruent values, the generational gap loses its meaning and only flexibility in attitudes remains significant. For both South Korea and the U.S., it is crucial that all issues, including trade, military, and cultural matters, be based on helpful enthusiasm or a "young attitude" to tackle problems with an open and unbiased outlook in governmental and nongovernmental exchanges. It is a difficult task, yet difficult does not mean that it is unrealistic.

Solidifying U.S. Alliances in Northeast Asia

By Jason Show

To solidify its military alliances with Japan and South Korea over the next 10 to 20 years, the United States will need to pursue policies that allow it to balance this effort while maintaining flexibility to nurture the emerging economic relationship with China, currently the U.S.'s second largest trading partner and economic engine for the region. Such policies would allow the U.S. to better respond to the unique and ever-changing security, economic, and cultural dynamics of Northeast Asia, and maximize U.S. security interests and economic growth. To this end, I believe there are five specific areas U.S. policy should focus on: energy cooperation, economic development, Korean reconciliation, regional security, and cultural awareness. This essay will briefly examine each of these areas and suggest measures for each.

Energy Cooperation

China's rapid development has attracted worldwide attention. One consequence of this unprecedented growth has been a scarcity of energy resources to support such a large population. This reality is now driving China's foreign policy. In fact, the future of Northeast Asia is being shaped by energy security and economics since the industrialized economies of Japan and South Korea are also major importers of energy. However, it is China with its 1.3 billion people and economic growth hovering near 9 percent annually that has the world, and specifically Washington, waiting to see how it will meet its energy requirements. Meanwhile, Chinese officials harbor their own insecurities over U.S. policies to block Chinese purchases of natural resources.

It is precisely because China and the U.S. are both great oil consumers that there are grounds for energy cooperation. Viewing China as an energy partner instead of a competitor would give both nations an opportunity for energy cooperation. Cooperative efforts could take the form of a U.S.-China led consortium of energy partners, including Japan and South Korea, which could include North Korea at a later date. Working with Russia, a strategic energy supplier, the consortium could promote exploration of Russian energy deposits and work to develop mutually beneficial market strategies. The building of new regional mechanisms to promote and protect these strategic energy interests would also likely influence both economic and security cooperation across Northeast Asia. The U.S., fully understanding its influence as global hegemon, should foster a regional energy forum in Northeast Asia conducive to this goal.

Economic Development

China's economic development has had a tremendous positive impact on Northeast Asia. South Korea has been one of the greatest benefactors of China's meteoric economic rise, topping $200 billion in trade for the first time in 2004, driven largely by double-digit growth in exports to China. In fact, in 2003, South Korean trade with China outpaced its trade with the U.S. for the first time and saw China emerge as South Korea's largest trading partner. China is also the top destination for South Korean investment capital, and through mutual investments of about $45 billion, China and South Korea have given each other a strong stake in each other's economic

growth. Therefore, a second way to cement the U.S.-ROK alliance would entail continued U.S. support for China's, and in turn South Korea's economic growth.

U.S. support for Chinese economic growth is not entirely altruistic though. In spite of South Korea's growing relationships with China, the U.S. has been the primary beneficiary of China's growing market. With bilateral trade between China and the U.S. totaling over $180 billion in 2003 and over $230 billion in 2004, China has become the U.S.'s second largest trading partner while the U.S. is China's largest. This optimal economic relationship is not lost on Beijing or Washington and plays a vital role in policy decisions by both countries. It is imperative then that U.S. policies allow the flexibility to maintain the positive dynamics between the U.S. economic relationship with China and U.S. military alliances with South Korea and Japan.

Inter-Korean Reconciliation

The U.S. response to South Korea's strategy for inter-Korean reconciliation presents a third opportunity to solidify alliances in Northeast Asia. Presently, South Korea has a three-phase strategy designed to extend over several years in order to allow a smooth transition to a unified peninsula. The first stage consists of cooperation between the North and South, with expansion of trade as well as communication between each country. The next stage is the establishment of a Korean Commonwealth, and then complete reunification. By promoting regional linkages such as telecommunications, railways, roads, and other infrastructure, the U.S. will foster DMZ-crossing and inter-Korean trade, the first steps in South Korea's strategy for reunification and stability for the entire Northeast Asian region.

Regional Security

Most important to all powers in Northeast Asia and the U.S. is regional security. While the security dynamics of both the China-Taiwan and China-Japan relationships are important, the primary security threat for the U.S. in Northeast Asia is North Korean nuclear capabilities, and thus serves as the focus for my discussion.

There are two common denominators regarding the North Korean nuclear issue for all states in Northeast Asia. The first is a desire for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, which would pave the way for peace, stability, and continued economic growth. The second is an admonition that if negotiations are to proceed successfully toward the North's nuclear disarmament, the U.S. will need to show flexibility in its demands. To this end, one step the U.S. could take to pursue a settlement would entail the expansion of the six-party mechanism into a permanent Northeast Asian security forum. Such a forum would cement existing U.S. alliances as well as bring North Korea into the international arena by giving it a stake in the resolution of regional security issues. Including Pyongyang in a Northeast Asia security arrangement would also assuage one of the North's primary fears: U.S. aggression.

Exchange Programs

A fifth opportunity to ensure the viability of U.S. alliances and relationships in Northeast Asia entails the promotion of exchange programs with countries in the region. These might include military officers, teachers, students, or private sector professionals. The program would also benefit from an exchange of emergency response personnel given the opportunity for improvement China and North Korea have exhibited in this field. These individuals would share important knowledge, but more importantly, would bring an understanding of Northeast Asian cultures back to the U.S., which is largely ignorant of Northeast Asian history and culture due to its Euro-centric perspective. Concrete steps to begin this program would include the establishment of federal grants to fund exchanges and an intensive advertising campaign within the U.S. to generate awareness.

Conclusion

To cement its military alliances in Northeast Asia while simultaneously fostering its economic relationships in the region, the U.S. will need to adopt a set of policies flexible enough to adapt to the ever-changing inter-nation dynamics of the region. The ability of these policies to positively influence the pursuit of the region's shared goals of energy security, economic prosperity, Korean reunification and regional stability, while fostering cultural awareness through cultural exchange programs, will determine the extent to which U.S. alliances in the region are cemented and investors in the region prosper over the next 10 to 20 years.

Domestic Politics and the Push and Pull of U.S. and Northeast Asia Alliances

By Corrine Thompson

The U.S. relationship with Northeast Asia has grown steadily stronger since Sept. 11. Following the terroist attacks, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro pledged support and commitment to "defeat terrorism," marking a defining moment in the U.S.-Japan alliance. Of all U.S. allies, South Korea has the second largest contingent of troops stationed in Iraq. However, in November of 2005 at the summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Busan, South Korea, thousands of protestors gathered shouting "No to Bush." In Tokyo in March of 2005, more than 4,500 people marched during Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's visit. While the protestors may represent small minorities, they are the most visible and vocal examples of domestic sentiment toward the United States. The greatest menace to the U.S. alliances is not the alliances, but events and disputes that sway public opinion. Public opinion and its influence on domestic politics represent the paramount threat to the U.S.-Northeast Asia alliances.

One dispute is the result of simple economics. Increasing economic integration between the U.S. and Northeast Asia has been a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, the likelihood of open conflict between countries dependent on each other for continued economic growth is slim. Economically, Northeast Asia and the U.S. remain interdependent. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, from January to November of 2005, Japan imported $50.5 billion worth of goods from the U.S., accounting for over 6 percent of total U.S. exports. The U.S. imported over $126 billion worth of goods from Japan, accounting for over 8 percent of total U.S. imports. South Korea is the seventh largest importer and exporter for the U.S., providing 3 percent of total U.S. imports and 2.6 percent of exports. China is the second largest importer to the U.S., accounting for 14.6 percent of U.S. imports and 4.6 percent of exports[1]. This level of economic integration discourages the deterioration of relations.

On the other hand, tensions exist beneath the surface that have the potential to disrupt alliances. The U.S. has long been suspicious of its Asian partners and while that suspicion may be misplaced, the U.S. should be concerned. Years of persistent trade surpluses with the U.S. have allowed the governments of Northeast Asia to become the largest holders of U.S. dollars. The U.S. Treasury estimates that in 2004, Japan held $712 billion in reserves while China held $193 billion and South Korea held $69 billion[2]. Furthermore, with increased economic integration comes increased opportunity for conflict. Disputes brought before the World Trade Organization are numerous and signal a need for all parties to assess their "fair trade" policies. Japan and the U.S. have been involved in eight different disputes with each other as either complainants or respondents[3]. The WTO has been a somewhat effective forum for dispute

[1] U.S. Census Bureau. Top Trading Partners- Total Trade Exports Imports. 12 Jan. 2006. 1 Feb. 2006. <http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top0511.html>.

[2] Valderrama, Diego. What if Foreign Governments Diversify Their Reserves. 29 Jul. 2005. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. 1 Feb. 2006. <http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2005/el2005-17.html#subhead1>.

[3] World Trade Organization. Disputes by Country. 2005. 1 Feb. 2006. <http://www.wto.org/english/

resolution between Northeast Asia and the U.S. When bilateral negotiations fail, the U.S should continue to utilize the WTO's dispute settlement procedures.

Another contentious issue negatively affecting public opinion in Japan and South Korea is the U.S. troop presence. Some 37,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Japan and over 20,000 are stationed in South Korea. Protests erupted in 1995 when three U.S. servicemen raped a young Japanese schoolgirl. Following the 1995 incident and increasing domestic pressure within Japan, negotiations began to move the Futenma base on Okinawa. These types of incidents do not just occur in Japan. In 2002, Shim Mi-Sum and Shin Hyo-son, both in their early teens, were run over and killed by two U.S. soldiers in South Korea.

With such a significant number of troops on Japanese and Korean soil, it is likely that other incidents will strain the relationship between the U.S. and Korea and Japan. To avoid conflict, it is imperative that procedures and lines of communication remain open to address incidents as they arise. In response to the Okinawa base dispute, Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless stated, "The U.S. side, taking into consideration the importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance... has accepted the most recent Japan Defense Agency proposal and plan."[4] This statement reflects the sentiment necessary to maintaining and strengthening Northeast Asian and U.S. alliances: compromise.

The future looks hopeful for alliances between Northeast Asia and the U.S. However, the U.S. needs to address four issues to maintain the viability of its alliances. First, Americans have a future-oriented culture and the study of history has become increasingly absent from the U.S. school curriculum. Today's generation is woefully ignorant not only of world history, but U.S. history, too. This will not serve us well in maintaining viable alliances in Asia (and elsewhere). To lack an understanding of history is to lack comprehension of events and where we are going and why. Whole-scale reform and realignment of priorities within the U.S. education system are a long way off. However, the U.S. military could incorporate more cultural and historical training into its programs, in particular for soldiers stationed abroad.

Second, due to the detrimental economic and political ramifications, it is unlikely Japan, South Korea or China will begin a campaign to dump their dollars. However the U.S. needs to be aware that these countries are financing America's debt and as such are in precarious positions. As they accumulate more dollars, they become increasingly sensitive to issues related to the dollar, including appreciation and depreciation. At the same time, the U.S. becomes increasingly indebted and susceptible to economic policies in Asia. Large trade imbalances affect the long-term health of an economy.

The majority of U.S. citizens are somewhat financially irresponsible: low savings rates, high debt, and massive spending. It is doubtful this will change without a dramatic event or crisis, especially when their government operates in the same way. Although all parties could do much to improve their economic relations, the U.S. government can start by putting its own house in order. That requires balancing the budget and addressing the large trade imbalances.

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tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm>.

[4] "U.S. agrees Okinawa air base move." BBC News 26 Oct. 2005. 1 Feb. 2006. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4377350.stm>.

Third, conflict and disputes are inevitable. With the interconnected nature of today's world, communication is essential to prevent and resolve disputes quickly and fairly, before domestic sentiment is negatively affected. For example, dispute resolution between the U.S. and Japan was recently illustrated when a U.S. sailor, based on the *USS Kitty Hawk* aircraft carrier was implicated in the death of Sato Yoshie. The U.S. Navy handed the sailor over to Japanese officials and pledged to continue to cooperate. This is drastically different from the 1995 incident. Establishing clear and direct lines of communication with specific contacts within the Japanese, Korean, and U.S. governments and security sectors will help defuse and resolve conflict. It is not only how countries manage conflict between them that ensures viable alliances, but also the steps they take to prevent disputes.

Finally, the U.S. and Northeast Asia are working together to address issues of mutual concern. The North Korean nuclear crisis is one of the greatest threats to international security. As a result, its resolution is high on the agenda for Northeast Asia and the U.S. This is one reason why the U.S. must be cautious of what it asks of its allies. The building of strong relations within Asia to address the crisis is of paramount concern. U.S. actions can affect power dynamics and differentials within Asia. For example, while efforts to support Japan's increasing role in international security benefit relations between the U.S. and Japan, Japanese relations with South Korea, North Korea, and China are strained by an increasingly prominent Japan. Mutual suspicions between and among the U.S. and the countries of Northeast Asia remain. To ensure stability in the region, and any progress in the Six-Party Talks, China, Japan, and South Korea must be able to cooperate.

The Future of U.S. Alliances in Northeast Asia

By Ana Villavicencio

Security alliances will continue to be indispensable for Northeast Asia as the region attempts to cope with certain security issues, such as cross-Strait relations and North Korea's nuclear proliferation. Since alliances are the result of shared concerns, fears, and threats among nations, their continued existence seems guaranteed; they will not play the same role as that of the Cold War, however. Today, alliances face challenges that must be overcome to develop stronger security relations in the next 10-20 years. In particular, lack of trust and poor understanding of domestic issues and cultural factors have created ripples in relations between these countries and have undermined their alliances.

Relations between the U.S. and Northeast Asia are growing because of shared economic interests. Indeed economic ties between them have become stronger in recent years. U.S.-China economic relations are a clear example. These two countries' agreements are based on trade interests, despite historical and political issues. Ideological differences gave way as the Cold War came to an end and these two nations realized they shared similar economic interests. Although it is unlikely that the U.S. and China will form a security alliance, trade and investment will force these two nations into closer relations. This improvement of relations will also likely help stabilize relations with other countries in the region.

Recent developments between the U.S. and Korea also show movement toward stronger relations based on economics. The U.S. and Korea have initiated talks on a free-trade agreement. These steps will benefit both countries by increasing foreign investment and trade opportunities as well as strengthening bilateral relations.

While economic relations are improving, stronger economic ties will not necessarily translate into flourishing security alliances. To strengthen alliances among the U.S. and Northeast Asia, all countries have to face and overcome their mutual lack of trust. This distrust is evident in the reaction to Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and in Japan's depiction of history in school textbooks. As China becomes more offended by Koizumi's visits and Korea grows increasingly irritated by Japan's portrayal of history in its educational system, active diplomacy is needed to fix deteriorating relations.

Even though these issues do not affect U.S. alliances with Japan or Korea directly, they do have an indirect impact. As tensions grow between Japan, Korea, and China, both China and Korea will start to question U.S. intentions and they will put pressure on U.S.- Japan relations. China and Korea are questioning not only Japan's policies but also U.S. policies and its role in the region. For Japan's best interests, Koizumi needs to stop visiting the shrine, for the well-being of Japan's relations with China, Korea, and the U.S.

The U.S. diplomatic role should be neutral when it comes to regional diplomatic conflicts such as Yasukini visits and the textbook battle. Although these issues may jeopardize U.S. relations in Northeast Asia, it is better for the U.S. to remain impartial and indicate its willingness to work and maintain relationships with Japan, China, and Korea in spite of their differences.

The second challenge alliances face is a lack of information and understanding about allies' culture and domestic concerns. South Korea is experiencing a wave of anti- U.S., anti-globalization, and anti-free market economy protests. These protests are having an impact on U.S.-Korea relations and could jeopardize the U.S.-ROK alliance if they are not dealt with quickly and carefully. In addition, the U.S. should try to improve its image abroad. One way to do this is through cultural exchanges and by holding and hosting university-level seminars in both countries promoting the benefits of U.S. relations with Korea and trying to increase information about issues that concern both societies, including the importance of having a security alliance to deal with North Korea's nuclear threat and the benefits of other types of bilateral and multilateral agreements in the region.

Cultural exchanges can also improve the two societies' knowledge about and understanding of the importance of U.S.-Korea relations. By developing a better understanding of each other's cultures using a bottom up approach, people in both counties will begin to support foreign policies that aim at improving bilateral relations, which will lead to a stronger security alliance. This same approach should be applied in U.S. relations with other nations in the region.

Current alliances will continue. Economic ties will strengthen relations between the U.S. and nations of the region but security alliances might not remain as important or grow stronger, especially if there continues to be a lack of trust and a lack of understanding about allies. Traditional alliances will not disappear in the foreseeable future; however, they will likely not play as essential a role in the international arena, perhaps with the exception of North Korea's nuclear issue and Taiwan's search for independence.

Asia-Pacific Alliances and Rivalries in the 21st Century: Reemergence or Reformation of the Old Game?

By Qinghong Wang

Political realists believe that there are neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies but permanent interests. This principle was evident in the Asia-Pacific geopolitical landscape during the past 100 years. During the 20th century, most of the region's major powers experienced dramatic changes in their alliances and rivalries. For instance, during World War II (1941-1945), China was the main ally of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific theater, while Japan was its number one foe. But China and Japan reversed their roles not long after the end of the war. And the U.S.-ROK alliance and U.S.-Japan alliance, which replaced the U.S.-China alliance, combined to provide the foundation of Washington's Asia-Pacific security strategy after the start of the Korean War in 1950. Meanwhile, China joined the Korean War as an ally of the Soviet Union and the DPRK, fighting against the U.S., the ROK, and other UN troops. This Soviet-China alliance lasted only for about a decade, after which China surprisingly joined the U.S. to counter their mutual foe – the Soviets – an alignment that continued from President Nixon's trip in 1972 to the Tiananmen Incident in 1989.

The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s and the rapid globalization that followed have fundamentally changed international relations in the Asia-Pacific. In the 21st century, will the region's major powers continue to play the same alliance game of the 20th century? I doubt those old games can be played today. And I believe all of the alliances and rivalries in the Asia-Pacific from the last century should and will be transformed into a new mechanism. Globalization has gradually eroded the traditional boundaries of nation-states, resulting in the intertwining of the interests of different nations. Newly emerged nontraditional security issues – such as terrorism, avian flu, global-warming, and HIV/AIDS – have become threats for all humankind in the 21st century, against which all peoples and governments should ally. But there is a "temporal lag" between this reality and the perception of policy-makers. As such, many policy-makers in the Asia-Pacific are struggling with chosing between playing the old game and keeping pace with the new era. Their decisions will decide the efficiency and costs of the transformation in this region. An examination of the major contemporary alliances and rivalries in the Asia-Pacific offers clues as to how they will evolve and provide policy-makers with ideas for constructive solutions.

U.S.-Asia-Pacific alliance vs. Shanghai Cooperation Organization

With the end of the Cold War, the rise of China and India during the final two decades of the 20th century, and the challenges of the war on terrorism after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. has shifted its strategic focus from the Europe-Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific. To both maintain stability and order and to face the new challenges in the region, Washington is trying to establish a new security mechanism in the Asia-Pacific based on the consolidation of two of its long-time alliances: the U.S.-Japan alliance and the U.S.-ROK alliance. Some Chinese policy-makers believe the U.S. just wants to create a Pacific version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to fill the power vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and contain the emergence of China. Should anything happen across the Taiwan Strait and there was

an Asian version of NATO, Chinese strategists fear that they will be put into a predicament similar to that of the Russians during the NATO invasion of Yugoslavia in 1998. Meanwhile, in order to focus on battling terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan and to ensure regional stability, China initiated a continental alliance in 1996 with Russia, and four other Central Asia Countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan[1], which was officially named the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001. In the eyes of some U.S. policy-makers, China has invented the Asian version of the Warsaw Pact to challenge U.S. predominance in the Asia-Pacific.

The idea of pitting the U.S.-Asia-Pacific alliance against the Shanghai Cooperation Organization fits into the traditional geopolitical theory of Halford Mackinder, which emphasizes the contest between maritime power and continental power. However, Mackinder's 20th century theory is unable to address the possibility of cooperation between the maritime and continental powers of the 21st century. In fact, the U.S.-Asia-Pacific alliance shares many common interests with the SCO, especially in terms of fighting terrorism, which provides a solid foundation for them to support each other. If both sides have the vision and handle relations wisely, it will be a win-win game, instead of a zero-sum game.

U.S.-ROK alliance vs. the U.S.-Japan alliance

Legacies of the Cold War[2], the U.S.-Japan alliance and U.S.-ROK alliance are still relied on by Washington to defend and secure U.S. security and strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific in the post-Cold War era. However, due to different perceptions of national priorities between Seoul and Tokyo, the ROK and Japan have different attitudes and strategies toward their alliances with the U.S. Unification with North Korea is the priority for South Korea. As such, Seoul is trying to reduce, if not eliminate, the influence of Washington. This done, it will be able to directly negotiate unification with Pyongyang. But Japan's pre-eminent national interest is believed to be a restoration of a "normal" nation under the current Japanese leadership. So Tokyo looks at Washington's intention of promoting the U.S.-Japan alliance as a precious opportunity to develop Japan's military capacity and political influence in the world. Furthermore, Seoul's hatred of Japan's colonial history (1895-1945) and territorial disputes between the ROK and Japan have put Washington in an awkward position. Obviously, if ROK-Japan relations cannot be significantly improved, it will be impossible for Washington to strengthen its relationship with both Seoul and Tokyo and to establish a trilateral virtual alliance. Actually, the upgrade of the U.S.-Japan defense treaty in February 2005 has pushed the ROK closer toward China, which shares the ROK's anger at the attitude Japan's leaders have adopted toward their military history. Finally, their differing positions on the Taiwan issue also make Seoul and Tokyo approach their alliances with Washington differently. Seoul implicitly expressed its unwillingness to involve itself in a confrontation with Beijing over the Taiwan Strait because of its alliance with Washington, while Tokyo clearly supports Washington by taking a position in favor of the

[1] Uzbekistan officially joined the SCO in 2001. Mongolia received observer status in 2004. And Pakistan, India, and Iran received observer in 2005.

[2] The Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea was signed Oct. 1, 1953 and entered into force Nov. 17, 1954. The Mutual Security Treaty between the U.S. and Japan was signed Sept. 8, 1951. The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed by the U.S. and Japan March 8, 1954 and entered into force May 1, 1954.

"peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait", as noted in the Security Consultative Committee statement in 2005.

As the leader of the allies against Japanese militarism during WWII, the U.S. should play a more active role to help China, Japan, and South Korea solve their historical issues and territorial disputes. The wrong attitudes of Japanese politicians and rightwingers toward the history of WWII not only worsen nationalism in Northeast Asia, but also damage and will eventually destroy the foundations of the U.S.-ROK alliance and the U.S.-Japan alliance.

U.S.-ROK alliance vs. China-DPRK alliance

Although the U.S.-ROK alliance and the China-DPRK alliance have been effective for more than 50 years since the truce in the Korean War in 1953[3], the relationship among the four parties has undergone great changes since the end of the Cold War. The balance of power on the peninsula greatly favors South Korea in the post-Cold War era, so Seoul has adopted the "Sunshine" policy to politically and economically engage with Pyongyang for the preservation of stability that they hope will lead to peaceful unification with North Korea. The North's international isolation and the failure of economic planning after the collapse of the Soviet Union pushed the DPRK to seek and accept economic aid from the ROK and the international community. The engagement of South Korea and North Korea peaked at the North-South Summit on June 15, 2000, but the friendly atmosphere was over-shadowed by the hardline policy of the Bush administration, which counted North Korea as a member of the "axis of evil," along with Iran and Iraq, in January 2002. Nationalism in South Korea built up by the North-South engagement quickly enflamed anti-U.S. sentiment in Korea. This sentiment was further strengthened by the misdeeds of U.S. troops in South Korea, such as the deaths of two Korean teenage girls due to the negligence of U.S. soldiers in June 2002. Washington's decision to cut U.S. troops in South Korea from 37,000 to 25,000 by 2008 could be interpreted as mere coincidence or a sign of the downsizing of the U.S.-ROK alliance.

Meanwhile, China became the biggest winner of the post-Cold War game on the Korean Peninsula. On one hand, China has successfully developed its once tarnished traditional alliance with the DPRK (due to the diplomatic normalization between Beijing and Seoul in 1992) by providing large amounts of economic aid to Pyongyang. At the same time, China dramatically strengthened its relationship with both the ROK and the U.S. in all fields. While Washington cautiously changed Beijing from being a "strategic competitor" to a "responsible stakeholder," Seoul has enjoyed economic integration and cultural identification with Beijing from Confucianism to Korean TV dramas. The strong connections connoted by these alliances along with its breathtaking economic growth, have combined to establish China as a core player in regional security and development. China's role in the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear crisis makes clear its importance in the region's affairs.

[3] The China-DPRK Agreement on Economic and Cultural Cooperation was signed Nov. 23, 1953, and became effective Dec. 9, 1953. The China-DPRK Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was signed July 11, 1961, and became effective Sept. 10, 1986.

The multilateral security mechanism derived from the Six-Party Talks might evolve into the Asian-Pacific version of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which could lessen the impermeability of alliance politics and promote preventive diplomacy. This multilateral security mechanism could coexist and dynamically interact with both the U.S.-Asia-Pacific alliance and the SCO. However, all blueprints for the Asia-Pacific security system have the same precondition – the peaceful transformation of North Korea. Kim Jong-Il's January 2005 tour through south China, following a route similar to that taken by Deng Xiaoping in 1992, might well be a harbinger of future stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific.

Fostering Northeast Asia and United States Alliances

By Stephanie Young

A stable, democratic, and progressive Northeast Asia is in the best interest of both the United States and the region. To ensure the viability of strong alliances between Northeast Asia and the U.S., all parties must focus on three points; cultural awareness, military sensibility, and economic partnerships. Success in all three arenas is dependent upon domestic and international policies that embrace an attitude of mutual respect and the goal of an improved quality of life.

Many Americans know little about Asian culture. Few have traveled within the region because of language barriers and/or a lack of genuine interest. But important cultural idiosyncrasies are illuminated when translation is no longer necessary. In the past the U.S. has lacked Asian linguists to help the governments communicate effectively. Fortunately, this is beginning to change: "Between 1998 and 2002, the Modern Language Association reports student enrollment in Chinese jumped 20 percent, to about 34,000 students. Studying in China is also on the rise, up 90 percent, to 5,000 students, between 2003 and 2004, according to the Institute of International Education."[1] This interest is most likely brought on by the desire in the U.S. to tap China's economic growth, but it should bode well for Northeast Asian alliances with the U.S.

Currently many Asians have a "love to hate us, hate to love us" idea of the U.S. and its culture. Much of their popular culture is influenced by Western culture, but has its own distinct flavor. With economic growth comes an opportunity to develop a modern lifestyle that is characteristic to a particular people. Many Asian countries, such as South Korea, now have an industrialized economy. This allows them to adopt a global perspective through education, travel, and communication. Nurturing this evolution will positively influence the alliance system. The alliance system is currently buoyed by mutual aid efforts as the U.S. and Northeast Asia support each other during times of need. South Korea has donated over $30 million worth of aid to the victims of Hurricane Katrina, while the U.S. is helping to coordinate aid to help prepare Northeast Asian countries to deal with pandemic diseases such as SARS and avian flu. This reciprocal aid is vital to our friendship as people and as governments.

Alliances between the U.S. and Northeast Asia are respectful and strong. Japan and South Korea have pledged support through aid programs and/or through allocation of troops to the war on terror. U.S. military strategy and troop alignment around the globe is in a state of flux. As such, Northeast Asia will be given more responsibility to take care of their own problems. The U.S. military will be more of a "guest' on foreign soil rather than a constant resident. U.S. military leaders are aware of this change in dynamics and are acting accordingly. Recently Lt. Gen. Bruce Wright, commander of U.S. Forces in Japan, formally apologized for the wrong-doing of a U.S. sailor. The apology has been well received by Japanese military counterparts despite the brutality of the sailor's act. Both parties must understand the boundaries and responsibilities – the *quid pro quo*s – of their relationship.

[1] "Language is China's Hottest Export," The Star Press, 01 Feb 05

The alliances between Northeast Asia and the US also promote freedom and democracy around the world. South Korea is the third largest supporter of the war on terror in Iraq with over 3,300 troops on the ground supporting humanitarian and infrastructure efforts. Supporting this global effort against terrorism is one of the ways in which the alliance is being strengthened internationally, but weakened domestically. Many South Koreans disagree with the war in Iraq, and disapprove of the South Korean government dispatching troops to the cause. This dispute will continue to be a pressure point as the regional powers find a new equilibrium. China continues to rise as a major player in the region; as such, nations around China will have to pick and choose their connections with more care. The United States must appreciate this and establish an equal rapport with each of the Northeast Asian countries.

Security in this region revolves around many issues, but a key concern is nuclear proliferation. North Korea is researching ways to create nuclear weapons, and may possibly have enough weapon-grade plutonium to make one or two bombs. Lack of trust continues to be a stumbling block to negotiations between the six nations. The Bush administration has alienated itself by labeling North Korea as part of the "axis of evil" in January 2002. This kind of rhetoric will not produce a secure environment for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to stop its weapons program. Kim Jong-il's domestic policies are detrimental to most Koreans yet it is not the U.S.'s right, even as a global power, to change another country's government. Once the U.S. government understands that many countries hope to enjoy the same security that we do, perhaps our government will take the appropriate steps to make progress in this critical issue. North Korea will continue with its weapons program until Kim Jong-il and his government feels it is in their best interest to stop the development of nuclear arms. Even though North Korea agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons program, the Six-Party Talks have stalled and the DPRK government recently demanded that "Washington end its 'foolish dream' of toppling its leadership by pressure."[2] North Korea hopes that the U.S. will end its sanctions against Banco Delta Asia, a bank in China that North Korea allegedly uses for money laundering.

To make progress on the proliferation issue requires the continuance of the Six-Party Talks that involve China, Russia, Japan, the U.S., North and South Korea. South Korea plays a very important role in the talks and hopes to guide North Korea away from developing more nuclear material. Due to the countries' ethnic ties, they understand culturally and historically the people to the north better than the rest of the world. South Korea has made it clear that they will not try to oust the North Korean government militarily. South Koreans would rather lift the sanctions imposed on North Korea by the U.S. and entice the North Koreans by helping them become more democratic and developed. This strategy appears to be working; Kim Jong-il recently visited Shenzhen and Guangzhou, two of the fastest growing cities in China, to learn from his neighbors. Economic growth in North Korea will no doubt temper the need for security through nuclear weapons.

In order for the Northeast Asia region to develop economically, both the U.S. and regional powers must continue to create an environment in which economic activities can continue. Embargoes, taxes, and duties should be kept at a minimum to entice communist countries to become more capitalistic. Lifting economic regulations will also deregulate other aspects of life within the communist counties. This has already started in parts of China, where

[2] "U.S. Urges Asia Action To Hold N. Korean Counterfeiting," Swiss Info/Reuters 25 Jan. 06.

they are realizing the human spirit has a desire to improve and succeed when given the freedom and ability to do so. Much of Northeast Asia has thriving economies. Japan and South Korea have come a long way in a short amount of time, but their economies still have some "cultural tie-downs" which can restrain growth and development. Japanese and Korean people have been known to "save face" rather than be honest when it comes to business affairs. This "politeness" is foreign to the U.S. business sector. In this atmosphere, both sides must become more culturally aware of each other to be more efficient and productive.

The political and economic environments in Northeast Asia are changing with or without U.S. involvement. To maintain and strengthen alliances the U.S. must embrace and cultivate this change. Improving cultural awareness will bring about a higher level of understanding. This improved understanding will allow Northeast Asian countries and the U.S. to become better military and economic partners. This partnership will be based on mutual respect and a shared dream of an improved quality of life.

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South Korea in U.S.-Japan Relations: Key Partner or Third Wheel?

By Celeste Arrington

Japan's National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) of 2004 reaffirmed the indispensability of its security alliance with the United States and signaled Japanese efforts to carve a more proactive niche for the nation in international affairs. However, South Korea was conspicuously absent from the NDPG. This omission reveals underlying problems in Japanese and U.S. ties with South Korea that should be of utmost concern, considering their regional importance.[1] For its part, Seoul bridled at Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro's fifth visit to Yasukuni Shrine in October 2005, and diplomacy between Tokyo and Seoul continues to be frigid.[2] As Assistant Secretary Christopher Hill noted in House testimony, "In addition to being key alliance partners of the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea are key partners in the six-party process aimed at resolving the North Korea issue."[3] Is South Korea a key partner for the U.S.-Japan alliance or an awkward third wheel? Specifically, how does Tokyo perceive the ROK within the context of the post-9/11 U.S.-Japan relationship?

The answer to the latter question is unclear. This paper argues that a top priority for Japan in the coming decade should be to formulate an unambiguous vision of how the ROK fits into Tokyo's and Washington's plans for their own alliance and for the region. Doing so will contribute greatly to the U.S.-Japan alliance itself. Admittedly, the U.S. faces its own challenges regarding the ROK, and Seoul needs to consider how it contributes to the difficulty Japan has had in articulating its vision for relations with the ROK. But I only focus on one part of the question of how the U.S.-Japan alliance can "get it right" in Northeast Asia because Japanese ties to the ROK are usually either taken for granted or just overlooked.

The Problem: No Vision

The media has amply covered and arguably exaggerated the significance of recent tensions in both U.S.-ROK relations and Japan-ROK ties. For instance, mounting South Korean protests against the U.S. and ROK involvement in the war in Iraq have been touted as anti-Americanism in the U.S. However the U.S.-ROK relationship is much stronger than appearances suggest. As one conference participant remarked, rather than bowing to popular pressure and fully withdrawing troops, the ROK reduced troop numbers but increased their responsibilities in Iraq. Additionally, Seoul pushed through U.S. troop realignment, a task that the Japanese government has not yet done due to local political difficulties. In light of the key strategic position of Korea, a clear Japanese understanding of the ROK's role in U.S. policies and in Asia is important. Likewise, with the transfer of U.S. military command to Camp Zama in Kanagawa Prefecture and Japan's wider global involvement with U.S. military activities, Tokyo must maintain transparency vis-à-vis Seoul. But mutual misunderstanding abounds.

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[1] See chapter 4 in Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power*, (2001); and Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle*, (1999).
[2] ROK President Roh Moo-hyun cancelled his summit meeting with Koizumi in December 2005; history issues dominated the 20-minute discussion between foreign ministers at the sidelines of APEC meetings in late 2005.
[3] Testimony before the House Sub-Committee on Asia and the Pacific, May 25, 2005.

We are familiar with the dismal state of Japan-ROK relations, outdone perhaps only by Japan-China relations in the region. Signaling the debilitating effects of history, territorial disputes, and mutual misperceptions, diplomacy between Seoul and Tokyo has been tense. The ROK government joined China in opposing Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Seoul also flirted with the notion of being a "balancer" in East Asia, possibly against the U.S.-Japan alliance, thereby upsetting Tokyo. Territorial disputes over Tokdo/Takeshima riled Japan-Korea relations several times in the past few years, as did Japan's history textbooks and Koizumi's troublesome visits to Yasukuni Shrine. Most of these tensions stem from domestic political issues but they are exacerbated by mutual misperceptions.

Though the extent to which these problems have affected routine policy initiatives between the two countries is unclear, these troubles should not be belittled as mere emotionalism on the part of South Koreans. The rhetoric has grown more acrimonious, the mutual recriminations have escalated, and both countries' leaders appear content to cancel summit meetings and capitulate to domestic constituencies: this is worrisome. In the more fluid post-Cold War environment and as perceptions of the North Korea threat diverge, a concrete articulation of shared interests and values on the part of Japan (as well as South Korea) will help both nations weather disagreements and constructively help shape the future of Northeast Asia.

Not a New Problem

Historically, Japan has had difficulty articulating a vision of how to relate to the ROK. Revealing Tokyo's conflicted goals and perceptions of Korea, Japan's postwar policy toward the Korean Peninsula has waffled between the North and the South. Though policymakers have been able to largely overcome a historical rivalry between Japan and South Korea, that rivalry remains latent and occasionally rears its ugly head. Intermittent conflict and Japanese aggression have long overshadowed the centuries of relatively peaceful interactions. Korea became a security concern when Kublai Khan attempted to invade Kyushu in 1274 and again in 1281 from Korea. In the late 19th century, Meiji oligarch Yamagata Aritomo would recall the Mongol invasion as evidence that Korea was a dangerous "dagger pointed at the heart of Japan," that should be contained in a Japanese sphere of influence in Northeast Asia — a concept that came to be known as the "Korea question." Conversely, Koreans saw Japan as a threatening aggressor. Koreans cite Hideyoshi Toyotomi's failed offensives against China via Korea in 1592 and 1598 as the start of Japan's expansionist tendencies. Korean concerns grew as Japan, justified by the "Korea question," fought the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. Japan subsequently established a 35-year colonial rule that left an indelible mark on both Koreas' relations with Japan. Historical memories of Imperial Japan's brutal cultural policies in Korea, its demeaning treatment of comfort women, the forced practice of emperor worship, and other facets of colonization continue to plague modern relations.

In the years after World War II, Tokyo bungled relations with Seoul in: 1) handling the hundreds of thousands of Koreans remaining in Japan, 2) fitting into U.S. foreign policy in Northeast Asia, and 3) formulating a new, peaceful role for itself in regional affairs. Early on, the Japanese authorities feared the socially destabilizing effects of disillusioned resident Koreans. Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru actually called the Koreans living in Japan "insects in the

stomach of a lion with the potential to kill the lion itself if not checked."[4] Seeing Korean residents of Japan fingerprinted until the early 1990s and still facing rampant discrimination, South Korea has good reason to question Tokyo's sincerity when it calls for continued improvement in Japan-ROK relations.

Second, unease with the United States' Cold War policies and distrust of South Korea, led Tokyo to pursue a more pragmatic "two Koreas" approach that angered Seoul. Of course, Tokyo signed the Treaty on Basic Relations in June 1965, providing $800 million of economic assistance in order to help strengthen the ROK's economy vis-à-vis the North's. Then, Tokyo only grudgingly acknowledged that South Korea's security was "essential to Japan's own security" in the 1969 Sato-Nixon Communiqué after the U.S. pledged to return Okinawa.[5] The Japanese government subsequently went to great lengths to "bury the Communiqué as deep as possible" in favor of the more flexible pseudo-"two Koreas" policy.[6] These moves perpetuated deep-seated distrust among Koreans toward Japan. And yet, signaling its insecurity and awareness of the potential strategic implications, Japan vociferously opposed President Carter's proposal to withdraw U.S. ground forces from Korea in 1977. Thus, Japanese interactions with the ROK during the Cold War revealed the contradictions in Japanese objectives and the effects of the distrust this approach created are still evident today.

Third, in the midst of the crumbling communist bloc, South Korean President Roh Dae-woo's *Nordpolitik* of engaging North Korea in conjunction with the 1988 Olympics in Seoul, and the U.S. loosening of restrictions on contact with the DPRK, Japan glimpsed an opportunity to carve a role for itself in the international system. The way Tokyo managed this transition period again illustrates the lack of a clear vision and its implications for relations with Korea. For example, key LDP politician Kanemaru Shin traveled to Pyongyang as part of Tokyo's new focus on bolstering Japanese political influence in Asia.[7] But Kanemaru far exceeded his original plans to secure the release of a captive Japanese ship crew and discuss North Korea's debts to Japanese firms. His over-emotional capitulation to the North angered Seoul and confirmed Korean distrust of Japanese strategic intentions. When the U.S. and Japan agreed on revisions to the Defense Cooperation Guidelines in 1997 to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance and prepare for regional contingencies, the South Korean defense minister proclaimed in October 1997 that, "the ROK will not allow Japanese SDFs to operate in Korea's sovereign territory."[8] Strategic thinking and open discussion about the future role of Japan in the world could have helped avoid such hurdles to regional cooperation.

Since World War II, Japan's vision for how to relate to the ROK has been saddled with contradictions that breed mistrust in South Korea. Much of the frustrations Japan has faced in handling South Korea's distrust stems from domestic political factors on both sides of the Sea of Japan/East Sea. Rather than drive together Japan and Korea as stalwart democracies,

[4] Cha (1999) p. 26; Lee and de Vos, *Koreans in Japan*, (1981).
[5] Armacost and Pyle "Japan and the Unification of Korea: Challenges for U.S. Policy," in Eberstadt, Nicholas and Richard J. Ellings, eds., *Korea's Future and the Great Powers,* (2001), p. 135.
[6] Remarks by Hoshuyama Noboru, National Security Archives and the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, (March 12, 1997) www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/japan/shocks.htm.
[7] Ahn, Byung-joon, "Japanese Policy Toward Korea," in Curtis, ed. *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change*, (1993) pp. 263-273.
[8] *Korea Herald,* October 23, 1997.

democratization in Korea has given rise to anti-Japanese and nationalist sentiment that stems in part from Japan's contradictory Cold War relations with the two Koreas. And Japan has faced greater domestic pressures to assert itself internationally since the embarrassing early 1990s. Articulating a vision for Japan's relationship with the ROK will help minimize the security consequences of such domestic political adjustments.

A Vision to Minimize the Effects of Domestic Politics

The Japanese government needs to clarify its vision for relations with the ROK and "market" it to Japanese, as well as Koreans. Tough questions will include ways to apologize acceptably, to overcome the bad taste of Koizumi's Yasukuni Shrine visits, and to institutionalize a process of reconciliation. South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon declared in late 2005 that, "it is not an exaggeration to call the Shrine visits the most critical factor in strained South Korea-Japan relations." The editorial discussions that began late in 2005 signal minute progress in opening honest domestic Japanese debate over how to repair relations with the ROK and China. Territorial disputes, economic tensions, and textbook issues may appear frustrating now but Japan's history of ambiguous feelings about South Korea looms as a larger hurdle. Does Japan consider South Korea a "strategic liability" akin to Taiwan? Overcoming that legacy will require open discussions about national defense strategies that are usually closely guarded. Close coordination with the United States throughout this process will also be key.

In discussions about the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance, many see shared values rather than shared threats as additional glue for relations. The same cannot be said for Japan-ROK relations. Japan and South Korea perceive the North Korea and China threats differently, despite both being committed democracies. Divergent values appear most starkly in both nations' relations with the DPRK. For example, South Korea abstained from the United Nations resolution criticizing North Korea's human rights record in December 2005, while Japan was a co-sponsor of the resolution.

Even if threat-based and values-based approaches fail due to a long history of distrust and changing domestic politics in both countries, South Korea and Japan have numerous shared interests and issues that could become bases for a public relations campaign aimed at rehabilitating bilateral relations. For instance, publicizing joint working groups on the future of the Internet and cyber-security would foster a common sense of purpose. Likewise, cooperating on efforts to deal with issues related to U.S. bases in their countries – revising the SOFA, prosecuting crimes committed by U.S. servicemen, etc. – would emphasize shared challenges. As such, the process of articulating a vision for Japan's interactions with the ROK will be challenging and require committed leadership.

Though this discussion has focused on just one piece of how the U.S.-Japan alliance can "get it right" in East Asia, it highlights the importance of getting citizens on board each part of the puzzle of regional relations. In the near term, the ability of Washington and Tokyo to coordinate effectively with Seoul has great implications for the Six-Party Talks. In the longer term, coping with the rise of China depends likewise on a clarification of how Korea fits into Japan's regional security goals. As three democracies, public support for the vision of how to

address these challenges is crucial. Though usually taken for granted or ignored, one pressing challenge confronting Japan with regards to its alliance with the United States is its relationship with South Korea. Devising a vision for the tenor, goals, shape, and extent of Japan-ROK relations will bolster the U.S.-Japan alliance and contribute greatly to peace and security in Northeast Asia.

Strengthening the Economics of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

By R. Ashle Baxter

The U.S.-Japan alliance has always rested upon a combination of mutually beneficial economic and security trade-offs that have helped ensure peace, prosperity, and stability in the East Asian region and across the globe for the past half-century. Although the focus of the alliance has in recent years largely shifted to security matters, the maintenance of strong bilateral economic ties remains a vital binding agent and makes possible costly security efforts on the part of both nations. It is also an important factor in maintaining common regional and global interests. Equally important is the health of the Japanese economy, a vital prerequisite for Japan's regional and global diplomacy, which is in turn a critical component of the alliance.

This paper identifies three challenges for the alliance, examines their economic significance, and concludes with a number of policy considerations for the United States to help maintain a strong relationship with Japan in the future.

Improving Bilateral Trade and Investment Ties

The economic relationship between the U.S. and Japan is of tremendous benefit to both countries and remains a vital part of the alliance. In 2004 bilateral trade totaled $187 billion. The U.S. remains Japan's largest export destination, accounting for 22.7 percent of total exports in 2004, and was Japan's second largest trade partner behind China. Japan is the U.S.'s fourth largest trade partner behind Canada, Mexico, and China. It is also its third largest export market, but only accounts for 6.7 percent of total exports. Given this small figure and the fact that U.S. had a $78 billion trade deficit with Japan in 2004, there remains room for improvement in the trade relationship.[1]

Inward FDI to Japan has grown significantly in recent years, however at 2.1 percent of GDP Japan's stock of inward FDI still falls far below the G-7 average of 20.6 percent.[2] Investment from the U.S. has mirrored this overall FDI growth, but a number of barriers remain, especially in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Eventual removal of these barriers will greatly benefit both the U.S., which stands to gain from increased investment opportunity, and Japan, which can gain access to new capital, products, management techniques, and technology.

Many of the same factors that hinder closer economic ties with the U.S. have important implications at the regional and global levels as well. By encouraging greater bilateral openness Washington can help create a Japan that is economically more open to the region and the world. This will reinforce the economic base upon which much of Japan's strength rests, benefiting the alliance in the process.

[1] All trade figures are from International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics CD-ROM (November 2005).
[2] UNCTAD *World Investment Report*, 2004.

Establishing Japan's Role

The subject of Japan's role regionally and globally was raised by a number of participants in the conference. Yet, a measure of uncertainty remains as to what the nature of this role should be. Debate continues not only among Japanese policymakers, but also between them and their U.S. counterparts as to the appropriate balance of political, military, and economic diplomacy Japan should pursue. Nevertheless, there is agreement that as China's influence expands in the region and Washington's focus is drawn elsewhere in the world, Japan's role will be of increasing importance to the alliance.

But whatever course Japan plots for its future security and foreign policies, the government will be faced with the question of how to finance this course. Important and long-standing elements of regional diplomacy, such as Japan's Official Development Assistance, have recently come under heightened scrutiny as the government seeks to downsize and more efficiently allocate limited economic resources to more pressing domestic uses. The need to reduce a $6.89 trillion national debt and rein in the deficit spending that has caused it could also put increasing pressure on Japan's defense and security policies.[3]

These trends raise serious concerns about Japan's ability to continue to fulfill its obligations at past levels. Greater economic growth will provide more flexibility to Tokyo in determining its future role as a member of the alliance.

Ensuring Continued Japanese Economic Reform

Under the reform agenda of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro a great deal has been accomplished, helping bring to end a long decade of economic stagnation. The nonperforming loan ratio for major banks in September 2005 was 2.4 percent, down from 8.7 percent in 2002. Nationwide retail sales were up 1.2 percent from the previous year in December 2005. Unemployment fell to 4.2 percent in 2005 from 5.1 percent in 2002, and according to the OECD, output rose at a rate of 2 percent during this same period. [4]

Much remains to be accomplished if Japan is to achieve sustainable economic growth in the coming decades. Japan's long-term potential growth is estimated to be only around 1.5 percent and the OECD strongly recommends continued structural reform as a means of removing obstacles to growth and raising this potential.[5]

This growth is important because it is the foundation for Japan's influence in the world as well as an important element of its alliance with the U.S. The Japanese government is aware of this correlation and has begun mapping out strategies to foster growth by taking advantage of

[3] The FY2006 budget includes cuts in all areas of spending, including a 0.9 percent reduction in defense spending and a 3.4 percent reduction in ODA.
[4] NPL data are from Financial Services Agency. Retail sales data are from *The Economist*, Feb. 28, 2006. Unemployment data is from December 2005 Monthly Labor Force Survey, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Statistics Bureau. Output figure is from OECD Economic Survey of Japan 2005.
[5] Growth figure is from Treasury Department Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa, Middle East, and Asia David Loevinger's testimony before the House Committee on Ways and Means, Sept. 28, 2005.

globalization.[6] But there is no guarantee that these strategies will be adhered to following Prime Minister Koizumi's departure this September. For this reason, Washington should continue its policy of encouraging structural reforms begun under Koizumi.

Policy Considerations for Washington

The three challenges discussed above highlight the importance of the economic aspect of the alliance. What is needed to resolve the problems identified is more robust and open economic ties between the two countries. This will lead to greater openness overall, creating increased potential for both economies to grow and strengthen the alliance in the process.

Bearing this in mind, Washington should consider the following six steps:

- Both countries should pursue deeper economic integration by proposing a comprehensive economic partnership agreement. While necessary political capital and the willingness to expend it on such a difficult and long-term goal may be hard to come by on both sides, simply discussing such an agreement could add much needed momentum to increased openness all around. As suggested by one of the conference participants, given the growing weakness of Japan's highly protected agricultural sector, such an agreement may help break the impasse here as well as in other key sectors.

- Cooperation from Japan in the Doha Development Round of WTO negotiations is essential to ensure its successful completion. Japan's obstinate resistance to tariff reductions on agriculture and insistence on exclusion of a relatively high percentage of sensitive products (along with similar stances from the European Union and others) threatens to derail the talks. Washington should strongly urge Japan to make compromises on these issues, as greater openness would benefit both the alliance and the world economy.

- Washington should continue to work through the subgroups established under the U.S.-Japan Economic Partnership for Growth, especially the Reform and Investment Initiatives, to ensure that reforms are taken to improve competition and enhance Japan's growth potential. According to one conference participant, the Partnership has not been convened in over a year. Because the framework exists and addresses key sectoral and structural reform issues, reviving this process will allow both sides to maximize gains while minimizing additional organizational effort.

- A number of conference participants on both sides voiced dissatisfaction over the debate so far on Japan's role. Some Japanese complained that Washington did not support its efforts to seek a more active global role, while some Americans complained that Japan was never forthcoming with proposals for doing so. More effective communication and coordination is required to solve these problems. Japan must be more vocal about the role it wishes to play, and Washington should be more willing to accept and stand behind Japan's initiatives.

[6] For an elaboration on these strategies see, the Council on Fiscal and Economic Policy's Globalization Working Group Report "Japan: Creating an Influential Nation Without Walls" (April, 2005).

- Both countries should work to ensure the continued relevance of APEC, which includes Japan, the U.S., and China. This will secure Japan's established role in the region while it seeks to modify and adjust this role as necessary. Additionally, it will keep China engaged and encourage it to become a more responsible stakeholder. Lastly, it will help prevent the marginalization of Japan and the exclusion of the U.S. by China through the creation of new regional organizations such as the East Asian Summit.

- One final, noneconomic consideration concerns Japan's status in APEC and the region more broadly. While direct involvement would be both unproductive and undesirable, Washington should discreetly encourage Tokyo to work toward improving its relations with other members of APEC so that it can be more active at the leadership level. It does the alliance little good for one member of the team to be sitting on the bench during an important part of the game.

Avoiding Cold War II: Upgrading the U.S.-Japan Alliance and Bridging Regional Divides

By Leif-Eric Easley

The U.S.-Japan alliance is well known for its Cold War purposes: providing the United States a military foothold in East Asia and facilitating Japan's effective and efficient defense posture. In the post-Cold War era, both sides committed to maintaining the alliance as a cornerstone of regional stability and expanding its constructive role in dealing with regional and global contingencies. A recent statement by the foreign and defense ministers of both countries (the Security Consultative Committee, or SCC) went further by outlining common strategic objectives, including peace on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait, countering WMD and terrorist threats, encouraging China to be a responsible international player, and promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.[1] Realizing the alliance's potential for meeting these objectives requires sustained and coordinated efforts by Japan and the U.S. Means for these ends involve two complementary processes: upgrading U.S.-Japan security cooperation and working to bridge regional divides in East Asia. This essay argues that while developments have been made in the former, greater progress is required in the latter, as both processes are necessary for regional peace and avoiding a second Cold War. Recommendations will be made for U.S. policy and issues for further study will be suggested in light of discussion at the 12th annual Japan-U.S. Security Seminar.

A More Active, Versatile Alliance

Much has been invested in the U.S.-Japan alliance, yielding great strategic benefits for both sides. Further investment promises significant returns, given the breadth of U.S.-Japan shared interests and the advantages of expanded security cooperation. The alliance is capable of doing more than its Cold War deterrence functions, and can rise to the challenges of the current international security environment. These challenges most notably include the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related technologies, the threat of international terrorism, and the uncertainties of global power shifts and military modernization. To realize the potential of U.S.-Japan security cooperation, the alliance is adapting to its new global context, and this means becoming more active and more versatile.

Rather than simply deterring military conflicts by maintaining the strength to counter aggression, today's U.S.-Japan alliance looks to actively shape and improve the security landscape. In other words, instead of primarily providing for stability via a favorable balance of power, the U.S.-Japan alliance intends to engage in "efforts to improve the international security environment, such as participation in international peace cooperation activities."[2] Recent efforts include: support of international activities in Afghanistan and Iraq; cooperation on Ballistic

[1] Joint Statement of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee, Feb. 19, 2005; www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html.

[2] "US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future," U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, Oct. 29, 2005; www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html.

Missile Defense (BMD) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); and assistance to areas affected by the 2004 tsunami and 2005 South Asia earthquake. The alliance has also witnessed various doctrinal advances stemming from the 1997 Revised Guidelines: Japan's National Defense Program Outlines published in 1995 and 2004; new laws passed by the Japanese Diet for security contingencies; the U.S. Global Posture Review; and joint statements by the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on shared objectives, coordinated roles, and complementary capabilities.

These developments notably involve Japan adjusting its security policies to operate as a more equal and involved security partner. But such adjustments are not without controversy in Japanese domestic politics and regional diplomacy. It is thus important for the U.S. to be aware of these difficulties and take concrete steps to support bilateral upgrading of the alliance. The following are recommended for U.S. policy:

- Facilitate Japan's greater international security role by helping Tokyo attain political recognition commensurate with its economic standing and postwar record as a responsible and contributing member of the international community. Washington can keep U.S.-Japan cooperation in the spotlight at high-level meetings and press conferences, and more actively support Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

- Maintain good high-level working relations – the Bush-Koizumi relationship has provided impetus for strengthening security cooperation; it will benefit the alliance if such a close relationship between principles continues between their political successors.

- Coordinate military capabilities by encouraging expedited implementation of the SCC agreements. This includes upgrading military hardware and technologies such as missile defense, but especially the "software" of the alliance concerning interoperability, information sharing, and contingency planning. The U.S. can also support implementation of Japan's new National Defense Program Guidelines by encouraging command-control reform and inter-service cooperation among Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces, Maritime Self-Defense Forces, and Air Self-Defense Forces via enhanced joint training and mutual use of facilities with U.S. Forces Japan.

- Closely consult with Japan regarding changes in the U.S. global security posture and plans for further troop realignments, not just involving U.S. troops based on Japanese soil, but also regional and global realignments that will affect strategic possibilities for U.S.-Japan cooperation.

- Be sensitive to local concerns about military bases. This is mostly a NIMBY (not in my backyard) politics issue for the Japanese government, but Washington should confirm it is allowing room for local consultations while encouraging Tokyo to expend the political capital necessary for good public relations for the alliance. Agreements on modifying the U.S. footprint in Japan need to be quickly modified, if necessary, and implemented without delay. The U.S. can help this process by not publicly appearing heavy-handed on basing issues, and strictly following the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and related

understandings in dealing with incidents and accidents involving U.S. personnel on Japanese soil.

- Be aware of Japan's legal (especially constitutional) concerns regarding upgrading the U.S.-Japan alliance, and coordinate with Japan accordingly in the articulation of roles and missions.

- Show flexibility on Host Nation Support (HNS) and understanding of Japanese budgetary challenges, encouraging mutual use of facilities, close coordination of military capabilities and lower cost U.S. solutions to weapons needs to avoid any future crisis in defense spending.

Regional Community Building

While there has been much process in upgrading the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the way forward, while not easy, is clear and well charted by Japanese and U.S. strategic planners, the process of bridging regional divides in East Asia lags behind, and the way forward remains uncertain. The first step in making the alliance more supportive of regional community building is recognizing this process as essential to peace and stability. If the U.S.-Japan alliance were to strengthen further and as planned, without progress on bridging regional divides, the result could be unnecessary military build-up and a new Cold War.

Deepening economic interdependence among the U.S., Japan and China makes a hot war in the region unlikely, as all sides share the perception that military conflict would have high costs. But while interdependence among these powers might be a source of optimism when compared to the U.S.-Soviet case, the seeds for a Cold War II are evident: territorial disputes, historical rivalries, resource competition, nationalist politics, ideological conflict, regime-type differences, disparities in development, lack of regional integration and institutions to minimize misperception, and so on. The U.S.-Japan alliance thus needs to expand the sphere of U.S.-Japan security cooperation and promote a greater sense of common destiny among the nations of East Asia.

The U.S.-Japan alliance will not be the primary force for regional integration; that is the role of economic incentives and trade. But the alliance should not be against or hamper identity building in East Asia. Rather, the alliance should encourage shared goals and understandings of regional stability. This is possible by enhancing the "attractive power" of the alliance, making other states want to join Japan and the U.S. in security cooperation. The following are recommended for U.S. policy:

- Emphasize the alliance as a mechanism for stipulating policies for the common good in East Asia, its role in reassuring all countries in the region, and its welcoming of multilateral cooperation. Broaden active subscribers to U.S.-Japan "common strategic objectives" and make clear what the alliance is for, rather than letting others assume what it is against.

- Increase multinational training operations and include the participation of China when possible. In particular, regional disaster relief exercises for environmental (e.g., chemical spills) or natural disasters would be useful not only for preparing for future contingencies, but also for building confidence and mil-mil relationships. A medium term goal could be a U.S.-Japan-led rapid reaction force for regional catastrophes.

- Invite representatives from other countries to join a series of U.S.-Japan hosted strategic talks in Tokyo. Use the alliance to help insulate security cooperation from nationalist tendencies by keeping concerned parties talking via multiple channels. In particular, strengthen trilateral U.S.-Japan-ROK coordination so as to increase security dialogue between Tokyo and Seoul.

- Assist Japan in any ways possible with a compromise on the Yasukuni issue. While prime ministerial visits to the shine are arguably a Japanese domestic matter, the regional implications are too costly for the alliance to ignore. If Japan's relations with its neighbors deteriorate, so too will the reassurance capacity of the alliance. Resolution or at least positive developments on the Yasukuni issue are needed to repair Japan's regional image and dispel myths that the U.S. favors Asian rivalries in order to play countries off each other.

- Further consult with Tokyo on how the United States can help Japan take on a constructive leadership role on security issues through the alliance. Possibilities include a greater leadership role for Japan on nonproliferation concerns, providing technical assistance to other countries on export controls, assuming regional leadership of PSI, advancing joint and coordinated explorations of energy sources, and hosting a dialogue on codes of conduct in East Asian waters. For the latter possibility, if Japan is willing, the U.S. could signal Tokyo's flexibility to South Korea on Dokdo/Takeshima and to China on Senkaku/Diaoyu to bring them to the table.

- Encourage the establishment of an antiterrorism regional hub in Japan, where Japanese Self-Defense Forces and administration would host antiterrorism experts from China, Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and elsewhere to jointly monitor and analyze terrorist activity in the region.

- Make joint U.S.-Japan presentations on security issues at regional fora such as ARF and APEC meetings. This will put the U.S. and Japan shoulder to shoulder in advocating dialogue on hard security issues, and also signal the alliance's support for East Asian community building by working with developing regional institutions.

Conclusions and Further Research

The U.S.-Japan alliance came to be based on shared values, mutual interest, and a common vision. This is why the alliance outlasted the Cold War; by the time the Soviet threat dissolved, there was much more to the relationship than shared threat perception. A similar progression, from threat-based to value-based cohesion, now needs to develop among all states of the region. Extending the sphere of U.S.-Japan cooperation will be an important component

of the process. But while strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance alone may contribute to stability, it could be a cold peace in East Asia. To fully realize the alliance's potential to achieve Japanese and U.S. shared strategic objectives, both processes – upgrading the alliance and bridging regional divides – are necessary and require sustained and concerted effort.

At the Japan-U.S. security seminar (admittedly a pro-alliance gathering) these suggestions received broad support. Several additional issues were raised that I found vital for strengthening the alliance and promoting regional community building. I summarize these in four points:

- **Japan's role as an active long-term ally requires more international openness.** Numerous participants at the Japan-U.S. security seminar voiced concerns about Japan's stamina as a U.S. ally because of demographic issues. Japan's aging society will intensify the already serious challenges of funding social security, managing the national debt, and retaining a highly productive labor force. These challenges must be met not only for the welfare of the Japanese, but also for the future of the alliance. As I see it, this calls for greater international openness via trade liberalization and increasing immigration. Conference participants proposed investigating the possibility of a Japan-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and building an economic alliance.

- **Both Japan and the U.S. need to implement "transformational diplomacy."** [3] Conference participants contrasted the bad press received by the U.S. on Iraq and by Japan on Yasukuni to diplomatic inroads achieved by China in Southeast Asia and Africa. While PRC diplomatic efforts are buttressed by the draw of the Chinese economy, participants noted the increased sophistication – in terms of both substance and style – of a new generation of Chinese diplomats. These comments made clear that, in order to facilitate greater international support for U.S.-Japan shared objectives, both governments need to expedite localization of diplomatic missions, enhance foreign service officer training in language, history and culture, and increase public diplomacy employing IT solutions.

- **Broader ally cooperation: from hub and spokes to coalitional network.** Major U.S.-Japan shared interests (counter-terrorism, Middle East political and energy stability, economic development in Africa, etc.) require broader international cooperation. Japanese participants at the conference asked why the United States has not involved Japan in U.S.-EU efforts to deal with Iran's nuclear program. U.S. participants spent more time than expected speaking on India's importance for Asian regional stability. It became clear that both sides need to think more about how to link U.S.-Japan efforts to multilateral cooperation in East Asia and globally. My recommendation is that Japan participate more with other U.S. allies, not just in military training operations, but in diplomatic efforts as well. At the top of this agenda should be channeling Chinese foreign policy in the direction of "responsible stakeholder."[4]

[3] Fact Sheet on Transformational Diplomacy, U.S. Department of State, Jan. 18, 2006; www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/59339.htm.
[4] Robert B. Zoellick (U.S. Deputy Secretary of State), "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?" Sept. 21, 2005; www.state.gov/s/d/rem/53682.htm.

- **Value-informed vision for regional community building.** This paper argues the necessity of bridging regional divides, but it is important that the process of community building not be hollow or value-free. Burma was frequently mentioned at the conference as an obstacle to a more effective ASEAN. The East Asian Summit was criticized as "clutter in the room," a meeting without a purpose, a rudderless institution. Populations become frustrated with political systems and institutions that do not meet their needs and expectations. Lack of progress leads to fundamentalism and anti-Western sentiment, leading to further lack of progress. Robust community building thus needs to include shared values for freedom and individual economic empowerment, and a common vision for regional progress. The Six Party Talks could take the early steps needed to bring North Korea into international society and to demonstrate China's constructive role, but much greater progress is necessary to close the door on a possible second Cold War in Asia.

Reinforcing the U.S.-Japan Alliance through East Asian Regional Leadership

By Jermaine Howard

Japan is moving into a critical phase that will decide its future on the international stage. In the next decade, East Asia will yield challengers for regional leadership. The choice for Japan is to stand down and accept gradual decline of its influence, or step up its efforts to penetrate East Asian financial service sectors and provide political leadership for the region. Japan is not alone in its fight for regional dominance, however, as the United States has a vested interest in seeing that its ally holds onto the political and economic reins of East Asia. Having a weak ally in the Pacific will undermine U.S. national security policy and force shifts in established relationships. Thus, to maintain the viability of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the U.S. must help propel Japan to a position of power and stability through diplomatic and trade appeals to its neighbors to ensure that the next 20 years are peaceful and prosperous for both countries.

China has emerged as a contender, threatening the balance of power in East Asia. China is in line to clash with Japan regarding enhanced international leadership. Whether it is a seat on the United Nations Security Council or a defined role in APEC leadership, China will contest Japan to ensure no further gains are made. That is not to say that relations with China are impossible for Japan, but they will be challenging. Economic partnerships may be the safest way to smooth relations in the short term. And as a successful recipe for international trade seems to all but require that China is included, it is in Japan's interest to welcome Chinese trade. Political hurdles will take more discretion and finesse. This is where the U.S. can offer support.

The U.S.-Japan relationship allows for considerable flexibility on security and trade issues, given the trust that both countries have built. By extending its military umbrella over Japan, the U.S. can continue to give Japan breathing room to concentrate on economic and trade issues. It will do no good for Japan to waste resources on an arms race with China, and given that the current situation is a stark contrast to Cold War policies toward the Soviet Union, there is no need for Japan to hold onto a power advantage over China[1]. Since Japan's military spending is already quite high, increasing that level is not necessary as long as the U.S. is a close ally, backing Japan with a security treaty. As Japan invests its time in initiating trade talks, both bilateral and regional, the U.S. can court Southeast Asian leaders to reduce tension along borders, to resolve questions of disputed territory and resources, and to press for further arms control. Given that Japan has outstanding issues over items such as territorial disputes, having the U.S. act as a third party to resolve such bickering would be appropriate. If the U.S. can broker deals on unsettled disputes, particularly between Japan and China, diplomatic inroads can be made that will extend to future regional cooperation. If there is only mistrust and suspicion between neighboring countries, there can be no lasting peace.

[1] Tanaka, Hitoshi. "Strategic Challenges for Japanese Diplomacy in the Twenty-First Century," in *Gaiko Forum, Japanese Perspectives on Foreign Affairs Winter 2006 – Volume 5, Number 4*, ed. Junko Suzuki. (Tokyo: Toshi Shuppan, Publishers, 2006).

One of the best ways to achieve peace is through prosperity. Therefore, if Japan is able to initiate trade talks with its neighbors, tensions will likely decline. Economic benefits yield cooperation, which can take the focus off formerly contentious issues. The U.S. and Japan need to work closely to encourage trade with North Korea, in particular. Setting up dialogue with Japan and North Korea to discuss abduction developments is far less appealing than talk of money. U.S. worries over North Korean nuclear programs are longstanding. Initiating trade with North Korea is the only way to change that country's leadership direction. If the U.S. can spend less time worrying over a nuclear standoff with North Korea, it can invest more time and resources in crisis management in the Middle East. The U.S. needs Japan to be more forgiving toward North Korea, although Washington has long blocked trade deals with the Pyongyang. A Japanese willingness to engage North Korea can only strengthen the alliance between the U.S. and Japan. U.S. military resources will be deployed in the Middle East for the foreseeable future, giving Japan incentive to curb the North Korean problem through economic partnership. Extending trade to smaller countries in the Pacific will also help to curry favor with regional leaders when there is a need to resolve international disputes.

Perhaps the most important apparatus for resolving international disputes is the United Nations. The coming decades will witness a greater need for UN action, and having both Japan and the U.S. on the Security Council will be advantageous for each country. By taking its place on the Security Council, Japan will be forced to work with China on regional security issues. The U.S. must begin persuading other members of the Security Council to extend membership to at least a few more countries. It will be a hard sell, but countries such as Germany and Japan are active players in the international community, and must be given greater influence in the UN. Rather than continue the Bush administration's backing for Prime Minister Koizumi's campaign to abolish Article IX, it might better serve Japan to keep Article IX intact to convince China that there are no militaristic intentions behind the move. Another method is to reinterpret Article IX, allowing Japan's lawmakers to make the language plainer and clarify Japan's position on international peacekeeping[2]. With the U.S. and Japan having responsibility for peacekeeping in the UN, there is increasing need to share technological research and development to support these activities.

The U.S. and Japan are both centers for creativity in science and technology. Innovations in military technology have given the U.S. a critical edge against other nations. Holding onto this lead is important for future security. By having the latest technology, the U.S. does not need a massive standing army, allowing it to rely more on weapons. As a strategic ally, Japan has been given access to certain military technologies, and this sharing should continue. Aside from the military side, research and development in the computer and technology industries are quite strong in the United States, as well as Japan. The U.S. should continue to allow open communication with Japanese scientists and scholars to breed innovation and quality through increased funding and access to appropriate tools and facilities. Keeping technology strong will also help to keep both economies strong and vibrant. Fresh ideas and positive planning are small, but important steps to keep Japan and the U.S. on the path to progress and unity.

[2] Nishi, Osamu. "Bringing Article 9 into the Twenty-first Century," in *Japan Echo*, ed. Sumiko Iwao. (Tokyo: Japan Echo Inc., 2005).

There have been many possibilities for division between the U.S. and Japan since the end of World War II, but both remain committed politically and economically to friendship and cooperation through security alliances and trade negotiations. The prospect of East Asian regional instability will require that Japan take a more active role in diplomatic relations, and with U.S. support security across the Pacific will be easier to maintain. Economic ties will promote dialogue and cooperation for the long term, reducing political tensions at the same time. By continuing on this path, and making renewed commitments to improve Japan's leadership role in East Asia, the U.S. will help retain its important ally and ensure the viability of their alliance for the next 20 years.

Ensuring the Long-Term Viability of the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Investing in Education and Public Diplomacy

By David P. Jänes

The Japan-U.S. Security Seminar highlighted the strength of the alliance between the United States and Japan and the need for that alliance to play a major role in Asia and the world. Conference participants also made it clear, however, that challenges to the alliance will surely arise and that its future will rest on the ability to manage these challenges.

Managing challenges in the relationship in order to ensure the viability and vitality of the U.S.-Japan alliance for the next 10 to 20 years will require not only government-to-government communication, coordination, and consultation, but also major investments in education and public diplomacy. The U.S.-Japan alliance cannot rest on historical factors or solely on political-military concerns of the day. Its viability also rests, in part, on the extent to which the citizens of both countries understand each other and share common values.

Since both Japan and the U.S. are democracies, the citizens of both countries play a role in driving policy and, as such, it is primarily in programs that reach out to the broad public that I believe we must make major investments. I recommend that investments be made in four specific areas to ensure the stability of the alliance: pre-collegiate education, journalism, leadership forums, and advanced policy studies.

The conference also highlighted the current tensions between China and Japan and the challenges this could present to the U.S.-Japan alliance. As such, I also propose that the United States has a role to play in alleviating the tension between these two nations.

Pre-college Education

Edwin O. Reischauer knew precisely the power and impact of pre-college education when he wrote, "The child entering first grade this year will not be a member of the voting public for well over a decade. He is not likely to have gotten well started on his career for two decades or more. His most important period as a leader or a molder of opinion, if he ever achieves such levels of prominence, lies roughly three to six decades ahead. During the intervening years he will no doubt still be learning, but his basic attitudes are likely to have been strongly conditioned, if not completely shaped, by the perceptions and prejudices he is absorbing now."[1] Studies have shown that a majority of U.S. students are absorbing little knowledge about Japan as a result of a complete lack of focus by most U.S. schools on international education. This lack of content on international issues, including Japan and the importance of the U.S. alliance with Japan, places the relationship between both counties at risk.

To illustrate the lack of knowledge about Japan, consider the *National Geographic-Roper 2002 Global Geographic Literacy Survey* of U.S. 18 to 24 year-olds, which states that only 42

[1] Reischauer, Edwin O. *Toward the Twenty-first Century: Education for a Changing World.* New York: Random House, 1974. p. 13.

percent of those surveyed could find Japan on a map.[2] While the report illustrates a significant lack of geographic awareness overall, the report's results emphasize that young Americans have a significant weakness when it comes to knowledge of Asia. Students who cannot even locate Japan geographically will find it difficult to understand Japan's importance to the U.S. in terms of security. I recall leading a workshop three years ago on Japan for a group of students from some of New York City's top high schools. Upon asking them how many thought Japan was an ally of the U.S., a very small percentage raised their hand. Some were unsure and others thought we were still enemies. Whatever impressions about Japan these students leave high school with are likely to be with them 20 years from now when they will be in their late 30s and rising in their careers. Perceptions created at a young age are difficult to transform.

The U.S. government and U.S. citizens must encourage states to adopt a new curricular requirement that includes coverage of Asia, and especially Japan. These new curricular requirements must emphasize contemporary issues and not focus solely on historical periods. The private sector and government must encourage teacher education programs to require those seeking a teaching license in the humanities to take courses on Asia, including Japan, as many colleges and universities have no such requirement. There must be investments in professional development programs for teachers about Japan.

There are two other educational-related issues that are of importance for the future of the U.S.-Japan relationship: an investment in Japanese-language education and an exchange between young Americans and Japanese. With regard to the former, only about 1/3 of secondary students in the U.S. study a foreign language, with many only taking one year.[3] Approximately 50,000 students in grades 7 to 12 are studying Japanese, which represents 0.4 percent of the entire population of students in these grades.[4] Japanese is a category-four language and thus one of the hardest to learn. If we are to develop a cadre of people who can engage with Japan, we must have the educational infrastructure necessary to develop fluency in the language. Some municipalities, like Seattle Public Schools, are doing this by creating a K-12 Japanese language immersion program. However, there is no national leadership on this effort.

With regard to exchange, the U.S. government and private sector should invest in a program on the level of the *Congress-Bundestag Program*,[5] which brings 250 U.S. high school students to Germany for a year to live and study, and brings young Germans to the U.S. annually. While there are an array of opportunities for young Americans to study in Japan and vice-versa, there is no program in any way similar to the stature of the *Congress-Bundestag Program* when it comes to Japan. If Japan is to remain our staunchest ally in Asia and perhaps our strongest ally overall, should we not be investing in friendships and understanding between the youth of our countries?

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[2] National Geographic Education Foundation, *2002 National Geographic-Roper 2002 Global Geographic Literacy Surve*,. November 2002, p. 71. See: http://www.nationalgeographic.com/geosurvey/download/RoperSurvey.pdf

[3] *Education for Global Leadership: The Importance of International Studies and Foreign Language Education for U.S. Economic and National Security.* Washington, DC: Committee for Economic Development. 2006. p. 15.

[4] Draper, Jamie B. and June H. Hicks. *Foreign Language Enrollments in Public Secondary Schools*, Fall 2000, American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages, May 2002. See: www.actfl.org/files/public/Enroll2000.pdf

[5] See: http://www.usagermanyscholarship.org/

Journalism

The role of the media in the U.S.-Japan relationship is critical as well. Media coverage of Japan has the potential to impact the coverage of Japan in America's schools, and it also shapes how citizens think of Japan and the Japanese. Furthermore, journalists play a role in shaping how political decision makers view issues and therefore they have a policy impact.

Over the past few years, coverage of Japan has been limited and numerous news agencies have closed their Japan bureaus, some to move to China and others so that they could better cover the Middle East. News agencies that have closed bureaus recently include *The Chicago Tribune* and *The Christian Science Monitor*; others, such as *The New York Times,* have reduced their Japan-based staff.[6]

This reduced coverage of Japan, despite Japan's close relationship with the U.S. and its status as the world's second largest economy, leaves citizens of the U.S. with a dearth of information about the country and its culture. Furthermore, many of the articles that are written about Japan tend to emphasize oddities and therefore reinforce stereotypes.

To ensure the long-term viability of the U.S.-Japan alliance, U.S. citizens must be made aware of the importance of this relationship, and must also be alert to Japan's thinking on domestic and international issues. Therefore, media organizations, foundations, and others must invest in programs and policies that encourage greater coverage of Japan and that provide journalists with a deeper understanding of Japan.

Leadership Forums

When the telephone was invented in the late 1800s many believed that war would cease since people from distant countries could talk and resolve problems peacefully instead of fight. But the 20th century was one of the bloodiest ever. This does not mean dialogue is ineffective; rather, it means that dialogues must be structured in specific ways with specific people. To ensure that leaders in the U.S. and Japan talk instead of fight, the U.S. government, the private sector, and civil society must invest in forums that select and connect up-and-coming leaders in both countries. These forums should aim to develop friendships as well as offer a place to discuss substantive policy issues. They should be places where perception gaps are reduced and expectations are defined. Furthermore, they should not only be about the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship, but also about ways in which they can work together to solve some of the world's most pressing needs such as environmental and health issues, and, of course, security issues.

Some of these programs are being directed by organizations such as the U.S.-Japan Foundation, Pacific Forum CSIS, and the Japanese-American National Museum. Yet these programs need additional funding to ensure long-term sustainability and need to continue to expand their circle of participants. Other organizations, such as the Council on Foreign Relations, have programs that engage young Americans in policy discussions with other Americans, but have yet to link them with young leaders in other countries.

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[6] *Foreign Bureaus in Japan Close as News Elsewhere Draws Notice.* Japan Media Review. http://ojr.org/japan.media/1088103923.php

Advanced Japan-focused Policy Studies

In addition to ensuring greater knowledge about Japan broadly among U.S. citizens, it is critical that the U.S. produce individuals who are Japan experts. The future of the relationship between both countries rests, in part, on the availability of individuals to be able to interpret Japan to Americans and policy makers. As such, investments must be made in graduate schools and programs that focus on international affairs in order to expand their ability to cover Japan.

Furthermore, the U.S. think tank community's knowledge base on Japan has been in decline for the past few years as many focus Asia-related funds on China. Think tanks play a role in assisting policy makers deliberate issues; they also bring some issues to the table in the first place. Unless think tanks have funding to cover Japan-related topics, there is a possibility that misperceptions about Japan will increase and that the alliance will not be as close or as beneficial as it could be.

The China-Japan Relationship

The China-Japan relationship is often defined as "hot economics and cold politics." A key question is which of the two represents the direction toward which the other will head, for it will be quite a challenge to sustain this dichotomy. Another key question is what role should the U.S. play in ensuring that positive economic relations turn into a more positive political relationship, one that leads not into war.

One viewpoint at the conference was that the United States should play no role in alleviating tensions between the two countries. However, a failing to resolve this tension has the potential to turn into a dangerous situation, one in which those who seek to create an enemy of China will have their voices heard even more loudly. Lack of resolution could also lead to reduced economic ties with China, which could be welfare reducing for the region and world. Furthermore, as tension between these two countries increases, Japan's popularity in the region and world will likely decline. Yet, Japan's popularity makes it an even more attractive ally for the U.S.

As such, it is imperative that the U.S. help alleviate this tension by promoting track II dialogues between both countries that explore ways to resolve the issues. Furthermore, the U.S. should assist both countries in reducing tension-increasing activities. For instance, China needs to transform its textbooks so that they include an accurate perception of Japan and not focus only the atrocities of yesterday. Furthermore, China must stop promoting anti-Japanese sentiment among its population. Japan must stop formal visits to Yasukuni Shrine, and stop promoting textbooks that provide scant information about atrocities committed by Japan in China.

The U.S. might want to consider crafting a bargain between China and Japan whereby China will accept Japan as a permanent member of the UN Security Council if Japan pledges to no longer have its leaders visit Yasukuni and if Japan builds a secular memorial for its war dead. If a seat in the UN Security Council is an alliance issue, and the U.S. is serious about getting Japan in, then the U.S. must engage China on this issue given their objections.

Conclusion

The American and Japanese peoples have a relationship extending over 150 years, some of it extremely brutal and some of it beautiful. Currently, the bilateral alliance is strong at the governmental level, but nowhere near as strong on the popular level. Furthermore, those in the government with the ability to understand Japan are restricted, given the limitations of America's educational system and other issues listed above. Ensuring the viability of this alliance in 10 to 20 years will take not only shared security concerns, but also a deep investment in public diplomacy. I suggest that real alliances are not built by having mutual enemies, but by having deep roots that extend far beyond the governments. Furthermore, this alliance can serve not only to deter, but also to assist. As the world's first and second largest economies and two of the world's most powerful democracies, the U.S.-Japan alliance can be utilized to solve long-term global issues, and this requires citizens in different sectors from the United States to be able to work together with their peers in Japan.

Transforming the U.S.-Japan Alliance : Is it as Good as it Sounds?

By Tetsuo Kotani

Given the "new security environment" following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Tokyo and Washington are transforming their security relationship into a global alliance. At the February 2005 Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meeting (sometimes known as the "2+2" meeting), both governments set forth regional and global "common strategic objectives." At the October 2005 SCC meeting, in order to pursue these objectives, the two governments issued an interim report and revealed a future vision of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japanese and U.S. armed forces, as well as the realignment of the U.S. force structure in Japan. The U.S.-Japan alliance will contribute to regional and global peace and stability if the transformation process is implemented properly. This is a challenging process and while the final report is not expected until March 2006, there is concern over its feasibility. The U.S.-Japan security relationship is not as good as it sounds.

First, the base realignment package, including the delayed relocation of Futenma Air Base, is meeting strong opposition from virtually all host communities. The realignment plan intends to reduce the burden of host communities, especially in Okinawa, while strengthening deterrence. But opposition from host communities and Washington's strong will to make the interim report final might spoil the realignment package. Base-to-personnel cooperation is still the basic characteristic of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Cooperation from host communities is key to stable and flexible use of U.S. bases in Japan. Also, without cooperation from host communities, personnel-to-personnel cooperation will be jeopardized. The realignment package was a rush job given Defense allegations that Secretary Rumsfeld's was "Japan passing" during his fall Asia tour as well as the pressure created by the prospect of the November 2005 Bush-Koizumi summit. Host communities were not necessarily uncooperative, but they were taken by surprise or at least lost face. Local individuals who favored cooperation were put in a difficult position, while those who objected to the plans had an advantage. A scandal in the defense agency, at the DFAA, made the situation worse. In short, the package lacked Japanese political leadership as well as coordination with host communities.

Second, as bilateral cooperation evolves on a global scale, it is necessary for the Self-Defense Force (SDF) to expand its roles, even though the political cost is still high. The envisaged "basic concepts" of bilateral defense cooperation follows the 1981 "division of roles and missions" – Japan takes "defensive" missions and the U.S. "offensive" missions. Such defense cooperation requires strategy coordination, joint planning, intelligence sharing, etc. However, Tokyo's ban on collective self-defense has restrained cooperation. The exercise of collective self-defense has not been put on the agenda yet, let alone the revision of the constitution. Again, Japanese political leadership is absent. Tokyo should also consider sharing "offensive" roles, which would reinforce the deterrence of the U.S.-Japan alliance while making it possible for the U.S. to reduce forces in Japan.

On the other hand, the expansion of Japanese military capability would raise concerns among neighboring countries. Given the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines, an emphasis is now placed on Japan's own defense efforts to counter "new threats and diverse contingencies such as ballistic missile attacks, attacks by guerrilla and special forces, and invasion of remote islands," as well as on bilateral "efforts to improve the international security environment," such as participation in international peace cooperation activities. How far is Japan going? Sooner or later, the revision of the constitution will be laid before the Diet. Tokyo should make clear its vision of a "normal country." For example, would a "normal" Japan participate in a preemptive or preventive action against a country such as Iran?

Another concern is Japan's deteriorating relations with neighboring countries, especially South Korea and China, over historical issues. The U.S.-Japan "common strategic objectives" include the denuclearization of North Korea and engagement with China. Cooperation with Japan's neighboring countries is essential to the realization of these objectives. In fact, the dispute over historical issues has something to do with the future of the alliance. When some Japanese justify "that war" as one of self-defense, how can the Japanese assure neighboring countries of their intention to expand Japanese roles and missions or to revise the constitution? Prime Minister Koizumi stated that a strong U.S.-Japan relationship would lead to better relations with neighboring countries. This is true, but it does not mean Japan does not have to work to improve relations with them. While some factions in neighboring countries use anti-Japanese feelings for domestic political purposes, Tokyo should not give them an excuse to criticize Japan and take measures to improve relations with them. Good relations with neighboring countries complement Japan's alliance with the United States.

Finally, one of the biggest concerns for the U.S.-Japan alliance is the future of China. It is essential for Tokyo and Washington to encourage China's "peaceful rise." There is growing concern over a "China threat" both in the U.S. Congress and Japanese Diet. Is China really a threat? A threat consists of capabilities and intentions. China is a nuclear power with ballistic and cruise missiles. It is modernizing its navy and air force. It has one of the largest armies in the world. The international community cannot help being worried about China's military capability. However, China's intentions are not clear. If Taiwan declares independence, China says it would pull the trigger. But there should be enough room for us to influence China's intentions. Although China is a totalitarian regime, it is far from monolithic. There are Chinese factions who find that Chinese interests are in cooperation with the international community. Japanese leaders should not take actions that place these moderate Chinese leaders into a difficult position. In short, China is not the Soviet Union. It has been integrated into the global economy to some extent. China should be treated differently. Tokyo, with Washington, should encourage China's "peaceful rise" by deterring China's military adventurism and by welcoming it as a responsible member of the international community.

In sum, to ensure the viability of the U.S.-Japan alliance for the next 10-20 years, Japanese politicians should be leaders. Today's developed countries maintain military capabilities not only for national defense but also for maintaining international order. As the second largest economy, Japan has to play a responsible role in the international community. With the largest economy, the U.S. Japanese leaders should take the initiative in designing a national strategy and in establishing a system and environment to pursue the strategic goals. The

following are suggestions for the Japanese government to make the U.S.-Japan alliance more credible.

1. The Japanese government should establish a National Security Law and make clear that it can exercise the right to collective self-defense (The revision of Article 9, Section 2 of the Japanese constitution is desirable, but not necessary for the time being).

2. The Japanese and U.S. governments should establish a U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Organization, which integrates the "comprehensive mechanism" and "bilateral coordination mechanism" set forth in the 1997 Defense Guidelines, for efficient policy coordination and joint planning.

3. The Japanese government should establish a perpetual law to send troops overseas for international cooperation and adopt international standard rules of engagement.

4. The Japanese government should fully coordinate base policies among the Japanese government, U.S. forces in Japan, and host communities.

5. The Japanese government should seek more U.S.-Japan and civil-military joint use of bases under the U.S.-Japan SOFA Article 2 Section 4(b).

6. Tokyo should conclude a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Washington for more efficient intelligence sharing.

7. Japanese defense ministers should not be rotated frequently so that they can take leadership in the JDA.

8. The SDF should acquire power projection capabilities for destroying missile sites on foreign soil as part of missile defense, and large transport ships and cargo aircraft for international cooperation missions (given the reinforcement of U.S. carrier forces in the Pacific set forth in the 2006 QDR, Japan does not have to acquire carriers for the time being).

9. Japanese Cabinet members should acknowledge Japan's history realistically.

10. Japanese Cabinet members should not visit the Yasukuni Shrine, which has a revisionist historical interpretation of Japan's colonial past.

11. The Japanese government should establish a religion-free national memorial for the war dead.

12. Tokyo, with Washington, should demand the maintenance of peace in the Taiwan Strait and oppose any unilateral action from either side to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

13. The Japanese government should strengthen political, economic, and intelligence

cooperation with India and Mongolia, as well as with ASEAN countries, which are located in strategically important positions.

A Vision for Japan: Partner of the United States in Asia

By Yuko Nakano

While 2005 represents a landmark year for the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan has many hurdles it must overcome before it can establish itself as the strategic partner it envisions itself to be. Japan must think seriously, and practically, about the steps it must take to overcome the remaining obstacles to its role as regional and global leader.

In December 2004, the Japanese Security Council and the Cabinet adopted the National Defense Plan Guideline (NDPG). In addition to redefining policy on the defense of Japan, the new NDPG addressed Japan's efforts to improve the international security environment and its support for multilateral efforts such as counter-terrorism and counter-piracy. On Feb. 19, 2005, the Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meeting), which includes the foreign and defense ministers and the secretaries of State and Defense – held the first of two meetings last year. The first 2+2 meeting resulted in the joint document "Common Strategic Objectives", which laid out common global and regional challenges. The second meeting, on Oct. 29, outlined a set of recommendations on roles, missions, capabilities, and the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan that was based on the joint global and regional challenges articulated in the Common Strategic Objectives.

The meetings produced a framework by which the United States and Japan have formed a common understanding of the strategic environment, and a commitment to a common approach for addressing future strategic challenges. While the 2+2 meetings and the Common Strategic Objectives established a foundation for the U.S.-Japan alliance for at least the next decade, it is imperative that Japan reflect on the steps it must take in order to assume the role it seeks in a strategic partnership with the U.S.

Assuming a More Assertive Role

Japan's position within the international community has changed considerably since the U.S. and Japan signed the first security treaty in 1951. During the past six decades, Japan has risen to be a technologically advanced country and achieved enormous success in its economy. But most importantly it has become a fully democratic nation and a genuine ally of the U.S., upholding a shared system of values and principles. As a result, the nature of the alliance has transformed, with the Japanese public and policymakers becoming increasingly willing to assume a more assertive role in contributing to peace and stability around the world.[1] It is now time for Japan to seek its role as a credible partner for the U.S.

The two countries share three common objectives in foreign and security policy. Those three objectives have been articulated recently in major policy statements by the Bush administration. First, in the State of the Union address, President Bush emphasized his vision to

[1] In a public opinion survey conducted by the Cabinet Office of Japan in October 2005, 24.4 percent supported a more active role for Japan in UN peacekeeping operations. 49.5 percent answered that Japan should participate at the current level. It is worth noting that the "current level" includes PKOs in Cambodia, Golan Heights and East Timor; refugee relief activities in Rwanda, Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan. <www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h17/h17-gaikou/3.html in Japanese or www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/poll-05-12.htm in English>

promote democracy and freedom in order to bring about a safer environment for humanity.[2] As a democracy that respects the rule of law, human rights, and a market economy, Japan has been and will continue to be a partner with the U.S. in the pursuit of this common cause.

Second, the Defense Department's National Defense Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) call for the strengthening of alliances and for shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads "in ways that foster cooperation and mutual security."[3] The Department of Defense is shifting its emphasis from reactive to proactive, from responding to crises to preventive actions so that problems will not become crises.[4] In this regard, Japan's participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Ballistic Missile Defense program work as a deterrent against threats posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Moreover, Japan will continue to work with its partners in the Six-Party Talks to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. In a nonmilitary area, Official Development Assistance and contributions to the World Bank and other international institutions will remain a focal point of Japan's effort to ensure peace and prosperity in developing countries.

Finally, the U.S. is determined to defeat terrorist networks in the global war on terror, or the "Long War," as the Department of Defense is now referring to it. While participation by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in the war on terror is limited to humanitarian missions and logistical support, Japan has demonstrated its resolve by standing firmly with the United States – despite numerous al-Qaeda threats.

Japan can best support these broad objectives by using its military forces to support building partnership capacity in strategic countries around the world. Helping to train other militaries serves a number of objectives simultaneously. First, Japan should take initiative in confidence building measures through joint exercises such as humanitarian operations for natural disaster relief or post-conflict reconstruction. Helping other nations defend themselves helps the U.S. and other security partners from spreading themselves too thin in deployments. Second, by creating a training course for humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping missions, Japan can aid the capacity-building efforts of other Asian countries while reducing the U.S. burden in multilateral post-conflict operations. While the Japanese SDF have restrictions on its use of force, Japan can provide good training in military and police conduct as well as civil affairs. As a U.S. participant in the seminar pointed out, other countries in the region – Indonesia, for instance – have called for a more active role for Japan, and joint exercises are "perfect tools" to develop deeper security cooperation.

In addition, helping other nations to protect themselves from both internal and external threats is one of the most significant and meaningful contributions one nation can make to another. In the region, many countries face significant security dilemmas. Recent trends in

[2] "On Sept. 11, 2001, we found that problems originating in a failed and oppressive state 7,000 miles away could bring murder and destruction to our country. Dictatorships shelter terrorists, feed resentment and radicalism and seek weapons of mass destruction. Democracies replace resentment with hope, respect the rights of their citizens and their neighbors, and join the fight against terror. Every step toward freedom in the world makes our country safer – so we will act boldly in freedom's cause." State of the Union Address by President George W. Bush, Jan. 31, 2006.
[3] Quadrennial Defense Report, pp. 87-92, Feb. 6, 2006.
[4] Ibid., p. vi.

Chinese military modernization – toward projecting power throughout the region – might foster an environment that would welcome an initiative by Japan to strengthen other nations' armed forces. More significantly, helping to make other nations feel more secure by improving their armed forces could allay fears of a more active Japanese defense force. Used in this manner, the Japanese defense forces have the potential to reduce regional anxiety over a more assertive Japan rather than exacerbate it.

Obstacles to a More Assertive Japan

There are two primary obstacles to a more assertive role for Japan in foreign and security affairs. First is the concern other Asian countries have of Japan taking a leading role in the region. While most Asia-Pacific nations with bitter memories of World War II have reconciled, there are several nations with which Japan has not been able to overcome historical issues, which surface periodically and serve as a constraint on Japan's relationships with its neighbors.

Constitutional issues constitute the second major obstacle. In every crisis in which the government of Japan has considered dispatching the SDF – from the deployment of Ground Self-Defense Forces to peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, to the deployment of Maritime Self-Defense Forces to the Indian Ocean in support of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq – Japan has relied on special laws. Such an ad hoc solution, usually accompanied by endless discussion in the Diet – prolonged by opposition parties – could, and has in some cases, delayed deployment when an early response was critical. The recent success of Japan's SDF in the Global War on Terror and in natural disaster relief efforts is largely credited to a swift and resolute decision by a strong political leadership. Whether the trend will continue after Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi steps down as anticipated in September 2006, is an open question. Ultimately, whether Japan will assume a more active role depends upon Japanese public opinion. Encouraging public debate, not limited to the question of constitutional amendment but also on the future of Japan from a strategic perspective, remains a major task for the next generation of leadership in Japan.

Necessary Next Steps for Japan

In order for Japan to assume a larger role in Asia, it must find a solution to its historical and constitutional problems. While it might be impossible for two entities of different ethnicity and culture to share the same understanding on any historical event, Japan must continue to make utmost efforts to mend historical animosities. Japan must also develop diplomatic strategies for handling sensitive historical issues so that other nations cannot use these issues to weaken and delegitimize Japan's position in Asia.

Furthermore, Japan should employ its diplomatic tools to explain its foreign and defense policies to nations that are suspicious of its intentions. Finally, Japan must remind itself that it should serve as a role model for others as a prosperous and truly democratic nation, at peace with itself and its neighbors. As Foreign Minister Aso Taro articulated in a December 2005 speech, a vision of "A Thought Leader" should serve as a centerpiece of its strategy for the architecture of

Asia.[5] Japan has plenty to offer as a nation that has used trial and error to achieve its success. This should encourage other nations that strive for economic and social development.

To solve the legal constraints surrounding the deployment of SDF, Japan must install a legal mechanism that functions regardless of political climate. Constitutional revision has been discussed in the Diet but not among the public; it will take years to complete the process. As an initial step, I suggest that Japan introduce a comprehensive national law. In the new law, the government of Japan will restate its policy on the four disputed areas related to the activities of Japan's SDF. Specifically, it should clarify the "Far East Clause" in Article 6 of the 1960 Security Treaty; integrate "use of force" guidelines into one coherent law; redefine the right of collective self-defense; and integrate all special measures submitted to the Diet should the government decide to deploy the SDF. Only by clearing up the uncertainty surrounding the legality of the SDF can Japan be a more reliable ally of the United States.

Today, the U.S.-Japan alliance serves not only as an agreement for defending the security and prosperity of these two nations, but it also serves as an alliance for "enhancing regional and global peace and stability."[6] While there are numerous areas of potential cooperation in a strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan should focus on a broader, strategic approach on what kind of regional and global role it wishes to play. That vision for Japan, accompanied by concrete steps to enable its goals, will ensure the viability of the U.S.-Japan alliance for the foreseeable future.

[5] Taro Aso, "Asian Strategy As I See It: Japan as the "Thought Leader" of Asia, December 2005, internet, www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0512.html.
[6] Joint Statement, U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, Washington, D.C., Feb. 19, 2005.

How to Enhance Domestic Support for the Japan-U.S. Alliance Sharing Values or Fighting External Threats?

By Ryo Sahashi

In its 55-year history, the Japan-U.S. alliance has suffered from a lack of strong domestic understanding and support. Washington and other European capitals made efforts to mobilize their countries during the Cold War, using fear of the Soviet Union and its aggressive behavior. However, it is doubtful that Tokyo mobilized its people by raising the fear of Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang, even though the government sometimes used rhetoric that painted them as "red menaces." In fact, public support for the Japanese government's (or the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's) policies was based on the promise of economic growth, and the longing for American society and its capitalist prosperity (Ford-ism). In other words, it was admiration for the Western bloc, or the aspiration to become a major economic power, not the fear of external threats, that turned Japan into one of the most stable and obedient supporters of the U.S.[1]

Moreover, because of the birth and rise of postwar pacifism and antinuclear sentiment among the Japanese people, open and frank discussions of Cold War strategies were very difficult: for example, the government delayed publicizing the idea of the "nuclear umbrella" until the late 1960s. The Johnson administration feared Japan's emerging economic power and the rise of conservative Japanese politicians' nuclear ambitious after the success of the first Chinese nuclear test in 1964. Unlike politicians who often consider matters of national prestige, the Japanese people only gained confidence in Japan's economic prosperity after the Tokyo Olympics in 1964. U.S. nonproliferation policy and the reassurance of extended deterrence provided the Sato administration with reasons not to develop national nuclear weapons and to declare its reliance on the U.S. "nuclear umbrella." The anti-nuclear feelings of the Japanese people also forced it to declare the "Three Anti-Nuclear Principles" and demand the return of Okinawa without nuclear weapons. It should also be noted that the Japanese government, with strong pressure from the business lobby, persisted in trade with China and separated politics from business. The *Yoshida Doctrine* persisted, and to persuade people of the significance of the alliance with the U.S., political realism sometimes prevailed over business realism and social pacifism. People knew there were external threats from the red camp, but they did not unquestioningly accept the necessity of a military response.

Leaping ahead, it was theoretically timely to redefine the alliance in 1996, after the serious frictions over trade that raged between Tokyo and Washington during the 1980s.[2] With the dismantling of the Eastern bloc, the alliance should have sought to redefine the relationship beyond shared external threats. Both governments desired to keep the alliance to stabilize their political friendship and prepare for future challenges in East Asia, one of the most unstable but

[1] During the Cold War there were significant discussions in Japanese foreign policy circles regarding "fear." Ironically, it was Sakamoto Yoshikazu, professor of international politics at the University of Tokyo and a famous theorist for the liberal camp, who emphasized the fear of nuclear attack or miscalculation by the Soviets and called for non-armed neutral diplomacy in place of the Japan-U.S. alliance. Kosaka Masataka, professor of international politics at Kyoto University, criticized Sakamoto's argument and supported the U.S. alliance in the context of balancing. Kosaka admitted that fear and threats from the Eastern bloc were motivations for the alliance.

[2] "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, Alliance for the 21st Century," signed April 17, 1996, in Tokyo. "Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation," signed Sept. 23, 1997, in New York.

economically vibrant areas of the world. Despite a loss of admiration for the U.S. after the end of the Cold War, there were no serious attempts to make a case for the alliance to the public in 1996 and after. Significantly, after the rape of an Okinawa schoolgirl by U.S. service personnel in 1996, the Japanese government failed to persuade the public of the importance of the alliance. Tokyo made some bureaucratic efforts but never involved top officials. Public efforts to justify the alliance consisted of reiterating the objectives of Japanese foreign policy: continuing the Japan-U.S. alliance and contributing to international society. Precious little effort was made to explain this slogan, or to articulate why Japan must maintain the alliance.

The serious problem that Tokyo and Washington now face lies not in a difference in the two governments' interests or perceptions, but in the lack of Japanese domestic support for the alliance.[3] The alliance that drifted seems to be sailing through calm waters. The Japan-U.S. (governmental) relationship could be called the "best since Nakasone." Both governments want to keep the alliance, and alliance management is better than in the past. (To be sure, BSE and the beef import ban have created new types of problems, but they will not split the alliance.) Unlike the past, however, Japanese admiration for the U.S. has waned because the Japanese economy has essentially caught up with the United States in terms of size, efficacy, and philosophy. The Institute for National Strategic Studies Media depictions of the U.S as a peace-breaker, not a peace-maker or stabilizer have further weakened admiration for the U.S. Globalization has also enabled the Japanese to get to know other countries and cultures, thereby devaluing the U.S. as a model. In other words, policy circles in Tokyo seem to have been become more "realistic," while the public is still apt to be "pacifist" and has lost its innocent admiration of the U.S.[4]

The Japan-U.S. alliance is seemingly going through a second redefinition process, but the prospects for success in winning over local governments in Japan on U.S. basing questions are ominous.[5] Without a strong sense of external threat, alarmists argue that the U.S. bases seem to merely serve as platforms from which to intervene in areas beyond those surrounding Japan. Even though the Japanese people increasingly support *humanitarian* operations by Self-Defense Forces and NGOs, they hesitate to support ambitious U.S. operations, recalling the Iraq war, which was not supported by many Japanese. The Japanese people now embrace the values of *democracy and freedom*, but a number of countries enjoying these values do not match the pacifist sentiment of Japanese. Mobilizing domestic support for the alliance at a time of

[3] The author understands that indifference in the U.S. toward Japan might cause problems in the future.

[4] For this idea, I appreciate my fellow Young Leader Celeste Arrington's comments on a previous draft of this article. One ominous change, however, is nationalistic and hawkish ideas have increased in the media and among conservative politicians.

[5] The government, reportedly, failed to consult in advance with local governments this time and made the situation worse. It is possible for the government to compulsorily enforce the construction and relocation of U.S. bases, but this should be a last resort because it might provoke a backlash in domestic politics and make the basis of the alliance fragile. For the recent arrangement between both governments, see "Security Consultative Committee Document U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future," Oct. 29, 2005. Available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html

declining U.S. soft power is a difficult task.[6] To be sure, the U.S. is increasingly returning to multilateral approaches, but it will take years to recover its reputation.[7]

Proposals to enhance domestic support for the alliance

How can we rebuild support for the Japan-U.S. alliance?[8] This paper tries to answer that question from two angles: an external threats approach and a "sharing values" approach.

A) External Threats Approach[9]

1) North Korea

The alliance has two potential threats, North Korea and China. North Korea has not operated as a galvanizing threat. The Cabinet decisions to pursue missile defense systems with the U.S. benefited from the North Korean threat demonstrated by the Nodong missile launch in 1993, the Taepodong missile overflight in 1998 and the ongoing second North Korean nuclear crisis. Also, as shown in the Six-Party Talks, Tokyo and Washington have strengthened their partnership to consult each other on Korean Peninsula issues. (One serious exception was Koizumi's 2002 visit to Pyongyang, of which the U.S. was informed at the last minute.) However, this was merely a fortunate exception, since a majority of Japanese do not feel serious insecurity as a result of North Korean nuclear and missile programs, and the North Korean crises have not made the Japanese people reevaluate the importance of the alliance. Indeed many people, including politicians, are more concerned by the abduction cases. Therefore, as long as both capitals maintain dialogues with Pyongyang and North Korea does not conduct nuclear

[6] I don't agree with the recent *Foreign Affairs* article by Alexander Cooley. He criticizes base politics with authoritarian regimes because of their instable nature. But it is difficult to maintain domestic support for allies in democratic systems, especially when people dislike the allies or do not support the alliance. Elections are not easy to manage. Cooley believes too much in the state power to manage "base politics" in democratic regimes.

[7] U.S. commitments to alliances ranging from West Europe and Asia to the periphery of the third world have been explained by the need to preserve U.S. credibility or reputation, to maintain deterrence against the communist bloc and to tie the allies to a Western bloc through consistent commitments, intervention, and aid, keeping sufficient capability and showing a strong intention and resolve to fight the Cold War. This concept of U.S. credibility during the Cold War, represented well by the historian Robert McMahon, was congruent with the idealism of U.S. foreign policies, but also could be interpreted as a rational pursuit of foreign policies because credibility was systematically required to manage relationships with allies. (see Ikenberry 2001) To be sure, in the face of expanding commitments, in response to a fear of "dominoes" or of demands from allies, it would be difficult to claim that credibility had a rational basis. Surely a fear of loss of credibility motivated the U.S. to intervene in regional conflicts, even deeply in the periphery, such as in Indochina. (For the prospect theory, see Taliaferro 2004) After the Cold War, without external threats like the Soviet Union and under relatively unchallenged U.S. global dominance (unipolar system), the significance of credibility has been ignored. Needing to regain the support of its allies to fight the "long war" against terrorism and proliferation, the U.S. has tried to recover its credibility even where there is no shared threat perception of terrorism and WMD and allies don't need external deterrence with U.S. nuclear weapons.

[8] This is my paraphrase of the assigned paper topic, "what concrete steps should each country take to ensure the viability of the U.S.-Japan alliance for the next 10-20 years?"

[9] To differentiate approaches theoretically between external threats (realism) and sharing values (liberal institutionalism/ constructivism) for the Japan-US alliance, the author owes a lot to Jun'ichi Fukuda, Ph.D candidate at the University of Tokyo and his work.

tests, Japanese concern about the threat from North Korea shall remain low, and the threat will not create domestic support for the Japan-U.S. alliance.[10]

2) China

The threat from China could unite the two countries in the long term, but it is too early to conclude that China will not peacefully rise, and business lobbies in both capitals cannot allow so-called dragon slayers to destroy economic opportunities. Both capitals, or at least Washington, persist in engaging China, trying to transform it internally and promoting a "soft-landing" in international society.[11] Unless there is strong evidence of Beijing's ambition or signs of turmoil, or unless China catches up with the U.S. militarily and economically, only conservative politicians and opinion leaders on the Hill and Nagata-cho will ring alarms about a rising China.[12]

Public polls show that the Japanese have been irritated by Japan-Sino relations but have not felt strong threats from China. As such, it will be difficult to raise perceptions of a China threat. Since a majority of Japanese do not want conflict in East Asia, if the alliance itself were to appear to cause tensions with China, the Japan-U.S. alliance might suffer the same problem as the U.S.-ROK alliance. To sustain the pro-alliance faction in Japanese politics, the U.S. should not send misleading signals to Japan regarding a rising China as a short- or mid-term threat to the alliance and should not fuel hardline politics. Hardline behavior would inhibit engagement with China, which both administrations want. If pressure on China is required, diplomatic means such as finance/currency, trade deficits, property rights, and counterfeiting controls would be best. Dissuasion by military means, including deterrence, could be achieved through deploying more naval forces and missile defense systems in the Western Pacific, but it should be done without

[10] Gallup has interesting polls in Japan and Korea in the summer of 2005. Among the perceptions of threats against countries in Japan, North Korea (64.6 percent) is ranked is top, far bigger than the U.S. (10.8 percent) and China (8.1 percent). (Available at www.nrc.co.jp/rep/rep20050815.html) However, a government poll published on October 2005 shows that abductions (87.6 percent) is still the top concern of Japanese. (Nuclear programs, 63.9 percent; missile developments, 55.2 percent; political regimes, 46.3 percnet) In this sense, the problem lies in the definition of "threats." (Available at www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h17/h17-gaikou/index.html) In government surveys, there is also a slight increase in concern about nuclear programs, with a slight decrease regarding abductions. This means that deadlocked negotiations and new actions by Pyongyang to change the status quo could influence Japanese opinions of national security.

[11] For a discussion of Japanese foreign policy in the context of the Japan-U.S. alliance and the rise of China, see Ryo Sahashi, "Primacy of America, Rise of China, and Future of Japanese Diplomacy," *Ronza* (Asahi Shimbun monthly opinion journal), April 2006. [In Japanese] My academic research focuses on U.S. responses to the *first* "rise of China" from the 1960s to 1970s. Ryo Sahashi, "Lyndon Johnson's China Policy and Taiwan – Credibility, Self-Restraint, and Dilemma," *Journal of Japan Taiwan Studies Association,* vol. 8 (June 2006; forthcoming). [In Japanese]

[12] It should be noted that a hardline position against China has not enhanced domestic support for the Japan-U.S. alliance. In Japan, anti-China opinion leaders tend to emphasize negative aspects of China, bashing its imperialistic intentions and its rising military capability, and criticizing domestic turmoil and the growing gap between rich and poor. These opinions are essentially nationalistic, and thus do not necessarily promote the alliance with the U.S. which hampers the "independence" of Japan. These individuals try to use hawkish reports and speeches in Washington on China.

targeting China.[13] To be sure, the alliance should be prepared militarily for any change of behavior by Beijing, but this should be pursued through diplomatic engagement policies.

In Tokyo, it is very common for Washington-watchers to observe that while anti-China hardliners tend to emphasize the alliance with Japan, pro-China engagement politicians and theorists tend to de-value or ignore it. To have a coherent approach to China without having policies swing between these two positions, Tokyo and Washington should both deepen the alliance and engage China, sharing long-term concerns about the rise of China with short- and middle-term interests in engaging Beijing and encouraging China's soft-landing when it comes to international standards. Institutionalizing trilateral or multilateral high-level regular talks is one option. (Simultaneously, the U.S. and Japan should continue their summits, "2+2," and foreign affairs ministerial dialogues to ensure that bilateral relations take precedence over trilateral relations.) Using this trilateral or regional mechanism, the U.S. and Japan should aim to deepen confidence building measures, lessen uncertainty, and demand the protection of human rights and freedom. For both capitals, the alliance should provide joint pressure and insurance.

The most difficult task will be developing domestic support for the alliance as it embraces this more sophisticated strategy. Emphasizing the threat posed by a rising and opaque China is not desirable, as it will hinder engagement and feed the hawks. On the other hand, business elites will support engagement. One solution is to back a U.S.-Japan joint statement that resembles the "responsible stakeholder" argument made by Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick. That statement needs to dissuade China from exploiting the alliance and pursuing regional multipolarity, without directly mentioning Taiwan affairs as a Common Security Objective.[14] It is essential that both administrations demonstrate a willingness to cope jointly with a rising China, sharing concerns for the future and an interest in engagement. Such a joint statement would explicitly define China in the context of the alliance and such a definition is lacking in the Zoellick speech, the 2005 QDR, and other documents.

B) Shared values approach

Coping with global challenges is a new agenda item for the alliance, but terrorism and WMD are not sufficient "external threats" to unite the two countries. No two countries feel the same danger from these threats. Instead, the alliance must address the problem of values or how societies want to construct the international order.[15] The difficulty lies in Tokyo's and Washington's divergent approaches to the use of force and the U.S. war on Iraq. To promote

[13] This point was more fully discussed in Ryo Sahashi, "Lessening the Uncertainty without Strengthening the Mistrust: Dual Deterrence and International Framework across the Taiwan Strait," Pacific Forum *Issues & Insights*, Vol.6, No.3 (2006), pp.47-50.

[14] The problem lies in the inclusion of Strait affairs in a pubic document, which aims to adjust the deployments of forces according to the U.S. Global Posture Review and implies that the alliance decided to put explicit military pressure on Beijing. It has an unintended impact not only on Beijing, but also on Taipei, Japanese domestic politics, and neighboring countries. "Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee," Feb. 19, 2005. Available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html

[15] I argued the difficulties and prescriptions for enhancing cooperation on counter-proliferation of WMDs, which are weak and premature threats to unite states but need precautionary approaches in Ryo Sahashi, "Improving Cooperation against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction –Theoretical Reflections," Pacific Forum *Issues & Insights*, vVol.6, No.4 (2006), pp.49-53.

shared values among the two countries, their operations should seek consensus and legitimation in both countries. In this sense, a multilateral framework for dealing with North Korea and Iran is a time-consuming but desirable approach. These approaches enhance public understanding of the significance of "international society," although not necessarily of the alliance.

Also joint internationalism, ranging from joint official aid and projects, humanitarian interventions, and post-conflict reconstruction approved unanimously by major powers and international laws, would be real ways for the alliance to show the two countries' common values. We must add a new sense of internationalism to the alliance, for the Japanese feel sympathy for human suffering but are worried about U.S. unilateralism. If the alliance is seen as a tool of peacemaking, it would get more support from liberals in Japanese domestic politics.

In the context of sharing values, some in the U.S. have advocated that the two countries begin Japan-U.S. FTA negotiations. However, considering the still strong power of Japan's agricultural lobby, it would be very difficult to agree on abolishing tariffs on agricultural produce, and as in the BSE issue, external pressure from Washington during negotiations might severely weaken the image of the U.S. To kick off a government-sponsored research project would be acceptable at this stage, but negotiations seriously aimed at an early agreement would cause a domestic backlash. Here, it should be clear that sharing *values* does not necessarily mean sharing *interests*. Interests are very unlikely to be synchronized beyond borders.

Images among people are essential for governments to adopt "shared values" as the legitimate reason for an alliance, because without a positive image of the counterpart country(ies), the government would have a hard time getting domestic support for the alliance, especially without strong and apparent external threats. To be sure, the personal friendship between political leaders, such as that between Prime Minister Koizumi and President Bush, has contributed a lot to stable government relations. Without domestic foundations, however, the ability to persuade people of the need for an alliance will be increasingly weakened. We must be cognizant of declining U.S. soft power and a lack of short-term external threats and their impact on alliance management. Also, when it comes to talks on sharing values, it would be advisable not to pursue negotiations and actions that highlight the different *interests* both countries have. In place of such provocative agendas, what is required are agendas that would be almost unanimously accepted or at least would not stimulate different interests.

Taking into Account Emotions for National Security
By Yoshiro Tasaka

Since the signing of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1951, the alliance has enjoyed support in both countries and created stability in East Asia. Still, both states face new security challenges more complex than those of 50 years ago. Invisible and stateless terrorists have threatened the U.S. since 9/11. Japan faces menacing neighbors, such as China and Korea that have a large amount of anti-Japanese sentiment. These adversaries are fundamentally different in their drives yet share common characteristics; they are motivated by hatred. Both the U.S. and Japan must examine the significance of these circumstances relative to the attitudes of the general public and the terrorists. Public diplomacy is the primary way to reduce hatred and hostility; promoting better public relations within the countries would build stronger alliances and secure communities.

Public Diplomacy and Deterrence

Public diplomacy used to be seen as unnecessary statecraft. President Roosevelt mentioned the importance of public affairs as early as 1945. Yet, public diplomacy was not popular among policymakers until 9/11.

As terrorists proved on 9/11, they do not pursue state interests, but seek to wound U.S. citizens instead. Their motivation – anti-Americanism – has spread worldwide and they have the media, scholars, politicians, and people to spread their narrative. Recent studies illustrate that anti-Americanism exists in U.S. allies, as well, such as in Europe and South Korea, and even in the U.S. itself.[1] Some publics in Arab nations consider that U.S. allies are quick to assume that the U.S. assists plots to dominate their countries[2] and anti-U.S. sentiment has become a "master narrative(s)."[3]

Similarly, recent conflict between Japan and East Asian states has been fueled by cultural and emotional contexts, such as the controversies surrounding politicians' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and history textbook revisions and censorship. Even though China and Korea are using these wedge issues against Japan as part of their strategy, Japan is losing legitimacy and popularity in international society as a result. Nevertheless, at the forefront of this dynamic is the notion that leaders in the U.S. and Japan have yet to take into account these groups' hatred and anger when thinking about security.

[1]Nakaya, Andrea C, ed., *Does the World Hate the United States?* (Farmington Hills, MI: Thomason Gale, 2005).
[2] Rugh, William A. *American Encounters with Arabs*. (Westport Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International, 2006).
[3] Judt, Tony. "A New Master Narrative? Reflections on Contemporary Anti-Americanism," in *With Us or Against Us. Studies in Global Anti-Americanism* , Ed. Judt, Tony and Lacorne, Denis. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 11.

Both the U.S. and Japan must avoid cultural and religious speeches and actions that stimulate this hostility. Farish A. Noor argues that words such as "crusade" and "Axis of Evil" would give legitimate basis for the use of terrorism against the West.[4] Ann E. Sartori argues:

> "Diplomacy is the use of language and other signals by one state in an attempt to convey information to another. [U]se of language by a representative of one state, aimed at influencing the actions of one or more others. Deterrence is the use of a particular subset of language – deterrence threats – to convey the information that a state is willing to fight over a disputed issue or issues. Deterrent threats are a form of diplomacy."[5]

The U.S. and Japan thus should conquer and lower enemies' hostilities through economic and cultural influences. The populizer of "soft power," Joseph S. Nye, states that culture will become the most influential resource to other states.[6] Through effective public diplomacy, gaining cultural influence would be greatly useful for security.

Attachment as a Bond of Value- and Interest-Based Alliances;

Managing emotion as a strategy can apply not only to enemies but also to alliances. There is a question whether the U.S.-Japan alliance is a value-based alliance or an interest-based alliance. Value-based alliances are seen as more reliable than interest-based alliances because the latter are subject to weakness if different interests arise. Value-based alliances generally avoid such conflicts.

If the U.S.-Japan alliance is interest-based, their relationship might not endure. The fact that both states' interests differ would distort the relationship far beyond that created by a differing interest itself. For instance, the U.S. strongly opposes Iran nuclear development program. Yet, future conflict between the U.S. and Iran would be unacceptable for Japan because of its heavy dependence on Iranian crude oil.

With regard to Japanese interests, Japan has pursued a permanent seat on the UN Security Council based on its international contributions and support for the Council's missions and goals. Yet, without U.S. support, Japan could have to give up its bid for the seat. Should the U.S. support Japan's bid even though it does not bring any benefit to the US, and might even create conflict with China? In reality, the U.S.-Japan relationship ultimately lies in both security interests and economic benefits. That being said, seeing theirs as an interest-based alliance only does note bode well for the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Is the U.S.-Japan a values-based alliance? Is a values-based alliance really any better? Both countries may share the same understanding of values, such as democracy, morality (human rights), and liberal/ free market economics. Yet, liberal economics might be seen as an obstruction to the bilateral relationship. Economic friction caused by Japanese protectionism has

[4] Noor, Farish A. "Uncle Sam to the Rescue? The Political Impact of American Involvement in ASEAN Security and Political Issues in the Wake of 9/11," in *With Us or Against Us. Studies in Global Anti-Americanism*, ed. Tony and Lacorne, Denis. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 208.
[5] Satori, Ann E. Deterrence by Diplomacy. Princeton University Press. Princeton. NJ. 2005
[6] Nye, Joseph S. Jr. *Power in the Global Information Age*. (London and New York: Routledge, 2004). 57.

been an alliance issue for many years. The liberalization of agricultural sectors, which Japan has rejected to protect its domestic industry remains a problem. Economic liberalism tends to be an interest for both countries and should not be considered a common value.

The Japanese constitution identifies three principles when thinking about peace: liberty, democracy, and peace. Peace is the ultimate value for Japan and is protected by the abandonment of military forces. Can we say the U.S. shares a similar interpretation and value of peace with Japan? The seemingly endless wars the U.S. has fought could be interpreted as imperialism. One might argue that using such forces does not shape peace but destroys it. That is, some disagreement might exist within the U.S.-Japan alliance, even when it is thought of as a values-based alliance.

Democracy might be seen as a common value of both states. Both institutionalists and constructivists argue that believing in democracy can create a security community among democratic states. Yet, values always turn into interests (the value "liberalism" is synonymous with economic interests) or interests are always stronger than values (people can live without democracy but cannot live without food and oil). Thus, it does not matter whether the U.S.-Japan relationship is values-based or interest-based. It will encounter frictions and disagreements that might weaken it if its members pursue mutually exclusive values and interests.

The remedy for this is emotional attachment. Understanding each culture brings attachment and builds stronger friendships and more peaceful communities. Even though people have different interests and values, if they understand one another on a fundamental level, they can overlook divergent values and interests and support each other more completely. In other words, both values-based and interest-based alliances can survive when based upon a deeper understanding of two different countries.

As such, public diplomacy would galvanize the U.S.-Japan alliance. Carol Gluck insists Japan has been an essential partner for the U.S.'s recent unilateral behavior. Gluck's historical analysis assumes that Japan is the most preferable partner for the U.S. because of Japanese gratitude over the past 60 years.[7] It would be ideal if the U.S.-Japan kinship went one step further and created emotional attachment for both states and their peoples. Public diplomacy helps to create a more emotional attachment for both nations and would ultimately lead to greater shared loyalty.

The Future of U.S.-Japan Security:

Only public diplomacy can shape reliable security communities between states. Public diplomacy as a security strategy is neither limited nor costly. Unlike other states' strategies, public diplomacy is not necessarily practiced only by states, but can be demonstrated by private sectors and state-private collaborations. Private sectors have a willingness to expand markets. Exporting cultural goods, such as movies, music, clothing, and education, would help facilitate understanding of foreign cultures. In other words, internationalization by domestic firms should be considered part of public diplomacy.

[7] Gluck, Carol "Japan and the United States in Re-Imperial Times," in *the New American Empire*, ed. Gardner, Lloyd C. and Young, Marilyn B. (New York and London.:The New Press. 2005). 255

Public diplomacy does not refer only to economic and cultural influences; favorable public sentiments by heads of state could also be an important vehicle. Political leaders should give light and honest compliments to volatile or potentially threatening enemies. For instance, the U.S. and Japan could say "Islam is a beautiful religion," or "Japan has learned many things from China and Korea throughout history." Such comments would make their enemies' negative perceptions of the U.S. and Japan more favorable.

States should make more of an effort to engage in public diplomacy. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs budget, Japan will spend approximately $300 million on public diplomacy in 2006 and the U.S. spent about $600 million in 2003.[8] The U.S. targeted Arab states and spent $100 million on that region.[9] Japan spent about $30 million on public diplomacy toward China. Both states have seemingly realized the importance of public diplomacy. Yet, as Makoto Yamanaka, Consul General of Japan, said, "There is no adequate public diplomacy." Both states must recognize the importance of such efforts for national security.

Recent enemies are likely to be motivated by negative sentiments. Thus, the U.S. and Japan must enhance their soft power to manage growing anger from enemies and, by extension, strengthen their partnership through public diplomacy. Such an effort – creating positive perceptions in allies and enemies – would confer legitimacy on their actions within the international arena. William A Rugh has argued that public diplomacy is not a panacea for all of our present problems, but it is a potentially valuable alternative to other more aggressive tactics.[10] Emotion is a significant part of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the next 20 years will prove that soft power can create greater security for both countries.

[8] MOFA, the 2006 budge. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/yosan/18/pdfs/h18_yosan.pdf (24 December, 2005)
[9] Jansen, Sue Curry. "Foreign Policy, Public Diplomacy, and Public Relation: Selling American to the World," in Bring 'Em on, ed. Artz, Lee and Kamalipour, Yahya R. (Lanham, ML. Roman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2005) 51.
[10] Rugh p198.

Strengthening Alliances through Strengthened Civil-Military Relations

By Corrine Thompson

Following the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meeting, "Transformation and Realignment for the Future" was released in October 2005 to address the changing regional and global security environment. Signed by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Minister of State for Defense Ohno Yoshinori and Minister of Foreign Affairs Machimura Nobutaka, it states that the U.S.-Japan security arrangement is at the core of the U.S.-Japan alliance and serves as the "indispensable foundation of Japan's security and peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region."[1] Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States says "For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan."[2] During the U.S.-Japan Security Seminar, participants noted that an alliance is only as strong as its weakest link, and identified the issue of U.S. bases in Japan as the weakest link. The centerpiece of the U.S.-Japan alliance is the U.S. troop presence in Japan, making civil-military relations the paramount threat to the alliance.

Civil-military relations are complex and traditionally refer to a national military and its civilians. In this situation, the issue is further complicated because the relations are between the U.S. military and Japanese civilians. The ability of the U.S. military and Japan to cooperate is imperative to the long-term stationing of troops in the country. The U.S. troop presence is not only important to Japan, but a high priority for the U.S., which views the deployment as imperative to its regional Asia and Pacific security strategies. While the U.S.-Japan case differs from most studies of civil-military relations, some of the best practices developed are applicable. If implemented they could help ensure the viability of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

One common means of improving civil-military relations is to move bases from urban areas and spread the burden among multiple communities. Currently the majority of U.S. military facilities are located in urban areas, although originally these areas were not urban. Okinawa hosts 66 percent of U.S. personnel in Japan, although the province accounts for only 0.6 percent of Japan's landmass. The issue of U.S. bases is complicated for the Japanese people. Some communities prefer not to host the bases for numerous reasons, including noise levels and pollution, while others welcome the income and employment generated by the U.S. military. Troop deployment and relocation are being negotiated between the U.S. and Japan. U.S. and Japanese officals are paying particular attention to the realignment of forces where U.S. facilities and areas are concentrated in densely populated areas.

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[1] Security Consultative Committee Document U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future. 2005. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 7 Feb. 2006 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html>.

[2] Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States. 2005. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 7 Feb. 2006 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html>.

The relocation of bases and troops is not a simple matter. Besides strategic concerns, the environmental impact, noise and pollution levels, and community safety issues all have to be addressed. Without doing so, moving bases will be of little consequence in the long run. Recently the U.S. has agreed to Japanese proposals to relocate a military base on Okinawa and abandoned a controversial plan to build a new base on the Henoko coral reef. Both governments have recognized the desire of Okinawa residents to have U.S. force relocations commence quickly, but Okinawa is the major U.S. logistics base in the Western Pacific. Finding a balance between maintaining deterrence and capabilities while reducing the burden on local populations will remain difficult. Seminar participants also noted that historical circumstances in Okinawa further complicate the issue and that the dispute over the U.S. troop presence may be a symptom of a much larger domestic problem within Japan.

While cooperation and joint exercises exist between the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the U.S. military, closer and more extensive cooperation and collaboration can improve civil-military relations. In demonstrating a more equitable distribution of roles and responsibilities in providing for Japan's security, Japanese civilians have a greater interest in maintaining the U.S. troop presence. Essentially, the U.S. military moves from being the "hired guns" of Japan's security to supporters and partners of the SDF. This could be accomplished in numerous ways: shared training, information sharing, and shared facilities. Stressing close and continuous policy and operational coordination and contingency planning has multiple advantages. Not only does it improve civil-military relations, but it improves the efficiency and response to security threats for all involved as well. It improves SDF capabilities and enhances readiness. Furthermore, U.S. troops are less likely to be viewed as "dominating" in the Japan-U.S. alliance and more as partners with the SDF.

Increasing joint exercises and sharing facilities without a strategic logic is unlikely. Seminar participants stressed the need for legitimate missions to justify the increased cooperation and coordination between the U.S. military and the SDF. Disaster relief operations could be that legitimate mission. Both the SDF and the U.S. military have an extensive and successful history of disaster relief. The U.S. and Japan were able to work well together during the tsunami disaster, and could potentially be even more effective and efficient in future crises with further shared training. Participants also suggested increasing joint operations in Asia and joining U.S.-Japan naval operations in the future.

Another way to improve civil-military relations is to introduce civil-military dual-use facilities and areas in a way that is consistent and compatible with the military's mission and operational requirements. U.S. forces have exclusive use of 89 facilities, comprising 77,000 acres throughout Japan[3]. Opening some of these areas not only increases positive contact between the military and civilians, but also extends benefits to the local population. Some dual-use facilities could include athletic and fitness centers. Unfortunately, in a post-Sept. 11 world, security issues make this increasingly difficult. The Japanese and U.S. governments have indicated an interest in finding opportunities to implement dual-use facilities, but have made little progress. Despite security concerns, further exploration is warranted.

[3] Yokota Air force base, Japan. United States Forces, Japan. 23 Nov. 2005. 13 Feb. 2006 <http://www.yokota.af.mil/PCS/FactSheets/USFJ/>.

The most important way to improve civil-military relations is to improve the reputation of U.S. troops. One avenue for this is confidence building measures (CBMs). Typically, CBMs are tools used between governments in times of conflict, but they can be applied elsewhere. CBMs try to lessen tensions and increase trust by promoting transparency and improving predictability in actors' behavior[4]. CBMs often utilize means that ensure direct and quick communication. To apply this to U.S.-Japan civil-military relations, the establishment of regional communication centers could provide a means of communication between the U.S. military and the Japanese population. Efforts to improve civil-military relations without providing an opportunity for debate may prove ineffective. Civilians need a place available to not only air their complaints, but to have their questions answered and their concerns addressed. Holding joint conferences and meetings with U.S. military and civilian leaders could provide another forum for communication. As an added benefit for the U.S.-Japan security alliance, it would also provide an opportunity to articulate defense priorities and explain the importance of the U.S. troop presence in Japan. The need for Japanese officials to rationalize and explain the U.S. troop presence at the local level was identified during the seminar as an important step for improving the alliance.

Cultural CBMs could also be useful. They seek to demonstrate sensitivity to traditional authorities and local cultures. This can be accomplished through a show of respect for cultural leaders and participation in traditional events. As part of an overall program of reaching out to civilians, the military should educate themselves on Japan's civics and history (military and political). Clarity and understanding of a society's culture and expectations provide an understanding of disputes and create the potential to prevent them. Showing interest in another's culture and history conveys respect for that culture and history, and mutual respect is a fundamental requirement of positive civil-military relations.

The improvement of civil-military relations is a long-term process requiring dedication and planning. The avenues open to improve civil-military relations between the U.S. military and Japan's civilians are numerous and pursuing them is essential to the viability of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the future. While disputes remain, both Japanese and U.S. officials have repeatedly reaffirmed their commitment to a continued security alliance. On Oct. 29, 2005, the SCC members "reaffirmed their shared view of the security environment, in which new and emerging threats have surfaced as common challenges that can affect the security of nations worldwide, including the U.S. and Japan. They also reemphasized the persistent challenges in the Asia-Pacific region that create unpredictability and uncertainty and underscored the need to pay attention to modernization of military capabilities in the region. In this context, both sides reiterated their commitment to work closely together to pursue the regional and global common strategic objectives[5]."

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[4] Creative Associates International. Tool Category C: Military Measures 5. Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBM). 2004. 12 Feb. 2006 <http://www.caii.com/CAIIStaff/Dashboard_GIRO AdminCAIIStaff/Dashboard_CAIIAdminDatabase/resources/ghai/toolbox5.htm >.

[5] Security Consultative Committee Document U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future. 2005. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 7 Feb. 2006 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html>.

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