



Arranged Marriage of the Willing:
Public Diplomacy Prescriptions for
Sino-Japanese Relations

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Executive Summary

China-Japan relations have entered a period of unprecedented tension. Official state visits have stopped since Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro's 2001 trip to China; and high-level dialogues have been few and far between. Public perceptions in both countries have reached record lows since the two normalized diplomatic relations in 1972. Scholars characterize the current bilateral relationship as "cold politics, lukewarm economics, and hot cultural exchanges."

One wedge that drives the two countries apart is their diverging interpretation and protracted settlement of historical issues. Too much attention has been focused on the Japanese prime minister's visits to Yasukuni Shrine. This overshadows more substantive and pressing problems, such as the displacement of and compensation for surviving victims of the Japanese aggression, who still suffer as a result of wartime atrocities. Two kinds of victims deserve immediate attention: 1) those injured by abandoned chemical and biological weapons (ACWs) in northeastern China; and 2) those who served as "comfort women" for the Japanese army during WWII. In addition to a speedy settlement of these issues, the two governments should join hands in establishing a mutually recognized interpretation of history, by publishing and adopting a joint history textbook for school children. An existing effort – *The Contemporary and Modern History of Three East Asian Countries* – collaboratively written and published by scholars and historians from China, Japan, and South Korea in 2005, serves as an example and basis for further cooperation.

Just as the Japanese government must assume its obligation to clean up wartime legacies, the Chinese government is responsible for correctly informing its people about modern Japan, which is different from that which waged the Second Sino-Japanese War. Japanese have long protested China's failure to acknowledge the contribution of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China's modernization and economic growth. Young people in China are often surprised to learn that many familiar projects were built with Japanese aid. Japan needs to realize that its ODA should help build a China that Japan would like to have as a neighbor. Another neglected subject is the work of Japanese NGOs working in China. A case study of one Japanese not-for-profit organization – the ABC Project Committee, which has helped Chinese victims of ACWs seek compensation from the Japanese government – paints a vivid picture of the extent and intensity of bilateral civilian collaboration.

In view of current political barriers to healthier China-Japan communication, people-to-people diplomacy is an ideal solution to bridge the gap and relieve tension. Civilian friendship organizations working on China-Japan issues alone cannot fix the deterioration in relations today. The most effective policy option, therefore, is government-sponsored public diplomacy, with an emphasis on people-to-people contacts. Successful public diplomacy will help shape public perceptions, build trust between the two peoples, generate economic interests, and establish confidence in future leaderships to permit them to find mutually agreeable solutions that overcome political impasse.

A number of agencies in China and Japan have realized the importance of promoting public diplomacy to reshape public opinion, and have embarked upon cultural projects and intellectual exchange programs toward this goal. They include: Japan's Foreign Ministry-

initiated fellowship and visa waiver programs for Chinese students that hope to “win over” a younger generation of Chinese leaders; joint degree programs established by China’s elite institutions such as Peking University and its Japanese equivalent Waseda University; and the China-Japan Friendship Association’s friendship sports events for elementary school students.

China fears the slightest evidence of Japan’s remilitarization and Japan has its doubts about China’s continued rise and strategic ambitions. China demands a sincere apology from Japan for its wartime conduct, while Japan demands that China be more transparent about its own military spending. Factors disturbing bilateral relations seem to be rooted in the two countries’ leadership: it is more “Beijing vs. Tokyo” than “China vs. Japan.” The “China School” and the “Japan School” in the two countries’ foreign ministries ought to be encouraged to play their roles more effectively.

Several policy recommendations are suggested for the two governments. China needs to devise a more efficient media policy and learn to adjust to changing international circumstances. Japan should put “understanding China” on its agenda, and use television to reach out to the Chinese people. Collaboratively, both governments could support a committee on joint history textbook, a Sino-Japanese exchange foundation, and the production of a bi-national film that depicts and reinterprets both countries’ WWII and postwar experiences.

The U.S. should play the important role of a “go-between” in the “arranged marriage” for China and Japan. It could share its public diplomacy successes and help establish a Joint Committee on the Settlement of Historical Issues, where it addresses the issue of releasing Unit 731 documents it obtained after WWII. The U.S. should also help set up an Institute for Objective Historical Research to enable scholars from both China and Japan to nourish a dispassionate and common understanding of history.

Arranged Marriage of the Willing: Public Diplomacy Prescriptions for Sino-Japanese Relations

By Peng Claire Bai

“The world is full of willing people, some willing to work, the rest willing to let them.”
- Robert Frost (1874-1963)

“Problems cannot be solved at the same level of awareness that created them.”
- Albert Einstein (1879-1955)

History does not predict the future. A glimpse of Sino-Japanese relations at the beginning of time reveals mentorship and reciprocity. When the “Middle Kingdom” enjoyed respect and tributes from its “subordinates” in the region, Japan was one of its most diligent disciples. *Kentoshi* – Japanese envoys to China in the Tang Dynasty – arrived as early as the 10th century to learn the language, calligraphy, painting, architecture, sculpture, wrestling, polo, and Buddhist scripts, as well as to borrow from what were then the most advanced political and legal systems.

Time passed. Japan absorbed nutrients from China and cultivated hybrid crops in its native soil. Starting from the 1890s, China sent exchange students to learn from the developments of the post-Meiji Restoration. These students – prominent among them Lu Xun, Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Zhou Enlai, Zou Rong, and Chen Tianhua – returned home and sparked the 1911 Revolution, the May 4th Movement, and the spread of Communist and Marxist beliefs among the young and progressive all over China.

Equally important were the two major wars between China and Japan from 1894-1895 and 1937-1945, however. The First Sino-Japanese War indicated that the power structure in Northeast Asia was undergoing critical changes; yet the number of casualties and the suffering caused by World War II revealed that neither country was ready to lead the region at that time.

Fortunately, the two countries were able to look forward. Following strenuous domestic reforms in each country, Japan and China achieved growth miracles and boosted their GDP to unprecedented heights. The two countries normalized diplomatic relations with the signing of the Joint Communiqué on Sept. 29, 1972. The development of bilateral economic relations has been particularly strong: according to Japan External Trade Organization statistics, Japan’s trade with China surged to \$189 billion in 2005, setting a new record for the seventh year in a row;¹ exports to China amounted to \$80.3 billion, while imports hit \$109 billion.² Japan’s investment in China rose to a record \$6.5 billion that same year.³ According to a Japan Student Services Organization survey, as of May 1, 2005, more than 80,500 Chinese were studying in Japan, accounting for two

¹ “Japan’s trade with China sets seventh straight record in 2005,” Japan External Trade Organization website, Feb. 22, 2006, retrieved at <http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/news/releases/20060222457-news>.

² James Przystup, “Japan-China Relations: Looking beyond Koizumi,” *Comparative Connections*, Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS, Vol.8 No.1, April 2006, p.128.

³ “Japan invested record \$6.53 billion in China in 2005,” *People’s Daily*, April 4, 2006, retrieved at <http://mnc.people.com.cn/GB/4267639.html>.

thirds of the total number of foreign students.⁴ Ever since China's reform and opening in 1978, over 110,000 Japanese students have studied in China.⁵

A reinterpretation of historical issues

One would presume that issues relating to World War II would have been dismissed with China's renunciation of war compensation and the remorse expressed by Japan in the Joint Communiqué. Therefore, it is both amusing and disturbing that historical issues have become the stumbling block preventing high-level dialogues and official state visits since October 2001. The inability to hold summits represents a crisis for foreign relations. In the words of Morita Minoru, a Japanese commentator, "it doesn't get any worse than not being able to hold summit talks... PM Koizumi has attracted monumental opposition from China and South Korea, and if Abe Shinzo [then candidate for Japan's next prime minister, since elected prime minister] continues to go about things the way he has, this situation will persist."⁶

The focal point of China-Japan tension today is clear: Japanese prime ministers' visits to Yasukuni Shrine, where Japan's Class-A war criminals from World War II are enshrined. On March 31, 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao further frustrated the policy community by officially stating that he is "ready to hold talks with Japanese leaders" as long as the latter "make a clear-cut decision to stop visiting Yasukuni Shrine," when he met with a delegation of seven Japan-China friendship organizations.⁷

Yasukuni should not be the centerpiece in China-Japan relations. True, as prime ministers, neither Koizumi nor his successors should worship at a shrine where some of the Shinto "Gods" committed hideous crimes against humanity. But Yasukuni in and of itself is merely a symbol. If China and other Asian countries reduce all disputes relating to the past to these visits, they are wasting time. At worst, they are drawing undeserved attention to the contentious place and, in effect, helping its owners to make a profit. The governments of China and South Korea should know that their protests have turned Yasukuni into a popular tourism destination in Japan, attracting domestic as well as international visitors at the price of ¥800 (\$8) per admission ticket.

History should be an "exit" instead of the "entrance" to bilateral problems. A good leader should be forward-looking, who "takes history as the mirror and looks forward to the future," and is capable of identifying areas where the two countries could work together to solve problems. Intelligent as these top leaders may be, they seem unable to discern the unresolved historical issues that continue to plague their countries. Understandably, Japan aspires to minimize the negative effects brought about by its defeat in the war and build a modern image to extensively participate in East Asian regional affairs. However, Japan perplexes its neighbors when it does not build this reputation through consistent, profound reflection on its wartime

⁴ "Chinese students in Japan exceeds 80,000," *Xinhua News*, Jan. 3, 2006, retrieved at http://news.xinhuanet.com/overseas/2006-01/04/content_4004789.htm.

⁵ "The 5th 'overseas education in China' Expo held in Japan," *Xinhua News*, Nov. 24, 2005, retrieved at http://news.xinhuanet.com/employment/2005-11/24/content_3826618.htm.

⁶ "An 'outsider' speaks out," *The Japan Times*, Sept. 3, 2006, retrieved at <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/fl20060903x1.html>.

⁷ "President Hu meets heads of 7 Japan-China friendship organizations," *People's Daily*, April 1, 2006: A1.

responsibilities and the causes for its defeat, but instead whitewashes or sometimes denies outright its wartime conduct.

To reinterpret historical issues, both countries need to adopt a forward-looking spirit and a cooperative attitude. There are numerous historical issues that both countries should put on their agenda and work together to solve. Three practical issues immediately come to focus: 1) clean-up the chemical and biological weapons abandoned in northeastern China by the notorious Unit 731 of Japan's Kanto Army at the end of WWII; 2) compensate victims that continue to suffer from these weapons in peacetime, along with laborers and "comfort women" forced to serve the Imperial Army during the war; and 3) establish a common understanding of WWII history by writing and officially adopting a joint history textbook in schools in both countries. (South Korea could and should be included in the latter two efforts.)

Devil-in-the-box: abandoned chemical weapons

Unit 731 tops the list due to both the appalling nature of its actions and the intensity of its continued impact. As Patrick Smith noted:

...even as crown prince, [Hirohito] was adamant as to the military uses of science, urging former tutors to develop the fungi and viruses needed to wage biological warfare. Thus were deadly bacteria bombs tested in China during the mainland campaign. By then Hirohito had approved the creation of the infamous Unit 731, a germ-warfare brigade distinguished as the only section of the army ever authorized by imperial decree.⁸

Ironically, this infamous brigade's chemical and biological warfare in China, which should have been considered a crime against humanity, was ignored in the Tokyo Trials because by bringing forward evidence against Unit 731, the allied powers, including the U.S., would have had to "publish the data obtained from the more than 3,000 human experiments performed in China."⁹ The allies decided that the "strategic value of controlling this data and preserving its secrecy outweighed its value as evidence."¹⁰

Therefore, this wartime atrocity was well hidden from the Japanese public until over 100 human skeletons were dug up in 1989 at a construction site near Shinjuku, where the Tokyo Army Medical College used to be.¹¹ In the meantime, from 1987-1998, more than 14 movies, documentaries, and TV series were produced about criminal activities of the Unit 731 in China, Japan, and several other countries in Asia.

Even without these visual reminders, it is impossible for the Chinese people to forget this tragic past as they frequently read about the exposure to leaking poisonous gas from buried canisters containing abandoned chemical weapons (ACWs) in the middle of domestic large-scale

⁸ Patrick Smith, *Japan: A Reinterpretation*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1997, p.230.

⁹ Takashi Yoshida, "A Battle over History: the Nanjing Massacre in Japan," in Joshua A. Fogel, *The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000, p.113.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Yamabe Yukiko, personal interview, April 11, 2006.

construction projects. This trend started in October 1974, when 32 men on the vessel *Hongqi 9* were injured and one was killed as a result of exposure to a canister containing ACW during a cleaning mission along the sea-route in Heilongjiang. In the summer of 1982, four more ACWs were excavated and five workers injured at a construction site in Mudanjiang city, Heilongjiang. In the spring of 1995, another incident took place in a village in Heilongjiang and killed one man.

It was not until August 2002 that the Tokyo District Court acknowledged, for the first time, that Japan had conducted biological warfare in China during WWII. Finally in September 2003, the Tokyo District Court ruled in favor of 13 Chinese victims of these incidents, stating that the Japanese government has the obligation to clean up ACWs in China and it was the government's inaction that contributed to the injuries upon these victims. The Court ordered compensation ranging from \$66,600 to \$200,000 from the Japanese government to the plaintiffs.¹²

The two countries signed a "Memorandum of Understanding on the Destruction of Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China" in July 1999. In September 2000, Japanese chemical weapons experts, working with China's People's Liberation Army (PLA), began the process of recovering the ACWs, mostly in Heilongjiang and Jilin provinces. Japan is committed to destroying an estimated 700,000 weapons by 2007 (the deadline has been extended to 2012). Recovered shells will be maintained in storage facilities pending construction of destruction plants and an agreement on neutralizing technologies.¹³ In September 2002, a team led by Iwatani Shigeo, director of an ACW office under the Japanese Cabinet Office, uncovered 467 shells including 193 chemical shells, four barrels of chemicals with a net weight of 306.5 kilograms, and 154 toxic canisters in Sunwu County, Heilongjiang. The team also cleaned up 1.8 tons of contaminated soil.¹⁴

This is far from the end of story. In August 2003, 36 workers were afflicted by poison gas leaking from ACWs at a construction site in Qiqihar, Heilongjiang; 29 of the victims were hospitalized and one died two weeks later.¹⁵ The following May, eight more workers in Qiqihar were hospitalized after exposure to fumes escaping from ACWs at a construction site. In July the same year, two Chinese children in Dunhua, Jilin, were injured by an artillery shell containing ACW. In June 2005, three Guangzhou residents were exposed to ACWs.

The list will lengthen in the next few years as the joint team continues its work excavating and recovering the ACWs. While we expect difficulty in the process, it would be worthwhile for the leadership in both countries to focus more attention and energy on this joint effort to give the residents in Northeast China a safe and clean environment.

¹² "Chinese victims won lawsuit against the Japanese government," *Jinghua Times*, Sept. 30, 2003, retrieved at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1026/2117526.html>.

¹³ James Przystup, "Japan-China Relations: Waiting for Zhu...", *Comparative Connections*, Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS, Vol.2, No.3, October 2000, p.98.

¹⁴ "Japanese team retrieves chemical weapons abandoned in China," *People's Daily*, Sept. 28, 2002, retrieved at http://english.people.com.cn/200209/28/eng20020928_104049.shtml.

¹⁵ James Przystup, "Japan-China Relations: Bridges to the Future, Reflections on the Past," *Comparative Connections*, Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS, Vol.5, No.3, October 2003, p.123.

Sadness of the comfort women

The “comfort women” were one of the ugliest stories of WWII, so despicable in fact that the perpetrators and their heirs were too ashamed to bring these actions to light until 50 years after they were committed. Politics, prejudice, and moral judgment impede proper apologies and compensation for the more than 200,000¹⁶ *ianfu* victims – referred to as “comfort women” – long after the war’s end. Even war criminals who admitted guilt would only “talk about killing POWs or looting, but hardly anyone admitted to raping and killing rape victims.”¹⁷ While the Japanese government attempted to set up funds in recent years to aid surviving comfort women, the efforts are inadequate in both the financial and psychological senses. Japanese prime ministers also failed to offer official apologies, which were supposed to accompany this compensation.

From its establishment in 1995 to the cessation of “atonement” payments in 2002, only 266 individuals from South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and the Netherlands have taken money from the so-called Asian Women’s Fund that was proposed by former PM Murayama Tomoiichi. The great majority of the surviving comfort women and their governments have maintained that they must have direct payment from the Japanese government together with official apologies.¹⁸ Yet

Legal resolutions cannot make up for the troubled lives many comfort women led after the war and the unhealed sorrow common to all of them. Nor do they have much to do with Japanese attitudes toward others. Sex tours to Seoul, Manila, Bangkok, and elsewhere are highly popular among Japanese men today. In provincial Japanese cities one finds groups of Thais, Koreans, Chinese, Filipinas, or Brazilians recruited as nightclub “entertainers,” whose employers often take away their passports and routinely withhold wages. It is difficult to view these practices as distinct from the imperial conscript’s one-hour visit to the house of comfort women.¹⁹

In this light, it is not difficult to understand radical Chinese reactions to the Zhuhai prostitution scandal in September 2003, when about 400 touring Japanese businessmen and 300 local prostitutes and nightclub hostesses allegedly had a three-day sex spree. Chinese nationalists vented on the Internet, noting that the scandal took place on the eve of the 72nd anniversary of the Manchurian Incident and this aroused great indignation among the Chinese people.²⁰

¹⁶ Gay J. McDougall, “Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like practices during armed conflict,” Report to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, June 22, 1998, retrieved at <http://www.unhcr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/fb00da486703f751c12565a90059a227/3d25270b5fa3ea998025665f0032f220?OpenDocument>.

¹⁷ Daqing Yang, “The Challenges of the Nanjing Massacre: Reflections on Historical Inquiry,” in Joshua A. Fogel, *The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000, p.156.

¹⁸ Thomas W. Burkman, “The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600-2000, Volume II: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1931-2000 (review),” *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol.30, No.1, Winter 2004, p.186, retrieved at http://muse.jhu.edu/cgi-bin/access.cgi?url=/journals/journal_of_japanese_studies/v030/30.1burkman02.pdf.

¹⁹ Smith, op. cit., p.273-274.

²⁰ James Przystup, “Japan-China Relations: Cross Currents,” *Comparative Connections*, Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS, Vol.5, No.4, January 2004, p.119-120.

A report by the *Xinhua News Agency* last year revealed the conditions in which many former Chinese comfort women live on the island of Hainan where concentration camps filled with comfort women were built during the war. Of the tens of thousands of Chinese women forced to serve as comfort women for the Japanese army, only 35 publicized their identities; among them, 21 came from Hainan. Even the brave ones who filed lawsuits against the Japanese government and fought on behalf of fellow female victims, live away from the crowd on limited subsidies (about \$10/month) from the local government, trying to tolerate discrimination and harsh insults from fellow villagers.²¹

The *Xinhua* report cited one scholar who pointed out that both the Chinese and the Japanese governments should help these former comfort women in three ways: a) provide physical checkups and medication; b) provide subsidies to meet basic living needs; and c) facilitate lawsuits and multidimensional compensation for their wartime suffering. It is imperative that the Chinese people remember this history and provide comprehensive assistance to these women to ensure their subsistence and their roles as living evidence of appalling war atrocities.

Official interpretation and collective memories of WWII

China and Japan do not share an official common understanding of WWII. The first textbook dispute between the two broke out in 1982 when Japan's Education Ministry approved for the first time a history text that "cleaned up" Japan's "aggression," referring to it as "entering" Northeast China. Then in 1986, it approved a history text that covered up the Japanese army's atrocities in Asia during WWII, and in particular, omitted the number of casualties in the Nanjing Massacre²². The situation worsened in recent years, culminating in the Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education's approval of a controversial high school textbook written by the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform in August 2004, and the Tokyo Metropolitan School Board's adoption of that text the following July.

Also in the summer of 2005, China, Japan, and South Korea simultaneously published *The Contemporary and Modern History of Three East Asian Countries* – a history textbook for teenagers collaboratively written by scholars and historians from the three countries, in the hope of establishing a jointly recognized interpretation of history, in particular the WWII period. The Trilateral Committee on the Joint History Textbook comprised of research scholars and university professors, was made up of about 40 people. Various civil group members donated pictures and other historical materials to the committee to assist in the writing of the book. The text appeared in all three languages, and the Committee is working to translate it into English and Esperanto to reach a wider audience.

Initially, authors from each country's committee wrote only about their own country; the drafts were sent to authors in the other two countries for proofreading and feedback. Thus, each chapter of the book, in the end, is a product of all three countries' efforts and is jointly agreed

²¹ "Comfort women: disgrace for a lifetime," *Xinhua News*, Aug. 15, 2005, retrieved at http://news.xinhuanet.com/focus/2005-08/15/content_3354923.htm.

²² "Revisionist history text: Japan will reap as it has sown," *Beijing Youth Daily*, April 6, 2005, retrieved at <http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2005-04-06/07395568598s.shtml>.

upon. As the editorial committee emphasizes, this book is not a historical narrative from a particular national point of view, but one that views history with an open mind and respect for all parties. The book has received positive feedback since its release in May 2005: it sold 70,000 copies in China within 10 days and was in its fourth reprint by late June, totaling 100,000 copies.²³ By the end of 2005, 110,000 copies were sold in China, 70,000 in Japan, and 50,000 in South Korea.²⁴

This effort's persistent idealism and more or less unbiased narrative encourage young people to become interested in and start to question historical conflicts, even if they do not find answers in the book.²⁵ It is not perfect, but it is a positive first step toward substantial resolution of historical problems among the three countries. Leaders in both China and Japan not only should be informed of and encourage similar endeavors, but must also offer involved academic and civic organizations financial support to ensure the continuity of their projects.

A “familiar” Japan unknown to Chinese youth

In addition to angst and resentment over remnant historical issues, Chinese youth are ignorant of Japan's postwar history. As in Japan, textbooks in China are to blame for the lack of a balanced picture of postwar Japan. Nestled under the U.S. security umbrella, Japan devoted almost all of its capital, social, and human resources to postwar reconstruction and economic development. Although these historical circumstances cannot and should not be reproduced, China can learn from Japan's modernization experience.

As scholars have argued, China's Ministry of Education should try to present a more balanced picture of Japan by incorporating the following in middle-high school history textbooks: 1) in the 60 years since the end of WWII, Japan followed the path of peaceful development and became the second largest economy in the world; 2) Sino-Japanese rapprochement occurred only after strenuous efforts on the part of visionary pioneers in both countries, and it had a very positive impact on China's foreign relations, e.g., the normalization of China-U.S. relations; and 3) Japan was the first country to lift sanctions on China and PM Kaifu Toshiki was the first leader of a developed country to visit China after Beijing's political disturbance in 1989.²⁶

ODA: “sympathy is not merely for others' sake”

The most heated debate surrounds China's lack of official recognition of Japan's financial assistance. Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China began in 1979, and as of June 2005, approximately ¥3.1331 trillion (\$26.78 billion) in loan aid (yen loans), ¥145.7 billion (\$1.245 billion) in grant aid, and ¥144.6 billion (\$1.236 billion) in technical

²³ “Joint history textbook in fourth reprint,” *Jinghua Time*, June 19, 2005, retrieved at <http://news.tom.com/1002/3291/2005619-2231506.html>.

²⁴ “New revisions to the joint history textbook,” *The Beijing New*, May 16, 2006, retrieved at <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2006-05-16/01468933073s.shtml>.

²⁵ For a detailed review of the joint history textbook, see Claire Bai, “The Weaker Voices in Northeast Asian History,” *Issues & Insights*, Vol.5, No.12, Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS, September 2005.

²⁶ Tao Wenzhao, “What China can do to improve Sino-Japanese relations?” *PacNet Newsletter*, Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS, May 4, 2006.

cooperation has been provided.²⁷ Japanese ODA to China is divided into three categories: a) grant aid: financial assistance that does not impose an obligation of repayment; b) loan aid: untied loans under relaxed conditions (low interest, long repayment period, etc.); and c) technical cooperation, such as the provision of technology to improve tech-literacy and technical levels in developing countries. While it is sensible to reduce the portion of grant aid as China reaches higher growth levels, it also makes sense to take into account the two countries' shared interests when considering the loan aid and technology cooperation portion of ODA. For instance, scholars have suggested that Japan use its ODA to transfer energy-saving technology to China and other Asian countries.²⁸

Even though Foreign Ministry spokespeople in China and Chinese ambassadors to Japan have remarked on several occasions that China appreciates Japan's ODA, the public is largely unaware of this program. Consider a major textbook used by an undergraduate international relations class at China's Peking University. In its chapter on Japan's postwar development, it mentions that "overseas development assistance is one of Japan's principal methods to improve its international reputation." But it merely stated that "two-thirds of Japan's ODA is concentrated in Asia, and ASEAN countries are its key recipients," without any specific mention of Japanese ODA to China.²⁹ Thus, it is no wonder many Chinese university students are surprised when they learn that the following major large-scale economic infrastructure projects that they are familiar with were supported by Japanese ODA:³⁰

- Tianshengqiao Hydroelectric Power Project (¥118.0 billion)
- Beijing-Qinhuangdao Railway Expansion Project (¥87.0 billion)
- Qinhuangdao Port Expansion Project (¥67.4 billion)
- Qingdao Port Expansion Project (¥59.7 billion)
- Shanghai Pudong International Airport Construction Project (¥40.0 billion)
- Shanghai Baoshan Infrastructure Improvement Project (¥31.0 billion)
- Environment Model City (Guiyang, Chongqing, Dalian) Project (¥30.7 billion)
- Beijing Capital Airport Terminal Area Expansion Project (¥30.0 billion)
- Beijing Subway Construction Project (¥19.7 billion)
- Beijing Shisanling Pumped Storage Power Station Construction Project (¥13.0 billion)

In addition, there are these medical and environmental infrastructure projects, commenced in 1996, with a focus on improving living conditions for China's urban and rural residents:³¹

- Public Health Improvement Project (Loan aid: ¥26.218 billion)

²⁷ "Overview of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China," Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, retrieved at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/region/e_asia/china/index.html.

²⁸ Feng Zhaokui, "The energy game between China and Japan," *China Youth Daily*, July 1, 2004, retrieved at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-07/01/content_1558891.htm.

²⁹ Fang Lianqing et al., *History of International Relations Post WWII*, Beijing: Peking University Press, 1999, p.525

³⁰ Compiled from "Overview of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China," Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, retrieved at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/region/e_asia/china/index.html.

³¹ Ibid.

- Inland Higher Education Project (Regional Vitalization, Market Economy Reform Support, and Environmental Conservation) (Loan aid: ¥25.482 billion)
- Public Broadcasting Infrastructure Improvement Project (Loan aid: ¥20.202 billion)
- Project for Construction of the China-Japan Friendship Hospital (Grant aid: ¥16.430 billion)

Japan's ODA to China has been suspended twice over the past two decades: the first time was right after China's political disturbance in 1989; and the second was in 1995, when Japan linked ODA to China's nuclear tests. The yen loans program reached ¥214.3 billion in FY2001, but then started a sharp decline after Japan's MFA conducted its first sweeping review of ODA to China that same year. Since then, the ODA program experienced three consecutive years of reduction to ¥96.6 billion of FY2003, a mere 45 percent of its peak.³² Finally, in March 2005, FM Machimura Nobutaka announced that the two countries agreed to terminate Japan's ODA loans to China by 2008.

Sakutaro Tanino, former Japanese ambassador to China, pointed out in 2000 that there were intense debates in Japan about ODA spending in China due to Japan's economic difficulties and China's reluctance to acknowledge that ODA played a role in its development.³³ Later, FM Kono Yohei commented during a meeting with Chinese FM Tang Jiaxuan that the combination of China's increased military spending and the high rate of economic growth was causing Japan to consider reviewing its ODA policy with respect to China. He also remarked that the Chinese government needs to inform its citizens of the content and effectiveness of Japan's ODA and increase transparency with respect to military spending.³⁴

While Japan's concern and complaints about China's lack of appreciation are justified, it should be noted that the ODA program is really a mutually beneficial collaboration. ODA is not related by any means to "war reparations"; instead, it is similar in nature to other construction projects that utilize foreign capital. Only a small portion of Japan's ODA to China is completely free assistance. With respect to the large portion of yen loans, a Japanese MFA spokesperson remarked that China is one of the best debtor nations and has an excellent record of paying back its debts.³⁵ The Chinese government and people need to understand that foreign economic assistance will phase out as their economy develops. In fact, countries such as Canada have already reduced assistance to China, and a Canadian parliament member even suggested that the government "turn off the tap" of Canadian foreign aid to China.³⁶

³² Masaki Hisane, "Japan's ODA at a Crossroads," *JFIR Commentary*, Dec. 9, 2004, retrieved at <http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/column/041209-1.pdf>.

³³ James Przystup, "Japan-China Relations: No Escaping History—or the Future," *Comparative Connections*, Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS, Vol.2, No.1, April 2000, p.79.

³⁴ James Przystup, "Japan-China Relations: Old Issues...And New Approaches?" *Comparative Connections*, Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS, Vol.2, No.2, July 2000, p.90.

³⁵ "Japan will terminate ODA to China," *International Herald Leader*, Oct. 8, 2004, retrieved at http://news.xinhuanet.com/herald/2004-10/08/content_2063123.htm.

³⁶ "Tory wants aid to China stopped," *CBC News*, July 23, 2005, retrieved at <http://www.cbc.ca/story/world/national/2005/07/23/china-aid050723.html>.

Many Chinese scholars agree that ODA is a win-win project by which Japanese enterprises market products and technology to China.³⁷ China's Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhang Qiyue noted that the yen loans were intimately tied to economic relations between the two countries and benefited Japanese companies.³⁸ In recent years in particular, the Japanese government paid a lot of attention to environmental protection and reform of environment policies in neighboring countries. Therefore, in spite of the 2004 debate over graduating China from Japan's ODA program, a Japanese MFA advisory panel on ODA recommended in 2005 that Japan continue aid projects for environmental protection and personnel training in China for Japan's own interest; the Japan Bank for International Cooperation announced \$80 million in untied commercial loans for China for use in the fields of energy and environment.³⁹

FM Aso Taro remarked recently that Japan's ODA is implemented to "raise the profile of Japan and its people in the world, and is a type of endeavor that should be considered with a broad and long-term perspective."⁴⁰ In this light, both countries should make a conscious effort to properly address the role of Japan's ODA to China. While the Chinese government needs to better inform its people of Japan's economic and other forms of assistance in China's modernization, the Japanese government would benefit from adopting a long-term strategic approach and be more creative in engaging China in economic and environmental cooperation. In short, Japan's ODA should help build a China that Japan would like to have as a neighbor.

Nongovernmental efforts: the ABC Project Committee

The endeavors of Japanese nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in China-Japan relations are another relatively unknown subject. Civilian organizations started promoting bilateral communication and exchange at the grassroots level even before the two countries normalized diplomatic relations. As shown in Table 1, there are an impressive number of Japanese NGOs in China; their work has had a deep and long-lasting impact on the Chinese people, and has sometimes changed public perceptions.

³⁷ Ma Junwei, personal interview, February 10, 2006.

³⁸ James Przystup, "Japan-China Relations: A Volatile Mix: Natural Gas, a Submarine, a Shrine, and a Visa," *Comparative Connections*, Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS, Vol.6 No.4, January 2005, p.128.

³⁹ James Przystup, "Trying to Get Beyond Yasukuni," *Comparative Connections*, Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS, Vol.7, No.1, April 2005, p.117.

⁴⁰ "ODA: Sympathy is Not Merely for Others' Sake," Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Aso Taro, Jan. 19, 2006, retrieved at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0601-2.html>.

Table 1. Number and Scale of Japanese NGOs in China (2002)

	Total number engaged in China	Engaged in cooperation ⁴¹			Engaged in exchange ⁴²
		Number	Operational expenses exceed ¥100 million	O.E. range from ¥50-¥100 million	
Foundations	150	89	53	12	149
Incorporated associations	56	38	12	6	53
Social welfare corporations	4	4	1	1	4
Religious corporations	2	2	0	0	2
Special corporations	1	0	0	0	1
NPOs	83	72	4	5	72
Voluntary organizations	640	344	9	8	620
Total	988	547	79	32	901

Source: Takahara Akio, "Japanese NGOs in China," in Lam Peng Er (ed.), *Japan's Relations with China: Facing a Rising Power*. London: Routledge, 2006, pp 240-241.

One example that showcases the success of such nongovernmental endeavors is the ABC (Atomic, Biological, and Chemical Weapons) Project Committee, a not-for-profit organization based in a Tokyo suburb that has hosted events, seminars, and exhibitions on Japanese Germ Warfare in China and Unit 731 for the past 15 years. The Committee currently has 15 full-time staff and 250 registered members; during its peak between 1993 and 1995, they had thousands of members from all over Japan. The primary objective of the ABC Project Committee is helping investigate ACWs in China, as well as assisting Chinese plaintiffs receive proper compensation for the damage done. The Committee has sponsored two educational trips for interested Japanese citizens: one to Harbin's Unit 731 Germ Warfare Exhibition Hall from June 7-11, 2006; another to the cities Jinan, Dezhou, and Qingdao of Shandong Province from Sept. 3-10, 2006 to talk with survivors and bereaved families.

The Committee has hosted victim hearings, assailant hearings, and exhibitions on chemical and biological warfare at institutions in Japan since 1993. In 1996, as Japan's Diet ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Committee started new exhibitions on the "poisonous gas" incidents caused by ACWs in China. As of 2006, it has organized about 160 exhibitions and spoken to more than 500,000 people. In 2001, the Committee published in Chinese a two-volume collection of evidence on the germ warfare of Unit 731, in which it compiled pictures, chronologies, secret documents, media reports, academic papers, and other

⁴¹ Takahara classifies cooperation as including: support in education, health and sanitation, environment and greenification, relief and emergency assistance for refugees, rural and urban development, gender, human rights, and fair trade.

⁴² Takahara classifies exchange as including: exchange of students and teachers, exhibitions, publications, speech contests, translations, development education in Japan, and exchange with Chinese living in Japan.

relevant materials recovered from the Jilin Provincial Archives and the Heilongjiang Provincial Archives, and confirmed the names of 277 victims.

One staff member related that their proudest – and saddest – moment was when relatives of those victims explained to them that without the Committee’s effort, they would never have found out what happened to their loved ones during the war. One man thanked the ABC Project Committee for helping to clear his father’s reputation and uncover his cause of death. He had always believed that his father was a “bad collaborator” with the Japanese army and probably got killed when China was liberated, as his fellow villagers repeatedly told him. The son lived in shame and disgrace after the war, until one day when he came across his father’s name in one of the books and learned that he had actually been a brave soldier in the Chinese army, but was captured and killed by Unit 731.⁴³

Yamabe Yukiko, an energetic lady of 76 and an unswerving fighter for justice and peace, is one of the principal investigators of Unit 731 war crimes. She has interviewed numerous survivors and documented a variety of evidence in video and photograph formats during her years at the Committee. Yamabe’s family was among the thousands of settlers to China’s Northeast in the 1930s, who went under the pretext of developing the region. After Japan’s surrender at the end of WWII, Tokyo abandoned many of the settlers, who then turned to local Chinese for help. Yamabe enlisted in the PLA and worked as an army nurse from 1945 to 1953. Upon returning to Japan, she joined the Japan-China Friendship Association and devoted her life to working as an ambassador of peace between the two countries. When the biological and chemical warfare crimes of Unit 731 were exposed in the 1980s, Yamabe wanted the world to know about the cruelty of Japanese militarism and invasion.

Yamabe also raises the issue of professional ethics. During her research, she discovered that some of the doctors sent to work with Unit 731 in China had been top medical students at the University of Tokyo and Keio University. After initial resistance, they succumbed to the temptation created by the rare opportunity to conduct experiment and even vivisection on human. After the war, these doctors not only evaded prosecution, but also became well-known for their experience in China. Patients would ask to see these doctors for their “advanced” skills. The medical profession never reflected on the implication of their wartime conduct, either. The ABC Project Committee thinks that these former military doctors also owe germ warfare victims an apology; what they did during the war was as unethical and inhumane as that done by the army.

Yamabe has been involved in a number of lawsuits seeking compensation for victims injured by ACWs. When she visited Harbin in 1995, she was introduced to Zhong Jiang, a victim of the 1982 Mudanjiang incident. Zhong was only 20 years old when he was exposed to the ACWs, and the injury ruined his health and his life. Yamabe exhausted her connections and solicited help from lawyers in both China and Japan; Zhong became the first Chinese plaintiff seeking compensation from the Japanese government for ACWs-inflicted injuries.

In February 2002, Zhong flew to Tokyo and started preparing his lawsuit with help from Yamabe and his lawyers. In the meantime, Yamabe and her colleagues organized exhibitions, hearings, and press conferences on ACWs, and facilitated meetings between Zhong and

⁴³ Yamabe Yukiko, personal interview, April 11, 2006.

opposition parties in Japan. Many Japanese were shocked by these facts and they offered strong support for Zhong's suit. His case also encouraged other victims in China: 18 plaintiffs soon gathered together and filed a collective suit against the Japanese government.⁴⁴ In September 2003, the Tokyo district court awarded ¥190 million in compensation to Zhong and his team, a ruling that was more than 20 years in the making.

The ABC Project Committee is one of many Japanese NGOs dedicated to resolving bilateral issues and promoting friendly ties. Positive nongovernmental efforts can usually be achieved with minimal governmental supervision and regulation. However, with appropriate guidance and support from the government, it is possible to optimize the work of NGOs and fully realize their potential. This leads to a discussion of the role of public diplomacy.

Public diplomacy: those willing to work

Public diplomacy “deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of intercultural communications.”⁴⁵ Edmund A. Gullion, former dean of the Fletcher School, who coined the term “public diplomacy,” stressed in 1965 that “central to public diplomacy is the transnational flow of *information and ideas*.”⁴⁶

Public diplomacy promotes a country's national interest through *understanding*, *informing*, and *influencing* foreign target audiences.⁴⁷ It works in three dimensions: daily communication of domestic and foreign policy decisions; strategic communication to develop policy themes; and development of lasting relationships with key individuals overseas.⁴⁸ Specific policies are devised to i) foster an accurate understanding of a country's national goals, policies, and activities abroad; ii) facilitate and broaden dialogues between domestic and international media, nongovernmental organizations, academic and other institutions; and iii) promote attractive “soft power products” to improve the country's image and raise appreciation among a foreign audience. Reshaping perceptions and opinions of foreign individuals is key to all three efforts.

While civic diplomacy contributed greatly to the normalization of relations between China and Japan, it cannot fix the deterioration in relations today. Friendship organizations working on China-Japan issues are often limited by their semi-official status: they have a

⁴⁴ Yu Baichun, “Yamabe Yukiko and ACWs lawsuits,” *Wenshi Chunqiu*, No.12, 2003, retrieved at http://www.gmw.cn/content/2004-12/14/content_143761.htm.

⁴⁵ “What is Public Diplomacy?” Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy website, retrieved at <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/murrow/public-diplomacy.html>.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Definition of public diplomacy used by the Planning Group for Integration of U.S. Information Agency into the Dept. of State (June 20, 1997), which also distinguishes “public affairs” from “public diplomacy” as the former aims to “inform the domestic audience.” Retrieved at <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm>.

⁴⁸ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics*, New York: PublicAffairs, 2004, p.107-109

difficult time developing new norms “by pressing governments and business leader to change policies.” They are relatively more successful in indirectly “altering public perception of what governments and firms should be doing.”⁴⁹ While Japan’s Foreign Ministry hopes to exert more influence on civic diplomacy, the Chinese government and ruling party pretty much dominate civic diplomacy and relevant organizations. If NGOs and other civilian groups are to play a greater role in reshaping public perceptions, it is necessary that both governments recognize their roles, provide them with stronger support, and give them more independence.⁵⁰

The most effective policy option is government-sponsored public diplomacy, with an emphasis on people-to-people contacts. In fact, when Foreign Ministers Li Zhaoxing and Aso Taro met at the Fifth Ministerial Meeting of the Asia Cooperation Dialogue in Doha in May 2006, they agreed to “promote people-to-people exchanges, especially among young people” of the two countries,⁵¹ in addition to their usual agenda on continuing a security dialogue, removing political barriers, and deepening economic cooperation. This is as much a strategic objective as a practical step to improve public opinion in their two countries.

Public opinion regarding China-Japan relations has experienced a downturn in recent years. According to a *Yomiuri Shimbun*-Gallup poll in 1999, 50 percent of Chinese respondents expressed an unfavorable opinion of Japan, and 46 percent of Japanese respondents felt the same way toward China. Three out of four Chinese respondents were unaware of the over ¥2 trillion ODA Japan had provided to China since 1979.⁵² A Chinese Academy of Social Sciences survey in 2002 reveals that 43.3 percent of Chinese respondents have an unfavorable opinion of Japan, 60.4 percent are concerned about Japan’s remilitarization, and “the Japanese Imperial Army” was the first image that came to mind when they think of Japan.⁵³

A 2005 *Yomiuri Shimbun* poll shows that 73 percent of Japanese believe Japan-China relations are not in good shape and 72 percent distrust China, an all-time high.⁵⁴ A poll conducted by Japan’s Foreign Ministry among 2,000 people aged 20 or older in February 2006 indicates that an overwhelming 67 percent of Japanese respondents do not think China-Japan relations are good: 78 percent think relations should be improved, but still 14 percent disagree. When identifying outstanding issues between China and Japan, 59 percent of respondents noted “historical issues including Yasukuni,” while 32 percent chose the “lack of mutual understanding,” and 30 percent highlighted “differences on international politics such as the UN reform.”⁵⁵

⁴⁹ Nye, op. cit., p.90.

⁵⁰ Sugiura Yasuyuki, personal interview, April 11, 2006.

⁵¹ “Tokyo urged to remove political obstacles,” *People’s Daily*, May 25, 2006, retrieved at http://english.people.com.cn/200605/25/eng20060525_268482.html.

⁵² James Przystup, “Japan-China Relations: Progressing, but Still Facing History,” *Comparative Connections*, Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS, Vol.1 No.2, October 1999, p.62.

⁵³ Liu Xiaobiao, “Where are China-Japan relations going?” *The Bund*, Aug. 13, 2003, retrieved at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guandian/1033/2015200.html>.

⁵⁴ James Przystup, “Japan-China Relations: Yasukuni Stops Everything,” *Comparative Connections*, Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS, Vol.7 No.4, January 2006, p.120.

⁵⁵ “Survey of Public Opinion on Japan-China Relations,” conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Feb. 10-13, 2006, retrieved at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/yoron05/index.html>.

The situation in Japan

Shortly after the 2004 Asian Cup soccer games, Japan's Foreign Ministry noted that the perception of China among Japanese youth was deteriorating. Prior to the tournament and the accompanying anti-Japan disorder, Japanese in their 20s and 60s usually had a quite favorable view of relations with China. People between the ages of 30 and 50 generally hold an unfavorable opinion of China. Since the Asian Cup, and especially after the anti-Japan demonstrations in major Chinese cities the following spring, pessimism prevailed in Japan with regard to the future of bilateral ties.

Sensing that Japanese youth do not by default harbor animosity against China and that their attitudes are largely a negative response to the Chinese protests, which creates a vicious circle of resentment between the two countries, Japan's Foreign Ministry (MFA) decided to continue exchange programs as well as initiate additional public diplomacy projects to reach out to China, particular Chinese youth. One MFA official remarked that Japanese feel that young people in China do not have sufficient access to resources to learn about the "reformed," modern Japan of today, and it is partly MFA's responsibility to take a "Chinese medicine" approach to inform the youth and help them understand Japan's domestic affairs and its China policy.⁵⁶

In this light, the MFA decided to reach out to and "invest" in Chinese "young leaders," through: fellowships for Chinese journalists, especially those working for private newspaper and magazines (this program has already existed for 10 years, generating 50-70 fellows); China-Japan high school exchanges and visa waivers to eligible Chinese students participating in these programs; and launching the very first English-language TV channel, broadcasting to China and the rest of the world political and economic affairs in Japan. This last effort was inspired by China's many English TV and radio channels. MFA officials think that Japan needs to help the Chinese understand Japan before blaming China for the consequences of misperception and lack of understanding.

The situation in China

Contrary to popular opinion, endeavors by China's "Japan hands" have not gone completely unnoticed. In early December 2002, Ma Licheng, a senior commentator at *People's Daily*, published an article titled "New Thinking on Relations with Japan" in the influential journal *Strategy and Management*. This piece received much intellectual attention overseas, and resonated within the Chinese Foreign Ministry. Subsequently, Wu Dawei, China's ambassador to Japan commented in February 2003 that "Japan's government and people had contributed significantly to China's modernization," and he expressed China's gratitude for Japan's yen loans and economic cooperation.⁵⁷

However, as long as senior Chinese leaders do not give the "go ahead" signal, no junior official will be willing to risk a political career to support implementation of this "new thinking"

⁵⁶ Taniguchi Yoshihiko, personal interview, April 7, 2006.

⁵⁷ James Przystup, "Japan-China Relations: Cross Currents," *Comparative Connections*, Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS, Vol.5 No.1, April 2003, p.107.

in China's Japan policy.⁵⁸ As a result, in spite of the sensation Ma's article created, there was no breakthrough in China-Japan relations between 2002 and 2003. (The same is true in the Japanese government. Few, if any, Diet members have stood up for China, as most see it as a vain effort to battle the prevailing negative views of China.) Judging from this, and the fact that decisions regarding leaders' summits are generally made by those at the top of the government, the "Japan School" in the Foreign Ministry has limited impact on China's Japan policy.

Despite this unfortunate reality, continuous efforts have been made to thaw relations by various government-sponsored China-Japan friendship organizations. As of 2004, there were 227 friendship-city arrangements between the two countries,⁵⁹ e.g., between Beijing and Tokyo, Shanghai and Osaka, Nanjing and Nagoya, and Chongqing and Hiroshima. The Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC) and the China-Japan Friendship Association (CJFA) are currently planning the fourth China-Japan Friendship Ping-Pong Competition to take place in 2007, marking the 35th anniversary of the normalization of relations. In contrast to previous friendship competitions, participants will mainly be elementary school students from the friendship cities; each pair of sister cities will join hands as one team to play other joint teams. One official from the CJFA thinks this arrangement will give young people from both countries a good opportunity to get to know each other and develop team spirit.⁶⁰

Another noteworthy example is the "Graduate Program in International Relations," established in 1996 and sponsored by a grant of \$774,000 from the Nippon Foundation, between China's Peking University (Beida) and Japan's Waseda University. The project "aims to foster global-minded international relations experts in China" by supporting a master's course at the School of International Studies (SIS) at Beida, and a joint doctoral course at Beida and the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies at Waseda. Students spend the first and fourth years of their studies at Beida, and the second and third at Waseda, where they focus on Japanese language and studies. A month-long trip to Japan is organized in the summer after their first year, during which students stay with Japanese host families and visit cities such as Tokyo, Yokohama, Kyoto, Osaka, and Hiroshima. The program is "an attempt to build a cadre of Chinese experts in international relations who have a focus or special interest in Japan."⁶¹

The Beida portion of the master's program, nicknamed the "Japan Class," usually has about 10 students. The Waseda Ph.D. portion included 11 people in 2005 and 16 in 2006. In 2004, five students out of 89 in the graduating class of SIS entered the "Japan Class." In 2005, five out of 105 did so. After her trip to Japan in the summer of 2005 (her first trip abroad ever), one MA candidate said that she "gained a vivid understanding of Japan, made friends, and established personal connections." She also expressed increasing interest in China-Japan relations and new thinking on bilateral issues after "experiencing firsthand the Japanese society and communicating with its people."⁶²

⁵⁸ Bonnie Glaser, personal communication, March 20, 2006.

⁵⁹ "Appeal for Peace and Good-Neighborliness," signed by 60 civil organizations from China and Japan, Tokyo, April 12, 2005, retrieved at <http://www.china-embassy.or.jp/chn/xsgxx/t191757.htm>.

⁶⁰ Qiao Lun, personal interview, April 11, 2006.

⁶¹ Program description on the Nippon Foundation website, retrieved at http://www.nippon-foundation.or.jp/eng/programs/asia_2004.html.

⁶² Fei Yang, personal communication, Aug. 21, 2005.

A participant in another graduate exchange program between Beida and the University of Tokyo commented that her six months in Japan was a very valuable experience, especially since she has been a student of the Japanese language for seven years.⁶³ She noted that she would benefit from the clash of ideas with Japanese people who hold different views regarding historical and other issues, as most of her contacts in Japan are people with an interest in China and Sino-Japanese relations, and, therefore, share similar ideas with her. She is a native of Liaoning province, which was part of the Manchurian Empire colonized by Japan during the war years; she touted the value of exchanges between residents of northeastern China and Japan to ease ingrained hostile feelings.

Scholars argue that China-Japan relations are characterized by “cold politics, lukewarm economics, and hot culture exchanges.” Ultimately, people-to-people contacts shape public perceptions, build trust between the two peoples, generate economic interests, and establish confidence in future leaderships to permit them to find mutually agreeable solutions that overcome political barriers.

Leadership challenge: those willing to lead

When the Qing government signed the first “Sino-Japanese Treaty” in 1871, Japan’s intentions and territorial ambitions toward China worried many statesmen and generals. Li Hongzhang, chief minister of the Qing government, expressed prior to the negotiation his concern about the *wako* problem – Japanese pirates who raided the coastlines of China and Korea since the 13th century.⁶⁴ At the turn of the 21st century, Japan’s remilitarization, among other things, again caught China’s attention. Some say it has to do with the Chinese government’s “victimization” mentality; others argue it is related to frustration with China’s reform and urbanization process. Meanwhile, Japan consistently demands that China be more transparent about its own military spending.

According to Fareed Zakaria, “statesmen, not states, are the primary actors in international affairs, and their perceptions of shifts in power, rather than objective measures, are critical.”⁶⁵ How the political elites in Beijing and Tokyo view bilateral relations and their subsequent policy options to accommodate and balance shifts of power are, therefore, critical to the direction of developments between the two countries. Many in the academic and policy communities say that East Asia is too small for power competition between China and Japan, and that a rising China challenges Japan’s leadership role and overshadows its influence in the region. Both sides worry about the other’s intention to assert a leadership role; and both sides blame the other for undeserved criticism. It is widely accepted in both countries that the “1972 system” has changed, but there is not a new system to take its place. Scholars and experts are disheartened to see that the major factors disturbing bilateral relations are in the two countries’ leadership: it is

⁶³ Liu Wei, personal communication, Aug. 2, 2006.

⁶⁴ Wang Shaofang et al., *A Diplomatic History of China from the Opium War to the 1911 Revolution*, Henan: Henan People’s Press, 1988, p.147.

⁶⁵ Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: the Unusual Origins of America’s World Role*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998, p. 42.

more about “Beijing vs. Tokyo” than “China vs. Japan;” and more like “middle-aged career politicians fighting over politics” than “two peoples pointing fingers at each other.”⁶⁶

Since the end of WWII, China viewed Japan as a more developed partner with which it could share abundant and scarce resources in East Asia. Japan viewed China as a less developed partner, which needs a more transparent regime and modern agenda. While China must pay due respect to Japan’s postwar developments and contribution to China’s modernization; the Japanese leadership must recognize that it is in Japan’s interest to see a stable and sustainable Chinese economy, equal distribution of wealth and more balanced development in China’s vast urban and rural areas.

Today, politicians in both China and Japan seem to be venting domestic frustrations through foreign policy. This leads to an unfortunate self-fulfilling effect. Frustration is dangerous because it easily mobilizes nationalism. Japanese scholars argue that most politicians in Japan lack a systematic strategy to deal with China. This lack of strategy, combined with the leadership’s anti-Chinese actions and assertive statements, is misinterpreted by Chinese to mean that Japan intends to return to its pre-WWII policies: Chinese politicians tend to simply connect the dots. Scholars argue that the Chinese leadership should induce their Japanese counterparts to discuss “strategies” and then attack them.⁶⁷ In present circumstances, however, both China and Japan lack substance in their debates, especially in regard to the Yasukuni Shrine issue, which only leads to an emotional vicious circle. Both leaderships should adopt a sense of crisis and search for a common agenda to improve the situation.

Some politicians in Japan are concerned that China’s foreign policy seems to “avoid direct confrontation with countries that China does not particularly like.”⁶⁸ They note that China seems to communicate with ASEAN without involving Japan in regard to the East Asia Community building. Japanese thus worry that in the bilateral relationship, China might avoid talking directly to Japan and instead resort to other factors or outside influence. It is unfortunate that Yasukuni dominated China-Japan relations for such a long time. While many Chinese strongly feel that it is a provocation and hurts their feelings, experts in Japan fear that China would merely find a second issue even after the Yasukuni matter is settled. This concern might have contributed to PM Koizumi’s unwillingness to change his stand on the issue.

Scholars and politicians note that worsening bilateral relations may result from a crisis of confidence in Japan. In the 1980s, China condemned Japan for its revisionist history textbook and other issues, but Japan did pay much attention to such complaints largely because its economy was growing, the political system was stable and the society was quite confident. Japan no longer has that confidence, and tends to find fault with China more often.⁶⁹ There are fears that a less confident Japan today might seek clues from its WWII and prewar experiences to solve current conflicts.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Kokubun Ryosei, personal interview, April 7, 2006.

⁶⁷ Soeya Yoshihide, personal interview, April 7, 2006.

⁶⁸ Miyagawa Makio, personal interview, April 10, 2006.

⁶⁹ Zhu Jianrong, personal interview, April 10, 2006.

⁷⁰ Fukuda Tatsuo, personal communication, Dec. 16, 2005.

Strategic calculation and miscalculation

China-Japan relations reached its pinnacle in 1992, after then CCP Chairman Jiang Zemin visited Japan, and Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko made a reciprocal visit to China to mark the 20th anniversary of the normalization of relations. According to one eyewitness in Beijing as a journalist at that time, when he went to Tiananmen Square to report on the Emperor's visit, almost every Chinese he spoke with expressed a favorable opinion of Japan. One man even remarked that he did not have a bad memory of the war because the Japanese army never went to his village.⁷¹ That same year, Sun Pinghua, late chairman of the China-Japan Friendship Association, commended Japan for being the first country to end sanctions against China after the 1989 political disturbance, and proposed that historical issues between the two be left to the past. Sun received an Order of Merit of the First Treasure from Emperor Akihito.

Around 1994-1995, however, the atmosphere in China changed. The CCP first launched a national propaganda campaign to "revive the Chinese nation," and then, as the 50th anniversary of the end of WWII approached, the government fostered intensive patriotic education in Chinese schools. Field trips, writing contests, and choral competitions were organized for elementary and middle school students, through which they studied the history of WWII and commemorated martyrs who died for the country in combat. China places high value on honor; therefore, such patriotic education achieved, to some extent, its desired impact on youth.

Instead of creating anti-Japanese sentiment in China, the primary purpose of this history education was to foster patriotism in the next generation. In fact, from 1970 to the early '90s, Chinese textbooks did not devote much attention to the Sino-Japanese war. Of the 100 Patriotic Education Bases in China, only three took the war as a theme: the Marco Polo Bridge, the Nanjing Massacre Museum, and the Site of the Pingdingshan Massacre. While China's 5,000 years of history is a source of pride, the painful experience of WWII is deemed an important lesson to be passed down from generation to generation so that the Chinese can use history as a mirror. Hence, the Chinese people feel perplexed when they see something fundamental is lacking in the teaching of history in Japan, such as the "study of responsibility through historical knowledge."⁷² Nevertheless, this education campaign revived in China many dreadful memories of WWII and nationalistic sentiment.

At the same time, the collapse of Soviet Union deprived China and Japan of a common "adversary." China's growing influence in the world is thus becoming more and more conspicuous. In this context, China's patriotic education is often perceived as a form of nationalism, and roused confrontational sentiment in Japan. This, topped with China's lack of appreciation of Japan's ODA efforts, fostered in Japanese youth resentment of Japan's "bended-knee diplomacy" toward China. They believe that Japan assumes the role of *make gumi* (the defeated group) in Japanese society, while China assumes the role of the *kachi gumi* (the victorious group).

Contrary to popular perceptions in China, Japanese intellectuals, politicians, and the general public usually attribute the downturn in Sino-Japanese relations to President Jiang

⁷¹ Shimizu Yoshikazu, personal interview, April 6, 2006.

⁷² "Interview with Wang Min," *Asia Pacific Perspectives*, Vol.3, No.9, January 2006, p.39.

Zemin's state visit in 1998. Following the 1996 China-Japan leaders' summit in Manila, PM Hashimoto Ryutaro's administration adopted a series of measures to rebuild confidence and trust between political leaders and the public of the two countries. Jiang's 1998 visit was part of these confidence building measures (CBMs). In fact, before signing their Joint Communiqué, Premier Zhou Enlai and PM Tanaka Kakuei both stressed the importance of fostering trust to healthy China-Japan relations.⁷³ But Jiang's repeated references to history during his visit "generated an immediate and negative public reaction in Japan."⁷⁴

When China normalized relations with Japan, the Chinese leadership made an extraordinary effort to end its isolation and ease tension with the former Soviet Union. It never demanded a thorough apology from the Japanese government before waiving the right to war reparations (estimated to be worth over \$1 billion today⁷⁵); nor did it really encourage domestic research and discussions of WWII, and merely described the aggression as a sinful decision made by a group of radical militarists. The Chinese public accepted this decision by their leaders; few victims raised questions about their right to war compensation. The sincerity of the Japanese leadership and the benefits that followed normalization of relations helped the people temporarily forget their past suffering and concentrate on the present.

With the end of the Cold War, however, the Chinese leadership could no longer control intellectual or popular curiosity about the Sino-Japanese War, and the two countries' long unsettled historical disputes emerged and inflamed bilateral relations. In the demonstrations of spring 2005, many Chinese participants in Beijing and Shanghai were merely using the occasion as an outlet for their personal frustration and discontent. In Japan and elsewhere, however, their actions were perceived and portrayed as "irresponsible." As a journalist explained, the Japanese press favors negative reporting over positive, as the former is usually more eye-catching. In addition, because the Japanese press is private, the government is pretty much the only entity that buys pages to print positive news. And since there is plenty of negative news about China, this resulted in the Japanese perception of a "fearsome" rising China.⁷⁶

The "China School" vis-à-vis the "Japan School"

The real challenge for both leaderships lies in their ability to discern the real essence of their relationship, to look beyond superficial disputes such as the Yasukuni problem, and make well-informed decisions with the aid of experts from the "China School" and the "Japan School" in their foreign ministries. China's modern identity and its drive for economic growth were to some extent fostered amid negative sentiment toward the Sino-Japanese War. To the leadership, as well as the general public, only unequivocal recognition of war guilt by the Japanese people as a whole can permit development of positive bilateral relations. Even though young Japanese today are not responsible for war crimes committed by their relatives, they are, nevertheless,

⁷³ Liang Shoude ed., *Europe and Major Power Relations in the New Century*, Beijing: China Radio International Press, 1999, p.217.

⁷⁴ James Przystup, "Japan-China Relations: Progressing, but Still Facing History," *Comparative Connections*, Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS, Vol.1, No.2, October 1999, p.58.

⁷⁵ Andy Xie, "Sino-Japan Relationship Is on a Slippery Path," *Morgan Stanley Investment Perspectives*. New York: Morgan Stanley Research, April 12, 2006, p.10.

⁷⁶ Shimizu Yoshikazu, personal interview, April 6, 2006.

responsible for the so-called “ghost politics” that revolve around the Yasukuni Shrine visits and impairs healthy relations with Japan’s neighbors.

Scholars and officials in China and Japan feel that the East China Sea oil dispute – a much more substantial problem – will take precedence once the Yasukuni farce ceases. This does not mean that formality and diplomatic protocols are less important than substance. Instead, rhetoric and diplomatic grace are the keys to unfreezing China-Japan relations. China and Japan share a common culture in which individuals easily succumb to social pressure and seldom seek to break free of the “sameness” that surrounds them. As long as the top leadership in China does not give its “go ahead” signal, public intellectuals will not be comfortable speaking on behalf of Japan or even in an objective tone, for fear of being labeled as “pro-Japan.” Even some of China’s best “Japan hands,” who have a profound understanding of both countries, struggle with domestic pressure when it comes to diplomacy.

A telling example of this situation occurred when Wang Yi, Chinese ambassador to Japan, failed to appear at Japan’s Foreign Ministry when called by Japan’s vice foreign minister, who wanted to officially protest FM Li Zhaoxing’s comment that Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits were “not moral” and “stupid.”⁷⁷ Wang’s action was deemed diplomatically unacceptable by the host nation, and the Japanese policy community considered it impolite even though it knew that Wang might have been concerned about his career in Beijing.⁷⁸ The nature of the incident notwithstanding, Wang’s “diplomatic disgrace” contributed to the deterioration of bilateral relations.

Reviving the “China School” in Japan’s Foreign Ministry and the “Japan School” in the Chinese Foreign Ministry is an ideal way to help both leaderships become better informed about foreign policy. There are a number of obstacles to realizing this goal, however. For Japan, it is difficult to overcome prevailing negative attitudes toward China and the “China School Bashing” in the government. Scholars argue that Japan lacks a “China strategy”: it is either pro-U.S.-anti-China, or pro-Taiwan-anti-China; either way it is clear-cut and xenophobic. Japanese politicians need to be aware that the “China School” is not just a group of pro-China scholars and diplomats; they are people who understand China, know what is in Japan’s best interests, and how Japan can best communicate with China.

Leaders that value good China-Japan relations include the politicians Tanaka Kakuei (1972-1974), Ohira Masayoshi (1978-1980), Hashimoto Ryutaro (1996-1998), Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato Koichi (1991-1992), Chief Cabinet Secretary Gotoda Masaharu (1982-1987), Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka Hiromu (1998-1999), and Ambassadors Tanino Sakutaro (1998-2000), Anami Koreshige (2001-2005), and Miyamoto Yuji (2006-present). Their China policies and political decisions vindicated Japanese national interests. One politician remarked that in the next 10-20 years, Japan’s *zaikai* (business and financial circle) hopes to see a more moderate politician, who understands China, elected prime minister. Japanese businesspeople and finance

⁷⁷ “Japan, China in new shrine row,” *BBC News*, March 8, 2006, retrieved at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4784716.stm>.

⁷⁸ Tanino Sakutaro, personal interview, April 6, 2006.

officials believe that an aging Japan will have to borrow substantially from China in the next few decades, and China can help so long as bilateral relations are good.⁷⁹

The Chinese government, on the other hand, needs to better nurture the “Japan School” and work harder to win the hearts and minds of pacifists in Japan. It should learn to better manage nationalism so as to prevent rightwing activists in Japan from taking advantage of its negative impact to stir up the so-called “China threat” theory. A former Japanese diplomat feels that the Chinese leadership should be more sympathetic toward China’s “Japan hands.”⁸⁰

One lesson that China should draw from its dealings with Japan is that when analyzing conflicts of political and economic interests, such as the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island dispute and joint exploration in the East China Sea, it should focus on the problem at hand, instead of bringing up history. Moreover, the Chinese leadership should do everything it can to build a positive international image. People in the West generally have a favorable impression of Japan, as it opened up early and shares Western political systems and ideology. Although it has been nearly three decades since China adopted its open door policy, radical opinions still appear when the West assesses China. Therefore, it is especially important and wise for China to resort to “soft power” approaches to inform the world about what is going on between China and Japan. Mere diplomatic protests and public demonstrations only elicit misperception of China’s benign intentions.

Additionally, both leaderships need to find a way to handle the negative impact of ultra nationalism. Worried about pleasing their constituencies, politicians tend to appear as “hardliners” when it comes to foreign policy; they feel that offering criticism, and “China School bashing” or “Japan School bashing” is “easy” and “safe” when it concerns their political careers. Sometimes they appear on radical “political shows” to gain popular support. To make matters worse, public opinion in both countries sometimes encourages hard-line or more confrontational approaches. It refuses compromise, and even deems diplomatic flexibility as “weakness.”

Generational change and evolving perceptions

The older generations in China and Japan might still retain somewhat biased perceptions of each other; but at the turn of the century, the younger generations know well, thanks to the Internet and other communication technologies, how the other side has changed. Japan is no longer a militarist regime, and Chinese cities, such as Shanghai and Guangzhou, look much like Tokyo. Motivated by the two countries’ economic cooperation, many Japanese students attend universities in China to study the language and Chinese youth have grown up with Japanese culture and products. Even at the peak of domestic anti-Japanese sentiment, popular Cosplay⁸¹ societies in major Chinese cities still performed regularly and held their annual competition.⁸²

⁷⁹ Ochi Takao, personal interview, April 6, 2006.

⁸⁰ Tanino Sakutaro, personal interview, April 6, 2006.

⁸¹ “Costume play,” a Japanese subculture centered on dressing as characters from manga, anime, and video games.

⁸² “In the heat of the 3rd annual Cosplay competition,” *NetEase*, July 13, 2005, retrieved at http://game.163.com/huodong/chinajoy_05_cos/editor/050713/050713_452695.html.

China's 1980s generation "will not say 'no' to world trends." They saw China adopt a policy of reform and opening up, and they are computer-literate and Internet-savvy. They were taught at school about the history of Sino-Japanese conflict, yet they are also surrounded by Japanese technology and cultural products. Many young Chinese seek a new individuality that relates better to the international community; in today's "composite culture," they sometimes resort to Japanese literary works – for instance, Murakami Haruki – for inspiration, and find resonance with the views and philosophies of Murakami's characters. Young people with ambivalent feelings toward Japan feel "betrayed by a close friend" when Japan does things that hurt their country's pride.⁸³

Youngsters from the two countries get along more easily with each other because they are not so much bothered by memories of the war. By the same token, when a Japanese youngster with no war memory and little notion of history visits China for the first time and experiences animosity against his country for reasons that defy comprehension, he is more likely to embrace radical views and come to resent China himself. In fact, before even setting foot in China, some young Japanese tourists already felt insecure as a result of continued media reporting on anti-Japan sentiment. For example, in the week of April 21, 2005, shortly after the demonstrations against Japan's UN bid in Shanghai and Beijing, JAL and ANA – two major Japanese airlines – received over 5,200 cancellations of scheduled trips to China for the May "Golden Week" holidays. Many tourists feared that they would not be welcome in China.⁸⁴

Watanabe Tsuneo, editorial chief of *Yomiuri Shimbun*, is worried about the consequences of the absence of historical memory and experience among the younger generation.

I am 79 years old. When we are gone, there will be nobody who remembers the realities of the [Sino-Japanese] war and I worry that there will only be debate on *ideas* about it rather than on *experiences*. Chinese and South Koreans are building museums and taking other means to preserve extreme aspects of the war for the next generation and thereby fanning anti-Japan movements. I believe I should talk about what I actually experienced in the war and keep records. I should talk and write that the Japanese military did terrible things.⁸⁵ [Italics added.]

Scholars have urged that young people in China begin seriously considering the value system and historical perspective they should inherit from their parents.⁸⁶ Youth should no longer simply follow the standards set by their elders, as many of today's problems are rooted in history. Of course, the younger generation should never forget history; but it is equally important to learn to look ahead. It is easy for politicians to implement an oversimplified policy, but much harder for the public to accept and reconcile among themselves. This should be a social issue, not one that just concerns the younger generation. The government, educational departments and organizations should get involved and help develop policies.

⁸³ "Interview with Wang Min," *Asia Pacific Perspectives*, Vol.3, No.9, January 2006, p.36.

⁸⁴ Osuga Tomoko, personal communication, April 26, 2005.

⁸⁵ "Yomiuri, Asahi editorial chiefs call for a national memorial," *Asahi Shimbun/Ronza*, Feb. 9, 2006, retrieved at <http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=9753>.

⁸⁶ Li Xiaoning, personal communication, March 10, 2006.

Policy recommendations

Efficient public diplomacy is one way to exercise a country's soft power and win the hearts and minds of target audiences. In the past, many Chinese public intellectuals and Japanese government officials proposed steps to improve China-Japan relations. Professor Shi Yinong of People's University in China put forward a five-point "China-Japan rapprochement" in 2003 to the Chinese leadership: 1) adopt historical confidence and patience, remove historical disputes from the short-term agenda and official propaganda; 2) officially express China's appreciation for the role Japanese ODA played in China's development; 3) be more understanding and accommodating to Japan's seeking influence in the region, while facilitating CBMs between the two countries' militaries; 4) welcome Japan's participation in East Asian multilateral institutions, and economic, political and security cooperation; and 5) choose an appropriate time to support Japan's UN Security Council bid.⁸⁷ The key of this proposal is for China to convey the message that "China is rising peacefully" to Japan's government, political elite, and the general public.

Likewise, Japan's then Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe Shinzo articulated in 2006 "strategic diplomacy with Asia" – especially to mend ties with China – in his bid to become Japan's next premier (a bid that succeeded). His main proposal calls for: a) setting up an exchange foundation and an organization to promote bilateral research on global policy issues; b) accept more Chinese to study in Japan; and c) expedite the conclusion of economic partnership agreements between the two sides.⁸⁸ Government-funded foundations and organizations can strengthen personal exchanges and fostering mutual understanding. It is the responsibility of both governments to develop awareness-raising programs to educate the public about the history and development of bilateral relations.

For China

To achieve optimal results, the Chinese government should devise a better media policy. While China wishes for the world to see an open and reformed China, it must recognize that Japan had also changed since the end of WWII. Unfortunately, the media sometimes focus on a superficial level, i.e., few if any media push their audience to ponder the actual causes of anti-Japan demonstrations in China. Meanwhile, many Japanese journalists "complain" that there seems to be a high-voltage wire hanging low over the Chinese press. They feel strongly that their Chinese counterparts should be given more "public space."⁸⁹

It is increasingly difficult for any government to monopolize the flow of information and ideas. Netizens will always find a way to circumvent censorship. Some scholars note that the Chinese leadership may be accustomed to the idea of censorship, and seems to expect Tokyo to do the same about the Japanese media's coverage of China's anti-Japan demonstrations or felonies committed by Chinese living in Japan. They fail to realize that as a democratic society,

⁸⁷ Shi Yinong, "China-Japan Rapprochement and Diplomatic Revolution," *Strategy & Management*, April 2003, retrieved at <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guandian/1033/2015190.html>.

⁸⁸ "Abe to set forth 'strategic Asian diplomacy' in race as next premier," *Kyodo News*, Aug. 23, 2006, retrieved at <http://asia.news.yahoo.com/060823/kyodo/d8jm4emo0.html>.

⁸⁹ Shimizu Yoshikazu, personal interview, April 6, 2006.

the Japanese government as well as its people tend to view censorship more as an affront.⁹⁰ Besides, crimes committed by Chinese students in Japan not only stain the image of the entire Chinese community, but also provide rightwingers with facts to be used against China and to further instigate anti-China sentiments. Their felonies should shame even the most radical Chinese nationalists.

The Global Security Research Institute (G-Sec) at Keio University has done extensive research on the Chinese government's media relations, and some of their findings shed light on the subject.⁹¹ In general, these researchers feel that the Japanese leadership should pay attention to Hong Kong media, for the Chinese government, in a sense, uses Hong Kong media to test the water for its public diplomacy options. With regard to the mainland media, Japanese researchers consider the *Reference News* a good source to get the Beijing leadership's response. For example, during the 2005 demonstrations, *Reference News* reported anti-Japan demonstrations in the Hong Kong SAR before following up with those on the mainland. The Chinese leadership could have used Hong Kong to ascertain international responses to the situation.

Scholars and researchers at Keio believe that Hong Kong papers usually offer more timely coverage, and are generally more open about topics considered controversial on the mainland. For example, Hong Kong papers print articles explaining the reasons why Koizumi promised to and kept visiting Yasukuni Shrine, in order to give readers another side of the story. At the same time, since the Hong Kong SAR has a more democratic environment, local media might be more critical of Japan or take more extreme anti-Japan stands. With its international image at stake, the mainland government sometimes shuts down anti-Japan websites or censors such news items.

In this sense, efficient management of the media is conducive to the management of nationalism. The Chinese leadership needs to understand the operating procedures of the media on the mainland and in Hong Kong in order to more effectively convey its Japan policy to the public and help the people understand its friendly official attitude toward Japan at times of popular hostility.

In regard to history, the Chinese government should consider adjusting to changing international circumstances and adopting a forward-looking spirit and revise the content of patriotic education in school textbooks. It should be aware of how the introduction and success of a market economy shifted the popular Chinese perception of domestic governance and international affairs, and the faith in the corruption-laden Chinese Communist Party.

In addition, China could benefit from becoming more transparent about its intentions and absence of a desire to become a regional power. China's ultra-cautious and obscure foreign policy-making sometimes backfires and "forces" other countries to see China as a potential threat. By openly stating its military expenditures, etc., China could rectify its international image and exert more influence in regional affairs.⁹²

⁹⁰ Bonnie Glaser, personal communication, March 20, 2006.

⁹¹ Asukata Mao, et al, Keio G-Sec, personal interview, April 10, 2006.

⁹² P. Claire Bai, "A Northeast Asian Initiative on Counterterrorism," *Issues & Insights*, Vol. 6, No. 6, Pacific Forum CSIS, March 2006.

For Japan

The number one priority for the Japanese leadership is to put “understanding China” on its agenda. Scholars have proposed a “grand bargain”⁹³ which would include “joint scholarly committees to review textbooks, encouragement of so-called second-track dialogues on contentious territorial issues, more extensive cultural exchange programs, high-level meetings that emphasize positive measures to improve relations.” Japan should take the initiative, beginning with a decision to defuse the Yasukuni issue and to depoliticize history in general, which is a “precondition” for improving relations with China.” Japan should be aware of the shifting sentiment in the U.S. and EU countries (which now see China not just as a commercial opportunity, but also as an important strategic partner) and take into account the international impact of its China policy.

South Korea’s successful public diplomacy in China is a good example for Japan. Most South Korean enterprises in China invest heavily in cultural and humanity projects; and their achievements are impressive. Companies such as LG, SK, and Samsung sponsor teenage talent shows and intellectual contests on major channels at Central China Television (CCTV) and Beijing Television (BTV). Winners receive scholarships to study in South Korea or a week-long tour of the country.

Japanese enterprises, and even the government, should consider similar programs and negotiate sponsorship with Chinese TV stations. It could start with cities in northeast China, or metropolises like Shanghai or Shenzhen, and then expand to CCTV after collecting enough feedback. Major themes of these TV programs could center on important issues in bilateral relations, with the objective of promoting better understanding. (Similar programs have been produced on the Taiwan issue, and they motivated many college students on the mainland to study cross-Strait relations.)

For both governments

There are a number of public diplomacy projects that the two governments could collaborate on. The first should be the establishment of a government-supported committee on a joint history textbook. As mentioned, in 2005, scholars and civic organizations from China, Japan, and South Korea set up a joint committee and published the first joint history textbook on relations in Northeast Asia, with a focus on WWII and its impact on regional developments. In spite of its significance, the committee faced funding problems and the book itself was less than perfect due to time, resources, and other constraints. A decision by the two governments to set up such a committee to assess and make revisions to the joint textbook – with sufficient funding and access to more resources – would yield greater results.

The governments of China and Japan should also create a Sino-Japanese exchange foundation that organizes programs for the young and the old. They could start a “Young Leaders’ Program,” as well as an “Old Leaders’ Program,” which would allow both the young-and-inexperienced and established officials to spend time in the other country and gain firsthand

⁹³ Gerald Curtis, “A bargain that could end Japan-China bickering,” *Financial Times*, Feb. 20, 2006, retrieved at http://www.howardwrench.com/archives/2006/02/22/a_bargain_that_could_end_japanchina_bickering/.

experience. Open discussion, in a Youth Forum for students from both countries, is another way to prevent excessive nostalgia for the past.⁹⁴ The younger generation is by default forward-looking and future-oriented. This forum should include domestic students and overseas Chinese and Japanese communities, especially as the latter are usually more open-minded about history.

The two governments could also support the production of a bi-national film that aims at depicting and reinterpreting WWII and postwar experiences in both China and Japan. Through this medium, audiences in both countries could gain a more vivid understanding of each other's war memories and feelings of victimization. A praiseworthy, albeit preliminary effort has actually been made in 2004, when independent Japanese filmmaker Kana Tomoko shot a 87-minute-long documentary *From the Land of Bitter Tears*,⁹⁵ which told the stories of four ACW victims living in northeastern China. The film was shown in small theatres in Fukuoka and at a number of middle schools. Kana is working to have her film accepted by major theatres in cities like Tokyo and Kyoto to reach a larger audience. For this purpose, the governments could invite directors such as China's Zhang Yimou and Wong Kar-wai, and their Japanese equivalents Takeshi Kitano and Imamura Shohei, to produce a bi-national film. Pop stars like Jackie Chan, Zhang Ziyi, Takeshi Kaneshiro, and Watanabe Ken could take roles in it, which would ensure media and public attention throughout East Asia.

Hitoshi Motoshima, former mayor of Nagasaki remarked: "We should not be cultivating any form of patriotism or nationalism. Rather, our aim should be to become international citizens."⁹⁶ This statement is true for both Chinese and Japanese. In order to become a true internationalist, people of the two countries must first understand their own history, the root of nationalist sentiment, and the history of their relations with each other.

Go-between: U.S. role in the arranged marriage

The Japanese use "go-betweens" to prevent direct confrontation between two parties in a competition. An intermediary is helpful in situations where the parties feel reluctant about or awkward to initiate contact with each other. Employing go-betweens is very common in negotiations of marriage in Japan. In this process, the go-between "gains prestige by acting in this official capacity, and gets the respect of the community by successful manipulation. The chances of a peaceful arrangement are greater because the go-between has an ego investment in smooth negotiations."⁹⁷ The U.S. would be a good go-between for the following reasons: 1) the U.S. maintains healthy relations with both China and Japan; 2) the U.S. is obliged to clear up its own responsibility regarding settlement of historical issues, such as releasing documents it obtained from Unit 731 after WWII; and 3) the U.S. can share its public diplomacy experience and successes with both countries.

⁹⁴ Tanaka Hitoshi, personal interview, April 10, 2006.

⁹⁵ For a detailed description of the documentary, as well as another of Kana's films depicting the life of an Indonesian "comfort woman," see Kana Tomoko's website, <http://kanatomoko.jp.todoke.net/file/6eng.html>.

⁹⁶ Smith, op. cit., p.296.

⁹⁷ Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989, p.156.

Before China and Japan signed the Joint Communiqué, the focus of their negotiation was war responsibility, historical issues, and the status of Taiwan. Three decades later there has still been no resolution of these issues. In fact, the deterioration of relations in 2005 started with the Taiwan question. The Joint Statement issued at the conclusion of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee meeting in February 2005 called for peaceful resolution of the mainland-Taiwan issue, which was interpreted by China as meddling in its domestic affairs. Japan has gone a step further in its annual Diplomatic Blue Book, published in April 2005, which portrayed China as “a serious problem that threatened Japan’s national security, sovereignty and other rights.” Even the U.S. has not used such strong language when referring to China.⁹⁸ In August 2005, Japan’s Defense White Paper repeatedly denounced the “Chinese military threat,” which was seen by China as a pretext for Japan’s own arms purchases.⁹⁹ Trust between the two countries has reached new lows.

While the leaderships in both countries are pressured by domestic interest groups to mend relations, they face political difficulties. To minimize confrontation and conflicts of interests, the U.S. should help lay the groundwork for rapprochement. It may be helpful for the U.S. to refrain from discussing the Taiwan question with Japan during bilateral security talks, as the Taiwan factor only further complicates already tangled Sino-Japanese relations.

The U.S. might not be comfortable pressing Japan, an ally, to moderate its policy toward China and be more accommodating of Chinese views. But such a shift would be beneficial to all countries including the U.S. The *New York Times* noted in a 2005 editorial that Japan needs “a more constructive relationship with its neighbors and trading partners.”¹⁰⁰

Some scholars believe that the U.S. has contributed to worsening China-Japan relations. On the one hand, they argue that the Chinese leadership’s efforts to gain diplomatic influence have failed with Japan, but won the support of the U.S. President Hu’s new emphasis on Taiwan, the administration of the Hong Kong SAR, proposals such as “building a harmonious society,” working toward a multilateral resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem, and revaluation of the RMB – all gained the favor of the U.S. At the same time, Beijing has more or less neglected the role of Japan.¹⁰¹ Japanese commentator Morita Minoru argues that, in order to prepare itself for potential threats from neighbors such as North Korea, “Japan deepens its relationship with the United States... [and] asks for more protection... while Bush is still around, [Japan and China] will be stuck with lousy relations.” He urged Japan to “have the freedom to get along with China without obstruction from the United States.”¹⁰²

⁹⁸ Zhu Zhiqun, “Five tough questions for Japan,” *Asia Times Online*, May 6, 2005, retrieved at <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/GE06Dh01.html>.

⁹⁹ “‘China Threat’ made up to cover Japan’s own arms expansion,” *Xinhua News*, Aug. 5, 2005, retrieved at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-08/05/content_3361176.htm.

¹⁰⁰ “One good thing about Japan’s election,” *New York Times*, Sept. 13, 2005, retrieved at <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/13/opinion/13tue3.html?ex=1149048000&en=1e645e1badccee3&ei=5070>.

¹⁰¹ Kokubun Ryosei, personal interview, April 7, 2006.

¹⁰² “An ‘outsider’ speaks out,” *The Japan Times*, Sept. 3, 2006, retrieved at <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/fl20060903x1.html>.

Practical proposals

The U.S. could take the lead in policy initiatives aimed at resolving historical issues in East Asia and mending relations between China and Japan. First, it could establish a Joint Committee on the Settlement of Historical Issues – with China, Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. as key participants – to create a platform where delegates from all countries could discuss issues such as multi-dimensional reparations for “comfort women” and ACW victims. The U.S. should address the issue of releasing Unit 731 documents in these sessions.

The U.S. could also help set up an Institute for Objective Historical Research, a place where scholars from both China and Japan could work together to nourish a clear, dispassionate, and common understanding of history, without politicization or ideology.¹⁰³ While doing so could be nerve-racking for the two governments at home, the U.S. could build a library that collects resources about the war from all sides in China and Japan: the left, the right, the progressive, and the conservative. It could publish research in East Asia to help create an unbiased understanding on the past.

¹⁰³ For the idea of a “joint historical research center,” the author thanks Brad Glosserman of the Pacific Forum CSIS.

Appendix I

Key Events in China-Japan Relations Since President Jiang Zemin's Visit¹⁰⁴

Nov. 25-30, 1998: President Jiang Zemin pays state visit to Japan, meets the Emperor and Empress, and holds talks with Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo. It is the first visit to Japan by China's head of state.

July 8-9, 1999: PM Obuchi visits China and meets President Jiang and Premier Zhu Rongji; two countries reach agreement on the terms of China's WTO accession protocol.

Sept. 13, 2000: Japan begins excavation and destruction of estimated 700,000 abandoned chemical weapons (ACWs) left by the Imperial Army in China at the end of WWII.

Oct. 12-17, 2000: Premier Zhu visits Japan and meets Japan's political leadership to discuss Japan's ODA, China's economic development (in particular its western development program), history, and security.

Apr. 3-4, 2001: Japan authorizes "New History" textbooks; China's FM Tang Jiaxuan protests decision to Japanese ambassador Anami Koreshige.

Aug. 13, 2001: Koizumi Junichiro's first visit to Yasukuni Shrine since becoming PM.

Mid Aug., 2001: *Asahi Shimbun* survey indicates that less than 1 percent of Japan's national and municipal middle schools adopted the "New History" textbook.

Oct. 8, 2001: PM Koizumi visits Beijing and meets President Jiang and Premier Zhu to discuss Yasukuni visit, bilateral relations, and Japan's response to the war on terrorism. He also visits the Marco Polo Bridge and anti-Japanese War Memorial.

Oct. 21, 2001: PM Koizumi meets President Jiang at APEC Leaders' Meeting in Shanghai.

Nov. 5, 2001: PM Koizumi meets President Jiang and ROK President Kim Dae-jung at ASEAN Plus Three meeting in Brunei.

Mar. 2002: Japan announces 25 percent reduction in ODA for China to ¥160 billion, largest single reduction since its inception in 1979.

Apr. 11-12, 2002: PM Koizumi visits to China to address Boao Asia Forum in Hainan and meets Premier Zhu.

¹⁰⁴ Compiled from *Comparative Connections*, July 1999-June 2006.

Apr. 21, 2002: PM Koizumi visits Yasukuni Shrine. China cancels scheduled visit of JDA head Nakatani Gen and PLA Navy port call in Tokyo.

July 9, 2002: Hiroshima District Court dismisses wartime forced labor compensation suit of Chinese plaintiffs against Nishimatsu Construction Company.

Aug. 27, 2002: Tokyo District Court acknowledges for the first time that Japan's Unit 731 engaged in biological warfare in China during WWII, but dismisses claims for compensation.

Sept. 22, 2002: Ceremonies marking 30th anniversary of normalization of China-Japan relations take place in Beijing; PM Koizumi decides against attending.

Sept. 24, 2002: PM Koizumi meets Premier Zhu at Asia-Europe meeting in Copenhagen.

Oct. 27, 2002: PM Koizumi and President Jiang meet at APEC Leaders' meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico.

Nov. 4, 2002: PM Koizumi, Premier Zhu, and ROK President Kim meet during ASEAN Plus Three meeting in Phnom Penh.

Jan. 14, 2003: PM Koizumi visits Yasukuni Shrine.

Jan. 27, 2003: Japan's Trade Ministry releases 2002 trade statistics; they show that for the first time Japan's imports from China surpassed that from the U.S.

Mar. 13, 2003: Japan announces 25 percent reduction in ODA for China to ¥120 billion.

Apr. 25, 2003: Japanese government sends SARS assistance to China, including surgical masks, protective clothing and equipment, and medical instruments, amounting to approximately ¥18 million. On May 11, it sends Disaster Relief Team and additional ¥1.5 billion SARS assistance.

Aug. 4, 2003: Some 36 workers injured at construction site in Qiqihar, Heilongjiang, as a result of ACWs.

Aug. 9-10, 2003: Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo visits Beijing and meets President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao.

Sept. 8, 2003: Minister for Reform suggests that China's lack of appreciation for Japan's ODA efforts causes reconsideration of the program.

Sept. 29, 2003: Tokyo district court awards ¥190 million in compensation to Chinese claiming injury from ACWs. It also rules in favor of Chinese seeking compensation for ACW incidents in 1972, 1982, and 1995.

Oct. 7, 2003: PM Koizumi meets Premier Wen at ASEAN Plus Three meeting in Bali.

Oct. 20, 2003: PM Koizumi meets President Hu during APEC meeting in Bangkok.

Jan. 1, 2004: PM Koizumi visits Yasukuni Shrine.

Jan. 1, 2004: Chinese officials disperse ¥300 million compensation from Japan for ACW incident in Qiqihar.

Feb. 9, 2004: Tokyo High Court rejects appeal from seven Taiwanese for official apology and ¥70 million compensation for being forced to serve as comfort women for the Imperial Army.

Mar. 10, 2004: Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) approves ¥20 billion ODA reduction for China to ¥96.7 billion, marking the third consecutive year of reduction and the first time that the total fell below ¥100 billion.

Mar. 17, 2004: Japanese immigration authorities deny entry for 150 Chinese students suspected of holding forged papers to study at Japanese-language schools in Tokyo; suspicions have increased following the Fukuoka murder case involving Chinese students.

Mar. 26, 2004: Sapporo District Court rules against Chinese plaintiffs seeking compensation for wartime forced labor.

Mar. 27, 2004: Niigata District Court rules against government and Japanese company in suit brought by Chinese nationals seeking compensation for wartime forced labor.

Apr. 22, 2004: Japan and China reach final agreement on construction of facilities to manage destruction of ACWs.

April 23, 2004: Rightwing Japanese activist rams loudspeaker truck into main gate of Chinese Consulate in Osaka; Chinese Foreign Ministry protests the “unscrupulous” act and expresses strong dissatisfaction with police protection. Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda apologizes for the accident.

May 24, 2004: Eight workers in Qiqihar are hospitalized after exposure to fumes escaping from canisters containing ACWs at a construction site.

July 9, 2004: Hiroshima High Court awards ¥5.5 million for wartime forced labor to Chinese petitioners, marking the first time compensation had been made in such cases.

July 23, 2004: Two Chinese children in Dunhua, Jilin injured by chemicals leaking from abandoned artillery shell, later confirmed by Japanese investigation team as ACWs.

Aug. 7, 2004: Japan defeats China in Asia Cup Final; anti-Japanese disorder breaks out, including damage to Japanese Embassy vehicle. Japanese FM Kawaguchi Yoriko protests when Chinese Ambassador Wu Dawei calls at MFA on Aug. 9.

Aug. 11, 2004: Thirteen Chinese plaintiffs bring suit against Japanese government and Mitsubishi Material Corporation for compensation for wartime forced labor.

Aug. 26, 2004: Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education approves controversial high school textbook written by Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform.

Aug. 29, 2004: China awards contracts for high-speed rail modernization to consortia of Japanese, European, and Chinese companies, adoption of Japanese *shinkansen* technology on the Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway sparks anti-Japanese protest on Chinese websites.

Sept. 10, 2004: Wang Yi, vice foreign minister, named ambassador to Japan.

Sept. 29, 2004: Nippon Yakin Kogyo agrees to ¥21 million settlement with Chinese wartime forced laborers in Osaka High Court.

Nov. 21, 2004: President Hu and PM Koizumi meet in Santiago, Chile during APEC meeting.

Nov. 29, 2004: PM Koizumi, Premier Wen, and ROK President Roh Moo-hyun meet during ASEAN meeting in Vientiane, Laos. Prior to meeting Wen on Nov. 30, Koizumi tells press it may be time to graduate China from the ODA program.

Dec. 15, 2004: Tokyo High Court dismisses suit for compensation brought by four Chinese women forced to serve as comfort women by the Imperial Army.

Jan. 6, 2005: PM Koizumi and Premier Wen meet briefly during tsunami relief conference in Jakarta.

Jan. 26, 2005: Japan's Finance Ministry releases 2004 trade statistics, revealing that China has become Japan's top trading partner, representing 20.1 percent of Japan's trade.

Mar. 17, 2005: FM Machimura Nobutaka announces Japan-China agreement to terminate new ODA loans by 2008.

Mar. 18, 2005: Tokyo High Court dismisses suit for wartime compensation brought by two Chinese comfort women.

Apr. 9-10, 2005: Large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations take place in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen, opposing Japan's bid for permanent seat on UN Security Council. PM Koizumi calls demonstrations "truly regrettable" and asks Beijing to prevent recurrence.

Apr. 11-19, 2005: Twenty-five reported acts of vandalism and harassment against Chinese embassy, consulates, businesses, and schools take place in Japan.

Apr. 23, 2005: PM Koizumi meets President Hu on sidelines of Asia-Africa Summit in Jakarta.

May 17-23, 2005: Vice Premier Wu Yi visits Japan to attend Aichi Expo, but cancels meeting with Koizumi and returns to China, due to the latter's remark that he does not think Yasukuni visits "have injured the feelings of the Chinese people."

May 26, 2005: Joint middle school history textbook, *History to Open the Future*, is published by a team of scholars and civic organizations from China, Japan, and ROK.

June 21, 2005: Three Guangzhou residents are exposed to ACWs.

July 23, 2005: Chinese plaintiffs appeal to Supreme Court decision by Tokyo High Court rejecting claims for compensation for suffering caused by Japan's germ warfare in China.

July 25, 2005: Japanese MFA announces decision to expand visa waiver for Chinese tourist groups from present locations – Beijing, Shanghai, and five provinces – to authorized tourist groups nationwide.

July 28, 2005: Tokyo Metropolitan School Board adopts disputed history texts compiled by Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform.

Aug. 5, 2005: Chinese injured by exposure to ACWs in Qiqihar meet in Tokyo with Senior Vice FM Aisawa Ichiro to seek assistance and medical care.

Oct. 11-15, 2005: Vice Minister of the Cabinet Office Erikawa Takeshi visits Beijing to discuss disposal of ACWs.

Oct. 17, 2005: PM Koizumi visits Yasukuni Shrine on first day of Autumn Festival. Beijing cancels scheduled visit of Japanese FM.

Nov. 9, 2005: Multi-party coalition forms Association to Consider Secular War Memorial.

Nov. 20, 2005: *Xinhua* reports CCP Propaganda Departments adds 66 National Patriotic sites to existing list; at least five commemorate the Sino-Japanese War.

Dec. 12-14, 2005: ASEAN Plus Three Summit; Japan-ASEAN Summit; East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur; PM Koizumi speaks briefly with Premier Wen.

Dec. 20, 2005: Koizumi government approves establishment in February 2006 of Japan-China 21st Century Foundation to provide scholarships for 150-200 Chinese high school students per year to study in Japan.

Jan. 31, 2006: Koizumi government adopts position paper stating China is not a threat to Japan.

Feb. 24, 2006: Miyamoto Yuji, China-school diplomat, named ambassador to China.

Feb. 25, 2006: Chinese companies establish fund to support lawsuits of Chinese citizens seeking compensation for wartime forced labor.

Mar. 10, 2006: Nagano District Court rejects suit for compensation filed by wartime conscripted Chinese laborers and their families.

Mar. 22, 2006: Japanese MFA postpones consideration of FY2005 ODA to China.

Mar. 24, 2006: China's national Development and Reform Commission announces funding to support rehabilitation and expansion of Harbin's Unit 731 Germ Warfare Exhibition Hall into a peace park.

Mar. 30, 2006: Group of 40 Chinese sue Japanese government in Tokyo District Court for wounds/loss of life suffered during Japanese bombing of Chongqing.

Mar. 30-Apr. 1, 2006: Leaders of seven Japan-China friendship associations, including former PM Hashimoto Ryutaro, visit Beijing and meet President Hu. Hu proposes ending Yasukuni visits in exchange for summit. On April 2, Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe and FM Aso reject Hu's proposal.

Apr. 17, 2006: *Japan Times* reports that Japan and China will request the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to extend deadline to spring 2012 for a Japan-led project to dispose of an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 ACWs in Dunhua.

May 23, 2006: Chinese FM Li Zhaoxing and Japanese FM Aso meet on the sidelines of the 5th ministerial meeting of the Asia Cooperation Dialogue in Doha, Qatar.

June 6, 2006: Japan's Council for Overseas Economic Cooperation approves lifting of freeze on yen loans to China; approves loan package of ¥74 billion.

June 8, 2006: China notifies Japan of discovery of chemical weapons in Heilongjiang and asks for fact-finding team. On June 14, Abe announces plan to send team to China to ascertain if the weapons had been abandoned by the Imperial Army.

June 10, 2006: President Hu expresses interest in visiting Japan under proper conditions to Japanese ambassador.

July 12, 2006: *AP* reports that a joint PRC-Japanese team of experts unearthed 689 shells and bombs abandoned by the Japanese Imperial Army near a school in Ning'an city; 210 of these bombs contain mustard gas, lewisite, phosgene and other toxins.

Appendix II

About the Author

Peng Claire Bai was the 2005-2006 Vasey Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS. She is currently a Freeman Fellow pursuing her M.A. degree in Security Policy Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. Claire is from Beijing, China, and received her B.A. degree with a dual concentration in Economics and International Relations from Peking University. She brings experience from the Asia Foundation, the Carter Center, the China Institute of International Studies, the Jane Goodall Institute, Hill & Knowlton, and the *Beijing Youth Daily*. Claire has been a participant in the Pacific Forum's Young Leaders Program since 2004. Her research interests include China's peaceful transition, transnational security threats, and East Asian regional security, with a focus on China-Japan-U.S. trilateral relations.