



A Second North Korea Nuclear Test:
A Young Leaders Simulation



Issues and Insights
Vol. 7 – No. 9

Pacific Forum CSIS
August 2007

Pacific Forum CSIS

Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate arenas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

The Young Leaders Program invites young professionals and graduate students to join Pacific Forum policy dialogues and conferences. The program fosters education in the practical aspects of policy-making, generates an exchange of views between young and seasoned professionals, promotes interaction among younger professionals, and enriches dialogues with generational perspectives for all attendees. Fellows must have a strong background in the area covered by the conference they are attending and an endorsement from respected experts in their field. Supplemental programs in conference host cities and mentoring sessions with senior officials and specialists add to the Young Leader experience. The Young Leaders Program is currently supported by the Freeman Foundation, the Luce Foundation, and the Yuchengco Group, with a growing number of universities, institutes, and organizations also helping to sponsor individual participants. For more details, see the Pacific Forum CSIS website, www.pacforum.org, or contact Brad Glosserman, director of the Young Leaders Program, at bradgpf@hawaii.rr.com.

Table of Contents

	Page
Acknowledgements	iv
Introduction	v
Simulation	vii
Scenario Report 1 – U.S. Group	I
1. Key national interests/concerns	I
2. Short-term and long-term goals	2
3. Immediate response What happens next?	2
4. Key diplomatic partners and targets How does it reach out to them?	3
5. International and regional regimes and activities (NPT, PSI and other NRBC agreements and treaties	3
Scenario Report 2 – China Group	5
Scenario Report 3 – UN Group	7
1. Key interests and concerns.....	7
2. Short-term and long-term goals.....	7
3. Immediate response Next?.....	8
4. Key diplomatic partners and targets How do you reach out to them?	8
5. International and regional regimes and activities	9
Scenario Report 4 – ROK Group	II
Discussion within the ROK Group.....	II
ROK Group Findings	12
Scenario Assessment	15
Scenario Report 5 – North Korea Group	19
1. DPRK’s key national interests:	19
2. Key national concerns.....	19
3. The short-term goals	20
4. DPRK’s long-term goals	20
5. DPRK’s key diplomatic partners/targets.....	21
International Regimes and Activities (Discussion)	21
Scenario Assessment	21
About the Authors	A-I

Acknowledgements

The Pacific Forum CSIS is deeply grateful to the Freeman Foundation and the Luce Foundation for their support of the Young Leaders program. We would like to thank Vietnam CSCAP and especially Drs. Nguyen Vu Tung and Ta Minh Tuan for their support and hard work in making the Young Leaders program a success at the Danang CSCAP WMD meeting. We would also like to thank Mr. Michael Schiffer and Dr. Frank Umbach for taking time to meet the Young Leaders during breakfast for a question and answer session.

Brad Glosserman thanks Ms. Sun Namkung for her assistance in running the Young Leaders program.

The views expressed here represent personal impressions and reflections of the Young Leaders program participants; they do not necessarily represent the views of the relevant governments, or the co-sponsoring or parent organizations and institutes.

Introduction

By Sun Namkung

The following report is a compilation of results from a political-military simulation conducted Nov. 30, 2006 at the Young Leaders' component of the Fourth Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on "Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific" held in Danang, Vietnam Nov. 28-20, 2006. The conference was co-hosted by the Pacific Forum CSIS (as secretariat of USCSCAP) and the Institute for International Relations (of the Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs and secretariat of CSCAP Vietnam).

The simulation was adapted from a previous Young Leaders assignment. At a conference on "U.S.-ROK Alliance Relations" in October 2006, Young Leaders were asked to think about crises for the U.S.-ROK alliance. They developed three: a second North Korean nuclear test, a demand by the ROK for the U.S. to bolster deterrence by stationing nuclear weapons on South Korean territory, and a Japan-ROK naval standoff over the disputed territory of Dokdo/Takeshima.¹ The original simulation explored a situation in which China welcomed regime change in North Korea; it was modified to focus on a second nuclear test during a humanitarian crisis in North Korea.

To better understand national interests, policy challenges, and possible solutions to the nuclear crisis, Young Leader participants were divided into five teams representing North Korea, South Korea, China, the U.S., and the UN. Each group was asked to develop a presentation on national interests, short/long-term goals, immediate responses, diplomatic targets, and positions on international regimes and activities.² The scenario was modified to exclude Japan and Russia, not because we didn't consider them important players, but because of size constraints and a desire to include the UN, which should play a role in a humanitarian crisis. The nature of that role – in particular, its limits – was one of the more illuminating elements of the simulation.

A key challenge of any scenario is getting participants to play their roles correctly. Participants were told to think as their country or organization would, not how they think it ought to. Nonetheless, some idealism crept into the decision-making process. Each group worked hard to identify, protect, and promote its interests. The game was played without iterations; the lack of contact between groups influenced group responses. It would be useful and interesting to see how a multi-move game that permitted groups to interact would develop.

The simulation results provide interesting nuggets for consideration: some expected, some surprising. The U.S. group insisted that Washington had to demonstrate its ability to manage the crisis and continue to provide leadership on a global and regional concern. The claim that the U.S. had ceded its leading role to China did not survive the simulation. The China group saw the crisis as an opportunity, primarily to show it too could manage crises but also to build stronger relations with key players. Note that Beijing kept a close eye on Seoul: while China did

¹ For more on these scenarios, see "Challenges for the U.S.-ROK Alliance: Three Crisis Scenarios," Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders project, Issues & Insights, No. 07-07, July 2007.

² See briefing materials on scenario including key players, maps, timeline, background readings and discussion questions following this introduction.

not necessarily follow the South Korean lead, it did look to Seoul for cues as it responded to developments. The UN group was frustrated, a product of its limited power and influence. It sought ways to include other organizations like ASEAN and the UN High Commission for Refugees to increase its leverage and accomplish its objectives. With a new conservative government, the ROK group had a higher tolerance for risk as the scenario unfolded. As its report makes clear, thinking has to be clear about diplomatic ends and means. The new government sees inter-Korean engagement as a means to an end, not an end in itself. This too has profound implications for crisis response. Finally, the DPRK group saw itself as in the best position in the crisis. While regime survival is its paramount goal, it wants to directly engage the U.S. to make a deal. For Pyongyang, a second test would aim at splitting the other parties, which would give the DPRK opportunities to play divide and conquer. In this context, it is interesting that Pyongyang identified no real “partners” in the diplomatic process: all interlocutors were to be exploited. Judging from the results of our groups' responses, Pyongyang may risk miscalculating.

This was the first trip to Vietnam for most Young Leaders. As in other meetings, they had lectures and visits to gain familiarity with Vietnamese thinking and concerns about foreign policy and regional security. Dr. Nguyen Vu Tung, director of the Center for Euro-American Studies at the Institute for International Relations, briefed the Young Leaders on modern Vietnam. He emphasized the role of *Doi Moi* in promoting reform and opening the country to foreign influence. He underscored the role membership in ASEAN played in shaping Vietnamese thinking and foreign policy. The group also experienced prewar Vietnam with a tour of Hoi An, a once-bustling seaport that is now a World Heritage Site.

Prior to playing the scenario, Young Leaders had a session of their own that explored the changing nature of proliferation in the post-Cold War world. They focused on the rise of nonstate actors and the need to balance both nonproliferation and disarmament. Young Leaders honed in on factors driving proliferation: if states do not recognize and deal with the reasons other governments feel a need to acquire nuclear weapons, nonproliferation efforts are certain to fail.

As in other Young Leader programs, participants also held private breakfast meetings with conference participants. In Danang, Michael Schiffer, program officer with the Stanley Foundation, provided insights into how the 2006 midterm U.S. elections would influence U.S. foreign policy as part of wide-ranging look at the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy. At another breakfast, Frank Umbach, senior research fellow at the Research Institute of the German Council on Foreign Relations, explained European thinking about Asia, and China in particular.

Simulation

Possible Second North Korean Nuclear Test

Key Players

China (PRC)
North Korea (DPRK)
Republic of Korea (ROK)
United Nations (UN)
United States of America (U.S.)

Scenario

A Chinese diplomatic mission travels to Pyongyang and receives assurances that North Korea will not conduct any additional nuclear tests. Beijing goes public with this statement. Subsequently, the PRC suggests re-engaging North Korea, arguing that Pyongyang has unilaterally frozen its nuclear program. Two more rounds of Six-Party Talks follow with no results.

A GNP³ candidate wins the 2007 presidential election in South Korea. After entering the Blue House, the president's first order of business is to show the world that Seoul will not appease Pyongyang. As a result, the Mt. Kumgang tourist project and Kaesong industrial project are suspended. This deprives North Korea of key sources of income and causes great fiscal strain on an already weak economy.

Threatened by the suspension of inter-Korea economic activities and the Chinese government decision to continue to freeze North Korean assets in Chinese financial institutions, Pyongyang comments via Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) that neighboring powers are abusing formal understandings and their actions may have unexpected consequences. U.S. surveillance satellites detect movement of equipment and personnel near Musadan-ri in North Hamgyong province, the site of the Oct. 17, 2006 nuclear test. The intelligence is confirmed by South Korea.

³ Grand National Party (한나라당): the main opposition party in South Korea. The GNP is traditionally conservative while supporting capitalism and free trade. The party favors a strong alliance with the United States and takes a harder line toward North Korea than President Roh Moo-hyun's Uri party or former President Kim Dae-jung's Millennium Democratic Party.





Timeline

Feb. 10, 2005: DPRK announces that it has nuclear weapons and will indefinitely suspend participation in the Six-Party Talks.

Feb. 12, 2005: U.S. rejects DPRK demand for one-on-one talks as a precondition for restarting the Six-Party Talks.

April 1, 2005: DPRK says it wants Six-Party Talks to be regional disarmament talks now that it is a “nuclear state.”

April 18, 2005: U.S. threatens to refer the nuclear issue to the UNSC should Pyongyang refuse to restart six-party process.

April 28, 2005: In a press conference, President Bush calls North Korean leader Kim Jong-il a “tyrant” and a “dangerous person.”

April 30, 2005: North Korea responds, calling Bush a “hooligan bereft of any personality as a human being.”

May 9, 2005: U.S. negotiator for the Six-Party Talks Joseph DeTrani meets with North Korean officials at Pyongyang’s mission to the UN.

May 11, 2005: DPRK spokesman states 8,000 fuel rods were removed at Yongbyon nuclear complex.

May 13, 2005: U.S. and North Korea meet for secret working-level talks in New York.

May 31, 2005: At a press conference, President Bush calls for peaceful solution to North Korea nuclear issue and refers to North Korean leader as “Mr. Kim Jong-il.”

June 29, 2005: U.S. authorities are given new powers to freeze assets of companies believed to be helping North Korea, Iran, and Syria pursue WMD programs.

June 30, 2005: North Korea restarts construction on two nuclear reactors halted under the 1994 Agreed Framework.

July 26, 2005: Fourth round of Six-Party Talks begin in Beijing.

Aug. 7, 2005: Fourth round of Six-Party Talks take a three-week recess after failing to produce a joint declaration. The talks are scheduled to resume the week of Aug. 29.

Aug. 30-Sept. 3, 2005: U.S. Congressmen Jim Leach (R-IA) and Tom Lantos (D-CA) travel to Pyongyang.

Sept. 13-19, 2005: The fourth round of Six-Party Talks resumes in Beijing.

Sept. 13, 2005: Presidents Bush and Hu meet in New York on sidelines of UNGA meetings to discuss Six-Party Talks and trade.

Sept. 14, 2005: The International Convention on Suppressing Acts of Nuclear Terrorism is signed by U.S.

Sept. 19, 2005: Six-Party Talks participants release joint statement that commits DPRK to abandon its nuclear program and to rejoin the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

Sept. 20, 2005: DPRK states it would not dismantle its nuclear facilities until it receives a light-water reactor.

Sept 28, 2005: Asst. Sec. Hill says the next thing DPRK needs to do is tell where its nuclear arms facilities are, noting there could be trouble if DPRK refuses to admit to a uranium enrichment program in the next round of talks.

Oct. 17-19, 2005: New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson visits North Korea “to move the diplomatic process forward.”

Oct. 17, 2005: The U.S.-India Science and Technology Agreement is signed to facilitate “a wide range of scientific and technical cooperation.”

Oct. 21, 2005: U.S. Treasury Department designates eight North Korean entities for supporting WMD proliferation and freezes their U.S. assets.

Nov. 9-11, 2005: Fifth round of Six-Party Talks takes place in Beijing.

Dec. 6, 2005: Pyongyang threatens to boycott Six-Party Talks unless the U.S. lifts sanctions issued Oct. 21 on North Korean companies for alleged counterfeiting, money laundering, and arms sales.

Dec. 20, 2005: DPRK official news agency reports North Korea will start to develop and build light-water reactors based on indigenous technology.

Jan. 3, 2006: North Korea says it will not attend the Six-Party Talks as long as U.S. financial sanctions remain in place.

Jan. 18, 2006: Asst. Secretary Hill visits Beijing to meet Chinese Vice FMs Yang Jiechi and Wu Dawei and DPRK Six-Party Talks envoy Kim Gye-gwan.

Jan. 23, 2006: U.S. Treasury Dept. team briefs ROK officials on alleged currency counterfeiting by North Korea.

Feb. 16-19, 2006: *The Korea Times* and *Hankook Ilbo* conduct a survey of 1,000 people aged 18-23; 48 percent of respondents say they would support North Korea if the U.S. attacked nuclear facilities in the DPRK.

March 7, 2006: U.S. State and Treasury officials meet DPRK representatives in New York to discuss issues related to sanctions levied on Banco Delta Asia.

March 8, 2006: DPRK test-fires two short-range missiles toward the East Sea (Sea of Japan).

March 14, 2006: *KCNA* states that the DPRK has the right to launch a pre-emptive attack because the DPRK and U.S./ROK are technically still at war.

April 6, 2006: Sixth Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercise *Pacific Protector 06* takes place in northern Australia simulating air interception of WMD.

April 14, 2006: DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan says North Korea could use the standoff in the Six-Party Talks to bolster its military “deterrent force” and demands return of funds at Banco Delta Asia as a precondition for resumption of talks.

May 8, 2006: Ban on U.S. citizens having any business relationship with North Korea-flagged vessels takes effect.

May 30-June 6, 2006: DPRK FM Paek Nam-sun meets Chinese counterpart Li Zhaoxing in Beijing to discuss Six-Party Talks and also visits Guangzhou.

May 31, 2006: South Korea holds by-elections. The conservative Grand National Party (GNP) wins in most contests. The ruling Uri Party fails to claim a single seat and wins only one of 16 ballots for mayors and provincial governors.

June 23, 2006: PSI meeting is held in Warsaw, Poland to review the past three years, look at emerging problems and their solutions, and discuss PSI’s future.

July 5, 2006: North Korea launches seven ballistic missiles – six *Nodong* and *Scud* missiles tests were successful; the one *Taepodong-2* missile launch failed.

July 6, 2006: President Bush consults with Japanese PM Koizumi and Chinese President Hu regarding North Korea missile tests.

July 7, 2006: U.S. and Japan submit a resolution for binding sanctions against North Korea for its missile tests, along with a moratorium on missile tests and a return to Six-Party Talks.

July 7-12, 2006: Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill travels to the region to consult with Six-Party Talk negotiators in Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo.

July 11-15, 2006: DPRK delegation led by Supreme People’s Assembly Vice Chairman Yang Hyong-sop arrives in Beijing for friendship treaty celebrations.

July 15, 2006: UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1695 to impose limited sanctions on North Korea. North Korea rejects resolution 45 minutes after vote.

July 15-17, 2006: Group of Eight (G-8) summit held in St. Petersburg, Russia. The U.S. and China have side-meetings to discuss the North Korea nuclear crisis.

July 26, 2006: *Yonhap News* reports since February North Korea has asked Asan Hyundai to pay tour fees in euros rather than U.S. dollars.

July 28, 2006: South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, the U.S., Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Malaysia, and New Zealand hold 5+5 Talks in Kuala Lumpur to discuss North Korea as well as other broader regional security concerns.

Aug. 17, 2006: *ABC News* reports that U.S. intelligence believes that a North Korea nuclear test is a “real possibility.”

Aug. 21-Sept. 1, 2006: U.S. and South Korea hold *Ulchi Focus Lens* exercises across the Korean Peninsula.

Aug. 22, 2006: North Korea threatens to quit the armistice that ended the Korean War over the *Ulchi Focus Lens* exercise and considers the exercise an “act of war.”

Aug. 26, 2006: Kim Jong-il is reported by Japan’s *Kyodo News* as having called China and Russia “unreliable,” saying that North Korea should overcome the international standoff over its nuclear and missile programs on its own.

Oct. 3, 2006: North Korea announces that it “will, in the future, conduct a nuclear test.”

Oct. 9, 2006: North Korea conducts first nuclear test near Musadan-ri near Kilchu City in North Hamgyong Province.

Oct. 14, 2006: UN Security Council unanimously passes UNSC Resolution 1718 which allowed for limited military and economic sanctions against the DPRK.

Dec. 17-19, 2006: Sixth round of Six-Party Talks convenes. However, no progress is made and the talks adjourn without future date for the next round.

Feb. 19, 2007: A high-level Chinese diplomatic mission to North Korea secures a promise from Kim Jong-il for no more North Korean nuclear tests. China gets the DPRK to commit to a June meeting of Six-Party Talks.

March 9, 2007: Beijing appeals to the international community to gradually lift sanctions and engage North Korea. U.S. responds that it will not ease off on financial sanctions until UNSCR 1718 is amended.

June 15, 2007: U.S. and DPRK meet in New York and have side meetings during UN disarmament experts committee meeting on breaking the Six-Party Talks impasse.

June 20, 2007: A seventh round of Six Party Talks is held in Beijing. Absent is aggressive rhetoric of the past, but the meeting succeeds only in deciding to reconvene at a later date.

Dec. 15, 2007: Former Seoul City Mayor, Lee Myung-bak wins the South Korean Presidential election. His GNP party also takes control of the National Assembly.

Jan. 10, 2008: South Korea halts the Mt. Kumgang and Kaesong projects to show that it will take a hard line against Pyongyang's misbehavior.

Jan. 13, 2008: North Korea asks Beijing to lift the freeze on assets in Chinese financial institutions. Looking toward the 2008 Summer Olympic Games Beijing refuses to lift sanctions without prior consultation with other members of the Six-Party Talks.

Jan. 15, 2008: *KCNA* accuses Beijing and Seoul of selling out to U.S. imperialism.

March 10, 2006: U.S. satellites detect equipment and personnel movement to the previous nuclear test site. South Korean intelligence confirms the movement.

March 26, 2008: *KCNA* announces North Korea will conduct its second nuclear test.

Discussion Questions

1. What are the national interests of the major players involved? (short-term and long-term goals)
2. How does your country or institution view the situation? What are the expectations and worst case scenario?
3. What does your government or institution propose as a solution to stop the North Korean nuclear program? What immediate steps should you take?
4. How do the international regimes and activities (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Proliferation Security Initiative, and various nuclear/chemical/biological/radiologic agreements and treaties) come into play for your group?
5. Do you find this scenario probable? If not, make amendments to the scenario.

Suggested Readings

Howard W. French, "Letter From China: Difficult choices ahead on North Korea alliance," *International Herald Tribune*, October 19, 2006.

<http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/10/19/news/letter.php>

Melinda Liu, "China's Reaction: Tightening the Screws," *Newsweek International*, October 30, 2006. <http://msnbc.msn.com/id/15365945/site/newsweek/>

Edward A. Olsen, "Coping with Dual Korean Problems," *Strategic Insights*, Vol. 2, No.1 (January 2003). <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/jan03/eastAsia3.asp>

David Shambaugh, "China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 43-56.

http://www.twq.com/03spring/docs/03spring_shambaugh.pdf

Anne Wu, "What China Whispers to North Korea," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Spring 2005), pp. 35-48. http://www.twq.com/05spring/docs/05spring_wu.pdf

Carin Zissis, "China's Relationship with a Nuclear North Korea", Council on Foreign Relations, October 24, 2006. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/11791/>

Global Security's backgrounder on China's Shenyang Military Area Command

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/shenyang-mr.htm>

Scenario Report I – U.S. Group¹

The report is divided into the five sets of questions regarding the management of the crisis scenario.

After each of the questions, the report presents, first, how the group thought the U.S. would act or react; second, the process by which the group reached these answers.

1. What are the key U.S. national interests/concerns?

Answer:

The U.S. has two key national interests in the crisis:

First, the U.S. is determined to maintain peace and security in East Asia. To this end, it has to prevent the DPRK from conducting a second nuclear test. In effect, a second test would be destabilizing to the region and perhaps even beyond. It could drive other regional powers to “go nuclear,” increase the risks of regional war and the likelihood that a financially strapped Pyongyang would sell its rapidly developing weapon technologies to terrorist groups.

Second, the U.S. is convinced that, as the world’s only superpower, it has to play a leadership role in the management of the crisis and maintain its influence in East Asia. For one to lead others must want to follow; therefore, the U.S. is resolved to maintain and strengthen its regional alliances and partnerships, which it sees as central for crisis management as well as for the post-crisis power balance.

Group discussion process:

In identifying the key U.S. national interests, we started out by talking about the ideological characteristics of the Bush administration and its propensity to favor regime change when dealing with so-called “rogue states” such as the DPRK. We recognized the extreme difficulties of any military intervention against the DPRK and we also stressed the difficulties the US was facing in the Middle East with the war in Iraq.

As a consequence, we concluded that the U.S. would favor the search for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Yet, for the sake of its own credibility, of the credibility of the red lines drawn by the participants of the Six-Party Talks, and that of the nonproliferation regime, it seemed to us that the U.S. would remain firm in managing the crisis.

¹ Group Members: Ashley Calkins, Wayne Mei, David Santoro, and Tsukasa Yamamura

2. What are the U.S.' short-term and long-term goals?

Answer:

The U.S. has short-term, middle-term and long-term goals in the crisis.

Its short-term goal is simple and straightforward: it has to prevent the DPRK from conducting a second nuclear test.

Its middle-term goal is to convince the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapon program and return to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state (in accordance with the joint statement issued by the participants of the Six-Party Talks on Sept. 19, 2005). Moreover, the U.S. also wants the DPRK to dismantle all its other weapons of mass destruction (biological and chemical weapons) and missile delivery systems.

Its long-term goals are to facilitate rapprochement/integration between the ROK and the DPRK (ideally by peaceful means) and promote economic development.

Group discussion process:

The outcomes of the discussion for question 1 fueled many of our answers in question 2.

While the DPRK's first nuclear test proved rather inconsequential (as to its effects on regional peace and security), a second test would be much more dangerous, threatening the credibility of the U.S.' security role in the region. That is why we thought the U.S. would be resolute to prevent the DPRK from testing again and to dismantle its weapon programs. In the longer run, the U.S. would like to see the current regime in Pyongyang disappear, preferably by itself and without outside intervention.

3. What is the immediate U.S. response? What happens next?

Answer:

In view of its key national interests and its short/middle/long-term goals, the U.S. intends to manage the crisis by proceeding by the following steps:

First, the U.S. announces at the highest level of government that the DPRK is approaching a pivotal point with its stated intention to conduct a second nuclear test and that it holds the key to its future.

Second, the U.S. puts an attractive multilateral package on the table for the DPRK in exchange for its commitment not to conduct a second nuclear test, the abandonment of its weapon program, and its return to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.

While the U.S. strongly reiterates several times that it has no aggressive intention toward the DPRK, it makes clear that it is holding diplomatic and military negotiations with its regional allies and partners to prepare contingency plans should the DPRK fail to cooperate.

Group discussion process:

In order to secure its key national interests and achieve its goals, – preferably in a peaceful manner – the U.S. would need to adopt a strategy mixing “carrots” (attractive package to encourage disarmament) and “sticks” (preparation for alternative means if the deal is not reached).

4. Who are the key U.S. diplomatic partners and targets? How does it reach out to them?

Answer:

The key U.S. diplomatic partners and targets are:

First, the U.S. focuses on the participants of the Six-Party Talks (the key *ad hoc* organization to manage the crisis). It does not meet solely with China, Japan, the ROK, and Russia (excluding the DPRK) in order to encourage China to press the DPRK to accept the proposed package. The emphasis is laid on the fact that the package is a multilateral offer.

Second, the U.S. holds bilateral and trilateral meetings with its partners, via special envoys.

Third, the U.S. expects to gain the support of the international community, expressed within the framework of regional and international organizations, such as ASEAN.

Group discussion:

The situation placed the U.S. in a rather favorable situation with its allies and partners to adopt the above-mentioned strategy. We thought the U.S. could expect more widespread support from Seoul (following the victory of Lee Myung-Bak and the GNP) and Beijing (following its unfruitful negotiations with Pyongyang and the flood of refugees in China’s northeastern provinces).

5. How does the U.S. use international and regional regimes and activities (NPT, PSI and other NRBC agreements and treaties)?

Answer:

The U.S. uses the following international and regional regimes and activities:

First, the U.S. makes it clear that the NPT is the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime by insisting that it is of paramount importance for international peace and security and that the DPRK returns to it as a non-nuclear weapon state.

Second, the U.S. indicates that UNSCR 1718, which allows for limited military and economic sanctions against the DPRK, still holds if Pyongyang refuses to cooperate.

Third, the U.S. stresses that Proliferation Security Initiative activities would be enhanced if the DPRK fails to cooperate.

Group discussion:

We thought it was crucial for the U.S. to reiterate the need to comply with the nonproliferation norm.

Scenario Report 2 – China Group¹

The China group consisted of five members. Anne Hsiu-An Hsiao was president and Ronald Rodriguez was foreign minister. Other members included Shanshan Wang, Shafiah Fifi Muhibat, and Dinh Thi Hien Luong. The interplay of the group members' diverse viewpoints made the simulation exercise both interesting and unpredictable. Noteworthy was the fact that Dr. Hsiao (from Taipei) played the role of Chinese president alongside Shanshan Wang (from Beijing). One participant retorted that having Dr. Hsiao as president might prompt the declaration of China as a renegade province of Taiwan. It should be emphasized, however, that each member's recognition of the underlying sensitivities, especially insofar as the positions of China and Taiwan on the Korean Peninsula issue are concerned, did not prevent frank exchanges.

The members of the group agreed that the most important security concerns are: (1) a possible second DPRK nuclear test; (2) regime collapse in DPRK; and (3) nontraditional security issues (e.g., a refugee crisis).

We identified at least four key national interests of China. These include: (1) border security (i.e., completion of the border wall between China and the DPRK); (2) regional economic stability (i.e., Chinese trade and other economic interests); (3) China's leverage over the DPRK (especially within the Six-Party Talks and other relevant frameworks); and (4) deterrence of other possible security threats. The fourth item touched on the threat of Taiwan's "opportunism." It would be interesting to mention here that Dr. Hsiao raised this point and Ms. Wang supported her view.

Discussions were most intense on the short-term and long-term goals of China. While there was immediate agreement on the need to (1) stop the DPRK from carrying out a second test and convince it to return to the Six-Party Talks and (2) prevent any further spillover effect of the humanitarian situation in the DPRK, the group failed to arrive at a clear consensus on China's long-term goals. Some of the propositions laid on the table suggested denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and nonproliferation. But others argued that China's long-term goal is to maximize gains from the crisis. A member of the group stressed the need to seize the moment and use the situation to improve China's position both in the region and in the world. Others insisted that the preservation of China's ties with the DPRK is paramount, underlining the need to prevent the emergence of a new regime in Pyongyang that is hostile to Beijing.

Several questions also emerged: Is it in China's interest to see a normal DPRK? If it is, how does this conflict with China's interest in maintaining leverage over the DPRK or influence in the Korean Peninsula? Is it in China's interest to keep the DPRK dependent on China? Is China willing to sacrifice relations with the anti-Pyongyang government in Seoul? As more and more questions emerged while time elapsed, the Chinese president declared that 'there is no argument' and pushed the discussion to the next question.

¹ Anne Hsiu-An Hsiao, Ronald Rodriguez, Shanshan Wang, Shafiah Fifi Muhibat, and Dinh Thi Hien Luong

The time spent discussing China's goals prevented the group from generating a strategically outlined list of responses. The group agreed, for instance, to mobilize international participation and support for a humanitarian relief, but it failed to assess how its decision to complete the China-DPRK border wall would impact on its goal to improve China's international position and image. Proposals to engage the DPRK in bilateral talks to address economic and refugee problems, as well as to lift sanctions in exchange for Pyongyang's commitment not to conduct second nuclear test were also put forward.

The group then defined partners as "those with common or shared interests with China" and targets as "those which China wants to influence." The U.S., Russia, South Korea, and Japan were listed as China's partners, on the one hand, and the DPRK, South Korea, and the U.S. as China's targets, on the other. There were expressed opposition to these definitions and listings, however. One participant maintained, for instance, that stakeholders have different interests. It was also observed that the group did not carefully take into account the new realities in Seoul. How China reaches out to the new conservative government in Seoul should have been given emphasis, observers noted.

For the group, reaching out to its partners and targets entailed highlighting the message that "cooperation is good for the region" and that "supporting China" in brokering negotiations in the Korean Peninsula will redound to common good. But these motherhood statements did not offer concrete measures that will help muster support for China. The group also indicated its intention to use international and regional regimes and activities to force the DPRK into agreements as occupant protection devices for lifting sanctions. Note, however, that all members of the group manifested a lack of confidence in the Proliferation Security Initiative as a useful instrument for this particular issue.

In the end, the group concluded that China stands to benefit from this crisis. But just as there are opportunities, risks for and threats to China also stand in the way.

Scenario Report 3 – UN Group¹

1. What are the United Nations' (UN) key interests and concerns?

- Threat to international stability and peace
- Growing humanitarian crisis (fleeing North Koreans (“refugees”) and North Korean famine victims.)
- Getting North Korea back to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections.

The group spent some time defining the identity of the UN. It became clear that the UN voice could not represent the UN Security Council or the UN General Assembly as the other teams represented the U.S., China, and the DPRK. The UN voice is easier to hear from its affiliated agencies like the IAEA and UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). These agencies are task-driven rather than policy-making organs of the UN. The group realizes this is an artificial definition of the UN, since in the real world the Security Council would have input into the growing crisis. To play the game, the group used the idea of functional units being the UN.

Another issue that the group spent time discussing was defining the status of the North Korean defectors. Are the fleeing North Koreans defectors, refugees, or economic migrants? The UNHCR has yet to define them as refugees. Given the ambiguous status, many North Koreans are seen as illegal immigrants. The group understood the legal limbo that many North Koreans fleeing to China and Southeast Asian countries face.

2. What are your short-term and long-term goals?

Short-term:

- Ease the escalation of tensions and prevent open conflict in the Korean Peninsula.
- Address the humanitarian crisis caused by the growing number of “refugees” in neighboring states (with shelter, food, clothing, and other basic needs), and famine victims in North Korea using food assistance from the World Food Program.

Mid-term:

- Conduct confidence building measures with the DPRK such as creating milestones at which certain sanctions as defined in UNSCR 1718 can be rolled back.

Long-term:

- Nuclear disarmament as stated in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
- Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
- Economic development of North Korea (i.e., infrastructure and agricultural projects)
- Conduct CBMs with North Korea to address the “trust” gap between the DPRK and the rest of the world.

¹ Group Members: Katherine Hernandez, Ta Minh Tuan, Sun Namkung, and Bryan San Juan

The group agreed that there needed to be clearly defined short-, mid-, and long-term goals. All the goals are important and all can be worked on simultaneously. The short- and mid-term goals were thought to be addressable by the UN agencies. However, long-term goals require input would be needed from other multilateral institutions like the Asian Development Bank and bilateral aid from the U.S. and China. The long-term framework needs input from global stakeholders, especially when addressing the issue of trust.

3. What is the UN's immediate response? Next?

These actions are to be done simultaneously.

- Call for UNSC meeting.
- Coordinate with partners (U.S., China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia) to set up refugee facilities.
- Back channel talks by UN envoys.

The group found the immediate response to be realistic. Should a collapse of the DPRK regime appear imminent, the Security Council will have an important role in marshaling the resources of the UN. However, given the mechanics of this game, the group felt that it was tricky to have the Security Council do anything other than convene. Otherwise, the remedies proposed may have contravened the intentions of players representing the U.S. and China.

4. Who are your key diplomatic partners and targets? How do you reach out to them?

Partners: P5, South Korea, Japan, ASEAN, EU, and IAEA.

Targets: DPRK, China, and U.S.

Use Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to engage with partners and target states China and U.S.

Use secretary general of ASEAN with an Indonesian envoy as back-up, to engage the DPRK.

The group thought that having a South Korean as UN secretary general was an unknown variable in the relationship between the UN with the DPRK. To be pragmatic, having South Korean Secretary General Ban makes for a more compelling spokesperson on the North Korean crises. However, the group concluded that Ban was not the right messenger to approach the DPRK. Secretary General Ban is a career ROK foreign service officer and not known for his politics. Current South Korean politics shows that the foreign ministers play second fiddle to unification ministers when it comes to issues of the DPRK and the Korean Peninsula. It took awhile for the group to come up with a third party to approach the DPRK. The DPRK has little trust in multilateral institutions. To respond to the distrust, a neutral third party like ASEAN or a Pyongyang-"friendly" nation like Indonesia was thought to be the ideal emissary to Chairman Kim.

5. How do you use international and regional regimes and activities?

Regimes and activities don't come into play in the short-term.

In the medium- and long-term, the Six-Party Talks and the UNSC will have a role in bringing the DPRK nuclear program under supervision of the IAEA and back to the NPT.

In the group discussion, it was concluded that the UN doesn't have a short-term role. It is only over the mid- and long-terms that the UN will have an effect on the DPRK. This is simply because international regimes cannot be applied to North Korea, which is not party to the regimes, for instance the NPT. Moreover, under the circumstances of the game, any assertion to employ international and regional regimes will push North Korea away and consequently disengage North Koreans from the talks, which is a prerequisite for further discussion on de-escalating tension.

Scenario Report 4 – ROK Group¹

Discussion within the ROK Group

The ROK group spent substantial time distinguishing key national interests from major policy goals. First, members expressed concerns about stability inside the DPRK that could lead to aggressive behavior and instability. Such a situation could spill over and threaten the ROK economy.

The group then engaged in debate over the new ROK government's position on DPRK nuclear arms. Members ultimately agreed that the new government's position, originating from the Grand National Party (GNP), would be different from the current government.

- This new government is expected to be more realistic and practical in balancing sticks and carrots. As provided in the scenario, this government favors a harder line toward North Korea than former governments.
- The group also discussed alliance relations. The group decided the new government favors a strong alliance with the United States, because the ROK-U.S. alliance and the U.S. troops in Korea are pivotal in preventing North Korean aggression. Therefore, the ROK-U.S. alliance should be strengthened and any negotiations with the North will be carried out in close consultation with the United States.

It was difficult to decide how the issue of North-South reconciliation and reunification should be prioritized. The group eventually decided to place the broader idea of reunification under "Key National Interests" and steps that are expected to lead toward reunification under "Long-term Goals."

Humanitarian and environmental concerns were difficult to place under a single heading as well. Considering the GNP's more hardline approach toward the DPRK, the ROK will be taking a more active position on human rights issues.² The group eventually looked at 'Humanitarian and environmental concerns' as a broader topic and dealt with specific issues under it. These details went under "Key National Interests," "Short-term Goals," and "Long-term Goals."

Following consideration of the above points, the ROK group decided it would be more risk-acceptant than the current Roh administration. In other words, the new ROK government is not interested in stability for stability's sake and would be willing to trade some stability for effective pressure on Pyongyang to abandon weapons of mass destruction. The difference between the GNP and the ruling Uri party lies in the former's belief that the DPRK's acquisition of nuclear weapons is not to use them as a bargaining chip but that North Korea actually wants these weapons, as they have shown a strong willingness to acquire them for decades. Accordingly, from the GNP's view, DPRK participation in the Six-Party Talks is to delay

¹ Group members: Julia Joo-A Lee (chair), Leif-Eric Easley, Adrienne Li-Tan (rapporteur), Thi Binh Khong.

² Ryu Jin, *S. Korea Should Actively Address NK Human Rights* (2006 [cited 7 December 2006]); available from <http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/nation/200601/kt2006012416215411990.htm>.

economic sanctions. In addition, the group observed that the Six-Party Talks are currently not responding well and the ROK group sees a need to apply punitive measures to convince the DPRK that its nuclear test and any subsequent tests are a mistake.

The group observed that in the scenario, ROK suspended the Mt. Kumgang and Kaesong projects. The continued suspension is expected to pressure the DPRK by cutting the source of hard currency. As refugees fleeing from the DPRK are indicative of internal turmoil, ROK needs to *convince the North Korean regime that it cannot survive with nuclear weapons.*

For the government led by the Uri party, engagement is an end in itself, open relations with North Korea is not just a tactic but an ideology. The group thinks that promoting inter-Korean relations should be regarded as a tactic within the broad strategy of advancing ROK national interests vis-à-vis the DPRK. This position significantly differs from the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, because they confused strategy with tactics and pursued favorable relations with DPRK as their main strategy. The result was one-sided assistance programs without articulating or achieving the necessary objective of inducing change of North Korea.

Given the circumstances of the scenario, the ROK group determined Seoul would adopt a long-term approach of strategic reciprocity, by which ROK assistance and cooperation are carefully tied to progress in DPRK.

ROK Group Findings

As the product of our discussion, the group developed the following points comprising the position the ROK would take in the simulation. These findings are provided under sub-headings of Key National Interests, Short-term Goals, Long-term Goals, Policy Responses, Diplomatic partners, and International Regimes and Activities.

Key National Interests

1. **Security** – It is in ROK’s interest to **deter any North Korean attack** as well as to **prevent North Korea from using nuclear blackmail**. Additionally, the ROK intends to **avoid a regional arms race**.
2. **Economic** – DPRK instability would negatively affect the ROK economy. It is thus important to minimize detrimental spillover effects from North Korea.
3. **Diplomatic** – ROK seeks to maintain favorable relations with key powers that possess influence on the Korean Peninsula.
4. A path to a peaceful and affordable unification.
5. Humanitarian concerns for the North Korean people

Short-term Goals

1. **Prevent Further Nuclear Tests** – the ROK’s primary short-term goal is to prevent North Korea from further nuclear testing, or at least to create the conditions under which Pyongyang would be worse off after conducting a second test.

2. **Avoid Further Conflict** – ROK will seek to avoid a broader conflict. There are many pressure points at which further conflict could take place and these include possible incidents at sea or along the DMZ, or security problems with the DPRK military related to refugee flows.
3. **ROK-U.S. Alliance** – ROK needs to maintain the credibility of the ROK-U.S. alliance in terms of nuclear umbrella, conventional deterrent, and diplomatic solidarity.
4. **Building International Support** – ROK will start to prioritize international relations over inter-Korean relations. This is aimed at building strong international support for the ROK’s position on the North Korea issue.
5. **Active Decisive Diplomacy** – ROK needs to ensure that South Korea’s voice is heard in the international arena with active and decisive diplomacy. ROK does not want a U.S.-DPRK or China-DPRK deal over South Korea’s head.
6. **Military Readiness** – ROK needs to prepare its armed forces for all possible contingencies and ensure the readiness of the ROK military.

Long-term Goals

1. **Complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement (CVID)** – The main goal in the long term is denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula which will ensure the security of all Koreans and serve as a step toward reunification.
2. **ROK-U.S. Alliance** – The friendship and alliance with the U.S. must be enhanced in breadth and depth.
3. **Encouragement for DPRK to transform regime** – North Korea needs encouragement to open and transform its regime. This would lead to more positive relations with its immediate neighbors and assure greater acceptance by the international community. Promoting economic and political transformation will also give North Koreans a stronger voice to influence government changes that will improve human rights.
4. **Improve humanitarian conditions in North Korea** – ROK should promote the freedom and welfare of the Northern residents, and increase aid targeting humanitarian relief in the North. However, all assistance to North Korea must be based upon the principles of reciprocity and effective monitoring.

Policy Response

1. The ROK will first and foremost **convey to NK that its WMD will not be tolerated** and that a nuclear test will be met with negative consequences. These will include the following immediate actions:
 - a. More economic sanctions;
 - b. ROK join PSI, will actively interdict;
 - c. ROK will re-label NK as “main enemy.”
2. The ROK will also **confer with U.S.** and request reaffirmation of the nuclear umbrella and U.S. defense commitment. At the same time, the ROK will look into holding a Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group meeting with U.S. and Japan.
3. The ROK will send an envoy to **confer with China.**

4. The ROK will **continue suspension of Kaesong and Mt. Kumgang projects**. At the same time, it is vital that the ROK government ensure South Koreans safe passage from North Korea.
5. Internally, the ROK will **revive civil defense training** and give a balanced account of threat to the ROK people to keep them informed of the situation. Providing such information to citizens would also prevent panic and minimize protest.
6. The ROK government will also begin to **harden soft targets** and protect infrastructure. There is a possibility of looking into building air-raid bomb shelters or similar protection for citizens. They can also be educated to respond appropriately in an emergency.
7. Finally, the ROK will look into **strengthening monitoring of humanitarian aid**, because the ROK does not want to empower the North Korean regime by providing unconditional aid. It is important for the ROK to view human rights in North Korea as not solely an ethical issue of whether to supply aid, but whether the aid will reach the people who need it.
8. Additionally, the government will also **improve surveillance of the refugee situation and extend humanitarian assistance to refugees in China**. Not only humanity demands it; handling the refugee issue through international cooperation will also help forge an operational consensus on the nuclear issue.

Diplomatic Partners

After discussion, the group decided that there are three major diplomatic partners the ROK government may try to influence. First, ROK will reaffirm and signal strengthening the alliance with the U.S. Since softer approaches toward North Korea have not been reciprocated, firmer actions should be able to create pressure upon the North Korean government. By reaffirming this bilateral relationship, ROK would be able to position itself closer to the U.S. position on the issue and further explicitly indicate displeasure over Pyongyang's decision to carry out tests. Seoul would also work with Beijing in a coordinated stance toward the North Korean refugee crisis. Beijing needs to be convinced that the refugees will not be well taken care of if they were repatriated to North Korea and needs to contribute by providing more humanitarian aid. Finally, the ROK would position itself closer to Japan to coordinate their coast guards as well as work on contingency planning. Japan would also be a diplomatic target since Seoul wants to ensure Tokyo does not take any provocative military measures vis-à-vis North Korea.

International Regimes and Activities

The ROK would first look into the effective and immediate enforcement of UN resolutions.

Second, the ROK plans to encourage UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon behind closed doors to emphasize the economic and diplomatic opportunities North Korea would gain by foregoing a second nuclear test in favor of disarmament. This would allow the UN to present a softer approach while the ROK takes a tougher stance. By approaching the problem with both incentives and disincentives, the possibility of achieving ROK goals would increase.

Third, the ROK will call for international assistance in helping North Korean refugees. The ROK would ask other countries to accept refugees and recognize them as asylum seekers, and will send aid via UN bodies to China, Mongolia, Vietnam, Thailand, etc.

Finally, the DPRK has indicated the intention of further tests. The ROK will demand that the DPRK rejoin the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Should Pyongyang appear to be planning more nuclear tests, Seoul will send a warning that it will join the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and actively interdict suspicious North Korea ships in South Korean waters.

Scenario Assessment

Issues raised on national positions

China was willing to pay to get North Korea back to the table whereas the U.S. is not. The U.S. does not define talking as success. Washington wants substantive progress toward suspension and dismantlement of North Korea's weapons programs.

Both the U.S. and ROK teams were focused on creating conditions whereby North Korea's decision to conduct a second nuclear test would prove costly to Pyongyang. The ROK in particular wanted to be able to convince the DPRK that such activities are a strategic error by spelling out consequences for North Korea in the event Pyongyang conducts a second nuclear test.

The ROK group was not satisfied by the explanation by the China group on how Korea refugees in northeast China would be handled. It was not clear whether refugee camps would be set up in northeast China or whether China would accept international aid for such camps.

Was the scenario realistic?

National presentations may have reflected what Young Leaders thought nations "should" do rather than what governments would actually do under the circumstances.

In reality, governments may face domestic political constraints that were not sufficiently considered in the Young Leaders' decision-making process. While the new ROK government's "position" was provided, one should remember that the president does not make the decisions alone. Any national leader would face pressure from the public or within the government. Different ministries would also have their own interests to protect.

The exercise was also lacking in the consideration of possible actions from domestic opposition parties and NGOs. We are not able to predict if there would be violent demonstrations from the public against the new ROK approach. As group discussion was focused on possible actions by a particular administration with the scenario set out for us, members of the group are only able to predict what *might* take place.

One of the concerns during the discussion was that the fortification of South Korean soft targets and infrastructure would result in unnecessary panic or suspicion from neighboring countries. The effect of this decision would be hard to predict, but there is basis for less concern as it was pointed out that Singapore, a country in a relatively peaceful region, has air-raid shelters built in all new apartments. For older neighborhoods, air-raid shelters are built into void decks and underground Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) stations are also fortified to serve the purpose. These actions did not particularly alarm the citizens of Singapore.

Another concern is whether the ROK would be able to implement its policy regarding PSI. There was a South-North maritime agreement that allows interdiction, but the ROK has been hesitant to enforce the law and risk any military conflict. The Roh administration and the Ministry of Unification never interdicted any ships even though the National Intelligence Service recently reported 20 suspicious activities of North Korean ships. The GNP has insisted that the ROK should fully participate in PSI, and actively interdict North Korean ships. However, it is more likely and reasonable (if the GNP is elected) to use PSI participation as strategic leverage against DPRK.

Who won?

Given the way the scenario played out, efforts to prevent North Korea's second nuclear test would probably have failed. The DPRK group made it clear that they would go through with its threatening statement should they be denied their requests (lifting of financial law enforcement at Banco Delta Asia).

However, given the solid but non-aggressive position of the U.S. and the firmer, more balanced (in terms of carrots and sticks) position of the ROK, North Korea's second nuclear test would probably have been against its own long-term interests. The South Korea-U.S. alliance would become more united over the issue of North Korea, Beijing would be put under greater pressure to positively influence Pyongyang, and North Korea's domestic instability and refugee crisis may force it to cut a deal rather than continue to escalate for more bargaining leverage.

Suggestions for future simulations

Future simulations might be enhanced with multiple stages. A multi-stage game could be played with one stage at the start of the conference, another during the conference and one after. This would allow more interaction and exchange of ideas among the groups and would contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the various group responses to the scenario. The added time would allow more detailed and sophisticated responses, and the multiple stages would make the exercise more realistic, as groups are given the opportunity to respond to other teams' moves.

Future simulations should also include Japan, as the country is a key player in the North Korean issue. Additionally, because of developments regarding the Japanese constitution and alliance with the U.S., it would be interesting to see how a Japanese group would respond to the scenario.

Finally, if conducive to a future conference's purposes and logistical constraints, it would be fascinating to run parallel simulations – one where national teams are made up of Young Leaders

and the other where national teams are comprised of senior participants. Such a double exercise would provide the opportunity to discuss generational differences in responding to the scenario and developing effective policy solutions.

Scenario Report 5 – North Korea Group¹

DPRK Answers to Simulation Questions

1. The DPRK's key national interests:

- Regime survival;
- Reunification of the Korean Peninsula;
- Become a regional power.

Discussion:

The DPRK group agreed that in the scenario's circumstances, the short-term national interest is regime survival. The financial sanctions imposed by the United States, China, Korea, and Japan, as well as the actions taken by the international community following United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718, constrain the already slim economic and diplomatic activities of the DPRK and threaten its survival. The DPRK's long-term national interests are to achieve the reunification of the peninsula under the terms and conditions set by Pyongyang and to become a regional power that is free from the influence of China, Japan, and the United States. The group determined that even under a harmonious relationship with the United States, the DPRK would not be able to live in peace with strong conventional forces south of the 38th parallel. At the same time, like any other country, the group agreed that as the leaders of the country, we would like to see a greater Korea that is free from foreign influence.

2. Key national concerns

- *Financial sanctions;*
- *Preemptive attack by the United States;*
- *Change of heart in China.*

Discussion:

As the leaders of the DPRK, the group's primary concern was the financial sanctions imposed on the country. Sanctions by the international community tighten the already fragile economic circumstances in the DPRK and force millions to starve. Furthermore, sanctions can pose a serious threat to political stability in Pyongyang as a dissatisfied military may launch a coup.

A concern about a preemptive strike from the United States was second on our list of concerns. It was our understanding that the U.S. faced much more difficulties in launching a military strike against us than against Iraq. To the north is the People's Republic of China and Russia. To the south, there are 46 million South Koreans who are mentally unprepared to face millions of deaths of their own people. They rather live in peace and the past and the current administration in Seoul has proven that. However, given the U.S. tendency toward unilateral action, the group

¹ Group members: Madhan Mohan, Junbeom Pyon, Raymund Jose Quilop, Tiphaine de Champchesnel

could not ignore such a possibility. If there is a preemptive war against us, everyone in the group agreed that the regime will shut down in matter of days.

Finally, a change of heart in China would pose a serious threat that would combine the first and the second concern. A changed China may halt economic assistance to the DPRK. A changed China may support regime change in Pyongyang.

3. What are the DPRK's short-term goals?

- Ease financial sanctions

Discussion:

The DPRK seeks to ease financial sanctions and will target China and South Korea, the weaker links of the chain by threatening a second nuclear test. Furthermore, the objective of the ambiguous statement is to engage the United States directly and extract optimal gain. The group determined that from past studies of the Chinese and Korean responses to the first nuclear test, both countries will neither halt their economic assistance to Pyongyang nor resort to military sanctions.

The tactic in the short-term is to “wait and watch”; the response of other countries will determine the likelihood of a second nuclear test. The key diplomatic targets are the United States, China, South Korea, and Japan. The primary target is the United States: the objective is to extract a profitable concession in a bilateral setting and make a deal. The second targets are China and South Korea: the aim is to ease sanctions with these countries. The third target is Japan: the rational is to isolate Japan by weakening its leverage and pitting it against China and South Korea. In the wake of an ambiguous statement suggesting the possibility of a second nuclear test, the U.S. and Japan would press for tougher sanctions. This move is likely to be opposed by China and South Korea; fearing an influx of refugees, these states will opt for a mild response. Japan's leeway on the issue will be further reduced.

4. What are the DPRK's long-term goals?

- To survive sanctions and to reunify the Korean Peninsula.

Discussion:

The long-term goal discussed by the group was to first survive the sanctions, and to gradually build diplomatic and economic relationships with other countries. This is designed to ensure economic and political stability on the peninsula and prevent an exodus of refugees. The DPRK should also wait for regime changes in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo and seek an opportunity to engage in bilateral relations with the United States, thus ensuring its safety.

5. Who are the DPRK's key diplomatic partners/targets?

- Partners: None
- Targets: China, South Korea, the United States, Japan, and UNHCR.

Discussion:

The DPRK group found no partners in the simulation. The ROK government could not be trusted as it is an ally of the United States. The ROK government is also the DPRK's number one enemy that prevents reunification of the Peninsula. Seoul also poses a serious threat with its conventional capabilities. The United States is the single largest military threat to Pyongyang and China often exerts political and economic pressure to shape North Korea's policies. Japan's normalization process and debate causes great concern among DPRK officials and Pyongyang believes that Tokyo is using the DPRK as a useful adversary in promoting an increase in the military budget and weapons development.

International Regimes and Activities (Discussion)

International and regional regimes will be used to further national interests. A return to the NPT may be suggested if the United States agrees to the terms and conditions set by North Korea. In such a scenario the other parties viz. South Korea, China, and the U.S. are unlikely to come to an agreement. The DPRK will continue to admonish and threaten South Korea from joining Proliferation Security Initiative, with the intention of causing more friction between South Korea and the United States.

Scenario Assessment

The DPRK finds itself in the best position among the five parties in the simulation. Pyongyang's 'Wait and Watch' tactic is possible because of conflicting interests of the United States, China, Korea, and the United Nations. While the U.S. is primarily concerned with proliferation of WMD, China and Korea are concerned with the maintenance of regional stability and peace, and the United Nations is concerned with humanitarian activities. Thus, while the U.S. seeks to further isolate the DPRK, the group has learned that the DPRK is able to extract gain and will be compensated by other parties, especially the People's Republic of China and South Korea. At the same time, the DPRK group, after observing the responses of other groups in the simulation, calculated that in the worst-case scenario, it is in the interest of DPRK to hold a second nuclear test. The DPRK finds military actions by the international community to punish it for its second nuclear test highly unlikely as South Korea and PRC remain strongly opposed to any military action against the regime. In fact, the DPRK group speculates that a second nuclear test may serve its interests by causing a further divergence among the other parties.

About the Authors

J. Ashley CALKINS is a program associate at the Stanley Foundation. She received her B.A. in Japanese with a minor in Political Science from Middlebury College in Middlebury, Vermont.

Tiphaine DE CHAMPCHESNEL is a research fellow at the Center on International Security and Arms Control Studies. She received her Master's in arms, control, disarmament and verification at the University of Marne-la-Vallée.

Leif-Eric EASLEY is a Ph.D. student in the Harvard Department of Government. He has studied and traveled extensively in Asia and Europe. Leif worked with security specialists at policy research centers in Los Angeles (RAND) and Washington, D.C. (Henry L. Stimson Center) and assisted with conference planning at the Japan-America Society of Southern California.

Katherine Marie HERNANDEZ is a research fellow at the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies. Katherine is also a consultant in the Office of the Senior Vice President at the National Power Corporation.

Anne Hsiu-An HSIAO is an assistant research fellow at the Institute for International Relations, National Chengchi University.

KHONG Thi Binh is a research fellow for the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at the Institute for International Relations. Recently, she was a visiting fellow at JIIA from 2005-2006, where she was the editorial board secretary of the Journal of International Studies, Institute of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam.

Julia Joo-A LEE is a research associate at International Crisis Group, Seoul Office. She was an intern in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International studies, Washington until recently.

Adrienne LI-TAN is a Ph.D. candidate at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies. She graduated from the National University of Singapore in 2003 with a BA (Pass with Merit). Her concentration was in Political Science and European Studies and was also part of the University Scholar's Program.

DINH Thi Hien Luong is a research fellow for the Centre for Northeast Asian Studies at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Wayne C. MEI is a special assistant for Policy, for the National Nuclear Security Administration at the U.S. Department of Energy.

Madhan MOHAN is an assistant professor in Disarmament Studies Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament School of International Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University.

Shafiah Fifi MUHIBAT is a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies.

Sun NAMKUNG is a research associate at Pacific Forum CSIS and a coeditor of Comparative Connections. She holds an M.B.A. from the College of Business Administration at the University of Hawaii Manoa and received her B.A. in art history from Wellesley College in Wellesley, Massachusetts.

Junbeom PYON, 2006-2007 Vasey Fellow, is from Seoul, Korea. He received his M.A. in Government and a B.A. in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University. As an undergraduate, he was awarded the Ripon William F. Clinger Fellowship.

Raymund Jose QUILOP is assistant professor of Political Science at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City. He is also a senior researcher/analyst of the Office of Strategic and Special Studies (OSS), Armed Forces of the Philippines and a fellow of the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies.

Ronald RODRIGUEZ is an Asia Consultant for Asia Exclusive Analysis, Ltd.

Bryan SAN JUAN is master's degree candidate in the International Studies at the Department of Political Science Graduate Program in the University of the Philippines. He is also a consultant to the Philippine Politico-Economic Affairs arm of the ASEAN Political Economy Project.

David SANTORO is concurrently a Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at Macquarie University in Australia and a research assistant at the Centre for Policing, Intelligence, & Counter Terrorism, Access Macquarie.

TA Minh Tuan is the Deputy Director at the Centre for European & American Studies, Institute of International Relations. He is also a Civil servant and a Research fellow at the Institute of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Shanshan WANG is a student fellow for the Asia Pacific Leadership Program at the East-West Center. She received her B.A. in Diplomacy at China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU). She is an M. A. Candidate in International Relations with specialization in China's Foreign Policy at CFAU.

Tsukasa YAMAMURA works in the policy research office of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Science and Technology Center at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency.