Security Dynamics in a Changing East Asia:
Views from the Next Generation

A Young Leaders Publication

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Pacific Forum CSIS

Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate areas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

The Young Leaders Program invites young professionals and graduate students to join Pacific Forum policy dialogues and conferences. The program fosters education in the practical aspects of policy-making, generates an exchange of views between young and seasoned professionals, promotes interaction among younger professionals, and enriches dialogues with generational perspectives for all attendees. Fellows must have a strong background in the area covered by the conference they are attending and an endorsement from respected experts in their field. Supplemental programs in conference host cities and mentoring sessions with senior officials and specialists add to the Young Leader experience. The Young Leaders Program is currently supported by the Freeman Foundation, the Luce Foundation, the Strong Foundation, and the Yuchengco Group, with a growing number of universities, institutes, and organizations also helping to sponsor individual participants. For more details, see the Pacific Forum CSIS website, www.pacforum.org, or contact Brad Glosserman, director of the Young Leaders Program, at bradgpf@hawaii.rr.com.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

Preface

After two and a half years, the Pacific Forum's Young Leaders program continues to grow and evolve. Nearly 200 young professionals from around the world have joined our meetings; most have attended multiple conferences, ensuring that there is an ongoing conversation about security issues. Perhaps more important, continuing participation helps us create a genuine network of young professionals, a core objective of this program.

We have also expanded the opportunities available to Young Leaders. Today, almost every Pacific Forum CSIS conference has a Young Leaders' component. When possible, we put Young Leaders on the agenda to provide the next generation's perspective on issues being discussed. Young Leaders have private sessions with foreign policy practictioners attending our meetings, affording them access denied many of their seniors. Young Leaders have broken bread with such as notables as former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, former ROK Foreign Minister Hang Sung-joo, and former Pentagon official Dr. Joseph Nye, and others.

Young Leader programs now rival the main conference in length as we work with local partners to give participants access to local individuals and institutions that can provide unique insights and perspectives on issues and concerns. Young Leaders have visited political party offices, national legislatures and other government offices, as well as media outlets. Pacific Forum CSIS owes much to its local partners who have made these programs possible.

Loyal readers know that Young Leaders must produce to participate. In the past, they have written essays before each meeting, which have been critiqued by their peers and revised to reflect discussions they heard. In an attempt to evolve this dimension of the program, we now promote group projects. These force participants to work together, even after the meetings, encouraging ongoing communications and the discussion of issues. It teaches them to negotiate and makes plain the difficulties in articulating common positions even among friends and between people who ostensibly agree on principles. The report that follows is the first such effort. It has stimulated considerable discussion among the participants and hopefully it will do the same for its readers. The report will be on the Pacific Forum web page (www.pacforum.org) with all other Young Leader reports. We will also put it on the Young Leaders website (www.pacforumyoungleaders.org) in a wiki-format to allow other individuals to add thoughts and hone concepts.

Pacific Forum CSIS is very proud of our Young Leaders and this program. We encourage interested individuals to contact us if they would like to join the Young Leaders program, if they would like to use these materials, or if they have suggestions on ways to improve this effort.

Ralph A. Cossa
President, Pacific Forum CSIS

Introduction
By Raymund Jose G. Quilop

In September 2006, the Asia-Pacific Security Forum (APSF) held its 10th meeting, bringing together academics and analysts the Taiwan, Southeast Asia, the United States, and Europe. The APSF focused on three themes: (1) nationalism, democracy, and security in East Asia; (2) the search for energy and resources in the Asia-Pacific; and (3) regional security organizations in the Asia-Pacific. In addition to bringing together experts, the meeting also included members of the Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders Program who participated in the meeting and shared their views on these issues. Not only did they engage actively in discussions and debate with senior participants, but they also collaborated among themselves to write the essays in this volume.

Preparing these essays was not an easy task. Each essay has been written by a group of Young Leaders; the work included discussing the points of view to include, how best to incorporate various ideas, as well as how the essay was to be written so that it is a coherent whole. The collaboration process began during the meeting when many of the Young Leaders met for the first time. Communication continued through email and internet chats after the meeting and drafts were circulated to collect commentaries and suggestions. These young scholars wanted to ensure that their essays were logical, coherent, and empirical.

The first essay in this collection examines the nexus between nationalism, democracy, and security in East Asia. Written by Leif-Eric Easley, Elina Noor, Raymund Jose Quilop, and Qinghong Wang,[*] it argues that nationalism, although sometimes thought to have been eclipsed by globalization, has re-emerged as an important issue in East Asia. And given the rise of democracy in the region, nationalism is having a profound impact on security in the region. They point out that it is useful to identify "correlates of nationalism" or "phenomena that exhibit similar magnitude and directional trends as nationalism in order to understand how nationalism affects security policy." These correlates are government legitimacy in the case of China, international political role in the case of Japan, national unification in the case of the Korean Peninsula, mobilization against external threat such as terrorism for the U.S., and economic development for Southeast Asian states. They caution, however, that these five correlates are "not a compete typology nor are they mutually exclusive."

In analyzing how democracy impacts on regional security, they examine several assumptions regarding democratic societies. These assumptions are: (1) democracies do not go to war, (2) democratic societies are less aggressive, (3) democracies prevent dictatorships, and (4) democratic societies have the tendency to experience an increasing number of internal conflicts. They note, however, that these assumptions, except for the fourth, may not be applicable to East Asian societies since national communities in the region are relatively young democracies, and a number of them have "weak states."

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[*] all bios are available at the end of this volume.

Indeed, the fourth assumption is likely to take place in developing societies with weak states because democracy could increase "divisiveness and tension among various groups competing for political power."

Finally, they discuss changing perspectives, specifically of the young people in several East Asian societies, about nationalism and democracy. They note how China may be seeing the rise of an outward-looking generation; Japan is experiencing an assertive type of nationalism; a more assertive sense of national pride as well as eagerness for inter-Korean nationalism with the North is emerging in South Korea; and nationalism in Southeast Asians is closely linked with the creation of national identity.

They end their essay acknowledging that examining the nexus of nationalism, democracy, and security in East Asia is a challenging project given the diversity and complexity within the region. Thus, it is difficult to definitely conclude how these three concepts are linked.

In the second essay, Ashley Calkins, Russell Hsiao, Darwin Moya, and Sun Namkung analyze how economic growth is driving competition for natural resources, particularly energy. Worse, this competition is taking place among the major regional powers, namely China, Japan, the U.S., and India.

The need for governments to ensure access to energy, fisheries, and other aquatic resources is a primary consideration. However, national pride may also play a role, particularly when competition for resources takes place in areas where there exist territorial disputes among regional states, such as the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Dokdo/Takeshima area, and the Kuril Islands. Thus, the search for energy sources is made doubly complicated because it could be "inflamed by nationalism and the desire to preserve territorial integrity."

The search for energy could induce cooperation among states, however. The authors identify several areas for cooperation: the exploration, provision and use of energy and its sources; securing exploration sites and delivery systems; and advocacy and environment protection.

They end their essay with a call to governments and private companies to reinforce the capacity of regional institutions to address the region's energy supplies, which, according to the authors, means having politicians exercise restraint, governments needing foresight, and private companies promoting greater transparency.

Taking off from the issues discussed in the first two essays, Susan Craig, Adrianne Li-Tan, Jun Pyon, David Santoro, and Ta Tuan take stock of the regional security organizations in the Asia-Pacific and examine the prospects and challenges faced by these institutions as they manage security issues in the region.

They note that managing security issues in the Asia-Pacific is difficult since "there is no overarching regional security structure" in the region, with such an

organization difficult to establish because of "historic and lingering conflicts [among states], diversity of political systems, and the extent of internal challenges facing each country." The various security challenges facing the region compound these difficulties.

These challenges are both traditional and nontraditional, according to the authors. Traditional issues pertain to the Taiwan Strait, North Korea, as well as territorial disputes. Nontraditional issues relate to maritime security, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, health-related issues, and economic security.

While an overarching security structure may be lacking, there are various regional security mechanisms, which are formal and evolving. The formal structures include the numerous bilateral and multilateral security arrangements of regional states, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Plus Three process, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the East Asia Summit are considered by the authors to be evolving security forums. It is unfortunate that while various security forums exist in the region, a key issue has not been addressed by these mechanisms: North Korea.

The essay concludes with a set of recommendations for the effective management of security-related issues by regional security forums while acknowledging that bilateral security cooperation remains the cornerstone of Asia-Pacific security. Expertise within the various regional forums needs to be enhanced, particularly because of the range of issues confronting the region. Coordination among the various forums needs to be fostered to avoid duplication of functions. Meanwhile, the role of other actors in the region, such as Taiwan, should be harnessed even though the "one China" policy should be observed; cooperation at the nongovernmental level should be the most pragmatic and feasible.

The role of other actors in the region, specifically Taiwan, needs to be examined. This issue was extensively discussed by participants in the Young Leaders Program, during the forum and after through electronic communication. The fourth essay in this collection attempts to put together these views. It is not a consensus document – not everybody agrees with all the points and recommendations. Nonetheless, all acknowledge that contents of this essay are important and further debates on the points are needed.

The exchanges among the Young Leaders reflect the diversity of views among them as well as the complexity of cross-Strait relations both for Beijing and Taipei on the one hand and for the rest of the Asia-Pacific on the other. But it appears that the younger generation believes it would be fruitful for both Beijing and Taipei to cultivate good relations with each other as China defines its role and Taiwan searches for its place in the regional landscape. At the end of the day, the issue across the Strait will only be solved when the two parties can agree between themselves. Hopefully, the result would be acceptable not only to Beijing and Taipei but to the rest of the Asia-Pacific.

With these essays, the Pacific Forum hopes to provide policy makers across the region with the views of the younger generation. We hope these essays will provide useful inputs for political, diplomatic, and defense leaders in the Asia-Pacific as they try to build a more secure, peaceful, and stable region.

Nationalism, Democracy and Security in East Asia
By Leif-Eric Easley, Elina Noor,
Raymund Jose Quilop and Qinghong Wang

Introduction

As perhaps with the rest of the world, nationalism, democracy, and security in the Asia-Pacific are intricately linked with each other. This is specifically important in the current context of international affairs, where the forces of globalization were previously seen to eclipse nationalism particularly after the end of the Cold War. But in this region, one that is dynamic with economic and military change, diverse in political systems and levels of development, and divided by historical and territorial disputes, nationalism seems to matter more than ever.

While nationalism was previously viewed as being eclipsed by globalization after the end of the Cold War, democracy on the other hand appeared to be gaining ground. The end of the Cold War saw the emergence of democracies from the previous socialist states. Other authoritarian societies also started to shift to democratic systems even as existing democracies were projected to be on their way of consolidating their democracies.

The seeming re-emergence of nationalism as well as the rise of democracies impact on the security of individual states in the Asia-Pacific as well as on regional security. It is in this context where this essay attempts to explore and examine the nexus of nationalism, democracy and security in the Asia-Pacific. Doing so, however, necessitates having a sense of what nationalism, democracy and security are, or at least, how they are viewed in this essay.

Conceptualizing nationalism, democracy, and security

Nationalism is a sense of loyalty and devotion to a nation, prescribing the promotion of national wealth, power and prestige relative to and often at the expense of other groups. It is therefore a feeling that people attach to the nation or the "imagined political community." As pointed out by Anderson, a nation is an imagined community because members of a nation, even of the smallest one, would never be able to actually meet every other member; yet as long they believe they are part of their nation, they would continue to "imagine" themselves as socially and politically belonging together.[1]

It is important for people to imagine themselves as belonging to a nation as this underpins social and political stability and hence their sense of having internal security. It encourages people to perform their civic responsibilities such as paying taxes and rendering community or military service, among others. It also enables their society to be able to interact effectively with other nations around the world.

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[1] See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (Revised Edition) (Philippines: Anvil Publishing Inc. with Special Arrangement Verso, New Left Books, 2003), p. 6.

Nationalism is also a manifestation of national identity: a consciousness of belonging to a particular national group with distinguishing characteristics. National identity, a product of human psychology, is contingent on historical interpretation and constructed through social interaction. It is essential for people to have a clear sense of their national identity as a shared identity allows them to imagine themselves as belonging to a national community.

On the other hand, democracy, specifically modern democracy which is also usually known as liberal democracy, is a type of society and form of government where making decisions is not monopolized by a particular person or group and where power is distributed among governmental, non-governmental, commercial, and non-profit organizations among others. It is derived mainly from the Western political tradition.

Modern democracy also involves granting and protecting human rights, from the fundamental right of physical survival to freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom to vote and to freedom to assemble. It comes in two major forms: direct and representative democracy. Also included are some basic procedures, such as electoral and legislation procedures, as well as several fundamental principles, such as separation of powers, checks and balances, and rule of law.

Modern democracy is the by-product and one of the major domestic governance mechanisms of the nation-state system, which was started in 1648. Due to varying historical, cultural, and political factors, however, democratization in different nation-states has not only reached different stages but also been marked with different characteristics.

In the Asia-Pacific, societies have varying stages of democratization. Some like the U.S. and Australia are considered as mature democracies. Japan, South Korea, and India are seen as relatively stable democracies while the Philippines and Thailand, although long considered as democratic societies, ironically, are still fragile democracies. The Republic of China (ROC) or Taiwan has recently joined the democratic club of countries in the region and is viewed as a "democracy under test."[2]

Meanwhile, security is commonly equated with the "absence of threat to a state's territorial integrity, its political system and values, and entails the maintenance of a harmonious relationship with the external environment."[3] It is also about "the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integration against forces of change which they see as hostile."[4] Thus, a nation-state is "secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of

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[2] The democratization in Taiwan has reached a quite high stage, but it hasn't solved the fundamental problems of its qualification for the nation-state. Furthermore, many systems of Taiwan democracy are still under examination and adjustment. So democratization in Taiwan should be singled out as a special case.

[3] Leszek Buszynski, "ASEAN National Security in the Post-Cold War Era," in Michael D. Bellows (ed.), *Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994), pp. 91.

[4] Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the 21st Century," in William Clinton Olson with James R. Lee (eds.), *The Theory and Practice of International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1994), p. 207)

having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged to maintain them by victory in such a war."[5]

In this manner, security is usually equated with the absence of threat – threats that conventionally meant military threats emanating either from within or outside of a nation-state's territorial limits. But it must be realized that security has also come to be viewed as comprehensive; it is multi-dimensional. It therefore includes economic, political, and environmental as well as health issues. It also means that it is multi-level; it is not merely confined at the national level but also regional and global as well. More importantly, it means that these various dimensions and levels are all inter-linked with each other.[6]

Having conceptually defined what nationalism, democracy and security mean, at least, for this essay, the following sections attempt to examine the nexus, first between nationalism and security and second between democracy and security. What follows after is a section that examines the nexus among nationalism, democracy and security.

Nationalism and security

Understanding nationalism and how it matters for security policy is theoretically and methodologically complicated. One way to simplify things is to use what are considered as correlates of nationalism to differentiate particular forms, and then consider where and how different forms of nationalism drive policy action and change.

Correlates of nationalism are phenomena that exhibit similar magnitude and directional trends as nationalism and are likely to drive a country's national identity debates. These include 1) government legitimacy, 2) international political role, 3) national unification, 4) mobilization against external threat, and 5) economic development.

It must be recognized, though, that these five correlates do not represent a complete typology. There are certainly others. Nor are they mutually exclusive; most cases exhibit some combination. But there is often a correlate that appears to best fits a country's nationalism, so that correlates can be useful for differentiating forms of nationalism, allowing focused discussion of what would otherwise be a slippery concept with unwieldy variation across cases. Below, a major case of each of the five correlates is examined in order to spin out implications of different forms of nationalism for security policy in the Asia-Pacific.

Government legitimacy in China

A decent argument can be made that Chinese nationalism is related to any one of the five correlates above, but the one that stands out is government legitimacy. The rise of the current Chinese nationalism coincides with the Communist Party's need to

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[5] Watter Lippmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little Brown, 1943), p. 51.
[6] For an overview of how security is conceptualized in the Asia-Pacific, see Raymund Jose G. Quilop, "Evolving Notions of Security in the Asia-Pacific," *OSS Digest*, 1st and 2nd Quarter 2006, pp. 1-5.

maintain the "mandate of heaven" to rule while moving further away from the established Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist thoughts. Economic growth is certainly an imperative for Chinese leaders today, but this is because of its importance for government legitimacy, not because of the relationship between China's economic rise and status in the world.

The process by which Chinese nationalism affects security policy might therefore operate as follows. The Chinese Communist Party pushes a brand of official (top-down) nationalism for the sake of government legitimacy. This involves remaking of the national myth, playing up symbols of national pride (skyscrapers, space program, hosting Olympics, etc.), and playing the "nationalism card" in defense of the government. Official nationalism could one day include revisionist claims such as territorial expansion or regional hegemony. But the current aims of Chinese official nationalism appear internally focused on maintaining social stability and domestic political control. As long as this remains the case, the effect of Chinese nationalism on security policy may be limited to theatrical responses to external provocations, such as the Belgrade embassy bombing or Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian's "two states" remarks.

However, the government does not hold a monopoly on Chinese nationalism which presents the problem that domestic political actors or the mass public might use Chinese nationalism against the Communist Party. Official nationalism can lead to an unintentional hardening of public opinion, making compromise difficult, painting the government into a corner and effectively constraining its foreign policy options. Ultimately, bottom-up push back on official Chinese nationalism may force the regime to defend its nationalist credentials, resulting in hardline, internationally destabilizing positions on security policy. This is dangerous because of possible spillover effects of Chinese nationalism in the region. Most of all, China's growing material capabilities make any increase in the probability that Beijing might exercise force a serious concern, prompting hedging strategies by the U.S., Japan, and Southeast Asian nations.

Japan's international role

In recent years, Japanese nationalism appears increasingly related to external threat perceptions of North Korea and China. But the major correlate of the current Japanese nationalism is squarely that of Japan's international role. In the 1990s, Japan lost the great source of pride associated with rapid economic growth. During the so-called "lost decade" of economic recession, Japanese engaged in much soul-searching about the global role and standing of Japan. During and after the first Gulf War, Japan contributed an enormous sum to the allied effort, approximately $13 billion. Instead of receiving due recognition for this contribution, Japan was criticized for an unwillingness to put Japanese soldiers in harm's way. Japan began to see its "checkbook diplomacy" as both unaffordable financially and ineffective politically. The focal point of this view became Japan's standing in the United Nations, an organization in which Japan enjoyed scant influence despite funding more than 20 percent of its budget.

Japan's economic and international political stagnation motivated calls from the Japanese population for strong reform-minded leadership. The administration of Koizumi Junichiro largely delivered, pushing through reforms to put Japan's economy back on track and placing Japan clearly on a path of greater international security contributions in conjunction with an expanded U.S.-Japan alliance. But the remaking of Japan's international role – a process still very much in progress – has combined with unresolved historical antagonisms (Yasukuni Shrine, textbooks, and competing claims to small islands) such that Japanese nationalism is straining relations with regional neighbors, especially China and South Korea.

The process by which the new Japanese nationalism matters for security policy begins with a domestically perceived Japanese identity crisis which creates political space for idea entrepreneurs. In Japan's case, the faction best positioned to fill this hole and build domestic support for new government policies were conservatives focused on advancing a more "normal" and assertive Japan. The resulting policy agenda, shaped in part by Japanese nationalism, prioritizes international contributions that are expected to deliver Japan the international respect and standing it deserves. Greater U.S.-Japan policy coordination appears positive for international security. But because of historical animosities resulting from the period of Japanese colonialism and military aggression, the problem with the new Japanese nationalism is that it may achieve normalization of the Japanese military before Japan is able to adequately reassure its neighbors. This could build regional tension or even fuel an arms race, based not on accurate assessments of present intentions, but on an overemphasis of historical rivalries.

Korean unification

Korean nationalism is related to South Korea's recent democratization and rapid economic growth. But the strongest correlate for Korean nationalism is the issue of unification, including other countries' role in the process. The Cold War basically froze North-South Korean relations at their 1953 stalemate. The end of the bipolar international order, collapse of the Soviet Union, China's opening to the world and South Korea's economic success compared to the nearly failed North, all allowed Seoul to engage Pyongyang from a position of new-found confidence. The concurrence of these events with South Korean democratization led to a resurgence of long suppressed desires for unification with the North. The artificial division of the Korean Peninsula and the Cold War context produced a South Korean nationalism focused on competition with the North. Post-Cold War circumstances returned Korean nationalism to its prior purpose: a unified independent Korean state encompassing the entire Peninsula.

This renaissance of Korean nationalism was manifested in former President Kim Dae-jung's "Sunshine" policy towards the North and President Roh Moo-hyun's concept of a more self-sufficient South Korean defense policy (meaning less reliance on the United States). The trouble with these policies driven by South Korean nationalism is that Pyongyang does not share Seoul's vision for the Peninsula. Both sides may express desires for unification, but are nowhere near agreement as regards the terms of unification. North Korea rejects economic reforms, human rights and outside contacts

that could mount challenges to the Kim Jong-il regime. Much at the expense of its people's welfare, North Korea devotes most of its resources to its large military and the development of missiles and nuclear weapons.

Seoul's policies based on Korean nationalism have yet to elicit North Korean reciprocity or a reduction in military deployments. Meanwhile, Korean nationalism, heightened by grassroots movements, pop culture, media coverage, and pandering by government leaders, has caused concern among South Korea's neighbors and security partners.

Meanwhile, China is hedging against a unified Korea, looking to increase its economic influence over the Peninsula and rewriting aspects of history (Goguryeo Dynasty) out of concern for its northeastern border. The United States and Japan show some signs of disengaging their relations with South Korea because of anti-American and anti-Japanese sentiments. With the notable exception of the Dokdo dispute with Japan, Korean nationalism is unlikely to cause Seoul to take any provocative military actions. But because the Korean Peninsula is such a strategic point in East Asia, Korean nationalism's impact on other countries' policies could significantly affect the security landscape of the region.

United States vs. terrorism

Nationalism in the United States is rather peculiar in that it may combine a sort of superpower pride with a missionary zeal to make the world a better place. The terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 appear to have elevated American nationalism, at least temporarily, via a "rally around the flag" effect. U.S. domestic politics concerning foreign policy became dominated by the need to defend America from the external threat of international terrorism. The domestic unity this nationalism provided has already waned significantly, as disagreements intensified over how best to conduct the war on terror.

Nonetheless, the immediate post-Sept. 11 spike in American nationalism supported security policies with lasting consequences. The American popular response to the threat of terrorism backed not only measures to strengthen homeland security and wage a retaliatory war against al-Qaeda and its harboring regime in Afghanistan. It also made possible a preventive war against Iraq, a criminal regime with suspected ties to terrorism, believed to be building an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Poor intelligence and hidden agendas aside, such action probably would not have been taken absent the post-Sept. 11 nationalism focused on the external threat of international terrorism.

The problem with nationalism focused on external threats is that it can lead to an aggressive security posture disproportionate to the threat or mandate unilateral military action for the sake of national defense. It is debatable whether the U.S. response to Sept. 11 has been disproportionate or unilateral. What is clear is that U.S. military superiority is such that, should the legitimacy of U.S. use of force come into serious question as it

has in Iraq, the effect of nationalism on security policy can be negative for U.S. interests and damaging to international security. This is because nationalism can preclude adequate analysis of the unintended consequences of aggressively countering threats. It remains to be seen whether the American pledge to "take the battle to the terrorists" ends up creating more terrorist attacks than it intends to prevent.

Southeast Asian economic development

Any characterization of nationalism in Southeast Asia will be superficial as the various nationalisms of ASEAN states are in themselves diverse. But there are enough similarities to make a comprehensive look at nationalism in Southeast Asia interesting. Nationalism in the region is mostly related to anti-colonialism and places premium on domestic sovereignty. But since Southeast Asian states exist largely according to colonial borders and patterns of trade, their societies are multi-ethnic and multi-religious, and are not yet fully integrated. On the fringes, this can result in secessionist movements and domestic terrorism. The problem for Southeast Asian governments, in addition to providing for domestic security, is unifying the populace behind a common purpose. That purpose across Southeast Asian states has usually been economic development.

The process by which this nationalism matters for policy begins with a government emphasis on the population's loyalty and sacrifice necessary for increased standards of living. Southeast Asian nationalisms were thus geared toward supporting export-led industrial growth. But this form of nationalism, not being exclusively based on any particular ideology or ethnic identity, tended to be flexible and pragmatic. As ASEAN countries found the need to pursue economies of scale in the context of global competition, Southeast Asian nationalisms came to support regionalism. Presently, Southeast Asian states compete for the driver's seat of ASEAN and try to one-up each other on regional initiatives. While working to build regional consensus on economic cooperation, Southeast Asian governments maintain a keen sensitivity to their own sovereignty, the so-called "ASEAN way."

At this stage, Southeast Asian nationalisms appear more related to domestic security than international security. What is perhaps most interesting is that Southeast Asian nationalisms do not appear to dissuade regionalism, but instead drive competing regional initiatives that respect national sovereignty. The result is a host of ASEAN-related institutions of growing importance for Southeast Asian economic and international relations. These institutions have begun to play an important role in regional security by establishing a framework for military codes of conduct and exchange within ASEAN, and providing a forum for security-related engagement of Asia-Pacific and European countries. The security related accomplishments of ASEAN remain modest, however, and it is unclear how much Southeast Asian nationalism, institutions and norms will shape the future East Asian security order.

Scope limitations of nationalism and security implications

The greatest concern about nationalism is that it produces tense international relations in which grievances may be aggressively addressed or miscalculation and miscommunication can lead to escalation of conflict. Nationalism alone may not be sufficient for conflict, but becomes dangerous when paired with other destabilizing factors. As suggested by the above cases, these include a disaffected mass public or manipulative government elites, especially when either perceives nearing the end of their rope. Perhaps a better analogy is that nationalism primes the fuse for conflict. Should an external provocation or internal crisis come around and provide the spark, serious conflict could ensue.

The cases above, considered for their different correlates of nationalism, suggest myriad processes by which nationalism can affect security policy. It is important to note that nationalism need not result in bellicose foreign and security policies. For example, Southeast Asian regionalism increases despite nationalism, and U.S.-Japan security cooperation expands in part supported by Japanese nationalism. Like competing interpretations of national interest, nationalism can drive policy in different directions and does not bear on all issue spaces or all of a country's international relations in the same way. Moreover, there may be a host of mitigating factors concerning nationalism's effect on security policy. These include the extent of positive-sum relations with other states (usually involving trade), constraints on a nation's material power for addressing grievances, and the influence of stable political institutions.

This brief analysis represents only a sketch of the landscape of nationalism in the Asia-Pacific and its implications for international security. A more extensive study would show how cases are many times more complicated than presented here. For example, identity debates in Taiwan significantly include all five correlates of nationalism posited in this section: government legitimacy, international political role, national unification, mobilization against external threat, and economic development. To understand more fully the relationship between nationalism and security, other issues also need to be considered such as: the affect of the international security environment on nationalism, the role of democracy in forming security policy, and the implications of socio-economic, generational and demographic change.

Democracy and security

In trying to understand the nexus between democracy and security, several key assumptions come to the fore. First, it is assumed that democracies do not go to war. Compared to Nazism, Communism, and other systems, modern democracy is the ideal choice because, theoretically, democratic states do not resolve their conflicts with other democracies through the use of force.

However, it must be pointed out that most of these modern democracies were established after the end of the Second World War; these states simply had to work together against a common enemy – the Soviet Union and its allies. This could probably explain why these modern democracies did not go to war against each other.

It is also instructive to point out that while modern democracies indeed may not have gone to war against each other, it could not be denied that a great number of these democracies actually adopted non-democratic approaches in solving their problems as compared to non-democratic societies.

In the Asia-Pacific, the assumption that democracies do not go to war against each other therefore remains to be seen. The best example of this could be the potential military confrontation between Japan and South Korea due to their territorial disputes. Will that confrontation be prevented by both countries' democratic systems or by the residence and interference of U.S. military power in the region?

The second assumption regarding democracy and security is that the more democracy a state has, the less aggressive it will be. Modern democracy is like a vehicle. The elected leader and his staff are the decision makers and act as the vehicle's driver. In turn, the masses are the vehicle's passengers. The passengers can periodically elect a driver they trust. But within the term, the driver has the right to drive the vehicle in whatever direction he wants, regardless of the opinion of the masses. So if the driver during a specific period is aggressive, the vehicle is likely to greatly affect the other vehicles on the road, though a great many of the passengers may not support the driver's style. The current U.S. war on Iraq is the best example of this.

Another scenario is that the majority of passengers shares a common opinion on the direction of the vehicle and elects the driver who can fulfill their ideas. The elected driver will likely drive the vehicle in the direction the masses want even if that move greatly affects other vehicles. Rapid democratization might lead China to this scenario. The more nationalistic, younger generations in China could obtain authority through more democratic systems and conduct their rather radical moves in cross-strait relations and Sino-Japanese relations.

Thirdly, it is assumed that democracies prevent dictatorships. In most modern democracies, certainly, there appears to be little chance for dictators to emerge. But this seems to apply only to states which have mature democracies and may not apply to less mature democracies.

For example, in the 1930's, Hitler was elected to power through a democratic political system. After he took power, he changed the newly established democratic system, only adopted after World War I, into the Nazi dictatorship. In Southeast Asia, there are still many modern democracies in their early stages, which are periodically threatened by dictatorships through military *coup d'etats*. The recent coup in Thailand is the best example of this. Correspondingly, concerns arose about Japan when the Japanese prime minister publicly visited Yasukuni Shrine where 14 Class A war criminals are

enshrined. Is the peaceful rise of Japan after the Second World War due to its democratic political system? Or have the residence of U.S. troops in Japan and the current Constitution of Japan drafted by Gen. MacArthur been the true impetus for this democratic state? Or is it the combined influence of all these forces?

Lastly, the more democracy a state has, the more internal fights it will have; quite an interesting way of putting democracy and security together. But this assumption is associated with those who worry of the negative effects of democracy.

A variant of this assumption is that democracy sacrifices efficiency. The premature democracy might cause domestic instability, such as the civil war among China's warlords in the 1930s. But a mature democracy which separates military power from administrative power will have little possibility of causing civil wars. And while democracy might be costly in terms of efficiency, the checks and balances inherent to democratic governance will greatly reduce mistakes resulting from rash decision making.

Nationalism, democracy and security

With nationalism being the feeling that people attach to the nation or the "imagined political community" where they belong, it is important for people to have a clear sense of their national identity. As previously noted, a shared identity allows them to imagine themselves as belonging to a national community.

Democracy is seen as ideally allowing people to have a shared sense of identity and promote its consolidation. This is because in its most basic sense, democracy affords people the opportunity to select their leaders through elections. It also allows them to freely express their opinion on fundamental issues. Most importantly, it ensures that their freedoms and rights are respected. By affording people to choose their leaders, by enabling them to express their views and by ensuring that their freedoms are respected, democracy provides an atmosphere whereby the national identities of people could be protected, respected and consolidated. In other words, democracy allows people to fulfill their need to belong to a national group and facilitates their willingness to be part of it.

If and when national identities are consolidated, with democracy providing the most appropriate platform for doing so, internal peace and security is expected to be attained. However, this is not always the case.

Democracy could also increase divisiveness and tension among various competing groups. This is particularly true in developing societies. For societies previously colonized, the sense of national identity was imposed by the colonial powers. As one scholar notes, in this case, an individual's "reference group" (the group where an individual sees or aspires himself as a member) does not coincide with his "membership group" (the group where one is, willingly or unwillingly, actually a member).[7] Thus, it

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[7] See Dimontenis Yagcioglu, "Nation-States Vis-à-vis Ethnocultural Minorities: Oppression and Assimilation versus Integration and Accommodation" found at http://www.geocities.com/athens/8945/minor.html.

could be expected that the individual would not fully feel that he belongs to the national community.

Consequently, the democratic space resulting from the end of their being colonies, resulted in conflict among various sub-national groups competing for political power, with one group becoming the dominant group and others being dominated. The presence of several sub-national groups within a territory should not necessarily lead to conflict. The situation becomes polarized only when one or more groups dominate the rest by using the instruments of the government or other means. Consequently, the dominated groups tend to highlight their distinct ethnic identities instead of affiliating themselves with the national identity. When individuals or groups, such as ethnic groups, reject their identity as members of the nation and demand that they be recognized as separate, conflict emerges.[8] In this case, the demand of the national group for individuals and other groups to conform is not met by those individuals' or groups' desire to be assimilated into the wider national group, making the relationship not a mutually beneficial one and instead characterized by conflict.[9]

Similar problems could also take place in societies making the transition from authoritarian governments to democratic systems. The opening up of the previously constrained political atmosphere allows various sub-national groups to compete with each other, often resulting in violent clashes against one another.

These conditions pave the way for the emergence of so-called intra-state conflicts, with non-state actors battling each other in some cases and with non-state groups in violent conflict with government instrumentalities in other cases, such as situations of rebellion. Whatever the scenario, whether conflict among non-state groups or between non-government actors versus the armed agencies of their governments, the internal stability and security of these societies are undermined.

The problem is complicated by the fact that in these societies, the state and its government are usually weak and seen unable to regulate the behavior of groups and individuals and enforce rules to ensure societal stability. What has resulted in these societies is a state dominated by elite politics and one that has weak social control. The cases of the Philippines and Indonesia may be good examples.

In most of these societies, the elites during the colonial period specifically the ones created by the colonizers themselves to help them control their colonies, were able to maintain their power even in the post-colonial period. As one scholar notes, these elites "have hogged social, economic, and political power, which are confined to a few urban centers, which in turn, are hitched to a colonial system dominated by metropolitan 'super-centres' lying outside these countries."[10]

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[8] See Fredd W. Riggs, "The Para-Modern Context of Ethnic Nationalism" found in http://www2.hawaii.edu/~fredr/7-cip1a.htm, pp. 1-11.

[9] See Dimontenis Yagcioglu, "Nation-States Vis-à-vis Ethnocultural Minorities: Oppression and Assimilation versus Integration and Accommodation" found at http://www.geocities.com/athens/8945/minor.html.

[10] Rajni Kothari, "State and Nation Building in the Third World" in Rajni Kothari (ed.), *State and Nation Building: A Third World Perspective* (Delhi: Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, 1976), p. 17.

Consequently, these elites have become the "strong men" in society with their leadership "enhancing an already established place in the community representing the state." [11] Worse, they use the state as an instrument for pursuing their personal interests, resulting in corruption and cronyism. They have "sought to maintain their own rules and their own criteria for who gets what in much more limited bounds; their rules have been parochial and discriminatory rather than universal." [12] This contradicts the very essence of a state as "an impersonal or 'anonymous' structure of power" which pursues the interest of the national community. [13]

States in post-colonial societies are also seen as weak unable to effectively centralize their powers because of the presence of strong local leaders. As correctly observed, "where power is concentrated at the local level, attempts by the national state to centralize seriously erode state authority and open it up to revolutionary challenge." [14] Consequently, state leaders end up accommodating and compromising with local leaders in order to ensure their own political survival.

While accommodating local interests may ensure the survival of state leaders, it nonetheless weakens the state as an institution for governance. Decisions are most likely to benefit the local leaders instead of their constituents. Furthermore, the state becomes a captive of the local leaders as it becomes dependent on the local stability that local leaders guarantee. [15] Meanwhile, the development of a professional bureaucratic apparatus, which is needed in implementing policies, is also undermined as state leaders focus on political survival. For example, state leaders using powers of appointment continuously shuffled personnel to prevent "loyalties in potentially strong state agencies from developing." [16] This weakens the state because bureaucrats could not develop their expertise if they are continuously transferred from one assignment to the other. [17]

With state powers no longer being impersonal as a result of the continuous politicking of elites in their quest to survive, its legitimacy is questioned and the state's capacity to enforce its laws and rules that are supposed to benefit society is compromised. This defeats the very purpose why a state is established in the first place. As Black notes, "[t]he proper function and scope of state activity is to ensure that these common interests are adequately catered for" otherwise the state will face a highly reactive society. [18]

In the context of the state being weak, the institutions necessary for stability are either missing or unable to perform their functions. These institutions are the following:

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[11] Patricio N. Abinales, *Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State* (Quezon City: Ateneo De Manila University Press, 2000), p.13.
[12] Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 255.
[13] David Held, *Political Theory and the Modern State: Essays on the State, Power and Democracy* (California: Stanford University Press, 1989), p. 48.
[14] Abinales, *Making Mindanao* p. 14.
[15] Joel S. Migdal, "Strong States, Weak States: Power and Accommodation," in Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, editors, *Understanding Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987), p. 427.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 407.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 407.
[18] See Anthony Black, *State, Community and Human Desire: A Group Centered Account of Political Values* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988).

accountable executive, elected legislature, independent judiciary, military subordinated to civilian authority, and political parties with clear ideological differences. The result is a society that is unable to consolidate its sense of national identity as the various actors involved are engaged in a vicious cycle of conflict.

The phenomenon of intra-state conflict also goes beyond the level of individual states concerned. Neighboring states may or may be directly involved, particularly if neighboring states provide assistance to certain groups, whether state or non-state, involved in the conflict.

Other states not initially involved in the conflict may also be eventually affected particularly if the effects of conflict start to spill-over to their territories. People affected by such internal conflict may start to migrate to their neighbors' territories, creating political, social and economic problems for the receiving state. Internal strife that drives people to become refugees in neighboring states impose additional burdens in terms of providing human needs such as food, housing, and medicine on the host country. Furthermore, if the host is not able to provide for these refugees or if their large number creates social, political, and economic problems for the host country, the issue can no longer be considered as a purely domestic concern of the state where the refugees originated.[19] As one observer notes, if forces of instability or challenges to domestic security that originate outside of "state boundaries penetrate societies that had nothing to do or little to do with their causes," the affected state can not afford to ignore these forces and allow them "to wreak havoc upon its society and peoples."[20]

A society plagued by internal conflict also affects the economic stability and prospects of the region where it is located. This is so because foreign investors look at the prospects and stability of regions instead of seeing societies as destinations of their investments. Investors now see the entire Southeast Asia as a single investment block. A region seen as volatile because of the domestic instability of states within it would not be considered as an attractive site for making investments. Thus, economic difficulties in a Southeast Asian state may discourage foreign investors from infusing additional capital in the sub-region. It has been observed, for example, that global investors were becoming impatient with the slow pace of reform in Southeast Asia, given the ethic and religious conflicts that continue to plague most of Southeast Asian states.[21]

It is also generally acknowledged that the primary reason why investors go to China is because of its cheap labor costs. Yet, it could not be denied that China, compared to Southeast Asia, is seen as more stable destinations of investments because most Southeast Asian states are still saddled with political instability resulting from conflicts, sometimes violent, among the various sub-national groups comprising these Southeast Asian states.

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[19] See Carolina G. Hernandez, "The Future Role of ASEAN: A View from an ASEAN-ISIS Member" (Paper based on a draft presentation prepared for the "Workshop on East Asia at a Crossroads: Challenges for ASEAN" organized by the Institute of International Relations, Hanoi, September 24-25, 1998), p. 11.
[20] *Ibid.*
[21] Ricardo Saludo and Assif Shameen, "Bracing for the Fallout," *Asiaweek*, Oct. 27, 2000, p. 24.

Changing perspectives

The complexity of trying to examine the nexus among nationalism, democracy and security is made more complicated by the diverse perspectives of the younger generations in various states across the Asia-Pacific, making it difficult to identify certain definitive trends as to how the younger people within the region view certain things.

As regards nationalism, for example, recent surveys have shown that national pride has, in general, been declining across generations in the Asia-Pacific and nearly the whole world. This could be attributed to the the growth of globalism and multilateralism, and a reaction to the nationalistic extremism of World War II.[22] Indeed, a 2004 survey reveals that with the exception of Latin America, the youth of the world are more likely to see advantages in increased global trade and communication and are more likely to embrace "globalization." It cites the hesitation among the elder citizens to embrace it based, in part, on "latent nationalism."[23]

The reality, however, is not so clear cut. The same Pew Global Attitudes Project poll showed that with the exception of Japan, feelings of cultural superiority are more intense everywhere in Asia. By contrast, this pride is more marked among the older generations in the U.S. There, 68 percent of those aged 65 and older agree that, "our people are not perfect but our culture is superior" compared to 49 percent of those aged 18-29 who felt the same way. Competing ideas of cultural superiority in Asia is sometimes mirrored in the ongoing Asian versus Western values debate and may be attributed to, among others, a long and rich legacy of civilization and tradition (particularly in China), a perceived malaise of the West, and increasing cynicism with Western foreign policy and the values it – specifically the U.S. – seeks to export.[24]

An outward-looking generation in China?

The young in China view the U.S. ambivalently.[25] Even the generation who grew up watching Hollywood productions and seeing America as a source of education also views it as a "bully" on the international stage. Additionally, there is great suspicion of the U.S. for its unilateral actions, support of Taiwan, and in the past, seemingly conscious strategy of encircling China. Distrust (and outrage) soared in 1999 when NATO forces bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Around 3,000 students took to the streets in protest and covered campus walls with anti-U.S. posters. In 2001, misgivings once again resurfaced when an U.S. *EP-3* spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet over international waters. However, since then, there has been a subtle yet significant change in the relationship between China and the U.S. China's imminent and inevitable rise is no longer seen to warrant containment or constructive engagement; rather, the White House now welcomes and encourages it to be a "responsible stakeholder" with obligations to the

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[22] Tom W. Smith and Lars Jarkko, "National Pride: A Cross-National Analysis," *GSS Cross-National Report No. 19*, National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, May 1998.
[23] "Adapting to a New World: A Global Generation Gap," The Pew Global Project Attitudes, Feb. 24, 2004.
[24] This debate peaked in the 1990s with magazine covers stories on the "Asian way" appearing in *Asia Week* (March 1994), *The Economist* (May 1994), and *Asian Business* (June 1994). It continues to a lesser extent to this day.
[25] Adam Brookes, "Young Chinese more wary of U.S," *BBC News*, April 16, 2001.

world. Although many of China's youth will continue to have a love-hate relationship with the U.S., President Hu Jintao's high-level meeting with President Bush in late April followed by Gen. Guo Boxiong's July visit to Washington, DC may be a sign of more positive – albeit still cautious – developments to come.

Nationalism continues to be a hot topic on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, however. In early 2000, a Beijing think-tank was quoted as having found that Chinese youth 19-25 were most supportive of invading Taiwan, if the island declared independence. This zeal among the younger generation in China – and indeed, elsewhere – is a by-product of historical factors. Free from the baggage of war and raised in a relatively affluent and more economically-democratic society, the youth are less hesitant to consider the option of open conflict. The growth of technology has also fueled this nationalist undercurrent, not only by allowing online forums on topics such as Taiwan but also by the virtual opportunities afforded by video games simulating invasions and strategic warfare.[26]

Assertive nationalism in Japan?

The "rock-and-roll" and populist image of former Prime Minister Koizumu Junichiro perhaps best captures the resurgence of a more assertive nationalism among Japan's younger generation. The election of Abe Shinzo as the youngest prime minister at 52 years old seems to further reflect Japanese frustration with the nation's "abnormal" status, although Japanese citizens, as a whole, are indifferent towards the controversial issue of the prime minister's visits to Yasukuni Shrine.

Koichi Mera identifies two kinds of nationalism in Japan. The first is fond nostalgia of the Meiji Restoration, where old customs and traditions are revered. The second is more open and forward-looking, to which younger Japanese tend to subscribe.[27] Both may have serious implications for the region's security but the latter aggressively advocates reform and "normalization" of the country. An increasing number of Japanese supports the view that the nation must have sufficient self-capability to defend itself against possible missile attacks by North Korea in the event the U.S. is unable or unwilling to come to its aid.

Tensions remain high between Japan and its Northeast Asian neighbors. A recent six-nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey on the publics of Asian Powers released Sept. 21, 2006 shows that only 21 percent of Chinese polled have a positive view of Japan while in Japan, the number of those having a favorable opinion of China dropped from 55 percent in 2002 to 28 percent, at present. Thankfully, although the Japanese find Chinese nationalistic and selfish and the Chinese see Japanese as male-dominated, only about 30 percent of those polled in both countries think of the other as an adversary.[28] Still, the complications of its neighbors' historical grievances, Japan's unwillingness to "sincerely"

[26] Hannah Beech, "Playing Games with Patriotism," *TIME Asia*, Vol. 156, No. 16, October 23, 2000.

[27] Koichi Mera, "Managing Japan's Rising Nationalism," Glocom Platform, July 18, 2006.

[28] "China's Neighbors Worry About Its Growing Military Strength: Publics of Asian Powers Hold Negative Views of One Another," *Six-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey*, The Pew Global Attitudes Project, September 21, 2006.

address its militarist past[29], and Abe's calls for a revision to its pacifist constitution in his opening speech to the Diet presage further security uncertainties in the region. This is despite of the new prime minister's bid to repair strained ties with South Korea immediately after his appointment to office.

Unencumbered by any memory of war, Japanese youth have their particular interpretation of history and sense of remembrance, remarkably manifested in *manga* and avant-garde art. Kobayashi Yoshinori's successful *manga* series, for example, reflects the views of *Tsukurukai* which is a group whose purpose is to educate Japanese schoolchildren with a different perspective of World War II.[30] His 400-page *Analects of War* sold 420,000 copies in its first three months of publication and went through 29 printings in its first year[31], while Murakami Takashi's art explores the effects of Japan's constitution which has restricted it to pacifism.

After a decade-long recession, Japan's economic stirring has also brought on renewed nationalism and resurgent pride. The other side of the coin is that there is still lingering angst from when the bubble economy popped and many of Japan's young were rendered unemployed, just as China began to rise. This assertive nationalism, conviction of self-sufficiency and a negative view of China all portend instability if not well-managed.

Some argue that apparent Japanese nationalism, in general and among its youth, in particular is really simply a necessary function of its "normalization" process. It is necessary to realign Japanese foreign policy with the realities of the 21st century, and increased and over-compensated nationalism is only a natural product which it has lacked for so long. Others, however, worry that this may be the start of a descent to Japan's imperial past. It remains to be seen just how far Abe will push his – and many young Japanese's – vision of a country freed from the shackles of its warring and hegemonic past.

Korea's other political constituent

Korean nationalism among the young may also be divided into two categories: a more assertive sense of national pride towards the world and the U.S., in particular, and an increased eagerness for inter-Korean nationalism with North Korea.

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[29] Former Prime Minister Koizumi apologized for Japan's militarist history in a speech he delivered at the Asian-African summit in Jakarta, Indonesia in 2005. However, many – especially those victims of Japan's aggression – considered this inadequate demanding instead a strongly worded official statement of apology in the government's name with the backing of Parliament. "Japan's apology breaks no new ground," Chinadaily.com, April 22, 2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-04/22/content_436701.htm. Also, in 1995, Murayama delivered a statement marking the 50th anniversary of Japan's wartime defeat. Many consider that to have been Japan's definitive apology after former Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu's expression of remorse in Singapore in 1991.
[30] Ian Buruma, "The Politics of Memory in China and Japan," *Modern Asia Series*, Harvard University Asia Center, September 30, 2005, as summarized by Michelle Lee.
[31] Rebecca Clifford, "Cleansing History, Cleansing Japan: Kobayashi Yoshinori's Analects of War and Japan's Revisionist Revival," *Nissan Occasional Paper Series No. 35*, 2004, http://www.nissan.ox.ac.uk/nops/nops35.pdf.

Like their Japanese counterparts, South Koreans in their 20s harbor no memories of war, poverty or limited political freedoms. They grew up in material prosperity, a more democratized political system and lack the fear of a threatening, communist North. They are also more politically active. As democracy in South Korea continues to evolve, the nation's student activist movements rooted in anti-authoritarianism in the early 1960s have morphed into youth movements that – coupled with the use of technology – affords them the chance to be an effective political force.

Korean youth's nationalism is both inward- and outward-looking. Inwardly, it takes a more pacifist view of North Korea and arguably sees the North's nuclear program as a leverage against a more aggressive Bush administration, which lumped the North into its "axis of evil."[32] This diminished threat perception of the North is accompanied by greater resentment of foreign interference on the Korean peninsula. Specifically, it views the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) as an infringement of sovereignty rather than deterrence against the North. Co-existence with a nuclear North is also less problematic for the younger generation. Many young South Koreans wave the blue-and-white flag of the Korean peninsula rather than their own nation's flag at inter-Korean sports events.

However, while there is national consensus for peaceful reunification, the nature of this process is still left to be seen. It is clear on both sides that there cannot be an "absorption" of the North, which would destabilize the peninsula and result in grave security implications for the region.

Outwardly, while Korean youth are not dismissive of South Korea's alliance with the United States they are more critical of what they increasingly view as American dominance in U.S.-Korean relations. As Sook-Jong Lee observed, it is ironic that the most Americanized younger generation is not only sympathetic to North Korea's survival but also feel freer to dissent with American unilateralism, notwithstanding their country's special relationship with the U.S. since the Korean War.[33] Surveys show that while Korean youth still find favorably their country's alliance with the U.S., with over 80 percent recognizing America's role in contributing to South Korea's security, they also want U.S. forces to withdraw "immediately" or "soon" than do older Koreans.[34] A South Korea without the U.S. as patron would leave many older Koreans insecure and feeling vulnerable but it is yet unseen how the younger generation in Korea would feel if foreseeable withdrawal becomes a reality. The current OpCon debate has demonstrated that young Koreans are much more concerned with how much tax they will have to pay to realize a more independent ROK defense posture than they are eager about less USFK in their country.[35]

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[32] Sook-Jong Lee, "The Rise of Korean Youth as a Political Force: Implications for the U.S.-Korea Alliance," *Brookings Northeast Asia Survey 2003 – 2004*, p. 22.
[33] *Ibid*, p. 23.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 26.
[35] The author is grateful to Leif-Eric Easely for pointing this out.

Southeast Asia youth nationalism: a different mold

Nationalism, for much of Southeast Asian nation's multi-ethnic populations, is closely related to the creation of a national identity. Without an internalized and shared identity, there can be little – if any – sense of nationalism for a hodge-podge of individuals with differing racial or religious loyalties within a defined set of geographical borders. For formerly colonized countries such as Malaysia where many of its current citizens trace their ancestry to "imported labor" from abroad, there is the uphill task of crafting just such a national identity with shared ideals from an essentially artificial construct. Compared to its racially more homogeneous neighbors in Northeast Asia, the challenge for Malaysia has, and always will be to integrate, assimilate and consolidate a diverse and multi-racial nation to satisfy as many as possible without sacrificing the equity of any. This challenge is similarly faced by the southern regions of Thailand and the Philippines where feelings of marginalization have caused unrest among the affected population and even sparked conflict. The volatility in these areas has also resulted in power vacuums which, in turn, have incited domestic and international militancy and terrorism.

Indonesia has had long deep historical cleavages among its many different ethnicities throughout the archipelago. To pull this diversity together, the ideology of *pancasila*[36] was borne in Sukarno's speech to the Independence Preparatory Committee in 1945. Its strength in reality, however, has been tenuous particularly as the embattled nation has faced one crisis after another – from political upheaval to the 1997 financial crisis and from natural disasters to pandemic diseases. While millions of Thais celebrated with a plethora of flags after their country's last loan repayment to the IMF, Indonesia has yet to experience such elation. Its long-weakened economy, among others, has been a significant hindrance to any consolidation of nationalism in the country.

With complications at home exacerbated by external factors, the struggle for a national identity and democracy can and has been confounded by external factors causing reactionary and potentially destabilizing movements. At a time when misperceptions are rife between the West and the Muslim world, the search for nationalism and perceived failures of democracy has transmogrified through religious, and sometimes radical, rhetoric. At the very least, this translates into political parties competing for righteousness against others as evidenced in both Malaysia and Indonesia especially in the run-up to elections. In a pluralistic society, this alienates people of minority faiths, creates resentment and threatens national amity. At worst, it has been used as the basis for promulgating militancy and terrorism. The discovery and subsequent unraveling of the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia and Jemaah Islamiah in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore is a constant reminder of this.

The sense of nationalism in Southeast Asia's younger generation is most predominantly manifested in a desire for their respective nation's economic growth to ensure peace and prosperity for the population. Once the nation is well headed on this

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[36] *Pancasila* encapsulates five principles: monotheism, humanism, territorial integrity, representative democracy, and social justice.

path, greater space for political expression will follow. Almost certainly, as in Northeast Asia, technology will continue to increasingly be a function of nationalism among Southeast Asia's youth as that space widens.

In general, the younger generation of the Asia Pacific not only views democracy positively but also has high expectations of their governments to deliver on democratic concepts, within the unique mold of each of their nations. Yet, since the late 1980s, their fervor for political activism has been fading due to a combination of cynicism, apathy, and pragmatism. The ideals which ignited pro-democracy battles of Korean youth in the 1980s and Tiananmen in the 1990s have now given way instead to concerns for job security, wealth creation and personal development. Cries for reform still ring through among Asia's youth but corruption, bureaucracy and inefficiency have also frustrated many. Paolo Benigno "Bam" Aquino, chairman of the Philippine National Youth Commission, points out that young Filipinos are weary of bickering among their leaders and of the failure to bring about economic growth 20 years after the street protests that ended Marcos' dictatorship. Nevertheless, the potential and capability of the younger generation to drive policy in different directions remains powerful especially with access to technology to organize and amplify their calls for democracy, transparency and accountability. Given the economic development of the Asia-Pacific region and the resultant stability that this has created, the nationalism of the younger generation is more likely to be focused on continued national prosperity. And as borders continue to break down in the information and communications world, any nationalism that develops or is sustained will continue to benefit from greater international experience and links with people of other nationalities.

Conclusion

Examining the nexus among nationalism, democracy and security in the Asia-Pacific is indeed a challenging project, what with the diversity and complexity found in the region, making it difficult to arrive at definite conclusions as to how these three concepts are actually linked. It appears that these three concepts are related in different ways for each of the states across the region. And within regional states, views of the younger generations who are expected to shape the future security policies, contribute to the continuing difficulty of arriving at definite projections as to how the future security landscape of the region will evolve.

The Search for Energy and Resources in the Asia-Pacific
By Ashley Calkins, Russell Hsiao,
Darwin Moya, and Sun Namkung

Given an ever-growing demand for energy and natural resources, the competition for energy and resources has a major impact on regional security. Unfortunately, it appears that Asia-Pacific regional organizations have not adequately addressed national conflicts arising over energy and resources; the two most contentious being in the South China Sea and Northeast Asia.

The disputes encompass many issues such as territorial sovereignty, fisheries access, oil and natural gas reserves, to name a few. There is some stability in the South China Sea as China, the Philippines, and Vietnam have reached an understanding over surveying the disputed area. The same cannot be said, however, for Northeast Asia. Mid-summer 2006 saw clashes between Russian border security and Japanese fishermen in disputed waters north of Hokkaido. Some of these disputes are inflamed by nationalism and the desire to preserve territorial integrity.

There is more at stake than national pride, however. Governments want secure "domestic" access to energy, fisheries, and aquatic resources. The demand for limited resources is putting pressure on supplies and causing price increases in oil, natural gas, fisheries, and other natural resources.

Oil and economic growth

The International Monetary Fund's 2006 *World Economic Outlook* indicates that the global economy is expected to grow by 4.9-5.1 percent in 2007. It likewise projects that Asian economies are likely to grow by 8 percent. According to IMF Managing Director Rodrigo Rato (2006), "[o]n the whole, Asian economies are resilient to external shocks, having strengthened their macroeconomic frameworks, increased exchange rate flexibility and reduced external vulnerabilities in recent years." This statement indicates the significant progress made by Asian economies in the decade after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998.

The crisis revealed the susceptibility of a market whose crash was attributed to two contending hypotheses: "weak fundamentals" and "international contagion." The crisis created the space for international monetary institutions to step in and implement structural reforms, and provide the impetus for strengthened financial integration for greater stability in the region's financial markets. However, moves toward greater financial market integration did not translate into greater cooperation in securing the energy resources needed to sustain economic growth.

In order to ensure economic growth, governments need to secure the "volume of energy [that] can be provided to consumers (governments, businesses, and citizen, etc.) at

the required quality and at a reasonable price, whether in times of peace or war."[37] The growing volatility of global energy supplies has heightened the importance of securing long-term stable energy supply to maintain economic growth.

Yet, one of the most disconcerting features of the global political regime is the volatility of oil prices, partly because governments came to the conclusion that energy security is too important to be left to markets. Because of increasing dependence on imported energy, economic prosperity becomes more exposed to global supply disruptions, chronic instability in energy exporting regions, and the vagaries of petro-politics leading to undesirable price spikes that can slow or inhibit growth.

For example, the implications of energy insecurity are especially acute for Beijing. Consequently, energy has become the concern of "high politics" under the mantra of national security and no longer "low politics" of domestic energy policy.

Meanwhile, against the backdrop of the U.S. geopolitical reorientation brought about by Sept. 11 and the U.S.-led "War on Terror," Asian governments have been scrambling to diversify energy supplies and reinforce their energy security. The first step was to re-assess their dependence on energy sources from an unstable region – the Middle East. Oil from the Middle East needs to be transported through highly congested bodies of water in Southeast Asia, the most important one being the Straits of Malacca through which passes about 60,000 vessels annually. This accounts for around 30 percent of world trade and 50 percent of the world's energy resources. The area vicinity surrounding the narrow passage of the Strait of Malacca to the South China Sea has overlapping exclusive economic zones (EEZs), which serve as strategic sea lanes for the transfer of the vast amount of oil supplies imported by countries in the region.

China, the fastest growing energy consumer in the world, began making strategic inroads into other areas, partly as a hedge against the potential fallout from Middle East in stability. Asian governments have plunged head first into securing procurement and acquisition of energy supplies, rather than cooperating with energy-consuming countries on joint development programs for alternative and renewable sources of energy. Overall, the potential for a conflict over newly discovered and uncontested energy fields has increased.

The complexity of the Middle East problem is magnified for major energy consuming countries because the threat to regional peace is perceived differently by the major oil exporting states. In Iran's case, the current president's refusal to discontinue Iran's nuclear program and cease the harsh rhetoric toward Israel has obliged the U.S. to threaten to impose sanctions. This has heightened tensions in a region that already has tense relationships.

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[37] Atsumi Masahiro (November 2003) "Taiwan's Energy Security Issues – Domestic Energy Policies and Transporting Energy by Sea" retrieved from Institute for International Policy Studies' website http://www.iips.org/bp300e.pdf

Japan and China are both vying for energy fields in Iran. But the U.S. imposition of sanctions on Iran would put Japan in a difficult position because of its close security relationship with the United States. China having strong ties with Iran would be able to secure major energy fields in that country, further fueling a rift between Japan and China.

Most governments' energy policy focuses on the supply side of the equation, securing short-term consumption, rather than finding ways to curb demand. According to the London-based BP Plc, proven oil reserves in 2006 rose by 0.6 percent to 1.2 trillion barrels, while consumption increased 1.3 percent to 82.5 million barrels a day.

In the past decade, China's and India's unprecedented average economic growth rate of 9 percent and 8.4 percent, respectively, served as the primary drivers of Asian economic growth. With its growing economy, China superseded Japan in 2003 to become the second largest energy consumer after the U.S. China's economic take off has been reinforced by its increasing political clout in the global energy market as it uses its accumulated capital to make strategic inroads into unstable regions of the world. China's mercantilist strategy uses the flexibility provided by its immense foreign reserves to buy oil even at inflated prices that in turn drive up the prices of oil as it is "locked up" by state owned oil companies and taken off the open market.

The future framework of energy security in the Asia-Pacific region, is therefore expected to be made up of a complex web of multilateral agreements that can either reinforce or severely inhibit bilateral agreements. One such significant bilateral agreement is the U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. Although the agreement has already been approved by the U.S. Congress in December 2006, any concrete measures to take hold would need the approval of the members of the international Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Nonetheless, it has set a precedent of how energy security can take shape in the era of globalization – energy security in the Asia-Pacific will have to consider the forces of powerful external influences, global market flux and traditional security concerns. The U.S. decision to reinforce a counterweight in the region where the traditional balance of power has been noticeably unsettled by the rise of China's growing military, economic and political clout, makes it clear that the U.S. favors a more energy efficient and independent India; an India that does not need to compete with China and therefore does not have to look for ways to cooperate with China in securing energy deals.

The rise of China as a major energy consumer-competitor has a significant impact on U.S. strategic and active engagement with Southeast Asian states and vice versa. Even though the U.S. enjoys many economic and political ties to the region, it is faced with an increasingly confident Beijing which has offered incentives and deepened economic ties while strengthening its political clout. Meanwhile, members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are concerned about being trapped in a position where they are not able to maneuver diplomatically and are forced to choose between China and the U.S.

U.S. exports to Asia in 2005 topped $200 billion, accounting for nearly 25 percent of its total exports; it imported over $540 billion worth of Asian goods, accounting for over 35 percent of its total imports. U.S. security ties with the region have grown into an overlapping network of friendships that help secure the sea lanes for the safe passage of trade and energy supplies.

The Taiwan government has been slow to respond to China's growing energy demand and the need to secure national energy supplies. Nonetheless, an energy crisis is not imminent for Taiwan, which has a dependency rate on imported energy of 89.3 percent because it has relatively diverse energy suppliers.

This is not to say that there are no troubling signs for Taiwan as well as other carbon-fuel poor nations in Northeast Asia like South Korea and Japan. With declining energy production capacity and rising energy demands, dependence on energy imports is increasing. Taiwan's isolated international status deprives it of diplomatic ties that allow for negotiations to take place and makes it hard for its oil companies to secure energy supplies. As Taiwan continues to be marginalized in regional mechanisms developed to manage future energy demands and supply, Taiwan needs to recalculate its energy policy by strengthening its commitment to the Renewable Energy Development Plan and seize on the global emphasis on renewable energy technology, a niche that can make it an integral component of the future supply chain.

Resources and territorial disputes

As Asian governments work to secure energy resources, territorial disputes and regional concerns play a large role in energy conflict. Flashpoints such as the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Dokdo/Takeshima area have become points of contention between Asian countries that hope to secure and safely transport oil, tar sand, and other resources.

Strategically, the South China Sea is important as a passage for oil and other resources to destinations throughout Asia. The area is also critical as a potential source of oil deposits; the Spratly Islands area may prove to be rich in oil and natural gas deposits. With China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, and the Philippines claiming sovereignty over the Spratlys, the area remains a source of unresolved conflict. Nonetheless, recent agreements and initiatives demonstrate the possibility of multilateral cooperation in the region. In 2002, the ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) was developed. It could serve as a mechanism for stabilizing the area and a basis for collaboration.

For example, the declaration paved the way for a 2004 tripartite Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) between the Philippines, Vietnam, and China that set up a cooperative research project to explore oil deposits in the region. The JMSU demonstrates one process for energy cooperation. The major drawback of this JMSU is that there is no clear agreement or plan on how the countries involved will proceed if oil

deposits are found. Successful conflict resolution and cooperation in the Spratly area will provide a model for other disputes involving territory and energy management.

Other disputes over sovereignty in Asia are also linked to oil, natural gas, tar sand, and marine resources. From the East China Sea's Diaoyutai/Senkaku (Liancourt) Islands to the Kuril Islands, competition over resources has complicated territorial disputes over land and EEZs.

In the East China Sea, China, Japan, and Taiwan continue to stake claims over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku (Liancourt) Islands. All base their claims on historical grounds with China and Taiwan basing their claims on the same historical records. They all claim 200 nautical mile EEZ rights and assert their right to develop natural gas resources in the area. Conflict over the islands fully emerged in the 1970s when the detection of petroleum resources in the area caught the interest of the three appellants. They also use the East China Sea as a transportation route for oil and other resources.[38]

Like the South China Sea, the area around the Senkaku Islands provides important shipping access, as well as rich fishing grounds. Its location is also ideal for aerial and naval surveillance. In recent years, China began to drill into the Chunxiao natural gas field, only a few kilometers away from the contested EEZ border with Japan. The Chunxiao drilling project dispute is directly linked to security in the region; Chinese warships and Japanese naval vessels patrolling the area often come close to the disputed zones, raising the chance of a military clash.

The Dokdo/Takeshima Islets area in the Sea of Japan/East Sea[39] – also rich in fish and an important area for sea-lane access – remains a territorial dispute between South Korea and Japan. Both countries claim the surrounding waters as their EEZ, creating a security environment with conflicting claims over marine resources. On April 14, 2006, Japan announced it would send two Coast Guard survey ships into the waters near Takeshima, setting off protests from the South Korean government resulting in the suspension of the surveys.

Similar territorial tensions exist in the Kuril Islands disputed by Japan and Russia where a Japanese fisherman was killed Aug. 16, 2006. Russia has controlled the islands since the end of World War II but Japan claims that the islands rightfully belong to it. Although joint fishing by both Japanese and Russian fishermen is allowed, lucrative crab fishing by Japanese fishermen was banned by Russia.

Territorial disputes are one aspect of Asian energy security. International trade and economics are another important catalyst of energy conflict and cooperation. China's growing energy demand has prompted its government to strengthen trade relations with a number of countries including Iran and Sudan which do not act in accord with international norms and regulations. The U.S. has responded to China's expanding

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[38] Japan Stokes China Sea Dispute, (July 14, 2005) *BBC News*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4681823.stm.

[39] The international name "Sea of Japan" is disputed between South Korea and Japan. South Korea claims that the island rightfully belongs to South Korea and should be called the "East Sea."

relationships by exhorting Beijing to become a "responsible stakeholder." Washington has also stated that China's policy of "locking up" energy supplies is "not a sensible path for energy security."[40]

However, in assisting these states develop civilian nuclear power plants, the assisting nations should work within existing multilateral regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to ensure the programs are safe. Strict security measures on nuclear facilities and materials to protect them against theft and prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials would also help ensure the safe development of nuclear technology.

North Korea's nuclear test and Iran's nuclear intransigence highlight the need for countries in the region to work together to regulate the development of nuclear energy programs. Regional security and the stability of individual countries are threatened by terrorism at nuclear and other energy sites.

There are also many downsides of relying on nuclear energy. The obvious one is that a nuclear power plant is large and many people would prefer not to have it in their backyard. There are concerns about environmental degradation. It also takes an enormous amount of energy to operate these plants, which have a limited life span of about 40-50 years.[41] The fuel – uranium – for these nuclear power plants is as finite as the fossil fuels that it is supposed to replace. While there is talk of hitting Hubbert's peak,[42] there is concern that uranium is being depleted at a much faster rate than oil, with estimates indicating that uranium would run out within 12 to 72 years depending on how quickly it is mined.[43]

Access to and maintenance of fresh potable water is another concern for Asian countries. This year, Chinese officials warned of a Chinese water crisis by 2030. Chinese officials have much reason to be concerned as many potable water sources are contaminated with industrial pollutants or farming byproducts such as fecal matter or pesticides. The need for reliable water access is an area for multilateral cooperation through implementation of joint water development and management strategies. The issue of potable water will be more urgent as the global climate changes, current grain belts become desertified and the extreme northern regions become temperate. Current technologies such as desalination are too expensive and lack capacity to produce enough drinking water for all who will need it.

Diplomatic linkages

[40] "United States Urges China To Be Responsible World Citizen," (Sept. 22, 2005) http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/Sep/22-290478.html.

[41] Deutch, John M. (September 2006) "The Nuclear Option." ScientificAmerican.com, http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articleID=0000137A-C4BF-14E5-84BF83414B7F0000

[42] American geologist M. King Hubbert predicted in 1969 that the annual production of oil can be graphed as a bell-shaped curve. The curve has been called "Hubbert's Peak."

[43] Jameson, Angela. (Aug. 15, 2005) "Uranium shortage poses threat." *The Times* at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,9069-1735134,00.html

Energy and resource acquisition is creating new dynamics in the ties among the Asia-Pacific states and the rest of the world. New spheres of influence are altering regional dynamics and creating an uncertain future. China is the primary agent of change due to its need for resources to develop its economy and people.

The paradox of leapfrogging ahead in technology is that there is need for more energy is needed to keep the technology working. However, the energy efficiencies acquired through better and newer technology do not mean less energy consumption. Greater energy efficiencies point to increasing energy consumption.

With a Chinese population of 1.3 billion people, this paradox between efficiency and increasing energy consumption is starkly played out. In Beijing, some 1,000 new cars are sold each week. This means that China will need to import more oil to run these vehicles.

Since 1995, China has been importing petroleum mainly from the Middle East. China will need to secure other sources to fuel its economic engine. Many of the international organizations like the International Energy Agency and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that deal with energy are open only to countries committed to democratic government and free market economy. And because of this, China is not qualified to participate. China's exclusion from this grouping compels China to secure resources from less than legitimate regimes like Myanmar and Sudan. The Chinese calculus is to ensure that the near double digit growth continues in the near future.

The diplomatic linkages are becoming a grave concern for the U.S. as China is willing to overlook the human crisis that is occurring in the country that China has signed resource contracts with. A prime example is the $1.3 billion energy and mining deal that China signed with Zimbabwe. China is willing to deal with international pariahs like Zimbabwe strong-man Robert Mugabe. In regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China is willing to overlook a multitude of flagrant disregard of international law by oil-rich countries like Iran. This is not to say that the U.S. does not make compromises on its advocacy of democracy and human rights (Saudi Arabia comes to mind), but the problem is that China is willing to look the other way. This encourages the international norm breakers, who work against various nations that promote human rights and democracy. As a nation that has willingly taken up being a "responsible stakeholder," China is looking less responsible and more self-absorbed. In a sort of irony, these deals work against Chinese interests in the long-run. There is a lot of resentment in these regions against Chinese corporations, with Chinese companies being seen as exploiting native workers and not offering fair compensation for the work they do.

This puts Taiwan from a bad to a worse situation. With each deal China inks with nations that once had diplomatic relations with Taiwan, Taipei's diplomatic standing slips down by another notch. It has been suggested at a January 2007 Honolulu International Forum that the more China competes with Taiwan over diplomatic recognition in the South Pacific, Africa, and Latin American, Taipei at some point will come out and

declare independence as it would have nothing to lose. Whether this will happen or not is open to debate.

Diplomatic linkages are not issues for China and Taiwan alone. The U.S. should also be rethinking its diplomatic links in relation to its energy concerns. If the U.S. need for Saudi oil were not essential, Washington would be raising a louder voice for reform in that autocratic kingdom. Many of the hijackers on the planes that flew into the World Trade Center towers were Saudi Arabian nationals. The silence of the U.S. on human rights issue in the Middle East has bred resentment among the public and that resentment has transferred to the Muslim population in Southeast Asia. The U.S. has made an image as the protector of the weary and tired masses, yet Washington has very intimate relations with the Saudi rulers.

Areas for cooperation

The issue of energy and resources is inextricably linked to economics and many proposals to address concerns and conflict involve measures on dividing the economic pie. However, in looking at the nexus of energy, resources, and security, the resolution of conflict pertaining to the aforementioned factors requires moving away from traditional notions of distribution. Looking at energy and resources as mere instruments for the achievement of other ends such as security and development, the prospects for greater cooperation becomes brighter as proposals focus more on the collective need for energy and resources rather than on adopting a zero-sum view of distribution.

In this regard, possible areas of cooperation fall under three general categories: (1) cooperation in the exploration, provision, and use of energy and resources; (2) cooperation in securing exploration sites and delivery systems; and (3) cooperation in advocacy and environment setting.

Cooperation in the exploration, provision, and use of energy and resources

Given the increasing energy requirements of Asia-Pacific economies, a collective approach to meet these demands might prove beneficial to all parties. In this regard, focus on zero-sum distribution should be replaced by a focus on collectively increasing energy and resources. As some analysts point out, the need to support the growth in Asia-Pacific economies might induce them to seek cooperation with developing countries that have untapped energy potential. Thus, strategic government investment in multilateral research projects and commercial ventures might be a practical endeavor for all parties.

For instance, joint efforts between developed and developing countries could be pursued whereby the former provides capital and equipment to explore energy sources in the latter. A breakthrough along these lines would be the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) between the Philippine National Oil Company Exploration Corporation (PNOC-EC), the China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC), and the Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation (PetroVietnam) signed March 14, 2005.[44] However,

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[44] "Joint Exploration Results Out by November," www.abscbnnews.com/storypage.aspx?StoryId=44894.

while such efforts are able to go beyond each signatory's territorial claims in the South China Sea, the mechanisms to facilitate actions following positive results are still unresolved. Actual development of energy sources discovered through joint exploration and common concerns in this regard requires careful crafting of terms of reference so as not to give the impression that parties are sold short. Thus, in order for development not to discourage joint exploration, separate agreements should be provided for each.

However, going back to the case of JMSU, whether positive results will consequently lead to greater cooperation or will instead resurrect tensions among the parties involved remains unresolved. In large part, the next steps depend on the respective governments. Of course, it is to everyone's benefit that these should encourage greater cooperation; some analysts argue that joint development is more feasible under current stable and cooperative relations than later with an even more powerful China.

A step further from joint exploration and development would be the creation of regional energy trusts or reserves. These might be instrumental in smoothing out energy-related costs and decrease the perception of competition among regional actors. Here, the underlying principle would again be to increase the energy pie available to states through cooperative action whose fruits would be pooled in a common reserve. Of course, how these resources would be distributed is a different issue that needs to be addressed through equitable channels. As such, there is a need to provide a mechanism to facilitate all aspects of this proposed energy trust or reserve and this could have a multitude of configurations, like an ASEAN energy reserve.

The private sector's involvement should be solicited in exploration and development efforts especially since they are one of the primary consumers of energy. The expertise and capital that multinational energy companies could provide should be put to best use and fuel-saving technologies employed in industries could be adopted for national and/or regional use. Hopefully, complemented by efforts toward exploration of new energy sources, the efficient use of fuel would translate to lower demand and decreased tensions among user states.

Related to the thrust toward more efficient energy use is the development of renewable sources of energy. The potential of wind, solar, and nuclear energy should be harnessed and technology sharing would be an important area of cooperation. Also, there is a need to create a plan to promote sustainable energy and the clean use of fossil fuels. Two advantages could be gained from technology sharing in these areas: (1) dependency on imported oil would be lessened as states secure energy sources within their own territories; and (2) the development of clean and sustainable energy would address environmental problems manifested by transborder pollution, which is commonly identified as a nontraditional, albeit increasingly urgent, security concern.

Moreover, environmental concerns related to energy and resources should also be addressed through conservation. For instance, moving beyond issues of nationalism and the confusion over how to decisively interpret delineations of EEZs, disputes over fishing grounds could, in large part, be attributed to a decrease in the fish population due to

overfishing and climate changes. Thus, the creation of a regional authority to balance environmental and economic needs might be necessary. Assessments and forecasts by this regional authority should be based on in-depth studies of credible institutions and it should survey resources available in Asia-Pacific waters. Akin to previously mentioned proposals on joint exploration and a regional reserve, the creation of a regional authority that would propose ceilings on resource exploitation particularly on fisheries and related areas, essentially aims to collectively secure a finite resource. Assistance from established multilateral mechanisms and institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) would prove invaluable.

Cooperation in securing exploration sites and delivery systems

Provided that consensus has been reached on joint exploration and cooperative development, securing sites and related delivery systems would necessitate greater cooperation. In this regard, the interoperability of military and security forces, such as those promoted by U.S. exercises with its allies, is a critical capability that states should constantly build.

The transportation of energy goods would definitely benefit from increased interoperability. In particular, sea lanes of communication and oil pipelines could be secured through a concerted effort among littoral and user states. Moreover, such cooperation springs from a sense of shared responsibility which could become a springboard for increased trust among participating countries. With an honest accounting of military and security capabilities as a prerequisite to exercises aimed at increasing interoperability, efforts to secure exploration sites and delivery systems should be paralleled by moves toward greater transparency. Thus, the necessity to cooperate put forth by the need for energy and resources should improve the overall security environment.

Cooperation in securing energy sites and delivery systems could be framed under the broader need to cooperate against transnational security concerns. With threats such as piracy, trafficking (people, arms, and narcotics), terrorism, and proliferation operating within the same space (i.e., sea lanes of communication), the argument for greater interoperability of security forces and other government agencies becomes stronger.

For instance, the Philippines recently formed the Security Engagement Board (SEB) with the U.S. to address nontraditional security concerns; among its committees is an inter-agency committee supervised by the Philippines' Department of National Defense. Accordingly, such an inter-agency committee would create quick response templates in the event of environmental disasters such as the Asian tsunami of December 2004 or the outbreak of Avian influenza. It was argued that cooperation in areas of soft security is easier to carry out and, once such has been firmly established, it could spill over to other areas where similar mechanisms for cooperation could be put in place. Again, the interoperability of security forces is supported by such arguments and in keeping with the desire to address environmental concerns, the creation of quick response

templates for energy-related issues like oil spills might be facilitated by similar mechanisms, preferably in a regional context.

Cooperation in advocacy and environment setting

In the context of energy and security, three factors were identified as capable of facilitating cooperation: (1) increasing demand and the prospects for new supply; (2) the current stable and harmonious relations in the South China Sea; and (3) regional integration trends in East Asia. However, there are factors that constrain cooperation. These are (1) lack of domestic support for joint development or strong nationalistic sentiment at the grassroots level; (2) absence of a mechanism for transparency, equal treatment, and fair distribution; and (3) legal issues such as constitutional constraints to pursue joint development in specific countries.

There is therefore a need for regional actors to pursue advocacy that can create an environment more conducive to cooperation. In particular, there is a need to create a common regional awareness on energy and resource-related issues to effectively move away from a zero-sum perspective. Accordingly, strengthening existing international institutions should be paralleled by efforts to pursue new avenues to manage current energy-related conflicts and competition. In this regard, the role of epistemic communities and educational institutions in facilitating multilateral dialogue especially among major players becomes crucial.

Several areas of cooperation have been highlighted. However, we should keep in mind that cooperation is highly contingent on trust and established relationships. As such, confidence building measures remain critical for further cooperation. At the outset, it is hoped that the urgency need to address energy and resource-related concerns would induce states to cooperate and that in the future, this initial consensus would ignite a more genuine sense of mutual trust and sincere dialogue.

Conclusion

The surge in the search for energy resources in the Asia-Pacific has been predicated on the need for governments to secure a stable supply of energy resources to insulate and sustain the region's economic growth. A stable source of energy is especially critical when security conditions in the Middle East – the world's largest oil producing region – are perceived to be worsening or in flux. At the heart of the Middle East quagmire is the continuing sectarian violence in Iraq and Iran's nuclear gambit, two of many destabilizing factors in the region that affects the world's supply of energy.

Although energy security has not been a priority for governments in the Asia-Pacific, the aftershock of Sept. 11 forward media spotlights on the vulnerability of the energy supply grid of the major superpowers to the threat of terrorism. Compounded by rising nationalism in the region, external and internal forces compel governments to reassess long-term energy security in the context of a global energy crunch. A disruption in the major sea-lanes transporting energy resources in the Asia-Pacific would jeopardize

over 60 percent of the world's energy supply. In this context, this essay has outlined short- and long-term measures: short-term measures needed as emergency responses to temporary energy supply disruptions, and longer-term policies that are needed at different stages of joint energy development to systematically build mutual trust. While energy and resource acquisition has been creating new ties among governments in the Asia-Pacific region, the increasing premium on energy creates the possibility that some states will use energy for political coercion, and such a gamble can jeopardize regional stability.

A viable regional framework for managing both the upstream and downstream components of the energy market is critical for addressing the many deficiencies in the energy infrastructure where the market is heavily influenced by geo-political considerations. Energy in the Asia-Pacific is fast becoming a matter of "high politics." This raises the stakes while compressing the space for negotiation as the issue is dealt with by more conservative and nationalistic security apparatuses of governments.

With China's re-emergence as the region's center of gravity, China shoulders the obligation to act responsibly as its new "superpower" status prescribes. However, China's actions have been less than laudable. In order to reduce the vulnerability of China's energy supply to the whims of U.S. power, China has been making strategic inroads into African and South American counties, securing energy resources with promises of no-strings attached development aid to the world's most despotic regimes and human rights offenders. China has repeatedly used its position in the UN to stifle attempts by the international community to sanction human rights violators.

However, even as China attempts to reduce its vulnerability and even as it invests in international oil and gas markets, it is unlikely to get, the energy security it desires. China lacks the naval capabilities to secure the sea-lanes through which most of its imported energy sources transit. Therefore, China is likely to rely on U.S. protection of those sea-lanes. This is another area of concern highlighted by some China analysts: as China modernizes its naval capabilities and doctrine to deal with sea-lane security, China's justification for the development of a forward blue-water navy force will challenge the balance of power not only in the region but also globally.

As the region moves toward greater economic integration through multilateral mechanisms and institutions, parallel efforts should be made by both governments and private companies to reinforce the capacity of these institutions to address questions about the region's energy supply. Politicians will need to express restraint, governments will need to exercise foresight, and private companies will need to promote greater transparency through dialogue. Only through a multi-pronged approach can "high politics" and "zero-sum" games be avoided.

Regional Security Organizations in the Asia Pacific
By Susan Craig, Adrianne Li-Tan,
Junbeom Pyon, David Santoro, Ta Minh Tuan

In examining the Asia-Pacific's regional security infrastructure, it is important to first understand several characteristics that define the region. First, there is no overarching regional security structure, like that of Europe, where the region's countries can come together, make and implement mutual agreements, and ensure they are carried out. Developing such an organization is difficult due to historic and lingering conflicts, diversity of political systems, and the extent of internal challenges facing each country. A significant amount of domestic uncertainty and democratic instability prevents many countries in the region countries from outward looking. Their political, social and economic vulnerabilities require "constant and meticulous tending."[45]

The United States ensured regional stability and security after World War II until today. But as the region's balance of power is changing as a result of the military, diplomatic, and economic power of China, as well as the growth of Japan and India, so too are the region's security challenges changing. An increasing number of transnational, nontraditional issues threaten the region as a whole and require cooperation if they are to be overcome. Meanwhile, China and the U.S. are both redefining their relationships and roles in the region, with each hedging against the other to prevent the other from dominating the region.[46] In the meantime, the region is attempting to develop a security structure that would address emerging nontraditional threats, and accommodate the leadership of both the U.S. and China while allowing them to hedge against each other.

This essay surveys the traditional and nontraditional security threats facing the Asia-Pacific. The traditional issues are those that involve other nations that increase the potential of military conflict; they are disagreements that have threatened the region for years and proven intractable. Nontraditional issues are those that are emerging, transnational, and do not lend themselves to a military solution but instead require cooperation if they are to be addressed. Subsequently, the existing and emerging security structures in the region are examined. What is clear is the incongruity between the threats the region faces and the organizations' security-related missions and successes. Finally, this paper examines the Six-Party Talks, a security forum that was created specifically to address the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons program. It will demonstrate just how difficult it is to resolve security problems in the Asia-Pacific.

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[45] Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, "Enhancing U.S.-Malaysia Cooperation on Transnational Security Threats" Paper presented at 2005 Pacific Symposium Asia Pacific Democracies: Advancing Prosperity and Security, hosted by Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies 8-10 June 2005; available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/Pacific2005/jawhar.pdf#search=%22%22constant%20and%20meticulous%20tending%22%20Asia%22.

[46] Evan S. Medeiros, "Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability" (*The Washington Quarterly*) Winter 2005-2006, p. 145.

Problems and challenges for the region

Traditional security issues

A number of traditional security issues continue to threaten the stability and security of the Asia-Pacific. These are the ongoing dispute over Taiwan, the threat posed by North Korea, and unresolved territorial disputes among regional countries. All pose the threat of military conflict and invite potential involvement of countries outside the region.

Taiwan Strait

The conflict over the sovereignty of Taiwan draws global attention as it poses a latent possibility of armed conflict between the U.S. and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The conflict between the Republic of China (ROC) and the PRC resulted in two armed conflicts (1955 and 1958) and is considered to have reached its peak in 1996 when the PRC conducted missile tests in the Taiwan Strait and launched a series of military exercises, including amphibious attack simulations, just 60 kilometers north of Formosa Island. A further escalation of the conflict was prevented when Washington sent two carrier battle groups to the Strait.

At the moment, military confrontation in the Strait may be unlikely but its scope has become larger and has drawn Japan into it. In 2003, Japan's new defense guidelines included a role for Japan in supporting the U.S. in case a war in the Strait breaks out. Further, in 2005, Washington and Tokyo declared for the first time that "Taiwan is a mutual security concern."[47]

North Korea

The most immediate challenging traditional threat in the region is North Korea. The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea is the world's most heavily armed border.[48] North Korea has demonstrated continued disregard for international agreements. In October 2002, it admitted "that it continued to conduct its nuclear weapons program in violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework."[49] In January 2003, Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Its recent nuclear test affirms North Korea's disregard for international agreements and norms. The North Korean regime is also developing long-range ballistic missiles as demonstrated by missile tests on two occasions, with the July 2006 tests being the most recent; perhaps most worrisome is the possibility that Pyongyang will proliferate nuclear technologies and materials to others including nonstate actors, specifically terrorist groups.[50]

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[47] Anthony Faiola, "Japan to Join U.S. Policy on Taiwan" *Washington Post*, Feb. 18, 2005.

[48] The Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/research/features/issues2004/northeast-asia.cfm

[49] missing citation!

[50] David E. Sanger, "Pakistan Leader Confirms Nuclear Exports" *New York Times*, Sept. 13, 2005.

Territorial disputes

Another potential source of conflict in the Asia-Pacific is the unresolved territorial disputes among the bigger powers of Asia namely China, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Russia. These include disputes over Dokdo (or Takeshima) dispute between Japan and ROK, the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands between the PRC and Japan, and the Kuril Islands between Japan and Russia. With a growing demand for limited natural resources and the potential resources in these areas, these territories have become of great value. In November 2004, the Japanese Defense Agency laid out three scenarios for possible armed conflict with China, including the territorial claims over the Senkaku Islands.

Equally important are competing territorial claims over the islands and natural resources in the South China Sea. According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA) of the United States, the South China Sea region "has proven oil reserves estimated at about 7.0 billion barrels, and estimated oil production of around 2.5 million barrels per day."[51] All involved states, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and PRC refer to the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea and claim great portions of it. These conflicting interests have resulted in numerous naval clashes in the region, most notably in the Spratly Islands in March 1988 between China and Vietnam. Over 70 Vietnamese sailors were killed in the incident.

<u>Nontraditional security issues</u>

The region is also plagued by a number of "nontraditional security issues" that are transnational in nature and often cannot be resolved by the use of military force alone.[52] Due to the borderless nature of nontraditional security (NTS) issues, the management of these problems requires the concerted effort of countries.

Maritime security

Major sea-lanes of communication (SLOCs) pass through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore Straits. Apart from 25 percent of the world's sea-borne trade, 50 percent of global oil supplies are carried through them.[53] As such, strait security is not the concern of the littoral states in Asia but states engaged in international commerce too. The strategic significance of these sea lanes and the limited ability of the littoral states to secure them makes the Malacca and Singapore Straits highly vulnerable to terrorism or piracy. The maritime character of Asia has also facilitated small weapons proliferation, human trafficking, and drug trafficking as it has allowed arms, humans and drugs to be trafficked across Asian states.

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[51] Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/South_China_Sea/Oil.html

[52] Ralf Emmers, Mely Caballero-Anthony, and Amitav Acharya (Compilers), *Studying Nontraditional Security in Asia: Trends and Issues*, *Nontraditional Security in Asia* (Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2006), xiv.

[53] The International Institute for Strategic Studies IISS, *Sept. 13 – Channel News Asia – "Eyes in the Sky" Initiative Launched for Malacca Strait Security* (2005 - 2006 [cited 10 Sept. 2006); available from http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/press-coverage-2005/Sept.-2005/eyes-in-the-sky-initiative-launched.

WMD proliferation

Another key challenge is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Asia-Pacific. The danger is that a cascade of proliferation could be sparked in the region, increasing tensions among states which could lead to catastrophic war.[54] North Korea's development of nuclear weapons could induce Japan, with Taiwan and Myanmar (Burma), following suit. Furthermore, nuclear, chemical, or biological materials could be smuggled out of Russia and end up in the hands of terrorists or insurgents in the region. Such proliferation could threaten the Philippines or Indonesia as a WMD-equipped insurgency would be detrimental to the stability of either state.

Terrorism

Terrorist acts have occurred throughout the Asia-Pacific with the Bali bombings in October 2002 and the Jakarta Marriot Hotel bombing in August 2003 being the most noteworthy. These attacks did not only injure local residents but foreign tourists as well, hurting tourism for an indefinite period. Eventually, terrorists started fleeing to neighboring countries in order to escape from local authorities.

Attacks have also occurred in southern Thailand, southern Philippines, and Sri Lanka. The insurgency in southern Thailand, for example, was a cause of concern because it could evolve into a regional security issue if left unchecked. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is the terrorist group most threatening to Asia as it has followers in Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines and is linked to the global terror group al-Qaeda. Its regional goal is to establish an Islamic polity encompassing much of Southeast Asia and its international agenda includes attacks on the U.S. and its allies. Late in 2001, a JI plot was uncovered with the arrest of members of a JI cell in Singapore. There were plans to bomb a shuttle bus service ferrying U.S. personnel between the Yishun and Sembawang Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) stations.

Health related issues

The avian influenza (H5N1) is a security problem in the region. According to the CDC,[55] animals infected with the disease were first reported in December 2003 and by January 2004, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported human cases of H5N1 in Asia, Africa, the Pacific, Europe, and the Near East.

In February 2003, Asia was hit by Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). The virus eventually spread to more than 20 countries in Asia, North and South America, and Europe.[56] Asia was hit hardest as SARS became widespread in China and Hong Kong, Vietnam, Thailand, and Singapore. The disease crippled both society and economy

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[54] Paul Bracken, *Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age* (New York, USA: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999)., xiii.

[55] See www.cdc.gov   (http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/outbreaks/current.htm)

[56] Centers for Disease Control and Prevention CDC, *Basic Information About Sars* [Website] (May 2005 [cited Sept. 14 2006]); available from http://www.cdc.gov/NCIDOD/SARS/factsheet.htm.

with the Singaporean government encouraging citizens to stay indoors and away from crowded places so as to minimize contagion. Eventually, most Singaporeans shied away from various public places including shopping malls and restaurants. Tourism suffered during this period since WHO reported SARS cases from affected countries, resulting in months of paranoia and fear. In 1999, Singapore and Malaysia were also struck by the deadly Nipah virus, which killed 105 people. As the virus could infect a wide range of hosts and be fatal to humans, it was a major nontraditional security concern.[57]

Economic security

The Asian economic crisis in 1997 started in Thailand and affected the economies of many Asian states Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore.[58] An economic slump resulted and these states spent years trying to recover as many businesses in the region failed and currencies depreciated.

Regional security mechanisms

<u>*Formal security structure*</u>

Bilateral and multilateral security arrangements

Unlike Europe, the Asia-Pacific is still in the process of developing a regional multilateral security organization that could deal with both traditional and nontraditional threats. In the meantime, the region's security is still largely dependent on a number of bilateral security agreements with the U.S.

Since the end of World War II, Japan has become an important U.S. ally. The security arrangement between Washington and Tokyo underpins U.S. involvement in the region and provides them an opportunity to contribute to the region's stability. Although the U.S. has decided to move some 7,000 troops from Okinawa to Guam, the U.S. and Japan still share bases and carry out military exercises. Both militaries are also looking into further cooperation in intelligence and training.[59]

In 1953, the U.S. and the Republic of Korea (ROK) signed the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. Fifty years later, the treaty is still important in securing the stability of the Korean Peninsula, especially in view of North Korea's recent demonstrations of military power. Both South Korea and Japan share common interests with the U.S. regarding security issues in the region.

Beyond these long-standing bilateral agreements with Japan and South Korea, the U.S. is expanding military cooperation with Southeast Asian states. It signed a Strategic

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[57] World Health Organization WHO, *Nipah Virus* [Webpage] (September 2001 [cited Aug. 14, 2006]); available from http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs262/en/.

[58] Also known as Asia's Four Little Dragons or *ya zhou si siao long* (亚洲四小龙)

[59] *U.S. to Cut Okinawa Troop Numbers* [Website] (Oct. 29, 2005 [cited 25 Sept. 2006]); available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4387660.stm.

Framework Agreement with Singapore, participates in a joint military exercise (*Cobra Gold*) hosted by Thailand, is militarily supporting counterterrorism operations in the Philippines, and recently agreed to participate in military exchanges with Vietnam.

Meanwhile, China is working hard to expand its diplomatic outreach and economic influence in the region. In addition to embracing and promoting the efforts of ASEAN and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Beijing has reached out to New Delhi. This is considered to be a significant policy shift. China also engaged in its first joint military exercise with Russia in 2005 and is increasingly cooperating with Russia on issues of mutual interest. Furthermore, China has made regional investment and cooperation with other countries contingent upon severing their ties with Taiwan, which has been effective in isolating Taiwan and limiting its ability to participate in regional security fora.

There are also a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements among regional countries. Despite disparities in military capabilities, defense cooperation is common. For example, Singapore enjoys close defense relationship with the U.S. and also maintains defense relations with Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, and Myanmar.[60] Additionally, Singapore is looking to forge stronger defense relations with India, Bangladesh, South Africa, Canada, France, Sweden, Japan, and China.

In November 1971, the Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement (AMDA) was transformed into the Five-Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA) which provides the framework for defense relations among Singapore, Malaysia, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. They carry out annual exercises. There are also plans for a biennial Defense Chiefs' Conference as well as occasional Air Defense Seminars and Joint Operations Forums.[61] These allow for constant defense interaction among the five members, creating a forum for regular communication.

In September 2005, the three littoral states of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia launched a security initiative with Thailand to maintain the maritime safety of the Malacca and Singapore Straits. The Eyes in the Sky (EiS) Initiative was proposed during the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2005 by Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister of Malaysia Najib Tun Razak. From this agreement, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia decided to cooperate and conduct combined maritime patrols over the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.[62]

Similar to Taiwan's exclusion in Asian security organizations, Japan's integration into the region's security structure has been limited. This is a result of Japan's historic aggression in the region and its recent actions, which only reinforces regional states' mistrust of Tokyo. Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine are seen as

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[60] Tim Huxley, *Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore* (Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2000), p. 208.
[61] Ibid., p. 200 – 1.
[62] Ministry of Defence Singapore MINDEF, *Launch of Eyes in the Sky (Eis) Initiative* (19 April 2006 [cited Sept. 10, 2006]); available www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2005/sep/13sep05_nr.html.

indications of Japan's intentions and don't foster regional goodwill. At the same time, Japan's deployment to Iraq, efforts to amend its constitution, involvement in the Proliferation Security Initiative and declaration of Taiwan as a "common strategic objective" with the U.S. exemplify a growing willingness to abandon Japan's defensive posture.

ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the ASEAN Plus Three

In 1967, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand established the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Brunei became a member in 1984. Eventually, the rest of Southeast Asia became members: Vietnam (1995), Laos (1997), Myanmar (1997) and Cambodia (1999). The 1967 Bangkok Declaration that established ASEAN identifies its objectives as 1) accelerate regional economic growth, social progress, and cultural development, and 2) promote regional peace and stability in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. ASEAN has proved central to progress among Southeast Asian countries in these sectors.

In 1993, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was formed. It is the first multilateral security organization encompassing the Asia-Pacific region and the only multilateral institution in the region devoted to security issues. It was designed to compensate for the loss of Soviet influence in the region following the end of the Cold War and to promote regional economic growth and interdependence as China, India, and Japan become more assertive. Implicit in the ARF concept is the recognition that regional problems require the engagement of other powers. That is why the ARF focuses on "inclusiveness," meaning it includes participants that were traditionally excluded from the consultative processes initiated by ASEAN: Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, China, European Union, India, Japan, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Republic of Korea (ROK), Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Russian Federation, and the United States. However, although it is supposed to address sensitive security issues, it is rather limited to encouraging regional dialogue.

The ARF endorses security cooperation in three main categories: 1) confidence-building measures – promoting transparency with regard to military spending and structure of armed forces; 2) preventive diplomacy – the notion of peaceful non-military methods to address potential disputes and tensions as stated in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia; and 3) nonproliferation and arms control – adherence to international security regimes devoted to nonproliferation and arms control.

At the same time, security cooperation between ASEAN countries and Northeast Asian states (China, Japan, and the ROK) has accelerated. Initiated as ASEAN celebrated its 30th anniversary and developed its Vision 2020 to promote an outward-looking ASEAN (1997), this process has resulted from a willingness to develop bilateral trading arrangements with these three countries, which could serve as building blocks for an East Asian Free Trade Agreement. The ASEAN Plus Three countries have cooperated in addressing security issues, notably the threat posed by terrorism and other transnational

crimes within the framework of the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting Plus Three Consultation on Transnational Crime (SOMTC+3).

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

The Shanghai Five was established in 1996 and included China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan as members. Its original purpose was to institutionalize border security agreements. In 2001, Uzbekistan joined, its name was changed to the SCO, and its scope broadened to include fighting the "three evil forces" of terrorism, extremism, and separatism as well as facilitating regional security and economic cooperation. Membership is likely to continue to expand: Mongolia became an observer in 2004 and India, Pakistan, and Iran joined as observers in 2005. The interest in the organization and the willingness of India and Pakistan to come together in a multilateral forum demonstrate its potential.

It is not yet such a force, however. Because it is still in its infancy, much of attention is focused on developing processes and procedures. Two permanent bodies, the Secretariat in Beijing and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATs) in Tashkent, have been established. Annual meetings among the member states' senior leaders have also been established. The presidents, prime ministers and the ministers of foreign affairs, economy, transportation, culture, and defense all meet annually. So do law enforcement, public prosecutors, and boundary enforcement officials. Interaction between the members is fairly robust.

Beyond meetings and the declared mutual concern about the "three evils" and the destabilizing effect of drug trafficking in the region, little substantive cooperation actually occurs. Nonetheless, a joint antiterrorism exercise was conducted in 2003 and another is planned for 2007 although no mutual defense arrangement exists. The SCO is also planning joint energy development and further cultural exchange.

Furthermore, in spite of Chinese rhetoric touting the organization's influence and significance, there are still significant areas of disagreement among the members as well as a small budget and staff limit its capabilities.[63] Nonetheless, its members have been united on several issues, which allows, the organization to project a certain degree of influence.

In 2005, prompted by the U.S. presence in Central Asia and the destabilizing and democratically inspired color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, the member states called for a timeline for the closure of U.S. bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. They also advocated the non-imposition of timelines regarding UN reform, essentially opposing the efforts of Brazil, Japan, India, and Germany to enlarge the UN Security Council. There are concerns about Iran's observer role with reports indicating that an invitation for full membership has been extended in 2006.[64]

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[63] Howard W. French, "Shanghai Grouping Rises as New Player" *The New York Times* (June 16, 2006).

[64] M K Bhadrakumar **"**China, Russia Welcome Iran Into the Fold" *Asia Times* (April 18, 2006), available at**;** accessed Sept. 15, 2006.

These actions coincided with increasing Sino-Russian cooperation and have more to do with furthering Beijing and Moscow's geo-strategic agenda than Central Asian security and stability. Prior to the SCO's request for a timetable for U.S. withdrawal, China and Russia issued their own declaration, calling for a new security framework for the world focused on multilateralism, development, and equality. China and Russia also conducted a large-scale joint military exercise in August 2005 and used the SCO's antiterror moniker as the pretext for the operation. But the exercise's scope and size far exceeded the requirements of any anti-terror operation and occurred in the Pacific Ocean, far from landlocked Central Asia.

If the SCO becomes merely a forum for pursuing Russia and China's larger geo-strategic goals, its objective of promoting Central Asian security and stability may be sacrificed. Requesting U.S. withdrawal from the region is more about limiting American influence in the region as the U.S. military presence is seen as a stabilizing force by countries in the area. By involving Iran, as either an observer or a full member, the organization is frustrating U.S. and European efforts to isolate Iran. Further, the SCO will likely have to take a position with regard to Iran's nuclear program and any potential UN resolution and sanction that may result.

Meanwhile, the organization has not been able to convince Afghanistan to join its ranks (although Hamid Karzai has attended meetings as a "special guest"), which is where many of the region's terror and drug trafficking problems originate. In overlooking Afghanistan, which plays a pivotal role in the region, and reaching out to Iran, whose role in Central Asia is minimal, the SCO is taking on problems not directly relevant to the region's security while ignoring more immediate issues. All SCO members share an authoritarian political agenda that puts a strong state and economic development before democracy.[65] This worldview, in addition to actions requesting U.S. withdrawal, engaging Iran and isolating Afghanistan, can be interpreted as efforts to impede U.S. foreign policy goals.

The organization is still young and the priorities of China, Russia and the Central Asian states are diverse. It has been successful in developing organizational procedures and laying the groundwork for cooperation in security, economic, and cultural affairs. Beijing has also successfully extended its influence into Central Asia. But it is unclear whether the SCO will evolve into an effective regional security structure, with defense agreements and joint military capabilities that allow its members to work together combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism. It may be merely a forum to be manipulated by China and Russia to further their goals of greater regional and international influence – perhaps at the expense of the U.S.

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[65] Cory Welt, "A New Eurasia? The Future of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization" *CSIS Commentary* (June 154, 2006), available at http://www.csis.org/images/stories/060615_sco.pdf; accessed Sept. 17, 2006.

Evolving security forums

The Asia-Pacific Economic Forum

Since its founding in 1989, the Asia Pacific Economic Forum (APEC)[66] has slowly expanded its focus. While APEC's original objective was to promote economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region by facilitating free trade, investment, and cooperation, its agenda today includes security issues. At the 2001 APEC summit in China a month after Sept. 11, the members agreed that there can be no prosperity without security and decided to include security issues in future APEC discussions.

The first move was to release a joint statement on terrorism at the Shanghai APEC meeting (in 2001) in which members agreed that terrorism poses a direct challenge to APEC's vision of free, open, and prosperous economies. Indeed, further pronouncements and policies showed the determination of APEC countries to enhance security cooperation. For example, APEC tightened export control mechanisms to detect, deter, and prevent the illicit trafficking of WMD materials and technologies. It has set guidelines to bar terrorists from obtaining and using weapons to attack civilian aviation. Home to large numbers of seaports, APEC paid attention to ship and port security as well, implementing the "International Maritime Organization's International Ship and Port Facility Security Code." The developed members pledged to provide grants and technical assistance to developing countries for complying with the code. Other measures to secure trade and strengthen air travel and container security have also been introduced.

As nontraditional security issues continue to threaten the region, APEC tries to cope introduce them as themes for discussion in APEC meetings at all levels. Much of this work is done through APEC's various task forces. As APEC is not an organization with hierachical structures, the task forces are basically functional mechanisms by which APEC deals with specific issues. For example, APEC's Health Task Force works to enhance avian and human pandemic influenza preparedness and response; fight HIV/AIDS; and promote advances in health information technology. A number of collaborative workshops on preventing the spread of AIDS, SARS, the avian flu and pandemic influenza have been held. The Counterterrorism Task Force is working to advance the APEC food defense initiative, "Mitigating the Terrorist Threat to the APEC Food Supply." The Task Force also agreed on the main objectives of the Fifth Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR V) Conference, which will be held in Sydney in June 2007. The STAR Conference focuses on policies and procedures to enhance security and efficiency in the APEC region's seaports, airports and other access points. The conference's 2007 theme "Mitigating Risks: Containing Costs" intends to foster coordination between public and private entities.

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[66] APEC members are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, the United States and Viet Nam.

The evolution of APEC since 2001 demonstrates that its focus goes beyond mere economic matters. It has taken significant steps to address nontraditional security issues. However, it is too early to conclude whether APEC has becoming a de-facto security organization.

East Asia Summit

The first East Asia Summit (EAS) was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on Dec. 14, 2005, with the 10 ASEAN members as well as China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand participating. Russia and East Timor were observers. This is another forum where East Asian leaders and their counterparts talk about the most pressing issues that confront the region. Although the main issues discussed during the summit focused on politics and economics, the leaders recognized the need to include security issues in their agenda and discussed the denuclearization process in the Korean Peninsula, terrorism, and avian flu. No substantial achievement was made on these security issues except a declaration on avian flu. It commits EAS members to quickly report all outbreaks and take necessary steps to prevent the disease from spreading.

The second EAS will be held in Cebu, Philippines in December 2006. The EAS is in its infancy and while security issues will be a part of the EAS agenda, the summit is unlikely to evolve into a security organization soon. In fact, the EAS is simply a meeting of leaders and there are no plans for turning it into a formal organization. And in the near future, the EAS will focus mainly on "issue-specific" agenda. But much criticism has already been hurled against it and described as another "talk shop." Many doubt if the leaders know what and how they want the EAS to evolve.

It should be noted that Tawain is a special case which is excluded from most of the regional security mechanisms except APEC. The major reason is not because Taiwan does not play any role in the regional security structure, but because mainland China has strongly opposed any move to bring Taiwan into formal organizations or fora. Taiwan's membership in APEC is possible only because APEC is an economic forum and not a political nor a security forum.

The case of North Korea

The North Korean nuclear issue is a good example of a traditional security issue that threatens the Asia-Pacific region which has not been addressed by existing multilateral regional security organizations. Neither formal security organizations nor evolving security forums have had a significant role in managing the problem. Instead, an *ad hoc* mechanism composed of North Korea, the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia, now commonly referred to as "the Six-Party Talks" was created to deal with the matter. Yet even this mechanism, devoted solely to preventing North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons is unable to achieve its limited regional security aims. This is due to the competing interests and divergent agenda of the participants as well as other actors in the region. This demonstrates how security cooperation is quite difficult in the Asia-Pacific region.

For North Korea, its highest priority is regime survival, seeing military attack by the U.S. (a perception which dates back to the Korean War of 1950-1953) and economic collapse as the two primary threat to its survival. Nuclear weapons are seen as effective means of addressing both these threats because they would deter the U.S. from taking advantage of its military superiority while at the same time allowing North Korea to have a bargaining instrument for extracting aid from the international community. Nuclear weapons also allow Pyongyang to cut its conventional military spending.

In the absence of concrete evidence, the recent missile tests conducted by North Korea can be interpreted in many ways: to force the U.S. to negotiate on a bilateral basis (thereby enhancing its status), to show aggressiveness, to rally internal support, to advertise the technologies it can sell to other states, or just to draw attention to itself, as Europe and the U.S. were focusing attention on Iran and offering it inducements to halt its nuclear program;

The U.S. objective is twofold. First, it wants to eradicate North Korea's nuclear and WMD programs for fear that they might trigger a major conflict in the region, lead to regional proliferation, or have fissile materials fall into the hands of terrorists. Second, a long-term goal is to put an end to the North Korean regime, which it perceives as a major threat. To achieve either of these goals, Washington recognizes the need for a multilateral approach. It is thus committed to keep the other parties involved (especially China as it is supplies North Korea's with energy sources, gives it aid and therefore has leverage to influence the Kim Jong-il regime). The U.S. thus refuses to engage with North Korea bilaterally or exclude any options (including the use of force);

Similarly, China does not want a nuclear-armed North Korea as it could lead Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan to develop nuclear weapons of their own, undermining China's deterrent capabilities. There is also the risk that Pyongyang could sell weapon materials or technologies to terrorists, or even to Taiwan. Orchestrating the talks and cooperating with the U.S. therefore enhances China's role as a regional and global leader and demonstrates to the U.S. that China can act as a "responsible stakeholder." In direct contrast to Washington, however, Beijing does not want the downfall of the North Korean regime, which could lead to a major U.S.-led operation and result in U.S. forces on its border. The North Korean regime would also lead to a flood of refugees into its impoverished northeastern provinces, threatening China's own stability. China therefore strives to maintain the process of the talks without pushing the regime so far that it collapses.

Japan feels most directly threatened by North Korea's nuclear program, especially after Pyongyang launched a long-range missile over its territory in 1998. Japan presented a draft UN resolution calling for sanctions against North Korea. Japan, and the U.S. to some extent, has an interest in an issue that no one else does: the return of Japanese abductees. This issue complicates the agenda of the Six-Party Talks. Tokyo is also not supportive of the downfall of the Kim regime as a unified Korea would remove the need for U.S. presence in Korea and make a re-united peninsula probably allied against China and against Japan.

South Korea's objective is rapprochement and normalization of relations with the North, a central element of President Roh's foreign policy. South Korea is anxious about North Korea's nuclear program but is more concerned about U.S. or Japanese policies that threaten Pyongyang as South Korea would bear the burden of rebuilding a collapsed or war-torn North.

Finally, Moscow has a more distant involvement in the Six-Party Talks. The main reason for being involved in the process is its desire to maintain prestige and involvement in the region.

The rest of the international community has three interrelated apprehensions with regard to the North Korean issue: war, proliferation and WMD-terrorism. There is fear that North Korea may use or threaten to use its nuclear weapons. This mainly results from the perception that the North Korean regime is reckless, unpredictable, and unstable and it could cross the red line and trigger a nuclear attack, creating a major humanitarian disaster in the region, and substantial economic slowdown.

There is also the fear that a persistent and provocative nuclear North Korea could spark a cascade of proliferation in the region. Its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty is seen as very worrying because it sets a precedent. Lastly, there is the apprehension that North Korea could sell nuclear and other WMD materials or technologies to others, including terrorists, because of the economic difficulties it is experiencing.

Recommendations

Bilateral security cooperation, led by the U.S., has long been and still is the cornerstone of Asia-Pacific security. However, the region's changing balance of power and the multitude of traditional and nontraditional threats that the region faces, all of which require cooperation, challenges this construct. A number of multilateral forums for engagement have developed but they are still in their infancy and lack clearly defined goals, authority, and even membership. ARF, APEC, and A+3 have yet to develop an institutionalized culture of professionalism and institutionalism in security collaboration. This lack of mandate, institutional framework, and culture makes rapid, cohesive action in the face of security threats difficult. In order to improve the effectiveness of these organizations, an effort should be made to improve professionalism and institutionalism.

As regards professionalism, which pertains to the way regional security structures operate, there must be a reliable coordinator for every area of cooperation once decisions are made in order to ensure action is taken. Often, no country takes responsibility for implementation of decisions. Countries that are capable of dealing with certain security issues should take the lead with others giving support by whatever means they can. For instance, the U.S. can coordinate efforts to counter terrorism and prevent the spread of WMD, and China can lead the campaign against transnational crimes. All regional governments must take part in the initiatives they deem fit by contributing financial and human resources and sharing intelligence and expertise.

Second, expertise is needed because many security issues pertain to certain fields ranging from territorial dispute, export controls, natural disaster mitigation, and avian influenza. There are instances when proposed measures go beyond the capacity of participating states due to insufficient consultation with experts. For example, a meeting on energy security in the South China Sea may gather more diplomats than energy and international law specialists, resulting in unrealistic recommendations, such as how to undertake joint development in a disputed area.

Third, ARF, APEC, A+3, and EAS need to foster coordination to avoid duplicating efforts. In recent years, infectious diseases and natural calamities have become a hot topic. But it seems there is only enough time for general discussion of these issues. With greater coordination, more detailed plans to deal with specific issues could be addressed at individual forums such as establishing a surveillance center in the Asia-Pacific to monitor earthquakes and tsunamis. Specifically, ARF and APEC could establish closer links to address issues that affect both regional security and economic integration.

With regard to institutionalism, legally binding agreements and commitments are needed. Most agreements are not binding and regional security structures do not provide an enforcement mechanism. The Declaration on the Code of Conduct in the South China Seas is an example. Regional countries solve their problems mainly by dialogue and mutual confidence. It remains unclear as to how a party to an agreement violating a certain commitment should be dealt with.

Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific Security Landscape: Views from the Young Generation[*]

Woven into many of the issues examined in the 10th Asia-Pacific Security Forum is the role and position of Taiwan. Its ties with economies across the region can not be ignored. Taiwan has been increasingly expanding cooperation to address nontraditional security issues, such as disaster mitigation, SARS, and avian flu. Moreover, Taiwan itself figures in two regional security issues: stability across the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea disputes. These issues cannot be addressed effectively without Taiwan's participation.

Relations between the two parties across the Strait, China and Taiwan, are a great concern for Asia-Pacific states, particularly because tension in the area can affect regional security. In any conflict between Beijing and Taipei, the balance of power may be upset and U.S. allies – namely Japan and South Korea – might be directly involved.

Taiwan claims the whole of the South China Sea and occupies the largest island in the Spratly archipelago. Any military action in the area, therefore, would have to take Taiwan into consideration, because Taiwan possesses a strong military with modern equipment that allows it to project power beyond its borders.

Meanwhile, Taiwan is undergoing a process of democratization, which could further complicate matters as Taipei and the rest of the Asia-Pacific work out Taiwan's place and role in the regional security architecture.

The democracy agenda may be seen by other regional players, particularly Beijing, as the cornerstone of Taipei's policy in regard to eliciting support from other democratic governments, specifically for international recognition and voice in the international community. Thus, there is the possibility that external support for Taiwanese democracy, particularly from the U.S. and Japan, could spark Chinese nationalism.

It is therefore necessary, some observers point out, for Taiwan to cautiously pursue democratization without necessarily pursuing independence. After all, other regional players, specifically the U.S., Japan, ASEAN, and the European Union appear to be searching for ways to support Taipei's democratization agenda without appearing to favor Taiwan's independence from China, as this may be too costly given the importance of their relations with Beijing.

Democratization in Taiwan could spark Chinese nationalism if China perceives that Taiwan's democracy is paving the way for Taiwanese political leaders to cultivate domestic popular support for Taiwan's independence from the mainland. Taiwanese political leaders, particularly those who want to formally declare independence from China, may need to refrain from using the democratic space currently available from eliciting domestic support for independence.

Democracy in Taiwan is linked with the issue of Taiwanese identity. Taiwanese political leaders, however, need to have prudence and pursue efforts of developing Taiwanese identity in a democratic manner so that such identity brings Taiwanese people together instead of exacerbating divisions among them. Political leaders need to develop the capacity to reach consensus in order to effectively move on rather than using the available democratic space to "fight" among themselves. Furthermore, they need to realize that referenda, which are integral in democratic societies to elicit people's choice on operative policy issues, should not be used for purely ideological issues. As Taiwan democratizes, reforms as well as the consolidation of democratic institutions such as the presidency, the legislature, courts, and the press, are necessary. Taiwan's democratization needs to be pursued while minimizing the "chaos" that seems inherent in democratizing societies – not only for the benefit of the Taiwanese but so as not to discourage both the leaders and people in the mainland from pursuing democratization.

Stability across the strait depends to a great extent on the sincerity of Beijing and Taipei as well as efforts of other regional players to create a peaceful environment. The mainland's goodwill could be shown by reducing missile deployments toward Taipei. Beijing should improve its capability to make regional security contributions without directly targeting Taipei. Observers suggest, it would be more fruitful if China cultivates good relations with Taiwan without political pre-conditions, such as Taipei's non-declaration of independence. In the same vein, Taipei needs to pursue economic links with mainland China without demanding political concessions from Beijing. Enhanced economic, social, and even political links will improve people's livelihoods and reduce the probability of conflict.

Meanwhile, probably because Beijing's believes that Taipei is pursuing international recognition rather than building mutual trust with the mainland, China appears to be utilizing its increasing international leverage to prevent Taiwan from having a place internationally and regionally. Taipei remains unable to participate substantively in almost all regional security arrangements as well as in the East Asian regionalization process. As China rises, Taipei may feel frustrated in its attempts to enhance its position in the region. Coupled with rising Taiwanese nationalism and search for a distinct identity, this could lead to instability across the Taiwan Strait.

It is therefore crucial that Taipei communicates to Beijing that good relations with China based on mutual trust is as important as international recognition. For its part, Beijing may need to refrain from giving Taiwan the space it needs to meaningfully participate in regional security mechanisms, while navigating the One-China Policy subscribed to by regional states.

With mutual trust, both Beijing and Taipei, as well as other regional players, could explore the possibility of inviting Taiwan's representatives as observers to official security forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asia Summit, and the ASEAN Plus Three meeting, while making it clear that this would not constitute a de facto recognition of Taiwan's independence. After all, the issue of independence or unification with the mainland is an issue for Beijing and Taipei to iron out among themselves.

Taiwan's participation in regional security mechanisms would provide Taiwanese representatives the opportunity to be actively engaged in discussions and negotiations pertaining to issues that directly concern Taiwan. This would also prevent a feeling of insecurity in Taiwan from boiling over and forcing it to engage in "provocative" action. Beijing needs to realize that far from "containing" China, Taiwan together with the U.S. and Japan have done more than any other international player in supporting China's economic rise.

It would be prudent for Taipei's political leadership to use international space to pursue Taiwan's interests rather than squander resources and opportunities at regional security meetings to promote symbolic independence. Taiwan's leaders should refrain from using international support for short-term political purposes, which could make Taipei's friends feel betrayed and be counterproductive for Taiwan's long term interests.

Taiwan also needs to realize that it would be worthwhile to give more attention to nonpolitical mechanisms such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), and Asia-Pacific Security Forum (APSF) rather than putting resources into a campaign for a seat at the United Nations.

Finally, while China continues to define its role in regional affairs and Taiwan searches for its appropriate place in the regional landscape, both parties should pursue cooperation in areas where Taipei could make substantive contributions, such as economic issues and health security. Hopefully, cooperation in these areas would build trust and confidence between the mainland and Taipei, making it easier for both parties to decide their future together or separately.

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