




The Rational Politics of Nukes and Refugees:
Averting Crisis on the Korean Peninsula
A Pacific Forum Young Leaders Scenario (2)



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Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate arenas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

The Young Leaders Program

The Young Leaders Program invites young professionals and graduate students to join Pacific Forum policy dialogues and conferences. The program fosters education in the practical aspects of policy-making, generates an exchange of views between young and seasoned professionals, promotes interaction among younger professionals, and enriches dialogues with generational perspectives for all attendees. Fellows must have a strong background in the area covered by the conference they are attending and an endorsement from respected experts in their field. Supplemental programs in conference host cities and mentoring sessions with senior officials and specialists add to the Young Leader experience. The Young Leaders Program is currently supported by the Freeman Foundation, the Luce Foundation, and the Yuchengco Group, with a growing number of universities, institutes, and organizations also helping to sponsor individual participants. For more details, see the Pacific Forum CSIS website, www.pacforum.org, or contact Brad Glosserman, director of the Young Leaders Program, at bradgpf@hawaii.rr.com.

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The views expressed here represent personal impressions and reflections of the Young Leaders program participants; they do not necessarily represent the views of their governments, or the co-sponsoring or parent organizations and institutes.

Introduction

The growing risk of WMD proliferation means that future security specialists must be well acquainted with the many dimensions of this issue. The Pacific Forum CSIS, as secretariat for the U.S. Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (USCSCP), has for three years chaired a CSCAP study group on “Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific” that is working to raise regional awareness, suggest ways to promote nonproliferation efforts, and is writing a handbook and action plan for regional governments and institutions.

The WMD study group has met five times. The fifth meeting was Feb. 12-13, 2007 in San Francisco, California and immediately preceded an ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) workshop on United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540. This resolution obligates member states to take steps to fight proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Cognizant of the need to build greater understanding of WMD issues among security analysts, Pacific Forum CSIS has hosted Young Leaders at all WMD study group meetings. In San Francisco, 25 Young Leaders took part; a significant number of them were YL alumni and had attended previous WMD study group meetings.

In addition to the usual preconference readings, Young Leaders were briefed by Dr. Mona Dreicer of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and David Saltiel, a member of the technical staff at Sandia National Laboratories’ Cooperative Monitoring Center. They provided technical insight into the workings of the fuel cycle and the issues it raises for nonproliferation. In retrospect, all participants at the conference would have benefited from these two sessions.

A key theme in the Young Leader discussion was the need for greater conceptual clarity about the issues and more precision in the proliferation/disarmament debate. Much of the rhetoric is sweeping, ill-defined, and impractical. That is not to be dismissive of the case for disarmament, but the discussion has to be more focused, with specific proposals and concrete steps. Disarmament may be an idealistic goal but that obliges advocates to be even more realistic in their thinking about how to proceed.

Indeed, the Young Leaders understand that nonproliferation and disarmament must be discussed together. While it is easier to make progress on the former than the latter, they recognize that the failure to acknowledge NPT Article 6 obligations, and the need for progress on them, will alienate nonnuclear weapon states and make it more difficult for them to back the nonproliferation agenda.

Young Leaders also seem more aware than senior experts of the ubiquity of the WMD threat and how the diffusion of technology and know how makes nonproliferation efforts more difficult than ever. Moreover, it erases many traditional distinctions in the proliferation debate: how meaningful is the concept of a “civilian nuclear program”? The CSCAP discussion tends to focus on nuclear issues, but the dual-use problem is especially pronounced for chemical and biological weapons. Young Leaders thought more time should be spent on other forms of WMD.

As in the past, Young Leaders spent considerable time discussing the factors driving proliferation. They know that nonstate actors constitute a new and unique challenge. They also understand that a successful nonproliferation regime must deal with the reasons states seek nuclear weapons. Several Young Leaders argued security assurances must be high on the agenda if states are to be dissuaded from acquiring their own nuclear arsenals.

All governments have a role to play in protecting the world from the WMD threat. As one Young Leader explained, the best protection is a “culture of responsibility” among all governments. The idea that WMD is not a particular government’s problem is dangerous and wrong; judging from some official policies, that belief is also widespread. All states can contribute to the nonproliferation effort, even if only in an incremental manner. (And failure to be part of the solution usually means a state will be part of the problem, even without intending to do so.) Developing ways to shore up the global nonproliferation regime unilaterally or regionally are the most important contributions a state can make. Southeast Asian Young Leaders highlighted the role played by the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in supporting the nonproliferation regime. The CSCAP WMD program assumes that the Asia Pacific can make a valuable contribution to global efforts to stop the spread of WMD.

This notion of responsibility also helps fill a hole in the nonproliferation regime: Taiwan. Despite Taiwan’s membership in the IAEA and its safeguards regime, its disputed international status has rendered problematic Taipei’s participation in state-based nonproliferation instruments. Taiwan’s efforts to support WMD regimes demonstrate its efforts to be a responsible stakeholder in the international system and underscore the need to ensure the GNR casts as wide a net as possible.

After the discussions, Young Leaders engaged in another crisis simulation concerning nuclear weapons. As at the fourth WMD study group meeting (held in Danang Vietnam in November 2006), the scenario hypothesized a threatened second North Korean nuclear test, simultaneous with a humanitarian crisis in that state. As at Danang, participants played the roles of the U.S., South Korea, North Korea, China, and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. (In the previous simulation, the UN as a whole was a party; this time, a specific institution was identified to focus participants.)

Our simulation produced several interesting results:

- The U.S. group seemed to believe that only regime change would change North Korean behavior. It was not so concerned about the prospect of another North Korean nuclear test as it would diminish the size of the North’s arsenal and help build international consensus against Pyongyang.
- As in Danang, the UN group was frustrated by its lack of power and inability to influence the behavior of other key actors.
- The South Korean group felt its options were restrained by public opinion – in this case, the increasing anger toward the North. Accommodation was made difficult by “a slap in the face for the South Korean people.” At the same time, the group noted that it was as concerned by U.S. intentions as those of the DPRK. Close consultations are a must to ensure there are no miscalculations or misunderstandings between Seoul and Washington.

The ROK team was surprised by U.S. decisions during the simulation and worried about what would be required to ensure that the two governments worked together in a crisis.

- The DPRK team recognized the threat to its survival and reached out to like-minded governments that would be happy to “tweak” the U.S. for aid and assistance. It appears committed to a second nuclear test to demonstrate its independence and to widen differences between other members of the Six-Party Talks.
- China is more worried about a U.S. response – in particular a military strike – than the North Korean test. With limited leverage over Pyongyang, Beijing is unlikely to do too much to try to dissuade Pyongyang from testing. Its most important concern is insulating China from the fallout – political, economic, and humanitarian – from the test

As explained by one of the groups in its discussion of the simulation, suspicion dominated each state’s response to the crisis. Although there is a common security concern, governments were reluctant to embrace real burden sharing. This enhanced the opportunities for miscalculation and made mishandling the crisis more likely.

Simulation: Possible Second North Korean Nuclear Test

Key Players

China (PRC)
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
Republic of Korea (ROK)
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)
United States of America (U.S.)

Scenario

A Chinese diplomatic mission to Pyongyang receives assurances that North Korea will not conduct any further nuclear tests. Beijing goes public with this statement. Subsequently, the PRC suggests re-engaging North Korea in the wake of Pyongyang's pledge. The Six-Party Talks (SPT) resume; two more rounds of talks make no tangible progress toward a deal. While Washington and Pyongyang have met bilaterally under the SPT umbrella and discussed U.S. financial sanctions (and other concerns), the sanctions have not been lifted and the U.S. continues to press other countries to be vigilant about alleged illicit activities by the DPRK. There is no communication through the second channel at the United Nations.

A GNP* candidate wins the 2007 presidential election in South Korea. After entering the Blue House, the president's first order of business is to show that Seoul will not appease Pyongyang. As a result, the Mt. Kumgang tourist project and Kaesong industrial project are suspended. This deprives North Korea of key sources of income and adds strain to an already weak economy.

In early 2008, the North again experiences severe floods; a poor harvest and diminished support from the ROK (and the international community as a whole as a result of concerns about how Pyongyang distributes aid) force growing numbers of North Koreans to flee the country. In response, China moves to complete a wall on its border with the DPRK. The prospect of its imminent completion – and the closing of an escape route – spurs more North Koreans to flee. Pyongyang demands that Beijing do more to stop the flow of refugees and to return those who have fled, using force if necessary. Refugees also explore other routes to Russia and South Korea. But since the demilitarized zone is laden with landmines, most attempts to reach the South are by sea; some refugees end up in Japan as well. Human rights groups rally around the world, calling for the protection of and safe haven for refugees.

Angered by the suspension of inter-Korea economic activities and the Chinese government decision to continue to freeze North Korean assets in Chinese financial institutions, North Korea comments via the *Korean Central News Agency (KCNA)* that surrounding nations are abusing

* Grand National Party (한나라당): the main opposition party in South Korea. The GNP is traditionally conservative while supporting capitalism and free trade. The party favors a strong alliance with the United States and takes a harder line toward North Korea than President Roh Moo-hyun's Uri party or former President Kim Dae-jung's Millennium Democratic Party.

formal understandings and may cause unexpected consequences. U.S. surveillance satellites detect movement of equipment and personnel near Musadan-ri in North Hamgyong province, the site of the Oct. 9, 2006 nuclear test. The intelligence is confirmed by South Korea although opposition party legislators publicly challenge the interpretation of the data.



Timeline

Feb. 10, 2005: DPRK announces that it has nuclear weapons and will indefinitely suspend participation in the Six-Party Talks.

April 1, 2005: DPRK says it wants Six-Party Talks to be regional disarmament talks now that it is a “nuclear state.”

April 18, 2005: U.S. threatens to refer the nuclear issue to the UNSC should Pyongyang refuse to restart six-party process.

April 28, 2005: In a press conference, President Bush calls North Korean leader Kim Jong-il a “tyrant” and a “dangerous person.”

April 30, 2005: North Korea responds, calling Bush a “hooligan bereft of any personality as a human being.”

May 11, 2005: DPRK spokesman states 8,000 fuel rods were removed at Yongbyon nuclear complex.

May 13, 2005: U.S. and North Korea meet for secret working-level talks in New York.

May 31, 2005: At a press conference, President Bush calls for peaceful solution to North Korea nuclear issue and refers to North Korean leader as “Mr. Kim Jong-il.”

June 29, 2005: U.S. authorities are given new powers to freeze assets of companies believed to be helping North Korea, Iran, and Syria pursue WMD programs.

June 30, 2005: North Korea restarts construction on two nuclear reactors halted under the 1994 Agreed Framework.

July 26, 2005: Fourth round of Six-Party Talks begins in Beijing.

Aug. 7, 2005: Fourth round of Six-Party Talks takes a three-week recess after failing to produce a joint declaration. The talks are scheduled to resume the week of Aug. 29.

Sept. 13-19, 2005: The fourth round of Six-Party Talks resumes in Beijing.

Sept. 14, 2005: The International Convention on Suppressing Acts of Nuclear Terrorism is signed by U.S.

Sept. 19, 2005: Six-Party Talks participants release joint statement that commits DPRK to abandon its nuclear program and to rejoin the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

Sept. 20, 2005: DPRK states it would not dismantle its nuclear facilities until it receives a light-water reactor.

Sept 28, 2005: Asst. Sec. Hill says the next thing DPRK needs to do is tell where its nuclear arms facilities are, noting there could be trouble if DPRK refuses to admit to a uranium enrichment program in the next round of talks.

Oct. 21, 2005: U.S. Treasury Department designates eight North Korean entities for supporting WMD proliferation and freezes their U.S. assets.

Nov. 9-11, 2005: Fifth round of Six-Party Talks takes place in Beijing.

Dec. 6, 2005: Pyongyang threatens to boycott Six-Party Talks unless the U.S. rescinds U.S. Treasury warnings issued Oct. 21 on North Korean companies for alleged counterfeiting, money laundering, and arms sales.

Jan. 3, 2006: North Korea says it will not attend the Six-Party Talks as long as U.S. financial sanctions remain in place.

Jan. 23, 2006: U.S. Treasury Dept. team briefs ROK officials on alleged currency counterfeiting by North Korea.

Feb. 16-19, 2006: *The Korea Times* and *Hankook Ilbo* conduct a survey of 1,000 people aged 18-23; 48 percent of respondents say they would support North Korea if the U.S. attacked nuclear facilities in the DPRK.

March 7, 2006: U.S. State and Treasury officials meet DPRK representatives in New York to discuss issues related to sanctions levied on Banco Delta Asia.

March 8, 2006: DPRK test-fires two short-range missiles toward the East Sea (Sea of Japan).

March 14, 2006: *KCNA* states that the DPRK has the right to launch a pre-emptive attack because the DPRK and U.S./ROK are technically still at war.

April 14, 2006: DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan says North Korea could use the standoff in the Six-Party Talks to bolster its military “deterrent force” and demands return of funds at Banco Delta Asia as a precondition for resumption of talks.

May 30-June 6, 2006: DPRK FM Paek Nam-sun meets Chinese counterpart Li Zhaoxing in Beijing to discuss Six-Party Talks and also visits Guangzhou.

July 5, 2006: North Korea launches seven ballistic missiles – six *Nodong* and *Scud* missiles tests were successful; the one *Taepodong-2* missile launch failed.

July 11-15, 2006: DPRK delegation led by Supreme People’s Assembly Vice Chairman Yang Hyong-sop arrives in Beijing for friendship treaty celebrations.

July 15, 2006: UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1695 to impose limited sanctions on North Korea. North Korea rejects resolution 45 minutes later.

Aug. 21-Sept. 1, 2006: U.S. and South Korea hold *Ulchi Focus Lens* exercises across the Korean Peninsula.

Aug. 22, 2006: North Korea threatens to quit the armistice that ended the Korean War over the *Ulchi Focus Lens* exercise and considers the exercise an “act of war.”

Aug. 26, 2006: Kim Jong-il is reported by Japan’s *Kyodo News* as having called China and Russia “unreliable,” saying that North Korea should overcome the international standoff over its nuclear and missile programs on its own.

Oct. 3, 2006: North Korea announces that it “will, in the future, conduct a nuclear test.”

Oct. 9, 2006: North Korea conducts first nuclear test near Musadan-ri near Kilchu City in North Hamgyong Province.

Oct. 14, 2006: UN Security Council unanimously passes UNSC Resolution 1718 which allowed for limited military and economic sanctions against the DPRK.

Dec. 18-22, 2006: Second phase of the fifth round of Six-Party Talks convenes. However, no progress is made and the talks adjourn without a date for the next round.

Jan. 8, 2007: Japan’s Prime Minister Abe states that Japan will not tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea.

Jan. 16, 2007: Senior U.S. and North Korean negotiators meet in Berlin to discuss the resumption of the Six-Party Talks.

Jan. 16, 2007: Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization’s (KEDO) board demand North Korea compensate KEDO \$2 billion for the canceled light-water reactor project.

Jan. 16-18, 2007: U.S. and DPRK six-party negotiators meet in Berlin for informal talks.

Feb. 8, 2007: Six-Party Talks resume in Beijing.

Feb. 19, 2007: A high-level Chinese diplomatic mission to North Korea secures a promise from Kim Jung-il that his country will hold no more nuclear tests. China gets the DPRK to commit to a June meeting of Six-Party Talks.

March 9, 2007: Beijing appeals to the international community to lift sanctions and engage North Korea. U.S. says it will not ease financial sanctions until UNSCR 1718 is amended.

March 15, 2007: U.S. and DPRK meet in New York and have side meetings during UN disarmament experts committee meeting on breaking the Six-Party Talks impasse.

Dec. 15, 2007: Former Seoul City Mayor Lee Myung-bak wins the South Korean presidential election. His GNP party takes control of the National Assembly.

Jan. 10, 2008: South Korea halts Mt. Kumgang and Kaesong projects to show that it will demand more reciprocity and responsible behavior from Pyongyang.

Jan. 13, 2008: North Korea asks Beijing to lift sanctions on assets in Chinese financial institutions. Beijing refuses to lift sanctions without prior consultation with other members of the Six-Party Talks.

Jan. 15, 2008: KCNA accuses Beijing and Seoul of selling out to U.S. imperialism.

Feb. 20, 2008: Massive floods hit North Korea. Casualty figures are high but unreliable. There is a surge in the number of North Koreans crossing the border with China and found at sea attempting to flee to South Korea or Japan.

March 7-20, 2008: China mobilizes PLA and civil engineering assets to complete a reinforced wall on the border with the DPRK. This prompts more North Koreans to attempt to flee.

March 23, 2008: Pyongyang demands that Beijing capture and return refugees to North Korea – by force if necessary.

March 30, 2008: U.S. satellites detect equipment and personnel movement to the previous nuclear testing site. South Korean intelligence confirms the movement.

April 1, 2008: *KCNA* says neighboring governments are abusing understandings and may cause unexpected consequences.

Discussion Questions

1. What are your country/institution's key national interests/concerns?
2. What are your short-term and long-term goals?
3. What is your country/institution's immediate response? Next?
4. Who are your key diplomatic partners and targets? How do you reach out to them?
5. How do you use international and regional regimes and activities (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Proliferation Security Initiative, 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and agreements and treaties)?

Suggested Readings

China:

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UNHCR

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Scenario Report 1 – U.S. Group *

During our discussion as special advisors to our Madam President (Lina Alexandra), we agreed that in terms of foreign policy, the United States often has a bipartisan consensus, especially on the North Korean issue. We tried to incorporate the role of Congress into our discussion, but the Alexandra administration had the power to exert its foreign policy and we did not include opinions from Congress (i.e., to resume the Six-Party Talks) into our cost-benefit calculations. Therefore, we decided to represent the perspectives of the administration – the president, who has the final say on U.S. foreign policy. In addition, given the situation in Iraq, we concluded that pressuring North Korea without triggering an all-out war is crucial to the U.S. and our allies.

Based upon this reasoning/assumption, we decided the best policy for the U.S. was first to secure our allies in the Asia-Pacific region, namely Japan and South Korea, and then seek China's cooperation to contain North Korea's ambitions. In our calculation and given the North's record, Kim Jong-il's brinkmanship is a means to an end: provoking the U.S. justifies his rule in North Korea and serves his own political interest. Therefore, articulated diplomacy became our first choice to rein in the North. Given the humanitarian crisis triggered by the North Korea refugees, the U.S. should express its concern and willingness to help. However, since China was deeply concerned about this problem, this issue could help persuade or even force China to take more action and responsibility in dealing with the North. We were aware of the dictum, "speak softly and carry a big stick," so we decided to facilitate the deployment of theater missile defense in Japan and urged it to rethink its policy on nuclear weapons. The rearrangement of our military forces could not only deter North Korea's ambitions, but also demonstrate the U.S. determination to defend its allies.

In the long run, however, North Korea under an authoritarian and opaque regime will continue to be a danger to other countries, and its unverifiable procedures with regard to nuclear proliferation issues worry the world. Therefore, we decided that for the long term, we expect to see regime change in North Korea, and a democratic North Korea will be conducive to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

1. What are your country/institution's key national interests/concerns?

The U.S. key national interests:

- Security of our allies and regions;
- Security of U.S. soil;
- Preventing transfer of nuclear technology;
- Credibility as superpower which has a responsibility to maintain international/regional stability and prosperity;
- Regime change/ promotion of democratic values.

* Group members: Lina A. Alexandra, David H. Saltiel, Elizabeth Mitchell, Raymund Jose G. Quilop, and Yeh-Chung Lu.

2. What are your short-term and long-term goals?

Short-term goals:

- To prevent any transfer of nuclear materials from the Korean Peninsula;
- To create a theater missile defense;
- To prevent a humanitarian crisis from destabilizing the Korean Peninsula – encourage China to take a greater role to stabilize the Korean Peninsula;
- To resume Six-Party Talks (bring North Korea back to the negotiating table).

Long-term goals:

- Regime change in North Korea;
- Denuclearization/ moving all nuclear weapons out of North Korea

3. What is your country/institution's immediate response? Next?

- the second nuclear test will make the U.S. think about Japan's armament with nuclear weapons;
- deploy more military forces to the region;
- draft proposal for United Nations Security Council resolution under chapter 7;
- flood experts to help North Korea deal with flood disaster;
- keep the Grand National Party (GNP) in power in South Korea;
- support China in dealing with refugees problem/ building walls against North Korea.

4. Who are your key diplomatic partners and targets? How do you reach out to them?

- China: dealing with refugees, building walls, resumption of Six-Party Talks;
- South Korea: deal with everything to create stability in Korean Peninsula, political stability, security;
- Japan: create TMD system, restore US-Japan security alliance;
- UNHCR: help North Korean refugees in China;
- UNSC: resolution to halt nuclear proliferation.

5. How do you use international and regional regimes and activities (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Proliferation Security Initiative, 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and agreements and treaties)?

- Proliferation Security Initiative: urge its adoption by other countries;
- Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT): urge North Korea to conform to NPT regulations;
- 1951 Refugee Convention: not an option for U.S.;
- Japan: seek funding support.

Scenario Report 2 – UNHCR Group*

The report is divided into the five sets of questions about the management of the crisis scenario. After each of the questions, the report presents, first, how our group thought the UNHCR would act or react, and second, our discussions process leading to these answers.

1. What are the UNHCR's key concerns?

Answer:

The UNHCR has two key concerns in the crisis:

- seek protection for people fleeing the DPRK;
- provide legal framework on refugee protection so that regional actors will respect the displaced (Article 1 of the International Convention on Refugees).

Group discussion process:

When discussing the UNHCR's key concerns in the crisis, we agreed that it would focus on one issue: refugees and their protection. Thus, we discussed how much and what type of protection should be granted at different stages of the crisis. We agreed that the protection UNHCR designates includes physical protection, temporary housing, fresh water, food, and clothes. Because it falls outside its mandate, whether the DPRK will test another nuclear weapon (and its related consequences) did not concern the UNHCR.

2. What are the UNHCR's short-term, middle-term and long-term goals?

Answer:

- The UNHCR's short-term goal is twofold: a) it wants to ensure that the people fleeing the DPRK do not return there and that all the parties concerned follow in both letter and spirit the principle of *non refoulement* flowing from Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention; and b) it wants to smoothly manage the flows of refugees coming from the DPRK;
- The UNHCR's long-term goal is the resolution of the refugee crisis and reestablishing regional stability.

Group discussion process:

The UNHCR's goals in this crisis would be short-term and that it would focus on refugees and their protection. We agreed that it is crucial to the UNHCR that North Korean refugees not return for two main reasons: first, the refugees could fear persecution from the North Korean state on return (principle of *non-refoulement*); second, neither the UNHCR nor any other organization can get access to North Korea, which would prevent the UNHCR from carrying out its important

* Group members: David Santoro, Yuka Tsukagoshi, Ana Villavicencio, Arun Vishwanathan, and Anna Wetter.

role of monitoring the return of refugees and undertake reintegration activities. There was discussion as to whether to name any country, notably China, in any statements that might be made by the UNHCR. The group, however, agreed that singling out any country might backfire.

3. What is the UNHCR's immediate response? What happens next?

Answer:

In view of its key concerns and its short/middle/long-term goals, the UNHCR intends to manage the crisis by responding in two ways:

- The UNHCR pushes for a resolution to be passed at the UNSC so that people fleeing the DPRK get refugee status;
- The UNHCR organizes a campaign at the grassroots level to raise public awareness about the condition of people fleeing the DPRK and to call on states, international organizations, and NGOs for humanitarian aid.

Group discussion process:

When we discussed what the UNHCR could do to achieve its objectives, we realized that the answer could be summarized in two words, “not much.” While it was with great frustration that we concluded that the UNHCR did not have leverage on regional players to guarantee the protection of refugees, its role should not be dismissed. However inconsequential, the UNHCR would act as the moral voice, denouncing the treatment of people fleeing the DPRK. We also discussed pushing for a resolution at the UNSC, given that its five members are not all directly involved in the crisis. We concluded that we did not have a choice and that we were forced to attempt to do best with what we had.

4. Who are the UNHCR's key diplomatic partners and targets? How does it reach out to them?

Answer:

The UNHCR's key diplomatic partners are:

- The UNHCR urges United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to play a proactive role in resolving the crisis;
- The UNHCR issues statements requesting nations, and the major powers involved in particular, “to show leadership in resolving the crisis.”

Simultaneously, the UNHCR issues statements reminding regional actors (its targets) of their international obligations regarding refugees.

Group discussion:

It seemed to us that Ban Ki-moon, the newly elected UN secretary general, was a key diplomatic partner in the management of the crisis as he is from the ROK, hence our strong appeal to his leadership. With complete acknowledgement (and frustration) that the UNHCR could not do much to solve the crisis, intense discussions took place about the language of point 3(2). We debated whether the UNHCR should appeal to the responsibilities of all “the nations of the world” or simply to those of “the great powers.” We agreed that only appealing to the responsibilities of all “the nations of the world” would not influence states. In other words, it seemed obvious to us that the UNHCR should recognize power realities and craft its policies accordingly. Yet, we decided that the UNHCR would not appeal to “the great powers,” but to “the major powers involved in the crisis” because it seemed that the crisis would be best managed by regional powers (we mentioned Article 53 of the UN Charter according to which the UNSC can mandate a regional organization to act to resolve crises and threats to international peace and security). As the UNHCR is an inclusive, not an exclusive organization, we concluded that it would also appeal to the goodwill of “the nations of the world” despite focusing its appeal on “the major powers involved in the crisis.”

5. How does the UNHCR use international and regional regimes and activities?

Answer:

The UNHCR’s key document of reference is the 1951 International Convention on the Status of Refugees.

Group discussion:

The UNHCR would predominantly use this document. Since we all agreed that the main issue was protecting refugees, the main international tool that should be used by the UNHCR is this convention.

Scenario Report 3 – South Korea Group*

Discussion within the ROK Group

The immediate finding of the ROK group in the simulation was that the domestic constraints inherited by the newly elected president from the Grand National Party (GNP) narrowed the administration's policy options toward the DPRK. First, in regard to the DPRK's demand for resumption of Mt. Kumkang and Kaesong Industrial Complex projects, the new administration in ROK had no option but to reject the DPRK demands. It was the group's assessment that the South Korean public viewed Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun's Sunshine policy as a failure because economic and humanitarian aid did not result in the termination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program but instead exacerbated the crisis. More specifically, the DPRK's nuclear test was a slap in the face for the South Korean people, and sent a clear signal to the Korean public that gestures made by the DPRK must be viewed with skepticism. The group's primary concern was how to prevent a war if possible while maintaining its differences with the Uri Party, and not giving into the DPRK's demands.

Second, the group emphasized the need to have a united voice of five parties – ROK, PRC, the U.S., Russia, and Japan – against one, the DPRK. One of many reasons the former administration was heavily criticized by the U.S. and Japan, was its inability to formulate a united position against the DPRK. Thus, the group recognized the importance of maintaining a united stance against the DPRK. However, the ROK group was skeptical of China's intentions and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's ability to persuade the public to think beyond the abduction issue. Thus, priority was given to maintaining a strong relationship with the United States.

Third, the ROK group determined that restoring the ROK's relationship with the United States is essential for improving its national security. Thus, the ROK group determined that if the newly elected administration fails to formulate a united voice against Pyongyang in the Six-Party Talks, Seoul must at least make sure that Seoul and Washington come to an agreement and present a united position to Pyongyang.

Fourth, the ROK group found itself concerned about U.S. intentions as much as it was concerned of the DPRK's. On the one hand, the new administration in Seoul emphasizes the need to have a stronger relationship with the United States: on the other hand, however, it constantly seeks to avoid conflicts that will negatively affect its economy. There is a high possibility that war may result from a miscalculation of the DPRK regarding U.S. intentions. Therefore, measures will be taken to increase interaction between the ROK and the U.S. leaders to avoid such a contingency. These measures are for the purpose of understanding what aggravates the United States, what would lead Washington to preempt the DPRK, and how to appease Washington while not giving in to the DPRK's demands. The ROK group decided that it is in its interest to maintain hardline policies toward Pyongyang to prove its commitment to the U.S.-ROK alliance but not to launch a joint military exercise that may provoke the DPRK.

* Group members: Junbeom Pyon, Russell Hsiao, Aleksandra Varova, Wakana Mukai

Fifth, the ROK group learned that as it rebuilds the ROK relationship with the U.S., Seoul found Japanese influence in the Six-Party Talks diminishing as Prime Minister Abe's hands were tied by the abduction issue. This resulted in the observation that if the Six-Party Talks fails to come to an agreement, the blame would not be on Seoul but on Tokyo. Having agreed upon this, however, it should also be noted that the DPRK shows no interest in the abduction issue nor Japan as a counterpart for dialogues: hence, it can be said that the deadlock regarding the Six-Party Talks derives directly from the DPRK.

Sixth, the ROK group was concerned about how Japan would react to the DPRK's announcement. Seoul is concerned that politicians in Tokyo will utilize the DPRK issues to fan nationalistic sentiments and argue for the acceleration of Japan's re-militarization. The re-militarization of Japan would create a security crisis in the region, which would raise the possibility of a "chain reaction."

Seventh, the ROK group came to a conclusion that because the new administration in Seoul seeks to maintain hardline policies toward the DPRK but not to provoke Pyongyang any humanitarian crisis that occurs in the DPRK will be handled by the ROK's replacement of hard currencies to the North with humanitarian aid in the form of food and necessities. However, the group also came to a conclusion that the humanitarian crisis should primarily be dealt with by the UNHCR and China.

Finally, the ROK group learned that although the secretary general of the United Nations has no authority to make decisions for the UN Security Council, having a South Korean secretary general gave Seoul psychological relief and the belief that the UN will come to support ROK if there is an outbreak of war and provide necessary humanitarian aid and assistances to the DPRK if ROK's hardline policies result in a serious famine in the North.

ROK Answers to Simulation Questions

Key National Interests

- ROK's top national interest is the survival of the nation.*
- ROK's second national interest is peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula.

Key National Concerns

- Concern over *a possible outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula* is Seoul's primary concern as a second Korean war is certain to destroy its economy and result in millions of deaths.
- *United States intentions and policy of preemption* are a concern to Seoul as Washington's decision to preempt the DPRK will start a war on the peninsula whether the ROK agrees or not.
- *Japanese intentions and reaction to the DPRK's statement*: How is Japan going to react? Will it develop of nuclear weapons? Is Japan going to exacerbate the crisis?

* The ROK group decided to exclude the U.S.-ROK alliance in listing Korea's national interests. The U.S.-ROK alliance is a means to improve ROK's security, not a national objective.

- *Should the ROK be concerned about China? Will China stand with the ROK against the DPRK or will it seek to increase its influence on Pyongyang by providing economic assistance?*
- *Economic concerns regarding refugees may occupy the ROK to some extent.*
- *Impact of the DPRK test on the South Korean economy and consequently its impact on social stability*

What are the ROK's short-term goals?

- The ROK's short-term goal is *to maintain its hardline policies to pressure the DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks with realistic proposals and a readiness to discuss solutions to the Korean crisis.* The key difference of this administration's approach to the North Korean nuclear program is that it seeks ways to prevent a war on the peninsula without appeasing the DPRK. The ROK would assure its allies that it is working with them in tackling this issue.

What are the ROK's long-term goals?

- Nuclear disarmament, especially a "Complete Verifiable Irreversible Dismantlement" of its nuclear weapons is the basis for the future coexistence of the two Koreas. Without solving this issue, the nuclear standoff will continue to cause tensions on the Peninsula. This eventually would threaten the economic development of the ROK.
- ROK's long-term goal is the reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Only after unification of the peninsula is accomplished can the ROK permanently remove the threat from the DPRK and focus on economic prosperity and external affairs.

What is the ROK's immediate response to the DPRK's statement? Next?

- The ROK's immediate response is to alert the military in preparation for unlikely outcomes on the peninsula.
- It then contacts governments in the following order: the DPRK, the United States, China, Russia, and Japan to collect information and have an accurate understanding of each country's position. Once the information is collected and analyzed, a presidential statement would be made to prevent panic and to reassure the investors.

Who are ROK's key diplomatic partners/targets?

- Partners:
The ROK's partners are the United States, Japan, and the United Nations. The ROK reaches out to its partners immediately after determining its own priorities. Contacts will be made through phone calls to Washington, D.C., and Tokyo as well as by contacting ambassadors in Seoul.
- Targets:
The ROK's targets are China and Russia. The ROK seeks to persuade China and Russia to support its stance on the DPRK's nuclear program by emphasizing the need to maintain "peace and stability" in the region. Whether Beijing and Moscow will listen to Seoul is unclear.

International Regimes and Activities

The ROK group found that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and Proliferation Security Initiative were not among its concerns at the moment. The DPRK has already defied the NPT and has stated that the ROK's joining PSI will only exacerbate the Korean crisis.

The ROK has already adopted necessary measures that constrain DPRK's illegal, and weapons development, activities. The newly elected administration in Seoul has prevented all flows of hard currencies to the DPRK by halting the Mt. Kuemgang and Kaesong Industrial Complex projects.

Finally, the ROK plans to utilize the South Korean secretary general of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, to strengthen and reassure international commitments to the security and stability of the Korean Peninsula. These not only include security commitments but also humanitarian commitments such as providing monitored humanitarian assistance to the starving population of North Korea.

Scenario Assessment

To the surprise of the ROK group, the U.S. team decided to send an aircraft carrier to the Korean Peninsula without prior consultation with Seoul. In their perspective, ROK did not play a significant role in solving the DPRK's nuclear development program. Furthermore, the U.S. team believed that the key in solving the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula was China, not the ROK. Thus, the ROK group concluded that the U.S. group's decision to make a unilateral move against the DPRK and to rely on China would seriously undermine the U.S.-ROK alliance.

Moreover, there were contradictions in the policy of the United States toward the DPRK. In spite of their clear intentions to exercise influence on the Peninsula and to take a lead in solving the nuclear issue, Washington did not show signs of doing so. Whether it is due to internal conflict of interests inside the group or hidden intentions remains unclear.

The ROK group found China's position in the North Korea unhelpful. If China was genuine about its commitment to the Six-Party Talks it should exercise flexibility in its handling of North Korean refugees.

In short, the scenario demonstrated that each actor was suspicious and skeptical toward each other rather than focusing its full attention on the DPRK. Although a common security interest, the DPRK, exists, none of the actors were openly relying on each other. This shows that strong ties between the five parties (excluding the UNHCR regarding the Six-Party Talks) are fundamentally difficult to achieve.

Finally, no party showed its commitment to handle the DPRK refugee problem. China blocked access to the country through construction of the concrete wall, the ROK took its hands off the issue, and UNHCR was also reluctant to take responsibility for North Korean people. Hopefully, parties will put their efforts to jointly resolve this issue if we don't want to let them die.

Scenario Report 4 – North Korea Group*

The North Korea Group played the game as North Korean elites and appointed Justin Hastings to be the Dear Leader. The decision was made early in the game to play as rationally as possible though several of the North Korean responses seem to be far-fetched such as asking for inclusion in the Proliferation Security Initiative and reaching out to Venezuela, Cuba, and Vietnam. But as real world event has shown, North Korea will do what is in the best interest of Kim Jong-il.

1. What are your country's key national interests/concerns?

Key interest: Regime survival

All of our interests in this scenario emerge from our concern for the survival of the current regime. To survive, we must avoid the following: 1) an invasion by the United States; 2) restrictions on our ability to conduct both legal and illegal activities, and; 3) the flight of a critical mass of North Korean citizens from the country.

Rationale: An invasion by the United States would eventually lead to the downfall of the regime. We could use our military forces to inflict considerable damage to U.S. and South Korean forces, and perhaps deal a psychological blow by laying siege to Seoul with artillery shells, but ultimately we do not have the resources to outlast a U.S. attack.

Sanctions and financial restrictions threaten our ability to maintain regime security because we can no longer provide our internal allies with incentives that ensure their loyalty.

Finally, since the regime can only exercise power if it has a citizenry to control, we cannot allow a critical mass of refugees to leave the country. We are not concerned with limited refugee flight, but we cannot allow such flight to reach a tipping point that threatens regime stability.

2. What are your short-term and long-term goals?

Short-term goal: Lifting of sanctions and receipt of aid

Our immediate goals include: 1) limiting the flow of refugees from North Korea; 2) soliciting humanitarian assistance from our neighbors to alleviate the suffering of our citizens; 3) recovering financial damage for the closure of Kaesong and Mt. Kumgang operations; 4) receiving food and energy assistance from South Korea, and; 5) receiving medical aid from Cuba, oil supplies from Venezuela, and rice from Vietnam.

Rationale: Limiting refugee flows and receiving humanitarian assistance are important for maintaining regime stability. We do not have the resources to provide basic necessities to our citizens in the aftermath of the floods, so we will call upon the compassion of our neighbors – both friendly and hostile – to help alleviate the peoples' suffering. The more we can provide for

* Group members: Tim Cook, Justin Hastings, Sun Namkung, and Ta Minh Tuan.

the well-being of the North Korean people, the less likely they are to leave the country and erode regime control. The same logic holds for asking South Korea for food and energy assistance, but we single out South Korea because it has in the past been more willing than other countries to provide humanitarian aid to its North Korean brothers and sisters.

The closure of the Kaesong and Mt. Kumgang operations severely curtail our ability to lavish luxuries on our internal partners to ensure their loyalty to the regime. It is unacceptable for the hostile U.S. puppet regime in Seoul to arbitrarily cut off a legitimate source of funding, particularly since the South Koreans (and the Chinese) would like to see further economic reforms in North Korea.

Although we continue to follow the *juche* philosophy, our desire to receive assistance from Cuba, Venezuela, and Vietnam is an attempt to make our current isolation less acute. China can no longer be counted upon as a partner in these negotiations as demonstrated by its unwillingness to help lift financial sanctions without the approval of all the parties to the Six-Party Talks. South Korea's new government has adopted hardline positions and the United States and Japan have always been hostile. We do not expect Cuba, Venezuela, and Vietnam to become negotiating partners, but they can provide needed resources. Cuba and Venezuela may advocate on our behalf, but Vietnam is more likely to assist based on its policy of maintaining good relationships with old friends (it does not want to create a confrontation with the United States and other countries).

Long-term goal: Regime survival

Our long-term goal is the survival of North Korea, with the following sub-goals contributing to this vision: 1) maintenance of a nuclear deterrent; 2) no reunification with South Korea on South Korea's terms; 3) improved energy infrastructure and energy output, and; 4) moderate expansion of special economic projects such as Kaesong and Mt. Kumgang.

Rationale: Our over-arching long-term goal is the survival of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, specifically the regime of Kim Jong-il. The most important contributing factor to this goal is the maintenance of a credible deterrent capability that ensures North Korea's security. Because our economy is a shambles, it is difficult to modernize and maintain our military hardware. Possession of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles that can reach enemy territory is the most simple and cost effective deterrent. We will not disarm.

We do not oppose the idea of one Korea on the Korean Peninsula, but we refuse to acquiesce to a reunification on South Korea's terms. As long as the government in Seoul remains an American puppet and maintains hostile policies, reunification will not be a consideration.

In the long-term, it is imperative that the sanctions be lifted so that we can generate hard currency to support the regime and its partners, as well as to make infrastructure improvements. We need to develop an energy grid that will allow for greater capacity and production at our factories, which will in turn generate currency for the regime and its people. The Kaesong and Mt. Kumgang ventures are good models for future economic activities. An improved economy

will ensure the continued loyalty of the regime's allies and will provide less incentive for a critical mass of citizens to flee the country.

3. What are your country's immediate responses? Next?

Responses: Our first response to is to work toward stopping the refugee flows and securing humanitarian aid from our neighbors and friends. Once these issues have been addressed, we will demand that South Korea pay damages for the closure of Kaesong and Mt. Kumgang, as well as reiterate our demand to end all sanctions. As a final act, we will conduct a second nuclear test.

Rationale: While a U.S. attack is cause for concern, the most immediate threat to regime stability is a massive flow of refugees out of the country. We will ask our neighbors to return any refugees that enter their territories, although we will not pursue the matter beyond verbal urgings. Allowing North Koreans to leave the country relieves a considerable burden on our resources. At the same time, to avoid a tipping point we will need a significant infusion of foreign aid to prevent massive flight. We will impress upon China, South Korea, Russia, and Japan that the refugee problems in their countries are not nearly as bad as they might be if they don't send assistance. Furthermore, although we will verbally oppose China's wall because it is causing refugees to flee before it is completed, we are secretly hoping they move quickly to finish it so that it is more difficult for people to leave.

After we stem the refugee flow and secure aid, we will demand damages from South Korea for closure of the Kaesong and Mt. Kumgang ventures. These are examples of legitimate commerce that help us conduct licit and illicit activities that support the regime and its domestic partners. In addition, we will reiterate our call for an end to financial sanctions since these are also limiting our ability to raise funds to support the regime. We realize it is unlikely – given recent developments – that any of these financial demands will be met. However, by raising the issues, it may be easier for the other parties to be flexible on humanitarian assistance, which will alleviate our concerns over refugee flight and the potential for regime instability.

As a final act, we will test a second nuclear device. We will do this after China has finished the wall along our northern border and after the other parties to the Six-Party Talks refuse to pay damages and lift sanctions (it would be a surprising – yet welcome – development if any of our financial demands to be met). We calculate that a second test will not trigger an immediate external military response because the United States will not take action without the support or understanding of all parties in the region. Furthermore, subsequent sanctions would have minimal impact since we are already quite isolated.

4. Who are your key diplomatic partners and targets? How do you reach out to them?

Key partners: Cuba, Venezuela, and Vietnam

These partners have specific expertise and resources that we can call upon to help alleviate the humanitarian suffering, which will hopefully stem the flow of refugees. Increased interaction with these states will also lessen our isolation. We will send an envoy to their capitals.

Key targets: China, Russia, South Korea

These countries will absorb the brunt of the refugees and are in the best position to provide meaningful humanitarian assistance. Because none of them want to deal with the burdens that a wave of refugees would impose we will seek to convince them that they should provide aid so that we can handle the problem internally. We will not ask much else from any of them because they have all proven to be unreliable partners. China can be blamed for much of the current crisis for its refusal to block financial sanctions and for its inability to stand up to American imperialism. We therefore believe that China is only useful in helping to solve the humanitarian issue through aid and by completing the wall. To reach out to these targets, we will send envoys to their diplomatic representatives at the United Nations, as well as send envoys to their capitals.

Japan's new leadership makes it difficult to look to Japan for assistance. While we will try to solicit humanitarian aid from their representatives at the UN using the same logic we will use with China, Russia, and South Korea, we do not believe such engagement will bear fruit.

As for the United States, we no longer feel that bilateral talks are necessary. We will continue to call publicly for talks, as well as for a security guarantee, but we believe sincere engagement with the Bush administration is not possible. Perhaps a more reasonable person will win the November presidential election.

5. How do you use international and regional regimes and activities?

There are few international and regional regimes or activities that would be useful in the current situation. Besides using our representatives at the UN to reach out to our partners and target countries, we will announce that we would like to join the Proliferation Security Initiative. Announcing this intention should demonstrate to states in the region, and the United States in particular, that we are serious about preventing the spread of nuclear weapons materials and technologies to terrorists. We have not spread any such materials to other state and nonstate actors during the period since our first test, which is evidence of the responsible manner with which we ensure the safety and security of our nuclear program. The United States will probably decline our offer, which will prove that the PSI is specifically aimed at North Korea.

Scenario Report 5 – China Group*

- I. Key national interests:
 - A. Maintaining the integrity of our sovereignty
 - B. Peace and Stability in region
 - C. Nonproliferation in region
 - D. Preventing further militarization of Japan as reaction to DPRK behavior
 - E. Minimizing refugee crisis
 - F. Not losing any more face because of North Korea
 - G. Preventing second North Korea nuclear test

- II. Short-term and long-term goals
 - A. Short-term
 - 1. Minimizing refugees – effective management of border
 - 2. Maintain or regain diplomatic control of Six-Party Talks
 - 3. Preventing second North Korea nuclear test
 - 4. Managing bilateral relations with North Korea

 - B. Long-term
 - 1. Nonproliferation in region – preventing nuclear cascade in Japan, South Korea, and Japan
 - 2. Keeping U.S. forces out of North Korea
 - 3. Gradual reform/transition of North Korean regime
 - 4. Protecting Chinese territory Changbai Shan 长白山

- III. Immediate response
 - A. Issue public statement opposing any use of force to resolve conflict
 - B. Send additional envoy to Pyongyang to talk
 - C. Finish wall along border with North Korea and talk to Russian government about accepting some refugees
 - D. If North Korea does not clear testing site or return to Six-Party Talks, then cut off fuel supply for one or two days

- IV. Key diplomatic partners and targets? How do we reach out to them?
 - A. DPRK – send envoy
 - B. U.S. – discourage them from taking rash action – garner support for restarting Six-Party Talks
 - C. ROK – garner support for restarting Six-Party Talks
 - D. UNHCR – enter negotiations about setting up refugee camps on border – admit as few as possible, allow UNHCR to share burden of supporting them until we can send them to Russia or ROK
 - E. RUSSIA – request that they take DPRK refugees
 - F. JAPAN – seek aid for support of refugees (temporarily, until removed from PRC)

* Group members are Jennifer Bulkeley, Ma Li, Ingrid Lombardo, James Stratford, and Qinghong Wang

- V. Strategy for using institutions and regimes:
 - A. SIX-PARTY TALKS, SIX-PARTY TALKS, SIX-PARTY TALKS
 - B. Possible attention or coordinated international response through UNSC

Issues to consider

Leadership Role: China is NOT responsible for the DPRK regime and does not have a lot of influence over Pyongyang; China is an important player in region but does not want to be a leader in the region (firm commitment to principles of nonintervention and state sovereignty)

Refugee Management: How much access to allow UNHCR? Will we send refugees back? Will we grant them refugee status? (We don't want them in China, don't want to build camps right away or else we just encourage additional people to flee DPRK.)

Talks with DPRK: How valuable is the PRC/DPRK relationship at this point? Should we even bother, or just let events play out on their own? Do we make a public statement or ultimatum? Given the intensity of the crisis, is it worthwhile for China to expend additional political capital? What kind of carrots could we offer? Do we cut off additional humanitarian aid if crisis continues?

- Interests: Do we really care about a second test?
- Contingencies: What if the U.S. launches a preventive strike on the test site?

Discussion

- Nobody cares about refugees (see them only as pawns or problems), very hard for UNHCR to get anyone to acknowledge/accept refugees
- Small role for UNSC
- U.S. may not want to cede leadership (even symbolically) to China
- U.S. Army and Marines are bogged down in Iraq but Air Force and Navy have been largely unaffected, U.S. military COULD take action against DPRK
- Nonproliferation sank down list of priorities; it is what initiated the crisis, but proliferation concerns were not the top priority when we started to negotiate the exercise
- Is anyone really concerned about DPRK's response, or are we all just playing with each other?
- What SHOULD U.S. or China do to resolve this question?

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