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
Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies, RCHSS, Academia Sinica

# PACIFIC FORUM CSIS YOUNG LEADERS IN TAIWAN

CO-ORGANIZED BY  
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## Pacific Forum CSIS

Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS ([www.pacforum.org](http://www.pacforum.org)) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate arenas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

## The Young Leaders Program

The Young Leaders Program invites young professionals and graduate students to join Pacific Forum policy dialogues and conferences. The program fosters education in the practical aspects of policy-making, generates an exchange of views between young and seasoned professionals, promotes interaction among younger professionals, and enriches dialogues with generational perspectives for all attendees. Fellows must have a strong background in the area covered by the conference they are attending and an endorsement from respected experts in their field. Supplemental programs in conference host cities and mentoring sessions with senior officials and specialists add to the Young Leader experience. The Young Leaders Program is currently supported by Chevron, the Freeman Foundation, the Luce Foundation, and the Yuchengco Group, with a growing number of universities, institutes, and organizations also helping to sponsor individual participants. For more details, see the Pacific Forum CSIS website, [www.pacforum.org](http://www.pacforum.org), or contact Brad Glosserman, director of the Young Leaders Program, at [bradgpf@hawaii.rr.com](mailto:bradgpf@hawaii.rr.com).

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## Acknowledgements

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The views expressed here represent personal impressions and reflections of the Young Leaders program participants; they do not necessarily represent the views of their governments, or the co-sponsoring or parent organizations and institutes.



## Foreword

The Pacific Forum CSIS promotes policy research and dialogue in the Asia Pacific region to stimulate cooperation on political, economic, and security issues. We regularly host conferences and seminars throughout the United States and Asia to explore contentious issues, share ideas, and build networks of individuals and institutions that can influence regional policy-makers.

A common theme has emerged in our discussions: the impact of generational change. The post-World War II/Korean War and colonial-era generations are being replaced by more nationalistic, less patient societies. These groups see the world and their place in it quite differently from their predecessors. They are more focused on the future and less captured or controlled by the past. Yet as we look around our conference tables, we have been confronted by a troubling fact: while a great deal of time is spent analyzing the new generation, few of its members are present at such gatherings.

To help remedy this situation, the Pacific Forum CSIS founded the Young Leaders fellowship program in 2004, with the support of grants from the Freeman Foundation and the Hawaii-based Strong Foundation, plus in-kind support from the CNA Corporation's Center for Strategic Studies. Since then several other institutes, organizations, and individuals have added their critical support as well; we thank them all.

In October 2005, the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy provided the Young Leaders Program with a grant and co-hosted the Young Leaders in Taiwan for the first time. During their trip, young leaders not only attended the Asia-Pacific Security Forum but they also had two days of meetings with officials and organizations in Taipei. The program was so rewarding that it became a model for all future Young Leader programs. Since Taiwan 2005, Young Leaders have attended similar programs all over East Asia and the U.S., including the 2007 Young Leaders Program in Taiwan.

We hope the Young Leaders program will continue to provide an extraordinary opportunity for networking and training for young professionals from the U.S. and Asia who would otherwise have only limited opportunities to be involved in senior-level policy research and debate. We believe this program provides unique benefits and opportunities not only to the upcoming generation, but to the deliberations of their senior colleagues as well. The high-quality thought and analysis contained in this volume's papers attest to the contribution that the next generation can make to the international security debate when given the opportunity.

Ralph A. Cossa  
President, Pacific Forum CSIS





# Young Leaders in Taiwan

## Project Report

By Jiyon Shin

Young Leaders from all over the world – Ecuador, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, the United States – with diverse backgrounds (from the media, academia, government, and nonprofit organization) participated in a five-day program hosted by the Pacific Forum CSIS as part of the Asia Pacific Security Forum. The program included visits to and briefings from the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD), National Chengchi University's Institute for International Relations (IIR), the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Legislative Yuan, the Mainland Affairs Council, and the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party). Before and after attending the Asia Pacific Security Forum on "Economic Security in the Asia-Pacific," Young Leaders had their own roundtable to summarize the meetings and briefings. YLs had two assignments: one pre-conference assignment that required an essay on our country relations with Taiwan, and a post-conference group assignment on suggestions for Taiwan to engage the world.<sup>1</sup>

The program began with a visit to the **Taiwan Foundation for Democracy**, the cosponsoring organization. Vice President Yang Maysing provided a comprehensive and passionate overview of Taiwan's democratic identity and TFD's history, mission, and activities. We had a frank discussion on what Taiwan's democratic experience means to China, how TFD contributes to raising awareness of Taiwan worldwide, and China's growing power and its impact on Taiwan's status in the world. Yang's comments underscored the strong Taiwanese support for Taiwan's bid for UN membership and the powerful national sentiment in Taiwan.



< Yang Maysing, Vice President of TFD, Vice Minister, Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission >

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<sup>1</sup> See Appendix 6 for the assignments.

The second stop took YLs to the **Institute of International Relations of National Chengchi University**, where they were briefed on Taiwan's referendum on constitutional changes, UN membership, and Taiwan's geo-political strategy and its limitations. There was an emphasis on the need to use China's economic power to gain leverage in the world market. Speakers also discussed the Chen Shui-bian government's outspoken stance on Taiwanese independence and national identity and its implications for foreign relations. A rich discussion followed, with concerns raised about the impact of the government's strategy on Taiwan's half-century alliance with the United States. Taiwan's bid for UN membership was another focus of discussion. It was clear that Taiwan faces real foreign policy challenges as it seeks to balance national sentiment, pride for its achievements, and frustrations with the lack of recognition. China's looming presence is a reality with which Taipei must deal.



<National Chengchi University IIR>

Next, Young Leaders visited the **Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) headquarters**. Dr. Lai I-Chung, director for international and China affairs, gave a presentation on DPP policy ahead of the 2008 presidential election. He emphasized changing conceptions of national identity in Taiwan and highlighted policies that demonstrated this emphasis, such as changing the name of the Chang Kai-shek memorial to the “democracy memorial,” changing the historical term “Sino-Japanese war” to “Pacific War,” the UN bid, constitutional change, and provided considerable data on Taiwanese support for such policies. He also voiced concern about tension created by cross-Strait trade dependency. Solutions such as diverting economic relations to countries other than China were suggested.



<DPP briefing>

Young Leaders were then briefed at the **Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)**. Assistant Director-General of the Department of North American Affairs at MOFA, Vincent C. H. Yao explained Taiwan's diplomatic status. Here, discussion topics included U.S. relations with Taiwan, arms sales, the tension in the U.S.-China-Taiwan trilateral relationship, and attempts to gain greater recognition and international breathing space<sup>2</sup>.



<MOFA briefing>

After the MOFA briefing, Young Leaders visited the **Legislative Yuan** for a tour. This was followed by a briefing at the headquarters of the KMT (Nationalist Party), the largest opposition party. Legislator Dr. Su Chi (legislator without constituency) explained KMT policies with regard to Taiwan's economic and political situation. He argued the DPP's identity politics is destabilizing Taiwan. Anticipating the KMT strategy in the January parliamentary elections, he

<sup>2</sup> To encourage a frank and lively discussion, Pacific Forum CSIS conferences and discussions are 'off-the-record.'

also stressed economic development in Taiwan. Later, YLs met with **China Mainland Affairs Council** Vice Chairman, Dr. Tung Chen-yuan (童振源).

The next day the YLs attended the **Conference on “Economic Security in the Asia-Pacific.”** The conference focused on cross-Strait relations, U.S.-China relations in political, economic, security, energy and environment-related dimensions, China’s rising momentum, and how the world views its rise, and included scholars and opinion makers from Asian countries, the United States, and Europe.

Discussion at the **YL wrap-up roundtable** after the Asia Pacific Security Forum was lively. Most YLs empathized with Taiwan’s situation, and showed concern about Taiwan’s foreign policy challenges. Some YLs believed the next Taiwanese government should focus more on improving relations with the U.S. and with China, and try to make the Taiwanese market more attractive for foreign investment. The Taiwan government was urged to act as a responsible stakeholder by increasing its defense budget, and to carry out its promise to purchase the arms package offered by the Bush government. YLs debated whether national sentiment for independence originated from the top, or if it was a reflection of general Taiwanese feelings and aspirations. Also, the YLs emphasized the importance of a more convenient transportation between Taiwan and China. Many regretted that the Chinese YLs who were supposed to participate in the program could not make it because their visas were not provided. At the end of the roundtable discussion, YLs were tasked with providing suggestions for Taiwan to engage the world multi-dimensionally – through economics, environment, security, health and human rights.

# Letter to the Next President of Taiwan on the Economy

By Shirley Flores and Ting Ming Hwa

01 October 2007

**HIS EXCELLENCY ---**

President

Republic of China (ROC)

Your Excellency:

We, members of the Pacific Forum-CSIS Young Leaders, write to you as the highest authority in your country, to give our recommendations on how the ROC can sustain the competitiveness of its economy and meet the new and daunting challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Undoubtedly, Taiwan's economy has been among the most dynamic in Asia. In the region, it is seen as a model for developing countries that are aspiring to rise from poverty and move toward economic prosperity through the twin approaches of democracy and openness. Yours is an economy that has withstood numerous challenges in the past – destruction from World War II and the Japanese occupation; the agricultural crisis that ensued afterward; the energy crises of the 1970s; political and social transformations in the late '80s; and most importantly, the Asian financial crisis that crippled most regional economies while yours emerged unscathed.

We laud these economic successes. As Asia takes advantage of opportunities of the 21<sup>st</sup> century to advance our economic interests in an increasingly global and competitive world, we believe the ROC has a crucial role to play. In an era where working together produces greater results than going alone, Asia needs Taiwan, its economic practices and experiences, to move the region forward.

It is therefore imperative for your government to stay focused on maintaining a robust economy, given new challenges and opportunities. We believe it is in the interest of your country that your government not stray from the goals you have set for your economy despite preoccupation on the issues of independence and identity.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

1. *Boost economic ties with mainland China, with or without a free trade arrangement (FTA) or comprehensive economic partnership (CEP) agreements.*

China's emergence as an economic giant is a reality. Economies, big and small, are scrambling to take advantage of the huge Chinese market for their products and services, as well as to win the investments that China has to offer. Despite the issues of independence and identity hounding the two territories, economic ties have been forged, albeit not as aggressively as they could be. To deny that China will continue to rise is counterproductive. We urge you to maximize and forge an even closer economic relationship with the mainland, for your economy to remain competitive and not be left behind by other emerging economies in the region. The absence of an FTA or CEP is not and should not be a hindrance. Two-way trade and investments can be boosted through other means, *sans* formal economic arrangements. Direct investments from China, which are expected to create jobs, can help address Taiwan's current unemployment problem.

2. *Pursue FTAs with countries that do recognize the ROC*

Taiwan's international status means that it does not have the full range of diplomatic and political options that are available to other states. Therefore, it is difficult for Taiwan to formalize trading relations with other states. Apart from the potential economic benefits FTAs have to offer, it is imperative that Taiwan seek them to increase its international exposure and space. It may be a good idea then for the ROC to sign FTAs with as many countries, or at least with those that diplomatically recognize it. It has already signed an FTA with Panama in 2003, although two-way trade between the two is minimal. The FTA is beneficial for Taiwan in two ways:

First, it increases Taiwan's legitimacy and visibility in the international society, distances itself from the pariah image, and presents itself as a normal country. Second, the FTAs Taiwan concludes are expected to have provisions and clauses that are unique to each country. The more FTAs Taiwan inks with its partners, the more examples of functional FTAs Taiwan will have when it tries to initiate similar arrangements with non-diplomatic allies.

3. *Maintain strong economic relationship with the U.S. and traditional markets but boost those with Asian countries.*

The United States remains Taiwan's second largest trading partner. However, Taiwan has substantially reduced its share of exports to the U.S. and has diversified true to include China and other Asian countries. This makes sense given the weakness of the U.S. economy. Taiwan also realizes the potential of other markets in Asia, particularly in Southeast Asia. To date, the ROC and its businesses are major investors in [Thailand](#), [Indonesia](#), the [Philippines](#), and [Malaysia](#). Since 1991, Taiwanese investment in the mainland has been increasing. Despite the advantages afforded by the Chinese market, it is in Taiwan's interest to head not only to the West, but to the South as well. Doing so reduces potential economic and political volatilities for Taiwan.

Furthermore, through these bilateral economic links, Taiwan does not isolate itself despite its lack of inclusion in regional or multilateral free trade mechanisms.

*4. Increase active participation in international economic organizations.*

Taiwan is a member of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). These are arguably the most important economic organizations in the Asia-Pacific region. Due to Chinese opposition, Taiwan is unable to be involved in various groupings under the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Plus Three, and the East Asia Summit. Your country should endeavor to play, or be seen to play, a more pronounced role in the economic groupings where it is a member. Focus on fulfilling current commitments and responsibilities, and then to exceed them, lends credence to the ROC's push to join other international organizations.

Taiwan may also be involved in the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) which aims to create a framework of bilateral currency swap arrangements in the Asian region to avert another financial crisis. This was proposed by former ASEAN Secretary General Rodolfo Severino during the Asia-Pacific Security Forum in Taiwan; the CMI is a purely financial undertaking whose success will largely depend on the number of countries or territories participation. Taiwan should not be excluded, most especially since it was the only territory in Asia that was able to weather the Asian contagion in 2007.

*5. Strive to separate economic from political agenda.*

In all these undertakings, separating the economic from the political will be a big challenge. We believe, however, that political ends may be pursued without putting a strain on the economy, without harming existing relationships with partners.

Your Excellency,

When your people made the difficult but necessary decision to pull the country out of its economic doldrums more than 50 years ago, there was no turning back. This momentum must be sustained. This can only be done if Taiwan fully embraces new challenges and opportunities and responds to these through new and creative ways, fully cognizant that this is the best way to move the economy forward.

Sincerely,

Ms. Shirley FLORES (Philippines)

Mr. TING Ming Hwa (Singapore)





# **Environmental Policy Recommendations for Taiwan's Next President**

By Ana Villavicencio, Dewardric L. McNeal,  
Jiyon Shin, and Shafiah Muhibat

Taipei and other major cities in Taiwan appear much cleaner than major cities of mainland China. As a result of lessons learned over the last 25 years, these cities could serve as an environmental model, particularly for Beijing and Shanghai. However, the next Taiwan administration must continue to consolidate the environmental gains that Taiwan has made and focus on this issue.

Taiwan's rapid industrialization has left the island with numerous problems: waste and water pollution, untreated sewage, air pollution, contamination of drinking water supplies, high levels of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, and nuclear waste are a few of Taiwan's environmental problems. Taiwan needs space internationally to tackle its domestic environmental concerns and help contribute to global environmental concerns. This not only will benefit Taiwan but also its neighbors in the Asia Pacific. Local environmental issues have become global concerns; sustainable development should be adopted not only as a domestic policy but also as a regional and international issue. This issue can provide Taiwan with opportunities to cooperate and collaborate with the international community.

## **Issues and Challenges**

1. Domestic. Transnational/regional issues: China's impact on Taiwan and the region.  
China poses great environmental threats to Taiwan and other nations. Sand storms and rain hurt the region, overuse of the Xinjian River causes problems downstream and Chinese demand for timber resources has caused deforestation.
2. Domestic environmental challenges: move toward a sustainable future.
  - a. Natural resources conservation-environmental protection.
    - i. Lack of efficiency- EPA is not a single governmental unit administering environment-related affairs. Its responsibilities are distributed among several central government departments and agencies, such as the Ministry of the Interior (National Park services and land use), the Council of Agriculture (forest, natural conservation and wildlife protection), and the Atomic Energy Council (nuclear power and radiation). EPA has been starved of personnel, resources, and judicial remedies necessary for effective enforcement.
    - ii. Legislative Yuan inefficiency and the impasse over many issues related to the national constitution and national identity has resulted in over 50 important environment-related laws and regulations languishing.

3. Lack of international voice and participation in international environmental issues.  
Taiwan's participation and involvement in global efforts for environmental protection have been restricted. Taiwan is often absent from international forums where these issues are discussed. Moreover, Taiwan also suffers from lack of communication with China, the biggest polluter in the region.

## **Recommendations**

How can Taiwan play a role internationally and promote sustainable development?

1. Taiwan should become an environmental model to gain an international voice. Taiwan can be an example just as it has been with its economic development and establishment of democracy. To do so, Taiwan needs to:
  - a. Prepare a written declaration of the governments' commitment to help make Taiwan an environmental model by promoting stronger environmental policies.
  - b. Strengthen its environmental laws to reach and preferably exceed international environmental standards. This includes elevating the EPA to a Cabinet-level position, as the Ministry of Environment, in order to improve the integration of environmental policy and the enforcement of environmental legislation.
  - c. Develop alternative sources of energy to achieve energy security.
  - d. Promote protection of natural resources to secure sustainable development. This will include the promotion of water conservation and water remediation, an important environmental concern for the island's future.
2. Engage China. Taiwan should try to work with China to control air pollution (as a start), and share knowledge of sustainable practices with China.
  - a. Taiwan could invest in China and other nations to develop and deploy new energy technologies.
  - b. Taiwan EPA could establish contact and exchange information with China's State Environmental Protection Administration to encourage dialogue and cooperative environmental threats from China.
  - c. Tax incentives for Taiwanese companies that follow international environmental standards when operating in China.
3. Participate Internationally by:
  - a. Sharing knowledge and technology supporting sustainable practices and natural resource conservation with the rest of the world.

- b. Giving aid to developing countries by implementing projects with local organizations that are environmentally conscious.
- c. Raising Taiwan's environmental awareness (both environment-related problems and achievements) through international organizations and grassroots organizations.
  - i. TEAN-Taiwan Environmental Action Network: TEAN works to combat Taiwan's environmental problems through international exchange and advocacy.
  - ii. Increase participation in ADB as it is one of the few international organizations where Taiwan has some power-ADB has many regional initiatives that promote environmental protection and sustainable development.



# The Future of Taiwan's Security: Policy Recommendations for Taiwan's Next President

By Leif-Eric Easley, Aki Mori,  
A. Greer Pritchett, and Alan Hao Yang

Taiwan's strategic importance for the Asia Pacific region, specifically, and for international security, more broadly, has not diminished. Taiwan's pivotal location astride Asia-Pacific sea lanes manifests its geopolitical and geo-economic significance, but its undetermined international status challenges the strategic calculus of global and regional powers. Identifying key strategic issues and challenges and formulating a robust, effective, and globally minded security policy is imperative for the next Taiwan president.

## Issues and Challenges

Taiwan faces an increasing military imbalance across the Taiwan Strait, serious diplomatic constraints imposed by the international community, and strained relations with the United States rooted in deepening cleavages in Taiwan domestic politics.

### *Cross-Strait military balance is rapidly tilting toward the mainland*

In contrast with China's growing military spending, Taiwan's defense budget has decreased in absolute terms from 1993 to 2006. Even when Taiwan's central governmental budget increased, the defense budget decreased from 24.1 percent of the government's budget in 1993 to 18.7 percent in 2006.<sup>3</sup> On the other side of the strait, China has pursued a comprehensive transformation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to "one capable of fighting and winning short-duration, high intensity conflicts against high-tech adversaries."<sup>4</sup> China continues to add missiles (the current estimate is nearly 1,000) targeted at Taiwan.

This growing imbalance challenges the *status quo* while Taiwan's decreasing ability to defend itself makes the island increasingly susceptible to military coercion.

### *Taiwan is losing ground to Beijing in the diplomatic race*

As China's economic and diplomatic leverage grows in magnitude and sophistication, Taiwan faces an uphill, Sisyphus-like struggle to win international space and recognition. It is excluded from many international governmental organizations, often due to Chinese pressure, and from the current East Asian integration process, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Community, the ASEAN+3 framework, as well as the East Asia Summit. Beijing's policy of being a "good neighbor" empowers China's leading role and further limits Taiwan's opportunities for international participation.

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<sup>3</sup> The Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS) of Executive Yuan, <http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=3374&CtNode=1690>. (Accessed 2007/9/27)

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/070523-China-Military-Power-final.pdf>. (Accessed on 2007/9/10)

*Attempts to secure international space are diminishing Taiwan's image.*

Leaders in Taiwan's government have politicized the pursuit of international visibility as the *raison d'être* of regime legitimacy. Since 2000, President Chen Shui-bian's statements concerning Taiwan independence have evoked a negative backlash and have induced an international perception of Taiwan as a "trouble-maker," challenging the status quo and hence stability across the Taiwan Strait.

*U.S.-Taiwan relations are strained due to inadequate consultation and coordination.*

The suspension or delay of arms sales hinders constructive U.S.-Taiwan relations. Prolonged arms package budget debates in Taipei have given the appearance of Taiwan free-riding on the United States instead of striving to provide for reasonable self-sufficiency on defense. Perhaps more damaging is the diplomatic record of Taiwan's government, which has caused international friends and allies to feel that Taiwan has reneged on diplomatic commitments and is not sufficiently considering others' national interests. More than a lack of communication, this situation results from insufficient priority placed on coordination.

## **Recommendations**

*Defense is not futile*

It is imperative to ***fund adequate military procurement for Taiwan's defense***. If necessary, renegotiation on specific points may take place, but the package should be passed early in the presidential term, which will require close consultation with the Legislative Yuan.

Taiwan should ***increase defense consultations with the United States*** not only between the executive branches, but between the legislatures and militaries as well.

***Increase defense spending while focusing on areas of comparative advantage.*** This includes avoiding symbolic or overly provocative military procurement that would antagonize China without significantly improving Taiwan's security such as the acquisition of purely offensive weapons. Taiwan must also ***improve defenses against nontraditional attacks*** such as cyberwarfare, psychological operations and covert biological agents.

*Choose diplomatic battles wisely*

***Taiwan's attention and limited resources should be focused on attainable goals that could increase its international space*** in strategic, pragmatic ways. Examples include increasing trade arrangements and trying to obtain non-state and observer status in international organizations. Taiwan should not place all of its eggs in the proverbial UN basket.

In addition to solidifying more bilateral relationships, ***Taiwan needs to contribute more fully to the international organizations in which it is already a member***. Taiwan could establish a special zone to host international nongovernmental organization (NGOs),

encouraging NGOs through financial incentives to maintain their regional headquarters in Taiwan. Such efforts can improve Taiwan's access to visibility in the international community.

***Increase the volume and recognition of Taiwan's counter-terrorism cooperation, reconstruction, and development assistance.*** For example, Taiwan could better market its current practices on international obligations such as the APEC STAR initiative at Taiwan's main ports.

***Deepen informal ties with ASEAN nations,*** including expanded engagement on nontraditional security issues and enhanced capacity-building opportunities. This would allow Taiwan to have an active participatory role in this highly critical region without inviting China's criticism of Southeast Asian partners.

Self-recognition of Taiwan's crucial geopolitical importance and efforts to promote itself under this banner would help to ***cleanse Taiwan's image as an "international trouble-maker" and instead show it to be an integral and "responsible stakeholder."***

***Better insulate cross-Straits security from domestic politics while enhancing stabilizing links***

***The current impasse in cross-strait dialogue needs to be overcome and a cross-strait peace regime promoted.*** This might include discussion of a non-aggression/non-targeting pact, at least on citizen targets. Such an initiative can help build a domestic consensus in Taiwan on cross-Straits relations, push the PRC to engage in meaningful dialogue, and increase international awareness of China's threats to Taiwan.

***Pursue confidence building measures (CBMs),*** such as codes of conduct at sea and the establishment of military hotlines.

***Support the creation of cooperative regional frameworks on issues such as sea lines of communication (SLOC) security.*** Taiwan should draw attention to how ceilings on its participation in such efforts place unnecessary limits on the region's economic security.

***Intelligence sharing by Taiwan with regard to PLA activity around the Sakishima Islands could prove invaluable.*** The Sakishima Islands are one of the key points of entry for the PLA Navy to pursue their deep water, power projection strategy and thus a mutual concern of Taiwan, Japan, and the United States.

## **Conclusion**

A comprehensive security policy for Taiwan will ensure the welfare of its citizens and contribute to international peace and stability. If the next leader of Taiwan focuses not only on Taiwan's hard power, but also its soft power, in an effort to develop a highly nuanced and sophisticated "smart" power security policy, the future of Taiwan and the Asian region will be considerably more secure.





# Korea and Japan in Washington's Taiwan Calculus

By Leif-Eric Easley

Security concerns in East Asia do not exist in a vacuum, but it is difficult to know how closely issues interact. U.S. reliance on China in dealing with North Korea has allegedly caused Washington to take a more pro-Beijing stance in its relations with Taipei. Recent Japanese elections, leading to an opposition Democratic Party takeover of the Upper House, will allegedly decrease Tokyo's commitment to the U.S.-Japan alliance, and hence diminish the alliance's capacity to promote stability across the Taiwan Strait. Both these theories deserve further investigation.

The U.S. needs Chinese cooperation to effectively deal with the North Korean nuclear issue. Beijing's ability to pressure Pyongyang and mediate the Six-Party Talks are key in the U.S. regional approach to North Korea. China may want to leverage its cooperation, but Washington knows that regardless of U.S. support of Taiwan, Beijing will pursue its own interests in its relations with Pyongyang. A "North Korea for Taiwan" *quid pro quo* is thus wishful thinking on the part of Chinese strategists. The U.S. is not so desperate for China's help, nor so bogged down in the Middle East to accept Beijing's attempts to link North Korea and Taiwan.

The U.S. would need Japan's logistical, if not active, support if it became necessary to defend Taiwan. After years of whispering about such contingencies, the U.S.-Japan alliance explicitly recognized Taiwan security as a common strategic objective in 2005. However, the Japanese Upper House elections in July dealt a blow to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and particularly to Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, who favors a greater international role for Japan's military. Observers thus predict an end to increasing U.S.-Japan coordination on Taiwan. Yet irrespective of the elections, the main limitations on Japan's involvement in cross-strait security – the importance of Tokyo's relations with Beijing and constitutional restrictions on the Japanese military – are not expected to change soon.

Japan's alliance commitment and China's productive role in dealing with North Korea are indispensable for East Asian security. Moreover, Washington does not want Taipei to take provocative actions while the U.S. foreign policy agenda is overbooked. Connections among these issues notwithstanding, U.S. policy toward Taiwan is primarily shaped by the situation across the Taiwan Strait.

Legally, the United States' Taiwan policy is a balancing act between the U.S.-China communiqués on the one hand, and the Taiwan Relations Act on the other. The U.S. has long balanced the two in the interest of avoiding violent or unilateral changes to the status quo. Of course, the "status quo" is a convenient fiction to maintain relative stability, as cross-strait relations continue to witness significant economic, military, and political change.

Practically, there are three major factors in Washington's current Taiwan policy: (1) the importance of the "One-China" concept for positive Sino-U.S. relations; (2) the closeness of American and Taiwan democracies; and (3) the military balance across the strait. The first factor

is more or less a given constant. The second and third are variables that Taiwan has notable control over.

Taiwan can improve ties with the U.S. (as well as with Japan and South Korea) by further strengthening its democracy. Taiwan's political development is impressive and demonstrates commonalities with other free societies, but Taiwan has not consolidated democratic institutions. Taipei can also make greater investments in a credible national defense. Allies are less willing to defend friends who do not show serious efforts to defend themselves.

U.S. cooperation with Taiwan has stalled because the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)-controlled executive has played the "democracy card" for political purposes rather than strengthening Taiwan's democratic institutions. In addition, the Kuomintang (KMT)-controlled legislature has obstructed adequate funding for Taiwan's self-defense. Circumstances may improve after Taiwan's 2008 presidential election, as both candidates – Frank Hsieh of the DPP and Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT – appear committed to address these matters.

In the meantime, Washington should communicate convincingly that the recent downturn in coordination with Taiwan is not because of a *quid pro quo* with China over North Korea or because of a reticent U.S.-Japan alliance. Otherwise, misperceptions about the role of Korea and Japan in U.S. Taiwan policy may grow, leading to feelings of betrayal in Taipei, an exaggerated sense of advantage in Beijing, and fears of entrapment in Tokyo. Such developments would not serve Taiwan's security or U.S. interests.

Korean and Japanese historical developments have had a significant effect on Taiwan. But Washington does not link current security issues in ways that force trade-offs for U.S. Taiwan policy. There is however, a lack of positive linkages. North Korea dominates the schedule of the U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asia and U.S. diplomacy is not doing enough to link friends in North and Southeast Asia. The U.S. can encourage more consultation among South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and ASEAN to ease Taipei's concerns about being adversely affected by security mechanisms that exclude Taiwan.

Japan-South Korea-Taiwan coordination should focus on economic issues. Both Tokyo and Seoul could explore free trade agreements with Taiwan, perhaps using a different acronym than FTA for political reasons. In addition, Tokyo, Seoul, and Taipei could benefit from greater information sharing on China's World Trade Organization (WTO) compliance. The three also share similar concerns for increased economic interdependence with China and a lack of transparency in Beijing's military modernizations. On these matters, more track II or unofficial dialogues among Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would prove useful.

China's contribution in dealing with North Korea is significant, and the U.S. would prefer to avoid developments that would disrupt Beijing's positive role. Tokyo's commitment to the U.S.-Japan alliance, inclusive of Taiwan contingencies, is vital to East Asian security. However, China-North Korea and U.S.-Japan interactions only indirectly affect Washington's relations with Taipei.

The recent strain in U.S.-Taiwan relations can be traced to Taiwan's domestic politics. When Taiwan achieves democratic reforms and builds an internal consensus on national security, cooperation with the U.S. will improve. Meanwhile, Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul should not allow productive relations with Beijing to obscure shared values and interests with a democratic Taiwan.



# Asia-Pacific Peace and Security and Taiwan's Role

By Shirley L. Flores

When the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) convened its first meeting in Bangkok in 1994, the situation in the Korean Peninsula was the only security issue specifically cited in what would be the most important outcome document of every ARF annual meeting in the next 13 years - the Chairman's Statement. This document summarizes the range of regional and international issues ARF participants deem crucial in the pursuit of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Except for a paragraph which, 1, reiterated the importance of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in maintaining peace and security, 2, welcomed the negotiations between the United States and North Korea, and 3, supported the resumption of talks that would lead to the normalization of relations between the two Koreas, the 1994 Chairman's Statement mainly talked of the ARF's role and plan of action as the only political and security forum in the region in the years to come.<sup>5</sup> Eighteen countries attended – six from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), seven from ASEAN's dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea and the United States), two consultative partners (China and Russia), and three observers (Laos, Papua New Guinea, and Vietnam).

Thirteen years later, this same document has evolved into a long list of political and security issues, from traditional to nontraditional, that are noticeably not limited to those happening only in the region. It has become a wish list of issues ARF countries hope to address, of action plans they expect to enforce. The 2007 ARF Chairman's Statement issued in Manila in August included seven pages of 60 important points that the 27 participating countries discussed during their annual meeting. The scope of political and security issues ranged from regional (the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the quest for democracy in Myanmar, the presidential and parliamentary elections in Timor Leste, the political developments in Thailand, the resolution of disputes in the South China Sea) to international (the situation in the Middle East, Iran's enrichment related activities, the instability in Afghanistan and the abduction of South Koreans) and included the nontraditional (terrorism, the illicit use of small arms and light weapons, maritime security, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, people smuggling and trafficking in persons, avian and pandemic influenza, and energy security).<sup>6</sup>

The politico-security situation in the Asia-Pacific has become more complex and inter-related, the concept of security has become more comprehensive, and new threats and challenges to regional peace and stability have emerged since the ARF's inception. While regional flashpoints remain the most important issues on the ARF agenda, nontraditional security threats have outnumbered traditional ones and are now given as much attention, especially after the September 11 terror attacks in the United States. Former Singapore Foreign Minister Shanmugam Jayakumar echoed this in 2002: "Previously, we were discussing traditional security concerns evolved around flashpoints like the South China Sea, Korean Peninsula and India sub-

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<sup>5</sup> Chairman's Statement, The First Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, July 25, 2004, Bangkok, <http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/PublicLibrary/ARFChairmansStatementsandReports/ChairmansStatementofthe1stMeetingoftheASE/tabid/201/Default.aspx>.

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=RbahNhjo2E8%3d&tabid=66&mid=940>.

continent. Now the nontraditional security threats have assumed as important (a place) as traditional matters.”<sup>7</sup> As crucial as the issues of climate change, environment, and energy security which are expected to take center stage come November when Singapore chairs and hosts the 13<sup>th</sup> ASEAN Summit and the 15<sup>th</sup> ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2008.

Notwithstanding the myriad security challenges, this does not mean though that the region is in worse shape compared to 13 years ago. Much of the peace, stability, and prosperity this part of the world enjoys are a result of years of dialogue and cooperation among countries. The ARF has played an important role in providing this venue for the multilateral discussion of political and security issues. Prior to the creation of the ARF, discussion of security issues among disparate countries was rare, a multilateral regional security machinery undeveloped<sup>8</sup>, if not non-existent. Developing habits of dialogue and cooperation among a diverse group of countries that have previously fought each other, whose economies vary from the richest to the poorest, and are beset with historical, cultural, and religious differences, is no small feat. Participants have grown in number from just over a dozen at the inaugural meeting in 1994. At least 27 countries participated at the 14<sup>th</sup> ASEAN Regional Forum in Manila this year, with Sri Lanka the latest addition. The People’s Republic of China, India, Myanmar, and North Korea – considered key players in shaping Asia-Pacific peace and security – are likewise on board. Membership of ASEAN has since expanded to 10, with the inclusion of the CLMV countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam). So far, having more countries involved in the ARF process has proved to be a boon rather than a bane to the forum.

The growing involvement of Asia-Pacific states in ARF, their commitment to moving the process beyond confidence-building and towards] preventive diplomacy<sup>9</sup>, will give this previously criticized “talk shop” the necessary clout to influence regional and international peace and security. Countries see the ARF evolving into an institutional and operational body that will respond more effectively to regional security issues.<sup>10</sup>

At the heart of this multilateral security forum is ASEAN, which, despite criticisms that its policy of non-intervention has slowed the process, remains a neutral venue or an honest broker for the discussion and resolution of regional conflicts. The regional grouping has been a successful counterbalance to the growing presence of a number of powerful and influential states in the ARF.

### **Country Assessments: Current Challenges and How to Address Them**

Countries in the Asia-Pacific generally view the peace and security situation in the region as relatively stable although beset with uncertainties that may lead to future conflicts. These can be grouped into: (a) traditional issues that have minor successes in terms of achieving resolution and those that have been contained; (b) traditional issues that may spark conflict anytime; (c)

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<sup>7</sup> *Kyodo News*, July 31, 2002.

<sup>8</sup> David Dickens, “Lessening the Desire for War: The ASEAN Regional Forum and Making of Asia Pacific Security,” Working Paper, Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 1998.

<sup>9</sup> Preventive diplomacy is considered the second stage in the evolution of the ARF process (see “The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper,” <http://www.aseansec.org/3635.htm>).

<sup>10</sup> ASEAN Regional Forum Annual Security Outlook 2007.

nontraditional issues that are already being addressed; and (d) emerging nontraditional issues that deserve immediate attention.

The resolution of these security issues, traditional or nontraditional, will largely depend on the political landscape in the region. In its latest security outlook<sup>11</sup>, Singapore, current chair of ASEAN, draws attention to the changing political scene in Asia – highlighting the emergence of China and India as economic powers, the impact of Japan’s quest for normalcy, and the role that Russia will play in Asia-Pacific affairs. Amid these changes, the role of the U.S. in ensuring regional security and prosperity is still very much part of the equation. To Singapore, the stability of relations among these major powers is imperative.<sup>12</sup> For its part, Australia looks at future “open and cooperative links” between the U.S., Japan, China, and India as key in sustaining regional stability and prosperity.<sup>13</sup>

### **Gaining Ground on and Containment of Traditional Issues**

The situation on the Korean Peninsula remains the most urgent issue for several countries in the Asia-Pacific. The fact that the issue was already on the first ARF Chairman’s Statement is proof that it has dominated regional discussions on security for more than a decade. However, this may take a back seat in the coming months as a result of positive developments in the Six-Party Talks wherein all relevant parties have so far fulfilled their commitments under the February 13, 2007 agreement. The talks are now on the second phase involving the verifiable disabling and elimination of all existing nuclear facilities in Pyongyang. North Korea has agreed to provide all parties a complete and correct declaration of all its programs by Dec.31. It has also committed not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, and know how. In exchange, it will receive the promised economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 1million tons of heavy fuel oil.<sup>14</sup> These positive developments allow countries in the region to give more attention to other pressing security matters that have long been overshadowed by the North Korean issue.

The territorial dispute in the South China Sea is the most important flashpoint due to the number of countries involved. The issue is being contained by the adoption of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea signed in 2002 by ASEAN countries and China. The Declaration calls for the peaceful settlement of all jurisdictional and territorial disputes among claimants. It allows parties to have cooperative activities pending a settlement. These include: marine environmental protection; marine scientific research; safety of navigation and communication at sea; search and rescue operation; and combating transnational crime, including but not limited to trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy and armed robbery at sea, and illegal traffic in arms.<sup>15</sup> Claimants have managed to practice restraint although there are occasional problems involving fishing and joint oil exploration conducted by some countries.

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<sup>11</sup> Exchange of Views on Regional Defence and Security Outlook presented at the ASEAN Defense Senior Officials’ Meeting, Oct. 18-19, 2007, Singapore.

<sup>12</sup> ASEAN 93.

<sup>13</sup> ASEAN 1.

<sup>14</sup> “Six-Party Talks Agree on Second-Phase Actions,” Oct. 03, 2007, <http://www.usinfo.state.gov>.

<sup>15</sup> Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, <http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm>.

## Looming and Unpredictable Traditional Issues

Cross-strait relations are not getting better and may in fact be the next newsmaker after North Korea due to the renewed determination of Taiwan to pursue independence and membership in the United Nations. Taiwan is set to hold a referendum on applying for UN membership under the name of “Taiwan” in March 2008 when it is also scheduled to conduct [presidential elections](#). China, whose political clout as a consequence of its economic rise continues to grow, is not expected to take this quietly. The reason for the lack of progress in resolving the issue is obvious. Taiwan remains diplomatically isolated as a result of the One-China policy practiced by most countries. Hence, venues to engage Taiwan in a dialogue are nil and countries could only limit themselves to calls for both parties to exercise restraint. ARF has no influence over Taiwan since Taipei is not allowed to participate in the forum. ASEAN countries deal with it on a bilateral and purely economic basis. Countries scramble to be on China’s good side, including the United States, which unfortunately is in the best position to broker a settlement or peaceful solution between Taiwan and China.

Everybody’s hands are tied unless the main players – Taiwan, China, and the U.S.– go back to the negotiating table and come up with a credible and lasting arrangement to contain, if not resolve, the issue. As Russia has put it: “a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait with possible involvement of U.S. armed forces seems unlikely, but not entirely impossible.”<sup>16</sup> ASEAN and ARF may also have to re-evaluate their roles in the cross-strait issue without necessarily giving up the One-China policy if they are bent on avoiding any future conflict that may arise.

Another issue that has dominated discussions in ASEAN and ARF is political developments in Myanmar. This issue should have been on the first category, and it was there for some time until recent protests initiated by the Buddhist monks in that country re-awakened the public to call for ousting the military regime and freeing pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi. ASEAN has consistently practiced its policy of non-interference when it comes to the situation in Myanmar and has limited itself to calls for the restoration of democracy in Yangon. The regional bloc has also given Myanmar time to complete its Roadmap to Democracy and has never imposed a deadline. It has rejected calls by the United States and the European Union, among others, to impose sanctions on Myanmar and has flatly denied suggestions of expulsion.

At the height of the demonstrations in Yangon in September, however, ASEAN issued a rare strong-worded statement against the military junta, emphasizing the impact events in Myanmar might have on the reputation and credibility of the grouping.<sup>17</sup> An ASEAN diplomat revealed that the group’s informal meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York was supposed to discuss progress on the ASEAN Charter, the draft of which is being rushed for signing by the heads of state in Singapore in November. This was shelved in favor of the statement. French Minister for Foreign and European Affairs Bernard Kouchner paid a visit to Southeast Asia to once again pressure ASEAN and even China, considered Myanmar’s ally, to intervene. According to Kouchner, “the capacity of China and ASEAN countries to engage in dialogue with the Burmese junta is irreplaceable.”<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> ASEAN 86.

<sup>17</sup> Statement by ASEAN Chair Singapore’s Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo, Sept. 27, 2007, New York.

<sup>18</sup> “Burma: The Status Quo Cannot Continue,” *Philippine Star*, Oct. 30, 2007.



## **Nontraditional Issues that are Being Addressed**

The region has been giving equal weight to transnational security threats such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) especially among nonstate actors, piracy, armed robbery and maritime terrorism particularly in Southeast Asia, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, people smuggling and trafficking, and illicit drug trafficking, among others. Of these, particular attention has been placed on international terrorism due to the presence of a number of terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia.

Terrorism and proliferation of WMD and missile technology are special concern of the U.S., the European Union, Japan, Australia, and Canada. However, in Southeast Asia where the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist organization conducts recruitment and training, discussions and plans of action have only gained ground after Sept. 11, 2001. Early this year, ASEAN decided to fast-track its anti-terrorism agenda by signing the landmark ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism. With regard to the proliferation WMD, again big powers are taking the lead and their Asian counterparts are following at a slow pace. This is not surprising as there are only a small number of countries in Asia that possesses or have the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. The U.S.-initiated Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), whose aim is to intercept trade in WMD, has managed to lure only a handful of Asian countries to join in since most countries are more inclined to support disarmament. Nonetheless, international terrorism and proliferation of WMD will remain on the security agenda of the region in the years to come.

## **Shifting Attention to Emerging and Pressing Security Issues**

The relative stability experienced by the region gives it the opportunity to set its sights on emerging issues. The issues of pandemics such as avian flu and SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), as well as climate change and energy security, are gaining ground. Singapore specifically highlights these trans-boundary issues that could impact on the internal stability and national security of Asia-Pacific countries. Environmental degradation and climate change could also cause “humanitarian crises, social upheavals, political tensions, instability and civil strife” over the long term.<sup>19</sup> Giving importance to energy security, meanwhile, is imperative as economies in the region are net importers of oil and hence, are susceptible to oil price volatility.

These nonconventional issues have been given considerable attention. Climate change and energy security are being discussed not only in ASEAN and ARF but in the East Asia Summit (ASEAN 10 plus India, Australia, and New Zealand) and the ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN 10 plus China, Japan, and South Korea) process as well.

Asia-Pacific countries are one in saying that there is a need to strengthen existing multilateral forums and create new ones to address threats. Given the multitude of security issues in the region, Singapore acknowledges the need for new, focused, and functional regional forums to discuss and address various threats. Aside from multilateral forums such as the ARF, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the East Asia Summit and the Shangri-La Dialogue, it welcomes the creation of other functional forums including the Regional Cooperation Agreement

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<sup>19</sup>ASEAN 94.

on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (RECAAP), the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, and the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). It likewise lauds the convening of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) in 2006 and considers it a clear manifestation of ASEAN's "maturity and readiness" in tackling regional security issues. The ADMM works on three principles: first, regional security is a collective responsibility; second, the regional security architecture should be inclusive big and small countries as well as international organizations; and third, cooperation is based on mutual respect and abides by international law.<sup>20</sup>

With regard to nontraditional security issues, China urged the ARF to give these a high priority.<sup>21</sup> It advocates a comprehensive response to new security threats and challenges – political, economic, diplomatic, legal, scientific, and technological – which involve information sharing, establishment of early warning mechanism on natural disasters and pandemics, and going to the roots of nonconventional threats as in terrorism.<sup>22</sup> Thailand calls for the promotion of human security, which aims to free individuals from fear and want, through prevention of conflict, terrorism, hunger, disease, homelessness, and illiteracy.<sup>23</sup> Human security encourages the employment of non-military means such as "preventive diplomacy, conflict management and post-conflict peace-building, to addressing the root causes of conflict by building state capacity and promoting equitable economic development."<sup>24</sup>

Apart from the ARF, proposals to expand the role and scope of the Six-Party Talks beyond the North Korea denuclearization issue have come up following the success of the February 2007 agreement. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill, the top U.S. negotiator in the North Korean issue, welcomed the proposals and expressed hopes that the "six-party process can serve as an 'embryonic structure' for Northeast Asia to create new bilateral and multilateral ties."<sup>25</sup> The creation of a Northeast Asian multilateral security regime that will take off from the six-party process is seen to not only serve the interests of Northeast Asian countries – to the normalization of relations between the two Koreas, to China's quest for regional influence, or to the United States which is being left out in the East Asia community building project. It can likewise supplement the U.S.-centered East Asian alliance structure and the ASEAN-led East Asian regionalization.<sup>26</sup>

### **Asia-Pacific Security: Philippine Initiatives**

The Philippines shares the perception of most Asia-Pacific countries that security in the region has become relatively stable owing to continued cooperation among countries over the years. It advocates multilateralism as the best approach to address regional threats and

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<sup>20</sup> Exchange 4.

<sup>21</sup> ASEAN 28.

<sup>22</sup> ASEAN 27.

<sup>23</sup> ASEAN 103.

<sup>24</sup> Human Security International website, [http://www.humansecurity.org/?page\\_id=4](http://www.humansecurity.org/?page_id=4).

<sup>25</sup> Todd Bullock, "US Hopes Six-Part Talks Can Be Model for Northeast Asia,"

<http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/Aug/19-916463.html>.

<sup>26</sup> Zhang Tiejun, "Six-Party Talks and Prospects for Northeast Asian Multilateral Security Regime," Shanghai Institute for International Relations, 2005, [www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/conferences/2005/CMinNEA/abstracts/abstract\\_Zhang\\_Tiejun.pdf](http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/conferences/2005/CMinNEA/abstracts/abstract_Zhang_Tiejun.pdf).

challenges. The Philippines is a member of a number of multilateral political, economic, and security arrangements in the region and sees cooperation in ASEAN as a cornerstone of its regional policy.

In its regional security outlook submitted to the ARF last May<sup>27</sup>, the Philippines considers the situation in the South China Sea, cross-strait relations, and the Korean Peninsula as the major traditional security concerns in the Asia-Pacific. It listed terrorism, transnational crimes (such as trafficking in narcotics and precursor drugs, trafficking of persons, trafficking in weapons or proliferation of WMD, money laundering, piracy and other maritime threats), pandemics, energy security, and environmental concerns and biological hazards under nontraditional security threats.

In the South China Sea, the Philippines pursues cooperative undertakings with a number of countries that are in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. These include the Joint Oceanographic Marine Scientific Research Expeditions (JOMSRE) with Vietnam that was started in 1996 and the joint marine seismic undertaking (JMSU) it is conducting with both Vietnam, and China in selected areas in the South China Sea. JOMSRE involves scientific research on marine life, topography, and ecology. Laos is an observer to the project which has so completed four expeditions. The tripartite JMSU, meanwhile, is a private sector undertaking led by the national oil companies of the Philippines, China and Vietnam. The three firms agreed in 2005 to conduct a joint survey of oil deposits in undisclosed areas in the South China Sea covering 143,000 sq km. The survey is on its second phase and the parties are considering joint resource and energy exploration and development should there be positive findings.<sup>28</sup> Both the JOMSRE and the JMSU and to transform the South China Sea from an area of conflict to an area of cooperation. It is not clear though whether the JMSU is open to other claimant-countries that might be interested in joining the survey and future exploration. Including more countries may help lessen the tension created when the tripartite cooperation was first announced and criticism that a number of countries are violating the provisions of the UNCLOS and the Declaration on the Code of Conduct.

The Philippines is also closely following developments in cross-strait relations as it enjoys and pursues strong relationships with both China and Taiwan. Despite its adherence to the One-China policy, Manila has aggressively engaged Taiwan through healthy bilateral trade and investments. The two countries also interact socially, culturally, and through people-to-people relations. The Philippines seeks to achieve the “optimum balance” in dealing with its two Asian neighbors and supports efforts to resolve the cross-strait issue peacefully.<sup>29</sup>

ASEAN was under the chairmanship of the Philippines when the landmark February 2007 agreement on the denuclearization of North Korea was realized. As chair, the Philippines endeavored to create an active role for ASEAN in resolving the issue in the Korean Peninsula cognizant of the importance of a peaceful resolution of the issue for regional security and stability. Other than the usual expression of support on progress in the Six-Party Talks,

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<sup>27</sup> ASEAN 65-73.

<sup>28</sup> ASEAN 67.

<sup>29</sup> ASEAN.

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has offered the Philippines as venue for future meetings among the six countries. In July, high-level representatives to the Six-Party process met for the first time in Manila prior to the ARF annual meeting. The Philippines has also kept a policy of engagement with North Korea as shown in the visit of Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo to Pyongyang in June.

The Philippines has also done its share in addressing nontraditional security concerns. It passed into law this year the Human Security Act that puts more teeth to the country's drive against terrorist organizations at home (Abu Sayyaf Group), in the region, and in other parts of the globe. It has actively taken part in the drafting of the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism which ASEAN signed in Cebu early this year.

The Philippines also supports the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and is a signatory to all 12 international conventions and protocols on terrorism as well as the 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. The Philippines believes, however, that getting to the roots of terrorism is as crucial in fighting this scourge. It is working with countries on a bilateral basis for peace and development projects, especially in Mindanao. It also participates in inter-faith and intercultural dialogues to promote tolerance and understanding among peoples.

On the nonproliferation of WMD, the Philippines has been active in many initiatives and a staunch advocate not only of nonproliferation but of disarmament. It has ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Treaty on Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Inhumane Weapons Convention, and the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention. It is among a handful of countries in Southeast Asia that support the PSI. Tied to this is the country's commitment to fight money laundering and related activities through the establishment of the Anti-Money Laundering Council, whose successes removed the Philippines from the list of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories of the Financial Action Task Force. On other transnational crimes, the country has been aggressive in going after drug and human traffickers. It backs regional and international endeavors to address these problems. It also works on a bilateral and multilateral basis with other countries in Southeast Asia to resolve maritime security threats.

Finally, the Philippines takes energy security seriously. It passed into law Republic Act 9367 or the Biofuels Act to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels through the mandatory use of a minimum of 1 percent biodiesel in all diesel fuels sold in the market.

### **Asia-Pacific Security: Taiwan's Role**

In order to effectively address the increasing number of threats and challenges to regional security, it is imperative that each country does its share. Taiwan may be isolated diplomatically but it remains, geographically, within Asia and is thus a stakeholder in the region. Regional stability is in the interest of Taiwan as it continues to create security and prosperity for its people. Taiwan's role and participation may seem limited, as it is being excluded from regional multilateral political, security, and economic arrangements. However, should Taipei decide to

take on a more active role and pursue initiatives to address the security threats discussed earlier, on its own, its choices are limitless.

On the cross-strait dilemma, both Taiwan and China have consistently rejected the possibility of an all-out war to resolve the issue. This, however, does not fully give their neighbors assurance as both countries continue to pursue policies and issue statements that could lead to a change in the status quo or to a military confrontation. There is no stopping the Taiwanese government or the Taiwanese people from pursuing identity and independence. Nothing will hinder the Chinese either from claiming what they believe is rightfully theirs. This issue, however, may still be resolved peacefully if Taiwan and China will go back to the negotiating table and resume discussions to arrive at a win-win solution. In the meantime, the two camps are urged to exercise restraint and not contribute to the already tensed situation.

Since a final resolution to the issue cannot be achieved overnight, both are encouraged to start cooperating in other non-sensitive, non-political areas. Taiwan and China are strong partners in the economic and cultural arenas. It is imperative that this partnership remains unhampered as these will help improve relations and develop habits of dialogue and cooperation between the two parties. More specifically, Taiwan should boost economic ties with China, with or without a free trade arrangement (FTA) or comprehensive economic partnership (CEP) agreements. The emergence of China as an economic giant in Asia is a reality and countries scramble to take advantage of the huge Chinese market, as well as for the investments that China has to offer. Taiwan should likewise maximize its economic partnership with the mainland for its economy to remain competitive. Together, the economies of the two countries can help sustain regional prosperity.

Economic security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is crucial if countries are to remain relevant in light of the accelerated pace of globalization. Taiwan's aim is to be an active player in the global marketplace by keeping its economy open to other countries in the region, by aggressively venturing into other territories where it can add in investment and where it can impart and acquire technological know-how. Despite not being a member of multilateral groupings such as ASEAN and the East Asia Summit, countries adhering to the One-China policy keep their economies wide open to Taiwan. In fact, bilateral economic relationships with Taiwan remain healthy and Asian countries recognize the importance of engaging Taiwan to take advantage of the opportunities that the latter has to offer. They also acknowledge the fact that Taiwan's economy has been among the most dynamic in Asia and look to it as a model. Taiwan is lauded for weathering the Asian financial crisis that crippled most regional economies in 1997. Asian countries are cognizant that they not only have lessons to learn from Taiwan, but they need Taiwan's cooperation to ensure economic and financial stability. Meanwhile, Taiwan's membership in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) are very important. It must make full use of this membership by endeavoring to play, or be seen to play, a more pronounced role in these groups. Taiwan may also be included in the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), which aims to create a framework of bilateral currency swap arrangements in the Asian region to avert another financial crisis. As explained by former ASEAN Secretary General Rodolfo Severino during the Asia-Pacific Security Forum in Taiwan, the CMI is a purely financial undertaking whose success will largely depend on the number of countries or territories participating. Taiwan should not be

excluded most especially since it was the only territory in Asia that was able to respond positively to the Asian crisis.

In all these undertakings, Taiwan should strive to separate the economic from the political agenda. Political ends may be pursued without putting a strain on the economy, without harming existing relations with partners.

Finally, Taiwan has a role to play in addressing nontraditional security threats. Taiwan supports the fight against international terrorism and has provided humanitarian assistance to victims of terrorist attacks in New York and Afghanistan. It has taken actions in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1371<sup>30</sup> despite not being a member of the organization. Taiwan's response to terrorism has been immediate and comprehensive. With regard to the proliferation of WMD, in 2000 Taiwan was been suspected of developing chemical or biological weapons which it has strongly denied.<sup>31</sup> In order to assure the international community, Taiwan must take concrete actions to show its commitment to nonproliferation. Taiwan has also been criticized for its failure to curb human trafficking. Much is to be done in order to convince the international community that Taiwan is bent on preventing and addressing human trafficking. In the areas of energy security and climate change, Taiwan, like any other country, is not immune. Already, there is fear of a power shortage that could have adverse effects on the Taiwanese economy. The lack of progress in power-related projects and the ban on new nuclear plants could cause a serious power crisis as the reserve margin is seen to go down by 8.5 percent in 2010. Taiwan needs 1,200 megawatts of generating capacity each year to meet demand<sup>32</sup> As in other countries, Taiwan must look at alternative ways to source energy if it is to avert a future crisis. Taiwan also needs to lend a hand in addressing environmental problems. These soft issues can provide the best opportunity to participate in regional or international programs or initiatives since they are not political in nature.

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<sup>30</sup> Taiwan's Goodwill: Furthering Human Rights and Peace, <http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/human/antiterrorism/anti.html>.

<sup>31</sup> "Defense ministry denies developing weapons of mass destruction claim," *Taipei Times*, Dec. 17, 2000, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2000/12/17/65853>.

<sup>32</sup> "Taiwan Power Shortage May Be Bigger Threat Than China Missiles," *Bloomberg*, April 25, 2007.

## Rich Country, Strong Armed Forces?

By Aki Mori

To fully grasp the Asia-Pacific strategic environment, it is critically important to understand the complexity of the rise of China. The Chinese government views international relations from a perspective that competition among nations is a measure of comprehensive national strength which includes such factors such as natural resources, population, economic performance, technology, politics, military power, culture, and education. This became the official thinking of the Chinese government after Deng Xiaoping advocated the concept of “comprehensive national power” in the early 1980s.<sup>33</sup>

If China’s economic growth had not been sustained for a significant period of time, or it had not been linked with building comprehensive national power, the linkage between economic development and military modernization would not have given Japan such deep concern.<sup>34</sup> Since the 1990s, Japanese officials have been concerned about the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s modernization; the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-96 fundamentally changed the Japanese security perspective toward China by making Japan aware of a “strong China.”<sup>35</sup> This episode highlights how Japan became increasingly concerned with questions of how China translates its expanded economic power into military capability, and how China uses its influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Because the answers to these questions are still unclear, Japanese officials have increasingly come to view and respond to security issues involving China in terms of uncertainty.

China’s massive demand for energy resources adds complexity to China’s rising national power. Ensuring secure and uninterrupted energy resources a potential bottleneck in the sustained development of China’s economy, leading some PLA leaders to see uninterrupted access to energy markets as a security issue and thus a potential mission for the armed forces. Another complicating factor are the environmental problems that result from natural resources consumption. Eighty percent of China’s electric power is provided by coal. As the world’s second leading emitter of greenhouse gases, the need to alter energy production methods is dire. It is likely that use of cleaner burning oil and gas will increase and replace coal as a source of energy in China. In this event, Chinese dependence on foreign oil and gas will increase, and thus, increase China’s concerns about its energy security.

Security planning in the Asia-Pacific region highlights the geographic importance of Taiwan which is located along the sea lane of communications (SLOC) to Japan, South Korea, and China. In the event of a conflict or crisis in the Taiwan Strait, some in China are concerned about being denied use of these SLOCs by hostile forces, a strategic vulnerability. To reduce the risk of depending on energy supplies traveling to China via the SLOCs, China has tried to diversify energy transportation routes while at the same time emphasizing that a powerful blue

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<sup>33</sup> Chu Shulong, “China and U.S-Japan and U.S Korea Aliances in a Changing Northeast Asia”, June 1999, <http://is-db.stanford.edu/pubs/10021/chu-Shulong.pdf>, P. 9.

<sup>34</sup> Drifte, Reingard, *Reisen go no Nicchu anzennhosho* (Japan’s security relations with China since 1989), (Minerva Shobo, 2004), p. 59.

<sup>35</sup> Yasuhiro Matsuda, “Anzenhosyo kankei no tenkai(development of security relationship), Ryoko Iechika, Yasuhiro Matsuda, and Duan Ruicong eds, *Kiro ni Tatsu Nicchu Kankei*( Japan-China relationship at cross road), (Minerva shobo, 2007), pp. 140-142.

water naval capability is needed to defend China's reliance of these routes, as well as the expanse of the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca through which vital energy supplies must also pass. Thus, the Chinese goal of energy security to sustain its energy development is one of the background factors in the linking of China's economic development and military modernization.

Yet China's security policy is not transparent; policy planners in Asia-Pacific nations must operate from assumption that China's economic and military capability has developed rapidly, and careful monitoring of how China uses its influence is necessary. This paper highlights security policy ideas within the CCP regarding the linkage between economic development and role of the armed forces in the context of China's security and foreign policies. The linkage of energy security and the Taiwan debate in CCP offers a good case study to examine the complexity of China's rise, and may provide political opportunities for broader security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region as well.

### **The “new security concept” and “Peaceful Rise”**

China's security policy debate in the 1980s was based on a new strategic view that a large-scale total war was not imminent. Planners thought that while the risk of that type of conflict might exist, the PLA could be most effective with its resources by preparing for a local war with a limited political purpose.<sup>36</sup> military modernization would be implemented as much as possible as long as it did not take away resources from Chinese economic development - the highest priority.<sup>37</sup> The PLA would have to find a positive role within the context of economic development.<sup>38</sup>

While the new security outlook was based on the view that total war was unlikely, it did not mean that China abandoned the use of force to achieve its political objectives along China's periphery. As an example, the end of the 1980s saw China became more proactive in maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea.<sup>39</sup> In February 1992, China passed a law proclaiming the Taiwan-claimed Senkaku Islands (Chinese name: Daoyu) belonged to China.<sup>40</sup> Another event in which China tried to achieve political objectives utilizing the possibility or threat of force was the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-96. Chinese leaders believed that a stable path to growth of comprehensive national power was essential to gaining the strength to “recover” territory in the South China Sea and deter Taiwan's declaration of independence in the mid-1990s.

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<sup>36</sup> Ryo Asano, “Gunji doctrine no henyō to tenkai”(The transition and development of military doctrine in China), Tomohide Murai, Junichi Abe, Ryo Asano, and Jun Yasuda eds., *Chugoku wo meguru anzenhosyo* (Security issues on China), (Kyoto, Minerva Shobo, 2007) p. 247. ; Shambaugh, David L., *Modernizing China's Military; Progress, Problems, and Prospects*, (University of California Press, 2002).

<sup>37</sup> Asano, “Gunji doctrine no henyō to tenkai”, p. 247-248.

<sup>38</sup> Deng Xiaoping, “Zai Junwei Kuodahui shang de Jianghua”(Speech to the Expanded Meeting of the Central Military Commission, *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan* (Collected Works of Deng Xiaoping) Vol. 3, (Beijing, Renmin Chubanshe, 1993), p. 128; Liu Huaqing, “Jianshe Yizhi Qiangda de Haijun, Fazhan Woguo de Haiyang Shiye”(“Let Chinese maritime business develop through building up strong naval capability”), *Renmin Ribao*, Nov. 24, 1984.

<sup>39</sup> Gerald Segal, “East Asia and the “Constraint” of China,” *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996), p. 159-187.

<sup>40</sup> “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Linghai ji Pilanqu Fa”, *Renmin Ribao*, Feb. 26, 1992.



However, since the middle of the 1990s, China began to explain its rapid economic and military development to other countries more clearly in a “new security concept” dubbed China’s Peaceful Rise theory. Jiang Zemin presented the core of the “new security concept,” at a speech in Geneva in March 1999. It established the basic definition of the concept in CCP’s debate – the core of the policy would be mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and cooperation” as principles governing international relations.<sup>41</sup> Jiang insisted that “only by developing the “new security concept” and establishing a fair and reasonable new international order can world peace and security be fundamentally guaranteed.”<sup>42</sup> In Jiang Zemin’s policy speech at the 16<sup>th</sup> Chinese Communist Party Congress in 2002, much of the thinking of the “new security concept” was enshrined as a principal for building up a “fair, and reasonable international political economic order.”<sup>43</sup>

Despite the conciliatory language in Jiang’s pronouncements about the “new security concept,” it did not dispell widespread fears about China’s growing economic clout and political stature. From the end of 2003, China’s fourth-generation leadership, the new group of leaders centered on Hu Jintao, began to speak of “China’s peaceful rise.” Zheng Bijian, chair of the China Reform Forum, and a senior advisor to China’s leaders of several decades, began to advocate this concept because of his concern about U.S. opinion that China might someday threaten U.S security and possibly collapse as a failed state.<sup>44</sup> Zheng introduced a new concept in international relations, which he termed “China’s Peaceful Rise” at the Bo’ao Forum in November 2003. Another origin of the peaceful rise theory seems to be the complicated leadership transition that accompanied the 16<sup>th</sup> Party Congress of November 2002. According to Suettinger, Jiang Zemin and some members of the Politburo Standing Committee are rumored to have raised objections, and it was decided in April 2004 that the leadership would not use the term “peaceful rise” in public.<sup>45</sup> China’s leaders became favor the phrase “peaceful development” (heping fazhan) instead of “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi).<sup>46</sup>

Zheng popularized the phrase in a *Foreign Affairs* article in September/October 2005. Zheng explained that despite widespread fears about China’s growing economic clout and political stature, Beijing remains committed to a “peaceful rise,” and committed to bringing its people out of poverty by embracing economic globalization and improving relations with the rest of the world. Zheng also asserted that as China emerges as a great power, China knows that its continued development depends on world peace, and China’s development will in turn reinforce world peace.

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<sup>41</sup> Seiichiro Takagi, “Chugoku no “Shin Anzenhoshoyokan”” (China’s “new security concept”), Boei Kenkusyo Kiyo (NIDS Security Report), March 2003, pp. 68-89.

<sup>42</sup> “Chinese President Calls for new security concept,” summary of a March 26, 1999, speech by Jiang Zemin before the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, <http://nti.org/db/china/engdocs/jzm0399.htm>

<sup>43</sup> Jiang Zemin, “Quanmianjianshe Xiaokangshehui, Kaichuang Zhongguo Tese Shehuizhizhi Shiye Xinchun” (“Achieve comprehensive being well-off society, Open new stage China’s unique socialism”), Xinhua Yuebao ed, *16da Yilai Dang he Guojia Zhongyao Wenxian Xianbian* (Collected Works of the Party and States Since 16<sup>th</sup> Party Congress), *Renmin Chibanshe*, Vol 1-1, p. 3-45.

<sup>44</sup> Suettinger, Robert L, “The Rise and Descent of “Peaceful Rise”, *China Leadership Monitor*, No. 12, p. 3.

<sup>45</sup> Suettinger, p1, pp. 7-8.

<sup>46</sup> Seiichiro Takagi, “Chugoku “Wahei Kukki” Ron no Gendankai” (Current debates on China’s Peaceful Rise theory), *The Japan Institute of International Affairs, Kokusai Mondai* (International Affairs), Vol. 540, March 2003.

Debates about China's approach to the world are ongoing. Hu Jintao emphasized that China must vigorously promote China's Peaceful Development Road during his policy speech at the 17<sup>th</sup> Party Congress of October 2007. Along the same lines, Hu talks of creating a "harmonious world" (*hexie shijie*), concluding that "China's development is nondivisible with the world; peace and prosperity of the world is nondivisible with China as well".

The development of this series of security concepts can be explained by three long-term motivations. First and foremost, the Chinese leadership seeks to defuse long-standing concerns that China's economic and military rise will disrupt the global status quo. Security policy toward maritime disputes in the South China Sea and Taiwan during the 1990s was rapidly creating a much more cautious mood in the region with respect to China. Chinese leaders, perceiving the distrust of neighboring Asian states, came to realize the importance of avoiding policies that engendered distrust and deep concern toward China as it developed comprehensive national power.<sup>47</sup> The fundamental motivation for seeking a new approach to the world is rooted in China's continued access to natural resources. As its economy rapidly grew in the 1990s, China's comprehensive national power increased, but the Chinese economy became irreversibly dependent on resources. As China's leaders have come to perceive economic security as critically important, continued access to these external resources has acquired critical importance as well.<sup>48</sup> Since the beginning of the 1990s, Chinese economic development accelerated, resulting in China becoming a net oil importer. China has grown to rely on stable SLOCs from the Middle East, and Africa, through the Malacca and Taiwan Strait. The risk of the closure or denial of these SLOCs presents a strategic vulnerability for China.

Second, Chinese leaders see vulnerability and external dependence as a diplomatic and military opportunity to expand Chinese influence in a way that does not alarm neighboring states. China's security diplomacy aims to augment China's wealth and influence, but in a way that reassures its neighbors, especially in Southeast Asia, of its peaceful and mutually beneficial intent.<sup>49</sup> Dependence on external energy sources offers China a compelling explanation to surrounding nations of its military modernization and expansion of capabilities. This situation offers the diplomatic opportunity to expand China's influence in Southeast Asian countries through maritime security as well as the initiative for developing alternative transportation options such as a canal or pipeline across Thailand and Myanmar.<sup>50</sup> From the military perspective, dependence on SLOCs offers an opportunity for the PLAN to expand its role and importance within the Chinese defense establishment. According to "Research for National Energy Security" conducted by the Central Policy Research Center of the CCP, other powerful competitor nations, including the United States, Japan, and India are developing increased naval capability to secure their energy transportation routes.<sup>51</sup> In response to concerns about Chinese vulnerability to loss or denial of energy SLOCs, they emphasized that a powerful blue water naval capability is

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<sup>47</sup> Ryo Asano, "Chugoku no Anzenhosyo Seisaku ni Naizaisuru Ronri to Henka" (The inherent logic and transformation of Chinese security policy), *Kokusaimondai* (International Affairs), Vol. 514, January 2003, pp. 17-35, p. 22.

<sup>48</sup> Asano, "Chugoku no Anzenhosyo Seisaku ni Naizaisuru Ronri to Henka", p. 22.

<sup>49</sup> Gill, Bates, *Rising Star*, (Washington, The Brookings Institution, 2007), p. 10.

<sup>50</sup> Zhang Xuegang, "Southeast Asia and Energy: Gateway to Stability," World Security Institute, eds, *China Security*, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 18-35.

<sup>51</sup> Ni Jiangmin ed, *Guojia nengyuan anquan baogao* (National Energy Security Report), Renmin Chubanshe, 2005.

needed to defend China's use of these routes. That naval power must be capable of extending through the Straits of Malacca into the expanse of the Indian Ocean.

This implies a third motivation behind the security concept, which is a soft balancing of power with respect to the United States. From the mid-to-late 1990s, in a response to concerns about U.S. "hegemony" and alliance-strengthening, Chinese officials and analysts began to more openly embrace and foster alternative security structures as part of a broader effort to promote Beijing's "new security concept."<sup>52</sup> In terms of Japan's security policy, it is important to note that China's "new security concept" proposed at the ASEAN Regional Forum on July 1996 was announced shortly after the announcement of measures to strengthen the Japan-U.S. security alliance in April 1996, implying that the "new security concept" was partly in response to a revitalized Japan-U.S. Alliance.<sup>53</sup> Jiang Zemin asserted that China's "new security concept" was required meet the needs of the present instead of the old security concept based solely on military alliances and the build-up of armaments.<sup>54</sup> This statement demonstrates that China's "new security concept" takes into consideration the strengthened alliance network between the U.S. and other Asia-Pacific nations, and shows a new willingness of China to secure its interest not by "hard" alliance, but by "soft" institutional arrangements.

As China's global influence grows, it has presented a series of new approaches to the world, namely the "new security concept" and "peaceful rise" theory. These new approaches demonstrate that China's security diplomacy has become more likely to engage in multilateral security cooperation. As the role of the Chinese armed forces has shifted in the years since China started on its path toward modernization, does this focus on multilateral security also indicate a further shift in the policy role of Chinese military?

### **The role of the armed forces in China's new security approach**

The armed forces play an underlying role in the new security approach. China's "new security concept" and "peaceful rise" theory do not mean that China has abandoned its views on the importance of traditional security.<sup>55</sup> The emphasis on continued military modernization can be seen in Jiang Zemin's policy statement at the CMC in 1999 which explained that effective national security would require China to build a modernized military in a way commensurate and balanced with its own growing economic might. This is proof that the military still occupied a premier position within the Chinese policy sphere.<sup>56</sup> Within China's new security approach, the armed forces can be expected to implement military diplomacy, participate in bilateral and multilateral dialogues, engage in confidence building measures, participate in peacekeeping operations of the United Nations, and respond to asymmetric security issues such as piracy and counter-terrorism.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Gill, *Rising Star*, p. 29.

<sup>53</sup> Takagi, "Chugoku no "Shin Anzenhoshokan"" (China's "new security concept"), p83.

<sup>54</sup> Jiang Zemin, President of the People's Republic of China Address at the Conference on Disarmament, "Promote Disarmament Process and Safeguard World Security," Geneva, 26 March 1999.

<sup>55</sup> Takagi, "Chugoku no "Shin Anzenhoshokan,"" p. 76.

<sup>56</sup> Jiang Zemin, *Jiang Zemin wenxuan*, vol. 2, pp. 465-466.

<sup>57</sup> Kang Shaobang and Gong Li ed, *Guoji Zhanlue Xinlun* (A New International Strategy), (Beijing, Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 2006), p. 375-378.

How we can understand the role of the armed forces in China's new security approach? Yang Xuetong explains that as Chinese security interest shifted from survival to economic security, the core defense strategy in the post-Cold War became preventing any war which could harm or destroy Chinese economic development.<sup>58</sup> Research of the Central Party School of CCPCC published in 2006 concludes that China's core national interest for the next 10-20 years is economic development.<sup>59</sup> Yang specifies three specific roles for the armed forces in securing the Chinese economy. Foremost, China should seek to avoid the possibility of a war or clash with armed forces. In such an occurrence, the armed forces should prevent a possible war along the periphery of the Chinese border. Because China's critically important cities are located in coastal areas, Yang argued that China needs a powerful defense capability to prevent a war from spreading to these coastal areas. A third role is to secure China's economic interests within its own territory, territorial air space, and territorial waters. Yang insisted China needed to have the capability to secure its own maritime economic interests because China's opportunities to develop and use maritime resources will continue to increase.

Regarding military operations, he explained that prevention of a limited war near Chinese borders is critical. Because that possibility continues to exist along China's periphery, building a powerful military capability during peacetime is necessary. Yang concluded that in order for security policy to be effective, China must implement three types of policy: modernization of China's military, fostering regional cooperation architecture, and enforcing diplomatic relationships with its neighbors. To successfully pursue these three policies, an active and capable military is needed, guaranteeing the role of the military if this framework is adopted.

As China has recognized the importance of economic security, some groups in the CCP insist that China's vulnerability to security risks is also rising. Some observers in China explain that a dual approach of cooperating and balancing is most likely to create the favorable international conditions for China's continued economic growth and security. Research of the PLA's Academy concludes that China, as a developing major power, needs to cooperate and confront as well in international affairs to maximize the national interest.<sup>60</sup>

In the Chinese leaders' view, the new security approach and building a powerful military are consistent within a framework of comprehensive national power symbolized by the phrase "rich country, strong armed forces." This statement, excerpted from Jiang Zemin's statement at the 16<sup>th</sup> Chinese Communist Party Congress in 2002, was a principle of "co-development between defense capability and economic development," promote building defense capability and modernizing military.<sup>61</sup> Moreover, at the 17<sup>th</sup> CCP Congress in 2007, Hu Jintao more clearly stated the willingness to translate economic development into military modernization. "Since the height of national security and national development, unification of economic development and defense capability development, and achievement of unification enriching the nation and

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<sup>58</sup> Yang Xuetong, "Zhongguo Lenzhan hou de Anquan Zhanlüe" ("China's post cold war security strategy"), "Dui Zhongguo Anquan Wenti de Renshi" ("China's perception security issue"), *Zhongguo yu Yatai Anquan* ("China and Asia-Pacific security"), (Beijing, Shishi Chubanshe, 1999), pp. 18-62, pp. 251-278.

<sup>59</sup> Kang and Gong ed, *Guoji Zhanlüe Xinlun*, p. 323.

<sup>60</sup> Ge Dongsheng ed, *Guojia Anquan Zhanlüe Lun* (National Security Strategy), (Beijing, Junshi Kexue Chubanshe), p. 112.

<sup>61</sup> Jiang Zemin, "Quanmianjianshe Xiaokangshehui, Kaichuang Zhongguo Tese Shehuizhiyi Shiye Xinjumian" ("Achieve comprehensive being well-off society, Open new stage China's unique socialism"), p33.

building up strong defenses, China has been quickly traveling down the road of developing a comprehensively well-off society".<sup>62</sup> The continued linkage of economic development and military modernization is clear.<sup>63</sup>

However, for China's neighboring countries, unanswered questions remain. The key questions are: how precisely will China increase transparency on military modernization as its economy develops? How will it share international responsibility with other countries on international affairs? And finally how will its developed military capability be incorporated into the greater security fabric of the Asia Pacific region?

### **Energy and Taiwan: the roles of the PLAN in China's economic security**

Wu Shengli, one of the members of the CMC and a PLAN Commander, asserted that a strong naval capability is needed to respond to a range of threats including territorial disputes, nontraditional security concerns such as terrorism, more traditional concerns of securing China's maritime interest and use of energy SLOCs, and deterring Taiwan's separatists from formally succeeding from China.<sup>64</sup> Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye argue that "some in China may believe that the ultimate guarantor of energy security is the People's Liberation Army and alliances with states of concern." The energy and security debate in China, especially as it regards a proactive PLAN, becomes a concern for surrounding countries as well.<sup>65</sup>

One of the key factors in China's sustained development is preserving energy access. China is dependent on the Strait of Malacca in Southeast Asia for 80 percent of its oil imports and estimates predict that China's oil imports will grow to 200 million tones (per annum) by 2010 with the high probability of continued growth past that date.<sup>66</sup> Some strategists see that high dependence on the Malacca Strait leaving China vulnerable not only to threats of piracy and terrorism, but also to other powerful competitor nations, including the United States, Japan, and India who may also seek to exert control over these maritime routes.<sup>67</sup> Therefore, they emphasize that a powerful naval capability is needed to defend China's use of these SLOCs.<sup>68</sup>

As evidenced by the discussion of energy access and maritime security, the geostrategic importance of Taiwan has come to be re-evaluated alongside China's traditional national concerns of sovereignty over the island.<sup>69</sup> If the PLAN was denied the ability to access or utilize

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<sup>62</sup> Hu Jintao, "Hu Jintao Zai Dang de 17dashang de Baogao"(Hu Jintao's policy speech at 17<sup>th</sup> CCP congress), [http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-10/24/content\\_6938568\\_8.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-10/24/content_6938568_8.htm)

<sup>63</sup> "As the state develop the comprehensive national power, we should appropriately invest for building the defense in order to improve defense capability and the level of the defense." Kang and Gong ed, *Guoji Zhanlue Xinlun*, p. 372.

<sup>64</sup> Wu Shengli and Hu Yanglin, "Duanzao Shiying Wojun Lishi Shiming Yaoqiu de Qiangda Renmin Haijun"(Building up historical-required powerful naval capability), <http://military.people.com.cn/GB/1078/5993685.htm>

<sup>65</sup> Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, "The U.S.-Japan Alliance; Getting Asia Right through 2020," Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2007, p. 5.

<sup>66</sup> Zhang, "Southeast Asia and Energy: Gateway to Stability,"p. 19.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ni Jianmin ed, *Guojia Nengyuan Anquan Baogao* (National Energy Security Report), (Beijing, Renmin Chunbanshe, 2005), pp. 151-152.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

the Taiwan Strait, the coastal defense of China could not be coordinated between the North China Sea Fleet, East China Sea Fleet, and South China Sea Fleet, diminishing their combined effectiveness in a conflict.<sup>70</sup> Chinese leaders believe that an independent Taiwan or a Taiwan operating in concert with other foreign powers would make the Chinese coastal area of the East China Sea and the South China Sea vulnerable like a “drawn sword on China’s stomach.” Viewing control of Taiwan as a geostrategic necessity, Chinese leaders conclude that an independent Taiwan would be a grave threat to Chinese security as well as an unbearable blow to Chinese sovereignty.<sup>71</sup>

Viewing the Chinese energy security debate from a Japanese security planner’s perspective, one must look carefully at the rapid modernization of PLA without transparency, a military capability imbalance in the Taiwan Strait shifted in favor of mainland China, the PLA Navy focus on control of energy SLOCs, and the severe negative environmental impact of air pollution from China. The uncertainty surrounding the resolution of Taiwan’s status is a particular source of concern for Japanese security because Taiwan is located centrally among the SLOCs to Japan, South Korea, and China. The possibility of conflict in the area rendering them unusable would have dire consequences for the economies of East Asia. This is detrimental to the interests of all countries and regions, including the United States. While distinct differences continue to exist as to the final resolution of Taiwan’s status, Japan has a particular interest in stable relations in the Asia-Pacific region that will enable a peaceful and diplomatic solution.

As with all other nations that depend on energy imports from distant sources, Chinese concerns about energy security are understandable and justified. But while using energy security as the primary cause for military expansion of the PLA leaves unanswered the question of how and if they will share responsibility for this task with the other nations in the Asia-Pacific. Leaving that question unanswered, and taking a realistic view toward China’s increased military ability, it is certain that China now has more leverage in achieving a wider range of policy options toward Taiwan and other Asian nations. The lack of transparency surrounding military modernization gives the appearance of a challenge and competition rather than being a cooperative partner in the realms of energy security and stable Asia-Pacific relations. As a country developing comprehensive power, it is China’s responsibility to explain its security policy to other countries and under what circumstances and methods that power could be translated into action.

Lt. Gen. Zhang Qinsheng, former deputy chief of Staff of the PLA, attended the 6<sup>th</sup> IISS Asian Security Summit, Shangri-la Dialogue in June 2007 and stated the goal of “building a harmonious Asia-Pacific of lasting peace and common prosperity”; this was a positive sign and a constructive confidence building measure.<sup>72</sup> Making China’s security policy more transparent is

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<sup>70</sup> Shigeo Hiramatsu, “Chugoku Taiwan Kankei to Chugoku no Tai Taiwan Gunji Senryaku” (China-Taiwan relationship and China’s Military Strategy against Taiwan), Aichidaigakuk kokusaimondai kenkyusyo ed, *21seiki ni Okeru Hokuto Ajia no Kokusaikankei* (International Relations in Northeast Asia in the 21<sup>st</sup> century), (Nagoya, Toho Choten, 2006), p. 161; Ni ed, *Guojia Nengyuan Anquan Baogao*, pp. 134-135.

<sup>71</sup> Ni, *Guojia Nengyuan Anquan Baogao*, p. 129.

<sup>72</sup> Lieutenant General Zhang Qinsheng, “Strengthen Dialogue and Cooperation, Maintain Peace and Prosperity”, Speech at the Plenary Session, 6<sup>th</sup> Shangri-La Dialogue by Lt. Gen. Zhang Qinsheng, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, PLA, People’s Republic of China,” <http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/plenary-session-speeches-2007/second-plenary-session--lt-gen-zhang-qinshen>.

needed not only for neighboring countries but also for China in order to stabilize the relationship among other nations in the Asia-Pacific through a “peaceful rise.” But despite these statements, continued proactive military modernization is ongoing as evidenced by Hu’s statement at the 17<sup>th</sup> CCP Congress in October 2007. He stated that “achieving unification by enriching the nation and building strong defenses at the process of developing a comprehensively “well-off society””. Discerning true Chinese intentions from often conflicting statements and images of Chinese security policy is a continuing process.

### **A subterranean “guns or butter” debate on China’s energy security**

There is internal controversy within the CCP regarding the role of armed forces in China’s energy security. Ni Jianmin, the International Bureau deputy head at the Central Policy Research Center within the CCP, concluded that the constant threat to China’s energy security is soaring oil prices, not embargo or blockade by war.<sup>73</sup> Some insist that China must acknowledge that it does not yet have the capability to ensure the security of its energy SLOC, and still requires cooperation with other nations to provide this security. Zha Daojiong, a professor in Renmin University in China, criticized Chinese analysts who argue “the United States controls vital sea lanes in the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and Southeast Asia, making unfettered transportation of Middle Eastern and African ports to Chinese shores a matter of U.S. choice. They seem to oppose the military-oriented energy security debate.”<sup>74</sup> Zha offers a counter argument that “China benefits from the freedom of commercial navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, which since the late 1970s has been protected by the U.S. naval presence in the region. Chinese analysts who complain about U.S. hegemony in the Middle East fail to take note of their own country’s need for security in maritime transport”.<sup>75</sup>

For Chinese economic security, a stable international environment along China’s periphery which includes the Taiwan Strait is critically important. If the economy is the top priority, then the international status quo provides a beneficial environment for the Chinese with respect to increased levels of trade, tourism, and investment, creating jobs, expanding wealth, and preserving stability.<sup>76</sup> Taiwan’s geographic importance, situated along the SLOCs to Japan, South Korea, and China means that the possibility of conflict in the area rendering them unusable would have dire consequences for the economies of Asia-Pacific.

How then can China most effectively engage in maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region? China’s insecurity is caused mainly by dependence upon unfettered access to foreign sources of energy and trade transiting through maritime routes. To minimize the potential risk, China is planning to diversify transportation channels, routes and countries to import energy to China. For example, the development of a canal or pipeline across the Isthmus of Kra in southern

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<sup>73</sup> Ni, *Guojia Nengyuan Anquan Baogao*, p. 16.

<sup>74</sup> Zha Daojiong and Hu Weixing, “Promoting Energy Partnership in Beijing and Washington”, *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 2007, pp.105-115.

<sup>75</sup> Zha Daojiong and Hu Weixing, p. 108.

<sup>76</sup> Friedman, Edward, “China’s dilemma on using military force,” Edward Friedman ed, *China’s rise, Taiwan’s dilemmas, and international peace*, (Routledge, 2005), p. 218.

Thailand, and oil pipeline from Sittwe to Kunming in Yunnan Province of China.<sup>77</sup> China is “certainly considering the use of force as a last option of defense against direct threats such as a blockade during a Taiwan crisis,”<sup>78</sup> but today generally it seeks to expand maritime influence through cooperation on nontraditional security issues with littoral states and by way of preparing for or engaging in armed conflict.

It is apparent that Chinese leadership feels insecure about the level to which they rely on maritime security provided by the U.S. Navy, but they also know that it is impossible to change this situation in the near future. Thus what some critics in Asia-Pacific nations and the United States may perceive as a non-transparent and unreasonable expansion of national power may in fact reflect more of a passive character and perceived strategic vulnerability by the Chinese leadership than a challenge to the existing order in the Asia-Pacific.

### **Partnership with China via U.S alliance network**

In order to integrate China as a responsible and constructive stakeholder in the region, understanding the complexity of China’s security is necessary. China’s perceived vulnerability and undeveloped policy on energy security may offer opportunities for security cooperation with the other nations in the Asia Pacific region. A coordinated response to energy security and environmental concerns via economic and military measures is possible to provide solutions in areas where interests converge and could narrow policy differences in other areas.

Through diplomacy (including alliance strengthening) and through technical assistance, Japan and the United States can try to influence China’s state-controlled energy policy in order to more fully integrate China into the international oil security system. Energy technical assistance and strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance is a dual policy on the part of the Japan and U.S. to engage China. In May 2006, Taro Aso, the former minister of foreign affairs in Japan, made a speech, in which he insisted that “it remains uncertain what course China’s development will take, hence, we need to resolve this uncertainty in order to minimize volatility of the East Asian regional climate.”<sup>79</sup> Aso believes that China understands its responsibility to enforce the international system. However, in urging China to undertake such an effort, it is important for Japan and the U.S. to assist China in a mutually beneficial manner to eliminate potential bottlenecks, sustain economic development as well as address environmental damage, and overconsumption of energy, and water resources. Aso explained that the outcome of this cooperation is not only resolving uncertainty, but also that China will recognize that its constructive cooperation with other key countries contributes to its national interest. A month after Aso’s speech, the Joint Statement of Japan and the United States: “The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century” stipulated that the United States and Japan share interests in “securing freedom of navigation and commerce, including sea lanes; and enhancing global energy security.”<sup>80</sup> Security cooperation between Japan and Australia, as well as the United States,

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<sup>77</sup> This canal or pipeline is unlikely to make a progress due to economic, technical constraints as well as recent domestic political upheaval in Thailand and Myanmar. See Zhang, “Southeast Asia and Energy: Gateway to Stability”, p. 21-22.

<sup>78</sup> Zhang, “Southeast Asia and Energy: Gateway to Stability”, p. 21.

<sup>79</sup> Taro Aso, “Washington de higashiajia wo ronjiru”, *Jiyuto Haneino ko*, gentosha, 2007, pp. 169-183.

<sup>80</sup> Joint Statement: The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/print/20060629-2.html>



would function as a collective hedge vis-à-vis a rising China.<sup>81</sup> This cooperation will contribute to maritime and aviation security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Such mutual hedging may result in creating a situation with China on one side and Japan, Australia, and the United States on the other, with all trying to promote close economic relations bilaterally and multilaterally at the same time.<sup>82</sup> Strengthened relationships and healthy cooperative military exchanges may also contribute to peaceful management of future tensions in the Taiwan Strait. The United States, Japan, and China can work to reduce China's pressure on the world's energy supplies via joint research, development, and technological assistance. This cooperation provides China effective energy security and environmental technology, and also helps ensure a path of sustainable development and peaceful rise within the Asia-Pacific.

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<sup>81</sup> Yoshinobu Yamamoto, "Strengthening Security Cooperation with Australia: A New Security Means for Japan", [http://www.jiia.or.jp/en\\_commentary/200710/09-1.html](http://www.jiia.or.jp/en_commentary/200710/09-1.html)

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.



# Cross-Strait Relations and the United States Perspective

By A. Greer Pritchett

Easing tensions across the Taiwan Strait would remove one of the major sources of anxiety in U.S.-PRC relations, in the Asia Pacific region, and in the world. This would represent a major achievement for the U.S. government.

Such a delicate balancing act will be difficult to manage. China will remain suspicious of and vigilant toward any seeming impropriety on Taiwan's side and the nationalist zeal in Taiwan will continue, especially as President Chen Shui-bian serves out his last months in office, bent on pushing the independence envelope. However, the U.S. government must continue to manage this complex problem. As long as this flashpoint continues to exist, the United States will spend an unnecessary amount of time handling both parties rather than focusing on maximizing areas of common interest. Further, as long as this conflict continues, the metastability<sup>83</sup> the United States currently relies upon in East Asia will continually be called into question.

## Dichotomies and Dualities

Cross-Strait relations are one of the most delicate foreign policy situations through which the United States must navigate. Part of the difficulty stems from the fact that the U.S., though an ardent supporter of democracy, cannot and will not support a move toward *de jure* independence by Taiwan from China. In fact, the U.S. government has frowned on recent attempts by President Chen to hold a series of referenda<sup>84</sup>, though the Taiwanese leader claims that this is one of privileged acts incumbent to a democracy, giving the people a chance to have their voices heard. At the same time, the U.S. is sworn to "... maintain the capacity... to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan,"<sup>85</sup> as outlined in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. Therefore, should China decide that Taiwan has breached one of the so called "red lines" and makes an aggressive and overtly hostile move against the island, the U.S. would ostensibly provide Taiwan with military support and assistance.

Another dichotomy in cross-Strait relations, at least from a U.S. perspective, is that there are disparities between the U.S. government position and non-official positions. Though this is not uncommon, and the acceptance of dissenting positions is a cornerstone of a democratic state, some in the DPP government, especially President Chen, have prefer to listen to these views even though they do not represent the official-U.S. position.<sup>86</sup> This not only adds fuel to the

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<sup>83</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski discusses this concept of "metastability" in, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*. He discusses how Northeast Asia today is reminiscent of pre-World War I Europe, and that the dangers of regional power rivalries in Northeast Asia need to be mitigated so as not to bring about the downfall of the region.

<sup>84</sup> The two referenda concern a change in the Taiwanese constitution and the recent petition to join the United Nations under the name "Taiwan."

<sup>85</sup> <[http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive\\_Index/Taiwan\\_Relations\\_Act.html](http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive_Index/Taiwan_Relations_Act.html)>

<sup>86</sup> The stated USG position is that there should be no unilateral change in the *status quo*.

Taiwanese independence movement, but it also leads China to think that we are not keeping President Chen in check, leading to much consternation on the mainland.<sup>87</sup>

This sheds light on another source of duality: on the one hand, China spends a great deal of energy getting the U.S. to understand Chen Shui-bian's maneuvers, hoping to get the U.S. to oppose these moves; on the other hand, China has seen President Chen's moves as evidence that the U.S. has limited influence over Chen him.<sup>88</sup>

### **Looking Ahead - Chen's Final Months and Beyond**

Maintaining peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region, generally, and in the Taiwan Strait, specifically, is crucial for the United States; this is clear. This should not imply that the U.S. needs to play a direct role mediating the cross-Strait conflict. This is yet another reason why this current impasse between China and Taiwan is difficult to finesse. The U.S. must operate within shades of gray; emphasizing the need for flexibility on both the Chinese and Taiwanese sides while actively promoting dialogue between parties. Our role should be one that helps guard against miscalculation, but this should not be confused with there being a "U.S. fix" to the problem.

In Beijing, the official line is that the coming year will be one of "great danger" because President Chen, in the final year of his presidency, will make some dramatic move toward independence. During a recent meeting with a diplomat from the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, it was explained that aside from the overwhelming drive to pull off a seamless Olympics, the issue that is at the forefront of everyone's mind is Taiwan. Chen's recent actions, petitioning for U.N. membership under the name of Taiwan, have exacerbated the mainland's apprehensions and fuel the alarmist school.

However, some take a more optimistic view and agree with the "window of opportunity" thesis. Chinese advocates of this view believe that whoever wins the election will want to improve relations with the mainland, and this group of optimists is arguing for greater Chinese flexibility.

Whether it is Ma Ying-jeou, the KMT presidential candidate, or Frank Hsieh, the DPP candidate, it is imperative that more than a modicum of trust is developed between the mainland and the new president of Taiwan. The relationship between China and President Chen was poisoned early on by a mutual lack of trust on both sides of the Strait. This cannot be allowed to continue into the next generation of Taiwanese leadership.

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<sup>87</sup> For example, in a recent meeting the author attended with several Taiwanese diplomats, the remarks made by former United States permanent representative to the United Nations, John Bolton, were brought up to corroborate the fact that "influentials" in the United States believe that the U.S. position with regard to Taiwan is flawed. It was pointed out that Bolton no longer represented the U.S. in any official capacity, but this detail seemed irrelevant to the Taiwanese party.

<sup>88</sup> This idea was explored in further detail in Alan Romberg's article, "Election 2008 and the Future of Cross-Strait Relations," *China Leadership Monitor* No. 21, summer 2007.

However, it does seem likely that a window of opportunity could exist to improve cross-Strait relations after Chen leaves office. However, for this to occur, all three sides — Beijing, Taipei, and Washington — will need to adopt policies that exploit this opportunity.

## **Conclusion**

In order for the U.S. to construct a cohesive and inclusive foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region, cross-Strait relations should be at the forefront of U.S. government. This is one of the singular issues that could bring the United States into a military conflict with another great power, China, and is an issue with widespread ramifications for other countries in the region, and therefore continues to breed mistrust and apprehension.<sup>89</sup> Further still, the question of “Taiwan” is still a relatively divisive issue domestically for the U.S., considering the continued strength of the pro-Taiwan lobby. With all these factors in mind, it is imperative that the U.S. remain engaged in the developments in the Taiwan Strait.

Washington will be guided by the same considerations it has followed during the past 30 years. It wants peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, good relations with China, and no forced reunification. It is opposed to any unilateral steps taken by either side. The central point that both Taiwan and China should note is that, though the present administration has had a tendency to wander the more ideologically driven path, when it comes to security in this particular region, The U.S. is pragmatist. Our patience and willingness to put ourselves on the line for an ally will only go so far if its actions have the potential to damage our peace and security. Taiwan will need to develop a strategy toward the mainland that respects U.S. national interests, instead of blazing a trail that might be damaging to them. (Hopefully whoever comes to power in the March 2008 presidential elections will understand and follow this.) At the same time, China needs to understand that after the 2008 elections, there might be a moment to ameliorate some of the tensions across the strait, and this should be seized. Offering increased flexibility toward Taiwan and dealing with conflicts that may arise with a more measured approach is highly advised. Finally, China should not expect any radical departure from the United States’ stated policy. Put another way, the U.S. is not looking to “sell out” Taiwan.

One could use the metaphor of walking a tightrope when thinking about cross-strait dialogue. Like most successful acrobatic feats, one cannot simply hold one’s breath, close one’s eyes, and hope for the best; rather one must maintain concentration and not be distracted by audience members’ shouts and requests. This should be the U.S. mindset when working on the cross-strait impasse.

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<sup>89</sup> This is especially true when discussing Japan’s potential role in the conflict.



# The Benign and the Belligerent: Re-Framing Taiwan's Role in Singapore's Regional Foreign Policy

By Ting Ming Hwa

In 1949, the Kuomintang (KMT) forces under Chiang Kai-shek retreated to Taiwan after they were defeated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under Mao Zedong. This event effectively marked the start of the Cold War in Asia. During the Cold War, the prospect of communist expansion, as evidenced by the domino theory was deemed to pose the most serious threat to Southeast Asia's political stability. By extension, therefore, China was viewed as a political threat as well. The geopolitical conditions were conducive for Taiwan to develop close links with Southeast Asian states; yet this development did not eventuate then.

With the end of the Cold War, communism no longer poses an imminent political threat to Southeast Asian states. Furthermore, since 1978, China under Deng Xiaoping not only underwent economic liberalization and adopted capitalist measures, but also ceased support for communist parties in Southeast Asia. Communist China therefore, is no longer the bogeyman it once was. However, this paper argues that it is still possible for Taiwan to play a significant role as it can still exercise a degree of ideational influence in maintaining stability in Southeast Asia. This paper will establish how Taiwan's *bentuhua* (本土化) policy helps to alleviate the ethnic tension Singapore faces from Malaysia and Indonesia, and in so doing, indirectly contributes to regional stability. Consequently, this development allows Taiwan to continue making its presence felt in the region, thereby maintaining its relevance.

## Colonial Legacy, Contemporary Repercussions: Relevance of Taiwan's *Bentuhua* (本土化) to Singapore

From Singapore's perspective, Taiwan's *bentuhua* (本土化) policy has much relevance and significance. This Taiwanese policy provides evidence that vindicates Singapore's continual struggle to convince both Malaysia and Indonesia that ethnic identity and political identity need not be congruent, thereby reducing the ethnic tension that has been a blight on Singapore's relations with these two states even before its independence in 1965.

Modern Singapore was founded by Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles in 1819. Prior to the British presence, the island was inhabited mostly by Malays. The British establishment of a free port in Singapore created increased economic opportunities that attracted many migrants, most of them ethnic Chinese from China, to the island. As a result of this development, Singapore underwent a major demographic transformation; ethnic Chinese soon displaced the indigenous Malays to become the dominant ethnic group. This trend continues. As Mauzy and Milne point out, Singapore suffers from a "double minority" setting: the Chinese are a majority in Singapore, but a minority in the region; the Malays are a minority in Singapore but a strong majority in the

immediate region.<sup>90</sup> As such, Singapore has been described as essentially “a Chinese island in a sea of Malays.”<sup>91</sup>

Singapore’s reputation as a regional outsider has also been in part encouraged by the actions of its policymakers who generally acknowledge 1819 as the starting point of Singapore’s founding history. As an ethnic anomaly with a large Chinese majority in the region, it might be possible for Singapore to moderate its image as an outsider by emphasising its pre-colonial Malay heritage. However, as Rahim correctly points out, Singapore’s political leadership has a policy of downplaying its Malay heritage and history.<sup>92</sup> Her argument is directly supported by the statement of Rajaratnam, Singapore’s first foreign minister, in 1990 that:

There is no shared past for us before 1819 when Raffles landed in Singapore and opened the island's doors to people from the four corners of the earth. Our memories before 1819 go back to different lands, different times, different histories and different peoples. These are memories that Singaporeans cannot share collectively. Our common memories are the joys, sorrows, disappointments and achievements since 1819. This is our only and relevant history to shape and guide our future. The history before 1819 is that of ancestral ghosts.<sup>93</sup>

The repression of the Republic’s past Malay heritage indicates that Singapore is not entirely at ease with its pre-colonial history. However, by focusing on the post-1819 history, Singapore is indirectly playing up its Chinese roots since ethnic Chinese constitute the majority of its population since then. Moreover, Lee Kuan Yew also acknowledged in his memoirs that “No foreign country other than Britain has had a greater influence on Singapore’s political development than China, the ancestral homeland of three-quarters of [Singapore’s population].”<sup>94</sup> As a result of the sizeable presence of ethnic Chinese and their dominant culture in Singapore, it has thus been perceived by both Malaysia and Indonesia to be an outsider in Southeast Asia, and this perception has clouded Singapore’s bilateral relationships with them.<sup>95</sup>

Due to Singapore’s inverse ethnic ratio in relation to the region, Singapore has always sought to establish and consolidate an identity that distances it from being viewed as a real or imagined Chinese satellite state by both Malaysia and Indonesia. Singapore was the last of the ASEAN-5 states to normalize relations with China. This was because as early as 1966, Lee Kuan Yew warned of the political risks Singapore faced if it was perceived to be a Chinese state by regional states:

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<sup>90</sup> Diane K. Mauzy and R.S. Milne, *Singapore Politics under the People's Action Party* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 99-100.

<sup>91</sup> Amitav Acharya, *Singapore's Foreign Policy: The Search for Regional Order* (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007), 23.

<sup>92</sup> Lily Zubaidah Rahim, "Singapore-Malaysia Relations: Deep-Seated Tensions and Self-Fulfilling Prophecies.," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 29, no. 1 (1999).

<sup>93</sup> "S'pore's Future Depends on Shared Memories, Collective Amnesia," *Straits Times*, 20 June 1990.

<sup>94</sup> Lee Kuan Yew Lee, *From Third World to First, the Singapore Story: 1965-2000* (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), 573.

<sup>95</sup> Bilveer Singh, *The Vulnerability of Small States Revisited: A Study of Singapore's Post-Cold War Foreign Policy* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1999), 17.



If you want a Chinese chauvinist society, failure is assured. Singapore will surely be isolated. But even if you are not isolated and you extend your chauvinistic influence to our neighbours, they will, if they find no way out, join up with another big neighbour to deal with you.<sup>96</sup>

In order to maintain its regional viability, Singapore set out to project an identity that is different from China. Likewise, Taiwan, over the past 20 years, has also sought to accomplish this same goal through the policy of *bentuhua*, and its outcome is pertinent for Singapore.

### **Bentuhua Policy in Taiwan**

The policy of *bentuhua* is defined by Makeham to represent “a type of nationalism that champions the legitimacy of a distinct Taiwanese identity, the character and content of which should be determined by the Taiwanese people.”<sup>97</sup> Under the *bentuhua* process, Taiwan strives to achieve its own national and political identities that are separate from China.

In 1949, the KMT lost the civil war and formed a government-in-exile in Taiwan. The KMT regime then was dominated by mainland elites who perceived the KMT to be the legitimate government of both the Republic of China (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). However, as more Taiwanese were born in Taiwan, this demographic development meant that the islanders became an increasingly significant political force in the ROC. The islanders perceived themselves to be different from the mainland Chinese in Taiwan. As a result of this demographic change, the KMT introduced the *bentuhua* policy to appeal to the increasing number of islanders in Taiwan. This is because these individuals have little or no emotional ties with China, who then perceived the KMT, whose senior ranks were dominated by mainlanders, to be less representative of the general population. The KMT’s fundamental aim of *bentuhua*, therefore, was to find common political ground between these two groups.<sup>98</sup>

The growth of the *dangwai* (黨外) movement was another catalyst that accelerated the pace of democratic reform and reorganization in Taiwan by the KMT. As a result of the democratization process, Taiwan began to acquire an overall identity that was increasingly different from China, so much so that “Chineseness” is no longer perceived to be the core element of Taiwanese identity.<sup>99</sup> Although Taiwanese and mainland Chinese belong to the same ethnic group, the *bentuhua* policy has resulted in these two groups developing significantly divergent political identities over the past 20 years. More recently, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has also moved to downplay Chiang Kai-shek’s legacy in Taiwan, and the fundamental objective is to distance Taiwan from its mainland ties.

The argument that Taiwan’s identity is distinct from that of the mainland is aptly summed up by Lee Teng-hui’s commencement address at Cornell in 1995 when he described

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<sup>96</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>97</sup> John Makeham and A-chin Hsiau, eds., *Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 1.

<sup>98</sup> Shale Horowitz, Uk Heo, and Alexander C. Tan, eds., *Identity and Change in East Asian Conflicts: The Cases of China, Taiwan and the Koreas* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 9.

<sup>99</sup> Wang Fu-chang, “Why Bother about School Textbooks?: An Analysis of the Origin of the Disputes over *Renshi Taiwan* Textbook in 1997”, in Makeham and Hsiau, eds., *Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua*, p. 56.

Taiwan's unique political and cultural development over the years as the "Taiwan Experience". He elaborated that:

By the term Taiwan Experience I mean what the people of Taiwan have accumulated in recent years through successful political reform and economic development. This experience has already gained widespread recognition by international society and is being taken by many developing nations as a model to emulate. Essentially, the Taiwan Experience constitutes the economic, political and social transformation of my nation over the years; a transformation which I believe has profound implications for the future development of the Asia-Pacific region and world peace.<sup>100</sup>

Politically, Taiwan under the Chiangs was an authoritarian state. Taiwan's political culture was therefore, largely similar to that of mainland China. Economically though, Taiwan was vastly different from China. Taiwan has always been a capitalist economy whereas China is still officially a socialist economy. However, with the implementation of *bentuhua*, Taiwan began its democratization process and its political culture changed accordingly, such that in recent years, democratization has become the defining trait of *bentuhua*;<sup>101</sup> economic differences are no longer the defining characteristic that separates Taiwan and China.

### **Congruent Culture, Divergent Destinies**

Taiwan's emphasis on the divergence between ethnic and political identities through *bentuhua* is very pertinent for Singapore. Within Southeast Asia, Malays constitute the ethnic majority. Although there are ethnic Chinese in every state, it is only in Singapore that they constitute the majority. At the same time, Singapore's political administration is largely dominated by Chinese. As such, the Chinese in Singapore have greater room to express their Chinese identity and culture. Lee Kuan Yew has also gone as far as to argue that Singapore is the only place in Southeast Asia where ethnic Chinese are not discriminated against and can hold their heads up high.<sup>102</sup> However, this development does not mean that Singapore is, by default, a Sinic outpost in Southeast Asia, or a "kinsman country" of China.<sup>103</sup> This potential for ethnic identity and political identity to be perceived as congruent by regional states is the predicament confronting Singapore. From Singapore's perspective, cultivating closer relations with Taiwan can serve as a buffer for such misperceptions. This is because, Taiwan, by continuing to champion its own distinctive political identity that is separate from China, emphasizes that even though both Taiwan and China do share a common ethnic identity, this does not mean that both entities are, in fact, the same.

To complicate matters for Singapore and increase the need for the latter to make such a distinction, China has a history of using the term "Overseas Chinese" in a general and ambiguous manner to refer to both Chinese citizens residing overseas and ethnic Chinese who

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<sup>100</sup> Lee Teng-hui Lee, *Always in My Heart-Commencement Address at Cornell* (1995 [cited 25 September 2007]); available from <http://cns.miis.edu/straittalk/Appendix%2080.htm>.

<sup>101</sup> Lee Teng-hui: "What actually is the goal of Taiwan's democratization? Speaking simply, it is the 'Taiwanization of Taiwan' (台灣的本土化)." Quoted from J. Bruce Jacobs, "'Taiwanization' in Taiwan's Politics" in Makeham and Hsiau, eds., *Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Bentuhua*, 17.

<sup>102</sup> T.S. George, *Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974), 169.

<sup>103</sup> This term is used repeatedly in the chapter "China: The Dragon with a Long Tail" of Lee Kuan Yew's memoirs. Lee, *From Third World to First, the Singapore Story: 1965-2000*.

are citizens of other countries.<sup>104</sup> Fitzgerald writes that one of the ways that the CCP has used the term “Overseas Chinese” is to denote “mainly Chinese nationals but also including all those who still maintained some attachment to the Chinese homeland.”<sup>105</sup> These perceived linkages that were thought to exist between ethnic Southeast Asian Chinese and mainland Chinese were very strong in the 1960s when many Southeast Asian states gained their independence. Rosenau posited that the key explanation was because:

For various reasons the Chinese in Southeast Asia have become leading merchants of these countries and in turn, are subject to oppressive taxation and discrimination in many ways. They naturally turn to China for protection [...]. Hence, this minority group becomes involved in the eyes of the dominant majority in these countries, a potential fifth column, to which is added the problem of whether or not the Communist Party will succeed in organizing these Chinese minorities.<sup>106</sup>

A consequence of the Chinese government’s loose usage of this term was that ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia were continually viewed with distrust by the Malay majority.<sup>107</sup> The Southeast Asian governments were worried about the political loyalties of their ethnic Chinese. More recently, the Chinese government has also at times referred to overseas ethnic Chinese as “diaspora.” The term “diaspora” has specific connotations that are at odds with the geopolitical realities of nationhood and sovereignty in Southeast Asia. By referring to the overseas Chinese as “diaspora,” it suggests that the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia regard China, and not the present states they inhabit, as their “homeland.” The Chinese government’s chosen terminology indicates that they perceive these overseas Chinese as (pseudo-) Chinese nationals who are merely based overseas.

Even though the vast majority of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia are now citizens of the Southeast Asian states, mistrust by the Malay majority toward the Chinese minority has not been eradicated. Historically, the overseas Chinese were more attached to China. They went overseas to regions like Southeast Asia to seek better employment opportunities and still considered mainland China to be their homeland. As such, ethnic Chinese who were based overseas were deeply involved with China’s political developments. They contributed financial and material resources to Sun Yat-sen’s efforts during the 1911 Revolution in China and the Sino-Japanese War.

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<sup>104</sup> Leo Suryadinata, *China and the Asean States: The Ethnic Chinese Dimension* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985).

<sup>105</sup> Stephen Fitzgerald, *China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Peking's Changing Policy, 1949-1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. x.

<sup>106</sup> James Rosenau, *Of Boundaries and Bridges: A Report on the Interdependencies of National and International Systems* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 42-3.

<sup>107</sup> Although Singapore claims to be a meritocracy, ethnicity is still a barrier in certain occupations for Malay Singaporeans. The ethnic distrust is mutual. Lee Kuan Yew said in a 1999 interview that “If, for instance, you put in a Malay officer who's very religious and who has family ties in Malaysia in charge of a machine gun unit, that's a very tricky business.” Quoted in Irene Ng and Lydia Lim, “Reality Is Race Bonds Exist-SM,” *Straits Times*, 19 September 1999. Lee Hsien Loong reasons that “If there is a conflict, if the SAF is called to defend the homeland, we don’t want to put any of our soldiers in a difficult position where his emotions for the nation may come into conflict with his emotions for his religion.” Quoted in Michael Leifer, *Singapore's Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 94.

This historical national inclination of the overseas Chinese is no longer applicable. However, this outdated perspective has yet to be completely eradicated. This is because this notion provides [flawed] legitimacy for regional governments to discriminate against ethnic Chinese on the basis of potentially suspect political inclinations and allegiances. In a similar vein, older ethnic Chinese who received a Chinese education and therefore have a stronger Chinese cultural background in Singapore are still sometimes regarded by regional states to be Chinese nationals rather than Singaporeans.<sup>108</sup> For instance, Lee Kuan Yew did not mince words and described the suspicions regional state have toward Singapore as “visceral”<sup>109</sup> because the indigenous peoples of Southeast Asia will always distrust the ethnic Chinese among them.<sup>110</sup> It is significant to note that China at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was the “Sick Man of the East”. Yet, overseas Chinese still identified with it. Now, at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, China is emerging as an economic and a political force. This development is reigniting fears among regional Malay political elites that conditions are conducive for another wave of neo-Chinese chauvinism in Southeast Asia.

The real or perceived existence of pan-Chinese sentiments under China’s aegis gives Malaysian and Indonesian governments cause to question the political loyalties of their ethnic Chinese populations. A corollary development would be for these two states to also view Singapore as politically suspect since ethnic Chinese constitute the majority of its population, especially in times of crisis. For instance, in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, Indonesian President Wahid felt that Singapore did not do enough to assist Indonesia during the economic crisis and accused Singapore of only wanting to develop relations with China.<sup>111</sup> In November 2000, Wahid also publicly stated that “Singaporeans despise Malays. We are considered non-existent”, and suggested that Malaysia turn off the taps that supplied water to Singapore.<sup>112</sup> This show of Malay solidarity against Singapore demonstrates that the ethnic issue is one of the perennial problems Singapore has to address in its regional foreign policy.

## Perception and Misperception

The image of ethnic Chinese in Singapore described above is an outmoded one that is not accurate.<sup>113</sup> However, it must be acknowledged that “It is an undeniable privilege of every man to prove himself right in the thesis that the world is his enemy; for if he reiterates it frequently enough and makes it the background of his conduct, he is bound eventually to be right.”<sup>114</sup> Hence, if Malaysia and Indonesia both have a pre-conception of Singapore as a Sinic outpost, Singapore would then be perceived to be one as it falls victim to confirmation bias. As a result, the

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<sup>108</sup> Suryadinata, *China and the Asean States: The Ethnic Chinese Dimension*, 18-9.

<sup>109</sup> Lee, *From Third World to First, the Singapore Story: 1965-2000*, 599.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., 600.

<sup>111</sup> Michael Richardson, *Wahid Speech Said to Assail Singaporeans* (28 November 2000 [cited 16 August 2007]); available from [http://www.iht.com/articles/2000/11/28/pacif.2.t\\_1.php](http://www.iht.com/articles/2000/11/28/pacif.2.t_1.php).

<sup>112</sup> Warren Caragata, *Making Enemies* (2000 [cited 16 August 2007]); available from <http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/foc/2000/11/27/>.

<sup>113</sup> Lee Kuan Yew asked Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong why he had problems with ethnic Chinese in Vietnam. Pham Van Dong’s “blunt answer was that, as an ethnic Chinese, [Lee] should know that ethnic Chinese would always support China all the time, just as Vietnamese would support Vietnam, wherever they might be.” See Lee, *From Third World to First, the Singapore Story: 1965-2000*, p. 599.

<sup>114</sup> X (George F. Kennan), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs* 25, no. 1 (1947): 569.

Republic must then go the extra mile to falsify this hypothesis. Jervis rightly argues that this objective is difficult to achieve since “[accurate] images are not automatically accepted, especially when the perceiver has reason to believe a state would like an image accepted whether it is accurate or not”.<sup>115</sup> Boulding supports Jervis’ stance by arguing that political elites generally interpret and perceive political developments in a haphazard manner as the process of reality formation is based largely on “a melange of narrative history, memories of past events, stories and conversations, etc., plus an enormous amount of usually ill-digested and carelessly collected current information.”<sup>116</sup>

Goh Chok Tong, speaking on Singapore's need for a credible defences force, made a comment that could easily be misinterpreted by regional political elites to mean that nationality is not a durable identity, which provides an explanation for why Malaysia and Indonesia’s continually distrust Singapore:

I was born a British subject. Before I could even walk, the Japanese dropped their bombs on Singapore. Soon Singapore fell, and I became, I suppose a Japanese subject. The Japanese lost the war in 1945. Singapore was returned to the British, and I became a British subject again. In 1959, when I was still in school, I became a Singaporean citizen. In 1963, when I was in the university, I became a Malaysian when Singapore became part of Malaysia. Two years later, soon after I started work, I reverted to Singapore citizenship. So, all in all, I have changed nationality five times!”<sup>117</sup>

Even though Goh’s nationality has changed many times, his ethnicity is permanent and has not changed. The permanency of ethnicity, in contrast to Goh’s implied transient nature of nationality, is the crux of the issue that sullies Singapore’s bilateral relations with both Malaysia and Indonesia. Singapore is unable to obscure its Chinese ethnicity and so it cannot afford to acquire the reputation of being under China’s political sway, which would prove detrimental to its regional well-being. However, Singapore can emphasize the distinction between its political identity and ethnic identity. This is the area where closer relations with Taiwan, which China does not fully approve of, can play an important role.

With the *bentuhua* policy, Taiwan has managed to successfully establish and consolidate its own unique identity that is different from China. This development has the potential to reduce the structural tension Singapore faces in the region because of historical misperceptions over the political allegiances of its ethnic Chinese. As Schelling rightly argues, “words are cheap [and] not inherently credible...Actions...prove something; significant actions usually incur some cost or risk, and carry some evidence of their credibility”.<sup>118</sup> Thus even though closer relations with Taiwan will elicit significant opposition from China as evidenced by its strong reaction to Lee Hsien Loong’s official visit to Taiwan before he became prime minister, it is important for Singapore to persist in this course of action. To have bowed to Chinese pressure would only serve to validate the hypothesis of regional states that Singapore is under China’s political sway.

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<sup>115</sup> Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 11.

<sup>116</sup> Kenneth E. Boulding, “Learning and Reality-Testing Process in the International System”, in John C. Farrell and Asa P. Smith, eds., *Image and Reality in World Politics* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1968), 9.

<sup>117</sup> Goh Chok Tong Goh, “The Second Long March,” in *Speech by Mr Goh Chok Tong, First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, at the Nanyang Technological Institute (NTI) Forum* (Singapore: Singapore Government, 1986).

<sup>118</sup> Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 150.

## Conclusion

Geopolitical considerations during the Cold War presented Taiwan with the opportunity to consolidate ties with Southeast Asia states. Even though Taiwan did not manage to accomplish this objective, the rise of China may present Taiwan with another opportunity establish closer ties with Southeast Asian states through Singapore. In order to do so, Taiwan has to put forward a value-proposition package that focuses on the role Taiwan can play in maintaining regional security that appeals to Southeast Asian states. Taiwan, through the *bentuhua* policy, can present itself as a very concrete example for Singapore to impress upon Malaysia and Indonesia that ethnic identity and political identity need not necessarily dovetail.

The defining characteristic of *bentuhua* has been the democratization of Taiwan, which is not entirely compatible with Singapore's political system, which has more in common with an authoritarian regime than a liberal democracy. Despite this dichotomy, however, bilateral relations between the two are good, which demonstrates the importance Singapore attaches to the ideational role Taiwan plays in asserting the difference between political identity and ethnic identity. This is perhaps one of the few areas Taiwan can focus upon to maintain and improve ties with Singapore and Southeast Asia given China's meteoric rise.

In order for Taiwan to gain international legitimacy and exposure, it has to always remain pragmatic and flexible, ready to utilize any development and change within international society to further its cause. Successes may not come soon or often enough, and as Lee Kuan Yew once said about the constraints Singapore faces in its foreign policy, "In an imperfect world, [a state has] to search for the best accommodation possible. And no accommodation is permanent. If it lasts long enough for progress to be made until the next set of arrangements can be put in place, let us be grateful for it".<sup>119</sup> His sentiments are applicable as Taiwan tries to step out of China's political shadows.

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<sup>119</sup> Leifer, *Singapore's Foreign Policy*, p. 162.


# Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific: A Stakeholder Missing in Action?

By Alan Hao Yang

## Economic Partnership vs. Political Marginalization

Taiwan, an island located at the west Pacific Rim, has struggled for subsistence under Asia-Pacific power politics for decades. Since 1949 and the withdrawal of the KMT government to Taipei, the isle has engaged in state-building. During the cold War era, the KMT government gave fresh impetus to domestic infrastructures and accelerated economic development. With distinguished economic performance, Taiwan was regarded as one of four East Asian Tigers in the 1980s. The successful transition from an import substitution to an export promotion industrialization strategy, moreover, put Taiwan stand heads and shoulders above its competitors. Moreover, it closely connected Taiwan with its Asia-Pacific neighbors. Taiwan's remarkable economic miracle, therefore, contributes significantly to the industrial division of labor and promotes close trading partnerships with neighbor states (See Figure 1).

Figure 1



Source: Database of Trade Statistics, Bureau of Foreign Trade, (R.O.C.) (<http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/fsci/>) (Accessed on 2007/8/28).

Aside from economic connections, Taiwan has been *politically exiled* for decades in the region. In 2007, only 24 states maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan, none of which are East Asian states. Under strong diplomatic pressure by the PRC, Taiwan could hardly sustain bilateral ties with other states officially, let alone establish new ones. Such *political marginalization* has consequences for participation in regional and global multilateral

organizations. Even though Taiwan holds membership in some international governmental organizations such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and the World Trade Organization (WTO), it has no seat in regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), or even the observer status at the World Health Organization (WHO) as well as the United Nations (UN). Further marginalization is underscored by the East Asian integration movement which has limited Taiwan's breathing space in the region as a stakeholder missing in action.

For this island state, it is very clear that economic ties and business networks with regional states barely contributes to political recognition. In addition, it is also obvious that PRC's diplomatic pressure undermines these shaky relations. For example, though Taiwan was a founding member of ADB, it had seldom worked actively with the ADB as a result of under China's constraints since the 1980s. The more PRC suppresses Taiwan's international space, the stronger Taiwan demands activities which may be regarded as the promotion of *de jure* independence. The push and pull effects, in turn, cause serious tensions across the Taiwan strait as well as the entire Asia-Pacific region.

### **Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific: A Stakeholder of Regional Stability**

During the late 1990s, several waves of regional integration movements advanced across Asia-Pacific region. These regional groupings include ASEAN-led community-building scheme from the south, the ASEAN+3 policy framework initiated by major powers, East Asia Summit (EAS) political dialogue of 16 East Asian countries, and the region-wide trade liberation acceleration of APEC. The essential idea of regional integration is to strengthen collective interests and to promote economic benefits for each state. However, the underlying concern behind regionalization in the Asia-Pacific is to secure peace and stability. For this, Taiwan should not be missing in action.

Taiwan's interest is closely associated with the region for at least four reasons. In the political and security sphere, extended tension between Taiwan and PRC maps a relatively vulnerable future for the region. China's hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) are the most menacing military threat. As long as PRC menaces Taiwan with the threat of the use of force, the strait will continue to be as Asia-Pacific hot spot, threatening East Asian regional security.

Besides security concerns, Taiwan has economic and trade ties with regional states, most of which consist of non-governmental and business networks instead of formal free trade agreements (FTAs). Asia-Pacific states such as the United States (1), Japan (2), South Korea (6), Singapore (7), Malaysia (8), Thailand (12), Indonesia (13), and Philippine (14) are among Taiwan's top 15 trade partners.<sup>120</sup> These business links increase Taiwan's foreign direct investment (FDI) in Southeast Asian states and also promote bilateral trade with East Asian countries. From 1990 to 2000, Taiwan's FDI flows into East Asia was estimated \$48.777 billion on average annually; its FDI flows to East Asia was about \$29.473 billion. In 2005, both

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<sup>120</sup> Bureau of Foreign Trade, (R.O.C.) (<http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/fsci/>) (Accessed on 2007/9/6).



increased to \$118.192 billion dollars and \$54.189 billion.<sup>121</sup> Linkages like these keep Taiwan flexibly aligned with current regional integration movements. Nevertheless, recent advances in governmental dialogue and cooperation over comprehensive issues that exclude Taiwan have eroded the momentum of economic ties, then, pushing this island toward regional marginalization.

Another aspect concerns China's pressure on Southeast Asian states. It is difficult for Taiwan to contribute much to Indochinese or the Mekong basin countries that need societal development and local infrastructure. Excluded from the EAS, Taiwan cannot join regional environmental efforts such as anti-global warming activities, biodiversity preservation and ecological sustainability, or region-wide energy cooperation schemes. What is worse, as a stakeholder in regional stability, the elimination of Taiwan's participation in regional grouping will not only damage its interests but also hollow out current integration efforts on both hard security matters and non-traditional security affairs, including terrorist activities, human trafficking, and money laundering within the region (see Table 1).

**Table 1: Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific Region: Still A Partner in Need?**

	<b>Taiwan</b> (Engage actively) ( + )	<b>Taiwan</b> (Engage passively) ( - )
<b>Region</b> (Advance with Taiwan) ( + )	( + ) ( + ) <b>Ideal Win-Win Situation</b> Economic and Trade Issues (ex. Only non-governmental business networks)	( + ) ( - ) <b>Development and Infrastructure</b> <b>Issues (ex. Taiwan in ADB)</b>
<b>Region</b> (Advance without Taiwan) ( - )	( - ) ( + ) <b>Non-traditional Security Issues</b>	( - ) ( - ) <b>Political and Security Issues;</b> <b>Environmental and Energy Issues</b>

Source: the author.

### **The Aspiration to Pragmatically Reapproach the Region**

Even though Taiwan is a small country, it is still “a piece of the world, a part of the main.” Taiwan craves to make more contributions to the world. The aspiration to engage with the Asia-Pacific through a flexible approach is the first priority. As a responsible stakeholder, Taiwan can (and “should”) keep contributing to economic development and trade liberation, and help advance hard security cooperation as well as non-traditional security cooperation at a regional level.

For the promotion of trade and economic development, Taiwan's remarkable experience in Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) is essential to both business activation in the region

<sup>121</sup> Ffrom UNCTAD ([www.unctad.org/sections/dite\\_dir/docs/wir06\\_fs\\_tw\\_en.pdf](http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir06_fs_tw_en.pdf)) (Accessed on 2007/9/10).

and to local economies in East Asian developing countries. Moreover, Taiwan's FDI to sub-regional economic growth areas such as the eastern ASEAN growth area (BIMP-EAGA) will promote the forging of regional FTA and help foster the realization of an ASEAN Economic Community.

Concerning hard security cooperation, since major East Asian powers have their own stakes in the Taiwan Strait, a more secure Taiwan is crucial to a stable Asia-Pacific. As a responsible stakeholder, Taiwan can engage with China in a cautious but pragmatic manner, moving beyond domestic political and ideological cleavages. It is important to seek constructive security cooperation in non-sensitive matters, such as information sharing, military officer exchanges, or joint training program not only with the United States and Japan, but with East Asian countries as well, for the purpose of preserving peace and security.

Regarding non-traditional security affairs, issues like environmental crises, disaster management, maritime security, anti-terrorist efforts, human trafficking and money laundering at a regional level are critical concerns for all Asia-Pacific states. For Taiwan, these issues should be a priority. Measures for safeguarding sea lanes of the Taiwan Strait and initiatives for promoting governance networks should be encouraged to advance Taiwan's importance and efforts.

It is imperative that Taiwan work with the region. It is also important that Taiwan's contributions to the region and neighbor states should not be underestimated or even eliminated in many aspects. By acting as a responsible stakeholder, the inclusion of this island country will bring about a win-win future for the Asia-Pacific.

## APPENDIX I

### Young Leader's Observation of the Conference

By Jiyon Shin

There is quite a difference between learning about a country in a textbook or through mass media, and experiencing it. As a student of international studies, I have frequently encountered Taiwan as part of the 'Cross-Straits Dilemma' in two or three paragraphs in textbooks and lectures. What I learned was that Taiwan is raising concerns in Northeast Asia because of its outspoken call for independence, making both China and the United States uncomfortable.

A key issue is, what is Taiwan's identity? Is it a country or a province of China? The Young Leaders trip to Taiwan organized by Pacific Forum CSIS, and co-organized by Taiwan Foundation for Democracy provided a timely opportunity to 'be there and learn' Taiwan.

I found many similarities between the Republic of Korea, my own country, and Taiwan. Both South Korea and Taiwan share a surprising number of similarities in their history, 1) both were victims of Japanese colonization, 2) both were close allies of the United States throughout Cold War, 3) both were ruled by repressive (and effective) dictatorships during the Cold War, 4) both were democratized in 1987 (or martial laws were lifted), 5) both continued to have conservative governments that had roots in the authoritarian order even after direct elections were held. In 1997, progressives in South Korea took power when Kim Dae-jung won the presidency (he was followed by Roh Moo-hyun in 2002); in Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian was elected president in 2000, and 6) both current governments share a similar political background and they both use nationalism as a political tool, which adversely affects diplomacy.

South Korea had presidential elections in December 2007 and Taiwan will have its own in March 2008. These political events can have a profound effect on international relations in the Asia Pacific. In both cases, pragmatic politicians look set to succeed. For South Korea, the left was penalized for President Roh's economic policies, and conservative GNP candidate Lee Myeong-bak won by a landslide. Taiwan's case looks quite similar in that the Chen government did not focus on reviving the ailing economy, and made diplomatic ties with other countries more difficult. This could be an indication of Taiwan's choice in 2008.

As a Korean, I sympathize with Taiwan's national struggle for democracy against dictatorships and human rights violators. However, I have embraced post-ideology politics, and believe that both sides in both countries should recognize that a government that produces solutions to current maladies is needed.

Finally, on a personal note I would like to thank the YL program and Pacific Forum. Thanks to the YL program, Dr. Chyungly Lee, from National Chengchi University, IIR, recently invited me to the Taipei-Seoul Forum in December 2007, after South Korea's elections.

It was a great opportunity to meet senior professionals and exchange ideas, sit down and have a frank discussion with governmental officials, bond with other YLs from diverse areas of studies, different countries, and hear their opinions. All of us came with a different understanding of Taiwan, and went back with a lot of information on Taiwan, far more than shallow understandings learned from the media or books.

# APPENDIX 2

## Agenda for YL



亞太區域研究專題中心  
Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies, RCHSS, Academia Sinica

PACIFIC FORUM CSIS  
YOUNG LEADERS IN TAIWAN  
AUGUST 28-31, 2007 • TAIPEI, TAIWAN

<b>28 August</b> 1000 –1200	Taiwan Foundation for Democracy	Dr. Lin Wen-cheng / President
1200	Lunch	
1430 – 1700	National Chengchi University – Institute for International Relations (IIR)	Dr. Zheng Tuan-yao, Director IIR
	Trip to Tamsui	
<b>29 August</b> 0930 – 1030	Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)	Dr. Lai I-Chung / Director for International and China Affairs, DPP
10.45-11.45	Visit to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)	
12.00-13.10	Lunch	
1350 – 1420	Legislative Yuan Tour	Hon. Dr. Su Chi / Legislator without Constituency
14.30-15.30	Kuomintang (Nationalist Party)	Dr. Tung Chen-yuan (童振源), Vice Chairman
15.50-16.50	Mainland Affairs Council	
17:00-1800	YL Roundtable meeting	Taiwan Foundation For Democracy
	Visit to Taipei 101/Dinner	
<b>30 August</b> All day	Howard Plaza Hotel, Taipei  VIP Dinner hosted by Dr. Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang, Deputy Secretary general of National Security Council	Attending the Conference on “Economic Security in the Asia-Pacific” At Academia Sinica
<b>31 August</b> All day	Howard Plaza Hotel, Taipei	Attending the Conference on “Economic Security in the Asia-Pacific”
17:00-18:30	YL wrap-up meeting	Taiwan Foundation for Democracy
19:00	Farwell Dinner	



## APPENDIX<sub>3</sub>

### Young Leaders Bios

**Ms. Shirley FLORES** is a journalist for the Manila bureau of Nihon Keizai Shimbun (NIKKEI), covering political, business and economic news in the Philippines as well as regional events. She is finishing her masters in International Studies at the University of the Philippines and has written on Asian regional integration, globalization, and security issues.

**Mr. Leif-Eric EASLEY** is a Ph.D. candidate at Harvard University's Department of Government. His dissertation examines national identity, bilateral trust and security cooperation among Japan, South Korea, China, and the U.S. Leif has served as a teaching fellow for Asian International Relations and American Foreign Policy at Harvard and is currently a Visiting Scholar at the UCLA Department of Political Science.

**Mr. Dewardric L. McNEAL** is the assistant director of the China Initiative at the Brookings Institution. Previously he was vice president for Policy and Planning with the Peace and Conflict Resolution Workgroup in San Francisco, which conducts community-based dialogues on conflict resolution. He is a graduate of East-West Center's Asia Pacific Leadership Program (02), and served as a foreign affairs analyst with the Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division at the Congressional Research Service where he co-authored, with Kerry Dumbaugh, "China's Relations with Central Asian States and Problems with Terrorism" (CRS Report to Congress, 2001).

**Ms. Aki MORI** is a Ph.D. candidate at Doshisha University's Graduate school of Law, Japan, Kyoto. Her research topics are comprehensive security, security policy of China, and U.S-China relationship etc. She received M.A in political science at Doshisha University in 2006 and her master thesis was included in *China's Energy Security; From Military Security to Comprehensive Security*, Tomohide Murai, Abe Junichi, Ryo Asano, Jun Yasuda eds, *Chugoku wo meguru Anzenhosyo*, Minerva Shobo, 2007. She will study at Renmin University's School of International Studies from September 2007 for one year.

**Ms. Shafiah Fifi MUHIBAT** is a Researcher at the Department of International Relations, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, since December 2000. She holds an M.Sc degree in Theory and History of International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), United Kingdom. She has done extensive research on politics and regional security in Southeast Asia and the Asia Pacific, and has special interest in the regional security framework in the Asia Pacific and most recently in maritime security issues in Southeast Asia. She is currently the coordinator of CSCAP Indonesia (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific - Indonesian Member Committee), and Lecturer at Al-azhar Indonesia University.

**Ms. A. Greer PRITCHETT** is the Assistant Project Director of the Northeast Asia Project at the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) in New York. In that capacity, she manages projects on multilateral cooperation for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula; the possible creation of a Northeast Asian Security Forum; China-Taiwan relations; and the U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea. At the end of August, she is moving to Beijing to lecture at the China Foreign Affairs University for the 2007-2008 academic year and will simultaneously assume the newly created role of NCAFP's Northeast Asia Liaison Officer. Greer has also worked for the

International Crisis Group and the International Peace Academy. She received her B.A. summa cum laude from Hunter College, majoring in Political Science and Classical and Oriental Studies, and will pursue her graduate studies after her year in China.

**Mr. Junbeom PYON**, is Pacific Forum CSIS 2006-2007 Vasey Fellow from Seoul, Korea. He did graduate studies in international relations at Waseda University in Tokyo and received his M.A. in Government and a B.A. in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University. As an undergraduate, he was awarded the Ripon William F. Clinger Fellowship. He has interned in the Office of the Under Secretary General at the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, where he prepared briefs on the Korean Peninsula and Iranian nuclear issues and compiled *Disarmament Digest*. He has also interned at the Brookings Institution, the Korean Embassy in Washington, D.C., and the Seoul-based Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

**Ms. Jiyeon SHIN** is Pacific Forum CSIS 2007-2008 Vasey Fellow. Currently an undergraduate at Ewha Women's University, she specializes in International Studies, minors in Korean studies, while focusing on diplomacy and security in Northeast Asia, and spent a year as an exchange student at University of Hawaii 2005-2006. She has worked extensively with the Korean University Students' Politics & Diplomacy Research Association on issues pertaining to the ROK-U.S. alliance, and anti-American sentiment among ROK's young generation. Ms. Shin was a member of the North Korea Security Research Group in Ewha Women's University, and assisted several international conferences related to North Korean refugees, and the UN ministerial conference on sustainable environment at the Environment and Sustainable Development Division office of UNESCAP. Most recently she attended Shanghai's Fudan University for a summer Chinese language program.

**Mr. Ming Hwa TING** is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for Asian Studies, University of Adelaide. He was awarded the Endeavour Postgraduate International Research Scholarship by the Australian Federal Government and he started his candidature in February this year. His dissertation examines Singapore's foreign policy using the English School theory with a particular focus on the Republic's bilateral relations with regional states like Malaysia and Indonesia, and rising powers like India and China.

**Ms. Ana VILLAVICENCIO** is the program officer at Pacific Forum CSIS. She received her dual B.A. in Environmental Studies and International Relations from Hawaii Pacific University and an M.A. in Political Science from University of Hawaii. She participated in organizing a workshop on energy projects to help alleviate poverty in Africa at the UNEP – Risø Center in Denmark in 2004 and completed an internship working with projects involving sustainable energy in Mali.

**Mr. Alan Hao YANG** is a doctoral candidate at the department of Political Science at National Chung Cheng University of Taiwan. He has an Academia Sinica Fellowship for Doctoral Candidate in the Humanities and Social Science (CAPAS, RCHSS). He attended this conference as one of the local leaders.



## APPENDIX 4

### Asia Pacific Security Forum Agenda

#### Economic Security in the Asia-Pacific

Institute for National Policy Research (Taiwan)

Co-sponsors:

The Pacific Forum CSIS (US)

Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (Philippines)

Asia Centre (France)

August 30-31, 2007, The Howard Plaza Hotel, Taipei, Taiwan

#### August 30 Thursday (Day One)

8:40-9:00 Registration

9:00-9:10 Welcoming Remarks  
Hung-mao Tien, President & Chairman of the Board,  
Institute for National Policy Research

9:10-9:40 Keynote Speech: Tsai Ing-wen, Former Vice Premier

9:40-10:00 Coffee Break

10:00-11:30 **Session One –The Rise of China: Economic Power and Challenges to the World Order**

Moderator: Cheng-yi Lin, Research Fellow, Academia Sinica, Taiwan

Presenters:

- Edward Friedman, Professor, University of Wisconsin, Madison  
“The Rise of China as a Global Power?”
- John Ravenhill, Professor, Australian National University  
“China’s Economic Rise in the Asia-Pacific Region”

Discussants:

- Philip Yang, Professor, National Taiwan University
- Huan Guocang, Managing Partner, Primus Pacific,  
Hong Kong

11:30-12:00 Open Forum

12:00-14:00 Luncheon  
Speaker: Rodolfo Severino, Former Secretary-General of ASEAN

**14:00-15:30 Session Two –The Other Side of China’s Rise**

Moderator: Yun-han Chu, Professor, National Taiwan University

Presenters:

- Pierre Noel, Research Associate, University of Cambridge  
“Energy Security and China’s Rise”
- Ching-ping Tang, Professor, National Cheng-chi University  
“Environmental Security and China’s Rise”

Discussants:

- Yann-huei Song, Research Fellow, Academia Sinica, Taiwan
- Daigee Shaw, President, Chung-hua Institution for Economic Research, Taiwan

15:30-16:00 Open Forum

19:00 Dinner

**August 31 Friday (Day two)**

**09:30-11:00 Session Three - Responses from Major Powers: Balancing or Bandwagon Strategy?**

Moderator: Chi-cheng Lo, Professor, Soochow University, Taiwan

Presenters:

- Brad Glosserman, Executive Director, Pacific Forum, CSIS  
“An American Perspective of the Rise of China”
- Satoshi Amako, Dean, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University  
“A Northeast Asian Perspective of the Rise of China”

Discussants:

- Jaeho Hwang, Research Fellow, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses
- Shiau Chyuan-jenq, Professor, National Taiwan University

11:00-11:30 Open Forum

11:30-13:00 Luncheon

**13:00-14:30 Session Four –Responses from Two Blocs: Balancing or Bandwagon Strategy?**

Moderator: Ralph A. Cossa, President, Pacific Forum, CSIS

- Carolina G. Hernandez, President, Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Philippines  
“A Southeast Asian Perspective of the Rise of China”
- Francois Godement, Director, Asia Centre, France  
“An EU Perspective of the Rise of China”

Discussants:

- Chyungly Lee, Associate Research Fellow, Institute of International Relations, Taiwan
- Tuan Y. Cheng, Director, Institute of International Relations, Taiwan

14:30-15:00 Open Forum

15:00-15:10 Coffee Break

15:10-17:00 **Session Five - A Tale of Two Cities: Taipei and Beijing**

Moderator: Chong-pin Lin, President, Foundation on International and Cross-Strait Studies, Taiwan

Presenters:

- Teh-sheng Hung, President, Taiwan Institute of Economic Research  
“Choosing between Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement or Free Trade Agreements?”
- I-Chung Lai, Director, Foreign Policy Studies, Taiwan Thinktank  
“Absorbing into Chinese Economic Arrangement while Maintaining Political Independence?”

Discussants:

- Ralph A. Cossa, President, Pacific Forum, CSIS
- Huan Guocang, Managing Partner, Primus Pacific, Hong Kong

17:00-17:30 **Session Six** Concluding Session

Moderator: Hung-mao Tien, INPR

Panelists :

Ralph A. Cossa, Pacific Forum, CSIS  
Huan Guocang, Primus Pacific, Hong Kong  
Francois Godement, Asia Centre  
Carolina G. Hernandez, ISDS  
John Ravenhill, ANU

19:00 Dinner



## APPENDIX 5

### More pictures of YL program



Young Leaders' Roundtable discussions with Executive Director Brad Glosserman: anyone who wishes to comment holds up their white table name cards, and apparently everyone had something to say as the end of the program was nearing.




YLS in front of the front speaker stand, Legislative Yuan. Behind, there is a large portrait of Dr. Sun Yat-sen



Dinner with the VIPs at the Asia Pacific Security Forum. Dr. Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang, Deputy Secretary General of the National Security Council.

President of Pacific Forum CSIS Ralph Cossa, Ambassador Rodolfo Severino, and YL Jun Pyon 2007 Vasey Fellow, Pacific Forum CSIS



Enjoying local Taiwanese food at Damshui

## APPENDIX 6

### YL Assignments

#### **Pre-conference Assignment**

Write a 1,500-word essay describing your country's relations with Taiwan. Talk about the issues identified in the conference agenda and how these issues affect the relationship.

#### **Group Idea**

How does Taiwan engage the world/Asia? How does Taiwan interact with other countries on the issues identified below:

- Energy security
- Environment
- Economic/trade (secure trade)
- Health/pandemic diseases
- Aid and development
  1. What are the mechanisms Taiwan uses to engage the region on these issues?
  2. Describe the problems Taiwan encounters
  3. What are the problems that are created as a result and how can Taipei get around them?
  4. How can Taiwan better interact with other countries on these issues.