Making Article 6 'Stick'

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Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate arenas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

The Young Leaders Program

The Young Leaders Program invites young professionals and graduate students to join Pacific Forum policy dialogues and conferences. The program fosters education in the practical aspects of policy-making, generates an exchange of views between young and seasoned professionals, promotes interaction among younger professionals, and enriches dialogues with generational perspectives for all attendees. Fellows must have a strong background in the area covered by the conference they are attending and an endorsement from respected experts in their field. Supplemental programs in conference host cities and mentoring sessions with senior officials and specialists add to the Young Leader experience. The Young Leaders Program is currently supported by Chevron, the Freeman Foundation, the Luce Foundation, and the Yuchengco Group, with a growing number of universities, institutes, and organizations also helping to sponsor individual participants. For more details, see the Pacific Forum CSIS website, www.pacforum.org, or contact Brad Glosserman, director of the Young Leaders Program, at bradgpf@hawaii.rr.com.

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The views expressed here represent personal impressions and reflections of Young Leader program participants; they do not necessarily represent the views of the relevant governments, or the co-sponsoring or parent organizations and institutes.

Introduction

By Brad Glosserman

A changing security environment makes new thinking about weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and nuclear weapons in particular, more important than ever. To develop new approaches to this problem, the Pacific Forum CSIS, working through the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), has for four years chaired a Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific. This group has worked assiduously – and with some success – to raise awareness among Asia Pacific nations of the seriousness of the WMD threat.

Even countries that appreciate the WMD threat complain that the attention to nonproliferation should not – must not – overshadow or diminish the obligations of the five nuclear weapons states to reduce their arsenals; the disarmament bargain of Article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) must be honored. A renewed commitment to that goal, and progress toward it, would go a long way to help build or reinforce international consensus behind efforts to stop the spread of WMD. Here, perhaps more than anywhere else, new ideas are needed to jumpstart thinking about how to realize the dream of a world free of nuclear weapons.

That ambition is often dismissed as naïve and idealistic by nuclear strategists and policy makers. That criticism lost some of its force when four distinguished American strategists – Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, George Schultz, and William Perry – published two commentaries calling for progress toward a nuclear-free world. Their arguments have mobilized disarmament advocates and helped energize the debate about disarmament and nonproliferation.

Pacific Forum CSIS expects much of the next generation of security analysts and policymakers. We launched our Young Leaders program to give them exposure to debates about key regional security issues and an opportunity to interject their ideas into those discussions. At the seventh meeting of the WMD Study Group, we asked the assembled Young Leaders to devise ways to get nuclear weapons states to take their Article VI obligations more seriously and push the case for disarmament. The group papers in this volume –Young Leaders work in groups to help them better understand the variety of perspectives on questions and hone their diplomatic skills in reaching mutually agreeable proposals – provide ambitious and creative solutions to help move this process forward.

The Young Leaders understand that the NPT is a set of bargains. Nonproliferation and disarmament go together (along with access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes). They explore ways to make these bargains more meaningful and couch the issues in terms of national interest. Their efforts validate our faith in the Youth Leader program and provide real food for thought on these important topics.

The Young Leaders Program in Ho Chi Minh City

By David Santoro

The Pacific Forum CSIS is especially proud of its "Young Leaders Program," which regularly invites young professionals and post-graduate students to join a series of policy dialogues and conferences in the Asia-Pacific region. The program aims to give a voice to the new generation of foreign policy specialists to enable the introduction of fresh and innovative solutions to complex problems.

The seventh meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific, which took place May 25-29, 2008 in Ho Chi Minh City (Vietnam), had a significant Young Leaders (YL) component with 17 participants from Australia, Ecuador, France, Indonesia, Japan, the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Philippines, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Taiwan, Vietnam, and the United States. These participants had diverse backgrounds, ranging from academia, the media, and government, to foreign policy think tanks and organizations.

The YL program included attendance and participation at the two-day CSCAP Study Group meeting, a visit to the Reunification Palace, a tour of Cu Chi tunnel, a visit to the University of Social Sciences and Humanities (as well as a briefing by the university rector and presentations to and discussions with a class of students in international relations), and a briefing by Mr. Dang Dinh Quy, director general of Vietnam's Institute of Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies. Before and after the CSCAP meeting, YLs had their own meetings to prepare, summarize, discuss, and reflect on their meetings, briefings, and experiences throughout these four days. Divided into small groups of five or six, YLs also had a post-conference assignment in which they devised a specific and creative strategy to convince Nuclear Weapons States to live up to their NPT Article VI obligations. The results of that work is presented in the papers that follow.

The YL program began with the CSCAP Study Group meeting. The latter focused on safeguards, their implementation, and regional strategies for combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, with the ongoing goal to further develop the Handbook and Action Plan to Counter Proliferation in the Asia Pacific. A great deal of conference discussion centered on the renewed interest in putting nuclear disarmament at the forefront of the arms control agenda, following the editorials recently published by Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, George Schultz, and William Perry. The key discussions revolved around the link between nonproliferation and disarmament and its significance.

After the CSCAP Study Group meeting, YLs joined conference participants in a visit to the Reunification Palace. Formerly known as the Independence Palace (Dinh Doc Lap in Vietnamese), it was built on the site of the former Norodom Palace and designed by architect Ngo Viet Thu as the home and workplace of the president of South Vietnam during the Vietnam War. YLs learnt much from such a key historic landmark, which was also the site of the official handover of power during the fall of Saigon in April 1975.

That visit was followed, the next day, by a tour to the Cu Chi tunnels, an immense network of connecting underground tunnels which are part of a much larger network of tunnels that underlies much of southern Vietnam. The Cu Chi tunnels were the location of several military campaigns during the Vietnam War, and were the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam's base of operations for the Tet Offensive in 1968. Some YLs actually braved the tunnels, while others decided to wait outside.

Next, YLs visited the University of Social Sciences and Humanities, where the university rector gave a briefing about the development of Ho Chi Minh City and the role plays in Vietnam. Following explanations of Vietnam's *doi moi* (renovation) policy and its socialist orientation, i.e., its adoption of a market economy with guidance, the university rector pointed out some of the specifics of Ho Chi Minh City – in particular when compared to the capital, Ha Noi. He showed that Ho Chi Minh City was the industrial and economic hub of the country with a promising future despite challenges such as high social stratification, corruption, and education.

After a rich Q&A session with the rector, YLs met with a class of students in international relations. One of them gave a brilliant presentation on security issues in the Asia-Pacific, which focused on inter-state relations, WMD proliferation, the competition between major powers, and nontraditional security threats. He concluded that education was the best weapon for regional actors to learn how to live together peacefully. Then, two YLs gave presentations on the relevance of nonproliferation policy for the region and on the meaning and political and technical challenges of nuclear disarmament. A lively interactive Q&A session followed, with questions ranging from broad regional security issues such the significance of the North Korean nuclear program for the stability of the Asia-Pacific to specific nonproliferation issues such as the usefulness of missile defense systems.

YLs were then briefed by Dang Dinh Quy, director general of the Institute of Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies in Ha Noi. Quy gave an overview of major historical developments of Vietnam. He pointed out that Vietnam is now in the best position ever to play a key and constructive role in its region and in the world, that is, by consolidating its security environment, maintaining favorable conditions for economic development, and keeping good relations with great powers (with the United States and China in particular).

The Q&A session began with a query about Vietnamese-North Korean relations. Quy explained that the PM's visit was productive in evaluating the success of reforms. Asked about conflicts in the South China Sea, Quy emphasized the need to maintain stability in a situation where differences are manageable. Although prepared to ease tensions on territorial issues, Quy stressed that Vietnam does not want to fight over cross-Strait relations. Finally, when asked to how Vietnam seeks to manage Chinese power in Southeast Asia, Quy insisted on the need for cooperation, not competition with China because, in his own words, "China's peaceful development is uncontainable."

The YL program concluded with a wrap-up session that focused on the value of nuclear weapons and consequences of disarmament. YLs from Taiwan, Japan, and the ROK were unanimous in explaining that nuclear disarmament should be the goal, but that it should

proceed on a step by step basis and, most importantly, take into account security considerations. Another YL stressed that nuclear disarmament has historically taken place precisely when the security environment made it possible. A series of questions were then raised. How can/should disarmament be defined? Who should lead the process? Can the process be verified? Can we really get to zero nuclear weapons and, if so, would we be safer?

Overall, YLs seemed to agree that nuclear disarmament was a good thing and that it needed to be promoted, particularly by great powers. Although relatively confident that the process could happen, YLs remained quite skeptical that it would because of the mere power (or the perception of power) provided by nuclear weapons.

Toward Non-Possessive Disarmament

By Raymund Jose G. Quilop, Christopher Roberts,
Shiuan-Ju Chen, and Thibaud Mougin

As has been widely acknowledged, the production and possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) has been driven by the desire of states to "ensure" their security; the more lethal the weaponry, the more states are assured of their own security – or so they think. The quest to ensure one's security will remain a primordial concern for states as long as the current international structure composed of independent and sovereign states, and characterized by anarchy, remains.

While these types of weapons may provide the illusion of security to those that possess them, they create insecurity for other states. Furthermore, they create a host of additional problems, the most recent being the possibility of nonstate actors gaining access to related materials and technology that could enable them to produce crude versions of these weapons that are, nonetheless, highly lethal.

It is because of this that the elimination of WMD is necessary. Thus, and beyond the issue of preventing further proliferation of these types of weapons – thereby adding to the existing stockpiles, it is timely to think about how to encourage those that already possess WMD to pursue disarmament.

A redefinition of paradigms of international security to support the end of the rule of nuclear deterrence is therefore necessary. As some analysts have underlined, the world is approaching a time when deterrence will become less effective as nuclear weapons become more widely available. Spurred by this reality, the global community, led by those already in possession of WMDs, should begin discussions for alternate policies, particularly disarmament.

One could oppose this program with a so-called "realist" vision of global security, emphasizing the need for states to maintain WMDs under the principle of nuclear deterrence. Supporters of this "realist" vision may be right as long as the international community continues to fail to endorse a global political action plan for disarmament.

The Road toward Disarmament

Disarmament requires the consent of all nuclear weapon states as well as the support of all UN General Assembly members. Convincing states to give up their WMD, however, is a difficult and challenging task. Foremost, these states need to be convinced that they could give up such weapons without putting their security at risk. This can only be realized if all nuclear weapons states agree to limit their defensive postures to the stockpile of conventional arsenals. Moreover, international relations throughout history informs us that a unanimous agreement for disarmament will be necessary as the failure to obtain agreement (and compliance) with even one nuclear weapons state will prevent other nuclear powers from surrendering their WMD. For thousands of years historians, philosophers and other scholars

have observed that an increase in one nation's security is often 'perceived' as a threat to another nation's security. This dynamic has been termed "the security dilemma." Because of the security dilemma, as well as divergent identities and historically driven perceptions of mistrust, interaction between states in recent centuries has been marked by preferences to compete and to seek self-help, often resulting in a proliferation of weapons and heightened military power for the purpose of maintaining a balance of power. Thus, it will also be impossible to achieve nuclear disarmament in the absence of a binding agreement with verifiable oversight and enforcement mechanisms.

Second, there needs to be enough confidence and trust among states that possess WMDs, so much so that they could agree among themselves to eliminate these weapons from their arsenals or at least significantly reduce their stockpiles. Confidence building and conflict management can start at the regional level.

For example, 13 countries under the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) framework have forged a work-plan to expand cooperation and strengthen trust among countries in the region. Similar measures can be adopted in such institutions as the EU, NATO, MERCOSUR or the African Union. Further, a new organization embracing the nuclear weapons states could be created to serve as a forum for dialogue and confidence building. Eventually, additional measures and mechanisms such as preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution procedures could be institutionalized.

Where there exist disputes with the potential for armed conflict, then such disputes will need to be resolved, or at the very least, moved to the sidelines so that issues no longer cause excessive tension and thereby block a commitment to nuclear disarmament. In the case of the Taiwan Strait, for example, China needs to give up military deterrence as a threat against Taiwanese independence. Concurrently, the international community should assure peace in the Straits and protection against China's missile deployment along its eastern coast. Under the prerequisite of maintaining peace, China and Taiwan should begin negotiations.

While agreement between nuclear weapons states will always be a mandatory component of nuclear disarmament, the process will also require the construction of a regime with global perimeters that contains and constrains all state actors. In other words, even if the nuclear powers agree, in principle, to forego possessing these weapons, they may be discouraged from doing so by the thought that other states that previously did not possess these weapons have the potential to develop and/or possess them. Thus, nuclear weapons states may argue for the need to maintain a minimum number of these weapons as an assurance of, or at least a balance against, other states that may seek to develop a WMD arsenal. In this context, total elimination is no longer the thrust but simply a reduction to a minimum.

What constitutes a minimum number of WMD that could serve as a hedge against the uncertainty of other states possessing these types of weapons would have to be consensually agreed by every state that possesses nuclear weapons. Otherwise, the move to reduce these weapons would never be realized. Further, even a minimum number of WMD may be sufficient to encourage states without WMD to pursue production and development. Thus, to

discourage these states from producing and developing their own WMD, a number of crucial prerequisites must be put in place.

First, the holders of WMD must give a definite assurance to those that do not possess them that these weapons will not be used against them. To make the assurance more credible, it may be fruitful to have these weapons deposited with an international body, perhaps the United Nations or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), so that no individual state can gain immediate access to these weapons. Having them deposited in the custody of the UN or some alternative body would mean that these weapons could only be withdrawn by the depositor when there is an extreme necessity to have such weapons. It is like putting one's money in a long-term deposit account with a bank. The depositor still owns the money but can only draw it out of the bank when it is necessary to do so.

This approach, termed 'Non-Possessive Disarmament' (NPD), would first need the consent of all the nuclear powers and, second, would also require the support of all UN General Assembly members. In order to achieve such agreements a framework needs to be devised regarding what controls the weapons and the circumstances under which such weapons can be released.

Further, NPD will remain unachievable unless the United Nations itself, as an international body, undertakes further reform to strengthen its capacity and capability as an international actor, particularly if it were to become, or be linked to, an effective "repository" of weapons of mass destruction. Meanwhile, the UN can consider Security Council reform to dispel the apprehension by some states that the permanent members will dominate the use of the WMD for their own interests. Another option would be to place the decision to decide whether a state could retrieve WMD it deposited with the UN in the General Assembly.

Simultaneously, the United Nations should provide enough guarantee of peace for conflict-torn countries to pursue negotiation and not to resort to the possession of WMD to destroy others or to protect state sovereignty. In other words, the United Nations and/or the UN Security Council needs to be more firmly placed as a decisive and meaningful protector of state security. This might begin with the implementation of enhanced mechanisms for conflict prevention or dispute settlement but eventually structural limitations within the United Nations must be fixed.

The fundamental limitation of the UN, of course, is the fact that it remains an inter-governmental body, with its decisions resting on its members, particularly the Security Council, which is responsible for global peace and security. This does not mean, however, that the UN as a body could not move toward becoming an independent and capable actor in the international arena, even if it is not as independent and sovereign one as the states comprising it.

Toward 'Non-Possessive Disarmament'

This program of non-possessive disarmament has three phases. First is the destruction of the stockpiles of WMD, providing options such as the use of recessed deterrence and virtual arsenals for complying states. In this area, experiences of the former Soviet Union and U.S. in 1986 should be taken as examples. Second is the implementation of a reliable monitoring mechanism to prevent the rebuilding of stockpiles. In this regard, lessons must be drawn from the difficulties encountered by the IAEA vis-à-vis Iran and Iraq. And finally there is the transfer of WMD to an international body.

As regards the transfer of WMD to an international body, the number of nuclear weapons held in any 'repository/s' would need to be negotiated between the nuclear weapons states in collaboration and under the oversight of the United Nations General Assembly. Such negotiations should be conducted on the basis of a *bone fide* intention to achieve a bare minimum for the purpose of collective and/or individual state security.

The nuclear weapons states, together with the international community as represented by the UN General Assembly, should agree on a structure for the repository/s. Negotiations in respect to such an agreement should keep the following in mind:

a. The repository may not be a single location and/or entity but a collection of locations. For example, five individual countries deemed to embrace a secure and stable political environment may be nominated and voted in by the General Assembly as repositories for WMD.

b. The repositories for WMD may only act as such for a specified term, the renewal of which would be subject to re-nomination and re-election. For example, the General Assembly may hold a debate on the issue, followed by an election, every four to five years.

c. In order to avoid a conflict of interests, the 'holding' states could not simultaneously be depository states.

d. There should be a dual layer of security at each repository installation. The first layer would consist of a UN security force complete with a team of technical experts to manage and maintain the nuclear weapons. The UN Security Force (UNSF) would have the primary responsibility for maintaining and securing the nuclear weapons within the 'inner perimeter.' No 'depositing' state would be permitted to supply personnel to the UNSF.

e. Security for the outer perimeter would be the responsibility of the 'holding' state. Thus, and if need be, it would be prepared to commit its entire defense force to the security of the repository. Such a commitment is also made with the guarantee that the repository state would have the full diplomatic and military support of the international community at large in the defense of the installation and of the state.

f. The savings generated by reduced military expenditures (as a consequence of a reduced security dilemma) could be used, in the form of member contributions, to fund the repository scheme.

Strict, binding and enforceable guidelines would also have to be negotiated in regard to when and how nuclear weapons could be removed from the repository state. Likewise, the depositing nations would need to be provided with guarantees that they will have access to their weapons should their security be fundamentally threatened. A fundamental threat to security would need to be defined but might include the idea that it would not be less than the imminent risk of invasion by another state. In the event that the depositing state is rendered incapable of using the weapons in its defense by an attack, then a mechanism to provide the repository states with the power to use them in the depository state's defense could also be considered.

Finally, any agreement negotiated in the context of NPD should be negotiated with further disarmament in mind. For example, such negotiations and the final instruments establishing such a mechanism may also allow for the addition of a new level of nonproliferation where, eventually, the international body would control the weapons and they would be used in the defense of any nation where its territorial security, without provocation, has been fundamentally threatened. This next phase would mean that no-individual state would ever again control nuclear weapons.

Again, these proposals rest on the assumption that enough confidence and trust has also been developed between the states that possess WMDs and those that do not. In order to support negotiations for NPD, the resolution or mitigation of major inter-state disputes should remain one of the highest priorities for the UN and the entire international community.

Encouraging Nuclear Weapons States to Demonstrate Commitment to NPT Article VI

By Shirley Flores, Ta Minh Tuan, Wakana Mukai, and Ha Anh Tuan

This paper aims to come up with specific, implementable recommendations to achieve a safer and more secure world where nuclear weapons are significantly devalued and fewer states feel the need to seek nuclear weapons capability. Concrete steps by states in possession of nuclear weapons toward the goal of disarmament, as called for the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), is critical to the achievement of this goal.

We recognize, however, that all states must contribute to this objective and that the burden does not rest solely on the shoulders of Nuclear Weapon States (NWS).[1] Parallel efforts must also come from states that do not possess such weapons, particularly those protected under nuclear security umbrellas.

Hence, the approach must be two-fold. Sincere and concrete progress toward the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons among NWS, as called for in the NPT, is a critical element. Successful realization of this goal equally depends on nonnuclear weapon states to further reinforce this objective.

This paper outlines specific initiatives that we believe would increase incentives for NWS to take their commitment to Article VI of the NPT more seriously. This should also apply to states with nuclear weapons but are not signatories to the Treaty as they, too, have obligations to promote global peace and security.

Moreover, we will try to demonstrate how nonnuclear weapon states could contribute to disarmament by creating the security conditions under which nuclear weapons are far less relevant to national security strategies, thus allowing NWS to take more rapid, concrete steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

a. The Road to Disarmament

At present, the only disarmament obligation is the NPT Article VI commitment by NPT parties that NWS "undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." The vague nature of this obligation does not offer a strong enough normative goal nor a clear enough standard to evaluate progress. We believe that one key step to making progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons is establishing a set of expectations that can guide a constructive dialogue. With that in mind, we suggest:

[1] In this paper, the term "Nuclear Weapons States" or NWS refers to *all* states possessing nuclear weapons – the traditional understanding of the term "NWS" refers only to the five NPT member states with nuclear weapons.

In the next two to three years, states with nuclear weapons should:

i) Declare a unilateral no-first use policy.

ii) Demonstrate to the international community their sincere commitment to disarmament by first, declaring the total amount of existing weapons-grade fissile material; and second, by agreeing to a moratorium on the production of additional materials. During this period, they must also make demonstrable efforts to increase safety, security, and use control standards for their weapons.

iii) Sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and provide information about all testing activities to improve confidence in compliance.

iv) Conclude (and if possible, sign) a multilateral treaty prohibiting the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons.

v) Voluntarily forgo the development of new types of weapons and related research and development except to the extent this work furthers safety, security, and use control approaches.

In eight to 10 years time, they must be able to significantly and verifiably reduce the total number of nuclear weapons through dismantlement as well as reduce the alert status of remaining weapons in their arsenals. This will require interim activities to create the appropriate security environment.

The ultimate goal total elimination of nuclear weapons is a long-term process. In particular, as the number of nuclear weapons reaches very low numbers, the process will become more difficult. When numbers are very large, large reductions (measured as a percent of the total) can likely be made with limited security implications – regardless of whether other states with nuclear weapons make similar reductions. However, as the numbers get very low, states will need to have a very high level of confidence that other NWS have reduced to the same level. NWS will be unwilling to go to zero unless they are sure that every other state has done the same. This will require a level of verification that is presently not technically possible.[2]

We, therefore, acknowledge that there are a number of short- to medium-term initiatives that would contribute to the ultimate goal of disarmament. It is imperative that we do not let the perfect (total disarmament) become the enemy of the good (real progress toward disarmament).

b. Key theme

The key theme that unites each of the initiatives below is "solidarity." The long-term goal of disarmament must be shared by all stakeholders – nuclear weapon states and those

[2] We believe that a world in which states would be willing to reduce to very low numbers would be so different that evaluations of security will occur in a different context.

that do not possess nuclear weapons. Nonnuclear weapons states must stand together to demand that states with nuclear weapons take their obligation to the world community more seriously.

Initiatives

Here we lay out six initiatives that we believe will increase the incentive for nuclear weapons states to take their commitment to Article VI of the NPT more seriously and for non-NPT parties to commit to a similar standard. Again, key to these initiatives is solidarity among nonnuclear weapons states.

a. Repudiate nuclear security guarantees

All nonnuclear weapons states that benefit from extended deterrence provided by nuclear weapon states should publicly demand, in unison if possible, that a nuclear response on their behalf be eliminated as an option. While embracing the continuation of robust *conventional* security guarantees, and perhaps even asking that they be strengthened, nonnuclear weapons states should make clear that their defense, in the name of extended deterrence, will not become a justification for the use of nuclear weapons. Demands that the consideration of the use of nuclear weapons be taken off the table made by U.S.-aligned forces in the Korean and Vietnam wars provide a precedent for such a declaration. In addition to reducing justifications for large stockpiles, high alert levels, and new weapons, this strategy will decrease the likelihood of miscalculation in a crisis. The complex geopolitical calculations associated with extended nuclear assurance are overwhelming. In addition, this rejection of extended nuclear assurances would significantly reduce the strategic value of nuclear weapons, creating a security environment in which the elimination of nuclear weapons becomes more possible.

While this effort requires political courage, it may also require additional analysis to demonstrate that extended deterrence can be conducted with conventional weapons as or more effective than with nuclear weapons. Study of the mechanics of deterrence that has been long neglected. We continue to rely on assumptions and academic work done 30 or 40 years ago even though the world has changed dramatically.

The move from extended nuclear assurances might be aided by greater levels of military transparency or "cooperative monitoring" within regions. If states felt more confident that they could anticipate attacks, the need for the kind of fast and dramatic retaliation offered by nuclear weapons would be less necessary. States should begin developing ways to share additional information about military capabilities to reduce the risks of misperception. This is a key component of fundamentally altering the security environment.

b. Set specific and realistic expectations

Prior to the 2010 NPT Review Conference (RevCon), nonnuclear weapons states meet to develop a set of near-term expectations based on an informed understanding of the

challenges of verifiable disarmament and constraints of the current security environment. The draft will form the basis for the nonnuclear weapons states' negotiations with nuclear weapons states during the RevCon.

Again, while noting that the long-term expectation is that states with nuclear weapons will ultimately eliminate them, we recognize that this is an unrealistic near-term goal and cannot happen in the next 10 to 20 years. To increase nuclear weapons states' ability to both encourage and monitor progress toward that goal, it is important that nonnuclear weapons states set specific expectations. For example, what steps must NWS take and over what period should they be taken (see Section a)? Specific expectations will allow nonnuclear weapons states to have more productive conversations with nuclear weapons states and would deny them the opportunity to dismiss their goals as unreasonable.

c. Identify potential consequences of failure

While doing anything that might increase proliferation, nonnuclear weapons states must consider the consequences they are willing to impose should NWS fail to implement their obligations to reduce nuclear weapons.

Consequences might include withdrawal from the NPT. Consequences may also include such traditional nonproliferation measures as trade sanctions. However, nonnuclear weapons states do not necessarily have to inform nuclear weapons states what the exact consequences would be. It is crucial that nonnuclear weapon states act as a "team" or demonstrate solidarity in pushing their objectives. Nonnuclear weapons states must make clear that there are graduated consequences but faced with a real lack of effort, all options will be considered.

d. Agree to consider additional obligations

Given the obligations in the NPT, nonnuclear weapons states expect NWS to take demonstrable actions to meet their commitments without parallel, reciprocal actions by nonnuclear weapons states. However, fully committed to the goals of reducing nuclear dangers and proliferation risks, nonnuclear weapons states must be open to and consider a range of additional obligations. In particular, they should be willing to consider limitations on their rights based on article VI of the NPT, such as limiting the right to operate reprocessing facilities and placing them under international control. Note, however, that the first step must come from states that possess nuclear weapons.

e. Offer to increase security cooperation

To demonstrate the sincere commitment of nonnuclear weapon states to nonproliferation and disarmament, they must bolster support for counter-terrorism initiatives and other international nonproliferation measures. These include both multilateral as well as national export controls, and those that are not stipulated in the NPT such as the Proliferation Security Initiative. Actions such as these not only represent an offer to the NWS but also serve as confidence building measures and will contribute to the changed security

environment discussed elsewhere in this paper. Moreover, non-nuclear weapon states must support and work with nuclear weapons states in multilateral settings to sanction nonnuclear weapon states that violate their nonproliferation obligations or fail to abide by expected norms of behavior. States without nuclear weapons must recognize that improving the overall security environment is a key component in allowing NWS to feel comfortable in moving toward disarmament. It is important they contribute to this goal and at the same time, actively police themselves.

f. Negotiate to expand permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council

A fundamental problem with regard to the strong political value of nuclear weapons is the fact that the NWS are the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Therefore, to moderate the ultimate decision-making privilege of the NWS' regarding international affairs, nonnuclear weapons states should negotiate and move toward revising the permanent seats of the UNSC. To include several developing countries as permanent members, or at least reserve seats for regions (and circulate the position amount countries in the region) would be make the UNSC a more dynamic and a less "nuclear-depending" decision-making entity.

Strengthening U.S. Leadership in Nuclear Disarmament

By Thi Binh Khong, Julia Joo-A Lee, Lianita Prawindarti, David Santoro, and Veronica Tessler

This memo reflects on nuclear disarmament and highlights the goals that need to be achieved (as well as how to achieve them) to make progress toward that goal. It includes caveats regarding current nuclear disarmament projects in Northeast Asia and the existing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs).

Background

Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requires all Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race […] and to nuclear disarmament […]"[1] Defined as those states which manufactured and exploded a nuclear explosive device prior to Jan. 1, 1967, the NWS include the United States, Soviet Union, France, Britain, and China. *De facto* NWS, i.e. states which have developed nuclear weapons since 1967, include India, Israel, Pakistan, which have never signed the NPT. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) can now be listed as a *de facto* NWS because it withdrew from the Treaty (January 2003) and conducted a nuclear test (October 2006).

Over the years and, in particular at the occasion of NPT Review Conferences, **Article VI performance has been presented by NonNuclear Weapons States (NNWS) as the main condition of NPT success**. The 1995 decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely was largely won on the promise that NWS would move swiftly toward nuclear disarmament[2] and that they would agree on a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT). That agreement was reached in 1996 and, at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the NWS recognized that the NPT represents an "unequivocal undertaking" to "accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals."[3]

While the United States, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom made significant moves toward nuclear disarmament in the 1990s, that process somewhat began to stall (but did not stop) in the early 21st century. Evidence of that stall includes, in particular, the rejection of the CTBT by the U.S. Senate and the increased role given to nuclear weapons in Russia's military doctrine. The failure to conclude a final document at

[1] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/140, 22 April 1970.

[2] 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT, Final Document, Annex, Decision 2, *Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament*, NPT/CONF.1995/32.

[3] 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Volume I, "Review of the Operation of the Treaty, Taking into Account the Decisions and the Resolution Adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference – Improving the Effectiveness of the Strengthened Review Process for the Treaty" (Part I) / "Organization and Work of the Conference" (Part II), NPT/CONF.2000/28.

the 2005 NPT Review Conference and the fact that all NWS and *de facto* NWS continue to consider their nuclear arsenals as part of their defense policies are further illustrations that nuclear disarmament is no longer the priority it once was.

Defining Nuclear Disarmament

Nuclear disarmament is generally defined as an end-state (zero nuclear weapons). Serious doubts loom over the technical feasibility of getting to zero nuclear weapons (verification issues) and, as a consequence, over its desirability with regard to domestic and regional security issues. Achieving zero nuclear weapons would require much time and political will, outlined by step-by-step procedural measures.

For these reasons, **nuclear disarmament is best defined as a process**. More specifically, it should be understood as a sustained process toward the gradual de-alerting, de-deployment, decommissioning, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons.

Defining Progress toward Nuclear Disarmament

If nuclear disarmament is viewed in terms of the process by which such measures can be attained, it is necessary to identify the various goals to be reached to move that process forward. In the words of George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, "[i]n some respects, the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is like the top of a very tall mountain. From the vantage point of our troubled world today, we can't even see the top of the mountain [so we have to] chart a course [...] where the mountaintop becomes more visible."[4] That course of action or road map should include the following steps:

a) **In the short-term, progress on nuclear disarmament should be characterized, quite simply, by a strong commitment to its cause**. That commitment would best find its expression in the release of statements by NWS and *de facto* NWS whereby they would detail their respective number of strategic and tactical weapons and weapons grade fissile material as well as the various technical, administrative, and financial steps which would have to be taken to verifiably eliminate them. A realistic estimation of how long that process would take should also be included in this initial assessment. Given a one-to-two year timeframe to issue such statements, NWS and *de facto* NWS should also immediately forgo the development of new types of nuclear weapons (as well as R&D on the question), agree on a moratorium against the production of additional materials, sign and ratify the CTBT, and make official declarations that nuclear weapons, while they exist, are only weapons of deterrence and that they will never be used first.

b) **In the medium-term, progress on nuclear disarmament should be characterized by the implementation of the process of deep weapons reductions**. Spanning several years, that process should proceed with adequate oversight from the IAEA, whose budget will have to be substantially increased. The IAEA should also be held accountable for

[4] George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, "Toward a Nuclear-Free World," *The Wall Street Journal*, Jan. 15, 2008.

verifying the storage and disposition of all HEU and plutonium in excess. As the number of nuclear weapons shrinks and subsequently increases the general level of confidence, there should also be an end to hair-trigger postures and to the forward deployment of nuclear weapons used in operational military planning.

c) **In the longer-term, there will be, as mentioned earlier, serious questions as to whether achieving a world free of nuclear weapons is feasible and, therefore, desirable**. No NWS would agree to dismantle its last nuclear weapon without extremely high assurances that other NWS have done the same. Whether the IAEA or any other organization will be able to provide these levels of assurances is uncertain. This determination is critical, as it would indicate whether a world free of nuclear weapons will actually be so in its literal sense or whether it will instead denote a world with a minimal number of nuclear weapons, whose levels will have to be carefully balanced and monitored in a way that maintains international peace and security.

Making Progress toward Nuclear Disarmament: In Need of NWS/U.S. Leadership

No project can be brought to fruition without supportive leadership. The nuclear disarmament project is no exception.

NWS are the natural leaders of the nuclear disarmament project. For a start, as developed earlier, the five NWS bear a legal (and moral) responsibility, as the official possessors of nuclear weapons, to move the nuclear disarmament project forward. **That duty of leadership is particularly powerful in the case of the United States.** Given the "monarchical nature" of the nuclear order, i.e., that it is and always has been essentially "a U.S. project,"[5] there is a strong expectation among the nations of the world that the United States should be the leader of the disarmament project.

NWS, the United States in particular, are also the world's security stakeholders. As permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the five NWS bear another special responsibility, that of applying their power to maintain international peace and security, including through the use of force if necessary. Dating back to the creation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 and therefore preceding their nuclear disarmament obligation, **that responsibility has come to entail, among many other things, the fight against nuclear proliferation**. That is why Article X(1) of the NPT stipulates that a NPT Party which decides to withdraw from the Treaty must give notice to all other Parties and to the UN Security Council.[6] That is also why the UNSC President declared in January 1992

[5] William Walker explains that "although many states gave shape to this nuclear order, it was seen by the U.S. as peculiarly *its* creation and responsibility, as the product of *its* exceptional genius – and with some justification. Throughout the nuclear age [...] most of the *ordering ideas* and most of the desire to realize those ideas, came from the U.S.. The American attitude toward the nuclear order has therefore always been monarchical. The U.S. has unquestionably conferred upon itself unique rights to decide when the game and its rules should be changed" ("Nuclear Order and Disorder," *International Affairs* 76, October 2000, p. 709).

[6] Article X(1) reads that "[e]ach Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the

that the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons deemed "of mass destruction" are "a threat to international peace and security" (code words for justifying the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter).[7]

Some scholars have argued that the disarmament obligation is inherently less important than the responsibility of NWS, as UNSC permanent members, to fight against nuclear proliferation. Others have even put up a case that the United States, as the only power with truly global security responsibilities, should not make any moves toward disarmament because its powerful military arsenal, intrinsically "benevolent,"[8] provides stability to the world and discourages proliferation incentives. Incidentally, these scholars also contend that the United States should contemplate acting unilaterally when the UNSC fails to respond effectively to high-risk proliferation crises.

Undeniably, the security guarantor role of UNSC permanent members (and particularly that of the United States) is critical to win the fight against nuclear proliferation. There is an urgent need to build a stronger consensus among these nuclear powers. **Yet, at the same time, NWS/U.S. leadership on the disarmament front appears both possible and necessary**:

- **NWS/U.S. Leadership in Nuclear Disarmament is Possible**. During the Cold War, progress toward nuclear disarmament was impossible because of the East-West confrontation. Due to these reasons, the NPT instituted nonproliferation efforts as a stepping stone to this ultimate objective. The Treaty sought to reconcile realities (the then impossibility of nuclear disarmament) with the ambition of preventing further nuclear proliferation. Since the end of the Cold War, however, great powers have found themselves in general agreement as to how the world should be managed. Thus, the absence of major threats beyond those posed by so-called "rogue states" and terrorist groups has made possible significant progress on the nuclear disarmament front in all NWS, with the notable exception of China. Notwithstanding these laudable efforts, it seems that **the strategic environment does not justify the approximate 25,000 nuclear weapons currently retained by NWS (and *de facto* NWS)**. The process could be promoted more forcefully without compromising the NWS's established security alliances.

- **NWS/U.S. Leadership in Nuclear Disarmament is Necessary**. There are two main reasons why NWS/U.S. need to accelerate nuclear disarmament efforts. First, **NNWS criticisms** of the NPT, although not new, are mounting, with statements suggesting that NNWS should be allowed to develop nuclear weapons if they so choose as a result of the

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Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests."

[7] Declaration S/23500, Jan. 31, 1992.

[8] Robert Kagan, "The Benevolent Empire," *Foreign Policy* 111, Summer 1998. Two years later, Kagan and Kristol stated that "American dominance can be sustained for many decades, not by arms control agreements, but by augmenting America's power and, therefore, its ability to lead" (Robert Kagan and William Kristol, *Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy* (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000), p. 26).

failure of NWS to live up to their disarmament obligations. Moreover, **only ambitious disarmament efforts will enable NWS to reinforce nonproliferation rules**. There is a strong need, in particular, to prohibit the development and transfer of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, which give a "breakout" option to its possessors.

If these assumptions are correct, this means, in strictly rational terms (that is, not necessarily in human terms), that NWS should move toward disarmament.

The Nuclear Disarmament Project Today: Seizing the Opportunity

Hippocrates, the ancient Greek physician now known as "the father of medicine," stressed that "healing is a matter of time but it is sometimes also a matter of opportunity."[9] That statement could apply to the nuclear disarmament project. As developed above, moving toward disarmament cannot happen overnight. It is bound to be a time-consuming and step-by-step enterprise that requires strong and continuous political and financial commitments.

At the same time, **all indicators suggest that the opportunity to proceed more forcefully with that enterprise is in place today**. It is therefore up to NWS – the United States in particular – to show enlightened leadership and capitalize on that window of opportunity while it is present. As Joseph Nye explains,

> Events create windows of opportunity, which may close in a relatively short period of time. Many opportunities for change go unfulfilled. Leaders matter when they have the intuition and skills to take advantage of those windows while they are open.[10]

Failure to seize the current disarmament opportunity be disastrous for the nuclear order and, in turn, for international peace and security.

Potential Challenges to the Nuclear Disarmament Project in Asia-Pacific

There are potential challenges in the Asia-Pacific that could undermine the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. But it is possible to craft a strategy to manage these challenges.

Concerns in Northeast Asia

Plausible challenges from from U.S. allies in Northeast Asia, which are strategically depending on U.S. nuclear umbrella, present serious security challenges. Uncertainties arise not only from the DPRK and its nuclear capability, but also from the rise of China with an increasing number of nuclear weapons. Both Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have given up options to arm themselves with nuclear deterrents, but have chosen to maintain the extended U.S. nuclear deterrent as one of its most important alliance commitments.

[9] Hippocrates, *Precepts*, trans. by W. H. Jones and published in *Hippocrates*, vol. 1 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1962), p. 313.
[10] Joseph S. Nye Jr., *The Powers to Lead* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 9-10.

As the United States becomes more active on the nuclear disarmament front, strategic thinkers in Japan and the ROK are likely to become anxious about the absence of a U.S. nuclear umbrella, or at least the weakening of U.S. influence in the region. To forestall the situation in which the United States can no longer maintain the regional balance of power, it is highly likely that U.S. allies would reconsider their defense strategies vis-à-vis potential adversaries, the DPRK and China.

Because of U.S. provision of security assurances to its allies, it has been unlikely that either Japan or the ROK would attempt to develop its own nuclear deterrent. However, both countries are known to possess the technical capabilities to build nuclear weapons. Japan's nuclear energy program, albeit peaceful, has been able to reprocess large amounts of plutonium. Given Japan's past ambitions, some neighbors remain fearful of an overzealous Japan with regard to developing a nuclear program. However unrealistic, these suspicions remain, and significant nuclear reposturing could quickly engender distrust and tensions in the region.

Similarly, perceptions of the ROK are not free from its past attempts to secretly develop nuclear weapons in the 1970s. Even if Japan and the ROK are determined not to go nuclear, a regional non-nuclear arms race is possible. In the extreme situation where the U.S. nuclear deterrent is no longer in place or where the United States would take steps toward a no-first use (NFU) policy, it is possible that this would significantly weaken U.S. leverage in dealing with regional contingencies.

In order to mitigate these challenges, the next U.S. administration should:

- **Reassure Japan and the ROK that the United States will not unilaterally make a decision to weaken its nuclear deterrent and that it will maintain a credible deterrent against potential adversaries while reducing the number of its warheads.** By ensuring its strong commitment to protect its allies, the United States remains a credible partner. Close and frequent consultations with Japan and the ROK should take place to prepare for any shift in the security environment. These consultations must occur simultaneously, in the form of a trilateral dialogue. Considering Japan and the ROK's historical animosity and suspicions of each other's intentions, it is important for the United States to make sure that the three countries are on the same page, thereby keeping its allies from revealing the nuclear tipping point.

- **Carefully approach the NFU issue in balance with progress in the Six-Party Talks as well as in bilateral arms control dialogues with China.** Premature decisions to adopt a NFU policy could harm the credibility of the U.S. alliances in the region. For example, as the Six-Party Talks make significant progress toward its goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and as diplomatic relations between the United States and the DPRK improve, these will be procedures for the U.S. to make an NFU declaration.[11] It is

[11] Cheon warns that "U.S. security assurance to North Korea and improved relations between the two countries would have profound political and security repercussions beyond tactical and symbolic meaning. See, Seongwhun Cheon, "Security Assurance and Other Alternatives: Lessons from the Past Experiences," United

therefore important to agree that the symbolic U.S. nuclear umbrella vis-à-vis the DPRK will be subject to change in these circumstances, and that this will not harm the security ties between the United States and its allies.

- **Proactively communicate with allies to ensure shared values and security objectives on nuclear disarmament**. The U.S. nuclear force structure is "only one of the factors influencing China's force posture decisions" as well as the DPRK's decision-making with regard to its nuclear weapons program.[12] It is important to agree that progress toward nuclear disarmament will not prevent China and the DPRK from pursuing aggressive military build-ups.

- **Actively encourage its allies to take more international roles supporting nuclear disarmament.** There is a growing Japanese assertiveness on nuclear disarmament issues as Japan tries to take more ambitious international roles.[13] Similarly, the ROK has reasons to believe that complete disarmament in the region without the threat of nuclear war would significantly its security.

Improving the Effectiveness of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs)

NWFZs are one of the success stories in the field of nuclear disarmament. However, the zones face many challenges which include the lack of more substantial progress in global nuclear disarmament, dangers from the illicit nuclear market, the risk of nuclear terrorism, the challenge of reliably safeguarding and physically protecting ever-increasing amounts of fissile material, issues concerning nuclear cooperation with non-NPT states, the development of missiles and other delivery vehicles that are nuclear-capable, and the challenge of maintaining or strengthening export controls.

The biggest challenges come from the NWS that are reluctant to become parties of the NWZ treaties and have created problems such as the issues of transit and negative security assurance. Visits and transits through zonal states of ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons may take place if allowed, but their frequency and duration are not limited.

Since the great powers refuse to publicly disclose the whereabouts of their nuclear weapons, they are unlikely to request permission for a visit or transit by a nuclear-weapon-carrying ship or aircraft. Their prerogative to enter a zone without permission has already occurred and will likely continue to do so. The right of the zonal states to deny permission is thus purely hypothetical. In any event, introduction of nuclear

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Nations – ROK Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Issues, Jeju Island, Republic of Korea, 3-5 December 2003.

[12] Sidney Drell and James Goodby, "What Are Nuclear Weapons For?: Recommendations for Restructuring U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces," An Arms Control Association Report, April 2005.

[13] For example, Japan had been active in "calling for G-8 financial support to dispose of surplus plutonium from Russian decommissioning, which will cost about $2 billion." See further, Michael Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa, "New Ambitions, Old Obstacles: Japan and Its Search for an Arms Control Strategy," *Arms Control Today*, July 2000.

weapons into the zone, even for a short time, whether in time of peace or in time of war, would defeat the goal of total regional denuclearization.

Meanwhile, in regards to the issue of negative security assurances, the pledge made by France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. not to use nuclear weapons against the members of the denuclearized zones is conditional. It will cease to be valid in case of an attack on the nuclear-weapon powers or their allies, carried out or sustained by a nonnuclear-weapon state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state. This exception weakens the negative security assurances of the nuclear powers. Hence the demands made in different disarmament forums to make these assurances unconditional.

The U.S. policy with regard to support for NWFZs has been focused almost exclusively on retaining minor exceptions for itself, rather than supporting new non-proliferation commitments by regional states that would serve both international nonproliferation aims and U.S. security goals. The United States has insisted on self-interested rights to transit nuclear weapons through these zones, even when such zones are landlocked and have no seaways. For example, negotiations on a NWFZ in Central Asia nearly broke down in the 1990s due to U.S. insistence that a clause be included in the draft treaty allowing freedom of transit for U.S. nuclear weapons. Eventually, the states agreed to drop a blanket ban on the transit of nuclear weapons through the zone by leaving it to each state to decide, despite the fact that such a clause would have strengthened one of the main benefits to the United States of the proposed regime. By insisting on a narrow and doctrinaire point, the United States sent the wrong signal to these states and ended up halting an important nonproliferation initiative in a critical region of proliferation concern like Central Asia. Washington has done little to promote the establishment of a zone free of WMD in areas such as the Middle East, while withholding its support for the Southeast Asian NWFZ because it could deny the U.S. the right to transit of nuclear weapons through the zone.

We suggest the following steps to improve the functionality of NWFZs:

- **Draft a resolution calling for an international conference of NWFZ member states to discuss cooperation**.[14] With over 100 states under the framework of the four existing NWFZs, their coordinated effort could bring considerable political influence and attention to bear on key nonproliferation issues. They should expand their agenda rather than merely acting on a regional basis to push NWS to become parties of the NWFZs. To start, the existing zones can consider joint steps to strengthen verification systems, which currently rely on the classical IAEA safeguards system.

[14] This draft resolution was once proposed by Mexico at the 2003 UN General Assembly, but it was withdrawn due to concerns over the cost of such an event. Mexico and other members of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) suggested that the members of the four existing zones must work together to put issues of common concern, is including, but not limited to nuclear disarmament, on the international agenda.

- There should be **a promotion of regional solutions to problems associated with the nuclear fuel cycle**, especially uranium enrichment and the secure storage of spent nuclear fuel. It is necessary to avoid the same discriminatory division between “haves” and “have-nots” that exists with nuclear weapons.

- **The evolution of existing zones into WMD-free zones that also include delivery vehicles**. There is an urgent need to recall that all states are already committed to the goal of general and complete disarmament as mentioned in the preambles of the nuclear weapon free zone treaties, which encompasses the elimination of all WMD and their respective delivery vehicles, as well as the limitation of conventional arms.

APPENDIX A

About the Authors

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APPENDIX B

Seventh Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on
Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific
Rex Hotel, Ho Chi Minh City,Vietnam, May 25-27, 2008

Agenda

May 25, 2008

Participant arrival and check-in

19:00 Opening Dinner

May 26, 2008

9:00 **Welcome remarks**
(CSCAP Vietnam and USCSCAP)

9:15 **Session 1**: **The Global Nonproliferation Regime**
Discussions will focus on developments since our last meeting that impact the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. What is the status of the Iranian nuclear program and the U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement? Are there lessons to be drawn from them? Are there other emerging threats to the GNR? What was the outcome of the April Preparatory Committee Meeting? What is the impact of the editorials by Kissinger, Nunn, Schultz, and Perry on disarmament? What is the impact of recent announcements by Great Britain and France regarding their nuclear programs? Do these developments affect the Asia Pacific region?

11:00 Coffee Break

11:15 **Session 2: Developments on the Korean Peninsula**
This session will examine the progress of the Six-Party Talks on Korean Peninsula denuclearization. What progress has been made by the working groups? What is the status of the dismantlement process? What is the impact on the global nonproliferation regime? What is the status of the North Korean declaration on its nuclear programs? What are the actions involved in Phase 3 of the agreement? What kind of positive role can/should CSCAP and/or ARF play in the process?

12:30 Lunch

14:00 **Session 3: UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the Global Nonproliferation Regime**
This session will address the role UNSCR 1540 plays in ensuring compliance with the GNR. How do national implementation plans relate to regional strategies? What regional benefits can be derived from national implementation of UNSCR 1540? How does UNSCR 1540 relate to the current safeguards system for controlling proliferation? Does it serve as an enabler for expanded use of nuclear energy?

15:00 Coffee break

15:15 **Session 4**: **Regional Safeguards Arrangements as a Complement to IAEA Safeguards**
This session will examine the role of international nuclear safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in support of the GNR. It will provide an overview of the safeguards systems and consider how it might be strengthened. What role do safeguards play in the expansion of nuclear power as a source of energy? In Europe and South America regional safeguards arrangements have an important role in building regional confidence and complementing IAEA safeguards. This session will examine the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the Brazil-Argentina Agency for Accounting and Control (ABACC) and examine proposals for similar arrangements in Asia.

17:00 Session adjourns

18:30 Dinner

May 27, 2008

9:00 **Session 5: Regional Strategies for WMD**
This session will focus on the implementation of regional strategies to deal specifically with the WMD issue. How has the European Union implemented its WMD Strategy Plan? What obstacles has it faced? Are there lessons for the Asia-Pacific region to be drawn from the EU experience with implementing the plan? How has the Pacific Island States' experience with the South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone and ASEAN's experience with the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone affected their perspectives on WMD issues? How has each group approached the issue of treaty compliance? What obstacles have they faced in implementing the treaties? How is the adoption of nuclear weapons free zones different from the EU's WMD Strategy Plan approach?

11:30 Coffee break

11:45 **Session 6: Asia-Pacific WMD Handbook and Action Plan**
This session will focus on recommendations for completion of Chapter 3 on the threat of WMD and Chapter 5 on the treaties, regimes and protocols.

12:30 Lunch

14:00 **Session 7: Wrap up and Future Plans**
This session will focus on future work of the Study Group. How should the Study Group focus its efforts? How can it be more relevant to the work of track one and the ASEAN Regional Forum in particular? How can it coordinate with other Study Groups? How can it better disseminate its product and facilitate the implementation of its recommendations?

14:45 **Meeting Adjourns**

15:00 **Tour of Reunification Palace**

18:30 **Farewell Dinner**

APPENDIX C

PACIFIC FORUM CSIS

YOUNG LEADERS

Seventh Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on
Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific
Rex Hotel, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, May 25-29, 2008

Agenda

May 25, 2008

Participant arrival and check-in

18:30 YLS meet at lobby for quick introduction to the program

19:00 Opening Dinner

May 26, 2008

9:00 **Welcome remarks**
(CSCAP Vietnam and USCSCAP)

9:15 **Session 1**: **The Global Nonproliferation Regime**
Discussions will focus on developments since our last meeting that impact the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. What is the status of the Iranian nuclear program and the U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement? Are there lessons to be drawn from them? Are there other emerging threats to the GNR? What was the outcome of the April Preparatory Committee Meeting? What is the impact of the editorials by Kissinger, Nunn, Schultz, and Perry on disarmament? What is the impact of recent announcements by Great Britain and France regarding their nuclear programs? Do these developments affect the Asia Pacific region?

11:00 Coffee Break

11:15 **Session 2: Developments on the Korean Peninsula**
This session will examine the progress of the Six-Party Talks on Korean Peninsula denuclearization. What progress has been made by the working groups? What is the status of the dismantlement process? What is the impact on the global nonproliferation regime? What is the status of the North Korean declaration on its nuclear programs? What are the actions involved in Phase 3 of the agreement? What kind of positive role can/should CSCAP and/or ARF play in the process?

12:30 Lunch

14:00 **Session 3: Safeguards and the Global Nonproliferation Regime**
This session will examine the role of international nuclear safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in support of the GNR. It will provide an overview of the safeguards systems and consider how it might be strengthened. What role do safeguards play in the expansion of nuclear power as a source of energy? Is the current safeguards system adequate for controlling proliferation? Does the safeguard system serve as an enabler for expanded use of nuclear energy? A participant will report on the last meeting of the CSCAP Energy Security Study Group.

15:00 Coffee break

15:15 **Session 4**: **Regional Safeguards Arrangements as a Complement to IAEA Safeguards**
In Europe and South America regional safeguards arrangements have an important role in building regional confidence and complementing IAEA safeguards. This session will examine the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the Brazil-Argentina Agency for Accounting and Control (ABACC) and examine proposals for similar arrangements in Asia.

17:00 Session adjourns

18:30 Dinner

May 27, 2008

9:00 **Session 5: Regional Strategies for WMD**
This session will focus on the implementation of regional strategies to deal specifically with the WMD issue. How has the European Union implemented its WMD Strategy Plan? What obstacles has it faced? Are there lessons for the Asia-Pacific region to be drawn from the EU experience with implementing the plan? How has the Pacific Island States' experience with the South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone and ASEAN's experience with the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone affected their perspectives on WMD issues? How has each group approached the issue of treaty compliance? What obstacles have they faced in implementing the treaties? How is the adoption of nuclear weapons free zones different from the EU's WMD Strategy Plan approach?

10:30 Coffee break

10:45 **Session 6: Asia-Pacific WMD Handbook and Action Plan**
This session will focus on recommendations for completion of Chapter 3 on the threat of WMD and Chapter 5 on the treaties, regimes and protocols.

12:30 Lunch

14:00 **Session 7: Wrap up and Future Plans**
This session will focus on future work of the Study Group. How should the Study Group focus its efforts? How can it be more relevant to the work of track one and the ASEAN Regional Forum in particular? How can it coordinate with other Study Groups? How can it better disseminate its product and facilitate the implementation of its recommendations?

14:45 **Meeting Adjourns**

15:00 **Tour of Reunification Palace**

18:30 **Farewell Dinner**

May 28, 2008

7:00 Leave hotel for Cu Chi tunnel for site visit

12:00 Lunch

14:00 Leave hotel for University of Social Sciences and Humanities for a talk by the University Rector, Prof. Vo Van Sen about the development of Ho Chi Minh City and the role it plays in Vietnam followed by YLs roundtable discussion with senior students from the Department of International Relations.

16:30 Leave for Binh Quoi resort (8km from city center) for dinner
http://www.binhquoiresort.com.vn/

May 29, 2008

9:00 Talk by Mr. Dang Dinh Quy, Director General (IFPSS)

11:00 Young Leaders Wrap-up Session

13:00 Young Leaders farewell lunch