Next Generation Views on Preventive Diplomacy: The Role of the ASEAN Regional Forum

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Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate arenas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

The Young Leaders Program

The Young Leaders Program invites young professionals and graduate students to join Pacific Forum policy dialogues and conferences. The program fosters education in the practical aspects of policy-making, generates an exchange of views between young and seasoned professionals, promotes interaction among younger professionals, and enriches dialogues with generational perspectives for all attendees. Fellows must have a strong background in the area covered by the conference they are attending and an endorsement from respected experts in their field. Supplemental programs in conference host cities and mentoring sessions with senior officials and specialists add to the Young Leader experience. The Young Leaders Program is currently supported by Chevron, the Freeman Foundation, the Luce Foundation, and the Yuchengco Group, with a growing number of universities, institutes, and organizations also helping to sponsor individual participants. For more details, see the Pacific Forum CSIS website, www.pacforum.org, or contact Brad Glosserman, director of the Young Leaders Program, at bradgpf@hawaii.rr.com.

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Introduction
By Brad Glosserman

Frustration with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is increasing. Nations of the Asia Pacific region face new security challenges but there is considerable skepticism about the ARF's capacity to address those concerns. A test case for the forum focuses on preventive diplomacy (PD). A 1995 ARF concept paper outlined a three-step roadmap for the ARF's development: it would evolve from confidence building measures to preventive diplomacy to the elaboration of approaches to conflict resolution. Yet more than a decade after the ARF's birth, it has not moved to the second stage of that process and embraced preventive diplomacy.

As Asia Pacific nations debate the need to develop a new security architecture to deal with 21st century threats and challenges, there is renewed interest in resuscitating the ARF. Recognizing the work the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) has done on preventive diplomacy, several ARF member states urged the group to again take up the issue. The U.S. CSCAP member committee and Singapore CSCAP hosted a two-day discussion of PD that preceded an ARF Inter-sessional Support Group meeting on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy in Bandar Seri Bagawan, Brunei, in October 2007.

As part of that program, the Pacific Forum CSIS (Secretariat of USCSAP) invited a number of Young Leaders (YL) to join the discussions and provide a next-generation perspective on the ARF and regional security cooperation. The papers that follow lay out their views on these issues. The first four essays provide recommendations from multinational groups of Young Leaders outlining steps the ARF should take to become more relevant. They are followed by papers by individual YL participants that address specific issues for the ARF and regional security challenges. The papers reflect discussions at the meeting as well as those at the Young Leader-only session that followed the conference and focused on divergences between YL thinking and that of senior participants. As is evident from the essays, the next generation is increasingly frustrated with the slow progress of the ARF and seeks greater activism by the forum.

Young Leaders did more than just ponder preventive diplomacy while in Brunei. Prior to the conference, they received briefings on Brunei's new defense white paper by a Ministry of Defense representative, the country's views on key foreign policy issues by members of the Foreign Ministry, and economic diversification plans by a member of the Brunei Economic Development Board. In addition, they received a tour of Bandar Seri Bagawan and visited a water village for a taste of local culture. As an added treat, they received a private briefing from an ASEAN diplomat stationed in Myanmar who provided an off-the-record and detailed assessment of developments in that country. That report made one of the most pressing cases for energetic PD efforts – and made plain the ARF's failure to do so, and its consequences.

Preventive Diplomacy and the Future of the ARF: Policy Recommendations for Diversified Cooperation

By Aki Mori, Alexandra Retno Wulan, Ami Amu Bakar, and David Santoro

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is the only regional forum that actively involves the United States, China, and other powers in Asia Pacific together with members of the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It seeks to hold multilateral discussions on regional security issues, share information, promote confidence building measures (CBMs), and enhance transparency. However, the ARF is often criticized for being no more than a "talk shop" because of its apparent inability to move beyond CBMs in the context of Preventive Diplomacy (PD). The ARF is particularly needed in the Asia Pacific as an ongoing regional attempt to prevent threats or violent conflicts from arising, and construct peaceful resolutions of conflict in the post-Cold War era. Thus, identifying key issues and challenges and formulating robust and effective security cooperation are imperative for the future of the ARF.

Issues and challenges

Issues and challenges are both conceptual and operational.

Conceptual Challenges

Challenges in this category are caused by the ambiguous definition of PD.

Disagreements over the definition and scope of Preventive Diplomacy

The ARF define PD as consensual diplomatic and political actions taken by sovereign states with the consent of all directly involved parties[1]. Hitherto, the ARF is almost solely implementing CBMs due to variety of disagreements over the definition and scope of PD. Some ARF members worry that the implementation of PD might lead to a breach of national sovereignty, such as a humanitarian intervention in the Myanmar case.

Operational Challenges

Institutional Limitations

Signed on Nov. 20, 2007, the ASEAN Charter emphasized institutional change in order to ensure prompt implementation of decisions and agreements, as well as swift response to new opportunities and challenges. No article mentions the ARF. In fact, the latter still suffers from serious structural limitations. Neither does it have any standard decision-making mechanism nor clear point of contacts in each participating state. As a result,

[1] "Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy", The ARF, July 2001.

participating states wanting to take preventive diplomatic actions are confused as of how to proceed within the ARF framework.

Members engagement in the processes

The commitment given to the ARF from member countries has been poor. Member countries have not been able to implement PD successfully even within the ASEAN region, as illustrated by the South China Sea disputes.

Competing with or completing other regional security organizations?

The ARF does not command equivalent attention in an environment in which heads of government are increasingly involved in the alphabet soup of regional diplomacy through ASEAN, ASEAN Plus 3, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the East Asian Summit (EAS), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO). It is unclear what role the ARF can play in such a diversified institutional environment.

Recommendations

There is no common agreement among scholars, politicians, and surely ARF participating states on the conceptualization and operationalization of Preventive Diplomacy. However, it remains crucial to craft mechanisms to prevent an escalation of conflict in the region. Below are key recommendations of our group.

Recommendations to Address Conceptual Challenges

Identifying minimum common denominators

PD is a multilateral initiative to prevent the escalation of a conflict. Hence, one of the most important prerequisites for effective PD implementation is the consent of participating states. In order to promote PD, it is crucial that the ARF to identify minimum common denominators that would trigger PD implementation – within the framework of the ARF. All participating states face nontraditional security issues that cannot be solved by one country, hence, cooperation on nontraditional security issues could provide a basis to establish common denominators.

Cooperation on nontraditional security issues

Practical cooperation on nontraditional security challenges such as counter-terrorism, transnational crime, maritime security, disaster relief, and threats arising from the spread of pandemic diseases could serve as a basis to develop PD. In order to enhance the institutional framework of PD as well as to establish more comprehensive mutual trust among regional powers, systematic mechanisms of cooperation among government officials, the armed forces, and the NGOs are needed.

Recommendations to Address Institutional Challenges

Empowering institutional framework of PD

It is important to form a standard mechanism within the ARF for PD implementation. First, it is important to set up a clear contact point so each member can contact another in case of emergency. Second, it is important to set up a standard coordinating mechanism so each case can be dealt with as required. Experiences dealing with nontraditional security cooperation will provide a vehicle to develop an institutional framework for PD.

Supporting other security cooperation

The role of the ARF as regional security cooperation architecture needs to be empowered. Coordination with other institutions such as the UN Security Council and the Six-Party Talks will not only help these organizations meet their objectives of implementing PD into their discussions but also help the ARF mature.

Conclusion

The newly signed ASEAN Charter does not clearly address the problems of security in Southeast Asia, the ARF should play a significant role to ensure peace and stability in this particular region. Nontraditional security cooperation will ensure the role of the ARF in regional security issues as well as provide an effective platform for PD in the future. It is time to empower the ARF as an institution for security cooperation and to protect the ARF from irrelevance and abandonment.

Re-Examining the Quest toward Preventive Diplomacy

By Raymund Jose G. Quilop, Li Mingjiang,
and Chang Liao Nien-chung

In the 1995 Concept Paper regarding the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which came to serve as a roadmap for the forum, it is spelled out that the ARF will "evolve" along three phases, namely the promotion of confidence building measures, promotion of preventive diplomacy (PD) measures and finally conflict resolution, with the last phase eventually being revised as "elaboration of approaches to conflict resolution." Twelve years have passed since the concept paper was put forward, and yet, the ARF seems to be stuck in the phase of building confidence among its members with the forum seemingly unable to move towards the preventive diplomacy phase. This is in spite of the fact that in 2001, the ARF had already adopted a working definition and principles of preventive diplomacy.

Of course, confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy measures do overlap. In fact, it could be argued that because confidence building measures (CBMs) help prevent conflict, CBMs could rightfully be considered to be preventive diplomacy measures.

Nonetheless, preventive diplomacy is rightfully a different sphere of concern. And because it has been spelled out as the second stage of the ARF's evolution, the move toward the preventive diplomacy phase has become both a quest for some ARF members and at the same time a yardstick that observers of the ARF use to measure the forum's progress. Unfortunately, it appears that the ARF, or at least, a great number of its members, is not yet ready for preventive diplomacy.

The complexities of the security situation in the region partly account for this observation. First, strategic suspicions or misgivings among major powers serves as the biggest barrier for any significant advancement of preventive diplomacy measures. Countries that are reluctant to make commitments to preventive diplomacy are afraid that formal and legal measures of preventive diplomacy will go beyond the stated objectives of PD; political elites in those countries fear that preventive diplomacy could be used as a political tool to endanger their political rule and harm their strategic and security interests. They are doubtful any measures to be taken as preventive diplomacy will be fair in cases in which they are involved.

Second, the many salient security issues in the Asia-Pacific bespeak the difficulties and in some sense the implacability of designing a grand architecture of preventive diplomacy in the ARF. These issues include the North Korean nuclear crisis, Sino-Japanese contention in the East China Sea, the South China Sea imbroglio, and the Taiwan problem. Of course, preventive diplomacy is supposed to tackle these issues, but their complexities coupled with strategic misgivings among states make the parties directly involved in these issues reluctant to commit to outside mediation roles.

Another factor that works against ARF preventive diplomacy is how the "ASEAN way" evolves. If the gradualist, informal, consensus-inclined, and "noninterference in

domestic affairs" approach of the "ASEAN Way" continues to prevail in the ARF, preventive diplomacy is not likely to occur. For example, some members believe that applying preventive diplomacy in intrastate conflicts violates the principle of non-interference.

Given these considerations, it is necessary that members of the ARF, if the forum were to move toward the preventive diplomacy phase, change the way they perceive what preventive diplomacy and the ARF are. Members that are apprehensive about how preventive diplomacy could be utilized must realize that preventive diplomacy does not undermine their strategic interests. On the contrary, preventive diplomacy is useful when the need for it arises. Other members of the ARF must assure the apprehensive members of the forum that preventive diplomacy would not be used as a pretext for interfering with issues that are purely internal. In sum, a change of mindset among the members is the most fundamental consideration: their mindset enables them to move the forum toward preventive diplomacy.

Next a specific approach for moving toward PD is needed. And it is more plausible to stick to the gradualist and informal approach that is favored by many members. This does not mean that there is nothing that the ARF can do. In fact, there is quite a lot that countries involved in the ARF process can do, even outside the ARF process, to create conditions that will facilitate the development of preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific. But first, they have to shift their focus from ambition to action. With the action-oriented approach, states that have a stake in peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific can work on quite a few things, such as the reduction of strategic suspicions, more extensive and effective multilateral cooperation on nontraditional security issues, and actual practice of PD on some emerging security matters, i.e., the Myanmar and Taiwan problems.

Three things are crucial for this action-oriented approach to work. First there must be an assessment of the common ground or consensus that ARF states have reached or are likely to reach. Excessive attention to differences and the ambitious attempt to construct a holistic security architecture have obscured the convergence of security interests among states. For instance, according to results from previous meetings, both official and track two, one consensus view is that focusing on confidence building measures should be the priority because all parties seem to be supportive of it. No doubt, CBMs are part of preventive diplomacy, but what seems to be insufficiently emphasized is the fact that CBMs are also the foundation of preventive diplomacy. The question then is whether enough has been done in the area of CBMs. Many signs indicate CBMs have not been adequately developed. Some developments in the Asia-Pacific even point to the deterioration of CBMs at the strategic level for instance, the emerging quasi-alliance among the United States, Japan, Australia, and India.

Another point of contention between activist and reluctant states is whether preventive diplomacy should include domestic crises when they have international security repercussions. Many states opposed the idea of including intrastate issues in preventive diplomacy, but they are less opposed to the inclusion of interstate security issues. An action-oriented approach should forego the debate on this contentious issue, instead focus on developing preventive measures in interstate security. What should be recognized by ARF members is the fact that ethnic, separatist and religious violence has become more intense

and prevalent means that members of the ARF need not wait for the request of states involved before taking preventive diplomacy measures.

Second, it is important to keep in mind that preventive diplomacy should not be treated as a separate enterprise as if there can be progress without regard to other issues. In fact, the alleviation of strategic rivalry among major powers in the region, more confidence-building measures in other issue areas, and effective efforts to address security issues that are emerging on the horizon can contribute to the formation of preventive diplomacy mechanisms no less than the numerous official and track two efforts that specifically aim at preventive diplomacy issues.

Third, a proposal related to the above point is how to make full use of the existing ARF process to practice preventive diplomacy as much as the common understanding and agreement that have been reached in the ARF allow. States should be more pragmatic by focusing on what can be done on real issues. Many complain that there has been no actual practice or no success story of preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific. This is not true. There have been successful experiences of preventive diplomacy: the South China Sea and the North Korea nuclear crisis.

On the South China Sea issue, there have been quite a lot of CBMs, but some measures go beyond CBMs and are essentially substantive preventive diplomacy measures. On the North Korean nuclear issue, there have been impressive results, pushing Northeast Asia towards some kind of permanent security architecture or framework. These two examples demonstrate the feasibility and applicability of the pragmatic approach to preventive diplomacy: focusing on real issues instead of engaging in contentious debates about principles and institutions. There are two merits of this approach. First, it ameliorates tensions among states involved in the imbroglios. Second, it creates an opportunity to accumulate experience in PD in the Asia-Pacific. Every small success enhances strategic confidence among actors in the ARF.

Alongside the adoption of this approach is the need to enhance the ARF structure itself. Four key considerations come to mind. First is the enhancement of the ARF chair, with the need to de-link the ARF chair from the ASEAN chair being the first step. ASEAN may have to relinquish its de-facto monopoly on the ARF chair and considering sharing it with non-ASEAN members of the forum. Sharing the chair could come in the forms of (1) co-chairmen with a non-ASEAN member, (2) single but alternating chairmen between an ASEAN and a non-ASEAN member, or (3) a triumvirate composed of the immediate past, current, and future chairmen with the current chairman alternating between an ASEAN and a non-ASEAN member.

Second is the need to set-up an ARF Secretariat that could effectively support the ARF Chair. This is a crucial move in the quest to strengthen the ARF. Because the initial purpose of the ARF was to bring Asia-Pacific powers, in particular China, to a process where sensitive security issues could be discussed, a structured organization was not initially necessary. However, as China has participated in more international organizations and has

engaged in regional processes, China's absence is no longer something that other Asia-Pacific states should worry about. A structured ARF, with a Secretariat, has come of age.

A Secretariat that could provide the ARF with information gathering and logistic support is a prerequisite for the implementation of preventive diplomacy. The Secretariat could provide preventive diplomacy services both before or during a crisis. Pre-crisis services include provision of early warnings of possible points of conflict as well as maintenance of the registry of Experts and Eminent Persons, which could come handy when there is a need to utilize the services of these experts and imminent persons to assist and prevent the occurrence or spread of conflict. The Secretariat could also offer other preventive diplomacy services such as fact-finding, goodwill missions, good offices, or mediation in times of conflict.

Third and related to the setting up of an ARF Secretariat is the appointment of an ARF secretary general, which would indicate that the ARF is a regional body and no longer just a forum. The presence of an ARF secretary general ensures continuity of direction and plans of action set by the ARF Chair, which rotates. The secretary general also sets the direction of the ARF upon the guidance and instructions of the ARF Chair. In other words, the ARF sec gen serves as the ARF's chief executive officer or chief operations officer.

Fourth, the ARF needs to go beyond the ASEAN Way of consensus decision-making. Instead, the ARF could adopt a negative (or reverse) consensus decision-making. This principle has been adopted by the World Trade Organization's dispute settlement process. According to Articles 6.1, 16.4, 17.14 and 22..6 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO, a negative consensus means that when a resolution is proposed, all participants must approve the decision unless there is a consensus against it. This means that one state can prevent the reverse consensus. To do so that state merely needs to insist on the decision being approved. In other words, any state intending to block a decision has to persuade all other ARF participants (including the adversarial party in the case) to join its opposition or at least to stay passive. Accordingly, a resolution can be reached more quickly in the dispute settlement process. The negative consensus decision-making procedure would therefore prevent a single state with a strong objection to a proposal from being able to effectively prevent the proposal from being adopted.

As the quest to have the ARF move to the preventive diplomacy phase gains momentum, four major developments in the Asia-Pacific need to be addressed. These are the reduction of strategic suspicions among major powers, closer multilateral collaboration on nontraditional security issues, cooperation on the current Myanmar crisis, and preventive diplomacy measures on the Taiwan issue.

A big hindrance to preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific is the strategic environment. Despite the end of the Cold War, strategic distrust among major powers in the Asia-Pacific has not abated. The recent development of a strategic constellation of four powers, the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, whatever the purpose, may not be good news for the establishment of a multilateral security architecture, let alone preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific. The formation of an exclusive "Asian NATO" will exacerbate

strategic conditions in the Asia-Pacific, forestalling the meaningful development of preventive diplomacy in the region. For preventive diplomacy to move forward, there is a need to think carefully how a more propitious strategic environment can be created.

Another area upon which ARF states can pragmatically cooperate is non-traditional security issues. At the Paris seminar, it was agreed that the scope and agenda of preventive diplomacy should include nontraditional security issues, such as drug trafficking, terrorism, energy, environment, and maritime security. There have been a few programs at the multilateral level on these issues, but there is much more room for collaboration among ARF participants.

The political crisis in Myanmar presents an opportunity to practice preventive diplomacy by participating states of the ARF. In retrospect, the crisis in Myanmar was a lost chance for ARF to practice preventive diplomacy. In the early days when signs of internal unrest emerged in Myanmar, the international society took little notice, let alone take actions. The ARF, even using existing mechanisms, could have done a better job at the initial stage of the crisis in Myanmar. Now there are signs that the international community can play a more effective role in solving the crisis. Ultimately, how the crisis is dealt with at the multilateral level will be a significant experience for ASEAN and ARF in exercising preventive diplomacy.

Taiwan has always been regarded as a flashpoint in East Asia, affecting peace and stability in the region. It is also one of the most difficult problems to tackle. With new developments in the recent months, the Taiwan issue could be a good case for ARF members to practice preventive diplomacy. There have been two major developments across the Taiwan Strait. One is the Democratic Progressive Party's strenuous effort in pushing for a "referendum on UN membership in the name of Taiwan" and the other is Beijing's recent proposal to conclude a peace accord with Taiwan. The first instance, which apparently seems to be an internal political issue of Taiwan, may engender drastic consequences in cross-Strait relations, affecting regional peace and stability. The latter development is an attempt on the part of Beijing to pursue the status quo on the Taiwan issue. How various states that have an interest in East Asian security respond to these developments will have an impact on the future of preventive diplomacy in the ARF.

In short, an action-oriented approach to preventive diplomacy should take precedence. States involved in the ARF process should try their best to create favorable conditions for building preventive diplomacy measures. Common understanding, norms, practices, and experiences will emerge from these actions.

Reinvigorating the ASEAN Regional Forum: Preventive Diplomacy and Beyond

By Kristi Govella, Shanshan Wang, and Alan Hao Yang

Created in 1994, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is the only forum for security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific, its 27 participant countries rendering it the most expansive of the region's groupings. Despite its potential, however, the ARF has had difficulty making progress in its mission to move from confidence-building measures to preventive diplomacy to conflict resolution, seemingly stalled in the first step of this ambitious process. In this paper, we argue that the ARF needs to reconcile its commitment to preventive diplomacy with the realities of the region to ensure that it remains relevant to member countries. We begin by outlining three challenges currently faced by the ASEAN Regional Forum: 1) lack of institutionalization, 2) the continuing debate over the definition of preventive diplomacy, and 3) incorporating increasingly important nontraditional security issues into its mandate. We then suggest concrete steps for the forum to move forward.

Assessing the ARF: challenges and dilemmas

In the one and a half decades since its inception, the challenges faced by the ASEAN Regional Forum have gradually come to light. The first and most concrete involves the forum's lack of institutionalization and the limitations that this poses for its functionality and relevance. Despite the fact that the ARF encompasses a large number of countries and a potentially broad security agenda, it does not have its own Secretariat. Like other institutions in Asia, ASEAN provides the driving institutional and organizational force for the forum; its staff consists of a small ARF Unit within the hectic ASEAN Secretariat. Though it sounds trivial, this poses significant limitations on the activities of this institution and leads countries to dismiss it as useless or irrelevant. How can the ARF play a role in regional crisis resolution if no one knows who to call to ask for dispute mediation? In the event of a regional crisis, the ARF, in its current weak state, is incapable of acting as a third-party arbitrator or even of providing assistance to parties involved. Its current role of providing channels and platforms for multi-level dialogue is meaningful, but there is a need to reinforce member adherence to the organization and to strengthen the central organization of the ARF in the long-term.

Second, the ARF has been plagued by a long debate about the definition of preventive diplomacy. Countries such as Japan envisioned preventive diplomacy measures as encompassing practical solutions to regional problems, including involvement in intrastate conflict, with the consent of involved parties; other countries such as China, Vietnam, and Myanmar (Burma) prefer that the ARF remain a forum for discussion and balk at tampering with the principle of nonintervention in states' domestic affairs.[2] Debates among members fundamentally involve the issue of sovereignty and interference on the part of great powers. Far from playing a productive role in the evolution of the ARF, however, these debates have

[2] Yuzawa, Takeshi. "The Evolution of Preventive Diplomacy in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Problems and Prospects." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 46, Issue 5, 2006. pp. 785-804.

largely served to exacerbate its stagnation. The fact that ARF's definition and incorporation of preventive diplomacy is still being debated 13 years after the penning of the 1995 concept paper is a real problem. This issue needs to be resolved before progress can occur.

Third, the region has witnessed a dramatic increase in the importance of nontraditional security issues over the last two decades. "Nontraditional security" issues arise primarily out of nonmilitary sources, such as climate change, resource scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters, drug and human trafficking, and transnational crime. These dangers are often transnational, defying unilateral remedies and requiring comprehensive political, economic, and social responses. Many of the ARF's greatest successes have come in the area of nontraditional security, and this is the area in which it seems to have the biggest contribution to make in the short-term. However, the ARF lacks a clear conception of how these issues relate to its primary institutional mandate of preventive diplomacy; consequently, it cannot embrace nontraditional security with a coherent plan, and it is less able to claim successes in this arena as achievements for the forum. Nontraditional security represents a real and important area of potential cooperation for ARF participants, but its secondary status among the ARF's goals remains problematic.

Improving the ARF: steps toward greater regional relevance

In order to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the ASEAN Regional Forum, we propose the following recommendations:

The ARF should pursue greater institutionalization. The ARF leadership should tackle the task of internal institutionalization with the support of a CSCAP study group. The most immediate and critical concern is the establishment of an autonomous Secretariat with sufficient personnel to handle ARF affairs year-round. In addition, ARF member states should establish a Regional Risk Reduction Center. This Center has the potential to be an important first step in linking ARF to meaningful cooperation, working in tandem with a regional crisis monitoring network composed of specialized centers from individual member states. Under the supervision of the ARF Secretariat, the crisis network will ensure appropriate allocation of regional resources in the event of a regional disaster or security threat.

The ARF should strive to definitively conceptualize preventive diplomacy, but not to the obstruction of institutional progress. The ARF should draft a new concept paper to definitively address the issue of preventive diplomacy. The concept paper will reexamine state-to-state applications of preventive diplomacy, distinguishing preventive diplomacy procedures from subsequent crisis management measures. Continuing disagreement about the definition of preventive diplomacy should not be allowed to contribute to the forum's stagnation. Instead, preventive diplomacy and crisis management should be folded into a broader mission for the ARF, one that places greater emphasis on increasingly salient nontraditional security issues.

The ARF should broaden its mission to officially incorporate nontraditional security issues. The ARF has made important inroads into traditional security, holding the first-ever joint security exercise by ARF states last spring, for example. However, the forum should also recognize that nontraditional security challenges pose some of the most pressing threats to the Asian region and are no less worthy of treatment than more traditional security issues. ARF should more fully embrace nontraditional security as part of its regional role. This will allow the ARF to evaluate its successes in nontraditional security as real and meaningful successes for the forum itself. It will also establish nontraditional security as a primary institutional domain of the ARF, discourage unnecessary duplication of efforts by other forums in the region, and encourage relevant organizations to partner with the ARF to address nontraditional security concerns.

The ARF should clearly delineate its relationship to other regional institutions. In recent years, Asia has witnessed a proliferation of regional institutions; it is now home to five forums and organizations: ASEAN, APEC, ASEAN Plus Three, the East Asia Summit, and the ARF. While these institutions have different areas of focus, their boundaries are often blurry, leading to a problem of "product differentiation." For example, all five institutions currently address differing combinations of nontraditional security issues. In order to ensure its relevance to regional state actors, the ARF must clearly define its mission; in situations where cooperation between forums is appropriate, ARF should take the lead in its respective domain (by coordinating regional nontraditional security efforts, for example).

The ARF should address the concept of enhanced engagement. It is necessary to clearly identify the principle, goal, operational definition, and practical measures of enhanced engagement. Enhanced engagement offers an alternative approach to reduce the severity of regional crises. By engaging the party concerned, it supports third-party activities on good offices, negotiation, mediation, and effective arbitration, not only at the inter-state level but at the domestic level as well.

The ARF should reexamine the nonintervention principle. The ARF must provide a working definition of intervention, elaborating on potential scope and action, and distinguishing between intervention and interference. The ARF could initiate an *ad hoc* moral clause, allowing ARF members to express concerns or take actions to ease the degree and scope of a crisis, should it occur. The ARF could enhance provision of international resources to a crisis-stricken area and ensure accountability of any final resolution, both positive effects of intervention. Moreover, the ARF Secretariat could partner with regional and international NGOs to play a more active role in promoting regional cooperation and easing domestic disputes.

The ARF should frame a vision paper. Finally, the ASEAN Regional Forum should draft a vision paper, emphasizing the importance of immediate reform and addressing the aforementioned ideas. It should also draw on suggestions from CSCAP, which has had an extremely productive symbiotic relationship with the forum. The paper and agreed-upon solutions should then be presented at the ARF ministerial meeting.

The ASEAN Regional Forum can play an important role in enhancing the security of the Asian region. While it is challenged by weak institutionalization, ambiguous self-definition, and a shifting organizational mission, all is not lost. Our suggestions represent concrete and feasible steps that can enhance and solidify the ARF's relevance. By continuing to work productively with member states at the official governmental level and with other partners at the track II and track III levels, the forum can make headway on a number of vital issues. China could lead the establishment of an ad hoc study group with ASEAN states, bringing together regional experts to find feasible solutions to territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Different combinations of states could tackle nontraditional security threats by encouraging track II proposals and by collaborating with local and regional NGOs. The possibilities are numerous and promising. By facilitating such endeavors, the ARF can craft a unique and meaningful role for itself and help to ensure the peace and prosperity of Asia in the years to come.

The ARF role in preventive diplomacy: Human Rights and the Environment

By Jiyon Shin, Ana Villavicencio,
Nik AA Tuah, and Ha Anh Tuan

The best way to prevent conflicts in East Asia is for the ARF to use preventive diplomacy (PD) to solve conflicts between and within countries. To apply this solution successfully, the ARF needs to redefine the concept of preventive diplomacy and persuade member countries to be more open in sensitive issues.

The PD definition rests on the idea of noninterference. It is peaceful and non-coercive, and based on international law. PD deals with inter-state conflicts, while most conflicts today are intra-state, with a tendency to spread across borders affecting the whole region. In the globalized world, the notion of independence is relatively weak. Interdependence causes developments in a country to affect other countries as well. The ARF, hence, needs to reshape the definition of Preventive Diplomacy to allow interference in nonmilitary-related issues such as the protection of human rights and environmental disasters.

If the ARF is able to forge agreement to allow a certain level of interference between member nations, then it will playa more effective role in preventing and controlling conflicts from escalating and spreading throughout the region.

One way of achieving this is to create a regional nongovernmental body or organization that has the 'authority' to investigate specific cases related to human rights violations in the region and is able to evaluate them, as well as make a report and recommendation to the ARF, in particular on what actions (i.e., non-coercive) should be taken. This organization can be similar to Amnesty International but focusing only on East Asia. Amnesty International has no political agenda, and it has demonstrated this commitment throughout its existence. Its goal is simply to inform and act against human rights violations. These violations are defined by the UN Human Rights Charter/international law, which has very clear statements of what constitutes a human rights violation. Amnesty International does not depend on funding other than its individual members, which makes it very easy for it to stick to its goals and rules.

Amnesty International tries to influence the UN, and the international community into taking action against the offending country, and it also tries to put pressure on countries that violate human rights to change their actions. Hence, it is crucial such a regional body or organization be created to work with the ARF. The membership of the suggested body or organization must ensure fair representation and a degree of independence from specific parties. Allowing NGOs and civil society to intervene and have a more active role in conflict resolution among countries in the region and in the ARF will allow the ARF to avoid political obstacles. A regional-Amnesty International-like organization is one example of how grassroots and nongovernmental organizations can play a significant role in strengthening the ARF.

Before the ARF can get involved with regional organizations fighting for social issues it needs to make itself 'visible' in the region and in the eyes of the international communities. The ARF can establish itself, for instance, by setting up a center or centers to enable management and coordination of its activities; implementing socio-economic programs or projects in regional countries that will create relationship and networking between the ARF and the communities; and setting up a link with international bodies such as the UN and UNICEF may provide a strong platform for the ARF to play the major role in conflict resolution in East Asia.

Another way of strengthening the ARF is to have a disaster management group that would detect environmental hazards before they occur, and has rapid communication tools to distribute warnings. For example consolidating a permanent early warning regional system may help to avoid another large-scale tsunami disaster. The point was highlighted in the Co-chair's summary report of the meeting of the Inter-sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy in Manila, March 2006: a special section states the importance of improving communication protocols, capacity building, seminars, and the provision of early warning systems. It is evident that detection and communication facilities are crucial to prevent natural disasters from occurring. Funding is a key factor in establishing an effective warning system. Therefore, the ARF needs to devise a sustainable funding support such as a continuing trust fund for the Tsunami early warning system. Environmental disaster control could be a less difficult issue for the ARF because natural disasters can be separated, to a certain degree, from political issues.

ARF involvement in regional organizations that fight for human rights and environmental issues or the implementation of ARF offices locally not solve all conflicts or stop all conflicts from arising and spreading but small steps a regional community and can help solve difficult problems together without the fear of losing sovereignty. Eventually these initiatives will contribute to improving the image of the ARF and, the images of Southeast Asian countries as well.

Preventive Diplomacy in the ARF: Action More Important Than Ambition

By Li Mingjiang

There has been much frustration over the slow progress of preventive diplomacy measures of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the primary security-related dialogue in the Asia-Pacific. Previous meetings at the official and track two levels have made clear the definition and principles of preventive diplomacy, although many disagreements still exist. What is far from certain is how concrete measures of preventive diplomacy, the second step envisioned for the ARF process, should be established.

Many complaints have been leveled at the ARF for not having been able to set up explicit institutions. Many criticisms have been voiced China, Vietnam, Myanmar, and other ASEAN countries for not showing any enthusiasm for preventive diplomacy and their obstructive behaviors in the process of pushing preventive diplomacy in East Asia. Not enough thought has been given to whether this region is ready for a well-designed preventive diplomacy framework.

East Asia is not ready

After a few years of stagnation, there seems to be renewed interest and effort in pushing for institutionalization of preventive diplomacy in the ARF. The ambition of some activist countries is to establish formal and legally binding security architecture to prevent crises from taking place, to contain the intensity of a crisis once it breaks out, and to circumscribe the negative impact of such crises. These are lofty and desirable objectives. However, one has to be realistic about the complexities of the security situation in East Asia.

A few things warrant a pessimistic assessment of the prospects for meaningful preventive diplomacy any time soon. First, the existence of strategic suspicions or misgivings among major powers is the biggest barrier to significant advancement toward preventive diplomacy measures. Countries are afraid that formal and legal measures of preventive diplomacy will go beyond the stated objectives of preventive diplomacy; political elites in those countries fear that preventive diplomacy could endanger their political rule and harm their strategic and security interests. They are doubtful that any measures taken as preventive diplomacy will be fair in cases in which they are involved.

Another factor that works against ARF preventive diplomacy is how the “ASEAN way” evolves. If the gradualist, informal, consensus-inclined, and noninterference in domestic affairs approach of the “ASEAN way” continues to prevail in the ARF, preventive diplomacy is not likely to take shape. For preventive diplomacy to take root, two major changes are required on the part of ASEAN: either relinquishing its leadership in the ARF or abandoning the so-called “ASEAN way.”

The fact that there are many salient security issues in East Asia bespeaks the difficulties of designing a grand architecture of preventive diplomacy in ARF. These issues

include the North Korean nuclear crisis, Sino-Japanese contention in the East China Sea, the South China Sea imbroglio, and the Taiwan problem. Preventive diplomacy is supposed to tackle these issues, but their complexity coupled with strategic misgivings among states make the parties directly involved in these issues reluctant to commit to outside mediation.

An action-oriented approach

there are many differences among participating states on this issue, it is perhaps plausible to stick to the gradualist and informal approach that is favored by many ARF members. This does not mean that there is nothing that the ARF can do: there is quite a lot that countries involved in the ARF process can do, even outside the ARF process, to create conditions that may facilitate the development of preventive diplomacy in East Asia. But first, they have to shift their focus from ambition to action. With the action-oriented approach, states that have a stake in peace and stability in East Asia can work on quite a few things, such as the reduction of strategic suspicions, more extensive and effective multilateral cooperation on non-traditional security issues, and the actual practice of preventive diplomacy on some emerging security matters, i.e., the Myanmar and Taiwan problems.

Three things are crucial for this action-oriented approach to be fruitful. First, more attention needs to be paid to taking stock of the common ground or consensus that ARF states have reached or are likely to reach. Excessive attention on differences and the ambitious attempt to construct a holistic security architecture has obscured the convergence of security interests among states. For instance, according to previous meetings, both official and track two, one consensus is that for the time being focusing on confidence building measures (CBMs) should be a priority because all parties seem to support this. CBMs are part of preventive diplomacy, but what seems to be insufficiently emphasized is the fact that CBMs are also the foundation of preventive diplomacy. The question then is whether enough has been done in the area of CBMs. There are many signs that CBMs have not been adequately developed. Some developments in the Asia-Pacific even point to the deterioration of CBMs at the strategic level for instance, the emerging quasi-alliance among the United States, Japan, Australia, and India.

Another contention between activist and reluctant states is whether preventive diplomacy should include domestic crises when they have international security repercussions. Reluctant states oppose the general idea of including intrastate issues in preventive diplomacy, but they are less opposed to the inclusion of interstate security issues. An action-oriented approach should forego the debate on this issue, and instead focus on developing preventive measures in interstate security.

Second, it is important to keep in mind that we should not treat preventive diplomacy as a separate enterprise as if it can be pursued without regard to other issues. In fact, the alleviation of strategic rivalry among major powers in the region, more confidence-building measures in other issue areas, and effective practice in addressing security issues that are emerging can contribute to the formation of preventive diplomacy mechanisms no less than official and track-two efforts that specifically aim at preventive diplomacy issues.

Third, and related proposal to the above point is how we can make full use of the ARF process to practice preventive diplomacy as much as the common understanding and agreement that have been reached in the ARF allow. We should be more pragmatic by focusing on what can be done on real issues. Many complain that there has been no actual practice or success of preventive diplomacy in East Asia. This is not true. There are successes in the practice of preventive: South China Sea and the North Korea nuclear crisis.

On the South China Sea issue, there have been a lot of CBMs, but some measures go beyond CBMs and are essentially substantive preventive diplomacy measures. On the North Korean nuclear issue, there are quite impressive results pushing Northeast Asia toward some kind of permanent security architecture or framework. These two examples demonstrate the feasibility and applicability of the pragmatic approach to preventive diplomacy: focusing on real issues instead of engaging in contentious debates about explicit principles and institutions. There are two merits of this approach. First, it ameliorates tensions among states involved in the imbroglios. Second, it provides an opportunity to accumulate experience regarding preventive diplomacy in East Asia. Every success enhances strategic confidence among actors in the ARF.

Four new developments as litmus tests

In addition to this pragmatic approach, there are four major developments in the Asia-Pacific that need to be addressed to facilitate the development of preventive diplomacy. These four issues include: the reduction of strategic suspicions among major powers, closer multilateral collaboration on nontraditional security issues, cooperation on the Myanmar crisis, and preventive diplomacy measures regarding Taiwan.

Quite obviously, one big hindrance to preventive diplomacy in East Asia is the strategic environment. Despite the end of the Cold War, strategic distrust among major powers in the Asia-Pacific has not abated. The recent development of a strategic constellation of powers, the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, whatever the purpose, may not be good news for the establishment of a multilateral security architecture, let alone preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific. The formation of an exclusive “Asian NATO” will only exacerbate strategic conditions in East Asia, and forestall the meaningful development of preventive diplomacy. For preventive diplomacy to move forward, a more propitious strategic environment must be created.

Another area in which ARF states can cooperate is non-traditional security issues. At the Paris seminar, it was agreed that the scope and agenda of preventive diplomacy should include non-traditional security issues, such as drug trafficking, terrorism, energy, environment, and maritime security. There have been a few programs at the multilateral level on these issues, but there is much room for further collaboration among ARF participants.

In retrospect, the crisis in Myanmar was a lost chance for the ARF to practice preventive diplomacy. In the early days when signs of internal unrest emerged in Myanmar, the international society took little notice. The ARF, even simply using existing mechanisms, could have done a better job at the initial stage of crisis in Myanmar.

The issue of Taiwan has always been a flashpoint in East Asia, affecting peace and stability in the region. It is also one of the most difficult problems. Given recent developments, the Taiwan issue could be a test for ARF countries to practice preventive diplomacy. Major developments include the Democratic Progressive Party's effort in pushing a "referendum on UN membership in the name of Taiwan" and Beijing's recent proposal of concluding a peace accord with Taiwan. The first, which seems to be an internal political issue of Taiwan, may have drastic consequences for cross-Strait relations, affecting regional peace and stability. The latter is an attempt on the part of Beijing to pursue the status quo on Taiwan. How states with an interest in East Asian security respond to these developments will also have an impact on the future of preventive diplomacy in ARF.

In short, an action-oriented approach to preventive diplomacy should take precedence. States involved in the ARF process should try to create favorable conditions for building preventive diplomacy measures. Common understanding, norms, practices, and experiences will emerge from these actions.

Preventive Diplomacy of the ARF: the Road Ahead

By Chang Liao Nien-chung

In July 1995, angered by Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's visit to the United States, China conducted a series of missile tests and military exercises aimed at Taiwan. China's intention was to deter Taiwan from moving toward independence, and its saber-rattling led to the defeat of Lee's party in the legislative election at the end of 1995. On the eve of Taiwan's presidential election in March 1996, the crisis escalated when Beijing announced more intensive military maneuvers and missile launches. During this crisis, Washington and Beijing undertook several high-level official communications to exchange opinions and minimize misperceptions. However, to demonstrate the credibility of the U.S. commitment to regional stability, the Clinton administration sent two aircraft-carrier battle groups to the vicinity of Taiwan. The crisis finally subsided, as Lee won the presidential election and China finished its military exercises. Neither war nor Taiwan's declaration of independence occurred. These actions can be considered preventive diplomacy.

Preventive diplomacy is diplomatic action to prevent the rise of disputes among the parties concerned, to avoid use of force in existing disputes, and to minimize the scale and scope when armed conflicts break out. Preventive diplomacy was advocated then United Nations (UN) Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992, aiming to replace traditional crisis management and conflict resolution approaches in the face of post-Cold War security challenges. Although its content and efficacy are contested in academia, preventive diplomacy is generally implemented through early warnings, confidence-building, good offices, and preventive deployment. Some regional institutions, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), have drawn inspiration from it for their security framework and made progress toward regional stability.

In the Asia-Pacific region, preventive diplomacy was officially introduced by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which was established in 1994 on the basis of informality, consensus, and sovereignty. The ARF has been facilitating regional dialogue, confidence-building measures (CBMs), and transparency on political and security issues. The ARF also declared its aim to upgrade its security agenda from CBMs to preventive diplomacy and then to conflict resolution. Not only have the concept, definition, and principles of preventive diplomacy been reiterated in the ARF context, but specific measures for the practice of preventive diplomacy – establishing a Regional Risk Reduction Center, appointing a Special Representative, expanding the role of the Chair, and developing registers of Experts/Eminent Persons (EEPs) – have been proposed. Despite those efforts, however, the ARF's preventive diplomacy process has yielded no substantive results and failed to tackle regional emergencies such as the 1995 Mischief Reef incident, the 1997 coup in Cambodia, the 1999 East Timor crisis, and the ongoing Myanmar crisis. As a result, the ARF developed a reputation as a talk-shop rather than a forum that offers practical solutions to critical security problems.

The dilemma has resulted from several organizational features of the ARF. First, the ARF is poorly institutionalized. With the initial purpose to including larger Asia-Pacific

powers, in particular China, the ARF was initiated as a process to discuss sensitive security issues. Because China was skeptical of multilateral organizations, a loosely organized forum was an enticement to ensure China's commitment. As the 1995 ARF Concept Paper noted, "In the initial phrase of the ARF, no institutionalization is expected. Nor should a Secretariat be established in the future." However, as China has participated in more international organizations and engaged in regional processes, the fear of China's absence had dissipated. More importantly, a solid institution that provides the ARF with information gathering and logistics support is the prerequisite for the implementation of preventive diplomacy. Therefore, the reform of the ARF's structure is required. To set up a permanent and independent ARF Secretariat is the first step to stimulate the substantiation of the ARF.

Second, the ARF's consensus based decision-making style is inefficient. The general rule for the ARF is to make decisions by consensus based on the principle that every participant state's concern is justified. This means that the chairperson merely asks whether the decision can be adopted and if no one opposes, the chairperson will announce that the decision has been taken. However, if an individual state or a minority of participant states object, they can block a proposal, even if a majority would like it to be approved. In terms of preventive diplomacy, any state involved in a dispute may turn down a resolution unfavorable to it. And, a consensus process takes time, making it difficult to settle a dispute or crisis in a timely fashion.

Under such circumstances, the consensus decision-making rule needs to be reviewed. The negative (or reverse) consensus principle adopted by the World Trade Organization should be introduced into the ARF's decision-making framework. The negative consensus means that when a resolution is proposed, all participants must approve the decision unless there is a consensus against it. Accordingly, a resolution can be reached more quickly.

Finally, the principle of non-interference is obsolete. The ARF endorses non-interference principle to preserve the independence and autonomy of participant states. Therefore, applying preventive diplomacy to intrastate conflicts violates the ARF's sacred cows of national sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. However, with ethnic, separatist, and religious violence emerging in the post-Cold War era, the non-interference principle has to be modified, as long as preventive diplomacy measures come at only the request of states involved.

In sum, the ASEAN-way of the ARF has been successful in building regional confidence and trust. As the only multilateral security institution in the Asia-Pacific, the ARF has the potential to move forward and become a more positive security mechanism. However, the ARF's principles of consensus, non-interference, and informality thwart further implementation of preventive diplomacy. As a result, the ARF's institutional formation, and decision-making process must be reevaluated.

The hub-and-spoke system and the ARF

By Aki Mori

From the vantage point of organizational capacity, the ARF is playing an extremely limited role in regional security cooperation. The ARF has not institutionalized the four main activities of preventive diplomacy: early warning of conflict situations, diplomatic good offices, confidence building measures, and preventive deployment. Instead, the preventive diplomacy agreement that has been reached limited the scope to interstate issues and defined it as consensual and voluntary diplomatic and political action without coercive measures. This came about, in part, because China and most ASEAN countries are extremely reluctant to move the ARF toward preventive diplomacy. Japan, Australia, Canada, and the United States, believe that the ARF should prevent conflicts from arising or escalating into armed confrontation. Japan argued to expand the scope of preventive diplomacy to cover interstate as well as internal affairs, because many potential regional conflicts are intrastate in nature. But China and ASEAN opposed the idea of applying preventive diplomacy to intrastate conflicts because this might allow outsiders to intervene in security problems involving their sovereignty and internal affairs. Consequently, institutionalization of the ARF hasn't progressed and it is often seen as just a talk shop. Moreover, some observers see the ARF's failure on preventive diplomacy as so severe as to potentially harm the momentum of security institution building.

It is often said that the ARF should be more institutionalized as an organization that conducts preventive diplomacy. Such criticism seems to originate from the premise that institutionalization is a good thing and would enhance regional security. However, the importance of the ARF to international security in the Asia-Pacific region cannot be assessed via a single indicator such as institutionalization. The reason why China is extremely reluctant to move the ARF toward further institutionalization should be assessed from the perspective of interaction between different types of security systems in the Asia-Pacific. This paper will consider why the ARF's institutionalization for preventive diplomacy has not progressed.

Although Cold War legacies such as the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan issue have remained in the Asia-Pacific region, there is no constant confrontation between capitalism and the communism, nor is there a specific threat like during the Cold War. The Asia-Pacific region has witnessed growing economic interdependence, and all countries faces nontraditional threats such as terrorism, piracy, and resource security. Threats in the post-Cold War era are diversified, and cannot be linked to a specific country.

There are two different types of frameworks to respond to uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific region. First, there is the alliance network among the United States and its allies, which is called the hub-and-spoke system. The alliance questioned its raison d'être when the threat of the Soviet Union and communism disappeared, but its tasks were redefined as coping with external uncertainty in the post-Cold War era. Second, there is the framework of cooperative security such as the ARF. Almost all countries in the Asia-Pacific region have joined the ARF. Cooperative security is defined as an attempt to mitigate against uncertainty,

to prevent actual threats and armed conflicts from arising, and to construct peaceful resolutions to conflicts. In the post-Cold War era, it has become difficult to define the terms "friend" and "enemy" in international relations. In this way cooperative security, which attempts to involve uncertainty into one security cooperation framework, is needed. Moreover, the scope of cooperative security covers not only military issues, but also robust issues such as politics, diplomacy, and economy.

From the perspective of each state, interest rests on how to coordinate the different security frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region. How can we understand the relationship between the hub and spoke system and the cooperative security system?

The hub and spoke system and the cooperative system exist in a complementary relationship. First, from the viewpoint of states within the hub and spoke system, the post-Cold War alliance is a platform to respond to potential risks and uncertainty. But the logic of the post-Cold War alliance excludes some countries. Because there is no overt and common threat in the post-Cold War era, the alliance needs to be strengthened via common values; democracy, freedom, human rights, rule of law, and the market economy. But, countries like China that don't share common values with states within the hub and spoke system often see the values-based alliance as an attempt at peaceful evolution as well as containment. Therefore, confidence building measures and security dialogues with other countries are needed. For example, if Japan and the United States insist that the task of the U.S.-Japan alliance is to respond to post-Cold War uncertainty and they decide not to incorporate China into these conversations; it will not be easy to set up confidence building measures between the alliance partners and China. In this event, a comprehensive and multilateral cooperative security system is needed to stabilize the relationship among countries in the Asia-Pacific region. This could be the same for states that are not incorporated into the international system like North Korea and Myanmar.

Second, from the viewpoint of cooperative security, a relationship with the hub and spokes system is also needed. Cooperative security can handle confidence building via dialogue and for preventing conflicts, but it doesn't have efficient coercive measures in the even of an outbreak of armed conflict. However, as a last resort to deal with coercive measures on preventive diplomacy, it relies on self defense, collective security under the United Nations, and the hub and spoke system. Therefore, once there is an outbreak of armed conflict, the efficiency of cooperative security decreases exponentially. For example, if one examines the East Timor issue, ARF and ASEAN failed to prevent armed conflict and could not end it, so they had to rely on help from a multilateral force under the United Nations and its peace-keeping operation.

In sum, the hub and spoke system and the ARF co-exist in the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War era, and these two different types of security systems complement each other and play an integral role in maintaining international security. Although the ARF doesn't work as a conducting organization of preventive diplomacy, it doesn't minimize the ARF's role as a security system in the Asia-Pacific.

However, there is a friction between the values-based hub and spoke system and cooperative security. The values-based hub and spoke system does not assume a division between countries deemed allies, and those who are not allies, but it also assumes that uncertainty will only come from outside the alliance. Foremost, it doesn't deny that uncertainty originates in countries that are not involved in the hub and spokes system. Therefore, the hub and spoke system is recognized as a nuisance as China attempts to secure its interests it has to respect the idea of balance of power. It will try to eliminate or weaken the exclusive alliance system and will pursue a framework built on comprehensive security. China's efforts to prevent the institutionalization of the ARF while adhering to non-interference in the domestic affairs of others can be understood from this perspective: China needs cooperative security to offset the military alliance network because China recognizes that the enhanced values-based alliance system in the post-Cold War era is targeting China. Jiang Zemin at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in March 1999 stated, "The old security concept which bases military alliance and takes measures of enhanced armament can not work for international security. Even more, it can not create everlasting peace of the world…the core of new security concept is mutual trust, mutual benefit, guaranteed equality, and cooperation." This shows China's strong preference for multilateralism, but it is also hedges against an enhanced hub and spoke system by illustrating China's position which opposes enhancing military alliances by supporting a multilateral framework. Given the strategic goal of engaging in cooperative security to expand its diplomatic space by offsetting the influence of the hub and spoke system, China's engagement of the ARF can be said to be a tactic for that purpose. So, the main function of the ARF for China is only to continue the dialogue about confidence building. China has never agreed with the concept of preventive diplomacy and its institutionalization which might confine China's sovereignty and political autonomy. It is safe to say there is no reason for China to institutionalize and reform the ARF, making it an enhanced organization for preventive diplomacy any time soon.

As long as China doesn't change its preference about the ARF, negotiations over institutionalization of preventive diplomacy will last a long time. So, regardless of the institutionalization of the ARF, now we should focus on how to coordinate the different types of security cooperation in Asia-Pacific to realize effective regional security.

In Need of Regional Leadership: How to Strengthen Preventive Nonproliferation Diplomacy in South-East Asia

By David Santoro

The ARF, preventive diplomacy, and the threat of WMD proliferation

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is the only multilateral organization in the Asia-Pacific region devoted entirely to security issues. It was created in 1993 to compensate for the loss of Soviet influence in the region following the end of the Cold War as well as to promote regional economic growth and interdependence. Unlike ASEAN, the ARF recognizes the need to engage powers beyond Southeast Asian states to address key security problems effectively.[3]

Central to the ARF is the promotion of 'preventive diplomacy' (PD). Although its definition has been the center of much academic debate, that notion is widely accepted to characterize the "actions to prevent existing disputes arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur."[4] The 2001 ARF *Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy* details that PD measures include 1) confidence-building measures (CBMs) or efforts to build mutual trust and confidence in the region; 2) norm-building or the nurturing of accepted codes of behavior (exemplified by the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia (1976)); and 3) the development of channels of communication among regional players to advance information-sharing, which, in turn, is meant to avoid misperceptions or misunderstandings.[5] In other words, PD in the ARF seeks to enhance predictability and strengthen cooperative behavior in regional security affairs.

The role of PD is particularly significant when it comes to combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),[6] a threat that many participants at the ARF Inter-sessional Support Group (ISG) on CBMs and PD (Helsinki (Finland), March 28-30, 2007) identified as "one of the greatest risks to global and regional security."[7] By telling what is right as opposed to what is wrong, non-proliferation principles and norms are, and always have been, of paramount importance to establish patterns of restraint among states, i.e., to *prevent* them from developing WMD. Predominantly embodied in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),[8] these principles and norms have gained increased

[3] Included are Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, China, European Union, India, Japan, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Republic of Korea (ROK), Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Russian Federation, and the United States.

[4] Boutros Boutros Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, New York, United Nations, 1992, p. 16.

[5] The role of the ARF Chair is also listed as crucial to the promotion of PD.

[6] WMD are nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (NBC weapons). Missile delivery systems, notably ballistic missiles, are sometimes included in that definition.

[7] ARF ISG on CBMs and PD (Helsinki (Finland), March 28-30, 2007).

[8] There are many other nonproliferation treaties and arrangements. For instance, the Treaty of Bangkok has made, since its entry into force in March 1997, Southeast Asia a so-called 'nuclear weapons free zone' (NWFZ), i.e., an geographical area where states have agreed not to develop such weapons.

significance over the past few years. As a result of the growing availability of WMD technology and expertise,[9] there has been, in fact, a growing requirement to focus nonproliferation policy on the intention of states to develop (and use) WMD rather than on their ability to do so. Thus, the preservation of nonproliferation principles and norms and the articulation of new and updated ones (that is, preventive nonproliferation diplomacy) are our greatest hope to shape the intention of states so that they decide not to develop and use these weapons.

The Evolution of preventive nonproliferation diplomacy and Challenges

The scope of preventive nonproliferation diplomacy has changed considerably over the past few years. It used to be sufficient for states to endorse nonproliferation principles and norms simply by adhering to treaties and agreements. That was how preventive nonproliferation diplomacy was understood. There were no mechanisms to verify compliance, i.e., to measure the actual performance of states with respect to their nonproliferation commitments. Before World War II, "[such mechanisms were] not needed since it was assumed states would act like gentlemen and honour their commitments."[10] The need to verify compliance emerged as a key requirement during the Cold War because neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union could fully trust the other to comply with the obligations set by their nuclear arms control and nonproliferation agreements. U.S. President Ronald Reagan's famous comment, 'trust, but verify', illustrated that reality quite vividly.

Today, the verification of NPT, BTWC, and CWC compliance[11] has become central to preventive nonproliferation diplomacy. This is because an increasing number of states have signed nonproliferation treaties with no intention of complying with their obligations. The cases of Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya, immediately come to mind. These states have, in fact, used these treaties to gain access to sensitive technology and develop covert WMD programs.[12] That is why the nonproliferation community has come to invest much in responding to that challenge, making the verification of compliance (as well as the security of sensitive facilities and materials) even more crucial than during the Cold War. Recent revelations about the scope of nuclear black markets such as the A. Q. Khan network and the subsequent proliferation risks to states and non-state actors (such the 9/11 instigators) have only made it an even higher priority on the nonproliferation agenda.

As a consequence, preventive nonproliferation diplomacy is no longer what it used to be. It has gone from 'mere' endorsement of treaties and other arrangements to their full (verifiable) implementation. This has been exemplified by the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (April 2004), which requires every state to establish effective

[9] WMD technology and expertise is now considered to be "out of the tube" (although key barriers remain in place) as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the expansion of 'globalization.'

[10] Michael Moodie and Amy Sands, "New Approaches to Compliance with Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements", *The Nonproliferation Review*, Spring 2001, p. 4.

[11] Unlike the NPT and the CWC, the BTWC does not (yet) have a verification mechanism. Still, CBMs have been set up to palliate that problem: they stand as the only means for BTWC parties 'to show compliance' for the moment.

[12] While prohibiting the development of NBC weapons, the NPT, the BTWC, and the CWC all promote trade and cooperation of nuclear, biological, and chemical technologies for peaceful purposes.

domestic controls against WMD proliferation, their delivery systems, and related materials and technologies, as well as to criminalize violations of these rules.

The problem is that such an expansive preventive nonproliferation diplomacy has found very limited expression in the developing world, and in Southeast Asia. The implementation of treaties and agreements has remained relatively slow in this region. Despite the effort, of the UNSCR 1540 Committee to provide assistance, implementation has lagged because most Southeast Asian states lack expertise, resources (financial and manpower), and because they simply have other priorities. Put differently, many of these states have been unable (or at least considerably hampered) to 'put substance' behind their nonproliferation commitments and obligations because of limited means. While endangering international and regional peace and security, poor preventive non-proliferation diplomacy is also eating away at the credibility of the ARF, the front line security organization of the region.

Recommendations

Finding remedies to that problem is the responsibility of each Southeast Asian government, all of which have nonproliferation commitments and obligations. The logic of problem-solving should help them make use of their credentials in the best possible ways, however imperfect and limited they might be. In other words, improving preventive nonproliferation diplomacy in South-East Asia begins with the application of 'self-help solutions.' This is clearly the spirit of UNSCR 1540.

Progress in the delivery of enhanced preventive non-proliferation diplomacy cannot be achieved without great powers or more 'experienced' states taking the lead. Action-oriented initiatives led by specific states are already being undertaken, such as the BTWC Regional Workshops hosted by Australia and Indonesia or the trilateral initiative led by the U.S., Australia, and Japan to provide training to Southeast Asian states for counter-proliferation and safeguards activities. Unfortunately, none of these initiatives has been undertaken within the framework of the ARF because of the traditional resistance to deal with 'sensitive' security issues such as WMD proliferation. With its focus on 'inclusiveness,' the ARF would do well to host and coordinate such initiatives. This would be beneficial to the region and would name the young organization as the main reference point when tackling regional security issues.

Preventive Diplomacy at the ASEAN Regional Forum: Why So Difficult?

By Jiyon Shin

The Birth of Asia Pacific Organizations and the Concept of PD

Globalization has changed the landscape of 'security.' The development of transportation and information technologies shrunk the distance among countries. The downside of this is that countries have become extremely interdependent and more vulnerable to threats. Heightened exchanges through all sorts of media create loopholes in governance, while a small security problem in one place can quickly spread throughout the region, creating a transnational security problem. The Asia Pacific is no exception to this trend.

Numerous organizations in the Asia Pacific were created to deal with thosse problems: ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Plus 3, APEC, ASEM, and the East Asia Summit. Each of these organizations has different characteristics which may focus more on economics or security. Yet, the common objective is to build trust in the community to lessen tension, and move toward creating a safe and prosperous region.

Countries have stepped forward to endorse the concept of 'preventive diplomacy,' which aims to prevent crises before they hit. According to the original definition articulated by former Secretary General of UN Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Preventive Diplomacy (PD) is an 'action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.' PD serves to lessen tensions before they form into conflicts, and to facilitate resolving conflicts that break out. Boutros Ghali mentioned in *Agenda for Peace* (1992), that to do so, an 'early warning' system based on information-gathering and informal or formal fact-finding will be necessary, and that in some cases, it may also involve preventive deployment and demilitarized zones.

The idea was laid out and, superficially, the Asia Pacific countries have agreed to put the concept of PD into practice. ASEAN endorsed the idea of Preventive Diplomacy by planning to establish a security focused ASEAN Regional Forum at the 23rd Ministerial Meeting in 1993. The ARF was established in 1994. The ARF aims to develop an institution that would research the possibilities of implementing practices of preventive diplomacy and confidence-building for the participating countries.

ASEAN way, too Little too Late

Hopes inventing an early warning system, stationing well prepared facilities at an inter-governmental level, and contributing to prepare an established preventive deployment unit have not been actualized. Both the ARF and ASEAN have had many cases in which they could have done something but looked the other way. Or, in some cases they did something when it was too late. As a result, the relevant organizations eventually earned a label of being a mere 'talk-shop' at times of crisis.

East Timor independence (a favorite case for ASEAN skeptics) was achieved through an extremely violent process. ASEAN countries regarded this as an 'internal' problem and agreed to stay silent despite international criticism. No protests were made by other members of ASEAN even though this incident severely threatened the image and security of Southeast Asian.

ASEAN has also accepted the military regime in Myanmar (Burma). This was done under the premise of non-intervention, and because of Myanmar's potential to contribute to the national interests of Southeast Asian nations with its rich natural resources. Myanmar's repression of its ethnic minorities has been an embarrassment to other ASEAN members, yet little has been done to better human security in Myanmar.

Terrorist activities and transportation of dual use materials (material that potentially could be used for WMD activities) has not been prevented. The Kuta bombing by a radical Islamic terrorist group in 2002 in Indonesia killed around 200 people, and injured several hundred others. This was an attack allegedly related to the Alqaeda network which raised serious questions about lax anti-terrorist measures in Southeast Asia.

Environmental security has been severely undermined due to political sensitivities blocking progress on multinational cooperation. Consider for example, the haze. Haze is caused by major forest fires in Indonesia, which has led to environmental and health problems to Brunei, Singapore, Malaysia, and the southern Philippines. There is a 'binding' ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution signed in 2002, which is invalid in reality because of Indonesia's failure to enforce its provisions. Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos and others are part of it, yet, the biggest polluter, Indonesia refuses to ratify it.

The ASEAN way of cooperating has been characterized in various ways: constructive engagement, flexible engagement, constructive intervention, enhanced interaction and so on. Nevertheless, all of these terms mean the same: non-interference, not much visible progress, informal diplomacy, and public silence on politically sensitive critical issues. The 'ASEAN Way' is based on the non-intervention principle. It means not raising other nations' 'domestic' problems in public, and by doing so, securing one's own domestic sphere. Whether this principle is contributing the security of the region is questionable given these failed examples.

Multilateral preventive diplomacy and its Hardship

Why is practicing preventive diplomacy so difficult? Nations have a right to protect their sovereignty, and it is in their interest not to be seen as compromising to other nations. Another issue is intrinsic mistrust for others resulting in a dilemma about how much information should be shared or kept separate to protect national security.

In Southeast Asia, many countries are different in their types of governance (military, democratic, or other types of government), religious and ethnic makeup, values, economic

models, etc. Thus, overlooking politically sensitive issues becomes the solution to keeping 'good' relations.

Other structural problems include the lack of a leader to motivate changes in the region, making it hard to push agendas, and induce cooperation on security-related agendas. In addition, there are too many countries with different interests in the ASEAN Regional Forum. This makes it hard to set priorities.

Other obstacles to progress in PD are:

1. Preference for distance among states is enough.
2. Inertia: getting used to how things have been done in the past decade.
3. Fear of conflict if the code of nonintervention is violated.
4. Sensitivity to sharing information

Progress, so far

However, there are supporters of the ASEAN way. They have done a laudable job on confidence building measures (CBM). CBMs develop a minimum level of political will, with a certain level of reciprocity and modest designs to build a hospitable, trusting environment. To a certain extent this has worked.

Mediation roles in conflicts between neighbor states were carried out in Southeast Asia. Thailand frequently mediated between Malaysia and Philippines in the conflict over Sabah until Indonesia took the mediating role in the '70s. Thailand also has been asked to serve as dialogue coordinator on peace talks between ethnic minorities in Myanmar and the regime in Rangoon. In the initial stages of East Timor independence no Southeast Asian country was involved, but after the storm went by, peacekeeping missions were willingly carried out by member countries, under the United Nations flag. Moreover, there was direct assistance from neighboring countries to address security issues. Indonesia has facilitated negotiations with Muslim rebels, paying a major part in the recent cooperation agreement between Manila and the main insurgent organization, the Moro National Islamic Front. Lastly, there has been progress in pushing Myanmar to refrain from abusing its own citizens, such as skipping Myanmar's turn to be ASEAN chair in 2006.

Conclusion: continue the dialogue

It is easy to point out at the failures and hardships of coordinating multilateral security measures. However, reflecting on the sources of failure is more important. In the ASEAN case, there should be an understanding that no matter what, there will be an 'ASEAN way' that is different from other multinational organizations and their ways. Building on this, yet motivating the countries confront transnational security threats (whether military, human, environmental security) for the sake of their own good is preferred.

ARF and Preventive Diplomacy: The Quest for Surrealism

By Alexandra Retno Wulan

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was conceived at the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Ministerial Conference in Singapore, July 1993. The inaugural meeting of this new forum was held in Bangkok on July 25, 1994. Currently, the ARF comprises 26 states, predominantly in the Asia-Pacific region.

On this 13th of ARF, a record of achievements has been attained. Nonetheless, questions of obsolescence and irrelevance continue in the discourse about this regional arrangement, particularly in relation to its role in preventive diplomacy (PD). Hence, identifying the primary obstacles to the ARF's capacity to prevent the escalation of conflict remain crucial. This essay argues that the obstacles will linger primarily because each participating state tries to exercise its maximum power and fails to empower the forum and find an "appropriate" balance of power within the ARF. The best way to support this argument is to explain the two basic tiers of PD, particularly in relations to the ARF, namely the conceptual and operational tier, respectively.

Conceptualizing preventive diplomacy in the ARF

The concept of preventive diplomacy was introduced by former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. In *An Agenda for Peace*, he defined PD as "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur."[13] However, disputes are inherently part of human life and it is very unlikely they can be eliminated. Therefore, preventing disputes from arising is impossible. Attention should be given to preventing the escalation of disputes into more violent conflict and to limiting the effects of the conflict. These should be the principal targets of PD.

Research has quantified the benefits of managing disputes and preventing their escalation. For example, in Macedonia, successful prevention by the UNPREDEP valued at about $ 300 million was much cheaper than the outbreak of a war, which would have cost approximately $ 15 billion[14]. Precisely for this objective, ASEAN leaders initiated the ARF and invited other countries in the Asia-Pacific region to join the forum.

However, the development of PD in this forum is definitely easy. Increasing difficulty in building a consensus on the concept, measures, and principles of PD within the ARF has derived from the ambiguous meaning of PD itself.

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[13] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (New York: United Nations, 1992), paragraph 20.

[14] Albrecht Schnabel, *Challenges of Operational Conflict Prevention: From Proactive to Reactive Prevention*, paper presented at UNU Global Seminar, 3rd Shimane Session of Prevention and Resolution of Conflict, accessed on http://www.unu.edu/hq/Japanese/gs-j/gs2002j/shimane3/Schnabel-paper.pdf

The definition of preventive diplomacy promulgated by the ARF[15] is consensual diplomatic and political actions taken by sovereign states with the consent of all directly involved parties to help (1) prevent disputes and conflicts from arising between states that could potentially pose a threat to regional peace and stability; (2) prevent such disputes and conflicts from escalating into armed confrontation; and (3) minimize the impact of such disputes and conflict on the region. Additionally, the ARF also affirmed the PD measures and principles. PD measures include confidence building efforts, norm building, enhancing channels of communication and setting up the role of ARF Chair. There are eight key principles of PD: diplomacy, non-coercive, it should be timely, requires trust and confidence, operates on the basis of consultation and consensus is voluntary, applies to conflicts between and among states, and it is conducted in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law.

These definitions, measures, and principles have generated highly divergent perspectives and attitudes toward PD within participating states. Takeshi Yuzawa identifies at least two different groups. He classifies the first group as the activist and the second group as reluctant[16]. The views of these two groups form a contentious approach: the activist group focuses more on the selection of PD measures, while the reluctant group prefers comprehensive discussion of definitions before specifying measures. More specifically, including non-interference and exclusion of intra-state matters as principles might avoid ARF interference in the internal affairs of participating states. These kinds of differences may hamper the effectiveness of the forum and gradually lead to irrelevance and obsolescence.

The different perspectives are primarily shaped by the intention of participating states maximize their power. An activist nation such as Japan, which has the capability to engage in early warning or other response, prefers to exercise their power via PD measures within the ARF, while reluctant members such as China and Myanmar prefer to exercise sovereignty at the maximum level by supporting political inertia and reticence within the ARF and by keeping the ARF a talking forum for security matters in the Asia-Pacific.

Operationalizing preventive diplomacy in the ARF

As discussed, Preventive Diplomacy has benefits. However, PD needs to be put into practice. William Zartman acknowledges that PD can be put into practice through several stages, namely establishing priorities, allocating resources, setting standards, and creating institutions and mechanisms.[17]

The ARF, however, has set its own stages to put its concept of PD into practice. There are three consecutive stages which are (1) promotion of confidence building measures;

[15] ARF, Internal document, "ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy," 8th ARF, 25 July 2001

[16] Takeshi Yuzawa, "The Evolution of Preventive Diplomacy in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Problems and Prospect", *Asian Survey*, Vol.46. Issue 5, (California: University of California, 2006), p.789

[17] I. William Zartman, *Preventive Diplomacy: Setting the Stage*, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/zart/ch1.htm. Zartman describes a mechanism as providing orderly methods of making choices.

(2) development of preventive diplomacy mechanism; and (3) development of conflict resolution mechanism.

There are at least two significant predicaments in this formulation. The first is the contention between institutionalist and non-institutionalist member states. The institutionalist group asserts that the process of confidence building measures (CBMs) has been attained by the ARF. Thus, it is important to proceed to a stronger institutional framework such as setting up the mechanism of decision making within the ARF. Non-institutionalist supporters argue that the CBMs process has not been achieved. Thus, it is important to keep the status quo as a "talk-shop."

The second problem is related to the implementation of ARF decisions. There has never been a test case regarding compliance of a ARF member with any ARF decision. However, the challenge in implementation is more likely financial as the ARF has not set up a clearly defined burden sharing mechanism. The Terms of Reference (TOR) for the establishment of the ARF Fund and contributions in the TOR are still voluntary. The usage of the funds is guarded by an Annual Work Plan and the approval is made through the ARF-SOM by consensus.

It is obvious that the issues of exercising power clearly hinder PD within the ARF. Mechanism inertia shaped by the reluctance to give up power and has consigned the ARF to irrelevance.

Concluding notes

There is no agreement among scholars, politicians, and ARF participating states on the conceptualization and operationalization of preventive diplomacy. However, preventing the escalation of conflict and limiting danger seem to be a much better option. Thus, developing the idea of PD is extremely important for any region in the world, and the Asia-Pacific in particular.

The ARF remains weak in identifying and articulating regional interests. Despite cozy diplomatic relations that serve the interests of and provide comfort to the political leadership of its members, the ARF does little to prevent violent conflicts (see for example the Myanmar case in September 2007). The failure of the U.S. secretary of state to attend the ARF meeting for the second time in three years could be seen as evidence of frustration from a participant state. The ARF has to deal with its problems and come up with substantive outcomes.

This essay argues that the problems of the ARF are a result of the power imbalance among states within this forum. Predictable and stable patterns of power relations among the participating states are a must. Hence, an institutional framework and empowering the ARF with relevant auxiliaries are the only ways to move forward and achieve its role in PD.

APPENDIX A

About the Authors

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Mr. HA Anh Tuan is a research fellow at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies of the Institute of International Relations of Vietnam (IIR). Tuan is also chairman of IIR's Junior Research Fellows' Club and Deputy Secretary of IIR's Youth Union. He received his M.A. (with thesis) in International Relations in 2007 at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University.

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Ms. Aki MORI is a Ph.D. candidate at Doshisha University's Graduate school of Law, Kyoto, Japan. Her research topics are comprehensive security, security policy of China, and U.S-China relations. She received her M.A. in political science at Doshisha University in 2006. She was the only student invited to publish an article on Chinese Energy Security that appeared in a book with articles by 13 of Japan's leading China security researchers. She is currently studying at the School of International Studies in Renmin University of China.

Prof. Raymund Jose QUILOP is assistant professor of Political Science at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City. He is also a senior researcher/analyst of the Office of Strategic and Special Studies (OSS), Armed Forces of the Philippines and a fellow of the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies. He was the 2006 Pacific Forum Yuchengco Fellow. He serves as the editorial associate of the Philippine Political Science Journal, a refereed journal published by the Philippine Political Science Association, and as the editor-in-chief of OSS official publication, the *OSS Digest*. He has published essays on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Regional Forum, preventive diplomacy, democracy and democratization, weapons of mass destruction, among others both in international and local publications. Mr. Quilop holds a M.A. degree in Political Science from the University of the Philippines where he also obtained the B.A. degree in Political Science in 1995 (Summa Cum Laude).

Mr. David SANTORO is a Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at Macquarie University in Austrialia and a research assistant at the Centre for Policing, Intelligence, & Counter Terrorism, Access Macquarie. He has worked as a research fellow in the Ministry of Defense, Assembly of the Western European Union, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in France. Mr. Santoro received his M.A. in International Relations from Macquarie University in Australia, Strategic Studies and Defense Policies at the School of Advanced International Studies in France, and Arms Control and Disarmament at the University of Marne la Vallee in France. He has a B.A. from the University of Paris, Sorbonne in Anglo-American Studies.

Ms. Jiyon SHIN is Pacific Forum CSIS 2007-2008 Vasey Fellow. Currently an undergraduate at Ewha Women's University, she specializes in International Studies, minors in Korean Studies, while focusing on diplomacy and security in Northeast Asia. She spent a year as an exchange student at University of Hawaii in 2005-2006. She has worked extensively with the Korean University Students' Politics & Diplomacy Research Association on issues pertaining to the ROK-U.S. alliance and anti-American sentiment among ROK's young generation. Ms. Shin was a member of the North Korea Security Research Group in Ewha Women's University, and helped organize several international conferences related to North Korean refugees, and the UN ministerial conference on sustainable environment at the Environment and Sustainable Development Division office of UNESCAP. Most recently she attended Shanghai's Fudan University for a summer Chinese language program.

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Ms. Ana VILLAVICENCIO is the program officer at Pacific Forum CSIS. She received her dual B.A. in Environmental Studies and International Relations from Hawaii Pacific University and an M.A. in Political Science from University of Hawaii. She participated in organizing a workshop on energy projects to help alleviate poverty in Africa at the UNEP – Risø Center in Denmark in 2004 and completed an internship working with projects involving sustainable energy in Mali.

Ms. Shanshan WANG works for Cleanergy Investment Service Co., Ltd and was an Asia Pacific Leadership Program fellow at the East-West Center. She is also an M.A. candidate in International Relations at the China Foreign Affairs University. She received her B.A. in

Diplomacy at the China Foreign Affairs University. She is currently a student leader of the 2004 graduate class and a chief coordinator of student affairs at the China Foreign Affairs University. Prior to joining the East-West Center, she worked as special assistant to the President and CEO and a special coordinator of the Poly Silicon Program at Kunical International Group. Her background also includes international studies in Singapore, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, and the U.S.

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APPENDIX B

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
CSCAP Study Group on Preventive Diplomacy
and the Future of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
Bandar Seri Begawan, BRUNEI, October 30-31, 2007
International Convention Centre

Agenda

Monday, October 29

17:00-18:00 Registration
18:30 Informal Dinner

Tuesday, October 30

9:00 Opening comments

9:15 *Session 1: Preventive Diplomacy Overview*
This introductory session will review CSCAP's previous work in defining the concept of preventive diplomacy (PD) and outlining a set of guiding principles. Is the level of ARF activity in the preventive diplomacy arena consistent with the concept and principles adopted by the 8th ARF in 2001? The session will also discuss the current status of PD initiatives recently adopted by the ARF. What is the envisioned role for the recently established ARF "Friends of the Chair" group? What is its relationship to the ARF Experts and Eminent Persons Group (EEPG)? Are there practical obstacles to further progress in implementing PD initiatives in the ARF?

10:45 Break

11:00 *Session 2: Confidence Building and Preventive Diplomacy*
This session will briefly examine the relationship between confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy. Are some types of confidence building more effective than others in promoting cooperation? Is there a cause and effect relationship between confidence building and PD? Can cooperation on nontraditional security issues enhance the prospects for preventive diplomacy? Is it possible to use cooperation in nontraditional security issues as a mechanism for evaluating early warning indicators? Are the existing conceptual framework and organizational mechanisms adequate for institutionalizing preventive diplomacy in the ARF? Are they adequate for enabling the establishment of conflict resolution mechanisms?

12:00 Lunch

13:30 *Session 3: Preventive Diplomacy Case Studies*
This session will examine three case studies to evaluate the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy in a variety of settings and identify best practices. The goal is not to discuss specific events, but to use them as vehicles to enhance understanding. Cases have been chosen based on ability to aid understanding of how preventive diplomacy works and the obstacles encountered in the confidence building and conflict resolution process. Tentative cases include: the Aceh peace process, Mindanao, and the South China Sea.

17:30 Session adjourns

19:30PM Dinner

Wednesday, October 31

9:00 *Session 4: Reinvigorating the ARF*
This session will provide specific recommendations aimed at enhancing the ARF's role both as a confidence building and a PD mechanism, while also examining the future role of the ARF and how it can be revitalized or invigorated. The session will identify best practices and lessons learned from the case studies and make recommendations for incorporating them into future practice. Are there opportunities for expanding the role of the chair? What are the best opportunities for utilizing the EEPG in pursuing preventive diplomacy initiatives? Are there synergies to be realized from interaction between the Friends of the Chair and the EEPG? Is it time to develop an early warning capability? Should ARF focus its agenda in other areas, such as non-traditional security and civil-military affairs? What areas can ARF succeed in gaining concrete and substantive measures of regional security cooperation?

12:00 Lunch

13:30 *Session 5: PD in Action: Supporting the Six-Party Talks*
This session will examine suggestions for greater track-two and/or ARF involvement in, or support to, the Six-Party Talks. Recalling the work done by CSCAP to establish a PD Working Definition and Statement of Principles, the group will develop a draft Statement of Principles for the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Charter currently under examination as part of the six-party process.

15:30	Break
15:45	Wrap-up and Future Steps
16:30	Session Ends
16:45	Young Leaders Roundtable
19:00	Informal Dinner

APPENDIX C

PACIFIC FORUM YOUNG LEADERS

28 October – 1 November 2007
Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam

Programme of Activities

Sunday, 28 October 2007

AM/PM	Arrival of Pacific Forum Young Leaders
18:15	Meet at Centerpoint Lobby for a YL introduction meeting
1900	Dinner hosted by Pacific Forum CSIS *Venue: Nyonya Restaurant, Delima* *Attire: Casual*

Monday, 29 October 2007

08.30 – 09.30	Briefing by Ministry of Defence On Defence White Paper *Venue: Media Secretariat Room, International Convention Centre (ICC)* *Attire: Smart Casual*
09.45 – 10.45	Briefing by Brunei Economic Development Board (BEDB) on Brunei Darussalam's Economy & Diversification Efforts *Venue: Media Secretariat Room, ICC* *Attire: Smart Casual*
10.45 – 11.00	Coffee Break *Venue: Foyer of Media Secretariat Room, ICC*
11.00 – 12.00	Briefing by Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade on "Foreign Policy" *Venue: Media Secretariat Room, ICC* *Attire: Smart Casual*
12.15 – 13.30	Lunch *Venue: Le Taj Restaurant*
14.00 – 17.00	Half Day City Tour *Attire: Casual*
17.15 – 18.00	Young Leaders Roundtable Discussion *Venue: Red Jade, 7th Floor, Centrepoint Hotel* *Attire: Casual*

19.30 – 21.00	Welcoming Dinner hosted by MOFAT for CSCAP Study Group delegates and Pacific Forum Young Leaders *Venue: RMS Portview Restaurant* *Attire: Smart Casual / Long Sleeved Batik*

Tuesday, 30 October 2007

08.00 – 09.00	Registration for CSCAP Study Group Meeting *Venue: Foyer of Muzakarah Hall, ICC*
09.00 – 17.00	CSCAP Study Group Meeting on Best Practices on Preventive Diplomacy *Venue: Muzakarah Hall, ICC* *Attire: Smart Casual*

Wednesday, 31 October 2007

09.00 – 16.30	CSCAP Study Group Meeting (Continue) *Venue: Muzakarah Hall, ICC* *Attire: Smart Casual*
16.45 – 18.00	Young Leaders Wrap-Up Session *Venue: Media Secretariat Room, ICC* *Attire: Smart Casual*

Thursday, 1 November 2007

AM/PM	Departure of Pacific Forum Young Leaders