



U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue



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Pacific Forum CSIS

Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate arenas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

The Young Leaders Program

The Young Leaders Program invites young professionals and graduate students to join Pacific Forum policy dialogues and conferences. The program fosters education in the practical aspects of policy-making, generates an exchange of views between young and seasoned professionals, promotes interaction among younger professionals, and enriches dialogues with generational perspectives for all attendees. Fellows must have a strong background in the area covered by the conference they are attending and an endorsement from respected experts in their field. Supplemental programs in conference host cities and mentoring sessions with senior officials and specialists add to the Young Leader experience. The Young Leaders Program is currently supported by Chevron, the Freeman Foundation, the Luce Foundation, and the Yuchengco Group, with a growing number of universities, institutes, and organizations also helping to sponsor individual participants. For more details, see the Pacific Forum CSIS website, www.pacforum.org, or contact Brad Glosserman, director of the Young Leaders Program, at bradgpf@hawaii.rr.com.

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The views expressed here represent personal impressions and reflections of Young Leader program participants; they do not necessarily represent the views of the relevant governments, or the co-sponsoring or parent organizations and institutes.

Introduction

China, long an afterthought in U.S. nuclear planning, is rising to the forefront of strategic concerns. While most of the five nuclear weapons states are modernizing their arsenals, China is the only one among them that is increasing its nuclear weapons. In its annual report on the Chinese military, the Pentagon concluded in 2008 that “China has the most active ballistic missile program in the world.” Its force modernization program is giving Chinese military planners entirely new options to deal with contingencies and necessitating a response from their counterparts in the United States.

The Pacific Forum CSIS and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, with support from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, have supported for two years a dialogue that brings together analysts from the U.S. and China to discuss strategic concerns. This dialogue has tried to promote better understanding of each country’s perspective on security issues and challenges. While rewarding, the results have also been frustrating: despite a candid and detailed dialogue, there is still a long way to go on both sides.

If reconciling views is critical to the future of this relationship, then there is no better project for Pacific Forum Young Leaders. Their understanding of the other’s strategic outlook will help lay the foundation for a stable and mutually secure future. As the papers in this volume attest, this process is well underway but significant differences remain.

Put bluntly, Americans and Chinese have a hard time trusting each other. Neither side believes the other when statements fly in the face of logic. Americans just don’t believe that China will stick to its no first use policy or that Beijing will not challenge U.S. pre-eminence in the region when it has the ability to do so. For their part, Chinese refuse to accept that the U.S. isn’t trying to contain China and prevent its rise and return to regional power status.

Both countries see issues through a narrow, national prism. That is to be expected, but it makes it hard to find common ground. And, as is becoming abundantly clear, these two countries must find that common ground to work on issues of regional and global significance. As an example, our Young Leaders were asked to develop recommendations for the U.S. and China that strengthen the global nonproliferation regime. Specifically, there were asked to develop opportunities for the two countries to work together at the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference. Those suggestions, along with individual assessments of the U.S.-China nuclear relationship are provided here.

Dimensions of the Nuclear Threat

By Justin Bishop

While threats and misperceptions remain a cause for concern on both sides of the Pacific, the threat of a nuclear exchange between the United States and the PRC has significantly decreased and continues to diminish. The U.S. nuclear and conventional deterrent to a Chinese nuclear offensive action against the United States or one of its regional allies remains almost insurmountable for the meager Chinese nuclear forces. But the threat of a nuclear strike on any U.S. regional ally or on U.S. soil continues to exist in the event of any conflict, nuclear, or conventional, between the United States and the PRC.

The U.S. nuclear capability

Despite recent significant reductions in the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, the quality and quantity of U.S. nuclear weapons, as well as the theory and application of these forces through the “New Triad”, remains a testament to the United States’ global nuclear supremacy.¹ Its delivery systems cannot be matched by any other country; the quick response time as well as the targeting systems used by U.S. nuclear forces cannot be beat. Recently, the United States has given more priority to nuclear deterrence in the Asia-Pacific, specifically against the DPRK. The Asia-Pacific missile defense program being created by the United States is to defend specifically against this threat.

The U.S. has made significant efforts to work bilaterally and multilaterally with the PRC on a range of nuclear technology issues from terrorism and proliferation, to the use of civilian nuclear reactors.² Conferences like these are also critical to reducing misperception and increasing transparency between the United States and Chinese nuclear forces.

U.S. and PRC concerns

The PRC still has many concerns about U.S. nuclear weapons. Are Chinese strategic and nuclear forces capable of deterring a U.S. nuclear strike? Specifically, would the United States consider using nuclear weapons in the wake of the destruction of the PRC’s second strike capability? Will missile defense systems negate PRC strike capabilities, leaving the mainland open for a U.S. nuclear strike? These questions and others sow distrust and confusion between Beijing and Washington.

The lack of transparency shown by the Second Artillery and the PLA in general, while slowly being reduced, continues to be a cause for concern at the Pentagon. The United States is worried about recent developments in Chinese nuclear delivery systems and Chinese

¹ Woolf, Amy. “CRS Report for Congress: U.S. Strategic Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues,” updated September 5, 2007.

² Kan, Shirley and Mark Holt. “CRS Report for Congress: US China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement,” updated September 6, 2007.

military modernization. These developments – modern nuclear SSBNs, mobile ICBM launchers, and ASAT missiles are worrisome.

Reducing misperceptions

While many misperceptions exist, the threshold of a nuclear exchange between the United States and the PRC has reached a new high. Bilateral and multilateral conferences and meetings between the United States and the PRC have opened up new areas of discussion between both parties. The discussion and (future) implementation of a U.S.-PRC military hotline is a prominent example of this cooperation. The expanding trade relations between the PRC, the U.S. and the majority of countries in the Asia Pacific region serve as ties and building blocks for enhanced security and political cooperation.

The PRC is worried that the nuclear forces of the Second Artillery are insufficient to deter a U.S. first strike or a U.S. conventional strike that would render PRC nuclear forces useless. The missile defense shield being built by the United States in the Asia Pacific region triggers Beijing's fears that the Asia Pacific nuclear deterrence mechanism is being erased. China is also worried that perceived U.S. unilateralism might lead to nuclear escalation between the two countries.

These fears are not well-founded. Neither the U.S. nor China can accept any sort of limited or total exchange of nuclear weapons. Any nuclear exchange will destabilize both countries politically and economically, as well as the region and the world. The United States argues that transparency in the conduct and operations of its military forces provide significant insight into the U.S. decision-making process. Recent cooperation between the U.S. and the PRC over Taiwan, the most likely source of conflict, help to reduce misperceptions. Even overt statements by President Hu in an attempt to reduce hostilities between Taiwan and the mainland have gone a long way toward reducing the likelihood of conflict.

Conclusion

It is irresponsible to say that the nuclear threat between the PRC and the U.S. no longer exists. However it is possible to say that the likelihood of any nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the PRC is at the lowest point in years. This paper advocates continued bilateral discussions between Beijing and Washington at all levels, increased military cooperation and transparency, and the creation of a multilateral security mechanism in the Asia Pacific to combat the spread of nuclear technology and WMD proliferation. This paper also advocates replacing the missile defense system currently in development with a multilateral shield built to protect the entire Asia Pacific region from any nuclear missile launch. This can be done as a joint U.S.-PRC-Japan-ROK cooperative effort. Both sides and the entire region have nothing to lose through expanding cooperation. Relationships in Asia take quite a while to build, so both sides need to start now.

Dimensions of the Nuclear Threat

By Tim Cook

The dimensions of the nuclear threat in U.S.-China relations are either direct threats that emerge from the bilateral relationship, such as misperceptions about the other side's intentions and the potential for conflict over Taiwan, or indirect threats such as the transfer of nuclear-related materials and technologies to state and nonstate actors or regional conflicts in which either the United States or China might become involved.

While the dimensions of the threat that stem from bilateral relations are less likely to lead to a nuclear conflict between the two states as a result of numerous mutual interests (economic and trade, regional security, etc.), missed signals and misperceptions can escalate a crisis to a far more destructive level if leaders in Washington and Beijing feel they have exhausted all options short of a nuclear exchange. Trust is thus an essential element in the relationship. Two areas in which a lack of trust increases the nuclear threat are misperceptions over nuclear capabilities and strategy, as well as questions surrounding the Taiwan issue.

- **Misperceptions:** Neither the United States nor China accepts at face value the declarations of the other in regard to nuclear strategy. U.S. strategists doubt the extent to which China would adhere to its stated policy of no first use, and Chinese strategists often perceive U.S. strategic ambiguity as a first use policy. In the event of a conflict, misperceptions could increase the chances of a nuclear exchange as one or both sides misinterpret the other's intentions. Additional sources of misperceptions include Chinese views of the intended use for U.S. missile defense capabilities and the U.S. linkage of Chinese weapons modernization (both conventional and nonconventional) with enhanced capabilities and a more belligerent Chinese force posture.
- **Taiwan:** Another dimension of the threat that emerges directly from U.S.-China bilateral relations – and also contains opportunities for crossed signals – is Taiwan. Should conflict arise over Taiwan, it is unclear the extent to which each side might rely solely on conventional weapons. Much would depend on the way in which the conflict was triggered, and would also have to take into account Taiwan's actions.

Indirect dimensions of the nuclear threat emerge from the transfer of nuclear materials and technologies to state and nonstate actors, and regional conflicts in which the United States and China might become involved. Such threats are unlikely to lead to a nuclear exchange between the U.S. and China, and even offer the potential for cooperation between Washington and Beijing to mitigate the possibility of a terrorist attack or regional war that escalates to a nuclear conflict.

- **Technology transfer:** The potential for nuclear technologies to be sold to states such as Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea, or terrorist entities is cause for heightened concern. Should it emerge that the technologies used in a terrorist attack against the United States came from China, a conflict could arise. However, China has made many strides in

strengthening and enforcing its export control regulations, which makes it difficult to determine if a hypothetical attack was caused by deliberate technology transfer or was the result of a rogue supplier. The control of such transfers has and will continue to be a key area for cooperation between the two countries.

- **Regional conflicts:** Regional conflicts also increase the nuclear threat, although once again, the United States and China have been working together to reduce the potential for conflict. North Korea is a possible source of regional instability and despite the recent positive steps toward the dismantling of its nuclear program, Pyongyang's threat to regional stability will remain for the foreseeable future absent a fundamental shift away from its military first policies. In addition to North Korea, a decision by Japan to develop nuclear weapons would threaten its neighbors and trigger countervailing moves. In addition to the Korean Peninsula and Japan, conflict could arise in South (Pakistan and India) and Southeast Asia (Burma, with terrorist entities in Indonesia, Philippines, etc). In any of these hypothetical situations, it is unclear the extent to which the United States and China would become involved. More likely, the two sides would work together to avert the escalation of a crisis and avoid getting involved in a protracted conflict.

Dimensions of the Nuclear Threat

By Dianna Hummel

Main Threat

The main challenge in the Sino-U.S. nuclear relationship is building trust and ensuring accurate perceptions. Both sides agree that nuclear weapons are dangerous and agree on a nonproliferation policy for third parties such as North Korea. However when it comes to managing bilateral proliferation issues, there seems to be an underlying lack of trust and misperceptions on both sides. These issues are caused by each country's individual nuclear history, political considerations, and other issues that cloud perceptions of each other.

Historical Dimensions

History plays a role in shaping and guiding perceptions of how China and the United States view the other's nuclear program. For the United States, the fact that China's first nuclear weapon was detonated at a time of high tensions between the two nations along with statements as to why China decided to become a nuclear nation caused the United States to think China saw the bomb as a weapon that would be used in a confrontation. Thinking the bomb could be used against American allies or American troops in the region caused great unease. This unease has lessened but policy makers are still worried about a nuclear threat against Taiwan, a country they have promised to aid in cases of Chinese armed aggression.

China's sees the U.S. as the only country to use nuclear weapons against another country. Also, America threatened to use nuclear weapons against China during the Korean and Vietnam wars. This suggests to the Chinese that the U.S. is willing to use nuclear weapons and could use them in Asia again.

Political considerations

Nuclear trust and perception cannot be discussed without discussing a larger picture of relations between the two nations. Overall the Sino-U.S. relationship is healthier than in the past and significant government and business interaction has developed between the nations. However, China and the U.S. still have many disagreements. China fears U.S. containment and sees U.S. ties with Japan and India as part of a containment effort. The United States is wary of China's friendship with countries unfriendly to the United States and those that seek nuclear arms, such as Iran. This, coupled with a surge in Chinese defense spending and a lack of transparency causes U.S. policy makers and others great concern.

Third-party nuclear proliferation

Yet another dimension to the nuclear threat is third-party proliferation. Both nations can agree to work together on the issue of North Korean nuclear proliferation, but they find it difficult to agree on other proliferation endeavors. Differing views of the impact of

proliferation in South Asia and Iran has made it difficult for them to cooperate on bilateral nuclear issues.

Lack of contact

Sino-U.S. military to military contact, while off to a good start, is still in its infancy. While this may not be seen as a dimension of the nuclear threat, it is an important way to decrease threat perceptions and military misunderstandings in which nuclear arms can play a role. Military to military contact can inform decision maker's threat perceptions. The more contact militaries and their leaders have the more likely they are to know each other's true capability, the will of a country to use that capability, and the state of civil-military relations. This can decrease threat perceptions the U.S. and China militaries have of each other.

U.S.-PRC Cooperative RevCon Initiatives

By Priscilla Eunkyung Baek, Christian Bedford, Justin Bishop, Tim Cook,
Dianna Hummel, Jiyon Shin, and Qinghong Wang

The 2010 Review Conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) offers an opportunity to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime and, at the same time, improve bilateral relations between Beijing and Washington (at a time when they have been subject to a number of strains). The following suggestions are put forward as proposals the United States and China could present at the 2010 Review Conference which if pursued either bilaterally or by all NPT parties would strengthen nonproliferation objectives and the China-U.S. relationship.

I. Intelligence Sharing

1. **Increase intelligence-sharing regarding radioactive material.** Building on the countries' "hotline" that was established recently for direct communication in the event of a crisis, the U.S. and China could increase intelligence-sharing between security agencies to locate unsecured nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological material. In the hands of a terrorist organization, this material represents a potentially serious security threat. Intelligence-sharing could also foster improved trust.

II. Operations

2. **Establish Joint NBC Disaster and Response Teams:**

- Propose a global NBC emergency response network that will include:
- Standardization of disaster response equipment and training;
 - Education of response team personnel

While the likelihood of an NBC accident in the Asia-Pacific region remains relatively low, the potential for cooperation in this field is relatively high. If the use of militaries or military personnel is contentious, non-military units, Coast Guard and police assets, can be used instead. Joint exercises can be used as confidence and security building measures to further enhance regional cooperation.

III. Nuclear Facilities and Safety

3. **Develop global weapons safety and security standards.** China and the United States should work together to develop standards for the safety and security of nuclear weapons. Cooperation would extend to the development of any technology or approaches necessary to implement these standards. This collaboration would build trust and confidence between the U.S. and China and reduce the risk of terrorist theft or sabotage. If adopted globally, it would support Article VI obligations, as well as significantly reduce the risk of weapons theft or accidental use.

IV. Fuel Cycle

4. **Develop a global nuclear materials registry.** China and the United States should work together to develop a database of existing civilian and military nuclear materials inventories. Global participation in such a database would support a notional fissile material cut-off treaty, as well as long-term disarmament goals. It would also contribute to the ability to trace the origin of any nuclear material acquired or used by a nonstate actor. Even if undertaken purely as a bilateral measure, such a database would improve strategic stability and transparency between the U.S. and China. China and the United States could work jointly to develop verification protocols to ensure confidence in the reported inventories of existing materials. The states might also work to develop innovative approaches to tagging materials to allow for real-time, remote and/or external accounting and tracking of materials.
5. **Joint Alternative Fuel Research.** The U.S. and China could collaborate in multiple capacities (university research, lab-to-lab exchanges, etc.) on scientific research to develop nuclear technologies that do not have weapons-grade materials as by-products. This technology would then be made available to other NPT members to build new reactors that only use this technology. This would shift the emphasis of the debate from a negative focus of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to a positive focus on peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

V. Studies

6. **Joint efforts to educate others on the disadvantages of proliferation.** This could be carried out in workshop or summit forum. By doing so they should be able to raise confidence in each other's goals and ideas while at the same time attempting to attack the source of nuclear proliferation.
7. **Studies on why nations proliferate.** Examining their own histories and why they continue their nuclear programs would build trust between the two countries and give them the chance to study in depth each other's thoughts and actions.
8. **CTBT Bilateral Study Group.** Neither the U.S. nor China has ratified the CTBT, although there is talk that the U.S. might do so in the next administration. This study group would serve to bring more transparency into the decision-making process on both sides by exploring the issues that each side perceives to be the greatest opportunities and challenges toward ratifying the treaty. If dialogue between the two sides led to an understanding and eventual ratification of the treaty, the nonproliferation regime would receive a significant boost by having a significant arms control document brought into force that gets closer to NPT goals of nuclear disarmament among nuclear states. The results of the study could be presented to the RevCon.

VI. U.S.-China Bilateral Relations

- 9. Increase joint naval interdiction exercises.** Following Defense Secretary Gates' November trip to China, the two countries agreed to hold joint naval exercises "at an appropriate time." If the two countries could direct those exercises toward interdiction operations, the US and China could strengthen maritime interdiction efforts while improving naval contacts. These maritime nonproliferation operations would need to be orchestrated carefully because of Beijing's unwillingness to embrace the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Over time, these combined operations could lead to greater trust and understanding between the states and their navies, and lay the groundwork for joint patrols and monitoring in Indo-Pacific maritime zones.

- 10. Work to improve safeguards at Pakistani nuclear facilities.** Both China and the United States have a strategic interest in Pakistan. With Pakistan embroiled in serious domestic challenges, there is concern about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. The US was instrumental in helping design and implement the safeguards on Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and at nuclear sites. Requesting Chinese participation in some of these initiatives would give Beijing a stake in the nuclear security of a neighboring state, increasing Chinese security and develop a platform for use in other nuclear-aspirant states. This could involve Chinese participation in talks between the US and Pakistan or the establishment of a joint bureau to examine nuclear safety issues and mechanisms. This would also allow Washington and Beijing to tackle another joint concern, militant Islam, as well as the risk of a nuclear weapon being passed through some of the world's most porous borders.

- 11. Establish regular exchange programs and meetings among American and Chinese scientists and scholars in nuclear technology and nonproliferation.** (especially among the younger generations of scientists and scholars). Chinese scientists and scholars in this field are young due to the personnel gap caused by China's Cultural Revolution (1966-76) and relatively isolated due to the characteristics of Chinese systems. Given the fact that most U.S. scientists and scholars in nonproliferation lack knowledge about their counterparts in China, exchange programs could be very valuable.

- 12. Clarify criteria.** A common observation from most U.S.-China talks is that both countries fail to lay down the criteria that need to be filled for them to believe the other side. For example, China feels threatened by the U.S.'s New Triad Policy and has developed a counterdeterrence program, which the U.S. feels threatened by. Both sides repeat their concerns and want the other side to reduce their arms, but do not clarify the specific actions they want the other country to take. There is a need to spell out specific expectations that each country has for the other to comply with the NPT.

VII. Other

- 13. Transform regional nonproliferation dialogues among states, such as the Six-Party Talks, into a fixed long-term regional proliferation regime.** With the experience of cooperation gained in the Six-Party Talks, China and the US should work together to turn their cooperation into a regional nonproliferation mechanism.

APPENDIX A

About the Authors

Ms. Priscilla Eunkyung BAEK is a Korean Flagship Fellow and Master's candidate in Korean Language Studies for Professionals at the University of Hawaii at Manoa. She graduated from Duke University in 2007 and majored in Public Policy and Spanish Studies. Her interests are in transnational identity, the North Korean diaspora, decolonial studies, ethnic nationalism, and foreign relations within the Asia-Pacific region and the U.S. She will continue her studies at Korea University next fall.

Mr. Christian BEDFORD is a senior analyst and budget manager at the Office of the Asia-Pacific Policy Advisor at MARPAC HQ.

Mr. Justin BISHOP is a development intern at the Pacific Forum CSIS. He is majoring in Diplomacy and Military Studies at Hawaii Pacific University.

Mr. Tim COOK is the Next Generation Leadership Fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research. He is a graduate from the Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, with a Master of Arts in International Studies, where he focused on China studies. Prior to his graduate work, Tim spent two years with the Trade Development Alliance of Greater Seattle. He also has experience teaching English in Gansu and Ningxia, China with the World Trade Centers Association. Tim speaks Mandarin Chinese.

Ms. Dianna HUMMEL obtained her bachelors degree in Political Science from Brigham Young University Hawaii. She attends Hawaii Pacific University as an MA candidate in the Diplomacy and Military Studies program and works as a research assistant intern at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies.

Ms. Jiyon SHIN is Pacific Forum CSIS 2007-2008 Vasey Fellow. Currently an undergraduate at Ewha Women's University, she specializes in International Studies, minors in Korean Studies, while focusing on diplomacy and security in Northeast Asia. She spent a year as an exchange student at University of Hawaii in 2005-2006. She has worked extensively with the Korean University Students' Politics & Diplomacy Research Association on issues pertaining to the ROK-U.S. alliance and anti-American sentiment among ROK's young generation. Most recently she attended Shanghai's Fudan University for a summer Chinese language program.

Mr. Qinghong WANG is a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the University of Hawaii-Manoa, is a Pacific Forum Young Leader, and is a 2006-2007 Vasey Fellow. He is from Beijing, China. Mr. Wang received his B.A. in Chinese Language and Literature from Beijing University in 1999 and an M.A. in Chinese Studies and an M.A. in Political Science both from the University of Hawaii in 2003. He previously worked as a language instructor at both UH and at the United States Air Force Academy's Chinese Language Immersion Program at the Japan-American Institute of Management Science.

APPENDIX B

U.S.-CHINA STRATEGIC DIALOGUE, Third Annual Meeting

The Role of National Perceptions of Security Environments in Shaping Sino-American Nuclear Affairs

YOUNG LEADERS PROGRAM

Agenda

*Conference organized by U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and Pacific Forum CSIS for the
Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency*

4-6 November 2007

Hilton Hawaiian Village • Waikiki, Hawaii

Sunday, Nov. 4

5:45PM

Young Leaders round table discussion - **Tapa Bar area** (*see enclosed map*)

6:30PM

Opening Reception and Dinner – **Tapa Tower, Honolulu Suite 3**

Monday, Nov. 5

8:30AM

Continental Breakfast - **Tapa Tower, Honolulu Suite 1 & 2**

9:00AM

Welcoming Remarks and Introductions

Chris Twomey, Ralph Cossa, Michael Wheeler, and Yang Yi

First Day: Perceptions of Security Environments

9:30AM

Panel I: *Comparing National Perceptions of Security Environments*

Chair: Ralph Cossa

Panelists: Brad Roberts and Chen Zhou

What is the nature of the international security environment with regard to strategic forces today? What threats are most important within it? How has this changed in the past two decades? What roles do domestic factors (political, cultural, or economic) play in influencing these threat perceptions and their relative prioritization?

12:00-1:30PM

Lunch - **Tapa Tower, Honolulu Suite 3**

1:30PM-5PM

Panel II: *Comparing Perspectives on the Specific Threat of Proliferation*

Chair: Pang Zhongying Panelists: Jim Wirtz and Yang Yi

What are each side's views about the dangers posed by North Korean, Iranian, and South Asian proliferation? What concerns does each side have regarding non-state actors and WMD? What is the prospect for cascading proliferation either in Asia or globally? In general, how important is this set of problems to each side relative to other issues (as discussed in the first panel)?

6:30PM

Reception and Dinner - **Tapa Tower, Honolulu Suite 3**

Second Day: Unilateral, Bilateral, and Multilateral Responses

Tuesday, Nov. 6

8:30AM

Continental Breakfast - **Tapa Tower, Honolulu Suite 1 & 2**

9:00AM

Panel III: *Responding to this Environment: Strategic Forces and Policies*

Chair: Mike McDevitt Panelists: Elaine Bunn and Li Bin

How does each side see its strategic forces, operational concepts, and political commitments specifically contributing to addressing its concerns about the contemporary security environment? How does each side's on-going strategic modernization program address these problems?

10:45AM-11:00AM

Break

11:00AM-12:30PM

Panel IV: *Responding to this Environment: Alliances and Extended Deterrence*

Chair: Yang Yi Panelists: Phil Saunders and Yang Mingjie

How does each side see alliances and extended deterrent commitments addressing the contemporary security environment? In general, what is the role of positive security guarantees in the contemporary era? What aspects of existing alliance and extended deterrence relationships does each side view positively and negatively? How might Chinese and American policy in this regard play a role in reducing dangers in regions outside of Asia?

12:30-1:30PM

Lunch - **Tapa Tower, Honolulu Suite 3**

1:30PM

Panel V: *Responding to this Environment: Treaties, Regimes, and Informal Coalitions*

Chair: Bonnie Glaser

Panelists: Brad Glosserman and Gu Guoliang

What role is there for formal, multilateral institutions to address these threat environments? How can the existing non-proliferation regime contribute? What informal, multilateral tools (e.g., PSI, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism) might be used? What does each side see as the record for these various categories of multilateralism? What synergies might there be between formal and informal multilateral tools? How might the two sides cooperate to advance multilateral approaches to the contemporary strategic environment?

3:30-4:00PM

Closing remarks and next steps

Chris Twomey, Yang Yi, Ralph Cossa, and Michael Wheeler

4:00PM

Conference Adjourns

4:15PM

Young Leaders Roundtable discussion

7:00PM

Closing Reception and Dinner