



Promoting the Southeast Asia
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone



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Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate arenas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

The Young Leaders Program

The Young Leaders Program invites young professionals and graduate students to join Pacific Forum policy dialogues and conferences. The program fosters education in the practical aspects of policy-making, generates an exchange of views between young and seasoned professionals, promotes interaction among younger professionals, and enriches dialogues with generational perspectives for all attendees. Fellows must have a strong background in the area covered by the conference they are attending and an endorsement from respected experts in their field. Supplemental programs in conference host cities and mentoring sessions with senior officials and specialists add to the Young Leader experience. The Young Leaders Program is currently supported by Chevron, the Freeman Foundation, the Luce Foundation, and the Yuchengco Group, with a growing number of universities, institutes, and organizations also helping to sponsor individual participants. For more details, see the Pacific Forum CSIS website, www.pacforum.org, or contact Brad Glosserman, director of the Young Leaders Program, at bradgpf@hawaii.rr.com.

Table of Contents

	Page
Acknowledgements	v
Introduction	vii
By Brad Glosserman	
U.S. Allies – The U.S. and China at the 2010 NPT RevCon	1
By Emma Belcher, Wakana Mukai, Jeffrey Robertson, David Santoro, and Jiyon Shin	
Toward 2010: A U.S.-China NPT RevCon Workplan	5
By Sam Polk, Veronica Tessler, Ruyi Wan, and Shanshan Wang	
Countering Nuclear Proliferation: The Usefulness of the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone	9
By Raymund Jose G. Quilop	
A Strategy for CSCAP to Support SEANWFZ	15
By Emma Belcher	
Proposals for CSCAP to Support the SEANWFZ Plan of Action	17
By Elina Noor	
CSCAP Support of the SEANWFZ Plan of Action	19
By Jeffrey Robertson	
The Role of CSCAP in Supporting SEANWFZ	23
By David Santoro	
Supporting the SEANWFZ Plan of Action	25
By Veronica Tessler	

	Page
What Should CSCAP do to Support SEANWFZ?.....	27
By Wan Ruyi	
CSCAP Efforts to Support the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Plan of Action	31
By Shanshan Wang	
Appendices	
Appendix A: About the Authors	A-I
Appendix B: Agenda	B-I
Appendix C: Young Leaders Agenda.....	C-I

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Introduction

By Brad Glosserman

Young Leaders (YL) have added an increasingly valuable element to meetings of the study group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific, an international working group of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). The younger generation of regional security students and specialists is cognizant of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and the need to develop innovative ways to address that danger. Pacific Forum CSIS has been fortunate to be able to invite Young Leaders to all the meetings of the WMD study group that it chairs in its capacity as secretariat of the U.S. member committee of CSCAP. Many of our Young Leaders have attended several meetings, helping – as the YL program intends – to build a real community of next generation thinkers who will be better able to work together to tackle shared security concerns in the future.

The sixth meeting of the WMD study group was held in Jakarta in December 2007, and followed the Sixth CSCAP General Conference. Young Leaders attended the General Conference, which highlighted the work of the CSCAP study groups as participants explored thinking about a panoply of regional security issues. When that conference concluded, the WMD study group convened, focusing at this meeting on Southeast Asia's attempts to support global nonproliferation norms, in particular the role of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) established by the Bangkok Treaty. The individual Young Leader papers included in this collection provide their suggestions about ways CSCAP can support the SEANWFZ and develop the Action Plan that was announced at the ASEAN summit earlier that year.

The group papers follow up on Young Leader analysis from the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue held the previous month in Honolulu. At that meeting, Young Leaders were asked to provide suggestions on ways the U.S. and China could work together to support the 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. (Those papers are collected in "Issues & Insights Vol. 8 – No. 10" at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/issuesinsights_v08n10.pdf.) At the Jakarta meeting, Young Leaders were divided into two groups to analyze the impact of such cooperation. The first paper reflects the thinking of U.S. allies about the prospects for such cooperation at the RevCon. They identify their national interests, the "ideal" vision of what the two countries can do, and the role each ally can play to help realize that vision. The second group, composed of Americans and Chinese, provides a detailed set of recommendations for bilateral (U.S.-China) cooperation at the RevCon to help ensure that the meeting is a success.

These papers make clear that younger security analysts understand the significance of the nuclear part of the regional security equation. While they acknowledge the emergence and importance of new security challenges, they also appreciate the need to tackle the WMD threat. Unlike many of their predecessors, they recognize that WMD is a threat to the region and attach priority to dealing with it. They also see how the behavior of nuclear weapon states, especially the U.S. and China, affects other governments' responses to

nonproliferation. Bluntly put, they understand how the NPT bargains work, and how the various components of the NPT deal fit together. Their suggestions are a glimmer of what is possible when new thinking is applied to longstanding problems.

U.S. Allies – The U.S. and China at the 2010 NPT RevCon

By Emma Belcher, Wakana Mukai,
Jeffrey Robertson, David Santoro, and Jiyon Shin

This paper provides Australian, Japanese, and South Korean perspectives on the U.S.-China relationship at the 2010 NPT RevCon. Each perspective is presented consecutively and organized in three parts:

- First, we identify relevant Australian, Japanese, and South Korean national interests;
- Second, against this background, we craft the “ideal” Australian, Japanese, and South Korean vision of what the U.S. and China should do at the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty RevCon;
- Third, we outline the role that Australia, Japan, and South Korea could play to encourage the U.S. and China to follow the desirable course of action.

Australia

Australian National Interests

Australia has a strong interest in nonproliferation and disarmament, and thus in the maintenance of the NPT as an integral part of the nuclear regime, given its normative value. Australia wants Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to reaffirm their commitment to disarmament under the NPT to diminish the argument by Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) that NWS are not living up to their end of the NPT bargain in an attempt to justify their own noncompliance.

Australia has strong relationships both with the U.S., its traditional ally and partner, and with China, its number one trading partner. Australia is therefore interested in a stable, nonconflictual U.S.-China relationship.

Australia also seeks to play an influential role in developing nuclear energy programs in its region while preventing the risks of proliferation.

Australian “Ideal Vision” for the U.S. and China at the 2010 NPT RevCon

Australia would like the U.S. and China to take a leading role in the reaffirmation of the grand bargain of the NPT. This could lead to similar assertions by the other NWS, thus increasing the confidence of NNWS in the grand bargain and value of the NPT, as well as weakening the argument of those who seek to justify their own noncompliance.

Australia would like the U.S. and China to initiate steps toward the establishment of CBMs to prevent the emergence of an arms race. The establishment of CBMs at an early stage could ameliorate friction as the U.S. and the region accommodate the growth of China.

Australia also would like the U.S. and China to promote the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) in the region to contribute actively to the development of regional nuclear energy programs and avoid the risks of proliferation.

Australian Role and Influence

Australia maintains strong relationships with both the U.S. and China. It has a role to play in pushing for the establishment of CBMs.

Australia also has a role to play as a diplomatic, technical, and material coordinator in the development of GNEP. Despite 10 years of limited activity, Australia maintains substantial credibility as a diplomatic coordinator in arms control, as evidenced through work undertaken in the NSG, the Canberra Group, and the UN. Importantly, as a stable and secure supplier of raw materials, Australia could play an important role in the development of GNEP

Japan

Japanese National Interests

Japan has a strong relationship with the U.S. under the U.S.-Japan alliance, which has contributed to the peace and prosperity of Japan as well as East Asia as a whole. Despite the end of the Cold War, multiple issues threaten regional stability; therefore, it is in the best interest of Japan to maintain a strong relationship with the U.S. to secure peace for itself and the region.

Relations with China have improved due to the expansion of exchanges in areas such as the economy, culture, and human resources. It is in Japan's best interest to maintain a sustainable relationship with China, especially in economics and politics to build strategically reciprocal relations and together tackle common global concerns.

Japanese "Ideal Vision" for the U.S. and China at the 2010 NPT RevCon

Japan has long sought concrete commitment to disarmament by the NWS under Article VI of the NPT. Japan would like to see specific indications from the U.S. and China regarding their intentions to sign/ratify the CTBT and negotiate an FMCT. These measures, even if just declaratory, would be valuable since sincere attitudes from NWS are crucial in shaping the "value" of nuclear weapons in the international community.

Although nuclear nonproliferation-related issues are much more practical nowadays, Japan will continue to make promoting disarmament a top priority.

As a result, Japan would like to see the U.S. and China, together with other NWS, hold a dialogue that will lead to the decrease in the quantity of nuclear weapons that each state possesses. The attitudes of these countries directly influence other NWS, which support the idea that nuclear weapons are needed for great power status.

Japanese Role and Influence

Japan, as a NNWS, cannot contribute to nuclear disarmament by decreasing the quantity of weapons. Japan can contribute by reducing the value many states see in nuclear weapons, both politically and militarily.

Being a pioneer in promoting nuclear disarmament and working to remind states that disarmament is as important as nonproliferation would, in one way, seem like a weak strategy. But it is, and always has been, embedded in Japanese politics and diplomacy.

Republic of Korea

ROK National Interests

The ROK is surrounded by great military and economic powers (the U.S., Russia, China, Japan), and nuclear powers including Russia, China, the U.S., and the ROK's immediate neighbor, the DPRK. Consequently, the ROK relied on the ROK-U.S. alliance for protection for the last half century. The ROK renounced its nuclear ambition in exchange for an alliance that provided a nuclear umbrella, and is now one of the nations in East Asia that increasingly depends on the peaceful use of nuclear technology.

The ROK's interest is to have a region of co-prosperity and peace; this means it will continue to be a NNWS and cooperate with other countries to reach sustainable peace in Northeast Asia.

ROK "Ideal Vision" for the USA and China at the 2010 NPT RevCon

It is crucial for the ROK's short- and long-term interests that both great powers possessing nuclear weapons cooperate. China and the U.S. have shown willingness to stop nuclear proliferation by collaborating to thwart the DPRK's nuclear ambitions through the Six-Party Talks (SPT). The SPT has been slow and its success is by no means certain, but it has showcased a possibility for the two countries to cooperate on security matters, thus increasing mutual confidence. For the 2010 NPT RevCon and beyond, establishing security dialogues on arms control and nuclear control will be a great start.

- Such dialogues can focus on CBMs, such as disclosing Chinese and U.S. defense budget estimates.
- Setting up working groups to make progress on the CTBT and the FMCT.
- Institutionalizing a group that works on expanding the SEANWFZ. This may strengthen the commitment of Japan and the ROK to remain NNWS.
- Regional cooperation on practices similar to PSI and other regional nonproliferation military efforts that include other countries is also valuable.

ROK Role and Influence

The ROK, as a global actor, has been an NPT member, a SPT member, and it recently joined GNEP. The ROK is against arms races, nuclear ambitions from NNWS (the DPRK, Japan, even the ROK) and the ROK is opposed to open rivalry between great powers in the region. As a middle power (Asia's third largest economy and the world's 12th), the ROK wishes to help create a peaceful Northeast Asia.

Toward 2010: A U.S.-China NPT RevCon Workplan

By Sam Polk, Veronica Tesler, Ruyi Wan, and Shanshan Wang

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime, faces unprecedented challenges. As two of the five Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and as key stakeholders in the international system, the United States and China share a major interest in ensuring that the 2010 NPT review conference (“RevCon”) produces constructive efforts to address these challenges and bolster global non-proliferation efforts.

Sino-U.S. cooperation and coordination in anticipation of the 2010 RevCon is necessary if this goal is to be achieved. Toward this end, the U.S. and China should resolve to develop a shared 2010 RevCon agenda and a set of principles to help guide the 2010 RevCon process and to help avoid the pitfalls of the 2005 RevCon. The U.S. and China need not agree on every aspect of preparations for the 2010 conference; rather, they should focus on practical measures built around the U.S. and China’s shared interests, including:

- establishing procedures for the conduct of the conference to set the stage for a focused and substantive debate on key issues facing the NPT;
- addressing noncompliance with the treaty and bringing treaty violators into compliance;
- addressing the threat of nuclear terrorism and bolstering the IAEA safeguards regime;
- addressing the ramifications of withdrawal from the treaty;
- achieving universal accession to the treaty;
- setting reasonable and achievable disarmament goals;
- promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy;
- strengthening military-to-military cooperation and increased transparency of nuclear programs.

Below is a set of proposals for U.S.-China cooperation to ensure that each of these issues is adequately addressed at the 2010 RevCon.

Establishing procedures for the conduct of the conference to set the stage for a focused and substantive debate on key issues facing the NPT

Disagreement among state parties over procedural issues bogged down the 2005 RevCon and delayed debate on substantive issues facing the NPT. To ensure that the same problem does not befall the 2010 RevCon, the U.S. and China should work together to develop a common set of procedures that can be raised and endorsed at the remaining NPT Preparatory Committee meetings. A common U.S.-China position on these issues will send a strong signal to the other parties concerned that the RevCon should be used to address key issues facing the treaty.

Addressing noncompliance

Despite disagreement over how individual instances of NPT noncompliance should be handled, the U.S. and China agree that noncompliance threatens to unravel the global nonproliferation regime. Both countries also share the belief that the IAEA should play the central role in monitoring compliance and deterring noncompliance with the treaty. Together, the U.S. and China should reaffirm the centrality of the IAEA inspections regime in helping assure compliance with the treaty. They should also agree to work to ensure that promoting compliance and addressing noncompliance remains the top agenda item for the 2010 RevCon, as the other provisions of the treaty, including the promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, are predicated on the trust that other member states will not give civilian technology to develop nuclear weapons.

Addressing the threat of nuclear terrorism and bolstering the IAEA safeguards regime

Nonproliferation efforts have entered a new stage. No longer can they focus simply on preventing the transfer of material and technology from one state to another; they must also confront the possibility of the spread of nuclear technology to terrorist groups and other nonstate entities. China and the U.S. should both recognize that this new reality increases the urgency to push for universal adherence to a bolstered IAEA safeguards regime, and together should seek opportunities to highlight the importance of the Additional Protocol as means to strengthen these efforts.

China and the U.S. also have a crucial role to play in helping promote nuclear safety and building nuclear security capacity among states that have recently undertaken civilian nuclear power programs. High economic growth in parts of the developing world along with concerns over the environmental impact of burning fossil fuels have heightened the appeal of nuclear energy. China and the U.S. should develop a joint agenda for 2010 RevCon discussions regarding the most efficient and practical ways to help countries with new nuclear energy programs develop robust nuclear safety measures to protect against theft, sabotage, natural disasters, and other factors that could contribute to nuclear proliferation or accidents. In particular, China and the U.S. should seek to develop proposals for delivering technical assistance and equipment that helps ensure transparency, accountability, and safety in the operation of nascent nuclear energy programs.

Addressing the ramifications of withdrawal from the treaty

Both the U.S. and China are well-positioned to exercise their influence on certain countries that withdraw from the treaty. North Korea's unilateral withdrawal from the treaty has set a dangerous precedent. China and the U.S. should continue to work through the Six-Party talks to encourage North Korea to rejoin the treaty and to adhere by its provisions. China and the U.S. should also urge North Korea to become more open and transparent in its conduct, and to reengage with the international community. China and the U.S. should cooperate to find other measures to promote openness with the DPRK, including people-to-people and cultural exchanges.

In particular, China and U.S. should join hands in highlighting the importance of the NPT and should develop proposals to ensure that parties to the treaty do not benefit from withdrawing from it. Such proposals might include the automatic referral to the UN Security Council of any state that withdraws from the treaty. As the viability of the NPT depends in large part on peaceful relations in Northeast Asia, China and U.S. should also try to reduce the possibility of an arms race in the region and a rise in regional tensions.

Addressing countries that have not signed the treaty

Persuading non-signatory countries to sign onto the NPT is in the common interest of both China and the U.S. Universal adherence to the treaty would significantly strengthen it and build confidence within the international community. China and the U.S. should work respectively and jointly through active bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts to persuade countries that are not parties to the treaty to adopt it.

Setting reasonable and achievable disarmament goals

Both China and the U.S. have expressed their consensus on further reducing nuclear stockpiles, yet a clear goal has never been set. The two sides should continue discussions in regard to the common criteria to be used to assess disarmament improvement and come together to outline a roadmap for achieving substantial disarmament goals in preparation for the 2010 Revcon.

In order to strengthen bilateral relations and demonstrate positive steps that the U.S. and China have taken toward ensuring a productive NPT Review Conference, the two countries should jointly underscore the importance of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as the main forum for achieving the NPT's disarmament goals, and should work to overcome differences over how the CD should proceed

Promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and cooperation on new energy development

As noted, economic growth in the developing world is increasing the appeal of nuclear energy, including in China.¹ China and the U.S. are both interested in ensuring that promoting civilian nuclear technology does not increase the risks of nuclear proliferation. They should therefore work to bolster the framework for ensuring that the practices of nuclear supplier states are transparent and guard against misuse.

To increase the credibility and appeal of the NPT, the NWS should act to ensure that non-NWS states continue to benefit under the treaty. China understands the resentment from the developing world of which China considers itself a part. China and U.S. should cooperate more to strengthen NWS efforts to assure non-NWS's profit from adherence to the treaty, a process in which China will act as an equalizer.

¹China, for example, has nine completed nuclear power generating units that now account for about 2.3 percent of the total power output of China. China also plans to increase nuclear generating capacity to 40 gigawatts by 2020, when nuclear power is projected to account for 4 percent of the nation's total generating capacity.

Strengthen military-to-military cooperation and increased transparency of nuclear programs

The development of U.S.-China military-to-military exchanges at senior levels signals strengthened mutual understanding between the two militaries. However, mutual distrust is still deeply rooted and may hinder a more desirable outcome from the 2010 RevCon. China and the U.S. should increase the frequency of military-to-military dialogues between now and 2010, and should include on the agenda for such dialogues RevCon status updates and clarification of each nuclear weapons programs.

China and the U.S. should strengthen information sharing, particularly with regard to each other's military development. Military personnel exchanges between China and the U.S. should also be given due attention, especially on China's end. In the long run, this will benefit U.S. and China strategic relations and pave the way for the two nuclear giants sharing strategic goals with regard to the NPT.

Countering Nuclear Proliferation: The Usefulness of the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone

By Raymund Jose G. Quilop

In 2005, during the meeting of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, I argued that two instruments of ASEAN are critical to having a Southeast Asia relatively free from the ill-effects of weapons proliferation: the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty.

In 1971 ASEAN came up with the idea of making Southeast Asia a Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), an effort to crystallize its collective vision of insulating the region from great power competition. But according to one observer of ASEAN affairs, ZOPFAN had a “less apparent purpose” – to “reassure ASEAN members themselves that no state would ally itself with an outsider to threaten another ASEAN member” (Simon 2007: 12).

It took 24 years (1995) before the idea of ZOPFAN was operationalized through a treaty – the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ), which, as aptly pointed out by Simon is “a building block to ZOPFAN” (2007: 14). The six original members of ASEAN, Vietnam, and Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia (which were not yet members of ASEAN) signed the treaty in December 1995. It entered into force in 1997.

It is quite ironic that a treaty that aims to make the Southeast Asian region free from nuclear weapons, the ultimate weapon then at the disposal of the two superpowers competing for global dominance, was signed after the Cold War ended.

But the idea of a nuclear weapons free zone remains useful. The “establishment of NWFZs is a collective response of non-nuclear-weapon states to the geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons and the risk of use of their territory,” notes one observer (Enkhsaikhan 2007: 1). Another observer acknowledges that it is the “wish to deny the great powers the use of the territory in question for nuclear military purposes seems to be the main motivation behind ... the creation of nuclear weapons free zones...” (Subedi 1999: 2). Thus, NWFZs could be aptly considered a cornerstone of non-proliferation efforts.

This is particularly true in light of the growing recognition that, the proliferation of nuclear weapons remains a key challenge to global and regional security. The nuclear weapons states continue to hold on to their nuclear stockpiles and other states intend to have them. Worse, the challenge posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons has gone beyond states. It is now widely acknowledged that the danger of proliferation is doubly complicated by the possibility of nonstate actors having access or possessing nuclear weapons, crude they may be (Quilop 2008).

Briefly, the SEANWFZ treaty (hereinafter the Bangkok Treaty) obliges the state parties

not to develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons; station nuclear weapons; or test or use nuclear weapons anywhere inside or outside the treaty zone; not to seek or receive any assistance in this; not to take any action to assist or encourage the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device by any state; not to provide source or special fissionable materials or equipment to any non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS), or any NWS unless subject to safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); to prevent in the territory of States Parties the stationing of any nuclear explosive device; to prevent the testing of any nuclear explosive device; not to dump radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter at sea anywhere within the zone, and to prevent the dumping of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter by anyone in the territorial sea of the States Parties.

The treaty covers the territories, continental shelves and exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of the state parties. As it aims to make the Southeast Asian region free of nuclear weapons and considering that Southeast Asian states do not possess nuclear weapons, a key component of the treaty is a protocol, which is open for signature by the nuclear weapon states (NWS) the U.S., Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom.

The treaty does not have a secretariat but it does establish the Commission for the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone composed of the foreign ministers or their representatives of the state parties. In 2006, the ASEAN foreign ministers at the 39th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia directed the commission to convene a meeting to review the operation of the treaty as provided for in the treaty itself (Article 20). In July 2007, the commission issued a joint statement which noted that “the state parties have abided by their responsibilities and obligations under the treaty” (Joint Statement on the Commission for the Treaty on the SEANWFZ 2007).

The members of the commission also “reaffirmed” their commitment in promote the SEANWFZ and “resolved to undertake the following measures” under the 2007-2012 Plan of Action:

- Ensure compliance with our undertakings under the SEANWFZ Treaty, including accession to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements and related instruments;
- Continue close consultations to pursue the accession of all five nuclear weapon states;
- Seek cooperation with the IAEA, other international and regional bodies, other Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones, Dialogue Partners and other friendly states, in developing legal framework to meet international standards on nuclear safety, establishing regional networks for early notification of nuclear accidents,

developing a regional emergency preparedness and response plan and strengthening capacity building in the region on nuclear safety issues;

- Jointly draw up specific work programmes/projects to implement the Plan of Action.

The commission may have been right in its assessment that “the state parties have abided by their responsibilities and obligations under the treaty.” But this is simply by default: no Southeast Asian state possesses nuclear weapons. Even if an ASEAN member wants to possess these weapons, the technical capacity for developing them is simply not available.

A more important consideration in assessing the progress of the treaty is the accession of the nuclear weapon states, specifically the U.S., China, Russia, France and the United Kingdom. Although China has expressed “willingness to adhere to SEANFWZ” (Simon 2007: 15), it has not signed the protocol. The U.S. is reluctant to do so claiming that the “treaty does not assure that the freedom of navigation will remain undisturbed by the treaty” (Subedi 1999: 2). Obviously, adherence to the treaty by states possessing nuclear weapons would mean their ships or submarines carrying nuclear weapons could not navigate within the zone covered by the treaty. Subedi (1999: 7) notes that the U.S. is worried that the treaty could be used by Southeast Asian states “to deny free pass[age] for nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered ships” in their territorial and archipelagic waters as well as their EEZs. Thus, it is understandable that they are reluctant to accede to the treaty’s protocol.

This may be mitigated by the fact that the Bangkok Treaty has a provision that allows a state party after properly notified by another state, to

decide for itself whether to allow visit by foreign ships and aircraft to its port and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft and navigation by foreign ships through its territorial sea or archipelagic waters and over flight of foreign aircraft above those waters in a manner not governed by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage or transit passage (Treaty on the SEANWFZ 1995).

However, this provision weakens the treaty as it practically allows “any member to decide for itself whether a nuclear weapon state’s ships and aircraft may visit” a territory within the treaty’s zone of application (Simon 2007: 16). This could render the treaty less useful as regards making Southeast Asia substantively a zone free from nuclear weapons.

These points could be emphasized by ASEAN to convince the NWS to accede to the protocol. However, they should not be emphasized by ASEAN as they weaken the goal of making Southeast Asia a nuclear weapon free zone. Instead, ASEAN, in its dialogue with the NWS, should emphasize that it is in their strategic interest that Southeast Asia becomes a nuclear weapon free zone.

A more pragmatic way to convince the NWS to accede to the protocol would be to move beyond ASEAN. ASEAN’s attempt to have the NWS sign the protocol is a long shot. But working with other Asia-Pacific states may be more effective. The East Asian Summit,

which brings together Japan, South Korea, China, India, Australia, and New Zealand, could be useful. New Zealand is a staunch advocate of non-production of nuclear weapons. The rest are known advocates of non-acquisition of nuclear weapons. While India possesses nuclear weapons, it would consider a Southeast Asia free of nuclear weapons in its own interest. And China has already shown and expressed willingness to accede to the protocol.

Finally, beyond the issue of NWS accession to the treaty protocol, a more key consideration, is how to make the treaty or the idea of a nuclear weapon free zone evolve such that the other dimension of nuclear proliferation – non-state actors having access or possession of nuclear weapons and related materials – is addressed.

The strategic environment when the treaty was signed and entered into force has changed. Today's nuclear proliferation challenge is no longer confined to states. Non-state actors have entered the scene. Yet, the Bangkok Treaty and the nuclear weapons free zone it advocates still revolve around the traditional notion that states proliferate.

Preventing states from contributing to nuclear proliferation and denying nonstate actors access to fissile materials and technology means paying close attention to the reprocessing and enrichment phases of the nuclear fuel cycle. This is because plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment are critical phases in the nuclear path.

Along these lines, Southeast Asian states may need to see the Southeast Asian Weapons Free Zone (SEANFWZ) as more than a nuclear weapon free zone. It may be more worthwhile and useful for Southeast Asian states to consider reprocessing and enrichment free zone, using the SEANFWZ as the take-off point.

Track-two institutions across the Asia-Pacific, specifically the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), should continue pointing out to regional states the necessity and usefulness of nuclear weapons free zones, particularly the SEANFWZ. A sustained reminder to policymakers around the region of the utility of the SEANFWZ would ensure that this mechanism remains high on their agenda. It could even prod policymakers to search for modes of re-invigorating and re-energizing the SEANFWZ.

More importantly, CSCAP could assist regional states in drawing up work programs and projects to implement the Plan of Action that they have committed to. Two of its study groups, the Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia-Pacific and the Study Group on Energy Security, could include this item on their agendas. Such recommendations would be a substantive contribution of CSCAP in the overall quest to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while preventing the proliferation of weapons.

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A Strategy for CSCAP to Support SEANWFZ

By Emma Belcher

The SEANWFZ Plan of Action encompasses four main components to enhance cooperation among States Parties and Nuclear Weapons States:

1. Ensure compliance with treaty obligations;
2. Pursue consultations to gain nuclear weapons states' accession to Protocol;
3. Enhance cooperation with IAEA and other international bodies to ensure nuclear safety and security;
4. Draw up work programs to support the above.

This plan of action comes at a time when the security landscape of the region is more complex than it was at the Treaty's inception in 1995. While the issues of nonproliferation and disarmament by states remain pertinent to peace and security in the region – and the Treaty's Protocol aims to constrict options for nuclear weapons states and reduce the currency of nuclear weapons – recent global and regional developments present Southeast Asian nations with new concerns that demand urgent consideration.

The rise of nonstate actors groups such as al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya, and their declared intention not only to acquire, but also to use weapons of mass destruction, present a particularly acute policy challenge. While the ease with which terrorists could develop nuclear weapons is hotly contested, the possibility and the potential devastation render the issue worthy of serious policy planning.

The most difficult part of building a nuclear device is developing weapons-grade nuclear material. This means that theft of ready-prepared material from a legitimate source is the most attractive option for those bent on developing their own weapon, but who lack the facilities to develop their own material. Unfortunately, the number of sources of such material in Southeast Asia is growing – both through energy and research reactors. The global and regional trend toward consideration of nuclear energy as a solution to energy demands and climate change concerns, while addressing one policy challenge, increases the opportunity for nonstate actors to get hold of weapons usable material. As Southeast Asia considers regional nuclear energy expansion (particularly Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam), doubts over the security of facilities and materials are increasing, and with good reason. Studies have shown that security at nuclear facilities around the world range from strong to weak, with some merely guarded by a chain link fence and padlock, or with absent guards and doors propped open.

Recommendations

CSCAP should focus its attention on practical measures that secure the region's nuclear material sources and it should advocate greater security for future sources of nuclear material. While nuclear disarmament should be a long-term goal – only destruction of the world's weapons stockpiles can significantly lower the risk of illicit acquisition – the current

political climate renders this unlikely in the short-term (although there is a growing push for greater progress toward complete disarmament at influential U.S. and British political levels in particular). The documented interest of nonstate actors in acquiring nuclear material, along with the projected proliferation of nuclear energy plants (which adds more potential sources of weapons-grade materials), is the most pressing challenge for the region. Thus, CSCAP should emphasize the need for governments to focus on components one (ensure compliance on treaty obligations) and three (enhancing cooperation with international and regional bodies to increase security) of the Action Plan.

CSCAP is well placed to focus regional governments' attention in this respect. CSCAP members should work to educate their governments about the real and potentially devastating danger of nuclear terrorism and the steps they can take to reduce the threat, such as conversion of highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium where possible, cooperation with the IAEA (especially in their nuclear security efforts), and implementation of Additional Protocols, to prevent diversion of materials for illicit purposes.

CSCAP should focus on lobbying the governments of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar to develop Additional Protocols with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the governments of Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam to bring their agreements into force as soon as practicable. Where possible, such lobbying should be led by CSCAP members of their own countries, so as to be mindful of cultural sensitivities and to avoid the perception of lecturing by others. Emphasis should be placed on the cooperative approach of the region as a whole and CSCAP should frame countries' participation as partners in the regional effort. CSCAP should also emphasize the need for effective and timely information sharing between all nations of the region.

Further, CSCAP should insert itself into the growing debate over nuclear energy and insist that, if nuclear energy is a country's preferred option, adequate plans are made for security. The increasing attention given to climate issues presents a valuable opportunity for CSCAP to assert its influence on this issue.

On a practical level, CSCAP could produce short reports and policy briefs for government officials detailing the very real threat of nuclear terrorism, the vulnerabilities that exist in the region, and provide solutions for addressing the issue. CSCAP might consider simulation exercises that use local conditions to demonstrate the potential for nuclear theft, the devastating consequences of nuclear terrorism, and the necessity of not only prevention, but of adequate planning for consequence management. Running exercises, and inviting government officials as participants or observers might be a more effective persuasion mechanism than reports and meetings alone. It could also enhance information-sharing and the development of working relationships, both important aspects of any credible effort to cooperate on the issue of nuclear security in the region.

Proposals for CSCAP to Support the SEANWFZ Plan of Action

By Elina Noor

Ten years after the entry into force of SEANWFZ, Southeast Asia remains nuclear weapons free and committed to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Compliance, however, is met by a number of challenges: first, the need to harmonize positions among state parties, in particular with regard to transit rights and airfield/port visits, in order to continue negotiating the issue of accession by the five Nuclear Weapon States (NWS); second, the need to comply with IAEA safeguard requirements; and third, the need for capacity-building for a regional early warning system (EWS) and an emergency response plan in the event of a nuclear accident.

CSCAP can facilitate the strengthening of SEANWFZ in the following ways:

- 1) As regards harmonization of positions among state parties, it could invite track-two expert representatives from ASEAN to discuss differences and propose recommendations as a group.
- 2) In preparing to resume negotiations with the NWS, invite experts from both NWS and ASEAN to identify, in their personal capacity, issues that are nonnegotiable and those that may permit compromise.
- 3) As regards compliance with IAEA safeguards, invite experts to summarize the details of compliance, provide estimates of resources (human and financial) required of each state party, and address and clarify sovereignty concerns that may arise from committing to safeguard agreements. This “fact sheet” (maximum of 5 pages) could be distributed to relevant government agencies within each state party.
- 4) As regards capacity-building for a regional EWS and an emergency response plan, publish a comparative study of EWS and recommend a model that would best fit the region. Similarly, a CSCAP publication could be issued suggesting an emergency response plan(s) that would address the most likely types of nuclear accidents or disasters in the region (for example, a leak from a nuclear power plant).

CSCAP Support of the SEANWFZ Plan of Action

By Jeffrey Robertson

- (1) Listed below are recommendations on CSCAP support for the SEANWFZ Plan of Action. **Appendix A** provides a brief background and issues note providing the basis for these recommendations.

Recommendations

- (2) Recognizing the background and issues as in **Appendix A**, the following recommendations on CSCAP support for the SEANWFZ Plan of Action are suggested:
 - (a) **Convene a regional and/or international conference on the implications of civilian nuclear energy use in Southeast Asia.**

There are currently operational plans for the establishment of civilian nuclear energy facilities in Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia. Timeframes for completion of these facilities are 2020, 2021, and 2017, respectively. While these are generous timeframes, experience in Japan demonstrates the importance of establishing a civilian nuclear regulatory framework that from the earliest stage, encourages transparency, predictability, and credibility.

A conference on the implications of civilian nuclear energy use in Southeast Asia would drive home the importance of early accession to IAEA safety agreements and the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident by all member states (as recommended under the SEANWFZ Plan of Action).

A side effect of such a conference would also be reaffirmation of the importance of a regulatory framework that encourages transparency, predictability, and credibility.

CSCAP is the ideal forum for such a conference, given (i) the role of CSCAP participating states in the supply and construction of Southeast Asian civilian nuclear facilities currently planned; and (ii) the role of CSCAP in facilitating dialogue amongst specialists, academia and government.

Such a conference would also build upon existing work, including the first CSCAP Study Group on Asia-Pacific Cooperation for Energy Security and the CSCAP Study Group on Countering WMD in the Asia-Pacific.

- (b) **Publication of a report that explores the various “grand diplomatic bargain” solutions to NWS accession to the Protocol and Member State accession to, and ratification of, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the IAEA Additional Protocol.**

In December 2006, China reached an agreement on signing the SEANWFZ Protocol. However, there remains substantial impediments to obtaining agreement from the remaining NWS, based upon ambiguity in the SEANWFZ Treaty text (transit and delimitation issues) and the negative security guarantee to other NWS.

Further, there are convincing arguments that China's decision to accede to the Protocol provides it with an advantage relative to strategic competitors, given its geographic proximity to the region (making transit and delimitation issues less relevant). Accordingly, obtaining further NWS accession could prove difficult.

Various forums have hinted at the possibility of a "grand diplomatic bargain" that could include NWS accession to the Protocol in return for SEANWFZ member states support for NWS control over the fuel cycle – an option that could be extended to other nuclear weapon free zones.

A CSCAP publication that comprehensively details and explores such 'grand diplomatic bargain' solutions would open the debate beyond the current limited options. It builds upon the strengths of CSCAP as an innovative guide to governmental diplomatic processes and as a forum that can look beyond immediate governmental policy agendas.

- (3) These two recommendations reflect concrete and realistic tasks that could support the SEANWFZ Plan of Action, building upon the strengths of CSCAP as both a complement to the ARF and as a guide for governmental diplomatic processes.
- (4) These recommendations do not cover other highly relevant issues of concern outside of the SEANWFZ Plan of Action. For example, the role of India both as a *de facto* NWS and as an increasingly important partner for Southeast Asia in both strategic and economic terms; another example is the potential expansion of the treaty to include Australia and New Zealand (or all parties to the Treaty of Rarotonga) in recognition of both the relevance of Australia in the nuclear proliferation debate and its increasing inclusion in other forums related to East Asian regionalism.

Appendix A: Background and Issues

Background

- (5) In July 2007 at the meeting of the Commission for the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), member states of the Association for South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) adopted a comprehensive Plan of Action.
- (6) The SEANWFZ Plan of Action includes provisions to:
 - (a) Encourage compliance with the SEANWFZ Treaty, including encouragement of member states to complete accession to International Atomic Energy Agency

- (b) Consider accession to other related international instruments such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the IAEA Additional Protocol; and
 - (c) Actively encourage Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) to accede to the Protocol to the SEANWFZ treaty.
- (7) The SEANWFZ along with the ASEAN Declaration of 1967, the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), and the Treaty for Amity and Cooperation (TAC), contribute to the establishment of a standard of common adherence to norms of good conduct among members of ASEAN and the wider regional community.

Issue

- (8) The CSIS Young Leaders' Program has been asked by the Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) for 'concrete and realistic' recommendations that support the SEANWFZ Plan of Action.
- (9) CSCAP, as a non-governmental (second-track) diplomatic process has a limited ability to directly influence governmental decision making. The primary strengths of CSCAP lies in its ability to guide or 'prepare the ground' for governmental diplomatic processes and in its ability to act as a complement to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) process.
- (10) Options for CSCAP support activities include (but are not limited to) establishment of working groups on key issues; provision of policy recommendations; the convening of regional/international meetings on key issues; establishment of linkages to encourage debate and discussion on key issues; and production and distribution of publications on key issues.

The Role of CSCAP in Supporting SEANWFZ

By David Santoro

The role of CSCAP in supporting the SEANWFZ should focus on three objectives:

➤ **Proliferation prevention**

= reinvigorate nonproliferation principles and norms through...

- ... the promotion of a clause to be included in the Bangkok Treaty to prohibit, in view of the current nuclear renaissance, the development of enrichment and reprocessing facilities;
- ... the systematic “advertising,” by the main powers, of their current nuclear disarmament steps;

➤ **Proliferation detection/protection**

= strengthen proliferation detection and protection mechanisms through...

- ... the promotion of enhanced verification – the Additional Protocol as the new ‘gold standard’;
- ... the promotion of the adherence to export control standards and the PSI;
- ... the promotion of greater material security (top-down approach through the adherence to the CPPNM, the Joint Convention, participation in the IAEA Action Plan, etc, and bottom-up approach through implementation of UNSCR 1540);

➤ **Proliferation management**

= suggest innovative solutions to crises...

- Active recommendations to manage the North Korean nuclear issue;
- Forward-looking scenarios on the Korean Peninsula.

Supporting the SEANWFZ Plan of Action

By Veronica Tessler

The strategic significance of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) ranges from dealing with nuclear nonproliferation and threats of WMD to prospects for global nuclear disarmament and advancing common security measures in the region. As the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons dominates much of the international security debate, it is critical that the international community presses for support of nuclear weapon-free zones.

CSCAP is uniquely positioned to support the SEANWFZ Action Plan and should continue to play to its strengths of convening conferences and supporting study groups on nuclear nonproliferation and WMD issues, while continuing collaboration with NGOs worldwide to prod discussion among governments of nuclear weapon states (NWS), especially those that oppose the protocol of the Treaty of Bangkok.

The Treaty's protocol for accession by NWS faces opposition by the United States and France, contributing to the current impasse. To loosen the deadlock, it is critical to address both domestic frictions within NWS as well as international tensions between NWS and non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS).

Key Recommendations:

- CSCAP should engage NGOs and advocacy groups of Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) to call upon their governments to act, highlighting SEANWFZ implications beyond Southeast Asia. For example, increased pressure should be placed on the U.S. Senate to ratify the UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The time is ripe in the U.S. for the Treaty's passage, harnessing support from the current administration and, most recently, gaining backing from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. This would accelerate movement on the passage of the SEANWFZ by building confidence between States Parties and NWS while simultaneously expressing support for resolving some sea-lane issues at play with SEANWFZ. Moving forward on the issue of the restriction of the passage of nuclear-powered ships through the zone would be a step in the right direction for the U.S. U.S. accession to the Treaty would signal a willingness to cooperate for increased global security.
- CSCAP should convene working groups aimed at building confidence between States Parties and Protocol Parties to address negative security assurances, which remain a roadblock to NWS signature on the protocol. Such discussions should take the form of direct consultations with NWS and should include government officials and working group members.
- CSCAP should promote the SEANWFZ in a broader context of advancing the nuclear disarmament discussion and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty universality leading up to the 2010 Review Conference. The U.S. concerns about SEANWFZ go beyond the

- CSCAP should collaborate with other NGOs and advocacy groups to promote the Action Plan through citizen venues, at universities and via media outlets in the United States. The implications of SEANWFZ, and nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament broadly, for the sake of international peace and security and the lack of political will among NWS should be highlighted. A more comprehensive approach aimed at engaging citizens would increase traction on the issue, which could strengthen domestic efforts if coupled with effective leadership. Such an approach would also advance discussion on the nonproliferation regime and nuclear disarmament, two issues already touched upon by 2008 U.S. presidential contenders. An incoming U.S. president may be well-positioned to engage constructively and cooperatively with the international community on nuclear issues.

What Should CSCAP do to Support SEANWFZ?

By Wan Ruyi

Afraid of being involved in a nuclear disaster, many countries have agreed to establish nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ). In addition to those in Antarctica, the sea bed, outer space and the moon, countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Africa have also come up with NWFZ agreements and received demarcation permission from the UN. Within NWFZ, nuclear weapons states are not allowed to use, threaten, or spread nuclear weapons; NWFZ countries are not allowed to authorize, manufacture, transport, purchase and possess nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

As part of track-two diplomacy in regional security, CSCAP aims to build understanding, to give policy consultation, to offer multilateral mechanisms and to support and cooperate with the ARF. For the SEANWFZ, CSCAP should pursue the consensual knowledge-building function. Shared knowledge is the precondition and foundation of cooperation, and can influence policy making in ASEAN or even nonmember countries. In the current situation, CSCAP should focus on the following three aspects to strengthen SEANWFZ implementation.

1. Proliferation Restriction

SEANWFZ faces three proliferation challenges, especially after the Cold War: nuclear smuggling, weapons trade, and scientist flight. Both expected and unexpected factors exploit these channels.

Nuclear smuggling and weapons trade rely on multinational networks, nongovernmental, antigovernmental, or even terrorism. We must prevent these actions from crossing borders. CSCAP should build consensual knowledge among member countries on how to restrict nuclear smuggling and stop the weapons trade. It would be better to reach a consensus on how to cooperate. CSCAP's multilateral dialogue mechanism can also help launch international police cooperation.

Nuclear scientists, especially those from former Soviet Union, fled for higher salaries and spread worldwide, accelerating nuclear proliferation. It is also important to work out a consensus for nuclear scientists as well as related staff. CSCAP can push for adoption among member countries with support from the ARF.

2. Treaty Implementation

There are numerous treaties aiming to prevent nuclear proliferation. The NPT involves 153 nations and does slow proliferation. But treaties must be fairly implemented. Nuclear weapon states did join the NPT, but their increasing powerful weapons and growing number of warheads violate Article 6. Since the 1960s, the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed nine nuclear reduction related treaties, but implemented few. Even under these treaties, a


superpower didn't have to give up nuclear superiority, and middle powers held on to nuclear weapons for protection. In this context, how can NWFZ remain nuclear weapons free and provide security guarantees? On the other side, nuclear technology has not been fairly shared or traded for fear of weaponization, which violates NPT Article 4. As a result, these treaties protect nuclear weapon states' nuclear superiority in disguised form, rather than halting real non-proliferation.

CSCAP should enhance knowledge about treaty implementation among its members as well as nuclear weapon states. Thus, SEANWFZ's protection can be expected. Furthermore, with a multilateral mechanism, CSCAP should pave the way for each party's compromise to help ensure compliance with SEANWFZ. What's more, CSCAP should work to assure the security of those who comply.

3. Distinguish Civil and Military Use

Another question is how to separate nuclear development for civil and military use as many countries adopt nuclear power. This is a prominent trend in Southeast Asia (SEA). Indonesia initiated a nuclear technology research in the 1950s. The supposed NPS (Nuclear Power Station) generation in 2025 will be 4000MWe, which includes 4 reactors. Vietnam is accelerating its research and claims power generation of newly built NPS in 2015 will be 4000MWe. Myanmar explored uranium resources and claimed to set up NPS with support from Russia early this year. Thailand wants to construct 2 NPS before 2020, of which power generation will reach 4000MWe. Without a concrete nuclear policy, Malaysia still preserves the possibility of NPS construction before 2020. Furthermore, Malaysia claimed early this year to spend 100 million RM on the first Nuclear Monitoring Facility in this region. Philippines claimed the first NPS in SEA, but due to geographic restrictions, financial debts, and political instability, it has not pursued nuclear energy.

With the volume and technology maturing, civilian nuclear facilities could be turned to military use. In different countries, the regulations to supervise nuclear facilities for civil use differ. CSCAP should help form a consensus on civil use regulations. On one hand, it can deepen cooperation with other organizations like the IAEA; on the other hand, it can build mutual trust, and lay a more solid foundation for ARF talks.



CSCAP Efforts to Support the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Plan of Action

By Shanshan Wang

Although it was initially muted on ASEAN's agenda, political and security cooperation was an important goal of member states from its inception. Some of the most important accords adopted by ASEAN concern political and security issues, such as the 1971 declaration designating Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord in 1976, and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) of 1995. With the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN created a consultation process and confidence-building mechanism for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

However, given the diverse interests within ASEAN countries and between ASEAN countries and major nuclear powers, challenges exist in the process of carrying out the specific plan of action for SEANWFZ. As the key and most ambitious track II organization in the Asia Pacific region, how can CSCAP play a more constructive role in strengthening the SEANWFZ Plan of Action?

In general, CSCAP should practice a more active role in bridging ASEAN countries and nuclear powers in the region through Track II activities and strengthening its educational function and its research capability.

Policy Recommendations

First, given the role nuclear powers (U.S., Russia, UK, France, and China) have and their influence on the plan of action, CSCAP should work closely with not only the Southeast Asian governments but also the "great powers" to strengthen their willingness to join/support this NWFZ Plan of Action;

1. Propose/help build up a Great Power Action Coordinator Center to strengthen dialogues and understanding among great powers; the Center can be located in any CSCAP country. Professionals specializing in international law should be resident in this Coordinator Center.
2. Strengthen multilateral military dialogues among nuclear powers by including more military people from nuclear weapons states in CSCAP activities (conferences and study group meetings);
3. Provide forum/platform and encourage/invite track I personnel to join CSCAP activities and help establish more networking among participants from Southeast Asian and nuclear countries.

Second, CSCAP should expand track II activities and its educational function to help provide more constructive and concrete solutions to the disputes among countries;

The importance of education on disarmament and nonproliferation was stressed in previous Study Group meetings. In this regard, CSCAP should:

1. Build up a CSCAP Young Leaders Study Group:

In the name of CSCAP, build up a Study Group of junior government officials and young scholars from the region that focuses on SEANWFZ and non-proliferation affairs and holds seminars in countries in the Asia Pacific region to enhance awareness of this issue. Invite high-level government officers from ASEAN and other nuclear countries to audit or participate in their discussions;

2. Provide more training to both government officials and young diplomats or other professionals with expertise in international affairs through cooperation with ARF:

e.g. Design a University Instructors Training Program: increase exchange of ideas and teaching methods of instructors in security studies to strengthen the average understanding of current obstacles facing the SEA weapons free framework, etc.

3. Provide more substantial suggestions to and help speed up the institutionalization process of ARF.

Third, CSCAP should strengthen its role as a “think tank” supporting multilateral mechanisms in the region and provide better solutions for tackling issues in the region;

1. CSCAP guided research project on “hot spot” issues in the region should be carried out.

China has shown willingness to join the treaty, yet different positions on South China Sea and the sense of “skepticism” among ASEAN countries toward China are potential obstacles that may hamper this momentum. Thus research on the “South China Sea” and more constructive and non-biased action proposals should be released and contributed by two sides. CSCAP China should take more responsibility and play a more active role.

2. Build channels of cooperation with the IAEA and get involved in the preliminary stage of the compilation of a nuclear warning and risk control international framework and related legal framework building.

APPENDIX A

About the Authors

Ms. Emma BELCHER is a PhD Candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a research fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. She is also a research assistant at the Jebson Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies. Ms. Belcher holds an MA in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School, where she was editor-in-chief of the school's journal of international affairs – *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*. She also holds a BA(Hons) in political science and a Diploma in Modern Languages (Arabic) from the University of Melbourne, Australia. Between 2005 and 2006, Ms. Belcher served as a policy adviser on national security and international affairs in Australia's Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. She has also held positions at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and in the Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch in the Department of Disarmament Affairs at the United Nations. Between 2000 and 2002, she was a public affairs officer at the Embassy of Australia in Washington DC.

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Ms. Elina NOOR graduated in law from Oxford University and obtained an LL.M in Public International Law from the London School of Economics and Political Science with distinction, at the top of her class. She also holds an M.A. in Security Studies from Georgetown University. She has volunteered at INTERIGHTS, a legal human rights NGO based in London, and worked on WMD terrorism at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Washington, D.C. After a stint at the Brookings Institution's Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World within the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, she returned to the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia. Elina's work includes published chapters in the Asia-Pacific Security Outlook series (2002 - 2005) and in *Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific: Threat and Response*, edited by Rohan Gunaratna. Her latest publication is, "Al-Ma'unah and KMM in Malaysia" in Andrew T.H. Tan (ed.), *A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia*, Cheltenham: Edward Edgar Publishing, 2007.

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Mr. Jeffrey ROBERTSON is a Senior Researcher at Parliament of Australia, providing research, analysis and advice to Senators, Members of Parliament and Parliamentary Committees on issues relating to East Asia. He previously worked for the Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and as a journalist in South Korea. He holds an undergraduate degree in Russian Studies, a Master of Defence Studies (MDefS) degree from the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), and is currently undertaking his Ph.D part-time at the Australian National University (ANU), looking into the diplomatic style of the two Koreas

Mr. David SANTORO is a Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at Macquarie University in Australia and a research assistant at the Centre for Policing, Intelligence, & Counter Terrorism, Access Macquarie. He has worked as a research fellow in the Ministry of Defense, Assembly of the Western European Union, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in France. Mr. Santoro received his master's degrees in International Relations from Macquarie University in Australia, Strategic Studies and Defense Policies at the School of Advanced International Studies in France, and Arms Control and Disarmament at the University of Marne la Vallee in France. He has a B.A. from the University of Paris, Sorbonne in Anglo-American Studies.

Ms. Jiyon SHIN is Pacific Forum CSIS 2007-2008 Vasey Fellow. Currently an undergraduate at Ewha Women's University, she specializes in International Studies, minors in Korean Studies, while focusing on diplomacy and security in Northeast Asia. She spent a year as an exchange student at University of Hawaii in 2005-2006. She has worked extensively with the Korean University Students' Politics & Diplomacy Research Association on issues pertaining to the ROK-U.S. alliance and anti-American sentiment among ROK's young generation. Most recently she attended Shanghai's Fudan University for a summer Chinese language program.

Ms. Veronica TESSLER is a program associate at the Stanley Foundation. She received her B.A. in Political Science and International Studies from Virginia Commonwealth University. Her studies also took her to the University of Torino (Italy) and to the University of Virginia as a fellow of the Sorensen Institute for Political Leadership College Leaders Program. She served as a regional director for Americans for Informed Democracy.

Mr. Ruyi WAN is from Shanghai, China. He received his B.A. in Electrical Power Engineering from Shanghai JiaoTong University and is now pursuing his Juris Master in Tsinghua University. He has been secretary of the Communist Party Student Branch in both universities and was twice awarded the People's Scholarship. He also worked as VP in AIESEC local committee in JiaoTong University. Mr. Wan interned at Shanghai Municipal Electrical Power Company and McKinsey & Company. He founded Gananan Forum Shanghai, an international bi-weekly open forum in 2005, which also has programs in Hong Kong and Beijing.

Ms. Shanshan WANG been working actively as a Pacific Forum "Young Leader" since October 2006. She received both her bachelor's degree in diplomacy and master's degree in international relations from China Foreign Affairs University. She was also a student fellow of Asia Pacific Leadership Program at East-West Center in Hawaii from 2006-2007. She worked as liason officer at Boao Forum for Asia, interned with People's Bank of China and Boston Consulting Group and also traveled extensively in the Asia Pacific region.

APPENDIX B



Sixth Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific Four Seasons Hotel, Jakarta, Indonesia December 8-10, 2007

Agenda

Dec. 8, 2007

Participant arrival and check-in

19:30 Opening Dinner

Dec. 9, 2007

8:30 Welcome remarks
 (CSCAP Vietnam and USCSCAP)

9:00 **Session 1: The Global Nonproliferation Regime**
Discussions will focus on developments since our last meeting that can impact the global nuclear nonproliferation regime such as: the status of the Iranian nuclear program, the U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement, the proliferation security initiative (PSI), U.S.-Russia strategic relations, the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2010 Review Conference of the NPT, and UNSCR 1540 implementation. Do they have an influence beyond their particular circumstances? Are there lessons to be drawn from them? How do these developments impact the Asia-Pacific region? How do they affect the WMD Action Plan?

10:45 Coffee Break

11:00 **Session 2 Nuclear Energy Security Concerns**
There is rising interest in the Asia-Pacific region in the use of nuclear power. A participant will report on the last meeting of the CSCAP Energy Security Study Group. What impact does the widespread adoption of nuclear power have on the nonproliferation regime? What are the key safety concerns associated with the adoption of nuclear power? The practical implications of this will be taken up in session five of the conference.

12:00 Lunch

13:00 **Session 3: Six-Party Talks**

This session will examine the progress of the Six-Party Talks on Korean Peninsula denuclearization. The Feb.13, 2007 agreement established five working groups to address specific issues of denuclearization, peace and security, economic and energy cooperation, Japan-DPRK relations, and U.S.-DPRK relations. What progress has been made by the working groups? What is the status of the denuclearization process? What is the impact on the global nonproliferation regime? What hinders more progress?

15:00 Coffee Break

15:15 **Session 4: Recommendations for Six-Party Talks**

This session will focus on developing recommendations in support of the Six-Party Talks. It will draw on discussions at the October CSCAP Preventive Diplomacy workshop in Brunei regarding the development of a Statement of Principles for the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Charter. What principles should guide implementation of the denuclearization initiative? How do we ensure that process is consistent with the global nonproliferation regime? What kind of positive role can/should CSCAP and/or ARF have in the Six-Party process?

17:00 Session adjourns

18:30 Dinner

Dec. 10, 2007

9:00 **Session 5: Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty**

This session will focus on recent developments associated with the nuclear weapons free zone. What is the status of the SEANWFZ? What are the objections to it? What lessons can be drawn from its history? What happened at the first meeting of the Commission for the SEANWFZ? What difficulties are associated with the proposals? What actions have been taken to implement specific work programs and projects to implement the commission's Plan of Action? How can we ensure that these proposals/actions are consistent with the global nonproliferation regime? Are there best practices that can be adopted by other nuclear free zones?

10:15 Coffee Break

- 10:30 **Session 6: Recommendations for Implementation**
This session will focus on developing recommendations for the ARF related to the SEANWFZ. What is the impact of the SEANWFZ Commission’s joint statement on the ARF? What role can CSCAP play in strengthening the SEANFWZ and ensuring compliance among other ARF states? What is the relationship between the action plans called for in the commission’s joint statement and the Asia Pacific Handbook and Action Plan? What are specific SEANFWZ recommendations for the Asia-Pacific Action Plan?
- 12:00 Lunch
- 13:30 **Session 7: Regional Implementation of the Asia-Pacific Action Plan**
This session will focus on recommendations for implementation of specific plurilateral initiatives identified in Chapter 7 of the Asia-Pacific Action Plan. Using discussions from previous study group sessions as a starting point, this session will provide specific recommendations for implementing plurilateral initiatives, in particular the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), in the region. What is the relationship between the PSI and the Container Security Initiative? How can the Eyes in the Sky Initiative and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative be leveraged to make PSI more effective?
- 15:15 Break
- 15:30 **Session 8: Wrap up and Future Plans**
This session will focus on future work of the Study Group. How should the Study Group focus its efforts? How can it be more relevant to the work of track one and the ASEAN Regional Forum in particular? How can it coordinate with other Study Groups? How can it better disseminate its product and facilitate the implementation of its recommendations?
- 16:30 **Meeting Adjourns**
- 16:45 **Pacific Forum Young Leaders meeting**
- 18:30 **Informal Dinner**

APPENDIX C

PACIFIC FORUM CSIS
YOUNG LEADERS

CSCAP, Jakarta Dec 6-10, 2007

I. CSCAP 6th GENERAL CONFERENCE, Jakarta, 7-8 December 2007 “Great Power Relations and Regional Community Building in East Asia”

Dec. 6, 2007

Arrival of international participants -Registration

17:00 (T) Young Leaders welcome meeting and talk on Indonesia’s domestic political developments.
Venue to be determined

19:00 Welcoming Dinner

Dec.7, 2007

07:30-08:30 Registration and Coffee

08:30-09:00 Opening Session
Keynote Address H.E. N. Hassan Wirajuda, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia
Chair Mr. Jusuf Wanandi, Co-Chair, CSCAP Indonesia

09:00-09:30 Special Address: Emerging Regional Order in East Asia
Keynote Address: Professor Emeritus Robert A. Scalapino, Robson Research Professor of Government and Emeritus of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, USA
Chair Professor Anthony Milner, Co-Chair, AusCSCAP

09:30-11:30 Session I: Great Power Relations in the East Asian Region
Keynote Speech: H.E. Wu Dawei, Vice Foreign Minister, People’s Republic of China (to be confirmed)
Presenters
• Ambassador Koji Watanabe, Senior Fellow, Japan Center for International Exchange
• Ambassador Morton Abramowitz, Senior Fellow, The Century Foundation, USA
• From China (to be confirmed)
Chair: Professor Brian Job, Co-chair, CSCAP Canada

- 11:30-12:45 Break for Friday Prayers
- 13:00-14:30 Lunch
Luncheon Speech: The Hon. Alexander Downer MP, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Australia (to be confirmed)
- 14:30-16:30 Session II: Regional Reaction to East Asian Great Power Relations
Keynote Speech (to be confirmed)
Presenters
 - Professor C. Raja Mohan, Professor, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
 - Professor Hugh White, Head, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University
 - Dr. Lee Seok Soo, Professor of International Relations, Korean National Defense University
 - Mr. Jusuf Wanandi, Co-Chair, CSCAP Indonesia
Chair Ambassador Ma Zhengang, Co-Chair, CSCAP China
- 16:30-16:45 Coffee Break
- 16:45-18:45 Session III
Regional Institution Building in East Asia
Keynote Speech (to be confirmed)
Presenters
 - Professor Qin Yaqing, Executive Vice President and Professor of International Studies, China Foreign Affairs University, PRC
 - Mr. Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow, Japan Center for International Exchange
 - Dato' Seri Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, Chairman and CEO, Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Malaysia, and Co-Chair, CSCAP Steering Committee
 - Dr. Charles Morrison, President, East-West Center, USA
Chair CSCAP Japan (to be confirmed)
- 19:00 Dinner
Dinner Speech: Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Japan (to be confirmed)

Dec. 8, 2007

- 08:30-10.15 Session IV
Combating Terrorism: Achievements and Obstacles
Keynote Speech
 - Professor Louise Richardson, Executive Dean, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Studies, Harvard University, USA
Presenters
 - Ms. Sidney Jones, Senior Adviser, Asia Program, International Crisis Group

- Dr. Rizal Sukma, Deputy Executive Director, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia
- Chair Mr. Kwa Chong Guan, Co-Chair, CSCAP Singapore

10:15-10:30 Coffee Break

10:30-12:15 Session V

Addressing the Proliferation of WMD in the Asia Pacific:
The Six-Party Talk

Keynote Speech :H.E. Lee Su-hoon, Chairman, Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative, Republic of Korea

Presenters

- Gen. Yan Kunsheng, Fellow, China Institute of International Studies
- Mr. Ralph Cossa, President, Pacific Forum CSIS, USA, and Co-Chair, US CSCAP
- From DPRK (to be confirmed)

Chair Professor Desmond Ball, Co-Chair, AusCSCAP

12:15-13:50 Lunch

Luncheon Speech: H.E. Juwono Sudarsono, Minister of Defence, Republic of Indonesia

14.00-15:30 Session VI

Security in the Malacca Straits

Keynote Speech: H.E. Syed Hamid bin Syed Jaafar Albar, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia (to be confirmed)

Presenters

- Professor Hasjim Djalal, Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia
- Professor Robert Beckman, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore

Chair Ambassador Kishan S. Rana, Co-Chair, CSCAP India

15:30-17:15 Session VII

Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in the Asia Pacific

Keynote Speech: General Satish Nambiar, Director, Council of the United Service Institution, India

Presenters

- Mr. Pieter Feith, Deputy Director General for the European Security and Defence Policy, General Secretariat of the Council of European Union

• Professor Pierre Lizée, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Brock University, Canada

• Professor Gary Hawke, Co-Chair, CSCAP New Zealand

Chair Professor Jim Veitch, Co-Chair, CSCAP New Zealand, and Co-Chair, CSCAP Steering Committee

- 17:15-17:30 Coffee Break
- 17:30-19:15 Session VIII
 Security Dimension of Climate Change and Energy
 Keynote Speech: Rt. Hon. Sir Rabbie Namaliu, Former Prime Minister,
 Papua New Guinea (to be confirmed)
 Presenters
- Mr. Chow Kok Kee, Chairman, Expert Group on Technology Transfer, United Nations Frameworks Convention on Climate Change
 - Dr. Jon Barnett, Australian Research Council Senior Fellow, University of Melbourne
 - Assoc. Professor Simon Tay, Chairman, Singapore Institute of International Affairs
- Chair Dr. Suchit Bunbongkarn, Co-Chair, CSCAP Thailand
- 19:15-19:30 Concluding Session

**II. Sixth Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific
 Jakarta, December 9-10, 2007**

Dec. 8, 2007

- 7:30 PM Opening Dinner

Dec. 9, 2007

- 8:30AM Welcome remarks -(CSCAP Vietnam and USCSCAP)
- 9:00AM Session 1: The Global Nonproliferation Regime
 Discussions will focus on developments since our last meeting that can impact the global nuclear nonproliferation regime such as: the status of the Iranian nuclear program, the U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement, the proliferation security initiative (PSI), U.S.-Russia strategic relations, the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2010 Review Conference of the NPT, and UNSCR 1540 implementation. Do they have an influence beyond their particular circumstances? Are there lessons to be drawn from them? How do these developments impact the Asia-Pacific region? How do they affect the WMD Action Plan?
- 10:45AM Coffee Break
- 11:00AM Session 2 Nuclear Energy Security Concerns
 There is rising interest in the Asia-Pacific region on the use of nuclear power. A participant will report on the last meeting of the CSCAP Energy Security Study Group. What impact does the widespread adoption of nuclear power have on the nonproliferation regime? What are the key safety concerns

associated with the adoption of nuclear power? The practical implications of this will be taken up in session five of the conference.

12:00PM Lunch

1:00PM Session 3: Six-Party Talks

This session will examine the progress of the Six-Party Talks on Korean Peninsula denuclearization. The Feb.13, 2007 agreement established five working groups to address specific issues of denuclearization, peace and security, economic and energy cooperation, Japan-DPRK relations, and U.S.-DPRK relations. What progress has been made by the working groups? What is the status of the denuclearization process? What is the impact on the global nonproliferation regime? What hinders more progress?

3:00PM Coffee Break

3:15PM Session 4: Recommendations for Six-Party Talks

This session will focus on developing recommendations in support of the Six-Party Talks. It will draw on discussions at the October CSCAP Preventive Diplomacy workshop in Brunei regarding the development of a Statement of Principles for the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Charter. What principles should guide implementation of the denuclearization initiative? How do we ensure that process is consistent with the global nonproliferation regime? What kind of positive role can/ should CSCAP and/or ARF have in the Six-Party process?

5:00PM Session adjourns

6:30PM Dinner

Dec. 10, 2006

7:30AM YL Breakfast with Edy Prasetyono, Senior Researcher in Dept. of IR, CSIS)
Venue TBD

9:00AM Session 5: Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty
This session will focus on recent developments associated with the nuclear weapons free zone. What is the status of the SEANWFZ? What are the objections to it? What lessons can be drawn from its history? What happened at the first meeting of the Commission for the SEANWFZ? What difficulties are associated with the proposals? What actions have been taken to implement specific work programs and projects to implement the commission's Plan of Action? How can we ensure that these proposals/actions are consistent with the global non-proliferation regime? Are there best practices that can be adopted by other nuclear free zones?

- 10:15AM Coffee Break
- 10:30AM Session 6: Recommendations for Implementation
This session will focus on developing recommendations for the ARF related to the SEANWFZ. What is the impact of the SEANWFZ Commission's joint statement on the ARF? What role can CSCAP play in strengthening the SEANFWZ and ensuring compliance among other ARF states? What is the relationship between the action plans called for in the commission's joint statement and the Asia Pacific Handbook and Action Plan? What are specific SEANFWZ recommendations for the Asia-Pacific Action Plan?
- 12:00PM Lunch
- 1:30PM Session 7: Regional Implementation of the Asia-Pacific Action Plan
This session will focus on recommendations for implementation of specific plurilateral initiatives identified in Chapter 7 of the Asia-Pacific Action Plan. Using discussions from previous study group sessions as a starting point, this session will provide specific recommendations for implementing plurilateral initiatives, in particular the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), in the region. What is the relationship between the PSI and the Container Security Initiative? How can the Eyes in the Sky Initiative and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative be leveraged to make PSI more effective?
- 3:15PM Break
- 3:30PM Session 8: Wrap up and Future Plans
This session will focus on future work of the Study Group. How should the Study Group focus its efforts? How can it be more relevant to the work of track one and the ASEAN Regional Forum in particular? How can it coordinate with other Study Groups? How can it better disseminate its product and facilitate the implementation of its recommendations?
- 4:30PM Meeting Adjourns
- 4:45PM Pacific Forum Young Leaders meeting
- 6:30PM Informal Dinner