



Three Crisis for Northeast Asia:
The Next Generation Explores
National Identity and its Implications
for U.S. Alliances



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Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate arenas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

The Young Leaders Program

The Young Leaders Program invites young professionals and graduate students to join Pacific Forum policy dialogues and conferences. The program fosters education in the practical aspects of policy-making, generates an exchange of views between young and seasoned professionals, promotes interaction among younger professionals, and enriches dialogues with generational perspectives for all attendees. Fellows must have a strong background in the area covered by the conference they are attending and an endorsement from respected experts in their field. Supplemental programs in conference host cities and mentoring sessions with senior officials and specialists add to the Young Leader experience. The Young Leaders Program is currently supported by Chevron, the Henry Luce Foundation, and the Yuchengco Group, with a growing number of universities, institutes, and organizations also helping to sponsor individual participants. For more details, see the Pacific Forum CSIS website, www.pacforum.org, or contact Brad Glosserman, director of the Young Leaders Program, at bradgpf@hawaii.rr.com.

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The views expressed here represent personal impressions and reflections of Young Leader program participants; they do not necessarily represent the views of the relevant governments, or the co-sponsoring or parent organizations and institutes.

Introduction

By Brad Glosserman

It is tempting to focus on the changes occurring in the external security environment when trying to plot the future of Northeast Asia security relations. North Korea's bluster, China's rise, Russia's resurgence, and the myriad "new" security challenges tend to dominate thinking about what lies ahead. Just as important, however, are changes taking place within the U.S. allies: the domestic social and political transformations occurring at the same time – an evolution that is both influencing and being influenced by the changes in the world around them.

Those changes are the very reason for the Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders program. Four years ago, we realized that a new generation was coming to power in the Asia Pacific and its views are quite different from those of its predecessors. We decided to bring together a select group of young security professionals to hear their views of international problems, to critique their elders, and to begin the networking that is essential to confidence building and problem solving.

Our U.S.-Japan-ROK conference focused on changing notions of national identity in Japan and South Korea and its impact on their relations with each other and their alliances with the United States. (This is part of a larger research project by Scott Snyder and Brad Glosserman that explores those questions in considerable detail: a preliminary version of their work, "Confidence and Confusion: National Identity and Security Alliances in Northeast Asia," is also available on the Pacific Forum CSIS website, www.pacforum.org.)

For their post-conference assignment, Young Leaders were divided into groups and asked to create scenarios that would pose serious decisions for alliance managers. As usual, our Young Leaders came up with devilish and difficult situations, ranging from a succession crisis in North Korea, a threat of reunification by force between Taiwan and China, and a North Korean missile launch that "accidentally" hits Japan. Each forces the three countries (and others) to examine their national interests and basis for acting with its allies and partners in the region. Crafting these scenarios is not intended to be the end of the process. Previous Young Leader groups have developed scenarios on other subjects and Young Leader groups have acted them out. We anticipate the "crises" in this volume will prove similarly useful to others who want to see how Northeast Asia nations react when facing the unexpected – and we hope that these exercises will make them a little less "unexpected" if they should occur.

Young Leaders Report on the U.S.-ROK Dialogue and U.S.-ROK-Japan Trilateral Conference

By Priscilla Baek

On May 1-5, 2008, Pacific Forum CSIS and the New Asia Society co-hosted a series of U.S.-ROK and US-ROK-Japan trilateral talks to discuss emerging issues of security, identity, and change in Northeast Asia, as well as the evolving role of the U.S. in this region. During these five days, Young Leaders from the U.S., ROK, and Japan had opportunities to discuss these issues with each other and with senior policy makers who attended the conference.

The U.S.-ROK dialogue focused largely on the foreign policy of the recently elected Lee Myung-bak government and the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance. More specifically, the panelists discussed how domestic politics, especially the strong division between the ruling and opposition party, was bringing about fundamental change in Korea's foreign policy. Participants also analyzed the evolution of U.S.-ROK relations after the April Summit in 2008 and the evaluated the effectiveness of the Six-Party Talks in denuclearizing North Korea.

The U.S-ROK-Japan trilateral talks focused on changing conceptions of national identity in Japan and the ROK and the effect that these changes have on each country's alliance with the U.S. The discussion concentrated on the effect national identity has on foreign policy.

Throughout the conferences, Young Leaders providing their generation's view of the issues, ranging from the effectiveness of "values diplomacy" to the possibilities of trilateral cooperation between the U.S., Japan, and ROK.

Session I: YL Overview of Alliances, Identity, and Values

The first YL discussion took place prior to the conference to give Young Leaders an overview of the issues in the meeting.

First, Young Leaders debated whether alliances need to be re-evaluated in the post-Cold War strategic environment. While U.S. alliances during the Cold War were based on a single common threat, the fall of the Soviet Union obliged the U.S. to find a new basis upon which to define its alliance relationships. Some Young Leaders argued that common interests, rather than common threats, were now the foundation of security relationships. Others argued that common threats are still the principal force that brings alliances together, but no longer in the form of a single entity such as the Soviet Union. Rather, countries must learn to overcome nontraditional and transnational threats, including terrorism, energy scarcity, environmental degradation, and natural disasters.

Second, we discussed whether there was a correlation between national identity and foreign policy. This discussion emerged out of the previous debate over whether common

threats or common interests could serve as the basis for alliances. Arguably, a country's national identity could define what the country perceives as an interest or a threat, thus influencing a country's foreign policy decisions. For example, if a country defines its national identity based on opposition to another entity or nation, it will inevitably develop policies to counter the threat of the other entity. On the other hand, if a country's national identity is based on insecurity and uncertainty about its own capabilities, it may be more inclined to receive support from other states.

We concluded the session by comparing the perceived identities of the Japanese and Korean public. According to survey research, foreigners could quickly identify the characteristics of Japanese national identity, but the Japanese tended to hesitate and propose muddled answers when asked. Koreans could answer what "being Korean" meant right away. The Young Leaders observed this interesting difference and analyzed ways in which national identity may play a role in the U.S. alliance relationship.

Session III: Discussion with Policy Expert Balbina Hwang

On the third day of the conference, the Young Leaders had breakfast with Balbina Hwang, special assistant to Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill. We discussed the achievements and limitations of the U.S. government in dealing with international security issues. The discussion, as with all Pacific Forum and Young Leaders events was off-the-record. But, Hwang concluded the breakfast by candidly discussing career development with the Young Leaders. Reflecting upon her own career path, she recommended Young Leaders to be open, flexible, and unafraid to make opportunities for themselves.

Session II: Reflecting on the Conference

In the second YL discussion, Young Leaders reflected upon the issues discussed and avoided, throughout the conference.

During the U.S.-ROK bilateral talks, Young Leaders observed a distinct divide between the conservative and progressive camps in Korea which was visible in the ways in which they viewed security issues. While the previous Roh administration promoted an autonomous defense system and a less dependent relationship with the U.S., the newly appointed members of President Lee's administration supported a strong U.S.-ROK alliance and sustained U.S. military presence in South Korea. There were also distinct policies toward North Korea, with the previous government providing unconditional aid and support to its "brothers" in the North while the Lee administration pushed for complete and verifiable denuclearization before giving further aid. Young Leaders noted that both conservatives and progressives were avoiding domestic consensus building. In hindsight, the lack of consensus may have contributed to the heated conflict over U.S. beef imports in South Korea over the last couple months.

Another issue that surfaced among Korean and Japanese experts was the concern over a rising China. There was considerable debate over whether China was perceived as a threat to these two countries and whether a stronger alliance with the U.S. would make China feel

threatened. A Japanese Young Leader argued that the values diplomacy Japan was pursuing had a hidden agenda of differentiating itself from China and bringing closer to the U.S. By prioritizing the values of liberal democracy, the Japanese government was indirectly reducing diplomatic ties with countries such as China that did not share common values. When asked whether Korea had similar diplomatic intentions toward China, Korean Young Leaders said Korea was trying very hard not to distance itself too much from China while simultaneously continuing to strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance.

This discussion led to a question of Chinese national identity. A Chinese Young Leader argued that there was a difference between the identity of the people and the government. She explained that while the Chinese people were full of pride for their nation, the government was continuously threatened by a sense of insecurity. Although China's economic development brought opportunities, it also brought threats and instability, as reflected by the Tibetan independence movement. Several Young Leaders agreed that the insecurity felt by China is also felt by Japan and South Korea because all three countries are simultaneously on the rise for the first time in history. These perceptions are thus affecting policy decisions in each country.

Session IV: YL Wrap-up Discussion

At the end of the conference, Young Leaders discussed the basis on which nations cooperate. As mentioned in the discussion prior to the conference, the common thread that allowed nations with distinct social, economic, and political systems to cooperate during the Cold War period was the perception of a common threat. However, with the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of more complex security problems, nations needed to establish a new foundation for bilateral and multilateral security cooperation.

Among the candidates for a basis for future cooperation was common values based upon national identity. Some Young Leaders criticized this perspective because basing alliances on values had the potential to premise international relationships with a dichotomous Cold War mentality. Others argued that the term "values" was too difficult to define because values could range from something as basic as human rights to something as specific as a democratic presidential system.

But that begs the question: Do the U.S., Japan, and Korea share similar values? While all three countries are liberal democracies that promote market economies, trilateral cooperation has been hindered by significant historical conflicts between Japan and Korea. Younger Koreans have been more active in protesting the Japanese government and demanding compensation for Japan's colonization of Korea than older generations. Thus, several Young Leaders concluded that values were not enough to promote significant cooperation between countries with historical conflicts, although in some instances, the violation of a certain value might justify security cooperation.

One U.S. Young Leader suggested that practical interests, not ideology or values, could justify cooperation between two very different nations. According to this Young

Leader, the only way to strengthen cooperation was to increase the overlap in mutual interests, whether they be economic, strategic, or social in nature.

Finally, the Young Leaders discussed whether the U.S., Korea, and Japan could cooperate trilaterally without threatening China. Many Korean experts were apprehensive about alienating China by cooperating too closely with the U.S. and Japan. A U.S. young leader suggested that when there was an issue of common interest, such as the denuclearization of North Korea, the three countries collaborated without threatening China. Another Young Leader even questioned whether cooperating trilaterally would bring added value to the countries' efforts and suggested that the bilateral relationships between the U.S. and each country had thus far been sufficient to keep peace in the Northeast Asian region.

Conclusion

The U.S.-ROK dialogue and U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral talks were opportunities for Young Leaders to delve into the current security issues in Northeast Asia. The Young Leaders concluded that common interests were the most practical means of promoting coordination and cooperation among different countries. Countries should try to expand their mutual interests beyond conventional military relations to continue strengthening their relationships.



Young Leaders conversing with conference panelists at lunchtime



Young Leaders with conference panelists Balbina Hwang and Gordon Flake

North Korean Missile Failure Scenario

By Priscilla Baek, Shuan-Ju Chen, Justin Bishop

On Nov. 7, 2008, U.S. early warning satellites detect a North Korean missile launch is imminent. A four MRBM salvo launched from a site 20 miles north of Pyongyang heads east over the Sea of Japan. Three land successfully in the Sea of Japan. However, one MRBM lands 10 kilometers north of Sapporo on Japan's northern-most major island.

Actors:

Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Republic of Korea
United States of America
Japan
The People's Republic of China
Russian Federation

Map:



Reading List:

Background

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Timeline:

1994: North Korea and U.S. sign an agreement. North Korea pledges to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear weapons program in exchange for international aid to build power-producing reactors.

31 Aug 1998: North Korea fires a multistage missile over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean, proving it can strike any part of Japan's territory.

Dec 1998: A U.S.-led consortium signs a \$4.6 billion contract for two safer, Western designed light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea.

Jul 2001: State Department reports the DPRK is going ahead with development of its long-range missile. A Bush administration official says North Korea conducts an engine test of the *Taepodong-1* missile.

16 Oct 2002: U.S. officials say they have discovered evidence of a nuclear weapons program in North Korea.

26 Oct 2002: Bush, Japanese PM Koizumi and ROK President Kim Dae-jung meet at an Asia-Pacific regional summit in Mexico and agree to seek a peaceful end to the North's nuclear problem.

11 Nov 2002: The U.S., Japan, and ROK halt oil supplies to North Korea promised under the 1994 deal.

10 Jan 2003: North Korea withdraws from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

24 Feb 2003: North Korea test fires another land-to-ship missile into the sea between the Korean Peninsula and Japan.

27-29 Aug 2003: Six-nation talks in Beijing on North Korea's nuclear program. The meeting fails to bridge the gap between Washington and Pyongyang. Delegates agree to meet again.

23 Jun 08: Third round of six nation talks held in Beijing, with the U.S. making a new offer to allow North Korea fuel aid if it freezes then dismantles its nuclear program.

01 May 2005: North Korea fires a short-range missile into the Sea of Japan, on the eve of a meeting of members of the international Non-Proliferation Treaty.

25 Jul 08: Fourth round of six nation talks begins in Beijing.

19 Sep 2005: In what is initially hailed as an historic joint statement, North Korea agrees to give up all its nuclear activities and rejoin the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, while the U.S. says it had no intention of attacking.

04 Jul 2006: North Korea test-fires at least six missiles, including a long-range *Taepodong-2*, despite repeated warnings from the international community.

05 Jul 2006: North Korea test-fires a seventh missile, despite international condemnation of its earlier launches.

15 Jul 2006: The UN Security Council unanimously votes to impose sanctions on North Korea over the missile tests. The resolution demands UN members bar exports and imports of missile-related materials to North Korea and that it halt its ballistic missile program.

09 Oct 2006: North Korea says it has carried out its first ever test of a nuclear weapon. It calls the test a "historic event" and says it was carried out safely and successfully.

14 Oct 2006: The UN Security Council votes unanimously to impose weapons and financial sanctions on North Korea over its claimed nuclear test. Resolution 1718 demands that North Korea eliminate all its nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. The resolution allows nations to inspect cargo moving in and out of North Korea to check for non-conventional weapons but is not backed by the threat of force. It also calls for Pyongyang to return “without precondition” to stalled six-nation talks on its nuclear program.

16 Jul 2007: International inspectors confirm North Korea has shut down Yongbyon.

11 Oct 2007: A team of nuclear experts arrives in North Korea to oversee the dismantling of reactors and other facilities.

27 Mar 2008: North Korea expels all 11 South Korean officials from Kaesong Industrial Zone in retaliation for Seoul’s new tougher line toward the communist state.

28 Mar 2008: North Korea test-fires a barrage of short-range missiles in apparent response to the new South Korean government’s tougher stance on Pyongyang.

April 2008: Christopher Hill continues to push North Korea for a nuclear declaration. It is decided that this will occur in two parts: North Korea agrees to disclose records on plutonium, and “acknowledge” U.S. concerns of proliferation to Syria.

13 May 2008: North Korea admits to “nuclear details.” A senior U.S. official returns from North Korea with 18,000 pages of documents.

- Focus on plutonium enrichment
- No information on uranium enrichment programs

31 May 2008: North Korea tests 3 short range ship-to-ship missiles off its west coast as a military exercise.

30 Jun 2008: Mossad briefs KCIA and CIA that it believes Syria transferred advanced MRBM targeting components to North Korea.

02 Jul 2008: Kim Jong IL announces that until heavy fuel aid is delivered North Korea will not give a nuclear declaration.

01 Aug 2008: Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda strikes harder stance against North Korea raising the abduction issue as a source of major national concern.

05 Aug 2008: Japan’s Ministry of Defense requests the Pentagon expedite BMD development and deployment as a result of developments on the peninsula.

17 Aug 2008: The first multiple launch and intercept test of the U.S.-Japan BMD system occurs with interceptors both launched from U.S. and Japan Aegis-equipped cruisers. The test is only partially successful.

18 Aug 2008: The PRC and DPRK both issue statements condemning the BMD test as detrimental to peace and security in East Asia.

02 Sep 2008: KCIA confirms that North Korea has advanced MRBM missile targeting components.

12 Sep 2008: The second multiple launch and intercept test of the U.S.-Japan BMD system occurs with interceptors both launched from U.S. and Japan Aegis-equipped cruisers. The test is only fully successful.

25 Oct 2008: A senior ultra-conservative LDP member issues harsh statements against Kim Jong IL, publicly referring to him and his regime as madmen bent on Japan's destruction.

07 Nov 2008: U.S. Early Warning Satellites detect a North Korean missile launch is imminent. A 4 MRBM salvo launched from a site 20 miles north of Pyongyang heads east over the Sea of Japan. 3 land successfully in the Sea of Japan. However, 1 MRBM lands 10 kilometers north of Sapporo on Japan's northern most major island.

Questions:

What international actors (if at all) should be involved in the resolution of this matter?

How will each actor react?

How will this impact the development of a multilateral security apparatus in East Asia?

Does this incident affect the Six-Party Talks and North Korean disarmament process?

How will this accident affect the debate whether engagement or containment is the correct policy for North Korea?

Scenario Role-Playing Begins

The Breach of DPRK Brotherhood: Preparing for a Civil War in North Korea

By Tetsuo Kotani and Jiyon Shin

Scenario

The regime of Kim Jung-il collapses with his sudden death. The leadership succession goes smoothly at first and Kim Jung-chul succeeds his father. The new North Korean leadership takes a moderate foreign policy by returning to the Six-Party Talks and by promoting friendly relations with Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington. But the North Korean leadership has difficult relations with Beijing, which hosts the exiled first son of Kim Jung-il, Kim Jung-nam. Ground troops led by Kim Jung-nam suddenly cross the Aproz river and conduct guerrilla warfare against the Korean People's Army (KPA). Some KPA generals, who are dissatisfied with the new leadership's moderate foreign policy, join Kim Jung-nam. Thousands of North Korean refugees take all possible routes to ROK, China, Russia, and Japan to avoid the conflict. The United Nations Security Council begins to discuss the situation and prepares a resolution calling for a ceasefire but China is reluctant about any UN involvement. Meanwhile, although Kim Jung-nam cannot reach Pyongyang, his troops take control of the Second Artillery Corps, the KPA's strategic missile forces, in southern North Hamgyong province. U.S. intelligence confirms some large vehicles and around missile launch complex in Musudan-ri. Kim Jung-nam announces that any intervention by a foreign power will trigger ballistic missile attacks on Seoul and Tokyo.

Timeline

Nov. 2013. The Six-Party Talks has been delayed indefinitely after the 11th round due to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's refusal to give up its nuclear ambitions unless a sufficient amount of energy, infrastructure, and food is provided 'first.' For a month, Kim Jung-il makes no public appearances and rumors spread that he is in ill health. The foreign media repeatedly predicts the end of the regime, analyzing predecessors, while the *KCNA* state broadcast channels, and *Rodong* news daily assure the domestic and international public that all is well.

Dec. 31, 2013. It is announced that Kim Jung-il died due to heart failure. The entire nation mourns the death of their dear leader. The foreign press spreads the news worldwide.

Jan. 9, 2014. A week of national mourning passes amidst international speculation about who will precede the Kim regime. Kim Jung-chul (32), Kim Jung-il's second son of his second unofficial wife Ko Yuong-hee, is picked as the next leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Kim Jung-un (30, the younger brother of Kim Jung-chul) is appointed as vice director of the Korean Worker's Party. The news rapidly prevails over the world causing excitement and numerous analyses on the future of the peninsula.

Jan. 10, 2014. It is reported that the first eldest son Kim Jung-nam, son of Kim Jung-il's first wife Sung Hye-rim, has taken refuge in China with supporters from the Korean People's Army.

Feb. 15, 2014. National blueprint of the DPRK is laid out, focusing on innovations on agriculture, economic reform, and expansion of special economic development zones, and the recommencement of the Six-Party Talks.

March 1, 2014. The Six-Party Talks reconvene in Beijing. The talks seem to progress with signs of a breakthrough.

March 16, 2014. Representatives in the Six-Party Talks release news that there is considerable achievement in denuclearizing the peninsula. Kim Jung-chul's leadership is praised throughout the world.

June 2014. Step four in nuclear dismantlement is carried out. Emotions run high as the world witness apparent change in the DPRK's attitude.

July 2014. It is reported that China showed discomfort at DPRK demands at the SPT while the U.S. and South Korea seem pleased with the DPRK's new leadership.

Oct. 4, 2014. The DPRK allows IAEA inspectors to investigate the thoroughness of the dismantlement of nuclear plants in the DPRK.

Oct. 28, 2014. South Korea and the DPRK host a joint conference discussing further cooperation in economic and cultural exchanges. Talks on securing the history of Goguryeo are discussed. There is euphoria in South Korea at the prospect of deepening exchanges between the two Koreas.

April 1, 2015. Kim Jung-nam and supporting KPA generals has crossed the Apnok river, destroyed water and electric supplies in North Korea, and are conducting guerilla warfare on DPRK soil.

April 2, 2015. South Korean shows grave concern and warns any further violence would cause international intervention. Outright civil war within the DPRK seems to follow.

April 3, 2015. Thousands of refugees take all possible routes to avoid conflict, crossing the DMZ, the Abok River to China, the Duman River to Russia, and some desperately row to Japanese waters. Relevant countries call for United Nations involvement. South Korea is militarily ready to be involved and requests a resolution by the UN Security Council.

April 4, 2015. The UN Security Council begins discussion on the situation in North Korea. The Council prepares a statement to condemn Kim Jung-nam, to demand a ceasefire, and to call for humanitarian intervention. While the United States, the United Kingdom, and France support the statement, China and Russia do not support the intervention clause.

April 10, 2015. The U.S. and ROK intelligence confirm that the commanding officer of the Second Artillery Corps, KPA's strategic missile forces, in southern North Hamgyong province, is siding with Kim Jung-nam.

April 13, 2015. U.S. intelligence confirms large vehicles around the missile launch complex in Musudan-ri.

April 15, 2015. Kim Jung-nam announces that any intervention by foreign power will trigger ballistic missile attacks on Seoul and Tokyo.

Questions:

1. What are the initial goals and policy options for Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo with regard to the civil war in DPRK?
2. What will be the role of the UN with regard to the civil war?
3. How should Seoul, Washington and Tokyo prepare for the missile launch?
4. How do they respond to the launches?

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5. CHRISTOPHER GRIFFIN, Beyond the joint force: Preparing for the next Korean War
<http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/06/3512442>
6. The Law for Measures to Deal with Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan
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Taiwan Strait Crisis in 2010

By Hyo-jin Kim, Kentaro Orita, Shanshan Wang

1. Scenario

In 2010, China faces serious economic stagnation due to the collapse of financial system, which derives from the accumulation of dead loans in state-owned banks and companies. An “after Olympic shock” hits the nation. Social unrest becomes a serious domestic issue in China, especially when the public starts openly criticizing the regime and questioning its lack of legitimacy. In response, to retain national solidarity and divert the internal frustration, the CCP tries to strengthen its reunification principle, one of its fundamental principles Chinese national sentiment becomes radical and aggressive against Taiwan, and some groups try to push the CCP to use force to reunify with it.

This tendency in the Continent causes a strong counter-effect in Taiwan. Anti-PRC sentiment grows and the KMT government, which has taken moderate positions toward the mainland, starts losing support from the Taiwanese public. President Ma Ying jeou’s economic revitalization policies through rapprochement with the mainland fail because of mainland China’s economic recession. Meanwhile, pro-independence forces are regaining public support and radical independence groups are formed aiming at an ultimate declaration of the independence of Taiwan.

As a result, the cleavage between the radicals and the moderates regarding Taiwan’s stance toward the mainland becomes serious. Supporters of the DPP and KMT collide in many cities. Taiwan falls into political and social chaos. On October 10, the Double Ten Day, President Ma, when he is giving a public speech to call for stability in the island, is assassinated by an activist of a radical pro-independence group. At the same time, on the next day, October 11, as Hsiao Wan-chang, the vice president fails to take quick and decisive action to stabilize the political chaos, young army officers, who sympathize with the pro-independence idea, attempt a coup-d’etat.

On October 15, the coup succeeds and the Republic of China Army declares martial law over Taiwan. The PRC starts deploying a huge portion of its naval power in the area surrounding Taiwan. On October 20, the provisional military government of Taiwan declares independence from China in a unilateral manner. The Chinese government, in response, issues a strong statement demanding the immediate withdrawal of the independence declaration and warns that failure to comply is to be dealt with the use of force, including nuclear attack, against Taiwan under the Anti-Secession Law.

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Yu Bin, "America's Rogue Ally", <http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4690>

Thomas Christensen, "The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict"

<http://www.twq.com/02autumn/christensen.pdf>

3. Questions:

-What are each country's primary interests and concerns?

-How do international actors involved in this matter react?

-How will this situation influence multilateral security cooperation?

4. Map

Taiwan Strait Area



802566 (R01492) 8-98

APPENDIX A

About the Authors

Ms. Priscilla Eunkyung BAEK is currently a Korean Flagship Fellow and Master's candidate in Korean Language Studies for Professionals at the University of Hawaii at Manoa. She graduated from Duke University in 2007 and majored in Public Policy and Spanish Studies. Her interests are in transnational identity, the North Korean diaspora, decolonial studies, ethnic nationalism, and foreign relations within the Asia-Pacific region and the U.S. She plans to continue her studies at Korea University next fall.

Mr. Justin BISHOP is currently pursuing an MA in Diplomacy and Military Studies at Hawaii Pacific University and he is an intern at Pacific Forum CSIS. He is also a researcher/integrator at Cubic Applications.

Ms. Shiuan-Ju CHEN is the 2008-2009 Pacific Forum Vasey Fellow from Taipei, Taiwan. She received her B.A. in Political Science from National Taiwan University in 2005 and her M.A. in International Affairs from the Elliott School of International Affairs, the George Washington University in 2007. Prior to working at Pacific Forum, Ms. Chen interned with CSIS in Washington D.C. and the Institute for National Policy Research in Taiwan. Her research interests include Taiwan domestic politics, China's transition and reform, and cross-strait relations.

Mr. KIM Hyo-Jin is Project Director in *JoongAng Ilbo* (daily news) in Seoul and is currently writing a PhD dissertation at Korea University on how to evaluate the Korean Peninsula Energy Organization (KEDO). He was a Chevening Scholar financed by the British government and a fellow of the 21st Century Trust in London. He received his MSc in Project Planning and Management from the University of Bradford, U.K. in 2002. English publications include "The Political Economy of Food Aid to North Korea" (The History and Society, Vol.3, Summer, 2003).

Mr. KOTANI Tetsuo is a PhD candidate at Doshisha University and is currently a research fellow at the Ocean Policy Research Foundation. His dissertation focuses on the strategic implication of homeporting U.S. carriers at Yokosuka. His other research interests include U.S.-Japan relations and international relations and maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region. His English publications include "Reaffirming the Taiwan Clause: Japan's National Interest in the Taiwan Strait and the US-Japan Alliance" (co-authored with Dr. Jim Auer) (NBR Analysis Vol. 16 No. 1, 2005) and "Presence and Credibility: Homeporting USS *Midway* at Yokosuka" in the Journal of America-East Asian Relations (forthcoming). He was a visiting fellow at the US-Japan Center at Vanderbilt University. He received the 2003 Defense Minister Prize for his essay.

Mr. ORITA Kentaro is an officer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), and a student at School of Foreign Service (MSFS Program) at Georgetown. He joined the MOFA in April 2004, worked at the Northeast Asia Division for 2 years where he engaged in

policy making on Korean Peninsula issues. Mr. Orita received a B.A.S. in international relations from the University of Tokyo in 2004. He also obtained a certificate of the international program at SciencesPo (Political Science Institute), Paris in 2002.

Ms. Jiyon SHIN is Pacific Forum CSIS 2007-2008 Vasey Fellow. Currently an undergraduate at Ewha Women's University, she specializes in International Studies, minors in Korean studies, while focusing on diplomacy and security in Northeast Asia, and spent a year as an exchange student at University of Hawaii 2005-2006. She has worked extensively with the Korean University Students' Politics & Diplomacy Research Association on issues pertaining to the ROK-U.S. alliance, and anti-American sentiment among ROK's young generation. Ms. Shin was a member of the North Korea Security Research Group in Ewha Women's University, and assisted several international conferences related to North Korean refugees, and the UN ministerial conference on sustainable environment at the Environment and Sustainable Development Division office of UNESCAP. Most recently she attended Shanghai's Fudan University for a summer Chinese language program.

Ms. Shanshan WANG is a Pacific Forum CSIS 2008 Vasey Fellow. She has also been working actively as a Pacific Forum "Young Leader" since 2006. She received both her bachelor's degree in diplomacy and master's degree in international relations from China Foreign Affairs University. She was also a student fellow of Asia Pacific Leadership Program at East-West Center in Hawaii from 2006-2007. She worked as liaison officer at Boao Forum for Asia, interned with People's Bank of China and Boston Consulting Group and also traveled extensively in the Asia Pacific region. Shanshan is also free lance translator and interpreter and has published four translation works in China. Most recently she has been involved in China's carbon emission trading market and conducted research on China's climate change policy. Her research interest lies in China's foreign policy, China's domestic politics and East Asian security.

APPENDIX B

**Pacific Forum CSIS
Changing Notions of National Identity and their Implications for
U.S.-ROK-Japan Relations
Doubletree Alana Waikiki Hotel
May 4-5, 2008**

AGENDA

MAY 3 – SATURDAY

18:30 **Welcoming Reception/Dinner** – *Pool Deck –Mezzanine Level*

MAY 4 – SUNDAY

8:30 **Continental Breakfast** – *Room 303 – 3rd floor meeting room*

9:00 **Project introduction** - *Room 303 – 3rd floor meeting room*
Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder

9:15 **Session I:** Changing Conceptions of National Identity in Japan
Presenter: Brad Glosserman

This session presents preliminary findings from research regarding conceptions of national identity in Japan and its impact on domestic politics. Are notions of national identity in Japan changing? If so, how? How is the process playing out in domestic politics? Are national identity issues becoming more prominent in post-Cold War Japan? Why?

10:30 **Break**

10:45 **Session 2:** Changing Conceptions of National Identity and the
U.S.-Japan Alliance
Presenter: Brad Glosserman
Discussant: Kuni Miyake

The session examines whether changing conceptions of national identity in Japan influence relations with the U.S. and if so, how? Key questions include: What is the role of U.S.-Japan relations in Japan's domestic politics? How is domestic politics influencing Japanese views of alliance with the United States? What are "hot-button" issues related to identity in Japanese politics that relate to the U.S.-Japan alliance? How important are these issues in Japan's domestic politics? How do national identity issues impact Japanese foreign policy generally?

12:00 **Lunch**– *J Bistro –Lobby Level*

MAY 4 – SUNDAY (cont'd.)

13:30 **Session 3: Changing Conceptions of National Identity in the ROK**
Presenter: Scott Snyder
Discussant: Hong Kyu-dok

This session presents preliminary findings from research regarding conceptions of national identity in South Korea and its impact on domestic politics. Are notions of national identity in South Korea changing? If so, how? How is the process playing out in domestic politics? Are national identity issues becoming more prominent in post-Cold War South Korea? Why?

14:45 **Break**

15:00 **Session 4: Changing Conceptions of National Identity
and the U.S.-ROK Alliance**
Presenter: Scott Snyder
Discussant: Park Yong-ok or Koo Bon-hak

The session examines whether changing conceptions of national identity in South Korea influence relations with the U.S. and if so, how? Key questions include: What is the role of U.S.-ROK relations in South Korean domestic politics? How is domestic politics influencing South Korean views of alliance with the United States? What are “hot-button” issues related to identity in Korean politics that relate to the U.S.-ROK alliance? How important are these issues in ROK domestic politics? How do national identity issues impact South Korean foreign policy generally?

16:15 **Break**

16:30 **Session 5: Japan-ROK Relations: the Role of the Other**
Japan presenter: Tetsuo Kotani
ROK presenter: Kim Ho-sup

This session looks at Japan-ROK relations. What are key factors influencing this bilateral relationship? Does national identity play a role? How? How has the bilateral relationship figured in each country’s domestic politics? Why? Are these issues rising or falling in each country’s domestic politic? What can be done to minimize the negative impacts of these issues on their bilateral relationship?

17:45 **Adjourn**

18:30 **Dinner**

MAY 5 – MONDAY

8:30 **Continental Breakfast** – *Room 303 – 3rd floor meeting room*

MAY 5 – MONDAY(cont'd)

9:00 **Session 6: North Korea and South Korean Foreign Policy**
 Presenter: Kwon Manhak
 Discussant: Takuya Iwamoto

What is the role of inter-Korean relations in shaping South Korean conceptions of national identity? How will changes in inter-Korean relations shape ROK relations with Japan and the United States? How does this affect the Six-Party Talks? Relations with China? How does it affect discussions of a Northeast Asian security framework?

10:30 **Break**

10:45 **Session 7: Future Prospects for U.S.-Japan-ROK Coordination:**

US Presenter: James Schoff
South Korea presenter: Park Sun-won
Japan presenter: Akio Miyajima

This session focuses on the future of U.S.-Japan-ROK relations. What is the ideal state of trilateral relations? What is the scope of possible cooperation? On North Korea? What is China's relation to trilateral cooperation? What inhibits realization of that relationship? Is there a role for the U.S. in the ROK-Japan relationship? What is the impact of changes in national identity in each country on the prospects for trilateral cooperation? What can be done to realize this goal?

12:15 **Wrap up and Next Steps**

13:00 Lunch

6:30 **Free Evening**

APPENDIX C



PACIFIC FORUM CSIS
YOUNG LEADERS

U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japan- ROK meetings
Honolulu, Hawaii
Doubletree Alana Waikiki
May 2008

Agenda

Pacific Forum CSIS-New Asia Society Joint Conference Foreign Policy of the Lee Myung Bak Government and Future of U.S.-ROK Alliance

May 1

17:30 **Young Leaders session- *Pool Deck Mezzanine Level***

18:30 Welcoming Reception/Dinner –*Pool Deck –Mezzanine Level*

May 2

8:30 Continental Breakfast – *Naupaka meeting room I & II – 4th floor*

9:00 Welcoming Remarks - *Naupaka meeting room I & II – 4th floor*
Korea: Sang Woo Rhee (New Asia Society)
US: Ralph Cossa (Pacific Forum)

9:30-12:00 **Session I: Domestic Developments and Their Implications for Foreign Policy**

Korea: Kyu Dok Hong
US: Scott Snyder

12:00-13:30 Lunch – *J Bistro –Lobby Level*

1:330-15:30 **Session II: US-ROK Relations after the Summit**

Korea: Bon Hak Koo
US: Gordon Flake

15:30-16:00 Coffee Break

16:00-18:00 **Session III: North Korean Nuclear Problem: New Developments?**

Korea: Ho-sup Kim
US: Balbina Hwang

18:30-21:00 Reception/Dinner

May 3

8:30 Continental Breakfast – *Naupaka meeting room I & II – 4th floor*

9:00-10:30 **Session IV: Changing Northeast Asia Security Environment**

Korea: Woo Sang Kim

US: Evans Revere

11:00-12:00 **Session V: Wrap-Up: Policy Recommendations**

Korea: In Taek Hyun

US: Ralph Cossa

12:00 Free Afternoon

17:30 *YL meeting- Pool Deck Mezzanine Level*

18:30 Reception and Dinner –*Pool Deck –Mezzanine Level*

May 4

8:30 **Continental Breakfast** – *Naupaka meeting room I & II – 4th floor*

9:00 **Project introduction** - *Naupaka meeting room I & II – 4th floor*

Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder

9:15 **Session I: Changing Conceptions of National Identity in Japan**

Presenter: Brad Glosserman

Discussant:

This session presents preliminary findings from research regarding conceptions of national identity in Japan and its impact on domestic politics. Are notions of national identity in Japan changing? If so, how? How is the process playing out in domestic politics? Are national identity issues becoming more prominent in post-Cold War Japan? Why?

10:30 **Coffee Break**

10:45 **Session II: Changing Conceptions of National Identity and the U.S.-Japan Alliance**

Presenter: Brad Glosserman

Discussant:

The session examines whether changing conceptions of national identity in Japan influence relations with the U.S. and if so, how? Key questions include: What is the role of U.S.-Japan relations in Japan's domestic politics? How is domestic politics influencing Japanese views of alliance with the United States? What are "hot-button" issues related to identity in Japanese politics that relate to the U.S.-Japan alliance? How important are these issues in

Japan's domestic politics? How do national identity issues impact Japanese foreign policy generally?

12:00 **Lunch**– *J Bistro –Lobby Level*

13:30 **Session III: Changing Conceptions of National Identity in the ROK**
 Presenter: Scott Snyder
 Discussant

This session presents preliminary findings from research regarding conceptions of national identity in South Korea and its impact on domestic politics. Are notions of national identity in South Korea changing? If so, how? How is the process playing out in domestic politics? Are national identity issues becoming more prominent in post-Cold War South Korea? Why?

14:45 **Break**

15:00 **Session IV: Changing Conceptions of National Identity and the U.S.-ROK Alliance**
 Presenter: Scott Snyder
 Discussant: Park Yong-ok or Koo Bon-hak

The session examines whether changing conceptions of national identity in South Korea influence relations with the U.S. and if so, how? Key questions include: What is the role of U.S.-ROK relations in South Korean domestic politics? How is domestic politics influencing South Korean views of alliance with the United States? What are “hot-button” issues related to identity in Korean politics that relate to the U.S.-ROK alliance? How important are these issues in ROK domestic politics? How do national identity issues impact South Korean foreign policy generally?

16:15 **Break**

16:30 **Session V: Japan-ROK Relations: the Role of the Other**
 Japan presenter: Tetsuo Kotani
 ROK presenter: Kim Ho-sup

This session looks at Japan-ROK relations. What are key factors influencing this bilateral relationship? Does national identity play a role? How? How has the bilateral relationship figured in each country's domestic politics? Why? Are these issues rising or falling in each country's domestic politic? What can be done to minimize the negative impacts of these issues on their bilateral relationship?

17:45 **Adjourn**

18:30 **Dinner**

May 5

8:30 **Continental Breakfast** – *Naupaka meeting room I & II – 4th floor*

9:00 **Session VI: North Korea and South Korean Foreign Policy**

Presenter:

Discussant:

What is the role of inter-Korean relations in shaping South Korean conceptions of national identity? How will changes in inter-Korean relations shape ROK relations with Japan and the United States? How does this affect the Six-Party Talks? Relations with China? How does it affect discussions of a Northeast Asian security framework?

10:30 **Break**

10:45 Session VII: Future Prospects for U.S.-Japan-ROK Coordination:

US Presenter: James Schoff

South Korea presenter: Park Sun-won

Japan presenter: Akio Miyajima

This session focuses on the future of U.S.-Japan-ROK relations. What is the ideal state of trilateral relations? What is the scope of possible cooperation? On North Korea? What is China's relation to trilateral cooperation? What inhibits realization of that relationship? Is there a role for the U.S. in the ROK-Japan relationship? What is the impact of changes in national identity in each country on the prospects for trilateral cooperation? What can be done to realize this goal?

12:15 Wrap up and Next Steps

13:00 Lunch

14:00 Young Leader Wrap up

18:00 YL dinner -Meet at the lobby