



The Relevance of Global Zero:
Strategic Pragmatism vs. Nuclear Disarmament



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Introduction

President Barack Obama's speech in Prague in April 2009 signaled a profound shift in US thinking about nuclear weapons and imparted renewed momentum to the nuclear disarmament movement. No supporter of this cause has any illusions about the obstacles that lie in the path of its realization. Indeed, a number of otherwise sympathetic analysts believe that the ambition is unrealizable, no matter how desirable it may be. Yet even if a world free from nuclear weapons is impossible, there is little dispute that a reduction in the number of such weapons is good in its own right.

At the ninth meeting of the CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific) Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific, which was held in Beijing China in June 2009, a group of Young Leaders debated the goal of "Nuclear Zero." They, like more senior nuclear analysts, were deeply divided over whether nuclear weapons could be eliminated. The first two papers in this volume articulate each case: the "strategic pragmatists" argue that a world without nuclear weapons is unattainable not only because the knowledge to make such weapons cannot be unlearned, but also because those weapons play a valuable role in maintaining international security and stability. Instead, they offer 10 steps the world can take to reduce the threat posed by such weapons in the short and medium term. The second group, the "realist progressives," aims to surmount the traditional divide between realists and idealists and offers "practical and achievable proposals" for a safer and more secure world. The two proposals were presented to the 10th meeting of the CSCAP WMD study group when it met in Hanoi in December 2009. Participants discussed the two papers as part of a wide-ranging debate about the prospects of disarmament. We take heart from the fact that the Young Leader discussion anticipated almost every element of the senior level discussion – the biggest difference was probably that the Young Leaders were more passionate about the topic.

The other essays in this collection are the preconference assignment given to participants, in which they were asked to assess the main point of Obama's Prague speech. The diversity of views they provide offers insight in to thinking in CSCAP member countries about nuclear disarmament, perspectives that might not otherwise be available. At a minimum, they suggest that the next generation of strategic analysts in the Asia Pacific is preparing for the challenges they will face when they become decision makers.

Strategic Pragmatism: Increasing Security in a World with Nuclear Weapons

By Catherine Boye, Justin Bishop, Kate Farrell, Kim Fassler,
Adam Liff, Junbo Liu, Shan Ni, and Yu Zhang

In recent years, a number of politicians and statesmen, most prominently President Barack Obama, have called for the renewal of the commitment to creating a world without nuclear weapons. This call has revived interest in nuclear disarmament¹ and prompted serious discussion of practical obstacles to the pursuit of this goal. We understand the logic driving the movement yet believe that a world without nuclear weapons is an unattainable goal in the short- to medium-term. At present, the valuable role that nuclear weapons play in maintaining international security and stability is a reality that cannot be dismissed. Instead, we believe that leaders should focus on creating a safer and more secure world and adopt practical measures that will work despite this reality.

This paper proposes 10 actions that the international community can take to reduce the threat posed by nuclear weapons to East Asia and the world. The first five proposals can be implemented in the short-term²; they include securing the world's nuclear arsenals, continuing to reduce those arsenals, reengaging North Korea, freezing the development or enhancement of strategic systems, and creating a multilateral working group to assist states in meeting the requirements of UNSC Resolution 1540. The latter five proposals will take longer to implement and are considered medium-term³ goals; they include creating legally binding sanctions to punish violators of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), developing a mechanism to include the nuclear weapon states not party to the NPT in important nonproliferation and disarmament dialogues, developing a multilateral fuel cycle, creating an international disarmament fund, and achieving universal adoption of the principle of no-first-use by all nuclear weapon states (NWS).

Short-Term Proposals

Secure the nuclear arsenals of all nuclear weapon states

For countries and nonstate groups alike, nuclear weapons represent tremendous power and prestige. These weapons not only threaten international stability because of the possibility of nuclear war but also because they could fall into the hands of rogue military units or non-state actors. Currently, devices to prevent unauthorized use do not protect many of the world's most vulnerable nuclear arsenals. The first step to a safer nuclear world is for states to secure their arsenals with Permissive Action Locks (PALs) or similar devices, especially in countries that are politically, economically, or socially unstable.

¹ Nuclear disarmament is defined as verifiable and irreversible reduction of arms with the end goal of global zero.

² 0-5 years.

³ 5-20 years.

Nuclear states, especially the nonsignatory nuclear weapon states (nuclear weapon states not party to the NPT), closely guard information about their nuclear arsenals, particularly information necessary to secure nuclear weapons and prevent unauthorized use. NPT NWS with advanced and secure arsenals should work with the non-signatory nuclear states to help them secure their arsenals. States worried about potential enemies gaining access to information about their arsenals could opt to receive help only from NPT NWS they trust.

Secure arsenals reduce the possibility of both unauthorized use and accidental detonation. Moreover, installing PALs will mitigate proliferation concerns; even if a nuclear weapon state were to collapse, the international community could be confident that the weapons would be unusable.

Pursue further reductions by NWS

Although the Cold War arms race ended nearly two decades ago, an estimated 20,000 nuclear weapons still exist. The US and Russia, whose arsenals together account for the vast majority of these weapons, have greatly reduced their stockpiles. There is still room for additional reductions however. The US and Russia are not the only countries that should pursue reductions. All nuclear weapon states, including the nonsignatory states, should immediately pledge not to add to existing arsenals. The next step is for them to begin actual reductions.

Although the US and Russia should lead the drive for disarmament, other NWS must be involved. Disarmament is expensive, especially in the short-term, and the current economic climate has placed additional constraints on the budgets of even the richest countries. Despite the short-term costs, however, disarmament, by reducing the economic burden of facilities and personnel necessary to maintain larger arsenals, in the long term would reduce the amount of government expenditure related to nuclear weapon programs.

Reengage North Korea

North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and missiles is an egregious threat to stability in East Asia. To address the issue of North Korea's nuclear program, regional powers must engage North Korea through the Six-Party Talks. Simultaneous bilateral discussions between the US and North Korea must also be held. The five parties should develop a clear set of objectives as well as disincentives to prevent further nuclear development. To establish a cooperative working relationship, the parties should focus on offers of economic and humanitarian aid to dissuade North Korea from illicitly trading weapons and technology.

The international community has sought to prevent proliferation through negotiations and dialogue for many years. Critics of continued dialogue contend that new talks will not yield meaningful progress on the issue and will merely provide North Korea with the time it needs to develop a functioning delivery system. While these are legitimate concerns, maintaining communication channels between the parties serves two important purposes: 1)

it eases tensions in times of crisis and 2) keeps the door open for efforts to address widespread humanitarian issues in North Korea.

Reengaging North Korea will be a vital step toward a safer and more secure East Asia. Establishing clear objectives and disincentives for containment – based on humanitarian and economic engagement in return for negotiations in good faith – has the greatest chance of reducing tensions in the region and preventing North Korea from proliferating. These incentives must be coupled with a renewed dialogue for there to be progress.

Moratorium on the development/enhancement of strategic systems

Many nuclear weapon states are either developing or enhancing strategic weapons systems, strategic delivery systems, or strategic defence systems. The development and deploying of these systems worsens security dilemmas and exacerbates tensions between states by deepening mistrust and suspicions of strategic intentions. To end to this vicious cycle, nuclear weapon states should freeze development of strategic systems, and use peaceful measures to improve their security environment.

A moratorium on the development or enhancement of strategic weapons, delivery, or defensive systems would be a boon to disarmament efforts, especially in the short term. In the long term, critics argue that preventing the development or enhancement of existing systems could lead states to rely on older, less reliable systems rather than newer, safer, and more secure systems. However, preventing the development or enhancement strategic systems would reduce tensions between NWS. A moratorium would provide these states with an opportunity to re-evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in their security strategies and force countries to use other means to solve disputes.

Create an ARF working group on outreach and capacity building:

East Asia is especially susceptible to proliferation given its vast open seas and a number of territorial disputes that contribute to weak border security and delicate relations between states. The region has many states interested in the development of nuclear energy and, in some cases, nuclear weapons. The proliferation threat is latent, but real. Working through a multilateral forum such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), countries should create a working group to engage in outreach and capacity building. This forum would identify needs for standardizing import and export procedures related to nuclear and radiological materials and technologies, and facilitate information sharing to help states meet the requirements of UNSC Resolution 1540.

Critics contend that global, not regional, institutions should serve as the primary venues for these efforts. However, regional institutions are often better situated to address issues of this nature since many of the proliferation challenges in East Asia are unique to the region. It should also be noted that this initiative does not require establishment of a new institution; the ARF is a platform for regional security cooperation and track-one dialogue.

Medium-Term Goals

Institute legally binding sanctions to punish NPT violators

The NPT is losing credibility. The NPT regime has proven incapable of preventing treaty violations, particularly concerning illicit weapons development. A legally binding sanction mechanism, which would punish states acting in defiance of their NPT obligations, would serve as an effective deterrent against future violations. This mechanism would provide a standardized set of consequences for any state that the IAEA found to be in violation of its NPT obligations and ensure that NNWS conclude that the pursuit of a nuclear weapons program is inimical to their interests.

Strict criteria should be established to determine circumstances under which the sanction mechanism could be used. This would discourage preferential treatment and limit abuse of this power.

A legally binding sanction mechanism to punish NPT violators would greatly strengthen the global nonproliferation regime. It would not only deter and dissuade states from engaging in illicit activities, but also counter double standards when addressing noncompliance. This proposal will face obstacles, but a sanctions mechanism, because of its legally binding nature and normative power, would bolster the international commitment to non-proliferation.

Establish a mechanism to oversee/include nonsignatory nuclear weapon states

The nonsignatory NWS – those states who are not party to the NPT: India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan are crucial to international efforts to maintain global stability, yet are largely left out of international dialogue on nonproliferation and disarmament issues. Additionally, these states are not legally bound by the disarmament provisions of the NPT. In these circumstances, these states may pose major obstacles to efforts to achieve global zero. The international community should design a parallel agreement to involve nonsignatory states in the global nonproliferation regime that obliges them to accept disarmament obligations.

The most vocal critics of this proposal come from those who believe that universal adoption of the NPT is of paramount importance. Many observers fear that the NNWS would interpret establishment of an inclusive agreement with nonsignatory states that is not conditional on accession to the NPT as de facto recognition of the group's status as nuclear weapon states. Such an agreement, critics argue, would deal a severe blow to the legitimacy of the NPT and encourage NNWS to pursue weapons programs. Furthermore, a double standard already exists in how the international community approaches states not party to the NPT. This is particularly true with regard to states developing peaceful indigenous nuclear energy programs. However a parallel agreement, by universally acknowledging a commitment to disarmament and reaffirming NPT nonproliferation obligations, would eliminate this double standard.

In the long term, failure to recognize nonsignatory states as NWS may do more harm to global disarmament efforts than accepting them; the more these states feel isolated, the stronger the incentive to maintain their nuclear arsenals and act in contravention of efforts to strengthen international security. Establishing a mechanism or regulations to which the nonsignatory states must adhere in order to be recognized as nuclear powers may be an effective way to ensure that they are more responsive to the wishes of the international community.

Establish a multilateral fuel cycle

Indigenous development of nuclear energy is not only a right afforded to all NNWS through the NPT, but is important for many nations' self-sufficiency and economic development. Many East Asian states are prime candidates for this technology. The establishment of a multilateral fuel cycle focused on fuel supply would provide NNWS with access to nuclear energy (including the necessary technology and fuel) while minimizing the risk of weapons proliferation.

The most promising proposals are those that target fuel supply and are administered by an international organization. These include the IAEA Fuel Bank, Nuclear Threat Initiative Fuel Reserve, or the International Uranium Enrichment Consortium. Some states object to the idea of a multilateral fuel cycle, citing their right under the NPT to develop nuclear energy programs, or because of concerns that fuel would be held hostage by hostile host governments. However, if states can agree on how to address access issues by developing the IAEA-administered proposals, or those of international nongovernmental organisations, the multilateral fuel cycle may prove integral to efforts to address proliferation concerns and reduce the potential for nuclear defiance under the NPT.

Create an international disarmament fund

The costs involved in dismantling and disposing nuclear weapons are frequently cited as a key obstacle to disarmament. An international disarmament fund administered by the IAEA, with contributions from various sources including the NWS, international and regional organizations, NNWS, private sector organizations, and individuals would alleviate the costs of reducing strategic arms.

Establishing, funding and administering a fund, and convincing states without nuclear weapons to pay for a problem they may have played no role in creating, will face many challenges. However, incentives, such as development assistance, could be offered in return for participation. Additionally, some states may believe that it is in their national interest to support efforts to dispose of nuclear weapons and create a more secure world.

In reality, strategic weapons held by the NWS threaten all of humanity, but NNWS that have refrained from weapons development may find it difficult to convince domestic constituencies that it is in their interest to help pay for the elimination of these weapons. An IAEA-administered disarmament fund would help to subsidize the costs of these efforts and weaken the cost-based argument against disarmament.

Push for universal adoption of no-first-use policies

The international community must devalue the political and military currency of nuclear weapons by reducing the importance of these weapons in national security strategies. To this end, a final long-term goal is the adoption of a no-first-use policy by the United States, then by all NWS. China and India have both pledged no-first-use policies and the remaining NWS claim that they will only use nuclear weapons defensively. By pledging no-first-use, a state takes the option of a pre-emptive nuclear strike off the table, thereby reducing the centrality of nuclear weapons in its global security strategy. Implementation of a no-first-use policy in the case of the US could build trust in East Asia, where some countries, particularly North Korea, cite hostile US policy as a driver behind their nuclear weapons programs.⁴

US adoption of a no-first-use policy would have serious ramifications for US global security strategy, in particular the US policy of extended deterrence. For many US, Japanese, and South Korean defence planners, the US nuclear umbrella functions as a key deterrent and guarantor of peace and stability in the region as it has prevented regional proliferation in response to nuclear developments. Given that US adoption of the no-first-use policy would reduce perceived hostility toward North Korea, there may be more room for cooperation in East Asia. A modified no-first-use policy, removing the option of a first strike but keeping the option for nuclear response open, would solve some issues posed by extended deterrence by assuring allies and reducing the perception of hostile U.S policy in East Asia.

Universal adoption of a no-first-use policy, in the traditional or modified form, would reduce the power and prestige of nuclear weapons, lessen the centrality of nuclear weapons in states' security strategies, and reduce international tensions and the likelihood of an accidental strike or nuclear war.

⁴ China and North Korea in particular, have cited US resistance to a no-first-use policy as a source of strategic instability and an example of hostile policy and have used this as justification for developing (or increasing) nuclear arsenals.

Progressive Steps Toward Nuclear Disarmament

By Lyndon Burford, Cho Sungmin, Togzhan Kassenova, Nadya Larsen,
Liu Jing, Rebecca Neame, Yang Young Jin, and Ying Chen

The international norm against the use of nuclear weapons is strong, as demonstrated by the reluctance of states to use them since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Although these weapons still play a central role in the security and defense strategies of many states, a recent surge in political will has provided a unique opportunity for progress on multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation. Russian and United States (US) leaders have again reiterated their desire to work for the elimination of nuclear weapons. These statements can be seen within the context of the ‘disarmament momentum’ that has been evolving over the last two years. Prominent US statesmen Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William Perry, and George Shultz began a high-profile campaign for a nuclear weapon free world in their 2007 *Wall Street Journal* op-ed. In 2008, 100 world leaders launched the Global Zero campaign for the phased, verified elimination of nuclear weapons, while Japan and Australia established the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Complete nuclear disarmament is high on the agenda of the U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, who last year unveiled his vision for nuclear weapons abolition, including the possibility of negotiating a nuclear weapons convention. Working towards nuclear disarmament can be seen as part of a broader goal – developing peaceful relations among nations and saving future generations, and their environment, from the scourge of war.

Discussion about nuclear disarmament has been divided for many years between ‘realists,’ who argue that nuclear weapons abolition is unrealistic or even dangerous, and ‘idealists,’ who see rapid disarmament as essential, ensure international peace and security. Of late, there has been renewed interest in the middle ground between these two, in recognition that a multifaceted approach is needed to achieve a nuclear weapon free world. We have named ourselves “Realistic Progressives”, as we move beyond the traditional divide between realists and idealists. We offer practical and achievable proposals toward a safer and more secure world. We believe that disarmament is possible, and our proposals will support this objective, by creating greater international security through diminished military competition and increased security cooperation between states. The following proposals, ordered by priority, offer practical suggestions on ways to improve the security of sensitive materials, reduce nuclear arsenals, develop public education on nuclear issues and boost international security cooperation.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Despite then-US President Clinton being the first world leader to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the US Senate has failed to ratify the Treaty. Given the key leadership role of the US in disarmament and non-proliferation matters, this has been a severe obstacle for the non-proliferation regime. The US, along with China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq and Israel, are among the CTBT ‘Annex II’ countries that must ratify the Treaty in order for it to enter into force, but have yet to do so. Also in this group are the

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), India and Pakistan, who have yet to sign or ratify the CTBT.

Indonesia has indicated its intention to ratify the CTBT if the US manages to do so. Given its expressed interest in developing nuclear power, this will be an important move. There are also some indications that China will follow a US lead in quickly ratifying the CTBT. While it is unlikely that all the remaining Annex II countries will follow as quickly, ratification by the US would be seen as an expression of commitment by the current Administration to the wider goal of disarmament. Despite the challenges the Obama Administration faces in securing Senate ratification of the CTBT, leading by example will be the most effective way of encouraging others to step in the same direction. We therefore urge the Obama Administration to actively pursue ratification of the CTBT. Equally, we call on all other states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty.

Strategic Arms Reductions

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1), signed between the US and Russia in 1991, is due to expire on 5 December 2009. It limits the amount of long-range or strategic nuclear missiles to 6,000 on each side and cuts the number of delivery vehicles (bombers, land-based and submarine-based missiles) to 1,600 each. Russia and the US have the largest nuclear arsenals in the world with over 10,000 warheads each. They are therefore expected to lead by example in disarmament efforts, as well as encouraging others to disarm and strengthening non-proliferation efforts. This scenario is only possible if a START replacement can be negotiated and signed by 5 December 2009, which will require some compromises from both countries.

The main points of tension in US-Russia relations are enlargement of NATO to include former Soviet republics; Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states; US missile defense plan in Eastern Europe;⁵ and Russia's cooperation with Iran and North Korea. We propose a set of trade-offs: The US gives up missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic; commits to no NATO expansion in the next 10 years; and assists Russia in dealing with the rise of extremism in Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In return, Russia ratifies START; supports tougher sanctions on Iran and North Korea through the UN Security Council; stops its assistance to the Iranian nuclear program; takes a tougher position on North Korea at the 6 party talks; and allows IAEA observation of and safeguards on its nuclear facilities. Through such a set of trade-offs, there is more for both countries to gain from a new START agreement, which is the only hope for further arms cuts between two nuclear superpowers.

⁵ After the draft of this memo was complete, the US announced its plans to suspend missile defense deployments in Poland and Czech Republic due to a "change of the nature of threat posed by Iran". The group decided to retain this section of the memo unchanged, to reflect the pattern of events prior to 5 December, by which time it is hoped the START replacement agreement will be completed. We note, however, that the US intends deploying land-based SM-3 missile defense systems in Europe by 2015, including potentially in the Czech Republic and Poland. Given the strategic implications of such a deployment, we encourage the US to maintain an open, responsive dialogue with Russia on this issue.

Association of South East Asian Nations: Declaration

Following US President Obama's Prague speech in April 2009 and the US-Russia summit in July, discussion of nuclear disarmament has re-gained momentum among the international community. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) should take advantage of this momentum towards nuclear disarmament and contribute to global efforts towards a nuclear weapon free world. By doing so, ASEAN would also enhance its own security environment in the Southeast Asian region.

To amplify the momentum created by Russian and US leadership, we propose that ASEAN declare its support for the global efforts towards nuclear disarmament. The following is a draft version of an ASEAN Declaration, submitted for ASEAN's consideration.

ASEAN Declaration on Nuclear Disarmament

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations:

1. Endorses the United States' renewed resolve to take a leadership role in achieving total nuclear disarmament and equally, endorses Russia's positive will to lead alongside the United States in this regard. This was demonstrated during the July 2009 Russia- United States summit, at which both countries recommitted themselves to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world and agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals as an interim step in this direction.
2. Urges the United States Congress to ratify the CTBT, a policy goal signaled strongly by President Obama. Leading by example in this regard will be the most effective way of encouraging others to move in the same direction.
3. Urges Russia and the United States to conclude negotiations for replacement of the START treaty prior to its expiry in December 2009. As the holders of the largest nuclear arsenals in the world, both countries have a special responsibility to take a lead in the reinvigorated disarmament movement, encouraging others to disarm and strengthening non-proliferation efforts.
4. Recommends that the nuclear weapon states:
 - a. Establish a Joint P5 Study Group on Nuclear Disarmament in order to discuss and share experiences in the field, build confidence among the themselves and begin to develop a feasible roadmap towards multilateral nuclear disarmament.
 - b. Change the guiding principle of international relations from unilateralism to multilateral cooperation. The nuclear weapon states should gradually eliminate any options of preventive or preemptive nuclear action and return to a classical, conventional deterrence model.

- c. Adopt a formal, legally binding “no first use” commitment, covering all states regardless of whether they are a nuclear weapon state, non-nuclear weapon state or non-NPT Party. The P5 have made undertakings not to use their nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states except in response to a nuclear attack, or a conventional attack to allies by a nuclear weapon state. These undertakings would provide greater security assurances, and thus a more stable environment for disarmament negotiations, if they were formally set out in a treaty.
5. Urge all nuclear-armed states to reconsider the utility of nuclear deterrence and seek alternative forms of conventional security mechanisms. As nuclear deterrence is the core theory underpinning the maintenance of nuclear weapons, its precepts and assumptions must be challenged for multilateral disarmament to occur. In the 21st century, faced with many non-traditional security threats such as terrorism, global warming, environmental degradation, and humanitarian crises, new strategic thinking is required to maintain international peace and security. Nuclear weapons are incapable of countering any of these threats and as such, are a clear security liability due to the threat of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation.
6. Decide to discuss the possibility of all ASEAN nations joining the Proliferation Security Initiative, in parallel with United States ratification of CTBT, successful negotiations on the renewal or replacement of START, and progress on cooperation among the nuclear weapon states as described above.
7. Re-affirm the value of the Nuclear Weapon Free Zones in the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, Central Asia and Mongolia (as well as those in non-populated regions) in furthering the cause of non-proliferation and thus supporting efforts towards nuclear disarmament. ASEAN calls on the nuclear weapon states to sign and ratify the relevant protocols to these treaties as a gesture of support for non-nuclear weapon states’ non-proliferation efforts.

Multilateral Approaches to Nuclear Power

In the near future, the Asia-Pacific region will see an expansion of the use of nuclear power. China, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea have plans for additional reactors, while Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam are giving serious consideration to the nuclear power option.

In 2007, ASEAN members signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the ASEAN Power Grid. This had been preceded by several agreements on regional power cooperation and interconnection. Pooling resources for energy security can be seen as part of a broader integration plan within Southeast Asia.

In a similar vein, multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle have been given much consideration internationally in recent years. There are currently a number of proposals on the table, largely dealing with assurance of fuel supply and international uranium enrichment centers. The proposals give states commercial and other incentives to join, while

reducing the proliferation risks associated with expanded nuclear fuel production through the involvement of multiple states and the IAEA. Such approaches will be particularly beneficial to states with limited resources, geographical or geological vulnerabilities, or concerns about the consistency of fuel supply for their reactors.

In light of this, we propose a region-wide committee, set up under the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, to look at the feasibility of implementing a multilateral approach to nuclear power within the region. In particular, we feel three initiatives deserve regional consideration: 1) a collective effort aimed at guaranteeing the supply of nuclear fuel; 2) regional collaboration on emergency responses to a nuclear incident; and 3) the Russian Global Nuclear Power Initiative. Given both international support for the concept and ASEAN's own initiatives on regional energy integration, the time may be right for such an idea to be well received.

Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

The nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the non-NWS alike support the establishment of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) in the hope that it will help achieve the goal of nuclear disarmament and strengthen non-proliferation. Despite this common understanding, countries have made little progress since they adopted the Shannon Mandate at the Conference on Disarmament in 1995; in particular, they have been divided over the scope and purpose of the treaty and the issue of verification. However, in light of President Obama's Prague speech, we are hopeful that a shift in US nuclear strategy will create a new momentum for an effectively verifiable FMCT.

We propose that an FMCT go beyond banning future production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes and cover existing stockpiles of fissile materials as well. We urge the US to take the lead and be ready to compromise in this process; otherwise it will be hard to persuade other countries to work toward the Obama administration's stated goal of global denuclearization. An FMCT that prohibits merely future production of fissile material is of marginal effect for at least two reasons: (1) all of the NWS states except China officially ended the production of fissile material for weapons in the 1990s (China is said to have unofficially done so during the same period); (2) such a limited treaty would permit countries to accumulate fissile material stocks before the treaty enters into force, thereby increasing the risk of nuclear proliferation. Conversely, a comprehensive approach to FMCT negotiations would preclude at the outset the diversion of pre-existing stocks of fissile materials, be they civilian or military, to nuclear weapon purposes. This would remove the 'retrospective breakout capacity' of states which already possess large stockpiles of nuclear weapons, who could otherwise engage in rapid vertical proliferation should the perceived need arise. Such a capacity generates uncertainty and would undermine mutual confidence and trust in a manner detrimental to efforts towards multilateral nuclear disarmament. Additionally, it is equally necessary to prohibit the production of tritium, neptunium, and americium.

We call upon ASEAN countries as non-nuclear weapons states to contribute to the negotiating process and help make the effect of the treaty irreversible. We suggest that non-

NWS be included in any agency created to carry out verification and inspections activities for a future FMCT and to promote greater transparency and accountability.

Strengthening the Proliferation Security Initiative in the Asia-Pacific

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a US-led cooperative effort aimed at detection and interdiction of shipments of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials. Members of PSI share intelligence and cooperate with one another for the purpose of preventing WMD trafficking. They prepare themselves to counter instances of such trafficking through coordinated operational exercises. As PSI is not a formal treaty-based organization, participating states are not legally obligated to take specific action at any given time. It is a framework for cooperation that states may utilize to further their contribution to non-proliferation efforts.

The expansion of PSI to include more states within the Asia-Pacific would enhance the region's ability to prevent the transference of WMD and associated equipment or materials, and strengthen the national capabilities of states to detect and deal with such incidences. We propose that Asia-Pacific states that have refrained from participating in PSI reconsider this as an option for increasing regional security and national capacity in this area and preventing WMD trafficking.

Strategic Trade Management

A number of the Asia-Pacific countries are the world's key producers and suppliers of strategic items, such as dual-use goods and technologies. Many countries of the region are currently experiencing development and expansion of chemical industries. Many of them are also making plans or already proceeding with nuclear energy development. Geographical conditions make Asia-Pacific countries key transit or transshipment hubs for different commodities, including strategic items, as they are a crossover point for major sea lanes. Moreover, rapid economic development calls for progressively greater utilization of strategic goods, technologies and services. All of the above results in a high volume of strategic items being traded or transited. While key to the development of and to increasing trade for states in the Asia-Pacific region, strategic items can also present a proliferation risk if they are not adequately regulated. In this context, comprehensive systems for the management of strategic trade are essential for regional and international security, as well as for safe and reliable trade. Currently, the level of strategic trade management in the region varies significantly from country to country. Some countries in particular face critical challenges in the development of such systems, such as difficulties in securing long maritime borders and archipelagic states, and a lack of resources.

We propose to have a dedicated effort at the regional-level to cooperate on strategic trade control management in addition to existing smaller scale initiatives. The countries with more advanced strategic trade controls should consider offering assistance to their neighbors with developing and improving their strategic trade control systems. This can be done in either a bilateral and multilateral fashion (through structures such as ASEAN). Such expertise sharing will be key to strengthening strategic trade controls on a regional level.

Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education / Public Outreach

An essential element of creating an international culture of peace is educating the world's citizens about the value of disarmament as a pathway to non-violent means of conflict resolution. At present, many ordinary citizens are not aware of the serious dangers related to the maintenance and proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, informed and engaged societies can help to increase political will and national capacities for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, particularly, though not exclusively, in democratic societies.

The 2002 United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education (UN document A/57/124) is the primary point of reference for states wishing to develop education and public outreach in this area. A key recommendation of the report is the designation of national points of contact for disarmament and non-proliferation education. We recommend that this idea be implemented immediately by states in the Asia-Pacific region. This would help to facilitate regional collaboration in this realm and would cost very little in terms of human or economic resources. A priority task for the designated individual or agency should be a survey of domestic peace, disarmament and non-proliferation education efforts at the local and national levels. This should be followed up by an ASEAN or ARF-hosted conference of disarmament / non-proliferation educators and national coordinators. Such a conference would allow for comparison of domestic educational strategies and programs and support the creation of best-practice guidelines and benchmarks.

Civil society is well placed to complement governmental efforts in this realm, and such collaboration should be encouraged. Non-governmental experts have demonstrated their strong commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation education, through initiatives such as the Hague Appeal for Peace, which developed the *Hague Agenda for Peace and Justice for the 21st Century*, (UN document A/54/98). In the first instance, NGO-government collaboration in this realm could be strengthened by establishing regular consultations between designated national contact points and local NGOs involved in the field.

Cooperative Threat Reduction

Cooperative threat reduction (CTR) programs, designed to assist countries in the former Soviet Union to deal with proliferation risks and threats in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, proved to be efficient and very valuable. The programs varied from assistance with physical security of proliferation-sensitive facilities to re-direction of WMD scientists to civilian sectors. In recent years, policy-makers around the world have started to debate how this experience can be applied to countries outside the former Soviet Union.

We suggest that North Korea might benefit from some CTR-type programs. Joint teams of those who have experience with CTR programs in the former Soviet Union, for example, Russians, Kazakhs and others, could contribute to threat reduction initiatives in North Korea. Such CTR-type assistance could be tailored to specific circumstances depending on the degree of access provided by North Korea and the overall state of regional affairs. For example, in the most favorable scenario (if North Korea decided to denuclearize)

such programs/teams could assist with safe and secure warhead dismantlement. In the interim stages while complete disarmament is not feasible, some cooperation under a CTR-type umbrella would nonetheless be extremely beneficial for mitigation of nuclear risks. For example, CTR-type projects can include assistance with the physical safety and security of nuclear facilities. Such cooperation with North Korea will be most likely if it engages teams that would be seen by North Korea as less 'hostile.'

Conclusion

As proliferation risks continue to expand, it is increasingly evident that the abolition of these weapons is the best guarantee against their eventual use. Nuclear weapons are useless in dealing with the increasing number of non-traditional security threats that states face in the 21st century such as terrorism, environmental degradation, climate change, intra-state conflict and poverty. In addition, there is a rising threat of non-state actors such as terrorists, extremists or criminal groups acquiring and using nuclear weapons. Likewise, the risk of nuclear weapons use by accident or miscalculation cannot be ruled out. As such, it is in the interests of all states to cooperate strongly on mutually reinforcing, multilateral efforts for nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and security. Given the binding legal obligation under the NPT to bring about the elimination of nuclear weapons, the NWS must show signs of good faith efforts in this regard in order to restore and maintain consensus that proliferation is totally unacceptable and will not be tolerated by the international community.

Many people believe that nuclear weapons may have minimized the outbreak of major state-to-state war since the mid-20th century. Conversely, many strategic thinkers, including ex-nuclear weapons operators and former military and political leaders in the NWS, increasingly question the logic, assumptions and value of nuclear deterrence in maintaining peace. Given the depth of feeling surrounding beliefs about nuclear weapons and the core role that many countries assign to them in their security strategies, multilateral nuclear disarmament will necessarily be a highly complex and challenging task. However, the fact that a task may be difficult does not make it impossible. There already exist in the international community all the legal, technical and financial resources and expertise needed to make rapid progress in nuclear disarmament. The only missing ingredient is political will. A rare window of opportunity has now opened and the moment is ripe for sincere consideration by the international community of tangible, irreversible progress towards the abolition of nuclear weapons. We cannot afford to let that opportunity pass.

Preconference Essays

What do you consider the most important aspect of US President Obama's speech in Prague on 5 April 2009 and why?

Mr. Justin BISHOP

The focus of President Obama's speech in Prague is how the United States can lead in enhancing global security from the threat of WMD. His remarks focus on several areas: a push for a reduction in nuclear stockpiles coordinated with eventual global disarmament and transnational cooperation against proliferation – mainly through the use of plurilateral initiatives and international institutions. President Obama's speech lays out his administration's roadmap for accomplishing these goals.

Some of the Obama administration's roadmap is in stark contrast to the realities of our world. Global nuclear disarmament is a fantasy, and the continued proliferation of weapons, technology, and knowledge are likely. Increased transnational cooperation will continue to vacillate between effective and ineffective, dependent on that actor's national interest or perception. In addition, President Obama's statements say nothing about efforts to mitigate the political, economic, military and environmental effects from a likely future nuclear weapon use.

President Obama argues that the spread of nuclear weapons can be stopped and their future use can be avoided. Nuclear weapons have already been used. More likely than not, the use of nuclear weapons will occur again. While it is important for the United States to push for global nuclear disarmament, the US must simultaneously push to mitigate the negative effects of their potential and likely future use.

President Obama is correct to push for the reduction of nuclear weapons' importance in US national security strategy and to advocate the reduction of existing US nuclear stockpiles. From a war-fighting perspective, neither the United States nor Russia needs such sizable nuclear stockpiles. Large stockpiles increase the risk of an accident and increase the potential for sabotage or accidental/purposeful misuse. Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the national security strategy should be done out of pragmatism, not an ideological belief in global nuclear disarmament. The immediate threat facing the United States is Islamist extremism from fringe, radicalized, militant groups espousing terrorist or insurgent tactics. Nuclear weapons are not necessary to deter or defeat this threat, as many non-nuclear states, which are facing a similar threat, can argue.

Despite renewed US efforts to reduce the importance of its nuclear arsenal, other states are moving in the opposite direction. Both Prime Minister Putin and President Medvedev have espoused modernization of their strategic nuclear forces as essential for Russian national security. China has increased its secondary strike capability. Pakistan, India, and Israel are also endeavoring to increase their arsenals. While a unilateral US reduction of its stockpiles is important, many other nuclear weapon states are increasing their own stockpiles. The problem is ensuring that the United States, or any other nuclear weapons

state, does not perceive another state with nuclear weapons to be a threat. Still, President Obama's other statements on US ratification of the CTBT and efforts to collaborate with Russia on a new START III treaty and a new treaty to enhance security in the fuel cycle are long overdue.

President's Obama statements on Iran and US plans for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) are worrisome. The US and Iran cannot, and will not, have a dialogue based on mutual respect and interest, as long as leaders specifically link Iran to "threat." BMD in Europe has caused tension in the US-Russia relationship for the better part of the decade. The US-Russia relationship is more important than developing and fielding an unpopular system to defend against a nebulous and unsubstantiated threat, and attempting to bargain away a system which doesn't exist with Russia and the Iranians is problematic.

Obama's comments about sanctions are also tiresome. While most nations speak of a strong response to rogue states who violate international law and norms, few actually follow with action. But are international sanctions effective enough to compel states' behavior? There is inconclusive evidence whether sanctions have been effective against North Korea and Iran in mitigating or changing their "rogue" behavior. Another question worth considering is how much of the "rogue state" threat is self constructed? An argument can be made that the Iranian threat is self-constructed by actors throughout the West and the Middle East. It is highly unlikely Iran would use or proliferate WMD if acquired, mainly out of the danger it could cause to the regime. If the US and/or Israel and/or Pakistan are willing to continue to openly or clandestinely spread their nuclear umbrella to states throughout the region, most regional actors would be unlikely to acquire their own, negating fears of a Middle Eastern arms race.

President Obama's strongest words are his comments on nuclear security and militant networks. Yet nowhere do his remarks recognize how difficult it is for a militant network, to acquire, develop, or unleash a nuclear weapon. This isn't an attempt to undermine the importance of increasing efforts to defend against WMD acquisition by militant networks. It is important to note that state actors can be inherently hindered by non-state actors, which tend to "play by a different rule set."

Obama's reliance on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) to combat non-state actors is insufficient. How can PSI and GICNT combat proliferation efforts by non-state actors, especially when they are as transparent and whimsical as actors and participants want them to be, due to their non-binding characteristics? Finally, the old saying "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" holds true. States, both "rogue and mainstream," use and/or develop non-state actors for their own ends. Often these non-state actors take on their own proportions and objectives and shed their state's control and support.

Even though many of President Obama's points seem illogical, world opinion and US national opinion provide a positive context for his reasoning. Additionally, these comments are a refreshing move towards international cooperation. If President Obama can lay the

foundation for, or achieving, global nuclear disarmament, the political, military, and economic benefits for the United States and the rest of world could be dramatic.

Ms. Catherine BOYE

The most important point of Obama's Prague speech was what he did not say: that a nuclear weapons-free world is impossible. President Obama calls such talk fatalism. I prefer to think of it as realism. When most people say that something is impossible, 99 times out of 100 it is. There are three reasons why a nuclear-free world is impossible: no country is willing to fully disarm first, nuclear weapons are too powerful a military and political tool for countries to get rid of, and disarmament to too low a number causes greater instability than a world with more nuclear weapons.

When Obama said, "As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies," he explained the exact reason why a nuclear free world will never happen. Most countries with nuclear weapons would agree with the sentiment. They are all for a world without nuclear weapons but they are not willing to give them up till the other country or countries do. This doesn't make the countries bad or good; they are simply acting in what they perceive as their best interest.

Nuclear weapons provide both prestige and a security that no conventional armament can match. Countries such as Iran and North Korea do not pursue nuclear weapons without good reason. Israel did not make them an unspoken pillar of their security strategy without good reason. Nuclear weapons are a way to dissuade greater powers and normally aggressive enemies from interfering with a country's interests. These weapons also bring with them an element of prestige; countries feel that they must pay attention to a country that is a nuclear power. Nuclear weapons will only be abandoned when some newer, better, more destructive weapon is created or something is created that can make nuclear weapons harmless.

During the Cold War, when disarmament talks were just starting, a study was done about the effects of disarming to certain numbers. The study showed that as this number got lower the focus quit being the number of nuclear weapons a country had and became who can create the most nuclear weapons the fastest. While no magic number was given 1,000 was the approximate cut-off point. Getting below 1,000 nuclear weapons on each side creates distrust on the part of Russia and the US but also between those two and the other nuclear powers who might decide to attempt a sprint to parity.

President Obama's suggestions such as a new START treaty with Russia and progress at the NPT convention should be done and supported. But we should stop daydreaming and start working toward less grandiose but more practical measures to secure nuclear materials and disarm to a low but strategically stable point. These goals do not have the same zing as a 'world free of nuclear weapons' but they are achievable and will provide the world with a greater measure of security.

Mr. Lyndon BURFORD

The key significance of President Barack Obama's April 2009 speech in Prague was its affirmation of a nuclear weapon free world as an urgent, imperative and achievable goal.⁶ In building political will for nuclear disarmament, the difference between aiming for zero nuclear weapons and aiming for the next small reduction is highly significant. For many countries, the step-by-step, 'incremental' approach to nuclear disarmament traditionally favored by the nuclear weapon states (NWS) is synonymous with a lack of good faith efforts to fulfill the Article VI disarmament obligations of the NPT. As the world's pre-eminent nuclear power, US willingness to discuss nuclear weapons elimination not just as a far-off, hypothetical goal, but rather as a vital and pressing security interest, marks a sea-change in the international nuclear order.

The elimination of nuclear weapons will be a long and difficult road. It will require a fundamental shift in national and international defense arrangements, in international law, in the collective understanding of what constitutes peace and security. In a world without nuclear weapons, relations between states will necessarily be conducted with far greater emphasis on common approaches to security – security *with* other nations, rather than security through power *over* other nations. In creating such a world, the focus must therefore be on mutual respect and trust, rather than on the assumed prerogative of great powers to impose their will on smaller states through threatening behavior, be it financial, military or otherwise. Obama's call to eliminate nuclear weapons reflects a belief that creating such a world *is* possible, and showed that the US is willing to lead by example.

Comprehensive change requires an unwavering focus on the desired outcome. A key problem associated with the traditional, step-by-step approach to disarmament is that it has not focused strongly on elimination as the key goal of the nuclear disarmament process. Rather, the focus has been on small, incremental reductions that do not challenge the status quo of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence as the core security framework underlying international relations. Furthermore, due to the diverse range of nuclear capabilities and strategic concerns among the international community, the inherent asymmetry of a step-by-step approach to disarmament means that any individual step in the process is inevitably perceived as favoring the interests of some states over others.⁷

The result of these two factors is that, without an unequivocal commitment to zero nuclear weapons as the primary goal, or a binding legal commitment to the effect that any strategic imbalance or disadvantage caused by a current disarmament step will be corrected in a subsequent step, there is never universal political will for any individual measure. It is for this reason, for example, that the non-NPT states are unlikely to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as a stand-alone document. Pakistan's recent pronouncements on

⁶ Obama, B. (2009, 5 April). *Remarks of President Barack Obama*. Prague, Czech Republic. Available from <http://prague.usembassy.gov/obama.html>.

⁷ Ware, A. (2008, August). *A Nuclear Weapons Convention and the NPT: Is it a Diversion or an Enabler?* Aotearoa Lawyers for Peace. Available from www.disarmsecure.org/publications/papers/papers_by_author.html#papers_alyn

the subject support this analysis,⁸ as does India's withdrawal from the CTBT negotiations when it became clear that the NWS were resolute in their refusal to attach any binding commitment to supplement it with negotiations on disarmament measures.⁹

Consequently, an incremental approach to nuclear disarmament is unlikely to achieve universal adherence and thus will not be capable of bringing about the elimination of nuclear weapons. The alternative to incremental disarmament – a comprehensive, legally binding abolition framework of phased disarmament steps – remains anathema to the NWS at present. Nevertheless, a strong, practical commitment to the goal of zero from the most powerful nation on earth is a step in the right direction.

In 1996, the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons wrote, “*the possession of nuclear weapons by any state is a constant stimulus to other states to acquire them.*”¹⁰ Ten years later, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission came to the same, simple conclusion: “*So long as any state has such weapons...others will want them.*”¹¹ These statements from two of the most distinguished international commissions yet convened on the issue of nuclear weapons point to an inescapable conclusion: without urgent, irreversible action on disarmament, the world is likely to experience a third wave of proliferation. If this were to happen, it is almost inevitable that humanity would one day suffer the devastation of nuclear war. As the Canberra Commission also noted, “*...the proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used – accidentally or by design – defies credibility.*”¹²

Obama acknowledged this reality in Prague, noting that proliferation risks have been increasing steadily in recent years and with them, the chances of nuclear conflict. Any such war would be catastrophic for humanity. Recent research has shown how dust caused by fires from even a “limited” nuclear war (i.e., one involving around 100 Hiroshima-sized nuclear bombs, representing less than 0.03 percent of the explosive power of the world's current nuclear arsenal) would devastate global food production. Spreading rapidly around the world, this atmospheric dust would bring with it severe frosts, shortened growing seasons, reduced rainfall, monsoon failure and a substantial increase in ultraviolet radiation.¹³ Thus, in

⁸ See: Nuclear Threat Initiative (2009, 19 June). *Pakistan Rules Out Test Ban Treaty Endorsement*. Available from http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090619_9389.php

⁹ For a summary of the Indian position, see: Gujral I.K. (1996, 31 July). *Statement by I.K. Gujral, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the Indian Parliament on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty*. Available from http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/gujral_ctbt_july_31_96.htm.

¹⁰ Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (1996). *Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons*. Canberra: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade: 7. Available from http://www.dfat.gov.au/cc/cc_report_mnu.html.

¹¹ Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (2006). *Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons*. Stockholm: Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission: 17. Available from http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/Weapons_of_Terror.pdf.

¹² Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. *Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons*: 9.

¹³ Toon O, Turco R, Robock A, et al. Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism. *Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics* 2007;7:1973-2002. www.climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf; Helfand I. *An assessment of the extent of projected global famine resulting from limited, regional nuclear war*. London: Royal

addition to the millions of people killed instantly in blast zones, an estimated 1 billion people worldwide would starve to death in the resulting famines.¹⁴ Furthermore, the historical correlation between famine and disease suggests that infectious disease epidemics would be another likely result of such a war.

If such a scenario is to be avoided, urgent action on nuclear disarmament is needed to prevent a slide into runaway proliferation. Obama's resolute call for a nuclear weapon free world cast aside traditional realist thinking, with its assumptions of predetermined state interests in maximizing power to achieve security. Such assumptions, with their built-in logic of proliferation, have long burdened humanity with the disempowering notion that an indefinite nuclear stand-off is inevitable. As Obama stated, to give in to such fear-based thinking "*is an easy but also a cowardly thing to do. That's how wars begin. That's where human progress ends.*" Rejecting such thinking, Obama affirmed that, "*human destiny will be what we make of it.*" His unequivocal assertion of humanity's ability to create a more peaceful, secure world was uplifting, empowering and constructive. It has helped to kick-start the stalled nuclear security regime and has revived hope for a world free from the threat of nuclear war. In developing the political will that has enabled this shift, the importance of focusing on zero cannot be overstated.

Mr. Sungmin CHO

Break from the Bush Administration

In his speech in Prague, President Obama hinted that his foreign policy will be different from that of President Bush in two aspects: The US will embrace multilateralism and approach global issues from a different worldview. The Iraq War in 2003 serves as the best example to prove the characteristics of Bush's foreign policy. The US launched the war in Iraq based upon the concept of preemptive strike. The US was not afraid to encounter opposition to the war across the globe. It also acted unilaterally by going to war without support from the UN. On the contrary, President Obama showed his willingness to consult and cooperate with other nations. He not only reiterated the need to strengthen the alliance among NATO nations, but also said that he would expand cooperation with Russia in pursuit of new partnerships. Obama also said, "My administration will seek engagement with Iran based on mutual interests and mutual respect. We believe in dialogue." It is also noteworthy that he mentioned international treaties such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It implies that he will be cooperative in multilateral efforts in the framework of international regime as well. Remarks on cooperation with Russia and Iran and on US leadership in promoting international treaties had not been heard during the Bush administration. In addition to these signs of multilateralism, Obama appears to have different worldview when compared to Bush. No phrase comparable to "Axis of Evil" was found in

Society of Medicine, 2007. www.psr.org/assets/pdfs/helfandpaper.pdf.; Mills MJ, Toon OB, Turco RP, et al. Massive global ozone loss predicted following regional nuclear conflict. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the United States of America* 2008;105:5307-12.

¹⁴ Helfand I. *An assessment of the extent of projected global famine resulting from limited, regional nuclear war.*

Obama's speech in Prague. This implies that Obama will have more flexible worldview than Bush's dichotomous view. As such, multilateralism and a more flexible worldview implied in Obama's Prague speech suggests he will show a sharp break from his predecessor.

Continuity with the Bush Administration

However, this does not mean the Obama administration will take an "Anti-Bush Course." During his speech in Prague, Obama provides a clue that he would continue the war on terrorism by saying, "We are targeting the same al Qaeda terrorists... So, finally, we must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security." Mentioning Iran and North Korea in turn, Obama framed terrorism as the biggest threat to global security at the end of the speech. Even though the specific words chosen by Obama are different from the terms used by the Bush administration, both are speaking of the same strategic goal in essence. Obama delivered the same message that the terrorist threat linked with WMD is the most dangerous threat and any possibility of proliferation of WMD or nuclear weapons should be removed. Accordingly, President Obama showed his willingness to continue the war on terrorism during his speech in Prague. In addition, Obama continues along the line of his predecessor in terms of means. During his speech in Prague, Obama said, "As long as the threat from Iran persists, we will go forward with a missile defense system that is cost-effective and proven." He used phrases such as "international pressure" and "increased isolation" when commenting on North Korea and Iran. This hawkish approach to resolve old issues with Iran and North Korea is not new. Methods such as developing a missile defense (MD) system and inciting pressure against provocative North Korea and Iran were shaped and implemented initially during the Bush administration. In sum, through his speech in Prague, Obama proposed that his administration will be consistent with the Bush Administration in implementing the war on terrorism and the targets remain the same.

Both Break and Continuity from the Cold War Era

Obama proposed a world free of nuclear weapons as a goal that the US is willing to the lead on. Obama showed his will to break with the Bush administration by reviving the issue of nuclear arms control. More specifically, he said, "To achieve a global ban on nuclear testing, my administration will immediately and aggressively pursue US ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty." At the same time, Obama is also prepared to continue the legacy of the Cold War by resuming START and re-strengthening the NPT and CTBT. His resolve to revitalize the international treaties will require him to remember the characteristics, targeting objectives, and methodologies of these treaties when they were initially devised in the Cold War era. An international treaty essentially aims to promote cooperation among nations. It is not aiming to deter or take preemptive actions against a particular nation. Its objective is to shape coordinated efforts among nations to achieve a common goal. It takes negotiation and dialogue rather than unilateral and military action. Likewise, Obama also used words like cooperation, global efforts, negotiations, and dialogue several times during his speech in Prague. His priority on nuclear arms reduction signals that the Obama administration will break with the Bush administration but continue efforts launched during the Cold War.

In summary, US President Obama implied that he would launch the grand strategy of nuclear arms control in combination with the war on terrorism. These are old issues inherited from the Cold War era and the Post-Cold War era respectively. There is nothing new in terms of each agenda. However, the combination of both agendas will bring about more dynamism, in US foreign policy and this is new

Ms. Kate FARRELL

“The basic bargain is sound: countries with nuclear weapons will move toward disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all countries can access nuclear energy. To strengthen the treaty, we should embrace several principles. We need more resources and authority to strengthen international inspections. We need real and immediate consequences for countries caught breaking the rules or trying to leave the treaty without cause. And we should build a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including an international fuel bank, so that countries can access peaceful power without increasing the risks of proliferation.”

In his speech in Prague, President Barack Obama broadly addressed the nuclear threat and acknowledged where progress must be made to curb proliferation and make disarmament a reality. The main issues Obama embraces here show that, as the key mechanism for control of nuclear weapons and technology, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is stretched for legitimacy and meaning. The “grand bargain” – where the nuclear weapon states committed to disarmament and the non-nuclear weapon states agreed to refrain from developing this technology – has long been an issue for debate within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the non-proliferation regime as a whole. President Obama shows that the US accepts there is a double-standard in the proliferation system and that it has a responsibility to uphold its disarmament obligations under Article VI. He adds that verification needs to be strengthened, consequences made real and the fuel cycle addressed if the non-proliferation regime is to have authority in the twenty-first century.

Refusal by the nuclear weapon states to initiate comprehensive steps toward disarmament has been a dividing issue within the IAEA. The nuclear weapon states have long been able to ignore the disarmament obligation without consequences. By acknowledging the significance of the bargain, President Obama has made a positive statement in support of developing trust with the non-nuclear weapon states that, for the most part, have been compliant with the principles of the NPT with little reciprocity.

Should the president make significant headway with his policy statements, the US would make a clear statement that the nuclear weapon states need to begin the disarmament process, with honorable intentions, if there can be hope of countering proliferation and eventually living in a world free of nuclear weapons. Likewise, renewed faith in the NPT going into the 2010 Review Conference is a move that signifies that the Treaty, as a multilateral venture, is the mechanism through which states can renew cooperation and work collectively to ensure this dangerous weapons technology does not again become the defining asset of international security.

How feasible are the options?

Obama puts forward three proposals that reinforce the ‘bargain’ and contribute to strengthening the NPT. He states first: “we need more resources and authority to strengthen international inspections”. Should the US pledge increased funding to the IAEA, it would simultaneously instill faith in the agency and make a contribution to the capital needed to fulfill their role effectively. Strengthening authority for international inspections is slightly more problematic. Although the Additional Protocol has provided a more comprehensive safeguards and inspections system, gaining access beyond this could be difficult. Many would argue against developing an inspections model that would undermine the principles of sovereignty the NPT is based on. In saying that, developing a global mechanism – either through the universal requirement of the Additional Protocol or a generic resolution adopted in response to those who engage in illicit nuclear activities – could combat concerns of impeding sovereignty.

Second Obama states that “we need real and immediate consequences for countries breaking the rules or trying to leave the treaty without cause.” For those breaking the rules, consequences would have to apply to both the nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states. States that have failed to uphold their international obligations in the past have been exposed to a variety of ad hoc responses that have resulted in both success and failure. Real consequences for states that threaten the stability of the regime need to be made in a decisive, reasonable and balanced manner. As curbing proliferation is critical to international security, and acts that defy this require consequences that dissuade non-compliance, all states need to pursue developments in good faith to ensure longevity. Addressing this issue on both sides of the bargain is imperative or the divide between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ will only grow.

President Obama states finally that developing an international fuel bank would address proliferation issues in the fuel cycle. This proposal is not new but would have a significant impact in countering proliferation issues that arise with dual-use technology. An international fuel bank would ensure that states still had access to the necessary materials for a peaceful nuclear energy program but would not need to independently develop the technology – a process that has led to weapons development in the past. Naturally there are concerns associated with this proposal, most notably the interpretation of ‘inalienable right’ and the ability of the governing agency to hold states ransom to access to fuel in return for cooperation. An international fuel bank would need to be governed by a comprehensive and balanced agreement if it is to be a feasible option.

President Obama’s speech was monumental in reaffirming the importance of disarmament to the international security agenda. Addressing some of the major issues that have plagued the non-proliferation regime and announcing a clear policy strategy to achieve disarmament, Obama gave new meaning to the ‘immediate threat’ that these weapons and technology have. Discussion of the ‘grand bargain’ was an important step in an effort to bridge the gap between the nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states. Similarly, by announcing suggestions to deal with the limitations of the IAEA and the NPT, non-

compliance, and proliferation concerns, Obama has made headway into discussion on how to approach these issues in the immediate future and, made a concerted effort to affirm the mechanisms in place. The proposals discussed will not be easy to enforce and will require leadership, willingness and trust among all actors in the international system to approach concerns with a united front, where all states strive towards the ultimate goal of an international security system that is no longer defined by nuclear weapons.

Ms. Kim FASSLER

Speaking in Prague in April, President Obama called the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” The President’s remarks reflect the changing nature of the international system, one in which both state and non-state actors must play a role in non-proliferation efforts. What is particularly interesting is Obama’s approach to addressing the threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists, and how this strategy will fit into the administration’s broader agenda of “a world without nuclear weapons.”

The rise of non-state actors has arguably changed the rules of the nuclear arms game in significant ways. During the Cold War and for much of the rest of the 20th century, fear that using nuclear weapons would provoke a retaliatory nuclear attack was arguably the strongest deterrent to any country striking first. Nations also dared not deploy nuclear weapons for fear that a first strike could ignite a chain reaction among other countries with nuclear capabilities and lead to a catastrophic nuclear war.

Some have argued that after witnessing Hiroshima, the world came to an unspoken understanding that the use of “unconventional weapons” – nuclear weapons – was taboo, because their scale of destruction dwarfed conventional weapons. Nobel Prize winner Thomas Schelling, for example, has pointed to numerous historical conflicts where countries could have used nuclear weapons, but refrained from doing so. However, Schelling warned in his 2005 prize acceptance speech that this universal aversion to nuclear weapons “is not guaranteed to survive; and some possessors or potential possessors of nuclear weapons may not share the convention.”

The growing importance of non-state actors will put this convention to the test. In the 21st century, terrorist organizations are expanding in membership, recognition and wealth. Some, like al Qaeda, have made possession of nuclear weapons a primary goal. Recent examples clearly demonstrate how conflicts that have pitted a traditional state against a non-state organization have often left the state struggling to fight an adversary that it cannot target and, therefore, cannot deter – regardless of the state’s financial or military might. The United States’ War on Terror, which has led it into at least two major conflicts in the Middle East, and international efforts to thwart piracy of the coast of Somalia are two such examples.

The rise of non-state actors with potential nuclear capabilities therefore alters the balance that used to exist between nation states with nuclear weapons. For 60 years, the world has not seen one nuclear bomb exploded in anger for fear that even one strike would lead to retaliation or the escalation of nuclear war. With terrorist groups, however, the

inhibitions on “first use” that had become a convention among nation states suddenly do not apply. A terrorist organization with branches in major cities and rural villages on several continents does not fear a second strike like a country whose cultural, financial, and most heavily populated centers are clearly outlined on a map.

In his speech, Obama made it clear that the United States will take the lead on international efforts to advance non-proliferation. The US will start by reducing the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy, and will seek the cooperation of other countries by negotiating a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and working with other nations on nuclear energy programs.

However, most of the signatories in these efforts are states – the challenge remains in how to bring non-state actors to the negotiating table. Moreover, how should non-state actors be punished for violating the terms of any treaty?

Obama’s answer is to prevent terrorists from obtaining weapons in the first place. He has proposed an international initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years. The United States will enlist the help of the global community through institutions like the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, with the goal of breaking up black markets, intercepting materials in transit and wielding financial tools to undermine the weapons trade.

Obama’s plan is no doubt ambitious; he recognized in his speech that many of these goals will probably not be achieved within his lifetime. The US still faces the challenge of bringing everyone to the bargaining table and the even more daunting proposition of persuading everyone to buy into a pact to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Primary obstacles include persuading countries that are currently developing nuclear weapons to halt their nuclear programs and convincing leaders that such a move is in their best interests.

The success of any treaty will also depend on the willingness and commitment of countries with nuclear weapons to reduce their nuclear arsenals. If the United States makes clear its intention to use nuclear weapons if needed, it will be difficult to convince countries with nuclear capabilities to disarm, or to persuade others to dismantle their developing nuclear programs.

Another major issue is nuclear energy. In his speech, Obama called for “a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including an international fuel bank, so that countries can access peaceful power without increasing the risks of proliferation.” However, the line between pursuing nuclear power and building nuclear weapons remains a delicate one, and is difficult to enforce.

Obama is right to address the skepticism of critics, but strongly stating the United States’ commitment to reducing its dependence on nuclear weapons is a major first step. In the coming years, it will be equally important for the United States to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and actively participate in similar international pacts. Signed

by hundreds of nations, these international agreements reinforce a universal attitude that nuclear weapons should not be used, which has persisted from Hiroshima to today. It is quite possible that terrorist groups in possession of a nuclear bomb will not share this convention. But if they are at least aware of it, they may be more inclined to hold on to the nuclear weapon and use it for influence over adversaries, rather than for mass destruction.

Dr. Togzhan KASSENOVA

More than 840 government officials, policy and technical experts, journalists, and academics from 46 countries gathered in Washington, DC on April 6, 2009 at the largest non-proliferation conference symbolically entitled “The Nuclear Order – Build Or Break.” The conference attendees had a reason to feel optimistic. The day before, on April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama delivered a seminal speech in the Czech Republic, the central theme of which was disarmament and non-proliferation. The broadcast of his speech to the hundreds of people in the conference hall, whose everyday job is working on these crucially important issues, resonated strongly with everyone present. It would be difficult to imagine a better morale boost to that specific audience than hearing President Obama’s views on the subject. But it was not only the conference attendees that listened carefully to the speech, people all over the world were listening and observing the first signs of the unfolding “Velvet Revolution” in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

There were three prominent themes in Obama’s speech in Prague that particularly deserve attention. First, President Obama made it clear that WMD non-proliferation will be a key priority for his administration. Obama brought up all major non-proliferation crises in his address, including those unfolding in North Korea and Iran, threats stemming from the proliferation of sensitive nuclear fuel technologies, and dangers connected to terrorists getting their hands on nuclear material. It appears that Obama and his administration have an action plan to counter those threats. Two important points related to non-proliferation agenda that should be singled out here: an announcement of a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material within four years, and reaffirmation from Obama that the US will seek to engage Iran based on “mutual interests and mutual respect.” Securing the vulnerable nuclear material in the world is one of the most efficient ways to prevent a non-state actor from detonating a crude nuclear weapon in the heart of one of the world’s metropolitan cities. Obtaining nuclear material remains the most important hurdle separating terrorists from acquiring a nuclear weapon. In regard to Iran, Obama’s message of being ready to engage diplomatically cannot be underestimated. While some conservative observers criticize President Obama for being ready to talk to Iran “without pre-conditions,” his approach seems to be the most viable to many observers. “Pre-conditions” which, in reality, are the goals of the negotiations, cannot be realistically met before the negotiations even begin. To wait for Iran to meet those “conditions” is to allow the current crisis to drag on indefinitely with possibly dangerous consequences.

Another defining moment of the speech was the beginning of a new era in US nuclear policy. For years, many have argued that while the US and Russia, the world’s largest nuclear powers, continue to have nuclear weapons central to their national security strategies, little progress can be expected in global disarmament and in curbing nuclear proliferation

worldwide. While these two powers continue to rely heavily on thousands of nuclear weapons in their arsenals and view those weapons as crucial to their survival, it will continue to be difficult to ask other countries in the world not to seek such weapons or act seriously about non-proliferation. President Obama made an important statement: “We will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.” With this promise and with the actions that will, hopefully, follow, the US leadership will set a completely different context for disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. US-Russian negotiations on a new strategic arms reduction treaty is an important step forward in the right direction.

In a U-turn departure from the previous US position, President Obama confirmed in Prague that his administration will “immediately and aggressively pursue US ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.” It is again a crucial step towards the future goal of global disarmament – only if testing of nuclear weapons is banned, can the world hope for eradication of these weapons in the future. Obama pledged US action on eradicating another important component of nuclear weapons production – the production of fissile material – by voicing support for a treaty that would put a ban on such production (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty). Only with a complete cessation of fissile material production will a future of no new nuclear weapons be assured. By promising to start reducing US nuclear arsenals, adhering to treaties banning fissile material production and nuclear weapons testing, the US demonstrates it is serious about eventual disarmament.

Last but not the least, President Obama personally embraced the idea of the world free of nuclear weapons and lent his optimism that this idealistic goal can be reached eventually. With this hopeful statement, he may inspire optimism in many nations and individuals around the world who hope to see a nuclear-weapon-free world, if not in their own lifetime then in the lifetime of their children and grand-children. Similar to inspiring millions of people to bring change to the US during the last presidential election, Barack Obama appeals to nations around the world to think that the change is possible, and that a nuclear-weapon-free world is not an unachievable fantasy. He asked his audience in Prague and millions of people who were listening to his speech around the world to believe that, “yes, we can” as a human race live in a world free of the world’s most horrific weapons.

It is symbolic that President Obama - who managed to inspire people to believe in and bring about change in their own country – is now joining many around the world to rally for profound changes in disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. One is left to hope that what we are experiencing now is a “Velvet Revolution” that will bring a completely different world order; a world order free of nuclear weapons.

Ms. Nadya LARSEN

President Barack Hussein Obama’s public speech in *Hradcanske* Square, Prague on April 5, 2009 is arguably the most important speech of the new US administration on world security. As Obama himself states, Prague is the most suitable place for this speech – a close ally with the US now, it was under a communist regime 20 years ago. Due to the power of a people who “insisted on pursuing their own path,” Prague has become a free, democratic EU country and NATO member.

As Barack Obama states, despite the fact that the Cold War is over, the world is faced with a new *nuclear* challenge. “In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up.” First, new players that are seeking international recognition through acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD), such as North Korea and Iran, arose in the international arena. There is an urgent need to find a suitable solution to deal with these countries before they pose a real threat to European and Asian, as well the whole of international security. According to Obama, the most effective way to find a long-term solution to this problem is through an established dialogue with these countries. As for the short-term solution, missile defense system is a cost-effective and a proven way to protect citizens of the European Union, Iran’s neighbors and the US from a possible missile threat. Second and arguably the most important point of Obama’s speech in Prague is the rising threat of nuclear terrorism in the world. Different terrorist groups are currently seeking to acquire WMD. This issue is of the highest concern to all countries as “one terrorist with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction.” President Obama is wisely stating that the security of all countries is threatened by nuclear terrorism. By doing so, he draws serious attention to nonproliferation efforts throughout the world.

Based on the above threats, Obama sets up an important goal for the international community – to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials all over the world by “setting new standards, expanding US cooperation with Russia and pursuing new partnerships.”

Surprisingly, President Obama goes deep into specifics of his new non-proliferation regime in his Prague speech. He mentions the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Global Terrorism becoming two durable international institutions, strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, negotiating the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia as well as the importance for the US to pursue the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. President Obama also talks about several steps such as “building a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation” and “establishing and strengthening international inspectors,” in his non-proliferation plan. By going into details Obama shows his understanding and knowledge of the problem as well as the fact that he has a detailed plan and will be realizing it step by step.

A new non-proliferation regime might seem to be a bit naïve taken into a consideration a complex nuclear history. In order to show the world that he has no illusions about the reality, it is an important and wise move by the president to state that four years are not enough for achieving his long-term goal which is abolishment of all existing nuclear weapons nor will all countries “obey the new standards”. However four years are enough for him to start the process and lead the world towards the path of peace and freedom.

After Obama’s speech in Prague, global nuclear disarmament can be seen as a new course of US foreign policy: cooperating with countries that are willing not to acquire nuclear weapons or, if they already have them, move toward disarmament and a “more rigorous approach” toward countries that are not willing to cooperate or do not obey the rules.

The main aspect of Obama's speech could not have been anything but global nuclear disarmament, taking into consideration the fact that North Korea tested a long-range missile several hours before this speech. We can only speculate now what Obama's speech included before the incident; but now the world sees the president as a global non-proliferation leader. He earned this status: throughout his presidential campaign, Obama was promising to alter America's posture on nuclear weapons. Since he was elected, he has been working with Russia on different sets of joint statements and bilateral agreements. And finally, Obama's truly historic Prague speech has removed all doubts from the fact that he will pursue his plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons. By drawing attention to the problem and, more importantly, by reminding all of us that the nuclear threat is a concern to every one of us, Obama has started a new era of global non-proliferation.

Mr. Adam P. LIFF

The true significance of President Obama's April 2009 speech in Prague will not be known for many years. His vision for a "world without nuclear weapons" is, by any account, idealistic. "Idealistic," however, is not to say that the goals he delineated in the speech are not achievable. Nevertheless, they will undoubtedly require visionary and determined leadership from the United States in the decades ahead. To have any hope of success, this commitment to disarmament and denuclearization must have the steadfast support of all future American presidents. Given the negative reaction to Obama's speech by many conservative observers—many of whom saw Obama's proposal as excessively naïve—whether this approach can acquire long-term bipartisan support is dubious, to say the least.

Realizing his vision will require the effective marshalling of all US soft power resources, Obama mentioned in his speech, "moral leadership is more powerful than any weapon." Selling this vision to not only existing nuclear powers but also those nations who seek to acquire nuclear weapons will require more than just pretty words; it will require the United States to lead by example, particularly as it concerns actual disarmament (rather than just returning currently deployed warheads to the storage shed), ratifying the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and constructively pursuing a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). It will also be incumbent upon the United States to engage with those countries that see nuclear weapons as necessary deterrents against hostile foreign powers and work to address their security concerns and persuade them that nuclear weapons will exacerbate, rather than address these concerns. The difficulty of this task should not be understated; in many cases, the country seen as the "hostile foreign power" is in fact the United States.

Obama said that the United States will "reduce the role of nuclear weapons" in its national security strategy. However, it is unclear exactly how the United States can realistically do this when nuclear weapons are such a central component of its commitments to its alliance partners. Just last week, Obama reaffirmed that the US will provide a nuclear umbrella to South Korea. Needless to say, US extended deterrence has been a core aspect of the US-Japan alliance throughout its existence. Somewhat paradoxically, given its supposedly strong identity as a pacifistic and "anti-nuclear" nation, many opinion leaders in Tokyo reacted very negatively to Obama's vision, fearing that a decrease in nuclear weapons

would dramatically reduce the effectiveness of the US nuclear umbrella over Japan and lead China to ramp up weapons production to achieve nuclear parity with the United States. Perceived US hypocrisy in this regard risks seriously damaging global efforts toward disarmament.

Two of the most significant commitments Obama made in his speech were to a global effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years and to building a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation, including an international fuel bank.

The first commitment is absolutely necessary, particularly in light of post-9/11 fears that a nuclear device could fall into the hands of a non-state actor, e.g. Al Qaeda. However, rather than extending this effort to include all WMD (nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons), Obama only mentioned nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons receive more attention, but other kinds of WMD can be equally, if not more, dangerous. A greater effort must also be made to ensure that these weapons are also secured.

A new framework for civil nuclear cooperation may be the least “sexy” proposal Obama made in his speech, but it is the one with arguably the single greatest potential impact on nonproliferation. Take as an example the case of Iran’s nuclear program. The Iranian government claims that it is pursuing peaceful nuclear energy. Although most observers are skeptical (to say the least) of this claim, if an international fuel bank provided non-nuclear powers with access to “peaceful power,” there would no longer be any doubt as to Tehran’s objectives. Civil nuclear cooperation, in particular an international fuel bank, will dramatically reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation.

Ms. LIU Jing

The president of the US, Barack Obama, made a speech in the capital of the Czech Republic, Prague on April 5, 2009, which attracted the eyes of the world. Especially as this speech was given after North Korea tested a rocket that could be used for long-range missiles on the same day. It made the speech more meaningful.

1. The proposition of “Global-Zero”

”Global-Zero” started in 2007, but it was proposed formally in Paris, Moscow, and Washington, D.C. in December of 2008. President Obama referred to building a nuclear-weapon-free world in a post-election speech and expressed the details in Prague, describing a perfect world and taking the moral high ground. ”Global-Zero” confirms great progress in human society, which will solve all the problems caused by proliferation of nuclear weapons if it takes effect. As the number of nuclear weapon states (NWS) increases, the possibility of nuclear accidents and misjudgements increase too. It is possible that nuclear weapons are being brought into black markets and bought by terrorists. At present, international non-proliferation regimes have not ensured the security of the world and America. The best way to reduce the threat is to decrease the production and proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It is a proposal which is fairer than previous policy. As President Obama said, “The basic bargain is sound: countries with nuclear weapons will move toward disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all countries can access peaceful nuclear energy.” This differs from the actions of the Bush administration, which unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001, leaving a more insecure world. The Obama administration stressed non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) could use nuclear energy peacefully.

At last, as the only country which has 4,000 nuclear warheads and the capability for nuclear attack from land, sea and air, it is the first time that an American president clearly declared intention to eliminate nuclear weapons all over the world. The US stated it would reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategy, pursue US ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty immediately and aggressively, and seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials as a model to the world. Moreover, it also promise to play a lead role in the “Global-Zero” plan. All of those measures show a great prospect for disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the future.

The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War. To put an end to Cold War thinking, America will negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia this year and set new standards, expand cooperation with Russia, pursue new partnerships to lock down the sensitive materials, which implies that American is waiting for the response from the other countries, especially the nuclear powers and the threat countries.

2. The change of US national strategy

The US has viewed nuclear weapons as the base of national security and the balance of military power since the end of World War II, and under the Bush administration the White House strengthened the role of nuclear deterrence in national security strategy. However, it cost too much and destroyed the environment and resources over the past decades. Moreover, the US has faced economic difficulties since last year. The proposal helps the US to cut down military expenditures by way of changing national strategy. As a matter of fact, the US can still retain its overwhelming advantages more easily in global economic and military affairs without nuclear weapons. President Obama’s proposal may lead to the basis of a long term military strategy.

Addressing the importance of a cooperative spirit in this proposal is another point that shows the change in US national strategy. As President Obama said, “We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it... The world must stand together to prevent the spread of these weapons.” Though the Bush administration changed its unilateral strategy in the late stage of its reign, the former unilateral strategy brought a lot of difficulties and threats to the country. These days, the Obama administration will make efforts to change its image and cooperate with the other countries to counter the problem together.

3. The policy toward North Korea

In general, the reasons why some countries dare to break the rules are because the temptation is attractive and the cost is low. Pyongyang's action caused tensions in the Asian-Pacific region. President Obama's speech was given the same day that North Korea fired a rocket. President Obama stated, "Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean something." He tried to let North Korea know that the path to security and respect would never come through threats and illegal weapons, but obviously the next step that the US will take is by no means a unilateral one. Though the six-party talks have been costly and did not reverse Pyongyang's thinking, the US still insists on the idea that all countries must come together to build a stronger, global regime and stand shoulder to shoulder to pressure the North Koreans to change course. Pyongyang's action should evoke anger all over the world and receive an international response instead of just an American one. In fact, it does. Recently, the five permanent members of the Security Council have begun considering a draft resolution that condemns Pyongyang's behavior. The proposed resolution would increase existing sanctions, while adding some new provisions aimed at curtailing the regime's nuclear activities.

4. Cut opportunities for proliferation

President Obama also addressed breaking up black markets, detecting and intercepting materials in transit, and using financial tools to disrupt this dangerous trade. Terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons is one of the most dangerous threats. Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, anti-terrorism has topped the agenda of the US. The Bush administration classified "non-proliferation" and "anti-tyranny" within the scope of anti-terrorism and started a few wars, bringing more terrors to America. President Obama decided to target al-Qaeda terrorists who have struck from New York to London, focusing on anti-terrorism itself and avoiding stretching the battle line too thin.

Mr. LIU Junbo

The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War, the risk of a nuclear attack has not been reduced. After 9/11, the combination of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear weapons, with terrorism poses the greatest and most imminent threat to US security according to US assessment. In addition to that concern, Iran and the DPRK's nuclear issues also rise to being big headaches for the US in terms of possible nuclear transfer and proliferation. It is urgent and necessary for the US to make efforts to contain the spread of nuclear weapons by adopting the new strategy on a global front by putting forward the initiative of a nuclear-free world.

As the only superpower, with the largest number of nuclear warheads, the US not only has a moral responsibility to act, but should take the lead to reduce and finally eliminate the nuclear warheads. It is very important for the US to take the lead. Obama's statement of pursuit of ratification of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), building a new framework for civil nuclear agreement and efforts to strengthen the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are a good start toward that effort. It signals that the US is aware of the negative role of nuclear weapons in international security and shows its willingness and responsibility to world peace and stability.

However, those efforts are far from being enough. The Obama administration ignores one of the most important reasons for a country to go nuclear. What's worse, Obama's words that the US will maintain nuclear weapons to deter any adversary and guarantee the defense to their allies as long as these weapons exist have an adverse effect on his efforts to achieve his goal of a nuclear-free world. Considering the imbalance of military power in terms of nuclear deterrence and conventional forces, countries such as Iran and the DPRK will have no other alternative but to choose nuclear weapons as their talisman to secure their regime.

The US should take those countries' security concerns into account so as to mitigate their impulse to develop nuclear weapons. Without solving the fundamental security concerns of certain countries by changing US policy hostile to those countries, even if the US calls for international cooperation, President Obama's goal of a nuclear-free world is just like a city in the sky.

Ms. Rebecca NEAME

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, efforts have been made to ensure international security from the threat posed by nuclear energy. Despite progress by the international community in reducing the nuclear threat, weaknesses in the non-proliferation regime have become evident in recent years. One does not have to delve too deeply to ascertain factors contributing to the current weakened state of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). These include clandestine nuclear activities, the spread of nuclear technology and knowledge, unsecured nuclear materials and facilities, the inability to deal with non-compliance, modernization of nuclear weapons arsenals and their continued inclusion in military strategy, and renewed interest in nuclear power.

The case of Iran has in particular caused a great deal of concern over the ability of the international community to prevent further spread of nuclear weapons. Iran's continued nuclear activities have also highlighted a fundamental division among NPT States Parties in regards to the right and responsibilities availed to them under Article IV of the treaty. Russia and the United States have worked towards lowering the number of nuclear weapons in their arsenals. While reductions have indeed been made, many strategic and tactical weapons remain deployed and on hair-trigger alert. From the perception of some states, this sends a mixed message about the importance of disarmament. It is troubling that in spite of the existing framework and international norm against nuclear proliferation, it is still possible for states to develop nuclear weapons, to which the nuclear test explosions conducted by India, North Korea and Pakistan attest.

From his speech in Prague in April, 2009, it is clear that President Obama recognizes both the importance of making a shift in thinking and in policy, and that the United States has a crucial role to play in achieving a world free from the nuclear threat. Renewed interest in

multilateral approaches and collective action to tactical collective problems demonstrates a move away from the nuclear policies of the Bush Administration.

One aspect worth particular attention was Obama's specific reference to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). He stated that one of the concrete steps toward international peace and security will be the immediate and aggressive pursuance of US ratification of this treaty. Despite then-President Clinton being the first world leader to sign the CTBT, the Senate has failed to ratify, leaving the United States in the 'group of hold-outs.' The rejection by the Senate in 1999 has held back the treaty's progress, as the US is one of 44 states that must sign and ratify the treaty in order for it to enter in force. Fifteen states have not signed, and only 148 out of the 180 signatory states have ratified. China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and the United States are the remaining Annex II signatory states, whose ratification is required for the treaty to enter into force. In addition, DPRK, India and Pakistan must both sign and ratify for the Treaty to enter into force.

The failure of the Senate to ratify the CTBT has sent a signal to other states that the development and maintenance of nuclear weapons is a priority for the United States, and of greater importance than the success of the treaty. However, according to Obama, this is no longer the case. The support for the CTBT expressed by Obama in Prague is reflected in the 2010 budget request, which included \$26 million for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). During the Bush Administration, the United States had its voting rights within the CTBTO suspended due to outstanding accounts. Thus, reinstating financial contributions demonstrates a significant repositioning of priorities.

If Obama can convince the Senate to approve ratification, there would be a flow-on effect for some of the remaining group of hold-out states. Indonesia recently indicated its intention to ratify the treaty if the US manages to do so. Given its interest in potentially developing a domestic nuclear power system, this would be an important move. While it is unlikely that all of the remaining Annex II states will follow as quickly, ratification of the CTBT by the US can be seen as an expression of commitment by the current Administration to the wider goal of disarmament. The perception that US nuclear weapons pose a threat to the national security of some states contributes to the desire to acquire such weapons. If there is to be any hope for a world without nuclear weapons, reducing their role in military defense and strategy is a key step in the right direction.

More broadly, US ratification may build momentum for other aspects of the non-proliferation regime that have been stagnated, such as the terms of conditions on the negotiations of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Such a treaty would ban the production of new weapons grade fissile material. In conjunction with a more effective CTBT, the creation of new nuclear weapons would be much more difficult than in present circumstances. In addition, the CTBT and a FMCT provide a mechanism for the inclusion of de-facto nuclear weapons states into non-proliferation efforts, without joining the NPT itself. This may allow hastened progress towards the global reduction or eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. If global disarmament is to occur, the entry into force of the CTBT is crucial, and US ratification will be an imperative step in that process.

Ratification will not be an easy task, as there will still be opposition to the CTBT from within the Senate. Despite the voluntary moratorium on testing adhered to by the US since 1992, there may still be unease at the prospect of closing off that option. The major concern will be that other states may surpass US nuclear weapons capabilities. However, leading by example will be the most effective way of encouraging others to step in the same direction.

Ms. NI Shan

US President Obama's speech in Prague was of great concern to the international community. President Obama proposed to seek peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons through international cooperation. He issued a large scale plan of arms-control which involves reducing numbers of nuclear weapons and recognizing the rights of developing countries to pursue research on the development of nuclear technology. Moreover, he promised that the US would take the lead in reducing quantities of nuclear weapons, such as by holding a global nuclear security summit to mark his commitment to non-proliferation with firm ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which won the support of Russia, China, and EU countries.

However, based on what he argued for and his strong determination, it is easy for us to find that the features of flexible diplomacy of a new government have been dramatically highlighted. Compared to the unilateralism and isolationist diplomacy of the Bush Administration, the diplomatic style of Obama has shown warmth and generosity of spirit for common peaceful purposes. Therefore, the use of smart power¹⁵ has definitely shown that the global strategy of the US has switched from the Bush administration's outward offensive to a more restrained strategic one under President Obama's leadership. Additionally, moral diplomacy has been emphasized by his inspiring speech.

First, moral leadership seems particularly important with positive effects in improving the national image of the US under the current global conditions. Although the US is still the greatest power in the world, it has faced serious challenges and problems. The most rigorous one is the financial crisis starting in August 2008. Meanwhile, the US has hit a grim milestone in Iraq. Consequently, the national image of the US has been greatly damaged. Obama extended in his speech the intention to claim the moral high ground in and his promise to take the lead in building a nuclear-free world, showing a high sense of responsibility and strengthening the people's confidence in the recovery of US economic prosperity.

Second, moral diplomacy would instill new vitality into the relationship between the US and the Muslim world as well as win more trust from other nation partners. Just as Obama stressed, "My administration will seek engagement with Iran based on mutual interests and mutual respect." Due to the huge costs of hostility between the US and the Muslim world, which has burdened the US, the new US administration has been making efforts to reduce enmity common peace and international security. Moral diplomacy is

¹⁵ Smart Power Initiative seeks to engage in a national dialogue to draw to America's side the support of friends and allies in the pursuit of its national security interests.

always seen as a flexible use of soft power without massive military force. In consequence, being more open to the Muslim world is not only a practical choice, it is also an effective and preventive way to eliminate the tension that may cause some terrorist attacks. The flexibility of moral diplomacy based on smart power enhanced mutual trust between the US and other partners. Countries which have the same national core interests are aligned to face the mixed security challenges of the modern world, especially in the area of nuclear proliferation.

Nevertheless, we may find that Obama's suggestions of building a clear world without nuclear weapons lack possibilities in the practical sense. The reasons for this may be concluded as follows: 1. It is not easy for a nuclear power to completely abandon its nuclear capability, which could be treated as a "Security Dilemma," thus, only by mutual cooperation could we gradually get rid of this dilemma; 2. With the lower threshold of nuclear power, the numbers of countries with capabilities of nuclear power would increase instead of being cut off. As Hans J. Morgenthau remarked, "the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power."¹⁶ Because of the nature of national power, such activities of non-proliferation could be taken as a tool for maintaining power by these great powers to a greater extent. However, this does not mean that there are no initiatives, even creative actions, in proliferation of nuclear. President Obama's suggestions included building an international fuel bank to provide access to enough sources of peaceful power, having a Global Summit on Nuclear Security that the US will host, etc. These specific acts of cooperation made by great powers in the area of non-proliferation by means of moral diplomacy should be paid high attention and awareness.

In conclusion, what President Obama addressed from his speech is the very embodiment of the strategic culture of the US, which results in the consciousness of moral diplomacy to deal with hot issues. The advantages of related measures are thought to be a feature of Smart Power. This kind of foreign policy has managed to shape the influence of morality by means of "smart and intelligent" approaches, such as through flexibility and kindness, to receive commending evaluations. Furthermore, although there is still a long way to build a peaceful world without nuclear weapons, such initiatives are a big step toward nuclear non-proliferation. However, no matter which specific means are used, the US' powerful national strength is a cornerstone, thus a strong and indispensable military is still considered a key component of US foreign policy. Hence, the Obama administration consistently emphasizes that it is necessary for the US to keep some nuclear deterrent before accomplishing its goal of "Zero Nuclear Weapons."

Ms. Young Jin YANG

President Obama's speech in Prague represents a significant shift in US nuclear strategy. He proclaimed that the United States will take the lead in creating a nuclear-free world, thereby ending the circular discourse of who should "go first" in reducing the spread of nuclear weapons and encouraging non-nuclear states to continue to participate in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) system. He reaffirmed his determination as he remained steadfast

¹⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fifth Edition, Revised, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, pp. 4-15.

in his commitment to nonproliferation in the face of North Korea's rocket launch just a few hours before he delivered his speech. While Obama's nuclear strategy is idealistic and ambitious, it is noble.

Admittedly, Obama's plan to take moral leadership in nuclear disarmament and create a nuclear-free world might sound impractical and infeasible. Obama himself acknowledged that his plan might not materialize during his lifetime. It is unclear as to how effective his idealistic nuclear strategy would be vis-à-vis the actual nuclear weapons. However, being frustrated by the NPT's weaknesses, or the lack of progress in disarmament, is one thing and working outside of the NPT framework and introducing new measures, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), is another. The previous Bush administration did not support the NPT; instead, it took unilateral steps to increase US nuclear capability. Under Bush, the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia, developed missile defense systems, refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and started the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program. US-India strategic ties made Bush's nuclear strategy even more controversial. More importantly, the counter-proliferation measures that Bush adopted outside of the NPT system – i.e. the PSI or UNSC 1540 – failed to stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapons program or Iran from launching a nuclear program. North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 and conducted an underground nuclear test in 2006. Iran has been producing enriched uranium.

Obama's initiative toward a world free of nuclear weapons can help reduce the complaints from non-nuclear weapon states significantly. At the sixth NPT Review Conference in 2000, non-nuclear states criticized nuclear states for not following the 13 practical steps. The seventh NPT Review Conference ended without a final declaration because non-nuclear states strongly opposed nuclear states' plan to restrict the rights of North Korea and Iran. Obama's willingness to take a "moral responsibility" as the first and only nation to have used a nuclear weapon may renew American leadership and restore its legitimacy. After all, the US and Russia are more likely to gain wider support from the world in strengthening the NPT or imposing sanctions against countries that violate the NPT when the two powers are at the forefront of "reducing the role of nuclear weapons," cutting down the number of warheads and arsenals, banning nuclear testing, or prohibiting the production of fissile materials. However, the US should also be able to reassure its alliance partners that its new nuclear policy would not jeopardize their security during the process.

It is still premature to predict the centrality of Obama's proposal toward nuclear disarmament. This will largely depend on whether the Obama administration would be able to bring North Korea back into the NPT or whether it would be able to halt Iran's nuclear program within the NPT regime. Although it is true that the NPT regime confronts a number of challenges today, it is equally true that the same system has helped defuse nuclear tension around the world. Absent the NPT regime, the world would be at a higher risk of nuclear proliferation. If the eighth NPT Review Conference concludes successfully as Obama envisions, a stronger NPT regime is expected to arise and his speech will be remembered as one of the greatest speeches in modern history.

Ms. YING Chen

“Moral leadership is more powerful than any weapon.” I think this is the core point of President Obama’s speech. If this becomes common sense among humans, nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation should not be so difficult and complicated.

Weapons are the embodiment of violence and violence produces nothing but more violence. The Cold War demonstrated this clearly. Rousseau said that voluntary giving not violent conquest is the only way to proper power. Apparently voluntary giving can only be led by trust. If we say A trusts B, that means A thinks the development of B is an advantage, not a threat. We cannot imagine trust will last if A does not believe B always acts in a rational and responsible way. In others word, morality is the only way to gain proper power.

There is a hot phrase in today’s international politics: soft power. As Joseph Nye defined it, soft power is the capability of making other actors act according to my will by attraction rather than force. Nye asserted that a country’s soft power could be weighed through three dimensions: national cohesion, cultural influence and roles in international institutions.

But as Samuel Huntington has pointed out, soft power is always based on hard power. American culture prevails over the world because America has the most advanced economy and industry. Similarly, America plays an important role in international institutions because it has the strongest power economically as well as militarily. Historically, Russia had a strong attraction in the 1930’s. In those days, America was going through the Great Depression while Russia had an amazing growth rate of 20 percent. As a result of that, 100,000 Americans migrated to Russia. Even in 1984, the famous economist and 1970s Nobel Prize winner John Kenneth Galbraith still argued: the success of Russia owes to the planning system taking plenty of advantage of human resources. But these days, people believe that the planning system constrains creativity, positivity, and human imagination.

Well then, is soft power meaningless? The answer is: No. Soft power does exist. If somebody moves our hearts deeply, or if we believe somebody will treat us nicely and his efforts are in good motivation to benefit us, we will follow him voluntarily. In other words, the power that can make us follow somebody voluntarily is moral power. As Kant said, morality is deep in our hearts. Moral life is an eternal objective of human beings.

Nye realized morality is a factor of soft power. He argued that whether the US will succeed in treating the new threats of the global information era is not only decided by the military and economic capability of the United States, but also by soft power as represented by its culture and values, by whether other nations feel themselves respected by US policy.

In my opinion, morality is not just an average factor of soft power. It is the core and most important factor. It is the very factor that makes soft power independent from hard power. I believe President Obama would agree with me. When he announced new threats demand us to listen to one another and work together, pledged the United States was now ready to lead in those global efforts and that a nation’s destiny should never be determined

without its voice being heard, the power of morality emanated from his heart as well as his words.

As far as nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation is concerned, to find the common sense that moral leadership is more powerful than any weapon is of great significance. Nuclear states want to maintain their arsenals and non-nuclear states want to obtain nuclear weapons because they believe nuclear weapons are the most powerful type in the world. They believe that nuclear weapons will ensure their security, enhance their national status in international politics and economics, and deter potential attack. But, if those nations realized nuclear weapons are not so powerful, at least not as powerful as moral leadership, why would they try to get nuclear weapons at the risk of international opposition?

Of course, we cannot persuade these nations to give up nuclear weapons just by words. The first measure we must take is proving ourselves as moral actors. Those nations owning a more important international status are bound to take more responsibility in this problem. We are glad to hear that President Obama promised the United States is now ready to lead. I believe the PRC is also ready to prove itself as a moral actor. President Obama said, "To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same." That will become a good beginning of well-ordered nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. Let's expect a more detailed schedule.

In Chinese, the word for "military" (*zhigeweiwu*) is composed of the word for "stop" and the word "*ge*" for a kind of weapon. That suggests military power is an instrument to stop violence and eliminate harmful actions. The object of military is peace, not competition and killing. This opinion should be treated as another guide for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. In this standard, nuclear weapons are an unqualified military power because of its huge execution impact. Once nuclear weapons are put into use, victims are killed indiscriminately, regardless of their role or nature. On the other side, if we all accede that the military is just a way that leads to peace, if nations never use military power to pursue aims other than peace, a moral international order can be expected.

Mr. ZHANG Yu "Philip"

President Barack Obama delivered a speech concerning the concept of establishing a world without nuclear weapons and possible control measures of nuclear tests at Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic on April 5, 2009.

Through a series of high-level emissaries, President Obama and President Medvedev prepared the grounds for a joint statement, released in London on April 1, which addressed a wide range of bilateral and international strategic issues. This was followed on April 4 by Obama's historic speech at Prague in which he spoke eloquently of his plans for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

These plans involve three key arms control initiatives. The most immediate is the renewal of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. This treaty between the US and Russia has,

since 1991, provided the legal and technical framework for massive and verifiable disarmament. However, the Treaty is expiring on December 5 and urgently needs to be renewed to enable further arms reduction. In their joint statement, Obama and Medvedev promised to seek an even greater reduction than agreed upon in the 2002 Moscow Treaty signed by George Bush and Vladimir Putin. Several existing areas of friction between the US and Russia, including US missile defense plans in Eastern Europe and NATO extension, could come in the way.

The next item addressed by Obama is the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Obama, in his Prague speech, has reversed this policy and declared the US will seek a treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials. FMCT has serious implications for India, as discussed earlier in these columns.

Finally, the most inspiring aspect of the Obama-Medvedev proposals is the emphasis on ridding the world of nuclear weapons altogether. That is historic. To set up a world without nuclear weapons is the core of Obama's speech.

President Obama created a new type of foreign policy the moment he took office. "Obamaism" is the key word and shows the friendly approach to the relations with other countries. Since Obama became the Presidential, he showed great a difference in his views of foreign policy than that of the Bush administration. He strongly opposed unilateralism and made great efforts to reconstruct the international image of the United States. We believe the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, the closure of the Guantanamo Bay Jail, establishing more friendly and cooperative relations with the Muslim countries, etc. are the concrete evidence to show the world is welcoming a changed America.

As President Obama's remarks in Prague mentioned, the United States would set up a goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Obama didn't "invent" this idea. Dating back to 2007, the concept was raised by a few US former high-level government officials including Dr. Henry Alfred Kissinger. The essential point is President Obama made the concept official.

As a Chinese scholar, I welcome more cooperative and constructive Sino-US relations. However, we do need to pay attention to the new trend of US diplomacy. During the Bush's administration, US international image and soft power was negatively affected. Obama's first task concerning diplomacy is to rebuild that image and soft power. During Hillary Clinton's visit to Japan, she wielded "smart power." Smart power, as we understand, is 10 percent soft power plus 90 percent hard power. Hard power is still the key element that US foreign policy relies on.

As far as I am concerned, "smart power" is a nice and intelligent approach, but with the topic of nuclear control, hard power still stands as a core inner impetus of US foreign policy. According to deterrence theory, the international community still regards nuclear weapons as a great potential threat. The US claims to want a world without nuclear weapons but it's easier said than done. Apart from that, even if one day all countries give up the possession of nuclear weapons, the US may have stronger deterrence through its

conventional weapons. It's said that the US has the ability to mobilize, launch and hit any location in China within 15 minutes. And China needs to be clear about what we are facing.

President Obama's attitude to the world is precious. The United States abandoned unilateralism and returned the way of seeking cooperation and understanding which is a big change of American foreign policy. From this trend, China may seek opportunity to work with the US on some global issues, like climate change. As Obama once mentioned about setting up more friendly personal relations with Chinese leaders, we may learn that Sino-US relations may lead to a more cooperative and constructive future.

Appendix A

About the Authors

Mr. Justin BISHOP is pursuing an MA in Diplomacy and Military Studies at Hawaii Pacific University with a focus on Chinese energy security and its implications for the global security environment. Justin currently works at Pacific Forum CSIS as a Research Assistant, and at Cubic Applications as a Research Analyst. Previously, Justin served as a Research Assistant at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, with a focus on Counter-terrorism in South and Southeast Asia. Mr. Bishop has worked on a wide variety of projects including: Chinese energy security, the CSCAP WMD Handbook, military modernization throughout Asia, and South/ South East Asia terror issues.

Ms. Catherine BOYE is pursuing an MA in international policy studies with a specialization in international security at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. She was the 2009 Monterey Fellow with Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu. She received a B.A. in political science and a B.A. in international studies from the University of Utah in 2006. Her research interests include Chinese military policy, Chinese energy policy, East Asian Security, disarmament and nonproliferation.

Mr. Lyndon BURFORD is a nuclear disarmament specialist with several years' experience in research, education and public outreach in this field. Lyndon has a MA in Political Science and a Postgraduate Degree in Diplomacy and International Relations (both with First Class Honours) from the University of Canterbury, New Zealand. His MA thesis examined the historical influence of non-governmental organizations on New Zealand's nuclear disarmament advocacy. Lyndon's experience in education and public outreach was gained at the non-governmental *Disarmament & Security Centre* (Christchurch, New Zealand) where he worked part time from 2005-2007. He is working as an independent researcher, examining New Zealand's nuclear disarmament advocacy from 2000 to the present day.

Mr. Sungmin CHO is a MA candidate in International Relations at Peking University in Beijing, China since September 2008. He has served in the position of intelligence officer in the Korea Army from 2005 to 2008 to include seven month-long tour to Iraq in 2006. He received his B.S in Political Science and International Relations at Korea University in Seoul, Korea. He was one of the founding members as well as the first president of the Korea University Buddy Program, which assists international students in living and studying at Korea University. He spent one year as an exchange student at the University of British Columbia, in Vancouver, Canada in 2003-2004 and participated in the Canada International Model UN in 2004. He is currently working on his dissertation with focus on the North Korean nuclear issue and its impact on Sino-US relation.

Ms. Kate FARRELL is a Master of Arts student at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand. Her research is focused on nuclear non-proliferation and regional approaches to non-compliance with the NPT. She completed her undergraduate studies in Political Science and Communications and received her honours degree in Diplomacy and International Relations. Kate spent some time researching in Europe in 2008 for her master's thesis, and is

currently tutoring in international relations and media and politics at the University of Canterbury

Ms. Kim FASSLER is pursuing a Master's degree in International Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and will do her second year of graduate work in Mandarin at the Hopkins Nanjing Center starting in the fall. She received her Bachelor's degree from Williams College in political science and Chinese. Originally from Honolulu, Hawaii, she worked as a reporter for The Honolulu Advertiser and currently writes a blog for their online site.

Ms. HO Thi Hong Hanh is a Researcher for the Institute of Diplomacy and Strategic Studies Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hanoi. She received her Master's Degree in European politics and policies studies from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Belgium. She obtained her Bachelor's Degree in international law from the Institute for International Relations in Hanoi. Past work experience includes analyzing overseas Vietnamese communities in Europe for the Committee for Overseas Vietnamese of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and working as a reporter for the English magazine *Vietnam Economic News*.

Dr. Togzhan KASSENOVA is a Senior Research Associate at the Washington DC office of the Center for International Trade and Security (The University of Georgia). In 2007-2008 she was a postdoctoral fellow at James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) in Monterey, California. She holds a Ph.D. in Politics from the University of Leeds (United Kingdom). Her primary areas of research are WMD non-proliferation and strategic trade controls. For several years Togzhan worked as a journalist and later as a university professor. Her first book, *From Antagonism to Partnership: the Uneasy Path of the US-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction* (ibidem-Verlag/Stuttgart), was published in 2007.

Ms. Nadya LARSEN holds an MA in International Policy Studies from Monterey Institute of International Studies, where her specialization was Security/Terrorism Studies. She also has a BA in International Studies with Magna Cum Laude Honors from Monterey Institute of International Studies, Bachelor of Arts in American and German Studies from Johann Wolfgang Goethe University (Frankfurt, Germany) and Bachelor of Arts in Teaching Foreign Languages from Karelian State Pedagogical University (Petrozavodsk, Russia). She has worked on the 2008 Nuclear Posture Review Project for Monterey Institute Terrorism Research and Education Program Center, the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies, Washington D.C. and General Dynamics Company requested by US Congress. Nadya is a fall 2009 Pacific Forum CSIS Vasey Fellow researching Russian Far East nuclear facilities as a weak link in the war against terrorism.

Mr. Adam Liff is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Politics at Princeton University. Before beginning his doctoral studies, he lived and worked in mainland China and Japan for several years. His most recent position was as a research associate at the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE), a think tank in Tokyo. He has worked as a MEXT research scholar affiliated with the University of Tokyo's Graduate School of Law

and Politics and as an intern in the Liberal Democratic Party's headquarters. He speaks, reads, and writes Japanese and Mandarin Chinese.

Ms. LIU Jing is a Ph.D.candidate in the Department of International Politics, School of International Studies at Renmin University. Her research interests include Chinese overseas interests, Asian-Pacific security and Sino-US relations. She received her M.A. in political science at the Renmin University of China in 2007 and her B.A. in political science at Zhengzhou University in 2005.

Mr. LIU Junbo is an assistant research fellow at the Department for Information and Contingencies Analysis at the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS). His research focuses mainly on Northeast Asian Security issues, especially the Korean Peninsula and conflict management. He majored in diplomacy and got his M.A from China Foreign Affairs University in 2003. His publications include *A Study of Conflict Management Theory, Conflict Management and DPRK's Nuclear Issue, Analysis on the Conditions of Third Party's International Crisis Management, The Blacklist Dispute: US vs. DPRK, Assessment of Japan's Nuclear Choice after the DPRK's Nuclear Test*. He also published numerous internet articles.

Ms. Rebecca NEAME is completing her MA at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch, New Zealand. Her thesis examines the current international proposals for a multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle, and analyses the responses of states to this concept. Rebecca holds a B.A. in German, a Graduate Diploma in Political Science, and a B.A. (Hons) in Diplomacy and International Relations. She has worked with other postgraduate students on Chapter 5 of the CSCAP Handbook and Action Plan, outlining multilateral WMD security initiatives in Asia Pacific. She also volunteers as a refugee support worker, assisting former refugee families with the resettlement process in New Zealand.

Ms. NI Shan was born in Shanghai and is currently a graduate student in diplomacy at the China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU). Her research interests are diplomacy of nations from the Asia Pacific and non-traditional security. Before that, she graduated from Shanghai Jiao Tong University with a major in public administration/cultural administration and minor in law. Due to excellent performance, she was the only one admitted to CFAU for the Master's program in diplomacy without any exams. She participated in both the Harvard Model United Nations (2007) as the Tanzania delegate on the Legal Committee and in the Beijing Foreign Studies University Model United Nations (2008) as the US delegate on the Security Council. The Model UN activities deeply aroused her interests in international affairs, as did her time as an exchange student at the National University of Singapore (NUS) studying public policy and public and business management. She is socially active as the vice president of CFAU Graduate Student Union and in her volunteer work with the Shanghai Charity Federation.

Mr. Raymund Jose G. QUILOP, an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of the Philippines-Diliman, is currently seconded to the Department of National Defense as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Strategic Assessments.

Areas of interest include non-proliferation and disarmament issues, Philippine relations with the US and China, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and preventive diplomacy, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), democracy and the process of democratization, civil-military relations in the Philippines, and the Mindanao conflict in the Philippines. He regularly participates in international and local conferences where he presents essays on those topics. He has published essays in both foreign and local publications pertaining to these and other related issues. He lectures in government training institutions such as the Department of Foreign Affairs' Foreign Service Institute, National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP), AFP Command and General Staff College, the Army General Staff College, Air Force Officer School and Air Power Institute, and the Naval Education and Training Command, as well as in private and business institutions. Prof. Quilop serves as the associate editor of the Philippine Political Science Journal, as well as editor-in-chief of the OSS Digest, a quarterly research publication of the Office of Strategic and Special Studies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. He is also the Secretary of the International Honor Society of Phi Kappa Phi's UP Chapter. He holds a Master of Arts degree in Political Science from the University of the Philippines – Diliman where he also obtained his Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science (Summa Cum Laude) in 1995.

Ms. Young Jin YANG, the 2009 Vasey Fellow and the first Kelly Fellow with Pacific Forum CSIS, is from Seoul, Korea. She received her B.A. in international relations from Mount Holyoke College and her M.A. in international studies from the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University. Ms. Yang has previously interned with the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, South Korea.

Ms. YING Chen is a Ph.D. candidate at the Institute of International Strategic and Development Studies (IISDS), School of Public Policy and Management (SPPM), Tsinghua University. She received her MPA at Tsinghua University and her Bachelor's degree in administration at Yunnan University. She previously served as a civil servant with various local governments.

Mr. ZHANG Yu “Philip” is a Ph. D. candidate in diplomacy at the China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU). His research focuses on the foreign policy making and non-traditional security issues in the Asia Pacific region. Before that, he studied English for BA at Nanjing Normal University and MA in diplomacy at CFAU. During his MA studies, he was chosen to work in the Beijing Olympic Organizing Committee for a year acting as Protocol Manager and Interpreter in the International Dignitary Program. He used to serve as the Member of Standing Committee of All-China Student Federation, Vice-President of Jiangsu Provincial Student Federation and President of University Students' Union. From 2004, he was honored the qualification to be an adjudicator for National English Debating Competitions and played an active role in promoting Chinese Debating association.

Appendix B



**Ninth Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on
Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific
Asia Hotel - Beijing, China, June 28-30, 2009**

Sunday, June 28, 2009

18:30 Welcome Reception/Opening Dinner

Monday, June 29, 2009

8:30am *Young Leaders meet Brad Glosserman and Victoria Hart in Asia Hotel lobby for program introduction.*

9:00 **Welcome remarks** (CSCAP Vietnam and USCSCAP)

9:15 **Session 1: Developments in the Global Nonproliferation Regime**
Discussions will focus on developments since our last meeting that impact the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. What is the status of the Iranian nuclear negotiations? What impact has the US-India civilian nuclear agreement had on the non-proliferation regime? What are the prospects for and the implications of US-Russia arms control agreements to replace START 1? What is the status of the 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)? What can CSCAP contribute to improve the likelihood of success? What are the implications of the inability of the IAEA to elect a new Director General? How do these developments affect the Asia-Pacific region?

10:45 **Session 2: Developments on the Korean Peninsula**
This session will examine the status of denuclearization in Korea. What are the respective parties' assessments? Can the Six-Party Talks be resumed? What are the alternatives to those talks? What actions could be taken to move the process forward? What is its impact on the global nonproliferation regime? What kind of positive role can/should CSCAP and/or ARF play in the process?

14:00 **Session 3: Developments in the Disarmament Movement**
This session will discuss prospects for nuclear disarmament. How should we define nuclear disarmament? How do we envision the disarmament process? What approaches to disarmament have been proposed? How realistic are these proposals? Is a “grand bargain” between nuclear weapon states and nonnuclear weapon states possible? How would such proposals be implemented? Are confidence-building measures possible and feasible? How would these developments affect security relationships in the Asia-Pacific region and how can countries in the region – and CSCAP – contribute?

15:45 **Session 4: UNSCR 1540 and Regional Organizations**
This session will focus on the role of regional organizations in implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540 in the Asia-Pacific. What role could regional organizations such as ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum play in implementing UNSCR 1540? Would involvement with UNSCR 1540 implementation influence states’ views of the role of these organizations? What role have regional organizations in other regions of the world played? Are there lessons to be learned from their experiences?

Tuesday June 30, 2009

9:00 **Session 5: Review and update of Asia-Pacific WMD Handbook**
This session will provide an update on the Asia-Pacific WMD Handbook. It will include a review of completed chapters as necessary.

10:15 **Session 6: Asia-Pacific Action Plan Breakout Session**
In this session individual breakout groups will meet to review and consolidate recommendations for the Action Plan provided by the member committees. Each group will focus on developing the contents of a specific CSCAP Memorandum and prepare recommendations for the plenary session. Young leaders will be integrated into each group. [Initial focus is to develop separate memos for the following areas: disarmament, weapons free zones, WMD nonproliferation regime implementation, civilian nuclear energy safety and security, and utilization and coordination of outreach programs similar to the one on export controls.

13:30 **Session 7: Asia-Pacific Action Plan Plenary Session**
Action Plan working groups will present their recommendations for the development of a CSCAP Memorandum on the individual topics being addressed by the working group.

15:30 **Session 7: Wrap up and Future Plans**
This session will focus on future work of the Study Group. How should the Study Group focus its efforts? How can the WMD Study Group complement and support the ARF Intersessional Meeting on Nonproliferation and Disarmament? How can it coordinate with other Study Groups? How can it better facilitate the implementation of its recommendations?



PACIFIC FORUM CSIS
YOUNG LEADERS

Young Leaders Roundtable: Nonproliferation and Disarmament in Asia
Beijing, China • Wednesday, 1 July 2009
Asia Hotel (Ya Zhou Da Jiu Dian) • 8 Xinzhong Xijie, Gongti Beilu, Beijing 100027
亚洲大酒店 • 北京工体北路新中西街 8 号

9:00 – 10:15AM Young Leaders Panel:

Togzhan Kassenova

Nadya Larsen

10:30 – 11:45 Professor Hua Han

11:45 – 13:45 Lunch (Origus (好伦哥) Restaurant)

13:45 – 14:50 Professor TENG Jianqun

Senior Research Fellow and Deputy Secretary General

China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA)

15:00 – 16:00 Admiral Yang Yi

Director, Institute for Strategic Studies

PLA National Defense University

16:15 – 18:00 Young Leaders Discussion Session:

Post-conference group wrap-up among Young Leaders.

19:00 Dinner

Delightful Spring (Yihe Chuntian 怡和春天) Restaurant