



Tomorrow's Views and Future Challenges:
Generational Differences in
Security Perceptions



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Pacific Forum CSIS

Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate arenas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

The Young Leaders Program

The Young Leaders Program invites young professionals and graduate students to join Pacific Forum policy dialogues and conferences. The program fosters education in the practical aspects of policy-making, generates an exchange of views between young and seasoned professionals, promotes interaction among younger professionals, and enriches dialogues with generational perspectives for all attendees. Fellows must have a strong background in the area covered by the conference they are attending and an endorsement from respected experts in their field. Supplemental programs in conference host cities and mentoring sessions with senior officials and specialists add to the Young Leader experience. The Young Leaders Program is currently supported by Chevron, the Henry Luce Foundation, and the Yuchengco Group, with a growing number of universities, institutes, and organizations also helping to sponsor individual participants. For more details, see the Pacific Forum CSIS website, www.pacforum.org, or contact Brad Glosserman, director of the Young Leaders Program, at brad@pacforum.org.

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Introduction

In 2004, Pacific Forum CSIS founded the Young Leaders program because it had become apparent to us that a generational transition was underway in the Asia Pacific region and many of the assumptions that guided thinking about regional relations were being re-examined. The YL program has tried to hone in on the seeming divergence of views. In the meantime, it has become one of Pacific Forum's most important initiatives: after 6 years, we have over 350 alumni from over 25 countries. In addition to providing a platform for this group's views, it has offered them unparalleled access to decision makers, unique insights into how the track two and the foreign policy decision making process work, and, perhaps most significantly, has offered this group a chance to begin the process of community building. If confidence, trust, and respect are the cornerstones of effective foreign policy, then the Young Leaders program is laying a foundation for the future.

In 2009, ASEAN ISIS, the network of think tanks in Southeast Asia that hosts the annual Asia Pacific Roundtable, decided to hold a panel that would feature next generation perspectives on regional security. It asked the Pacific Forum CSIS to solicit the views of its Young Leaders and identify suitable candidates to present on the topic at the 23rd APR. We queried participants, received about 10 responses and selected three – to ensure a diversity of views – that we forwarded to the conference organizers. Those three papers – by Catherine Boye, Tetsuo Kotani, and Chin-Hao Huang – were presented at the conference and generated a lively discussion afterward. In addition, the conference hosts were kind enough to provide waive fees for other Young Leaders so that we could assemble a group of about 10 people to attend the APR, the pre-eminent track-two security discussion in Southeast Asia. Our YLs were joined by other young professionals from New Zealand, which has started a similar project. After the conference, all the YL participants updated their original submissions, while the New Zealand contingent wrote short essays on the importance of generational differences. All those papers are included here.

Reading the papers it is apparent that we have only begun to plumb the meaning of a generational transition in the Asia Pacific. It is overly simplistic to say that all members of the next generation of strategists see security in a new light – the traditional realist paradigm retains a tight grip on the academy and security professionals – but they do appear more ready to challenge prevailing thinking. Moreover, it isn't clear that we have begun to think systematically about the structural differences that distinguish this generation from its predecessors. We hope to do so in the future. In the interim, this is an encouraging start.

Next Generation Challenges

By Catherine Boye

“Comprehensive security” presents many new challenges to states. This paper will outline the three greatest security challenges of tomorrow and detail generational differences in thinking about security.

Before identifying future challenges, I want to distinguish between a challenge and a threat. Identifying a threat is only the first step in a process of dealing with threats. Today’s threats are many and varied; there are the traditional issues such as territorial disputes, internal cohesion, and attacks from other states, as well as nontraditional security concerns such as climate change, pandemic diseases, cyber attacks, natural disasters, and economic insecurity. A challenge is the way to minimize or remove a threat. A challenge is not the threat itself but the way one deals with the threat.

The three greatest challenges of the future will be 1) the movement away from a concept of security based solely on national governments and militaries to a concept of security maintained by an assortment of actors; 2) movement from a reactive to proactive view of security; and 3) prevention of stalling or backward movement in trade liberalization.

Security maintained by an assortment of actors

The threats facing societies have changed. Traditional threats still exist but new, or in some cases, old threats viewed in a new way, require a new approach to security. One of the hardest shifts will be away from the belief that the national government and military are the sole actors able to guarantee a society’s security. It will become necessary for other groups to be incorporated into the structures that work to maintain the health and security of a society. While internal and external threats will at times require a response from the national government and military, and while both will have a role to play in dealing with new types of threats, the burden of providing security will fall on others too. These groups will include international organizations and large multinational coalitions, regional organizations and coalitions, local governments, and civil society.

Many of the threats that have caused this shift are transnational. Transnational threats, including climate change and pandemic diseases, can adversely affect every country and cannot be prevented by any single country alone. Solutions to these problems will need to be developed by most if not all nations. Any approach to these issues that is exclusive or discriminatory should be suspect. To organize such cooperation, international organizations or large multilateral coalitions must be involved. Organizations such as the UN and WHO can play important roles due to their large and diverse membership. These organizations and others like them should be seen not as a drain on resources and energy but as an important piece of the larger security structure.

Regional organizations have critical roles to play. Regional organizations are often better suited to deal with local issues because they have a more personal stake in the problem, understand the concerns better, and have a greater understanding of the sensitivities inherent in the issue. The Asia Pacific is a diverse and dynamic region. It is home to regional international organizations with great potential. New threats, such as the

resurgence of piracy off the East African coast must be watched carefully by those in the Asia Pacific. Many of the busiest shipping lanes in the world run through the Asia Pacific. Regional organizations can do much to prevent the same situations from arising in these busy shipping lanes. They can do this by working together to diminish the risk of war in areas close to important sea lanes and developing a system of best practices for groups operating in the area.

There are also diseases that are endemic to much of Asia but not to the entire world. These diseases can cause instability and slow economic development in disease stricken areas. The sharing of information about diseases and other problems with others in the region can lead to better, cheaper, and more effective solutions than a single government could provide. An example is the fight against counterfeit anti-malarial drugs. The fake drugs are often of high quality but contain no active medicine. The drugs are sold in every Asian country with endemic malaria. A regional coalition set up to complement the WHO run rapid alert system could greatly reduce the deaths caused by malaria and these fake drugs.

Local governments have an increasingly important role to play in maintaining security. Local governments have long dealt with internal security issues. Some development concerns as well as larger regional and transnational threats often have local effects that must be dealt with. Cities or counties located on a river could work with cities and counties in other countries upstream to deal with pollution, fishing issues and water use.

One group that can contribute to security but is often overlooked is civil society. In some countries, a working civil society is considered a threat. This is a mistake on many levels but I want to focus on the many benefits these groups can provide. Civil society can locate corruption, decrease crime, increase economic activity, identify areas of political or economic instability, and increase infrastructure security, among other things. Governments on both the state and local level should be finding ways to cooperate with civil society to protect internal security.

State governments and the military will still have a fundamental role in this new broad security scheme. There will continue to be the need to protect a country's territory and interests against other countries and rogue internal elements. But, as the role and importance of an organized armed force cannot be forgotten within this broader conception of security there should be the understanding that it alone is not sufficient. This transition will be one of the most important and difficult security challenges of the future.

This new view of security is not merely understanding that security threats are not necessarily external in nature or that state building is a security concern. Rather, it requires an understanding that any single government's efforts are unlikely to be enough to secure itself. This also means acknowledging the better your neighbor can deal with a pandemic disease, the more secure you are.

Most importantly, different groups should work together fluidly to provide security. Even small projects need cooperation from every group. A local monitoring station for emerging diseases might receive information from civil society, be run and staffed by the local government, funded by a national government, liaise with regional

and international organizations, and rely on the military in the event of an outbreak. If any of those links is not maintained, security would be compromised.

Proactive view of security

The new security paradigm should also attempt to change when and how a society deals with threats. For much of history, security has been reactive: governments usually respond to an immediate threat. The idea of working to prevent future threats has been gaining traction. Being proactive requires recognizing a potential threat and then taking action to either remove the threat or decrease the possibility that the threat will cause problems. One example is the recognition by governments that social unrest and armed insurrection are less likely in well developed areas; therefore they use infrastructure and economic development as a kind of threat prevention system. It is possible to be proactive about both traditional and nontraditional security threats.

Traditional security threats such as territorial disputes and internal security issues can be addressed by building trust and good relations with neighboring states. This helps to reduce tensions and make conflict between them less likely. Southeast Asia has understood for many years that internal security problems can often be prevented through state building activities. International, regional, and nongovernmental organizations can all work to identify areas of potential conflict and then act to prevent it through instruments such as track two dialogues, observer missions, targeted economic aid, confidence building measures, official good offices or mediation. The most difficult issue will be identifying potential flashpoints before they become too volatile; however, increased communication abilities such as the internet will make this easier.

There are territorial disputes throughout Asia. These potential flashpoints should be dealt with proactively. While solving these conflicts is often not possible in the short term much can be done to prevent these areas from becoming larger and more dangerous disputes. Creating codes of conduct, arranging coordinated patrols of the area, and keeping channels open to discuss the issue can all help minimize the tensions that surround these contentious issues. Land based disputes can be calmed through the use of international observers and agreements to limit military forces in the area. For maritime disputes the creation of special cooperative economic zones that jointly administer the exploration and development of natural resources, grant fishing rights and run patrols in the contested area is another options.

Nontraditional security issues can also be dealt with proactively. Nature, unlike an enemy state or rogue-armed group, cannot be deterred. But it is possible to prepare for these eventualities without making them more likely. Natural disasters, pandemic diseases, and climate change are especially pressing threats in the Asia Pacific region. Its unique ecosystems are especially vulnerable to warming temperatures and population centers are often located along coastlines that could be flooded if sea levels rise. The tropical region of Asia has been identified as the source of most new influenza strains and the most likely place for a new deadly strain to emerge. The geographic diversity that makes the Asia Pacific region so interesting also means its potential for natural disasters is greater: volcanic eruptions, cyclones, earthquakes, typhoons, floods, tsunamis, droughts, landslides, and in Northern Asia, blizzards are common.

While threats from the natural world cannot be prevented it is possible to develop systems to predict them and make their effects less severe. The development of early warning systems to detect earthquakes and the possible resulting tsunami, more advanced weather prediction capabilities and communication systems to provide information about natural disasters to far flung areas all provide extra time for governments and organizations to act and reduce casualties and destruction.

When a disaster does happen the international community often wishes to help and should be allowed to. Yet governments suffering from the effects of a disaster are often ill-prepared to deal with help from these groups: problems range from incompatible radios to visas. The creation of a regional response group is one way to deal with these eventualities. Groups that specialize in a type of disaster relief or fields such as search and rescue could apply for visas and customs exemptions for special equipment before an incident and can become active when a government requests assistance. When a disaster happens it will be possible for these groups to respond much quicker and in a more organized fashion.

It is possible for actors on every level to be involved in preventing or dealing with potential threats. Members of these different levels will see and understand threats differently from a government. People living in the country will be best able to spot emerging crop and livestock diseases. A local government could be best able to identify gangs as an emerging internal threat. These groups can be important in identifying new types of threats when they are small and more easily dealt with proactively.

Protecting against protectionism

Since the end of World War II, the idea of a free and open trading system has spread throughout the world and with it unprecedented prosperity. States have grown more interdependent and their interests have grown more entwined. Interdependence brought peace and security to many countries as development trumped historical differences and old enmities were replaced by shared success. These close ties proved to be a danger as well for when markets in one area of the world started to collapse it was not long before the markets elsewhere started to stumble.

The financial crisis and worldwide economic slump is affecting all governments but Asia has been especially hard hit. Asia had integrated itself more deeply into the economic system than most other regions and is now suffering the consequences. There is some hope: economic indicators have hinted at a recovery but damage has been done.

Groups made of scared, desperate people are pressuring leaders for policies to alleviate their current suffering. Many of the policies supported by these groups are protectionist in nature, they seek to improve the local economy to the detriment of their neighbors and trading partners.

Rising calls for protectionist measures and halting free trade must be countered. In the years between World War I and World War II when economic depression hit, many countries did all they could to protect themselves – even at the cost of the others. These actions created deep suspicion and distrust between the nations of Europe, nationalist sentiments flared, and were stoked by anxious politicians. World War II came as a direct result of economic hardships and the nationalist and protectionist policies implemented to

stem it. The Asia Pacific region has great potential to help turn the economic tide. This potential could be hampered by the stalling or backward movement on free and open trade through nationalist and protectionist measures.

What qualities does a leader possess? While countries and cultures disagree over how to choose a leader, all leaders share several characteristics. A leader is a far-thinking person who can convince people to do things that may not appear to be in their best interest but, which in the end, provides the greater benefit. Asia today requires leaders. Leaders who can understand the fears and problems of their people, calm the calls for protectionism, and convince their people that their prosperity and security is tied to that of their neighbor.

The current economic crisis allows us the opportunity to ask serious questions about the stability and use of the current free trade. It seems excessive – all or nothing. Sometimes capitalism seems too destructive. Debating this is right. The next evolution of the economic system should come from the lessons learned from our current experience. What must be kept in mind is that beggar thy neighbor policies, such as most protectionist policies, can lead to a tragedy of the commons and sub-optimal outcomes for all involved.

Generational Differences

My generation has come of age after the end of the Cold War. The idea of the world being split into sides is seen as outdated and no longer applicable. Our worldview is shaped by globalization. We see a world that is much smaller and cultures and people intermingle and are no longer seen as alien or strange. Most importantly, globalization is not merely the spread of McDonalds and Coca-Cola. It is a spread in ways of thinking; the younger generation through the internet can communicate simultaneously with people from all corners of the world and thus be exposed to viewpoints and worldviews that are different from their own. This younger generation has a broader worldview and greater international experience. Most importantly, they have the potential to question prevailing assumptions perhaps allowing these young professionals to think of new and different ways of dealing with old problems. They are better able to understand what drives the decision of other countries and peoples, perhaps allowing them to develop better policies toward these countries.

The Cold War was focused on the military and weapons. Counts were kept of the number of warheads, of delivery vehicles, and the total destructive power on each side. A zero sum mentality prevailed and cooperation between the sides was rare and often fraught with tension. Today's young professionals, while aware of historical differences, are less likely to see them as a constraint to cooperation. Old enemies have become potential allies; creating new arenas for cooperation.

The young professionals starting to enter the field have come of age in this globalized world. This generation has been exposed to differing views and cultures from a young age. They have a more cosmopolitan and international view. The problems of people around the world have become more real for them – reality rather than a story read in a newspaper. The younger generation is more technologically adept; they understand new fields such as cyber security because they have grown up using tools that could be used as weapons. Being more familiar with new weapons, technologies and problems

make them more likely to see solutions to these problems. If someone does not know what a distributed denial of service attack is, they are unlikely to be able to think of ways to counter one.

The younger generation views nontraditional security threats as equally important as traditional security issues. They have grown up hearing about environmental problems, energy shortages, and global pandemics. These issues are real to them in a way that more seasoned professional cannot understand anymore than the younger generation can grasp the idea of a nuclear holocaust. As more young professionals enter the field there will likely be a greater call to deal with these issues and a resulting change in security priorities.

Finding Security in the Post-Cold War Era: A Critique of 'Generational Changes' in Security Discourse By Leon Gaskin

That security is an overriding aim in international relations is a given; how a state of security is envisaged, and attained, is far more complex. Increasingly, so–termed 'traditional', or realist-derived concepts and practices of, security have been critiqued as the generation acclimatized to the post-Cold War global context questions their normative aims and methods. This essay considers how such 'generational differences' have contributed to the manner in which security is problematized, achieved, and sustained in the post-Cold War era, and contends that whilst rhetorically very attractive, such revisions may not necessarily represent an underlying shift away from a focus on its own security as an overriding aim of states, which remain the most powerful actors involved in international relations. Rather, the attention to ideals of human rights and needs evident of post-Cold War security discourse serves to de-politicize interventions which may serve more traditional security aims.

Post-Cold War debates have circulated around several key questions central to theorizing and practicing security: what a state of security consists of, who or what ought to be protected, the range of factors classified as security 'threats', and the methods and actors involved in delivering security. Realist-derived concepts defined security as being able to ensure the safety of states from external threats, largely defined in military terms and frequently requiring the external projection of various kinds of power (Morgenthau 1967; Waltz 1979). Newer approaches have disputed this emphasis on the state and its territorial security (see Booth 2004), and have instead articulated concepts of security which embrace new referents, such as the individual, central to the concept of 'human security' put forward within the United Nations (UN) system (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 1994). By redefining the object of security analysis, quantifying a state of security in these expanded definitions has become far more expansive, with human security, for example, including a consideration for human rights and the satisfaction of basic needs as constitutive factors of a state of security (UNDP 1994). Re-framing a state of security has also broadened range of factors as security 'threats'. Alongside the more familiar and no less severe threats posed by interstate conflict, wealth disparities, disease, climate change, denial of political participation, and perceived ethnic and religious exclusion warrant urgent consideration by policymakers for their ability to threaten individual as well as state security (UNDP 1994).

The UNDP's concept is one example which reflects the increasing prominence of normative ideals relating to human wellbeing in security discourse. Other examples include the commitments to the rights of the individual, overriding the principle of state sovereignty as absolute, contained in the International Commission on State Sovereignty (ICSS) report of 2001. The 'humanitarian' interventions undertaken by the UN to Somalia and the Balkans in the 1990s signaled a new global commitment to undertaking external interventions to uphold human rights and deepen the reach of democracy and the rule of law. Furthermore, in contrast to Cold War era peacekeeping operations, newer 'peace-building,' or 'state-building', missions require a long-term, in-country presence, and commitment, and are furnished with wide-ranging mandates to administer the provision

of immediate relief, undertake institutional and governance reform, and facilitate economic development in addition to managing ceasefires and disarmament, for example, in the Balkans and East Timor (Bellamy Williams and Griffin 2004). These more expansive practices of security now also involve a broader range of actors. International financial institutions (IFIs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and national aid and development agencies now operate in situations, particularly conflict-affected and post-conflict zones, where the achievement and maintenance of lasting security is the objective. These practices reflect a normative shift away from an exclusive concern for the integrity of the state and the advancement of its interests as the sole focus of international relations, to embrace a concern for human rights and basic living standards and the involvement of actors traditionally located in the aid and development fields.

Debates widening the meaning of security, the range of factors which must be protected against, and the methods and actors employed to ensure security have reflected new uncertainties and sources of insecurity in the post-Cold war global context. These revisions can be considered 'generational' by examining the changing global context from which they emerged. The end of bipolar superpower rivalry opened up the possibility of greater international co-operation to address issues submerged beneath the geopolitics of the Cold War, giving reason to suggest that long-standing international commitments to human rights might progress (Thomas 1999). The accelerating pace of globalization and the rapid economic development of certain economies, particularly in East Asia, suggested that a new era of prosperity was unfolding. It was hoped that a 'peace dividend' could allow greater resources could be devoted to issues such as global poverty, environmental degradation, and deepening global inequalities of wealth distribution (Thomas 1999).

However, the rise of these ideals cannot be considered independently from a second characteristic of the post-Cold War era, the ascendancy of public and private power, largely based in the erstwhile 'West', here referred to as the global 'North'. The advancing reach of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights was aided by the demise of viable political and economic alternatives as communism expired (Paris 2004). The resolute advance of economic globalization and the dominance of institutions largely based in the North further strengthened the appeal of these political and economic systems. Their widespread adoption by a number of global actors and the lack of ideological competitors allowed these systems to assume the appearance of universality, a depiction whose normative authority was strengthened by discourses presenting North-based NGOs, corporations and international organizations (IOs) as 'international' and 'multinational', rather than tied to one particular state or region. Furthermore, 'universal' models of development allowed global inequalities of wealth to be presented as temporary, with states separated by degree but nonetheless part of the same continuum of progress and modernization (Rist 2002). The demise of political opposition in the Security Council and other global fora allowed for 'international' interventions far more expansive in scope, whose aims would increasingly reflect the values of a North with newly unchallenged global power and reach. The 'liberal peace' thesis provided additional justification for these interventional security practices; with the adoption of Western political systems being posited as a necessary precursor to lasting security (Barkawi and Laffey 2001). An array of actors, conjoined by a commitment to these ideals, was politically unhindered and able to implement interventions and practices with commonly held aims, inclusive of and further strengthening the normative shift in post-Cold War security discourse.

Despite setbacks and skepticism in some quarters regarding the commitment of some actors to these ideals, the optimism which characterized international relations in the early 1990s and which contributed to the expanded meanings and means of contemporary security practices remains. Recognizing non-traditional security threats, valuing the security of people as well as states and involving non-military actors and methods in security practice continues to provide a basis for meaningful international co-operation to collectively find lasting security. For example, the increased global co-operation to combat trans-boundary threats, such as those posed by non-traditional challenges such as climate change and pandemics, open up opportunities for dialogue between actors with shared aims, potentially reducing rivalries and suspicions. Relating aims hitherto more recognizable to the development sector than to security practice sustains attention towards issues of global poverty and inequalities, human rights violations and problems of governance. The increase in multinational interventions to conflict-affected regions offer new opportunities for co-operation between actors with a mutual interest in preventing hostilities escalating to the regional level and in laying sustainable foundations for peace.

A risk is that these normative commitments to upholding human rights and raising basic living standards are understood and deployed within institutional structures containing continued imbalances of power between actors in the North and the South, with the normative aims integral to newer approaches to security, consequently having rhetorical but little substantive power. The inclusion of a focus on the broader exigencies of individual-level insecurity, such as poverty and a lack of basic human rights, risks de-politicizing external interventions whose underlying aim may be territorial security. The humanitarian rationale of multinational security interventions has received criticism of this nature, with the employment of a concern for humanitarian wellbeing and human rights violations serving to mobilize domestic political constituencies in favor of external interventions (Pugh 2004). Furthermore, relating development aims to security risks solidifying a perception that ‘underdevelopment’ is itself a security threat to the North, for instance as a potential breeding ground for so-called state failure and even terrorism, potentially suggesting a link between external humanitarian intervention and the domestic security concerns of the intervening state(s) (Duffield 2001).

In addition to providing a rationale for intervention, the normative shift in post-Cold War security discourse also provides a logical solution, with development ‘failures’ accounted for by an absence of ‘good governance,’ understood as Western political and economic structures (Duffield 2001) This could lead to new forms of control by powerful external actors, with the involvement of a growing range of actors in post-conflict situations multiplying the points of contact and direction external actors have with states and populations in the South. This is apparent in the increasing involvement of North-based NGOs, IOs, and national-level development organizations in the performance of public services previously viewed as the responsibility of local governments, in the reconstruction of governance institutions themselves, for example in Bosnia, and even in the assumption of complete sovereign authority, as in East Timor between 1999 and 2002. Though providing essential short term assistance, this trend inhibits the development of public institutions accountable to their citizens over external donors; longer term, their questionable legitimacy and transparency can aggravate the individual, national and global-level insecurities characteristic of frail and failed states (Chandler 2006). Furthermore, promoting peace by emulation of a development model itself questioned for its ability to deliver broad-based and equitable growth could ultimately

serve to entrench existing global inequalities of wealth distribution, sustaining the individual-level insecurities of poverty.

Generational differences are apparent in shifting approaches to security and the means available to ensuring its maintenance, or attainment. However, these revisions of security should be viewed no less critically than their realist-derived antecedents. Although holding promise for greater international co-operation and the achievement of normatively attractive outcomes, the values underpinning these revisions risk providing a rhetorical force to interventions, an outcome of which may be the governance of certain regions in the interests of securing the interests of actors, especially states, in the North. This may prove counterproductive to the achievement of the goals of peace, development, democracy and human rights; ideals which initially contributed the expansion of security discourse and which currently sustain an expanded array of actors involved in practices of security.

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Underneath the Pavement, the Beach!

By Tom Griffiths

What has Philip Larkin got to do with international security? *This be the Verse*, written in 1971, is a warning to all generations not to let their prejudices and faults continue through to the next generation. The warning, however, is fatalistic from its outset; that each generation takes on the faults of the one preceding it, There is no one generation to blame because they are all both victims and criminals of Larkin's accusations. As the scope of security threats widen to incorporate what is now termed "non-traditional security threats", the inter-generational transmission widens if such threats widens too. Global warming, religious and political fundamentalism, conflict over scarce resources and the weaponization of space are but a few of the new threats that have joined the threats of the Cold War - nuclear proliferation and proxy wars. The question that this essay will attempt to address is if the transmission of security threats can end and just what the generation that causes this end will need to do to bring it about.

"Think of the children!" Runs the cliché, designed to appeal to your emotional conscience; now over-used to the point of negating any authority generational arguments once had. One needs to 'think of the children' before driving two blocks to the shop when they could well walk, just as a government needs to 'think of the children' before they buy the latest F-22 Raptor fighter jet for their air force. This catch-all phrase no longer holds any weight, the inter-generational transmission of security issues still continues, despite the histrionic appeal to think of the next generation. While one cannot argue that events today have no bearing on the wellbeing of individuals in future generations, the severity of such effects are often subject to debate.

The new Obama administration seems to be taking positive steps towards disarmament. The threat of a nuclear apocalypse is no longer at the forefront of the general public's minds, as it was when news of the doomsday clock ticking towards midnight was commonplace. Global warming and terrorism are the security threats *du jour*. Despite the differences in both causes and nature of non-traditional security threats, we are still caught up in the same, cyclic, way of thinking about them: it is hard for us right now but it will be even harder for future generations. We inherit security issues from previous generations, we make their scope and effect worse, and then we pass them along to the next generation. We also inherit the methods in which the previous generation dealt with the security issues; we follow the same structures, same architecture, we use the same language, and so we are simply destined to repeat: this is the warning within Larkin's first two stanzas.

Samantha Power, in a recent talk with Azar Nafisi at the New York Public Library on the subject of her most recent book *Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World*, tries to draw parallels between the philosophical ideas of de Mello with those of Barak Obama.¹ Power claims that the approach to security issues that de Mello has shown throughout his career within the United Nations and her personal experiences with Barak Obama's approach to security issues both differ in the same ways from the status quo. Power argues that the current structure that we are using to deal with

¹ Samantha Power and Azar Nafisi, "Samantha Power in Conversation with Azar Nafisi: Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello & the Fight to Save the World" (presented at the Live from the NYPL, New York Public Library, February 21, 2008), <http://www.nypl.org/research/chss/pep/pepdsc.cfm?id=3920>.

security challenges is flawed. She cites de Mello's contempt with the State system that drove him to the UN seeking an alternative. De Mello had worked with the UN for over 34 years, dealing with some of the worst international crisis, and was repeatedly frustrated by the impacts of the actions taken by states on the individuals living within them. Sadly though, given the time of the talk (before the elections that saw Obama take Washington) she was unable to give a clear picture of Obama's viewpoints.

Looking at security through the State system lends strength only for traditional security questions to be answered. Violence is the foundation on which the State power structure is built. The State, in the modern Westphalian sense of the term, has a monopoly on legitimate, organised, legal violence.² George Orwell recognizes the role that the State plays in the security of an individual in his essay *The Lion and the Unicorn*. "As I write, highly civilized human beings are flying overhead, trying to kill me. They do not feel any enmity against me as an individual, nor I against them. They are 'only doing their duty', as the saying goes... He is serving his country, which has the power to absolve him from evil."³ Because the State is considered our unit of analysis in international relations, it is held to be responsible for security. As those highly civilized humans, trying to kill Orwell, were flying overhead, Britain's own highly civilized humans were trying to kill the original airborne humans, complete with the same consequences for success. The legitimacy of State power is a troubling issue, one that holds no easy generational fix.

A violent act committed by the State must be a rational act to have any legitimacy. If a state acted out of passion or lack of reason then they would be considered irrational, both internationally and domestically. A democratic state cannot eliminate a political rival in anger. Violence, in our modern legal system, is simplified down to two categories: Crimes of passion and crimes of logic. Both categories are concerned with the motivation behind the act, as opposed to the act itself. It is often not clear whether an individual act is one or the other, however courts use the concept of premeditation to distinguish between the two.⁴ A crime of passion is committed in a moment of madness. Where an individual places their motivation for violence above their respect for the lives of others. If a violent act was committed without any planning in advance of the act then it is considered a crime of passion. It is a crime without any thought to the consequences of the action. It is a crime that does not consider the act of violence within a greater causal chain but merely a thin slice of detached time. The actor is 'blinded' with a great passion that turns to a great rage and the act is, by definition, without rationality. In our legal system it is this lack of premeditation, the lack of rationality, which lessens the severity of the crime. George Bernard Shaw wrote "If you strike a child, take care that you strike it in anger, even at the risk of maiming it for life. A blow in cold blood neither can nor should be forgiven."⁵ The same cannot be said of a State striking a blow at another State. If carefully planning and proof, fabricated or real, is not produced then passionate State violence is deemed worse than premeditated.

² Max Weber et al., *The Vocation Lectures: Science As a Vocation, Politics As a Vocation* (Hackett Publishing Company, 2004), 33.

³ George Orwell, "The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius," in *Essays* (England: Penguin Group, 2000), 138.

⁴ Albert Camus, *The Rebel*, trans. Anthony Bower (England: Penguin Group, 2000), 11.

⁵ George Bernard Shaw, "Maxims for Revolutionists," in *Man and Superman: A Comedy and a Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass.: The University Press, 1903).

The generation soon to receive the hand-over of issues and authority are remarkable for their abilities to transverse borders. Breakthroughs in telecommunications and transportation mean that the distances between countries are not as insurmountable as they have been for earlier generations. It is tempting to view the mobility of the new generation with overly romanticized glasses. We need to steer clear of what Terry Eagleton has referred to as a "...hangover from the modernist cult of the exile, the satanic artist who scorns the suburban masses and plucks an elitist virtue out of his enforced dispossession."⁶ However, the permeations of borders are desirable as the fixed nature of borders is another facet of the State system. Herman Hesse, writing over 30 years ago, maintained that to the wanderer, a border presented nothing but trouble, and a border is as much a part of the State's power structure as the military.

Nothing on earth is more disgusting, more contemptible than borders.
They're like cannons, like generals: as long as peace, loving kindness and peace go on, nobody pays and attention to them – but as soon as war and insanity appear, they become urgent and sacred. While the war went on, how they were pain and prison to us wanderers. Devil take them!⁷

The current generation needs more in their arsenal to fight against the system of Statehood than an increased mobility. Such mobility is permitted by the State, though if the State does not allow mobility then mobility quickly suffers.

Let us, for a minute, entertain the notion that we need to break out of Larkin's generational cycle to make any difference in major security issues. We need a generation to not simply speak of regrets in passing on the same security issues to the next generation but to get angry at the previous generation for passing these issues on. De Millo was part of the riots of the Left Bank in Paris, 1968. These riots were the closest any generation has come to the anger needed to "get out" of Larkin's cyclic generational security dilemma. As security issues move beyond state control we are seeing an increase in the non-State responses to threats. "Human security" and "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) are both modern security philosophies that are aimed at individuals, not at States. Both are fallible, Power directly acknowledged the limits of R2P in her talk at the New York Public Library. However both ideas represent a shift away from the traditional, narrow, way of looking at security to a larger, encompassing one. A break away from traditional State thinking that has dominated the discourse of international relations and security analysis for so long.

R2P's limitations are made all too evident when there are calls within the international community to put its principles into actions. Recently, the international community threatened intervention in Myanmar after cyclone Nargis devastated substantial parts of the country and the government failed to act. Intervention, against a government's wish, to directly provide support and aid to the citizenry would be a step towards weakening the State system. However, if such an intervention was the legal response from the international community over cyclone Nargis, could a case have been made for intervention in Louisiana during hurricane Katrina? The concern with R2P is that intervention in a weak State by stronger States could set a precedent that one day

⁶ Terry Eagleton, *After Theory* (Canada: Penguin Books Ltd, 2004), 21.

⁷ Hermann Hesse, *Wandering: Notes and Sketches* (Jonathan Cape Ltd, 1972), 1.

might be used against a stronger State. Strong States wishing to maintain their dominance would block any further steps towards a system of non-traditional security protection.

To break Larkin's cycle of intra-generational we need to escape from not only the security issues, but also the systems and architecture that makes up the international community. The State system needs to be over-hauled in order to protect against the myriad of security issues that threaten the world. As one of the chants shouted by students during the '68 riots ran: let's be realistic; let's ask the impossible!

New Generation, New Perspective

By Brian Harding

A technological revolution, a rapidly globalizing world, and the end of the Cold War have created an emerging generation of foreign policy thinkers and practitioners that see the world in fundamentally different – and at times better – ways than their forbearers. This generation takes for granted a world where information and news flows constantly, instantly, and globally. They have lived and studied abroad, have connections with people from other countries forged early in life, and have a sense of mobility unknown to their predecessors, sometimes making them more internationalist in orientation than strictly nationalist. They have also not lived through the Cold War, which frees them of the historical baggage of ideological conflict, while at the same time making them lack the acute vulnerability that a world order built on mutually assured destruction gave the current foreign policy establishment.

While these factors transcend borders, the degree to which the emerging generation views the world differently from their seniors depends on their country of origin. In the Asia Pacific, differences are evident based on the degree to which countries have undergone political and economic transitions in recent decades. For instance, Vietnam and China have seen tremendous economic growth and political opening in recent years and the emerging generation in these countries therefore has decidedly different worldviews. While less dramatic, emerging leaders elsewhere in Asia also see the world differently. Younger Thais and South Koreans do not feel the American embrace like their predecessors. Indonesians know their country as a democracy and also are far more attuned to events in the Middle East. Young Japanese have no war memory and question the lingering constraints of that legacy. Singaporeans expect their country to be an important voice in global affairs.

Across the Pacific Ocean, the emerging generation of Asia specialists in the United States comes to the table with a view of Asia informed by different assumptions than their forbearers. In terms of specific countries, they see the U.S.-Japan alliance as a given. However, on the Korean Peninsula, the threat feels abstract and the need for tens of thousands of U.S. troops in South Korea – with no mission other than the defense of a now industrialized ROK – is less clear. While China's rise creates some anxiety for many security-minded emerging leaders, their economically-minded brethren see China's rise as an opportunity. Regardless, China carries extremely little ideological baggage, making noises from Capitol Hill about "Communist China" seem downright bizarre.

In Southeast Asia, young Americans have been exposed to the region in dramatically different ways than the previous generation. Instead of being introduced to the region through war or war protests, they are more likely to have seen it on a backpacking trip through the region. Rather than being a war, "Vietnam" is an emerging economy, a youthful nation, and a likely partner of the United States to secure regional interests in coming decades. Indonesia isn't a human rights-abusing Cold War stalwart; it's an emerging democracy. For better or worse, memories of Thailand and the Philippines as staunch allies are largely absent.

All together, across the Asia-Pacific, the views of emerging leaders are far more likely to be informed by close personal contact early in life, rather than the negotiations,

formal diplomacy, and war that often informed the current generation of leaders' opinions of these countries. This naturally leads to deeper understanding of the countries and their cultures, but raises the possibility that empathy might constrain one's ability think strictly in his national interest.

Likewise, the circumstances under which these emerging Asia specialists came to political consciousness has led to a different – and perhaps naïve – conception of national security, broadly conceived, from that of the current establishment. They have never felt an existential threat to the very existence to the United States nor do they have any memory of great powers actually coming into live conflict. Instead, their greatest national security fears flow from the events of Sept. 11, 2001 and similar attacks in London, Madrid, Mumbai, and elsewhere. Rather than witnessing wars between great powers, they've seen conflicts requiring international intervention in Iraq/Kuwait, the Balkans, and elsewhere, and civil wars in Sri Lanka, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the like. The lesson drawn from being attacked by al-Qaeda on 9/11 is that the greatest threats emanate from weak states. On the other hand, war between major powers is virtually unthinkable. While a rising China or resurgent Russia may be problematic for achieving some U.S. global interests, *major* armed conflict with these countries (or between these powers and their neighbors) seems unlikely.

Rather than focusing on traditional concepts of security, grounded in conflict between and among nations, the rising generation instinctively prioritizes transnational, non-traditional threats and root causes of weak states – human security, poverty – on par with traditional security issues. Cold Warriors might find this conception of security naïve, and derived from an unusual time in world history, but this is the worldview this generation takes. Climate change and poverty become top-tier security challenges under this rubric, with environmental degradation, pandemic disease, and other nontraditional, transnational threats close behind.

The importance of transnational and common threats does not necessarily diminish the importance of the nation state, however. Some talk about the decline of the importance of the nation state, which one might think would be germane to a discussion of generational views given that the emerging generation may sometimes see themselves as global citizens. However, we do still live in a world of nation states – and with any sort of relevant, global governing order as elusive as ever – the burden falls to nation states to work together to solve common challenges. More specifically, the greatest challenges will need to be solved by *strong* states. While security challenges flow from weak states as well as a lack of international coordination and cooperation against shared threats, the common and most significant threats of the 21st century will be solved by cooperation among major powers.

In the context of the Asia-Pacific, cooperation and collaboration between the United States and China will be critical to managing the most significant threats to the region and the world in the twenty-first century. And the good news is that China and the United States will have no choice but to cooperate as they confront common threats that only cooperation can tackle, such as climate change and pandemic disease. Furthermore, only a strong China will be a capable partner in confronting these challenges, making engagement with China as a respected, global power more important than ever. Likewise, an economically strong China will be a catalyst for economic growth in neighboring

countries, whose assistance and collaboration will be critical for stemming transnational threats.

While war between major powers in Asia is virtually unthinkable, numerous transnational threats exist that threaten our common security. These are the threats that most Asian countries cite as most important to their countries, sitting alongside economic development as national priorities. Fortunately, these are also the threats that an emerging generation of Asia specialists in the United States understand to be the key challenges facing the region as well. In this sense, we might expect there to be greater convergence in American and Asian threat perceptions as this next generation takes power. With the region largely at peace and regional powers beginning to see eye-to-eye on the greatest challenges to our common security, time is ripe for building the partnerships that will solve the problems of the future. Luckily, this congruity is only likely to deepen as the next generation gains more responsibility.

The Three Most Compelling Future Challenges Confronting the Asia-Pacific Region: A Discourse across Generations

By Chin-Hao Huang

As the Asia-Pacific evolves to become one of the most dynamic regions, it is presenting a unique set of challenges and opportunities to global growth, security, and stability. The region, as a whole, has an increased bearing on the interests of the international community. In trying to extrapolate the future direction of the Asia-Pacific region – whether it will turn toward greater integration and interdependence or toward growing divergence, suspicion and rivalry – one of the most important determining factors is how the region will respond to emergent regional and global challenges.

Going forward there are many topical issues with which the region needs to grapple. These could be summarized and grouped more broadly into three main baskets or themes:

Democratic consolidation

The Asia-Pacific region is by and large composed of democratically elected governments. In the last two decades, rapid economic developmental take-off has also been coupled with increasing political openness. Notwithstanding these encouraging developments, there are signs of democracy receding in the region, where the process of democratization risks backsliding and remains lurching at best. From Seoul to Bangkok to Manila, a wave of massive scale grassroots movement organizing anti-government protests and demonstrations have sprung up. The waning confidence could further deepen as a result of weak governance and corruption charges and other related scandals.

The demonstrations are reflective of the general public's growing understanding and perception that democracy is more than elections, with rising expectations for political representatives and governments to deliver and address bread and butter issues more effectively. If left unheeded, the growing discontent of the general public could turn to greater radicalism and other more violent measures that could have significant, paralyzing effects on both national and regional security and stability.

Strengthening democratic consolidation in the region requires each country to more fully and readily embrace such global values as: rule of law, human rights, freedom of speech, freedom of the press and good governance, to name a few. These are not only Western values and should not be regarded as ideas imposed by the West. Such criticisms, while understandable, limit the debate from moving forward. In fact, these are principles that are very much compatible with Asian values. The ASEAN Charter, for example, espouses many of these very same principles. As such, the critical issue and next step is the effective implementation of these global values and principles by governments across the region.

Managing China's rise and regional power balance

The prevailing approach toward managing China's rise adopted by policy elites across the Asia-Pacific region reflects both engagement and cautious accommodation. While a majority of the governments see China emerging as the most important country in the region, there are also increasing uncertainties with regards to what China's rise will portend. As such, China's growing military capability remains a topical and legitimate concern. According to the SIPRI Yearbook 2009, China ranks as the second largest military spender globally (behind the United States). At nearly \$85 billion, its military expenditure is the largest in Asia. The worry is the lack of transparency and continued opacity in China's regional intentions and ambitions.

Looking ahead, the region as a whole will need to press ahead and strengthen policies that further engage and embed China more deeply into regional institutions of common interests and normative values. This would not only help ensure that China is part and parcel of the regional and global system. It would also allow for China to contribute more positively toward regional growth and stability as well. The various political and economic dialogue and engagement with China under the frameworks of ASEAN, East Asia Summit, APEC and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, for example, are important steps in the right direction. More important, military-to-military cooperation through regional peacekeeping, joint patrol on the high seas and military exercises needs to be stepped up even further to allay fears and address the region's lingering concerns of Chinese military capabilities and intentions.

Responding to transnational, non-traditional challenges to regional security

The increasing risks of such non-traditional challenges as disease outbreaks, climate change, disaster relief and human and drug trafficking are some of the most pressing threats to human security in the Asia-Pacific region. With a strong adherence to and strict interpretation of state sovereignty and non-interference in the region, there remains a high degree of caution and reluctance to open up their borders to forge a more common and effective response. In turn, the implementation and coordination of any sort of regional policy remain a serious concern and impediment.

While these challenges are generally categorized as "soft" security issues, they are no less important and require, in many respects, cooperation through greater pragmatism. There are existing mechanisms and platforms within the region – such as the ASEAN Regional Forum – to respond to these concerns, but the region's leadership must invest greater political capital and will to pursue a more proactive approach toward these emergent security challenges.

To the extent that there are generational differences, they are perhaps more evident in ways to manage these new security concerns. Left unattended, these non-traditional challenges have an increasing impact and dire consequences for human security. The younger and successive generations, having been more fully exposed to the effects of globalization, are more willing to prioritize these concerns and accept that these challenges trespass traditional state boundaries that require far-reaching, comprehensive and action-oriented policies.

The Three Most Compelling Future Challenges Confronting the Asia Pacific Region: A Discourse across Generations

By Tetsuo Kotani

Asia, Not Rising but Resurging

Asia is not rising but resurging; Asia was always one of the centers of the world. Asia is increasing its economic, financial, technological, and political weight in the international system. As Japanese historian Takeshi Hamashita argues, Asia consists of continental and maritime Asia. The former is inward-looking and characterized by agricultural fundamentalism, while the latter is outward-looking and characterized by commercial networks. Today, globalization has obscured the border between continental and maritime Asia, which creates the dynamism of this region. As Robert Kaplan discussed in his recent *Foreign Affairs* article (March/April 2009), on a maritime-centric map of Asia, artificial land borders are becoming obsolete.

Asia faces two great Oceans: the Pacific and Indian. Even landlocked Asian countries are linked with the two Oceans by road, rail, river, and pipelines. The Pacific and Indian Oceans should be regarded as a single unified theater. The offshore island chain in the two Oceans creates a series of marginal seas along the Eurasian continent – including the Sea of Okhotsk, the Sea of Japan, the East and South China Seas, the Andaman Sea, the Bay of Bengal, and the Arabian Sea. As American geostrategist Nicholas Spykman found out, these marginal seas constitute a “maritime highway” which has contributed to the development of Eurasian coastal areas by providing easy and cheap sea lines of communication.

The geographical term “Asia Pacific” may be insufficient for describing the dynamism in this region. Given the fact that Asia occupies half the world's population and one-third of the global economy, the Indo-Pacific Rim has the potential to reach an unprecedented level of prosperity, freedom, and stability in this century. However, this region faces uncertainties.

The Three Most Compelling Future Challenges

Today, 90 percent of global commerce and 65 percent of oil imports travel by sea. Twenty percent of global seaborne trade, 33% of global seaborne crude oil, 37 percent of global semiconductor trade, 57 percent of the global shipping capacity moves between the Pacific and Indian Oceans via the Malacca Straits. The “maritime highway” linking the Pacific and India Oceans constitutes the lifeline of global economy. The seas are important not only as highways but also as suppliers of marine resources such as mineral, energy, and food. In short, the dynamism of this region heavily depends on the seas, therefore, future security challenges come from the seas.

The first and largest challenge is a naval arms race stimulated by the growing importance of the seas and growing Chinese maritime ambition. Throughout its long history, Chinese rulers showed little interest in the seas with some exceptions such as Zheng He's voyages in the 15th century. China became a net oil importer in 1993 and its

rapidly growing economy has turned Chinese eyes toward the seas today. Relieved of the Soviet pressure across land borders after the end of the Cold War, China has been investing a lot of resources to build up sea power for energy and SLOC security. The stability of East Asia depends on the balance between continental power of China and Russia and sea power of the United States and Japan. China's maritime ambition may destabilize this balance. This is literally a sea change.

Chinese maritime ambitions began with encircling the South China Sea to make it a Chinese lake. After the Philippines kicked out the U.S. Navy from Subic Bay in 1991, Beijing reasserted territorial claims over the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos as well as the Senkaku islands. Then, China seized Mischief Reef in the Spratlys in 1995.

China is taking an anti-access strategy to create a wider strategic buffer in the western Pacific vis-à-vis the U.S. Seventh Fleet. Chinese strategy conceived two "island chains" as China's maritime defense barrier: the "first island chain" along the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo and the "second island chain" along the Bonin and Mariana islands. The "first island chain" is no more than 200 nautical miles from Chinese coast and, unless Taiwan is unified with the mainland China, the "first island chain" would virtually "blockade" China during crisis. Therefore, China has enhanced area denial/anti-access capability up to the "first island chain by purchasing from Russia Su-30 ground-attack aircraft, *Kilo*-class attack submarines, *Sovremenny*-class destroyers with SS-N-22 missiles – all of which the Soviet Union had developed to target U.S. carrier strike groups. China is also introducing *Shang*-class ultra-quiet nuclear-powered attack submarines. China also conducted A-Sat test in January 2007. Chinese acquisition of aircraft carriers is a matter of time. Today, the Chinese navy has expanded operational areas into the high seas toward the "second island chain."

While encircling the South China Sea, China is developing naval facilities (or "pearls") in and diplomatic ties with countries such as Pakistan (Gwadar), Burma (Sittway) and Bangladesh (Chittagong) for sea lane and energy security. This "pearls string" strategy may not be led by Beijing but these Chinese efforts to press on both sides of the Malacca Straits, is clearly against strategic interests of Tokyo and Washington. Since its commercial and political interests overlap with China, India also fears being encircled by Chinese "pearls."

Given the growing Chinese maritime ambition, regional countries from Japan to Southeast Asia and to Australia and India are increasing their sea power, especially power projection capabilities. Several countries have acquired or are acquiring aircraft carriers or large amphibious ships. As Richard Bitzinger pointed out, Asian-Pacific navies are acquiring greater range, speed, operational maneuvering, firepower, versatility, and flexibility. Some say there is a naval arms race going on in this region. Reflecting this trend, the Australian government recently published a defense white paper calling for reinforcement of sea and air power. Japan is now reviewing its mid-term defense policy program and there is some discussion on a possibility of obtaining preemptive strike capability.

Given the growing importance of the seas, a naval arms race is legitimate since it reflects the inevitable clash of strategic interests, rather than the lack of mutual confidence among regional nations. That said, however, this naval arms race needs to be managed with crisis management measures.

The second challenge is preservation of “good order at sea.” Several factors can disturb “good order at sea.” Piracy and other acts of violence against maritime navigation endanger sea lines of communication and interfere with freedom of navigation and free flow of commerce. Just as the oceans are avenues for global commerce, they are also highways for the import and export of unlawful commodities, including WMD and related materials. Trafficking provides organized crime syndicates with a huge amount of funds to conduct other crimes or terrorist activities. Intentional acts of pollution or unlawful fishing have negative impact on regional economy and ecosystems. Competition for seabed resources, territorial disputes at sea, and environmental nationalism encourage states to exert wider claims over international waters.

The 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) – the “constitution for the world’s oceans” – provides a legal and policy architecture for conduct on, over, and under the world’s oceans as well as a mechanism for peaceful solution of disputes. Freedom of the seas were captured in the grand bargain between the rights of the international community to freedom of navigation and the rights of coastal states to a discrete territorial seas and limited jurisdiction beyond the territorial seas. On the other hand, transnational efforts to promote greater coastal state jurisdiction even beyond the national territorial seas endanger freedom of the seas. This legal warfare or “lawfare” – the efforts to reshape the navigational regimes in UNCLOS, and particularly those efforts that have the effect of a diminution of transit passage through international straits and high seas freedoms in the EEZ and high seas – destabilizes and weakens the treaty structure.

For example, China is conducting “lawfare” as part of anti-access strategy. China persists in a series of excessive maritime claims by requiring Chinese approval for innocent passage in the territorial seas by foreign warships or by failing to recognize the airspace above its Exclusive Economic Zone as international airspace. The U.S. Navy has challenged Chinese “lawfare” under the Freedom of Navigation Program, which led to the Hainan E-P3 incident in 2001 and the recent USS *Impeccable* incident. The “lawfare” could not only disturb freedom of navigation but also could lead to regional armed conflicts.

Regional nations should promote cooperation in nontraditional security issues while reaffirming the provisions of the Law of the Seas to preserve good order at sea.

The last challenge is partnership building. Partnership building is the third and last challenge but it is also a solution to the challenges discussed above. Today’s naval power plays three key roles: power projection, preservation of “good order at sea,” and naval diplomacy/partnership-building. Naval arms race and “good order at sea” can be managed only through multilateral approach. There are multiple frameworks and institutions – including the U.S. alliance network, Western Pacific Naval Symposium, Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting, the ReCAAP, ARF, and the PSI – which can contribute to maritime security. Multilateral counter-piracy efforts off Somali coast is another example.

Partnership building brings both risks and opportunities. Generally speaking, confidence-building among regional navies has just begun, while regional coast guards are developing substantive cooperation in nontraditional security issues such as counter-

piracy. Membership or who to invite makes a difference in partnership building. A partnership can be sometimes hostile to non-members. It is possible that the U.S. maritime alliance network and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization can be opposed to each other. Also, a partnership is ineffective unless key members join. An example is the ReCAAP. Although major powers in this region such as Japan, South Korea, India and China are the members of the ReCAAP, Malaysia and Indonesia have not joined yet. Some Japanese call for a league of maritime democracies, namely Japan, the United States, India and Australia, based on “common values,” but this is not an appropriate approach as it excludes China.

Countries in this region should establish a consortium of seafaring nations to avoid naval arms race while preserving good order at sea. Under the consortium, member nations should establish crisis management measures and deepen confidence building. Member nations should also deepen cooperation for nontraditional security issues while reaffirming the provisions of the Law of the Sea. In this regard, regional nations should adopt a guideline for military activities on the international waters while establishing hot-lines. Regional nations also should reinforce the ReCAAP not only as counter-piracy measures but also for other maritime crimes such as terrorism, illegal fishing and smuggling and trafficking.

Each state, even “rogue” states such as Iran or North Korea, has an intrinsic interest in the effective functioning of the global system of trade, while al-Qaida and its associated groups have endemic hostility to the system. This consortium of seafaring nations should be inclusive. There are only two conditions to join this. First, respect free trade. Second, respect freedom of navigation and regard the seas as highways, not barriers. China is standing at the crossroads between continental power and sea power. Continental powers regard the seas as barriers, while sea powers regard the seas as highways. China needs to learn that the seas serve best as highways.

Generational Difference

The next generation faces challenges that have no respect for borders. They offer us new arenas for global cooperation. But a state-centric mindset cannot seize these opportunities. In this regard, younger generation has an advantage – they have less respect for borders. They stay in touch with one another through travelling, emails, blogs, Facebook and YouTube. They care more about democracy and governance – the role of civil society, elections and political processes, rule of law, and anti-corruption activities. The younger generation might be more willing to take the responsibility to protect. So it is expected for member nations of the consortium of seafaring nations to respect rule of law, protection of internationally-recognized human rights, and democratic development as well as economic development, even if this is not a condition for the consortium membership.

The younger generation has no memory of World War II – even the Cold War is history for them. The lack of war memory sometimes makes the younger generation more nationalistic and less tolerable or at least indifferent to foreign nationalism. The advantage of the younger generation can easily turn into a disadvantage. The younger generation therefore needs to study history more sincerely.

Lastly, although this paper focused on maritime security challenges, the younger generation needs to tackle a wide variety of new challenges from climate change to energy, food, water, and environment. Doing so requires sufficient knowledge on these issues. We live in a world that is more complex than before and the existing and emerging challenges require discourse across disciplines as well as between older and younger generations.

Vietnamese Generation Difference in World Views

By Ha Anh Tuan

Vietnam is undergoing a transformation process with significant social changes. One key aspect is an attitude differences among generations demonstrated in their world views.

Generally speaking, the Vietnamese population is divided into three major categories. Senior residents are those aged 55-years and older, who spent most of their youth in wars or a centrally planned economic system. In the middle tier are those from 25 to 55, who grew up with a traditional education but have been working primarily in a market-oriented economic system. The youngest generation comprises of those under 25 and has enjoyed the results of Vietnam's opening policy.

Senior residents find themselves in a dilemma with their worldview. I sometimes talk to my father and his friends, who were soldiers in the war against the U.S. and now have positions in the government at the provincial and district levels. Their direct involvement in the fighting and the fact that many of them lost relatives or friends during the wars prevents them from having a positive attitude toward the U.S. They are happy to see that Vietnam benefits from good U.S.-Vietnamese relations. However, in any case where the U.S. is involved in wars, such as in Afghanistan or Iraq, their anti-America sentiment reemerges.

Senior residents also have mixed feelings of admiration for and hatred toward China. They acknowledge Chinese development, want to watch Chinese soap opera and are strongly influenced by Confucian philosophy. But they are deeply suspicious about Chinese intentions and ambitions because of the Chinese attack on Vietnam in 1979 and other clashes between the two countries. Unfortunately, the older generation doesn't know much about ASEAN and Southeast Asian countries.

People from 25 to 55 show a more pragmatic approach toward the world. They are skeptical about the U.S. and China but they have more positive thinking about ASEAN. Many people in this group see personal interests as the main drivers of their behavior. Therefore, they promote strengthened cooperation between Vietnam and the U.S. and are pleased to work in any company or institution regardless of domestic/foreign or private/governmental sectors as long as the jobs bring them a good income. For these reasons, they reckon that their personal gains can only be realized within a stable domestic and international system.

Significant changes can be observed among the young generation in Vietnam. They know a little about the wars and the centrally planned economic system through books. Most of them consider this period as history irrelevant to their lives. Internet, online gaming, digital devices, mobile phones, movies, and many other things attract them more. They drink *Coca-Cola*, watch Hollywood movies, and play with digital devices. So they naturally love American culture and dream of studying in the U.S. The number of Vietnamese students studying in the U.S. is growing.

In short, we are witnessing a significant change in the Vietnamese young generation in terms of their world view. The outstanding feature is that they see life as

more positive than their grandparents and parents. That explains why Vietnamese people are generally happy although they live in a poor country with many things that need to be done. On the one hand, this is a good foundation for them to start an independent life. On the other hand, this may alleviate pressure and slow efforts to reach their objectives.

Thinking about Generational Differences: Do They Exist?

By Raymund Jose G. Quilop

To speak of generational differences between the so-called younger and older generation is difficult. One has to be more circumspect about this issue for while it is almost automatically assumed that there are differences across generations, a closer examination reveals there is more convergence rather than divergence.

This is particularly true if the specific people from the younger generation concerned have interacted relatively closely with the so-called older generation. Conversely, convergence results when specific members of the older generation involved have developed the willingness and openness to look at certain issues beyond the usual perspectives that their own generation has developed. Each generation actually learns from each other. And for as long as there is that willingness from each generation to learn from one another, convergence of perspectives may be more evident rather than divergence.

To illustrate, both the younger and the older generations consider as security challenges major power relations, territorial disputes and conflict, as well as the relatively non-traditional concerns like climate change, environmental degradation, pandemics, maritime security, terrorism, among others.

The difference then, perhaps, lies not on what actually are the perceived security challenges but on how much priority or importance is given by a particular generation to specific security challenges. It is in this aspect where the difference becomes more evident.

For example, the older generation is expected, and many times it does, to give more importance to the traditional security challenges such as major power relations and territorial disputes, or at least consider these concerns as the bedrock of foreign, security and defense relations among states. The younger generation, however, is seen to give more priority to non-traditional security concerns such as climate change and pandemics.

Such a difference is actually brought about by the overall environment where each of the two generations evolves. Previously, great power relations and territorial disputes defined relations among states. This explains why the older generation may feel a strong affinity to these issues. Today, the younger generation lives in a context where it is not the traditional security challenges that affect their lives but the non-traditional concerns.

Beyond identifying the level and sources of differences, the more important question that begs to be answered is how significant are such differences? Do these have an impact on how a particular society manages and attempts to address the challenges that it confronts.

Ironically, these differences can actually enable a society to more effectively respond to security challenges by making it possible for an entire society to consider various challenges to its security and stability. The priority given by the older generation to traditional concerns ensures that these challenges remain to be considered important by

their respective governments. But the priority placed by the younger generation to the non-traditional security challenges could practically ensure that the attention including resources that ought to be rightfully given to these equally important challenges are made available. This would eventually enable societies to respond to various security challenges in a comprehensive and holistic manner.

At the end of the day, it is not actually an issue between an older generation and a younger one. A zero-sum perspective in today's strategic setting is no longer relevant. What is actually more important is the ability of a society and the entire region to ensure that all challenges are paid attention to and addressed, for it is in doing so where the survival and prosperity of societies, the region and the entire world eventually rests.

Chinese Nationalism and Regional Security in East Asia

By Wang Di

East Asia has enjoyed over two decades of peace and stability. However, challenges to regional security still abound. One area of crucial importance is the possible impact of domestic politics on international security in East Asia, as the recent fiasco at Pattaya, Thailand clearly shows. Analysts who are interested in looking beyond the horizon should not only keep a close eye on regional hotspot issues and regional institution-building but also pay more attention to what happens inside the nation-states in the region. This essay takes the examples of the changing dynamics of Chinese nationalism and growing populism and briefly examines their impacts on regional security.

No doubt, nationalism will be an important factor no matter how China evolves politically in the coming decades. On one hand, even after three decades of reform and opening up, nationalism is still a notable phenomenon in today's China. In addition, the Chinese nationalism still exhibits many assertive features. The assertive nationalism, to some extent, has restrained the Chinese government from adopting a more flexible foreign policy in East Asia. On many sensitive security issues, the public in China seem to be less flexible than the decision-makers. On the other hand, economic nationalism, often interwoven with populism, seems to be on the rise. Very little attention has been paid to the impact of economic nationalism on regional security. This paper will argue that economic nationalism will stifle the prospect of security in East Asia. Growing populism, especially in the coming decades when China experiences dramatic political changes, may render China more inward-looking economically, which may not bode well for East Asian security.

Most analysts would agree that peace and security in the region have been maintained largely because of increasing economic ties and economic interdependence among Asian countries in the past decades. Economic nationalism is likely to impede the process of economic integration, thus hampering the regional security. This paper will attempt to analyze the challenges to regional security by focusing on political nationalism and economic nationalism in China. Of course, such nationalistic sentiment also exists in many other East Asian countries. My purpose here is two-fold: to use China as a case study to explore the linkages between nationalism and regional security and to argue that domestic political processes warrant more attention among the scholarly community.

Challenges from China's Political Nationalism

According to a young Chinese nationalist organizer Feng Jinhua, nationalism among Chinese youth has become the Foreign Ministry's biggest headache.⁸ One consequence of China's political developments in recent years has been Beijing's loosened control of the public's mindset. Increasingly, many people in China, especially the younger generation, have conflicting views with China's old guards' foreign policy of "keeping a low profile" and call for more aggressive strategies in foreign affairs, particularly on issues involving territorial disputes. Even in today's China, which is considered an authoritarian or post-authoritarian regime, some interesting patterns of

⁸ Video, "Chinese Nationalism," (online) (cited June 11, 2009). Available from <URL: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=po5ZtkGzC0I>>

interactions between public opinion and foreign policy making, politically and economically, are emerging.

Politically, strong Chinese nationalism with regards to sovereignty and territorial integrity hinders cooperation between China and other states in the region on security matters. A few recent instances suffice to demonstrate the growing complexity in this regard. During the grand naval parade in Qingdao this April, an event that was supposed to showcase Chinese military transparency and increase exchanges and confidence with other naval forces, there was no Japanese vessel.⁹ Such absence of Japanese naval ship was never officially explained, but pundits surmise that it probably had to do with the fact that the vast majority of Chinese people were still not prepared to see a Japanese warship (or Japanese flag) at the event. In 2008, when China and Japan reached an in-principle agreement on joint development in the East China Sea, many Chinese people expressed their anger and resentment, and the Chinese authorities had to exercise public relations to assuage public displeasure.¹⁰ The recent dispute with the Philippines over the Spratlys in the South China Sea is another example. The Chinese netizens were outraged when the Philippine government declared the boundaries of its continental shelf in the South China Sea.¹¹

Recently, the growth of China's naval power and maritime interests has received much attention in international society. Pundits around the world have begun to wonder how China will use its growing naval power in the maritime domain. While at present there is little sign that China intends to be aggressive in the seas, assertive national sentiment in China with regard to China's maritime interests poses a challenge to good harmony in the sea in East Asia. A recent poll, for instance, indicates that as many as 90.4 percent of Chinese people are discontent over the state of China's protection of its own maritime interests.¹² Although currently there is little incentive for Beijing to allow the relations with its neighboring countries to deteriorate, domestic public opinion may effectively restrain political leaders from taking a more liberal stance.

Looking into the future, it is likely that China will experience some dramatic political changes, given the phenomenal transformations that have taken place in the economic and social sectors in the country. Whatever political orientation China embarks on, it is hard to predict that nationalism, both political and economic, will disappear or dwindle significantly in the short term.

⁹ "Ribei Xiwang Canjia Qingdao Guoji Yuebing, Zuizhong Weihuo Zhongguo Yaoqing"[Japan Wished to Attend the Qingdao Naval Parade Yet Was Not Invited By China], *Guoji Xianqu Daobao [International Herald Tribune]*. April 23, 2009 (online) (cited June 11, 2009). Available from <URL: http://news.ifeng.com/mil/1/200904/0423_339_1122246.shtml>

¹⁰ "Wangmin Buman Donghai Xieyi, Yuwan Ren Lianshu Yuzheng Zhuquan"[Netizens Discontent With East China Sea Agreement], *Mingbao* (online) (cited June 11, 2009). Available from <URL: http://app2.dwnnews.com/view-article.php?url=/gb/MainNews/SinoNews/Mainland/2008_7_7_17_8_52_473.html>

¹¹ "98% De Wangyou Zhichi Zhongguo Jiaqiang Nanhai Junli"[98% Netizens Support China to Enhance Maritime Power in South China Sea], Huanqiu Wang, March 12, 2009. (online) (cited June 11, 2009). Available from <URL: <http://mil.huanqiu.com/Observation/2009-03/401720.html>>

¹² "90.4% Shou Diaocha Zhongguo Gongmin Buman Haiyang Quanyi Weihu Xianzhuang"[90.4% Chinese Interviewees Are Discontent Over the State of China's Protection of Its Own Maritime Interests]. *Guoji Xianqu Daobao [International Herald Tribune]*. April 21, 2009 (online) (cited June 11, 2009). Available from <URL: <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2009-04-21/095517654697.shtml>>

Challenges from China's Economic Nationalism and Populism

In addition to political nationalism, there is growing economic nationalism in China. For instance, China's Ministry of Commerce ruled against Coca-Cola's proposed acquisition of China's leading juice maker in March 2009. People familiar with the matter said that the ministry's decision reflected wider worries in Beijing about public opposition to a foreign company taking over a leading Chinese brand. Such demonstration of economic nationalism is not good news for regional security. Economic nationalism hampers the growth of economic integration and interdependence in East Asia. Given the fact that economic integration and interdependence have contributed to the peace and stability in East Asia in the past few decades, the negative impact of economic nationalism on regional security is obvious.

Equally notable about China's political transformation is a growing populism that may bring about economic slowdown. Political scientists like Huntington have argued that since democracies are not able to curtail runaway immediate demands on the political and economic systems, consequently, their rate of economic growth is retarded.¹³ China may not be an exception as the political system seems to move inevitably towards populism. Needless to say, China has become the "factory of the world" and accumulated an enormous amount of foreign reserves without directing enough attention to the alleviation of social polarization. China's hitherto economic growth model has been flawed in that it favored certain social groups at the expense of others, most notably the peasants and the working class. Although the livelihood of Chinese peasants has greatly improved during the last few decades, a huge number of them still lead a hard life. Especially in the current global economic crunch, as many as 20 million Chinese migrant workers have lost their jobs this year,¹⁴ fueling the fire on the rising gap between rural and urban income gap.

From this perspective, it is perhaps reasonable to predict that once the authoritarian political system starts to loosen its control, a full-scale populist political movement is likely to emerge and compel the regime to focus on various social requests such as increasing migrant workers' income and welfare, the considerable low levels of which are China's competitive advantages for economic development. Those social requests may take away China's advantages in "race to the bottom", slow down China's economic growth, and make the country more inward-looking in the economic arena. This may pose a serious challenge not only to China itself but also to many other countries, including its Asian neighbors.

First, slower economic growth in China will undermine economic integration in East Asia. This is not good news for the further growth of economic interdependence, which many people believe have contributed tremendously to the peace and stability in East Asia. An analysis report by Australia's department of foreign affairs and trade concluded that China's continuing industrial expansion is not damaging but benefiting other regional economies. China is more closely integrating into mutually beneficial regional production chains, stimulating regional trade growth. China had a trade deficit of

¹³ Huntington, Samuel and Dominguez, Jorge. "Political development" in F. I. Greenstein (Ed.) *Handbook of political science*. Boston: Addison-Wesley. 1975.

¹⁴ Sharon Lafraniere, "20 Million Migrant Workers in China Can't Find Jobs", *The New York Times*, Feb. 2, 2009 (online) (cited June 11, 2009). Available from <URL: <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/02/business/worldbusiness/02iht-china.4.19876521.html>>

\$87.5 billion in 2006 with East Asian countries,¹⁵ as the largest export market for South Korea, the No.2 for Japan, the No.3 for Thailand, and the No.4 for Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines and Malaysia.¹⁶ In developing regional economies, China's industrial expansion certainly is challenging competing regional industries, encouraging them to specialize and adjust but, overall, competing sectors are still expanding strongly. Furthermore, China's expanding imports, including advanced components, capital equipment and raw materials, are generating lucrative new markets for East Asia.¹⁷ Thus, China's possible slowdown of its vigorous economic expansion could lead to higher rates of economic downturn in its trading partners in the region.

Second, China plays a central role in economic integration in East Asia. It vetoed the original proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund in 1997, largely because it was a Japanese initiative intended to preserve that country's financial leadership of the region, but has contributed to the strengthening of the Chiang Mai Initiative. To help ASEAN countries to jointly tide over the present financial crisis, China shows "sincerity, responsibility, confidence in East Asian cooperation"¹⁸ by allocating 10 billion dollars to an ASEAN infrastructure investment fund and making 15 billion for loans. Some observers consider it as China's attempt to exert a greater influence in the Asia Development Bank, which is mostly dominated by Japan.¹⁹ However, if populism becomes a strong political force in the upcoming Chinese political transformation, Beijing will find it very difficult to justify its domestic populist constituency and its active participation in international economic activities. In addition, much of its resources may have to be devoted to the domestic scene.

The Future of East Asia International Relations

The spurt of nationalism and populism are not new to China, but China's future political evolution may create their resurgence and put their consideration at the top of the agenda. Should shifting patterns of political regime take place in China, nationalism could have a negative impact on China's "peaceful ascendancy" policy and populism could halt the upward trend of China's economy, making China far more inward-looking than it is today. Either of them may deliver heavy blow to East Asian security.

With prudence and forethought, the rest of the region can develop three viable policies to meet the future challenges. First, it would be advantageous if regional political leaders continue to engage and even intensify the engagement with Chinese political elite, especially the younger generation of Chinese political leaders. This is because some die-hard fans for Socialism are leaving the political stage, while an increasing number of the

¹⁵ "China's Trade Deficit with East Asia Hits \$87.5b", Xinhua, July 15, 2007, (online) (cited June 11, 2009). Available from <URL: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2007-07/15/content_5435925.htm>

¹⁶ "China's trade deficit with East Asia hits \$87.5 b". *China Daily*, July 15, 2007. (online) (cited June 11, 2009). Available from <URL: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2007-07/15/content_5435197.htm>

¹⁷ "China's Industrial Rise: East Asia's Challenge". Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (online) (cited June 11, 2009). Available from <URL: http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/chinas_rise/summary.html>

¹⁸ "Chinese FM: China shows sincerity, responsibility, confidence in East Asian cooperation." *Chinaview*. April 12, 2009. (online) (cited June 11, 2009). Available from <URL: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-04/12/content_11170945.htm>

¹⁹ "China's ASEAN fund boost to challenge Japan," Australian Broadcasting Cooperation, April 16, 2009. (online) (cited June 11, 2009). Available from <URL: <http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/asiapac/stories/200904/s2545064.htm>>

young generation views the political trite as fake and unattractive. When a fifth generation of leadership assumes power in ten to fifteen years, China could become more open and tolerate greater dissent.²⁰ Some younger politicians like the 52-year-old CCP secretary of Guangdong Province, Wang Yang, are more open minded and aired some fresh views.²¹ Hence, mounting attention to those young Chinese cadres is helpful in understanding the future trend of China's domestic political views and making prompt policy decisions for East Asian countries.

Second, more programs through which the rest of the region can engage the civil society in China should be undertaken, because those Chinese grassroots will be the master of its nation in the process of democratization. However, since the cooperation between China and ASEAN countries is an elite construct, grassroots in those countries still need to be more comprehensive and need to renew understanding of each other. For instance, Japanese government invited over 200 Chinese high school students to visit Japan in 2007 in an attempt to "find ways to solve problems when they could not understand each other well."²²

In addition, it is particularly important that more exchange programs involve the Chinese media sector. Obviously, the interactions between domestic public opinion and foreign policy making in China have intensified, thanks to the growing role of the internet. It can become far more complicated when China starts a genuine democratization process in the coming decades when the younger generation will be either the opinion leaders or actual decision-makers. A growing diversity of voices, therefore, would create propitious conditions to mitigate the assertive nationalism in China.

²⁰ Arthur Bright, "Report: A democratic China could be 'great risk' to Asia". *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 2, 2006. (online) (cited June 11, 2009). Available from <URL: <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0302/dailyUpdate.html>>

²¹ Fong Tak-ho, "Wang Yang: A Rising Star in China," *Asia Times*. May 3, 2007. (online) (cited June 11, 2009). Available from <URL: <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/china/ie03ad02.html>>

²² "Over 200 Chinese students begin exchange tour in Japan", *People's Daily*, March 14, 2007. (online) (cited June 11, 2009). Available from <URL: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200703/14/eng20070314_357586.html>

Appendix A



Pacific Forum CSIS
YOUNG LEADERS

23rd Asia Pacific Roundtable
Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia
Kuala Lumpur ♦ 1-4 June 2009

Biographies

Ms. Catherine BOYE is a research assistant at Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Honolulu, Hawaii. She received a BA in Political Science and a BA in International Studies from the University of Utah in 2006. Catherine is pursuing a MA in International Policy Studies with a specialization in international security in Asia at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

Mr. Leon GASKIN is a recent graduate of the University of Auckland, having completed honors and master's degrees in Development Studies. His MA thesis examined emerging links between security and development in the context of the UN intervention in East Timor in 1999. Following the completion of his studies in 2008, Leon was appointed as a lecturer in the Centre for Business Interdisciplinary Studies at Auckland University of Technology (AUT), where he contributes classes for the course, "Globalization and Business Enterprise." As a graduate student, Leon tutored courses in international politics and security studies, and worked in Auckland University's equity program, facilitating initiatives aimed at strengthening the academic performance of Maori and Pasifika students. In 2008 was one of 36 individuals selected to participate in the Asia NZ Foundation Young Leaders Forum, and later that year he was a delegate to the 2008 New Zealand International Development Studies conference. He is also an active member of Save the Children New Zealand.

Mr. Tom GRIFFITHS is a member of the Asia New Zealand Young Leaders Network, with a strong interest in Asia. He received his BA from Victoria University, majoring in religious studies, political science and Mandarin, during which he studied on exchange to the National University of Singapore. He then studied Mandarin on scholarship at Zhejiang University in Hangzhou, China, for one year. Upon returning to New Zealand, he finished his Honors program year, concentrating in International Relations with a minor in Mandarin.

Mr. Brian HARDING has been a research associate with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Southeast Asia Initiative since its inception in January 2008. Prior to joining CSIS, he was a Fulbright fellow in Indonesia, where he studied the significance of Chinese Indonesians in the China-Indonesia bilateral relationship and served as codirector of the Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation's Indonesia initiative. Previously, he was a research assistant for improving the Nation's Security Decisions project, a research assistant at the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), and a volunteer English teacher in Nong Khai, Thailand. He holds a BA in history and Japan studies from Middlebury College, an MA

in Asian studies from the Elliott School at George Washington University, and has studied at Gadjah Mada University (Yogyakarta, Indonesia) and Doshisha University (Kyoto, Japan).

Mr. Chin-Hao HUANG is a Researcher with the China and Global Security Program at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Until 2007 he worked as the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC. He has authored and co-authored several monograph and book chapters on China, Africa, US relations, the latest of which include "China's renewed partnership with Africa: Implications for the United States," *China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence* (Brookings Press, 2008) and "U.S.-China relations and Darfur," (*Fordham International Law Journal*, 2008). He has published numerous other works on Chinese foreign and security policy. He is also a contributing co-author (with Robert Sutter) for the chapter on China-Southeast Asia relations for the Pacific Forum CSIS quarterly publication, *Comparative Connections*. Mr. Huang is a graduate of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.

Mr. Tetsuo KOTANI is a research fellow at the Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF). His dissertation focus is on the strategic implication of homeporting U.S. carriers in Japan. His other research interests include U.S.-Japan relations and international relations and maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region. He was a visiting fellow at the U.S.-Japan Center at Vanderbilt University. He received a security studies fellowship at the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), 2006-2008. He won the 2003 Japan's Defense Minister Prize.

Mr. Raymund Jose G. QUILOP, an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of the Philippines-Diliman, is currently seconded to the Department of National Defense as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Strategic Assessments. He regularly participates in international and local conferences and has published essays in both foreign and local publications pertaining to these and other related issues. He lectures in various government training institutions such as the Department of Foreign Affairs' Foreign Service Institute, National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP), AFP Command and General Staff College, the Army General Staff College, Air Force Officer School and Air Power Institute, and the Naval Education and Training Command, as well as in private and business institutions. Prof. Quilop serves as the associate editor of the Philippine Political Science Journal, an International Scientific Index (ISI)-accredited journal as well as editor-in-chief of the *OSS Digest*, a quarterly research publication of the Office of Strategic and Special Studies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. He is also the Secretary of the International Honor Society of Phi Kappa Phi's UP Chapter. He holds a Master of Arts degree in Political Science from the University of the Philippines – Diliman where he also obtained his Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science (Summa Cum Laude) in 1995.

Mr. Ha Anh TUAN is Deputy Director of Centre for Political and Security Studies, Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. He completed his MA at ANU in 2007. Tuan's research interests include international relations and security in Southeast Asia and Vietnam foreign policy.

Ms. WANG Di "Wendy" is a Research Assistant at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore. She received a BA in International Trade in

2008 and is currently pursuing an MSc in International Political Economy at the Nanyang Technological University. Wendy published a paper focused on China's rural microfinance and a commentary on China-ASEAN defense relations. Her current interest lies in the IPE issues enveloping RMB internationalization, defense technology transfer, as well as East Asian international relations.

Appendix B



Pacific Forum CSIS
YOUNG LEADERS

23rd Asia Pacific Roundtable
Kuala Lumpur ♦ 1-4 June 2009
Sheraton Imperial Kuala Lumpur Hotel

Young Leaders Agenda

Day 1	Monday, 1 June 2009
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1900 *Young Leaders meet Brad Glosserman in Nusantara Ballroom Foyer for briefing*

2000 **WELCOMING DINNER** (*Villa Danieli, Level 5*)

Day 2	Tuesday, 2 June 2009
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0900 – 0930 **OPENING SESSION**

0900 - 0905 **Welcoming Remarks**

Mr Simon Tay
Chair, ASEAN-ISIS and Chairman,
Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Singapore

0905 – 0930 **Keynote Address**

The Honourable Tan Sri Muhyiddin Haji Mohd Yassin, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia

1000 – 1130 **PLENARY SESSION ONE**

THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES AND FUNDAMENTAL REMEDIES

Co-Chairs

Dr Simon Longstaff, Executive Director, The St. James Ethics Centre, Australia

Tan Sri Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, Conference Chair and Chairman and CEO, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia

Keynote Presenter

HE Mr Mahendra Siregar, Deputy Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs, The Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, Indonesia

Presenters

Dr Narongchai Akrasanee, Former Minister of Commerce, Thailand and Chairman, Export-Import Bank of Thailand, Thailand

Tan Sri Azman Mokhtar, Managing Director, Khazanah Nasional Berhad, Malaysia

- 1130 - 1300** **PLENARY SESSION TWO**
A “NEW ERA OF PEACE”: APPRAISING US FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION
- Co-Chairs***
 HRH Prince Samdech Norodom Sirivudh, Member of Parliament and Chairman of the Board of Directors, Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP), Cambodia
- Mr Simon Tay, Chairman, Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Singapore
- Presenters***
 Dr Jamie F. MetzI, Executive Vice President, Asia Society, USA
- Prof Kishore Mahbubani, Dean and Professor in the Practice of Public Policy, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore
- Prof Koji Murata, Faculty of Law, Doshisha University, Japan
- Mr Jusuf Wanandi, Vice Chairman, Board of Trustees, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia
- 1300 – 1400** ***Lunch (Essence Restaurant, Level 1)***
- 1400 – 1530** **PLENARY SESSION THREE**
A “NEW ERA OF PEACE”: OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES IN EAST ASIA
- Co-Chairs***
 Prof Carolina G. Hernandez, Founding President and Chair, Board of Directors, Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS), Philippines
- Prof Brian L. Job, Director, Centre of International Relations, University of British Columbia, Canada
- Presenters***
 HE Mr Hitoshi Tanaka, Former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Senior Fellow, Japan Center for International Exchange, Japan
- Amb Ma Zhengang, Chairman, CSCAP China and President, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), China
- Mr Ralph A Cossa, President, Pacific Forum CSIS
- Prof Kim Young-ho, Visiting Research Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore
- Mr Simon Tay, Chairman, Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Singapore
- 1530 – 1700** **PLENARY SESSION FOUR**
A “NEW ERA OF PEACE”: OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADVANCEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
- Co-Chairs***
 Tan Sri Hasmy Agam, Executive Chairman, Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (IDFR), Malaysia
- Mr Zhou Xingbao, Vice Chairman and Secretary General, CSCAP China
- Presenters***
 Prof Sari Nusseibeh, President, AlQuds University, Palestine

Dr Satu Limaye, Director, East-West Center, Washington DC, USA

Dr Rashid Ahmad Khan, Senior Research Fellow, Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Pakistan

Dr Ajai Sahni, Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management, India

1715 – 1830

CONCURRENT SESSION I

THE NEXUS BETWEEN RELIGION, RADICALISM AND TERRORISM: HOW REAL? (Room 1 and 2, Level 7)

Chair

Dr Satu Limaye, Director, East-West Center, Washington DC, USA

Presenters

Dr Abdul Mu'ti, Sekretaris Majelis Pendidikan Dasar dan Menengah, Sekretariat PP Muhammadiyah, Indonesia

Dr Bill Durodié, Senior Fellow, and Co-ordinator, Homeland Defence Research Programme, Centre of Excellence for National Security, S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Mr Bunn Nagara, Associate Editor, Star Publications (M) Bhd, Malaysia

Dr Natasha Hamilton-Hart, Southeast Asian Studies Programme, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore

CONCURRENT SESSION II

ASEAN AFTER THE ASEAN CHARTER: PRIORITIES AND PROSPECTS FOR A PEOPLE-CENTRED ASEAN (Room 3 and 4, Level 7)

Chair

Mr Peter Cozens, Director, Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand

Presenters

HRH Prince Samdech Norodom Sirivudh, Member of Parliament and Chairman of the Board of Directors, Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP), Cambodia

Ms Natalia Soebagjo, Executive Director, Centre for the Study of Governance, University of Indonesia

Mr Mohammad Shafiee Kassim, Acting Deputy Director, ASEAN Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Brunei Darussalam

Prof Herman Joseph Kraft, Executive Director, Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Philippines

CONCURRENT SESSION III

THE ENDANGERED EARTH – WHAT THE ASIA PACIFIC CAN DO ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE (Room 5, Level 7)

Chair

Dr Thomas S Wilkins, Lecturer, Centre for International Security Studies, Faculty of Economics and Business, The University of Sydney, Australia

Presenter

Prof Dr Joy Jacqueline Pereira, Deputy Director, Southeast Asia Disaster Prevention Research Institute (SEADPRI-UKM), National University of Malaysia

1900 – 2000 *Dinner Reception*

*Hosted by HE Mr Masahiko Horie, Ambassador of Japan to Malaysia
Nusantara Ballroom 2, Level 2*

Day 3	Wednesday, 3 June 2009
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0900 - 1030 PLENARY SESSION FIVE
A “NEW ERA OF PEACE”: JAPAN-US-CHINA RELATIONS IN ASIA

Co-Chairs

Dr Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Director, Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS), Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand

Mr Jusuf Wanandi, Vice Chairman, Board of Trustees, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia

Presenters

Amb Koji Watanabe, Senior Fellow, Japan Center for International Exchange, Japan

Mr Brad Glosserman, Executive Director, Pacific Forum CSIS, Hawaii, USA

Prof Su Hao, Director, Center for Strategic and Conflict Management, China Foreign Affairs University, China

1045 – 1230 PLENARY SESSION SIX
MILITARY BUILD-UP IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION: TRENDS, RISKS AND RESPONSES

Co-Chairs

Amb Ma Zhengang, Chairman, CSCAP China and President, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), China

Mr Ralph A Cossa, President, Pacific Forum CSIS, Hawaii, USA

Presenters

General (R) Yan Kunsheng, Vice Chairman, CSCAP China

Dr Jim Rolfe, Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand

1400 - 1530 PLENARY SESSION SEVEN
POLITICAL CHANGE, DEMOCRACY AND STABILITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Co-Chairs

Amb Koji Watanabe, Senior Fellow, Japan Center for International Exchange, Japan

Dr James A. Boutillier, Asia-Pacific Advisor, Maritime Forces Pacific, Department of Defence, Canada

Presenters

Dr Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Director, Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS), Chulalongkorn University, Thailand

Mr Tin Soe, Director General, Planning and Administration Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Myanmar

Dr Michael Vatikiotis, Research Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Mr Xavier Nuttin, Directorate General External Policies, Asia Policy Department, European Parliament, Belgium

1530 – 1700

CONCURRENT SESSION IV

ADDRESSING INSURGENCY AND MILITANCY IN THE PHILIPPINES: THINKING OUT OF THE BOX (Room 1 and 2, Level 7)

Chair

Dr Michael Vatikiotis, Research Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Presenters

Mr Jesus Dureza, Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, Philippines

Major Dennis Eclarin, Director, Philippine Army, Philippines

CONCURRENT SESSION V

ENERGY SECURITY: CHALLENGES AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION (Room 3 and 4, Level 7)

Chair

Ms Clara Joewono, Deputy Chair, Executive Board, Centre for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia

Presenters

Assoc Prof Cheng Jian, Deputy Director, Institute of Geopolitics and Energy Economy, East China Normal University, China

Dr Pradeep Kumar Dadhich, Senior Fellow, The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), India

Mrs Khong Thi Binh, Deputy Director, Centre of Political and Security Studies, Vietnam

CONCURRENT SESSION VI

ADDRESSING INSURGENCY AND MILITANCY IN SOUTHERN THAILAND: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES (Room 5, Level 7)

Chair

Prof Herman Joseph Kraft, Executive Director, Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Philippines

Presenters

Mr Don Pathan, Regional Desk Editor, The Nation, Thailand

Mr Sunai Phasuk, Researcher, Asia Division, Human Rights Watch, Thailand

1830 – 2000

Dinner (Essence Restaurant, Level 1)

Day 4

Thursday, 4 June 2009

0900 – 1030

PLENARY SESSION EIGHT

THE REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE: IDENTIFYING WEAKNESSES AND REFORM (Nusantara Ballroom, Level 2)

Co-Chairs

Ms Malayvieng Sakonhnhom, Acting Director-General, Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Laos

HE Mr Hitoshi Tanaka, Former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Senior Fellow, Japan Center for International Exchange Former, Japan

Presenters

Prof Brian L. Job, Director, Centre of International Relations, University of British Columbia, Canada

Dr Yang Xiyu, Senior Research Fellow, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), China

Prof Yuri Dubinin, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, Russia

Dr Rizal Sukma, Executive Director, Centre for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia

Dr Thomas S Wilkins, Lecturer, Centre for International Security Studies, Faculty of Economics and Business, The University of Sydney, Australia

Tan Sri Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, Chairman and CEO, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia

1045 - 1230

PLENARY SESSION NINE

THE THREE MOST COMPELLING FUTURE CHALLENGES CONFRONTING THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION: A DISCOURSE ACROSS GENERATIONS

Co-Chairs

Mr Duong Van Quang, President, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam

Mr Brad Glosserman, Executive Director, Pacific Forum CSIS, Hawaii, USA

Presenters

Prof Eiichi Katahara, Deputy Director, Research Department, The National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan

Ms Catherine Boye, Monterey Fellow, Pacific Forum CSIS, USA

Mr Tetsuo Kotani, Research Fellow, Ocean Policy Research Foundation, Japan

Mr Chin-Hao Huang, Researcher, China and Global Security, SIPRI, Sweden

Dato' Mohd Ridzam Deva Abdullah, Distinguished ISIS Fellow, Malaysia

1230 – 1300

CLOSING ADDRESS

HE DR SURIN PITSUWAN, SECRETARY GENERAL, ASEAN AND FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER, THAILAND

1300 – 1305

CLOSING REMARKS

1400 – 1600

Meet Brad Glosserman for Young Leaders post-conference group discussion, to be held in the Boardroom on Level 3.

The Asia Foundation

Book Launch and Discussion on:
America's Role in Asia

The Gardens Hotel & Residences
Gardens, Mid Valley City, Lingkaran Syed Putra
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia • June 5, 2009

Every four years, The Asia Foundation program “America's Role in Asia” brings together a distinguished group of Asian and American policy experts, current and former diplomats, and scholars from both sides of the Pacific to develop recommendations for U.S. policy toward Asia. America's Role in Asia examines critical bilateral and trans-national issues in U.S.-Asia relations through a series of candid, high-level workshops in Asia and the U.S., culminating in a published volume, America's Role in Asia: Asian and American Views. A PDF version of the publication is available at: www.asiafoundation.com/resources/pdfs/AmericasRoleinAsia2008.pdf

- 10:00am – 10:05am Welcoming Remarks
Ms. Anthea Mulakala
Country Representative in Malaysia
The Asia Foundation
- 10:05am – 10:20am Introduction to America's Role in Asia Project
Mr. John Brandon
Director, International Relations Programs
The Asia Foundation
- 10:20am – 10:50am Keynote Speech
Mr. Ralph Cossa
Member of Asia Foundation's Task Force on America's Role in Asia; President, Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies
- 10:50am – 11:10am Presentation
Dr. Zakaria Ahmad
Executive Director
HELP University-College
- 11:10am – 11:30am Presentation
Dr. K.S. Nathan
Deputy Director, IKON &
Head, Centre for American Studies (KAMERA)
- 11:30am – 12:00pm Q&A, Discussion moderated by Ms. Anthea Mulakala