



Trilateral Collaboration in Three Dimensions:
US-Japan-China Cooperation in Politics, Economics,
and Security

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The Young Leaders Program invites young professionals and graduate students to join Pacific Forum policy dialogues and conferences. The program fosters education in the practical aspects of policy-making, generates an exchange of views between young and seasoned professionals, promotes interaction among younger professionals, and enriches dialogues with generational perspectives for all attendees. Fellows must have a strong background in the area covered by the conference they are attending and an endorsement from respected experts in their field. Supplemental programs in conference host cities and mentoring sessions with senior officials and specialists add to the Young Leader experience. The Young Leaders Program is currently supported by Chevron, the Henry Luce Foundation, and the Yuchengco Group, with a growing number of universities, institutes, and organizations also helping to sponsor individual participants. For more details, see the Pacific Forum CSIS website, www.pacforum.org, or contact Brad Glosserman, director of the Young Leaders Program, at brad@pacforum.org.

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Introduction

By Kim Fassler

Introduction

On Aug. 29-30, 2009, the Center for International & Strategic Studies at Peking University, the Research Institute for Peace and Security of Japan, and the Pacific Forum CSIS convened a Track II trilateral dialogue in Beijing entitled, “Trilateral Security Dialogue between China, Japan, and the US.” This dialogue brought together Chinese, Japanese, and US experts to share perspectives on several of the region’s, as well as the world’s, most pressing strategic problems with the goal of minimizing mutual misunderstanding and identifying practical steps for cooperation.

The following themes were focal points of the conference:

Sino-Japanese Relations: The Weakest Link

China and Japan’s once-strained relationship has evolved into a strategic partnership; historical issues, territorial disputes, and concerns about Chinese militarization hinder cooperation in other areas. This fragile relationship reflects a fundamental lack of trust between the two countries. Participants agreed that more China-Japan cooperation on less politically sensitive issues where collective action is needed, like disaster relief and disease prevention, would build confidence on both sides. However, those in attendance disagreed whether difficult areas like Taiwan, the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands and Chinese domestic affairs should be handled in a trilateral format or left off the table completely, and if they were omitted, whether the relationship could progress without addressing these disputes.

Japan’s Role and Relevance

Defining Japan’s leadership role in East Asia and seeking a more equal relationship with the US will be major issues for the Democratic Party of Japan as it settles into power. Given China’s militarization and North Korea’s nuclear program, Japan finds itself in a threatening neighborhood. “Japan passing” is a concern – Japanese worry that the US is not taking the US-Japan alliance seriously, especially following the appointment of Ambassador John Roos, who is viewed as having little Japan experience. Before the August election, Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio suggested in an essay that Japan may distance itself from the United States; participants agreed that international and domestic factors will likely limit any major changes in foreign policy.

Growing concerns about the international community’s resolve in dealing with new nuclear states and doubts about the US commitment to Japan’s defense have also stimulated discussions about a Japanese nuclear option. Although Japanese participants agreed that nuclearization is not likely, they did not put the likelihood at zero. Japanese colleagues pointed out that discussions about going nuclear do not reflect a desire for a change in national strategy as much as they reflect underlying concerns about Japan’s relevance.

Where is China Headed?

China has shown greater international leadership in recent years; there remains uncertainty in Japan and the US about its foreign policy goals. US and Japanese leaders are encouraged by Chinese engagement in multilateral initiatives like the Six-Party Talks, but whether China will shoulder greater international responsibility on other issues, like climate change, remains to be seen. China's hands-off approach to governance in other countries also gives it an international competitive advantage, but could have unintended negative long-term implications within those countries.

For Chinese leaders, foreign policy and domestic policy are inextricably linked. Policymakers fear that external circumstances – the global financial crisis, for example – will set off domestic unrest, which could undermine political legitimacy and impede economic growth. Recent conflicts in the country's border regions, such as clashes in Xinjiang this summer, only heighten this concern.

Chinese participants pointed out that although decision-making is more transparent than before, formulating a specific foreign policy strategy is still challenging, in part because of lack of coordination between policymaking bureaus. Some noted fundamental differences between China's older and younger generations whose perspectives and expectations for China differ sharply depending on the time in which they grew up. As Chinese leadership transitions to the next generation, these different views could lead to shifts in foreign policy.

Addressing North Korea and Nuclear Stability

Addressing North Korea's nuclear program is a prime opportunity for cooperation in Northeast Asia, but a trilateral mechanism may not be the best option because it risks excluding important players like Russia and South Korea (colleagues from both countries voiced these concerns). Although the Six-Party Talks have stalemated, conference participants agreed that a peaceful resolution must be found, whether through the continuation of Six-Party Talks or the introduction of a new multilateral mechanism.

Japanese colleagues suggested involving ASEAN because of the possibility of nuclear proliferation in Myanmar. South Korean participants encouraged greater Chinese involvement and noted that although the collapse of the current DPRK regime is unlikely, all countries should prepare a contingency plan, especially concerning refugees. Chinese delegates noted that although China has a special rapport with North Korea, the relationship is not an alliance, and the international community should not exaggerate China's ability to resolve the dispute.

Trilateral Cooperation: Limitations and Opportunities

Myriad challenges have prevented trilateralism at the state-to-state level. These include unclear priorities, structural asymmetries in the trilateral triangle, and questions about which issues would be discussed. Trilateralism also may not be the most appropriate mechanism in all cases, for example, to address North Korea's nuclear program. Some also

questioned trilateralism as a foreign policy priority. For example, Chinese colleagues noted that their leaders may not prioritize talks with the US and Japan over bilateral relations with Russia or the European Union.

For these reasons, trilateral cooperation may remain restricted to unofficial channels in the immediate future. The participants did see great potential for cooperation on “non-traditional” or “new” security threats, like the spread of disease and environmental degradation, where there is a common interest and which are considered less politically sensitive than traditional security concerns. However, questions of sovereignty, domestic politicization of these issues, and military involvement present challenges to new security cooperation.

Although official-level dialogue may be a distant goal, the participants agreed that there are strong incentives for trilateral cooperation. Trilateralism facilitates understanding, establishes a tradition of coordination, and allays fears about leaving any one country out of the discussion. Trilateral cooperation on immediate challenges, like energy and climate change, makes sense because the US, China, and Japan are large contributors to climate change and have the technical capacity to make progress on the issue. Finally, a successful trilateral relationship can be a model for stronger bilateral and multilateral cooperation in East Asia.

Young Leaders Session: New Perspectives on Old Challenges

The Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders convened in a separate day-long meeting following the senior-level dialogue. Like the senior experts, YLs from the US, Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, and Russia saw the potential and the urgent need for trilateral cooperation, but struggled with how to address fundamental imbalances in the relationship and prevent sensitive political issues from derailing cooperation.

The session opened with a discussion of a recently published YL paper, “US-China Relations: A Roadmap for the Future,” which focused on sensitive issues. The report’s authors, who met at a previous conference in Shanghai, argue that Chinese and US leaders should make a strategic decision not to allow politically charged disputes to get in the way of constructive collaboration. The report identifies areas for cooperation on trade and finance, as well as on traditional and nontraditional security issues, including maritime security, arms control, energy, and humanitarian assistance.

Many YLs agreed – at least in theory – with the idea of setting aside sensitive political issues. YLs also felt that cooperation on nontraditional security issues, like product safety and environmental degradation, should not simply be viewed as a confidence building measure; rather, nontraditional security issues should have as strong a role in foreign policy as traditional security issues. The participants also emphasized economic cooperation to smooth the aftereffects of the global financial crisis.

YLs agreed that trilateral cooperation is difficult where interests diverge, for example, on perceived threats. While the US perceives many major threats from the international arena,

like terrorism, in Japan, these external concerns may not rise to the same level of importance. China, on the other hand, is concerned with external threats but is also preoccupied with threats within its borders.

The participants also saw progress in cross-Strait relations. YLs from Japan and the US projected that China-Taiwan relations would remain at the status quo for at least the next 10 years. However, some Chinese participants felt that trilateralism could not proceed without resolving or at least addressing the Taiwan question; others did not think that a US-Japan-China trilateral dialogue was an appropriate venue for this issue. Some urged greater public diplomacy and participation by NGOs on sensitive questions.

YLs also differed on future visions of East Asia. Some foresaw a multilateral political framework based less on security, like NATO, and more based on economic development, like the OECD. Others did not expect much change. They imagined a stronger ASEAN, but did not foresee the formation of a formal Northeast Asia security mechanism. South Korean, Russian, and Taiwanese participants encouraged trilateralism – as long as discussions were transparent and they were not left out of important decisions.

The YLs generally saw the US-Japan-China relationship getting stronger, with many immediate opportunities for cooperation. The challenges for trilateralism will be defining interests, identifying priorities, navigating sensitive issues and determining where trilateralism is useful and where it is not. These are formidable questions – as one group concluded following a two hour-long break-out session on traditional security cooperation: “The conclusion is that hard security is hard to discuss.” But they are not insurmountable. Dialogues like these are a good first step on the road to action.

After a half-day of discussions, the Young Leaders were divided into groups to explore a specific area in more detail. The following sections are contributions from the new security, politics, and economics and trade groups. These groups were tasked with identifying and ranking five top priorities in their sections among the US, China, and Japan. After which, the group was to develop five specific suggestions for how to deal with the issues.

New Security: Opportunities for Trilateral Cooperation

By Kim Fassler, Eunice Ma, Masataka Nakauchi,
Ni Shan “Vency”, Shino Watanabe

As the three biggest players in the Asia-Pacific region, China, Japan, and the United States share similar interests and challenges. While relations between the three countries have traditionally revolved around traditional security issues, emerging threats such as tainted food products, energy shortages, and natural disasters have in recent years moved to the forefront of security concerns. These “new” security threats also present a prime opportunity for trilateral cooperation.

During the September 2009 CSIS Pacific Forum US-Japan-China Trilateral Security Dialogue in Beijing, Young Leaders from China, Japan, the United States, and Taiwan came together to discuss how to define “new” security and to identify priorities for trilateral cooperation in these areas of emerging concern. This paper offers views on the role of new security in foreign policy, identifies the top five new security issues that will dramatically impact people’s lives and the global environment, and offers suggestions for how trilateral cooperation can address them. The top five areas are (1) food and product safety, (2) disease control and prevention, (3) sustainable development and environmental protection, (4) energy, and (5) natural disaster mitigation and relief.

What is New Security?

Many policymakers in the United States and East Asia see cooperation on new security issues as a means to an end. By this logic, working together on “softer,” less politically sensitive problems such as environmental protection and humanitarian aid establishes a pattern of cooperation that builds mutual trust between countries, enhances confidence, and encourages progress on traditional (or “hard”) security issues like territorial disputes or military conflicts.¹

Young Leaders, however, believe that new security issues themselves represent some of the most critical challenges facing East Asia and should be viewed not only as trust-building exercises, but as key foreign policy goals. Unfortunately, new security issues are not easier to solve than traditional ones, nor are they free from difficult fundamental questions like border disputes, sovereignty and other sensitive political concerns.

With this in mind, the following new security concerns and recommendations for trilateral cooperation are identified in order of priority, taking into account both the viability of coordination and the potential benefits.

¹ Traditional (or “hard”) security issues can be defined as areas where military and traditional defense establishments play a leading role. While traditional security has historically dealt with issues that affect nation-states on a national level, including deterrence and territorial disputes, “new security” or “non-traditional security” is generally more concerned with threats that affect the well-being of a country’s citizens. These definitions are somewhat fluid, however, and it should be noted that military forces *can* be involved in aspects of new security cooperation, like disaster relief.

Food and Product Safety

Several high-profile scares surrounding Chinese products exported to the United States and Japan have marred relations between the three countries in recent years. In 2007, millions of Chinese toys with dangerous amounts of lead paint were recalled in the US, and in 2008, the discovery of packages of Chinese dumplings tainted with insecticide provoked a nationwide panic in Japan.

Trade is one of the strongest ties that bind China, Japan, and the US together. As Chinese goods are exported around the world, tainted food, drugs, and other consumer products threaten the health and safety of consumers worldwide. Leaders from China, Japan, and the US should establish an international alert system for problem goods, including food and pharmaceuticals, to facilitate rapid exchanges of information, encourage officials to issue immediate public warnings, and withdraw dangerous products from the market or restrict further export of these items.

The trilateral alert system could be based on the European Union's consumer product alert system, called RAPEX. RAPEX recently expanded cooperation with China to allow officials from China's General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) access to RAPEX data and notifications. AQSIQ is expected to investigate reports of dangerous products, take appropriate measures, and report the results to the European Commission on a quarterly basis.² A similarly structured alert system for China, Japan, and the US, that included Taiwan, would give consumers better information, allow quicker recalls of dangerous goods, and encourage officials to investigate and penalize problem manufacturers.

In the short term, each country would release alerts according to its own quality standards; a long-term goal would be to establish international product standards.

Disease Control and Prevention

The international focus on H1N1 is a unique opportunity for collective action and a chance to lay the basis for future coordination on disease control and prevention. In May, 2009, ASEAN members along with China, South Korea, and Japan met in Bangkok to discuss regional cooperation on H1N1.³ Trilateral cooperation should expand on this effort by (1) encouraging a meeting of health officials from China, Japan, and the US to draft an action plan on the immediate threat from H1N1, and (2) expanding participation and making these meetings a basis for future regional cooperation.

A main goal of the meetings should be to establish sustained international cooperation on surveillance. The public health departments of the US and Japan can bring their experience to the table, and China, which has taken concerted measures to prevent the spread of H1N1, has valuable firsthand knowledge in the containment of SARS.

² "Rapid Alert System for non-food consumer products (RAPEX)." EUROPA. Last updated 5/10/2009. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/index_en.htm.

³ The Director of the US Center for Disease Control participated through videoconference.

Because successful surveillance requires a regional effort, a second goal should be to expand participation to other countries and international organizations. As a starting point, these could include government and health officials from ASEAN, South Korea, and Taiwan, as well as representatives from the World Health Organization (WHO).

The collective gains from working together against the immediate threat of H1N1 should be obvious; the more difficult task will be making this a sustained effort. Leaders should seize this opportunity to set a precedent for future cooperation.

Sustainable Development and Environmental Protection

Environmental degradation from unrestrained development threatens public health, imperils wildlife, and depletes resources. Through sustainable development, cities can protect local environments and preserve resources to meet future needs. China, Japan, and the US have each passed significant national sustainable development initiatives. However, some of the biggest changes – and challenges – are happening at the local level.

The three countries should start an annual conference of city and county officials to discuss new technologies, strategies, and challenges in their communities. The conference location can rotate between cities that have made significant progress in sustainable development, like Yokohama, which is considered a model low-carbon city; De Zhou, which is known for its widespread use of solar power; and Portland, Oregon, which has been praised for its commuting options and promotion of local agriculture.

The meetings would be specifically structured to help local leaders working on strategic city plans or trying to meet the requirements of a government mandate. Ideally, these discussions would foster more direct cooperation, possibly in the form of more “sister city” or “sister state” relationships among cities and provinces.

Energy

China, Japan, and the US face many similar energy issues, including supply and environmental concerns. The transfer of renewable energy and advanced coal technologies from one country to another is a difficult and controversial issue, but there is much room for progress.

Past attempts at technology transfer have struggled because they failed to account for the motivations of private firms. For example, the Japanese government’s 1992 Green Aid Plan to introduce cleaner coal demonstration projects in Asian countries, including China, struggled because of the high costs of importing Japanese equipment.⁴ A US Department of Energy project to deploy coal gasification technology in China also encountered problems because commercial financiers considered the technology too risky even to be deployed in OECD countries.⁵

⁴ Jim Watson, “Rising Sun: Technology Transfer in China,” *Harvard International Review*, Winter 2005, Vol.26, No.4.

⁵ *Ibid.*

Public and private sector leaders should set up a trilateral dialogue on technical cooperation. The discussion should study the technical, personnel, and legal barriers to technology transfer, focusing on how to create incentives for private firms to transfer technology.

Deploying advanced coal technologies will be critical for China as it continues its rapid development. Taking past technology transfer projects as examples, the talks should focus on ensuring each country's intellectual property rights and improving business conditions that would encourage further development of transfers of clean energy and energy efficient technologies.

Natural Disaster Mitigation and Relief

Natural disasters can be unpredictable and highly destructive to populations and infrastructure. Recent natural disasters, from Hurricane Katrina to Typhoon Mongkok, offer valuable lessons in prevention and recovery. Trilateral coordination can strengthen efforts to send early warnings, protect citizens, and mitigate the economic and social turmoil that follows a natural disaster.

Trilateral cooperation is needed to enhance regional earthquake and tsunami monitoring capacity. China, Japan, and the US should encourage the establishment of an Asian Regional Seismographic Network, proposed at the China-ASEAN meeting in 2005. Trilateralism can be the basis for cooperation but it should be expanded to include Southeast Asia, Taiwan, Australia, and international organizations like UNESCO and the UN.

Conclusion

China, Japan, and the US can use their experiences and status as political and economic leaders to address these critical issues. But it should be recognized that trilateral cooperation is a long-term process. In the short term, establishing a pattern of dialogues and information sharing can be a basis for collective action with long-term goals.

Cooperation between the three Asia-Pacific leaders may also prompt leaders to consider the restructuring of regional power based on the surge of new powers in the age of globalization. As new security concerns play an increasingly prominent role in the regional security arena, and as handling many of these issues requires a cooperative effort, it is time for countries to think seriously about working together to address them.

The benefits of trilateral cooperation are not limited to China, Japan, and the US alone; nor should these initiatives necessarily exclude other nations where broader collaboration is needed – several measures can and should be expanded to include others. By leading the way on these initiatives, trilateralism can encourage multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region and sustained cooperation on issues that demand collective action.

Priorities for US-China-Japan Political Cooperation

By Shiuan-Ju Chen, Kei Koga, Lee Ridley

The key relationships in Northeast Asia are shifting – gradually – due to the unprecedented rise of China and changing political landscapes in Japan and the United States. Therefore, it is an opportune moment to reassess the importance and nature of trilateral cooperation between the United States, China, and Japan. This paper will focus on the political aspects of enhancing cooperation, and lists five priorities agreed by the younger generations, to build a lasting and effective trilateral relationship. We also agreed on specific policy recommendations on how to improve or achieve the objective detailed in each priority. Though the priorities and recommendations outlined below are discussed within the trilateral framework, some recommendations should be expanded to the regional or multilateral level, where applicable, to further enhance regional cooperation once adopted and practiced by the three governments.

Five Priorities

1. Develop a Five-Year Roadmap for Trilateral Cooperation

Young Leaders agree that nothing is more important to sustained trilateral interaction than a common agenda for the relationship. Developing a common vision amongst the leaders from the three countries for the future of the region is the most important first step. Although it does not require common perspectives on particular issues, agreeing on common objectives for trilateral cooperation and setting an agenda that goes beyond the obvious concerns of mutual interest will help sustain trilateral dialogue, though topics such as economic cooperation, climate change, and disease control and prevention will also be discussed. Such a common vision will provide the roadmap for future trilateral cooperation.

2. Improve Good Governance

As stipulated in many official documents including the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the East Asian Summit, the ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation Work Plan 2007-2017, and the ASEAN Charter, good governance is critical to political and social development in East Asia despite varied economic development paces and political systems. Young Leaders identified several topics that are central to good governance: transparency, corruption and social stability (such as human rights, health care system, etc.) Focusing on how these topics enhance their ability to govern rather than differences in system and methodology will allow for more frank exchange and reduce sensitivities. China, Japan, and the United States should share their experiences and best practices in each of these domains to assist each other in achieving higher good governance. Various trilateral channels of communication, mechanisms for trilateral shared learning cycles, or feedback systems, need to be pursued.

3. Increase Mutual Recognition of, not Consensus regarding, History between China, Japan, and the United States

This priority focuses on increasing mutual recognition of each other's perception of contentious historical issues between China, Japan, and the United States. The

fundamental obstacles among countries, especially China-Japan relations, are based on contentious historical issues with each state usually providing one-sided justifications. Although this goal does not aim at denying such perspectives, it can foster a conflict-management process by increase the three countries' ability to recognize another's perspectives. Therefore, this proposal emphasizes increasing mutual recognition and respect, as opposed to reaching consensus or solving disagreements regarding WWII history, as the most important factor to stabilize bilateral as well as trilateral relationships.

4. *Deepen the Trilateral Cooperative Mechanism through Multi-Track Exchanges*

Young Leaders agree that Track-2 or Track-1.5 exchanges allow for candid discussions compared with Track-1 dialogues, while helping governments receive information and recommendations from diverse perspectives. Though the official trilateral policy dialogue is stalled, Track-2 or Track-1.5 mechanisms should be encouraged by each government. In addition, Track-3 exchanges, which are based on citizen-level cooperation, should be bolstered through means such as institutionalized cultural exchanges to facilitate communication and reduce mutual misperception in each country.

5. *Establish a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for Crisis Management among the Three Countries*

The three counties should establish a SOP in case a crisis threatens regional stability or a common concern arises. "Crisis" here refers to unpredictable events such as natural disaster, piracy, arms smuggling, planes crashes, etc., instead of traditional security threats like the Taiwan issue or the Korean Peninsula, which Young Leaders agree should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. The SOP should include different crisis levels as well as outline how each country should respond. If the SOP is successful, the three countries' reactions will be more predictable and reduce the risks of misperception over reactions to a crisis and will help prevent crisis escalation.

Recommendations for Each Priority

1. *Develop Five-Year Roadmap for Trilateral Cooperation*

- 1) Set up working group meetings and ministerial dialogues to develop a common vision and a five-year roadmap for the trilateral relationship.
- 2) Conduct domestic surveys in the three countries to serve as a reference when setting the five year roadmap.

2. *Improve Good Governance*

- 1) The three countries should set up working groups and committees to encourage sharing experiences and best practices.
- 2) The working groups and committees should be established on the basis of the levels of consensus that the three countries can reach.
- 3) The trilateral working groups and committees should pursue cooperation within the context of international organizations.

3. ***Increase Mutual Recognition of History Between China, Japan, and the United States***
 - 1) Design short-term course work about history to allow university students and teachers to undertake activities including:
 - i. Visits to historical sites in other countries: The local host can list places that other countries should see and understand. The list could be biased, but Young Leaders agree that learning those biases is necessary and is the quickest way to understand other perspectives.
 - ii. Watching movies or T.V. programs: The local host can provide popular historical movies or T.V. programs in each country to attain a sense of how the public sees its history.
 - iii. Reading textbooks: The local host can provide major history textbooks that each country possesses.
 - 2) Provide scholarships to send individual students to different colleges for understanding different cultures and perspectives.
 - 3) Send history teachers to other countries to compare how they design history courses and textbooks, and how they teach students.

4. ***Build a Trilateral Cooperative Mechanism through Multi-Track Exchanges***
 - 1) Establish Track-1, Track-2 (or Track-1.5) and Track-3 meetings
 - 2) Track-1: establish two levels of procedures in the short-term, and merge them in the long-term:
 - i. Non-regular ministerial meetings: To take into consideration political sensitivities in each state, ministerial-level meetings should be held on an ad-hoc basis.
 - ii. Regular director-level meetings: To pursue potential cooperation among three countries, director-level meetings should be institutionalized.
 - 3) Track-2 (or Track-1.5):
 - i. Regular exchange of legislative representatives of all three countries to improve understanding of the decision making process.
 - ii. Regular exchange of researchers and academics to provide new information and creative recommendations to governments.
 - 4) Track-3,
 - i. Provide funding for regular exchanges organized by civil society to reduce political affiliations to the lowest level (This also relates to the third recommendation).

5. ***Establish Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) of Crisis Management and Prevention among the Three Countries***
 - 1) Set up crisis levels (including determining which circumstances constitute each level) and different handling process shared by three countries to avoid misperceptions and increase efficiency in response to a crisis.
 - 2) Develop a trilateral mechanism for handling nontraditional security threats, especially in fields where the three countries can reach a consensus relatively easily such as disaster management. The three countries should gradually expand this mechanism to a regional or multilateral scale by inviting other countries to participate as observers.

Three views of Trilateral Economic Cooperation

This paper was intended to be a collaborative effort aimed at identifying and ranking five of the top priorities in the economic and trade relationship between the US, China and Japan. However, the project faced challenges from the outset and this final product deviates significantly from the original assignment. First, the group was comprised of participants not only from China, Japan, and the United States, but also from the Republic of Korea as well as Taiwan. This contributed to the proliferation of ideas and brought to the fore variations in responses based on each individual's country of origin. Adding to the assignment's complexity was the fact that not everyone in the group had an economic and/or finance and trade background. Discussions during the brainstorming session therefore ranged from the sophisticated and technical to what might be considered naïve but perhaps more creative offerings.

Therefore, what follows should not be viewed as a consensus document; rather, there are three separate and individual responses from the group's Japanese, Korean, and US participants. It is interesting to note that at the time of the conference, the group's focus was on headline-grabbing stories – the financial crisis, free trade agreements, protectionism, and Bretton Woods reform. However what follows are solutions to specific and less broad topics that could enhance, in very tangible and constructive ways, trilateral cooperation between the three countries.

US-China-Japan Trilateral ODA Cooperation on Environmental Protection

By Sachi Nagaoka

Why it's important

As COP 15 (the 15th United Nations Climate Change Conference) illustrated, climate change is commonly perceived as a significant and eminent threat for most countries and is treated as a priority issue in both domestic and foreign policies. At the same time, it revealed the intricacy of the multilateral framework that requires agreement by all participant countries for issuing a common protocol. In order to make this process move forward, new approaches are required. A trilateral framework between the US, China, and Japan, the most powerful nations in the Asia Pacific, can build a solid regional foundation for global environmental cooperation.

There is an opportunity for trilateral environmental cooperation because the US and China started to shift policies to prioritize environmental policies. In contrast to the former administration, President Obama shows strong commitment to environmental issues as a way to create new jobs in the US as well as to lead other nations in the 21 century.⁶ China also set a target for the first time and announced that it will try to reduce carbon emissions per unit of GDP by 40-45 percent by 2020 compared with 2005 levels.⁷ In addition to these recent policy shifts – by two nations that account for nearly 40 percent of global carbon emissions – the Hatoyama administration set the ambitious goal of reducing carbon emissions by 25 percent from 1990 levels by 2020 and accelerated efforts to establish a low-carbon society.⁸ These changes in the mood of the political environment provide an opportunity for joint action between the three nations in the coming decade.

Recommendations

To jointly tackle climate change problems, a trilateral ODA framework for environmental protection is suggested here.

Bilaterally, the US, China, and Japan have long histories working together in ODA. China and Japan have been in agreement for more than two decades and Japan's ODA is targeted at environmental protection within China. The 1998 and 2007 Sino-Japan joint statements on environmental protection have accelerated the shift in most of Japan's ODA to environmental projects.⁹ The US and Japan, as leading ODA donors, have cooperated in

⁶ Remarks by President Obama at the Edison Electric Vehicle Technical Center, Pomona, California, March 19, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-the-Edison-Electric-Vehicle-Technical-Center.

⁷ Remarks by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao at the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen, Denmark, Dec. 18, 2009, http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2009-12/19/content_1491149.htm.

⁸ Remarks by Prime Minister Hatoyama at the Sixty-Fourth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Sept. 24, 2009, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/hatoyama/statement/200909/ehat_0924c_e.html.

⁹ Joint Statement by Japan and the People's Republic of China on the Cooperation for Environmental Protection

environmental, population growth, and health care projects since President Clinton and former Prime Minister Miyazawa agreed on “The Common Agenda for Cooperation in Global Perspective” in 1993.¹⁰ In regards to China-US ODA cooperation, the US has provided most of its ODA to China “for democracy assistance and aid to Tibetans.”¹¹ Furthermore, recent agreements between leaders of the two nations in the last summit will drastically expand bilateral cooperation on environmental issues. President Obama and President Hu Jintao declared a “US-China Joint Statement” that identifies climate change as one of the key issues that the two nations will work together on for the next decade.¹²

Based on this cooperation, the following two measures are suggested for realizing trilateral ODA cooperation.

First, launching a joint ODA Center on Environmental Protection in China is one option that the three nations can immediately implement. The new ODA Center can serve as a hub of trilateral ODA cooperation to bridge existing bilateral cooperation such as Sino-Japan and Sino-US centers for environmental protection. Between China and Japan, “The Sino-Japan Friendship Center for Environmental Protection” which was agreed to be jointly established in 1988, has played a major role in coordinating Japan’s environmental ODA projects in China for two decades. Between the US and China, “A Clean Energy Research Center” will be established with funding of \$150 million over five years with one headquarter in each country.¹³ As a branch of these bilateral centers in China, the new ODA center which will focus on trilateral ODA projects can facilitate coordination and implementation of trilateral projects.

Second, launching trilateral forestation projects is another option. As deforestation and desertification around Huang He and Chang Jiang rivers rapidly create environmental threats, locations around the rivers can be targeted for trilateral afforestation projects. Japan’s experiences of past ODA projects such as “The Project for Afforestation for Conservation of Middle Stream of Huang He (Grant aid: 1.656 billion yen)” and “The Model Afforestation Project in Sichuan (Technical cooperation: 548 million yen)”¹⁴ would provide great lessons for the US and Japan to jointly implement a new ODA project in China. The ODA Center can take a leading role in coordinating the dispatch of US and Japanese technical experts as well as selecting Chinese counterparts.

toward 21 century, Tokyo, Japan, Nov. 26, 1998, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/yojin/arc_98/c_kankyo.html; Joint Statement by Japan and the People’s Republic of China on the Further Enhancement of Cooperation for Environmental Protection, Tokyo, Japan, April 11, 2007, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint0704.html>.

¹⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “The US-Japan Common Agenda for Cooperation in Global Perspective,” April 1999, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/agenda/gpers9904.html>.

¹¹ Thomas Lum, “US-Funded Assistance Programs in China”, *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, April 24, 2009, pp.1-4.

¹² US-China Joint Statement, Beijing, China, Nov. 17, 2009, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-china-joint-statement>

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Overview of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China, June 2005, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/region/e_asia/china/index.html

Launching a trilateral institution and trilateral ODA projects will enable the US, China, and Japan to deepen trust at the governmental and grassroots levels. These measures will also enable them to share common objectives and work together with a long-term perspective in policy and implementation. Steady efforts are key to successful joint actions on environmental protection.

Trilateral Cooperation to Provide Joint Assistance to North Korea

By Sungmin Cho

Why it's important

China, Japan, and the US greatly influence North Korea's economy. While China is the biggest provider of food and energy, the US and Japan pose the biggest threat. The US and Japan lead economic sanctions against North Korea but they also have the potential to provide the most assistance in the future. Since foreign assistance to North Korea has been closely linked with its nuclear problem, all three nations have considered their aid to North Korea under the framework of each's own security strategy. Until now, the discussion of the three nations' cooperation to help the North Korean economy has been blocked due to economic sanctions imposed by a series of UN Security Council resolutions following two DPRK nuclear tests.

It is still necessary to contemplate in advance the possibility of trilateral economic cooperation to assist North Korea in preparation for the possibility of the abandonment of its nuclear program. Well-prepared as well as swift economic support may bring bigger positive political effects. Therefore, we need to review the kinds of trilateral cooperation that can be mobilized to provide North Korea with economic assistance and how to implement it. We need to consider the benefits and costs the three nations will have if they cooperate in this way.

Current Status

China is widely believed to be North Korea's single-largest provider of food and energy. China has aided North Korea on the basis of their bilateral relationship without attaching conditions. Despite the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2002, China never stopped supplying food and energy to North Korea, despite occasional downturns in 2001, 2006, and 2008. The US provided economic assistance to North Korea through various multilateral regimes, such as the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and through the World Food Program (WFP). US assistance was always conditioned on transparency in distribution of food and energy and on the establishment of a verification system. Economic assistance to North Korea is so closely tied to security that US assistance is currently halted and has been several times in the past. Japan has shown a similar pattern. Japan has linked its energy assistance to North Korea with the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea.

Expected Effects

Even though there is no precedent for trilateral cooperation in foreign assistance to North Korea, benefits clearly exist for the three nations. They should start discussing joint programs to support the North Korean economy in preparation for a possible change in North Korea's position on its nuclear program.

First, efforts to develop the joint assistance program will signal strong resolve among the three nations to assist North Korea depending on the progress in negotiations on the nuclear problem. During the Six-Party Talks, all three countries made oral commitments to provide economic support to North Korea if it gives up its nuclear program, but there has been no action. Taking actions will generate stronger persuasive power for North Korea. In other words, it will look more tempting. Second, by taking action first, the three countries' position will become stronger in a strategic sense, given the "action for action" principle. Claiming more legitimacy will help the three countries when negotiating with North Korea. Third, it provides an opportunity for the three countries to coordinate efforts to aid developing countries. As the most rapidly rising economic power and the first and second largest economic powers, the three countries' joint efforts to aid developing nations is highly expected by the international community. North Korea will be a good starting point for the three countries to train to meet global expectations.

Policy Recommendation

There should be division of labor. In addition, the joint program needs to consist of soft and hard assistance.

For the "hard" assistance of food and energy, the resumption of WFP and KEDO programs that include China's participation will establish the basis for trilateral cooperation. China has been supporting North Korea within the context of a bilateral relationship, but participation in a multilateral regime will allow China to diversify its channels to assist North Korea without a significant increase in the amount of food and energy supplied. To raise food productivity and energy efficiency in the longer term, modernization of agriculture and infrastructure is more important than mere supply of materials. As such, a joint program is required to include the delivery of devices for agricultural use and power-generation. Fortunately, KEDO planned to provide a light water reactor in addition to a supply of heavy fuel oil. The master plan to increase China's share and add agricultural devices to the WFP and KEDO programs will complete the basic structure of the joint assistance program.

For "soft" assistance, the three nations should provide North Korea with education, transfer of basic technology, and assistance in economic reform. Even though North Korea is provided with food and energy, North Korea will not be self-reliant unless it raises food productivity, energy efficiency, and learns how to run the national economy. Given the long history of isolation, it is not difficult to assume that North Korea's general knowledge system has lagged behind the rest of the world. In that sense, the joint program should dispatch personnel to North Korea to provide education on modernization of agriculture and basic industrial infrastructure. For the same reason, transfer of basic technology in the same fields need to be conducted. The transfer of technology can be integrated into the education program.

Assistance in North Korea's economic reform will be the most sensitive and difficult part of the joint program, considering North Korea's fear of political turmoil and social unrest following economic reform. North Koreans may not have confidence in the US or Japan's efforts in advising how to improve North Korea's development. But China has been

implementing its policy of reform and openness in the economic sector while maintaining its political system. Once the US and Japan agree with China under the framework of the joint program, China will be responsible for providing instruction and advice for North Korea's version of reform and openness without political interference from the US and Japan.

To sum up, the division of labor will be as follows: the US and Japan will provide food and energy by the resumption of WFP and KEDO programs, which will expand to include the delivery of agricultural devices. The US and Japan will establish and implement an education program inside North Korea, during which transfer of basic technology is conducted. China will consult for North Korea's reform and openness based on its experience. While US and Japanese personnel will focus on education at the economic and regional level, Chinese personnel will focus on economic reform at the political and national level.

Initial Action

To develop the joint assistance program for North Korea, it will be desirable to launch a research project at the track-two level among three nations to explore the feasibility of this program. If the research project can include North Korean scholars as participants or as observers, it will increase the transparency of the future joint assistance program and look more credible in the eyes of the North Korean regime.

Further Consideration

The biggest obstacle to this trilateral cooperation appears to be the lack of a verification system inside North Korea. WFP and KEDO were hampered because the US was not able to track food and energy distribution once shipment was complete because of noncooperation from North Korea. Accordingly, the establishment of a verifiable monitoring system has been the precondition for US aid to North Korea and North Korea has simply rejected it in fear of revealing defects in its political system. The solution is to replace this 'comprehensive approach' with the strategy of a 'phased approach.' Amounts of food and energy will be provided with no conditions; additional food and energy will depend on progress in establishing a verifiable monitoring system. It is most likely to become a time-consuming procedure. China may supplement these efforts by persuading and influencing North Korea. Also, China can take over the job of monitoring distribution and relaying information to the US.

Freedom to Innovate, Freedom to Fail: An Idea to Promote Economic Trilateral Cooperation Between the United States, China, and Japan

By A. Greer Pritchett

What?

The United States, China, and Japan should work together to create “Innovation Centers” (ICs) in each country that would foster entrepreneurship and power the development of cutting-edge next-generation business ideas. These Innovation Centers would be public-private partnerships (PPP) staffed by nationals from all three countries and would drive economic development at local, regional, and global levels across a wide-range of industries. These ICs might tackle the following prospective industries: green technology, transportation and infrastructure upgrades, clean energy, information communication technologies (ICTs), etc.

Why?

Groundbreaking ideas are often the result of trial and error. However, many countries do not have cultures that reward attempts or efforts to innovate, especially if these attempts are not successful. In essence, risk-taking is frowned upon even though many would agree that without risk-taking there is little chance for the next “revolutionary” idea to be discovered.

The US has a rich history of entrepreneurship and has placed an emphasis on research and development. From our formative elementary education, Americans are taught that opinions are unique and important. Looking at problems from a new perspective or tackling a question from a different angle is as important, if not more so, than memorizing facts and figures. This has led to a culture that rewards new ideas, even if they are not immediate successes. This is not necessarily the case in China and Japan, where to try and fail is not seen as a step toward a breakthrough, but is simply viewed as a failure that can have deleterious effects on one’s reputation and future employability.

It is incumbent upon the US, China, and Japan, as the world’s three largest economies, to continue to be drivers of global economic health in the 21st century. However, to be effective, these three countries must work together to continue to innovate, to create new businesses and new jobs, to ensure global financial health and stability, and to foster sustainable development. This will require, in many cases, a type of “group think” in which individuals can come together to float new ideas, develop new technologies, and find creative solutions to problems without fear of trying something new, trying something that might not be immediately popular and even trying and failing.

These ICs will be the incubators where these ideas might grow.

How?

Each of the three countries would, in cooperation with each other, set up an IC that would be staffed by visiting fellows from the US, China, and Japan. The day-to-day administration of the center would be the responsibility of the host country to ensure domestic compliance standards are met. Funding will come from government bodies as well as private companies and foundations.

These ICs would promote trilateral cooperation between the US, China, and Japan and would have both tangible and intangible benefits for these three countries. First, providing the environment and resources for individuals to develop innovative businesses might help transform the definition of “success” in countries like China and Japan. Risk-taking would not be a dirty word and fear of failure would not lead to mere adaptations of previously created technologies but to original ventures. Research and development (R&D) in China is still driven by state-owned enterprises (SOE) as opposed to private enterprises. Though there is recognition at a variety of levels that a transition is needed to change this trend, it has been a slow process. These ICs might be a way to achieve this goal.

Further, there is a tradition of joint enterprise innovation between the United States and Japan, between the United States and China and between China and Japan; but it is important to increase efforts to bring all three countries together. For example in 2009, China and the United States announced the formation of a joint clean energy center. Japan, as a leader in clean energy technology and the environmental movement, would be a natural partner to join such an energy technology consortium.

These ICs also might strengthen intellectual property rights regimes. In a World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) report, the corollary between strengthening the IP system and economic growth was explained. With these three countries working together, strong adherence to internationally recognized IPR regimes and the creation of more patented technologies might enhance foreign direct investment and technology transfer -- this would be a welcome trend to all three countries.

Finally cooperation within these ICs will foster a sense of shared responsibility for solutions to today’s and tomorrow’s problems in an economically viable and fiscally responsible way. Therefore, instead of the more elusive talk of “responsible stakeholder-ship” or “values-driven alliances,” or “community-building,” the US, China, and Japan would be able to focus on tangible, bottom-line dollars and cents driven results. Changing the lens through which we view cooperation between these three powers might have a large impact on the future trajectory of trilateralism in the region.

Appendix A



Pacific Forum CSIS
YOUNG LEADERS

China-Japan-US Trilateral Conference
Beijing University ♦ 29-30 August 2009

Young Leaders Roundtable
Beijing University ♦ 31 August 2009

Essays

Pre-Conference Assignment:

Write one paragraph on how you assess the “Other” bilateral relationship:

- If you are Japanese, how do you view the US-China relationship;
- If you are American, how do you view the Japan-China relationship;
- If you are Chinese, how do you view the US-Japan relationship;
- If you are not from any of these countries, how do you view trilateral relations among China, Japan and the US – from your country’s perspective?

Ms. Yi-Wen “Avis CHANG (*Taiwan*)

Cross-Strait relations may be one of the more sensitive problems in international relationships. Due to history, Japan and the United States play an important role in cross-Strait relations. If Taiwan isn’t included in trilateral relations, we should still pay attention to interactions of this group. Taiwan shouldn’t be a bargaining chip. To protect Taiwan’s rights and security, we have the right to know of decisions among the three countries, especially if it involves Taiwan. On the other hand, Taiwan should also have a good relationship with one or two of the trilateral members, which may benefit Taiwan in the future.

Ms. CHEN Chaoyi (*China*)

From a security level, the US-Japan alliance helps maintain the stability of East Asia. After the nuclearization of the DPRK, China doesn’t want another fragile neighbor equipped with an unstable, uncertain nuclear device like Japan to legitimize its pursuit of nuclear weapons in the future. The US nuclear umbrella makes Japan feel secure. The new concern is to what extent Washington can keep the credibility of its umbrella, which puts a heavy burden on economic power. Lifting the umbrella may lead to the nuclearization of Japan. This would raise tensions in the region, but in the mid-or long-term, Beijing and Tokyo would learn to respect each other since they learn a lot from the experience of Washington and Moscow in the past half century.

Ms. Shiuan-Ju CHEN (*Taiwan*)

The trilateral relationship of China, the US, and Japan has a rough shape but remains unstable. They have been trying to increase mutual trust and build a productive trilateral

relationship. The effort will work as long as they look forward, evaluate their common interests, and agree to leave history and political differences out of the relationship framework. Since their relationship has great influence on the region as well as the whole world, other countries expect them to avoid potential conflicts that could result in regional instability and take the lead in dealing with global issues such as climate change, epidemics, environmental protection, regional stability, etc.

Ms. Min-hua CHIANG (*Taiwan*)

Both the US and Japan are facing challenges from China's economic rise. China is likely to pass Japan as the second largest economy in terms of GDP before the end of this year. Since January, China's car sales volumes have also exceeded those of the US. Thanks to its "domestic stimulus policy," Chinese economic growth in the second quarter reached 7.9 percent, making it the first country to recover from the global downturn. However, China cannot continue its economic development without Japan and the US Technology imports (from Japan) and final goods exports (to America) have been the driving forces behind China's development over the past decade. As China's high technology still falls behind developed countries and its "domestic stimulus policy" cannot last in the long run, it is likely that China will seek more economic cooperation with Japan and the US to sustain its economic development. Although China has integrated itself into the US-led regional economic network, there have always been severe disagreements on political issues. The US questions China's increasing military budget while China blames the US for intervention in Chinese domestic affairs. Japan is cautious with China's military/political movement while China cannot be tolerant of Japanese politicians' visits to *Yasukuni Shrine*. For both Japan and the US, China's increasing political influence and military expansion in Asia challenge the status quo in the region. The US in particular has tried hard to roll back Chinese power.

Mr. Sungmin CHO (*South Korea*)

Let's assume Korea will be re-unified. What impact will unification have on trilateral relations among China, the US, and Japan? First, US forces in Korea will not withdraw to maintain regional stability. South Korea will not oppose this. Japan will not oppose it either, considering the advantages of having US forces in Japan in the longer term. China will not feel comfortable with US forces in a unified Korean Peninsula. China will not simply watch events and do nothing, as Japan is an ally of the US while China is not. If a unified Korea remains an ally of the US, China has to raise questions about the objective of US forces in Korea and Japan. This future scenario provides insight into relations among China, the US, and Japan. Despite cooperation among the three nations, there exists constant tension between China and the US-Japan alliance in security and competition over regional influence. The contest will resume on the Korean Peninsula, as always, if not in the Taiwan Strait.

Ms. Kim FASSLER (*US*)

In the past 40 years, Japan and China developed a strategic friendship occasionally marred by complex and sensitive conflicts over history and territory. At present, both recognize that there is an opportunity for them to be regional leaders, but the role each will play, and the role they could play together is undefined. There are numerous chances for cooperation. The two countries have set aside historical differences to jointly address North Korea's nuclear

program, an effort that requires a long-term commitment from both. Possibilities also exist for coordination on climate change, including technology transfers and energy research and development. But serious challenges remain, particularly because regional power roles have shifted dramatically since China's economic opening. Japanese leaders see China's rise as both an economic and strategic opportunity and a potential threat. Meanwhile, China views the Japan-US security partnership – especially as it concerns Taiwan – waning. Regional cooperation on energy may be complicated by territorial disputes in the South China Sea over areas potentially rich in undersea oil and natural gas. Moreover, China and Japan are nursing historical wounds. The 2005 anti-Japanese protests – and the ambiguous response by the Chinese government – demonstrated how decades-old issues can provoke strong emotions. In these disputes, the US can serve as a mediator, but only to a certain extent. It will be up to Chinese and Japanese policymakers to keep past clashes from standing in the way of progress.

Mr. Zheng GONG (*China*)

The US-Japan relationship can be traced back to the bipolar structure of the Cold War. The United States served as a conqueror and played a leading role in the transformation of postwar Japan. The US-Japan alliance was established as a front line to contain the Soviet bloc in Northeast Asia. In the 1990s, the decline of the Soviet Union deprived the alliance of its foundation by which the allies define their strategic goals. After several years of instability and friction under the Clinton administration, the US-Japan alliance remained effective and strengthened. Nowadays, the alliance is a cornerstone for the US to build an early warning mechanism at a low cost in case of the rapid emergence of a regional hegemon in Northeast Asia. Nevertheless, the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance that targeted the rise of China would further complicate the regional security environment, simply because security challenges in this region have changed and diversified. Nontraditional security issues, such as environmental degradation, arms proliferation, international crimes and terrorism, plague all three countries without exception. If we evaluate the potential for sustainable development among these three countries by the standard of vulnerability, it will be easy to conclude that China is the most vulnerable state when facing nontraditional security issues. Hence, both sides of the US-Japan alliance should think twice about strategic goals in the context of China's peaceful rise and increasing vulnerability. It's a self-fulfilling prophecy that China's rise would endanger the strategic interests of the United States regardless of China's domestic problems. China welcomes the reshaping and redefining of the foundation of US-Japan relations and enhancing deeper cooperation in the framework of trilateral relations. If so, a more peaceful security environment in the Northeast Asia would be in the offing.

Mr. Michael KISELYCZNYK (*US*)

Sino-Japanese relations are proceeding along a new positive trajectory, especially when compared to the turbulence of the earlier part of the decade. China and Japan have found more room to discuss complex bilateral issues like resource exploration and exploitation in disputed territories, to open up more direct means of travel and communication, and to cooperate on important and practical problems like swine flu. This can be partially attributed to an apparent understanding on both sides that a more cooperative relationship is essential to each country's interests.

Despite the willingness of each side to seek improvement in the relationship, a number of unanswered and difficult questions remain. First, just as recent shifts in attitude on both sides have allowed greater dialogue and cooperation, a domestic shift in either country or a slight but consequential bilateral incident could result in a slide back to more confrontational attitudes. Second, developing cooperation in practical areas often avoids truly difficult issues or highlights the vast and seemingly irreconcilable differences between the two sides. And third, differences between the two countries on larger matters like North Korea, territorial disputes, historical animosities, and longer-term strategic issues centered around China's military modernization, Taiwan, and the nature of the US-Japan alliance still linger over the relationship.

Cooperation at functional levels holds out the promise that the two sides can develop working relationships and build trust and understanding that could help address these larger issues in the future. However, the relationship will continue to confront many questions and retains the potential for sudden and volatile shifts.

Mr. Kei KOGA (*Japan*)

Improving the US-China relationship can contribute to peace and security in the region, which also serves Japan's interest. But the United States needs to constantly reassure Japan that it is one of the most important strategic partners in the Asia-Pacific. Currently, in Japan, there are two views of the US-China relationship. On the one hand, there is a view that Japan fears improving US-China relations. Two events at the end of July 2009 fostered this view. First, the US-Japan-China trilateral policy dialogue has been stalled due to China's concern about North Korea (such a dialogue might provoke North Korea, considering its missile test July 5), and Japan lost its opportunity to have dialogues with the United States and China at the same time. Second, the United States and China started the Strategic and Economic Dialogue ("G-2") in July 28, 2009. Given its domestic and international concerns, such as the decrease in population, economic decline, domestic political turmoil, North Korea's military provocation, and China's increasing economic and military capability, Japan may have a negative perspective about its future and concern that improving US-China relations would marginalize Japan's position.

On the other hand, there is a view that improving US-China relations has the potential to foster security and stability. While the United States attempts to improve relations with China, it is also eager to strengthen the US-Japan alliance as shown in the case of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's visit to Japan and Prime Minister Aso's visit to the White House. Furthermore, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue held by the United States and China revealed obstacles that prevent them from finding common ground, such as human rights and climate change, though these obstacles do not impede cooperation on issues where they can reach consensus.

Considering the common values and interests shared by the US and Japan, the nature of the relationship between the U.S. and Japan (matured) and between the US and China (developing) is different. Thus, Japan should not worry about improving US-China relations

and needs to take an initiative to create its own strategy, such as further strengthening US-Japan relations, and invigorating trilateral relations.

I lean toward the latter view, but to dispel the uneasiness that Japan is facing, the United States and Japan need to hold dialogues for reassurance to prevent Japan from falling into the vicious cycle of skepticism.

Mr. Tetsuo KOTANI (*Japan*)

The state of US-China relations can be described as “chilly military, hot economy.” Economic interdependence between the United States and China is deeper than ever. Because of the economic equivalent of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), a trade war between the two is very unlikely. Given the importance of the other in the economic sphere, leaders of the two countries emphasize opportunities for cooperation rather than challenges and differences. The G-2 meeting, or the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, represents this trend. On the other hand, the clash of geo-strategic interests of the two countries remains inevitable. China’s growing area-denial/anti-access capabilities are becoming serious concerns for US forces. Despite confidence-building measures, there is still little confidence between US and Chinese militaries. Naval confrontations in the Western Pacific represent this reality. In short, Washington and Beijing are pursuing economic opportunities without accommodating differences. So there is always a possibility that the US and China will face a serious crisis over either geostrategic interests or the values they represent.

Ms. Nadya LARSEN (*Russia*)

The name of the workshop “Trilateral Security Dialogue between the U.S, Japan, and China” is an interesting and contradictory one that raises several questions: Is the pattern of US-Japan-China relations a coincidence or a correlation? Should not it be China-US-Japan or Japan-China-US? Can the terms “trilateral” (which means three-sided) and “dialogue” (conversation between two people/nations) be used in the same sentence? Or is it actually a dialogue between two nations and the third one is there just for the record?

Trilateral relations among China, Japan, and the US are very closely observed by Russia as it considers itself a “Eurasian power” and an important player in the Asia-Pacific region. Although the emphasis in Russian international affairs is on cooperation between nations, it considers strengthening US-China relations a threat to its national security. China is seen as an economic, political, and strategic ally and recent years have shown that China and Russia form a strong bloc in the decision-making process in the UN Security Council. There is a lot of history in Japan-Russian relations and the two countries are officially in a state of war. Since the US and Japan are arguably the strongest military allies, Russia sees their relations as a threat to its national security; therefore in recent years the decision was made to strengthen the military presence and the borders in the Russian Far East. Overall, trilateral relations among China, Japan, and the US are not taken “seriously” by the Russians as China is believed not to be a part of them and is seen as an independent player.

Mr. Zhi “Michael” LI (*China*)

As alliance, the US-Japan relationship is structurally interdependent, and this interdependence is unbalanced but firm. The US is the only hegemon in the world, even after

the economic crisis, which has global interests to guard. Japan is, after the US, the second-largest economy in the world and an influential power in Northeast Asia, which is seeking great power worldwide. So their interdependence lies in military, economy, regional, and international affairs. In the military dimension, Japan relies on the US nuclear umbrella which was reaffirmed in Oct. 2006 after the nuclear test in North Korea. Japan also needs America's help to balance and hedge against China. For the US, Japan is the bridgehead of its interests in East Asia, which is one of the most important bases, garrisoned by the US army. Japan is also a good ally in engaging China, containing the DPRK, and donating to US operations in Iraq. In the economic aspect, the top two economic powers are also good partners. Japan is one of the US' most important creditor nations. Their economies are in one boat. On regional and international affairs, Japan has to rely on the US to shift its foreign policy from civilian internationalism to great power internationalism, for example to be a permanent member of the Security Council. Japan supports the US in many multilateral situations. The structure of interdependence between the US and Japan is complicated and unbalanced, and the US is dominant in most aspects. But the unbalance does not impair the structure; on the contrary the long existence of the unbalance makes interdependence indispensable.

Ms. Chih-Yun “Eunice” MA (*Taiwan*)

We can view the trilateral relationship among China, Japan, and the US from the aspects of military affairs and economics. On military affairs, the US and Japan have an alliance, whereas China and the U.S-Japan alliance are neither hostile toward each other nor have a truly friendly relationship. The US and Japan have investments in China, from which both the US and Japan have obtained economic benefits. However, Japan invaded China, which still impacts current dynamics. The ideology and national strategy of the US are different from and sensitive to China, which, from Taiwan's perspective, is advantageous given the above reasons.

Ms. Yan MA (*China*)

Despite rising historical issues as well as trade friction between the United States and Japan, bilateral political relations are being intensified and their alliance is strong. It is evident in Japan being Hillary Clinton's first overseas stop as secretary of state. This is an indication of the importance the Obama administration puts on its relationship with Tokyo. Their alliance is mutually beneficial. By maintaining its military presence in Japan, the United States can urge Japan to provide technical, political, financial support, and to balance the rise of China. All of this will contribute to preserving its national interests in the Asia-Pacific region and to maintain the US-centered world order. Under the current world economic recession, the US fiscal deficit and downturn need Japan's continued financing. And from Japan's point of view, US-Japan alliance is the basis of its diplomacy and security strategy. By continuously improving its position in the alliance, Japan can contain China in Northeast Asia, and realize its dream of being a “normal state.” China, for its part, does not want the alliance to consolidate. On one hand, it will exert negative impact on intergovernmental strategic mutual trust and cooperation and competition will become a zero-sum game. Dangerously, each side will draw negative perceptions of and take actions against the other side for fear of being attacked. On the other hand, Beijing-Tokyo relations have had a significant impact on China's growing nationalism, and this will intensify disagreements and distrust between the

two countries. If US - Japan alliance further inspires such feelings against Japan, regional peace and development will become an illusion.

Mr. Scott MOORE (*US*)

The Japan-China relationship is one of the most dysfunctional major bilateral relationships in the world today. Dysfunctional because, despite large-scale economic integration, long-standing academic collaborations, and shared geopolitical concerns (including North Korean nuclear adventurism) the weight of history inflames strong anti-Japanese sentiment in China. In Japan, the nation's economic might has not found expression in traditional levers of global power, causing a national debate that has led to resurgent nationalism, further inflaming anti-Japanese sentiment in China. Added to this is a growing sense of Japan's declining importance relative to China in economic, political, and military terms. Asia's center of gravity seems to be moving westward, leaving Japan again on the periphery. The challenges to Japan's foreign and security policy, not to mention its sense of self, are profound.

Ms. Aki MORI (*Japan*)

Given the growing influence of China in world politics and mutual interdependence, the US attempts to shape China's choices by involving it in a problem-solving mechanism. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of the Treasury Tim Geithner stated that "few global problems can be solved by the US or China alone. And few can be solved without the US and China together." In this regard, the key question for US policy makers is how the US can maximize areas of common interest and minimize areas where interests diverge. However, concerning issues in East Asia, US-China relations are still fragile. Neither nation is willing to entrust regional security to the other. For example, by acceding to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), the US made clear that it intends to remain actively engaged in East Asian affairs. At the same time, China has been building up its sea denial (anti-access) capabilities and is attempting to impede US maritime activities in the region. The US and China are caught up in a "mixed motive game" in which they need to constantly assess the degree to which the other is keeping its end of the bargain in the tacit agreement to "cooperate" while publicly reaffirming the benefits of collaboration.

Ms. Sachi NAGAOKA (*Japan*)

Japan has been concerned about China's growing influence on both the US government and public, and future implications of this trend. Obama's nominee for ambassador to Japan, who lacks diplomatic experience in Asia, made Japan concerned that this decision would be evidence that the US government priority is shifting from the US-Japan relationship to the US-China relationship. Japanese elites are also anxious about US public interests being shifting to China as US-China economic ties deepen. China's growing influence, which is observed in the rapid increase of Chinese language courses and China-related academic programs in the US, makes Japanese elites worry that Japan-related programs will soon be overtaken. Japan is carefully watching whether deepening a US-China relationship in the government and the public would mean a deteriorating US-Japan relationship.

Mr. Masataka NAKAUCHI (*Japan*)

The current global economic crisis has revealed that China is an indispensable partner for the world economy. While the US and its allies in developed countries couldn't react effectively

to the crisis, China's huge fiscal stimulus package has brought recovery not only to its own but to other economies. This creates the impression that the "Age of China" is coming. Interpreted another way, the crisis showed that China is not immune to outside impacts. So, I believe the most important feature of the current situation is a wide and deep interdependence between the US and China. Such mutual relations seem unlikely to change in the near future. Given the absence of alternative power, a decline in bilateral relations would not happen. Tibet, Uighur, or human rights might become hot topics, but not to shake the whole relationship. Tension across the Taiwan Strait is the only issue that could have that impact. Even the uncertain future of North Korea might help consolidate cooperation between them. The only concern I have over China is the sustainability of its development since rapid economic growth is working as an important force to integrate the huge population and territory. If China faces a more serious and longer economic downturn, the legitimacy of the present state framework might be questioned. Then if excessive nationalism is utilized to keep state integrity, that will erode the base of cooperative relations with all countries.

Ms. Shan Vency NI (*China*)

To view US-Japan relations, we should pay attention to the following factors. First, in the regional security and stability area, the US and Japan have been making efforts to strengthen their alliance to jointly promote democratic values and contain the development and impact of modern China. This may influence the relationship of China and Japan. In addition, Japan supports the US nuclear umbrella and close relations between these two countries is an effective way to avoid Japan's nuclear armament and together counter nuclear-proliferation threats of the DPRK, and it therefore stabilizes the whole area. Second, in the political area, as Japan has managed to enlarge its political space in international society, especially in the UN, building better relations with the US – the most powerful of the five permanent members of the Security Council – Japan would get more support and be easily recognized by other countries. On the other hand, this may complicate competition among regional countries and cause hardship for China's diplomacy. Finally, in the economic area, there is no doubt that the firm alliance between the US and Japan is the powerful basis of regional economic development. The US, Japan, and China are the most significant trilateral trade partners to each other. Nevertheless, devaluation of the dollar has also imposed severe difficulties on trade of Japan and China. On the whole, US-Japan relations maintain a stable trend. Even though Japan, to some extent, is trying to change the situation of "dominant USA, subordinate Japan" in their relations, it is hard to break the alliance between the two countries not only because of current global challenges but also because of their worries about the rise of China.

Ms. A Greer PRITCHETT (*US*)

The China-Japan relationship has been fraught with difficulties and challenges; many of these are wedded in history while others are the consequence of conflicting national interests. This has created a pervasive atmosphere of wariness and apprehension between the two countries, despite deepening economic ties as a result of expanded bilateral trade and investment. However, since former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo extended an "olive branch" to Chinese President Hu Jintao, and the two countries, under former Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo, agreed to a Joint Statement in May, 2008 to promote a "mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests," there has been a thaw in their often tense

relationship. This trend is welcomed by the United States because a tense and unstable Sino-Japanese relationship could seriously affect US strategic and commercial interests in the region. However, there are still questions regarding China's military modernization programs and lack of transparency, continuing territorial disputes and deep-seated fears about the potential for an increasingly "assertive," "normal" and "nationalist" Japan. This raises the question: *how durable and resilient is this apparent détente?* As the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) appears set to become Japan's new ruling party, it will be tested to see whether it can live up to its pledge to improve ties with China through "mutual trust" and enhanced economic integration. Beijing will be challenged to respond in kind by forging a more stable and cooperative relationship with Japan.

Mr. Lee RIDLEY (US)

Historically Japan and China have never coexisted while both powers were strong; one is up while the other is down. Since the end of the Koizumi era, it is clear that this is no longer true. Since that time, Japanese politicians have taken care not to visit the Yasakuni Shrine, and have instead focused on increasing trade and cultural ties to Beijing. The two nations are coordinating more than ever before on a range of initiatives in the financial, trade, energy, and environmental sectors. However, serious mistrust remains between the two great powers of Asia, primarily in the security realm, where cooperation and dialogue have yet to truly take off. Lack of PLA transparency, a territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and Japanese relations with Taiwan remain serious issues that limit security exchanges and dialogues. For the United States, increased cooperation and collaboration between Beijing and Tokyo is beneficial. As long as Tokyo and DC continue to place a priority on the US-Japan alliance there is a limit to how closely Japan and China will cooperate. If Sino-Japanese relations keep on their current trajectory, the US will have a close friend with shared values to help shape China's motivations and actions. Likewise, as China and Japan draw closer, the costs of conflict become greater and will help sustain peace in the region and globally, which is in the interest of all three countries.

Ms. Noriko SADO (Japan)

Further expansion of the US-China relationship is inevitable. In East Asia, with the growth of economy and the enhanced military capability of China, China's influence in the region will keep rising. Beyond East Asia, the international community has noticed that China's influence on global issues, including environment and WMD proliferation, is expanding. Then, the US will not manage the agenda in East Asia and the global community without China's commitment. And China also needs further dialogues with the US to achieve its agenda since the US is a power in East Asia and the world.

Ms. Xiaoqin SHI (China)

The US-Japan alliance survived the demise of the Soviet Union and bilateral relations were strengthened over the past 20 years as the two sides hardly fought on trade issues. Security issues serve as the foundation of this close relationship. The US got a very supportive partner in the global security area, especially in East Asia. Japan was encouraged to play more active role in this region. This is good for both of them, but it invites instability and uncertainty in regional security. In the long term, the US and Japan have to give more effort to building

more balanced US-Japan-China triangular relations to keep a peaceful regional security environment.

Ms. Lu SUN (*China*)

Stable trilateral relations depend on a balance of power in international relations. However, balance of power remains a dream in the current US-Japan-China system. The operating mechanism is more one with the US-Japan alliance vs. China than one with three balanced parts.

Since the end of World War II, policy coordination with the US has been one pillar of Japanese foreign policy. This policy coordination was institutionalized by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, which was signed in 1960. The treaty was reaffirmed by the US and Japan after a short period of alliance adrift in early 1990s. This policy coordination creates two working mechanisms of Japan's China policy.

First, Japan's China policy will not contradict US China policy. Historical cases lend support to this argument. In the 1950s, under opposition from the US, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru gave up his own policy which sought to distance China from the Soviet Union, and joined the US strategy to contain communist China. In 1971, US China policy underwent a sea change; as a reaction, Japan quickly moved to establish diplomatic relations with China in 1972. After the Tiananmen Incident in 4 June 1989, under US pressure, Japan imposed economic sanctions on China; after winning US acquiescence, it gradually lifted sanctions throughout 1990 and 1991. Currently, the US adopted a mixture of engagement and containment strategy in dealing with China. Facing a rising China, US China policy may have some changes; Japan remains prepared to make adjustment to fit the US China policy framework.

Second, under the general framework of US China policy, Japan's China policy still enjoys room for maneuvering. Without diplomatic relations in the 1950s and 1960s, Japan tried to engage with China through small amounts of bilateral trade and other informal visits. Since 1972, Japan was one of the most active supporters of China's modernization and open door policy, such as the ODA provision. Even after the Tiananmen Incident, Japan actively lobbied the West to avoid isolating China; it was the first to lift economic sanctions on China. In the post-Cold War era, Japan underwent major changes, from engaging to a mixture of engaging and balancing. Such changes mainly resulted from the shifting power between Japan and China. Japan-China relations reached a freezing point as a result of prime minister Koizumi's repeated visits to Yasukuni Shrine, territorial disputes in the East China Sea, Japan's increased anxiety to China rising, etc., dampened the traditional friendship between these two countries. Not much US role was found.

For China, this analysis has two policy implications. First, US-China relations remain the key to maintaining a trilateral system among the US-Japan-China. Second, China should work with Japan to move China-Japan relations in the right track with more independence from US influence. A balanced tripod will be more stable than a bipod.

Mr. Dong WANG (*China*)

China tends to perceive the reinvigoration of the US-Japan alliance as aiming at constraining, if not containing, China's rise. The biggest questions to ask are: how the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance could avoid deepening mistrust in China? What can Beijing, Washington, and Tokyo do to alleviate the simmering security dilemma between China and Japan, and to a lesser extent, between China and the United States? The US-Japan alliance should balance its deterrence and hedging logic with the imperative of engaging China. At the minimum, Washington and Japan should reassure China that the alliance is not against China. On the Chinese side, Beijing might need a more realistic assessment about what the alliance is and what it is not, and look more critically at some of its exaggerated fears of Japanese and US intentions. A trilateral dialogue mechanism between Beijing, Washington, and Tokyo would be important in removing mutual misperceptions, building strategic trust, and addressing the challenges and obstacles in bringing about regional peace and stability. China, US, and Japan, together with other key players in the region, need to envision a regional security order that is not premised on power politics or an ideological divide, but one that will reduce strategic mistrust and might lead to a security community in East Asia.

Ms. Shino WATANABE (*Japan*)

The US-China relationship has been characterized as the "same bed, different dreams." The region provides the two countries with a favorable environment for cooperation. Thus, in the short term, they are likely to enhance cooperation on a variety of issues, regionally and globally. North Korea's nuclear development and a possible change in its leadership are the most pressing shared concerns among the countries of the region. The US and China share common interests in achieving denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and a smooth leadership change in North Korea. They also need each other to cope with the global economic crisis. As the world economy experiences a sharp downturn in consumption, China's large-scale stimulus package provides the driving force to boost consumption. US efforts in restructuring its own economy are vital to maintain the dollar-based international monetary system and sound economic relations around the globe. In the long term, however, it is unclear whether the two countries will be able to continue their harmonious strategic coexistence. The US seeks to maintain its influence in the region both militarily and economically, but China's military modernization, and maritime expansion into the South China Sea and beyond, as well as its call for creating a non-dollar based international monetary system, seem to suggest Beijing's willingness to expand its influence in the region and to question the US-led international system. They also greatly differ in core values such as human rights and democracy. Much uncertainty exists over future bilateral relations.

Ms. Ting XU (*China*)

The US-Japan alliance has served well the peace and development of the Asia-Pacific region for several decades. Currently, the alliance which is primarily a US-Japan security arrangement is in transformation. The traditional base for the close bilateral relationship has been taken over by new challenges: terrorism, nonproliferation, realignment of US Forces, trade issues (BSE in recent years), etc. The relationship is also complicated by China's rise and Japan's temptation to move toward more of a regional leadership role in Asia. Meanwhile, the content relationship also depends on the style of US leadership. With a more assertive US administration (such as during the Bush years), Japan needs to face the issue of

defense upgrades and constitutional amendment; with an administration that focuses more on diplomacy and economics, the US-Japan security alliance serves more as a symbol and there are likely to be more requests for economic contribution/sacrifice. As Japanese politics goes through some major changes and its economic outlook continues to be murky, the bilateral relationship will have to change many of its fundamentals.

Appendix B

Pacific Forum CSIS **YOUNG LEADERS**

China-Japan-US Trilateral Conference

Peking University ♦ August 29-30, 2009

AND

Young Leaders Roundtable

Peking University ♦ August 31, 2009

BIOGRAPHIES

Ms. Yi-Wen “Avis” CHANG, from Taiwan, is an MA candidate at the Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies at the National Sun Yat-sen University (NSYSU). She earned her BA at the National Tsing-Hua University, majoring in Chinese Literature. She is interested in foreign affairs and international relationships between Taiwan and other organizations. She now works at the European Union Centre in Taiwan of NSYSU as an executive assistant.

Ms. Chaoyi CHEN is a development officer at the Fudan University Education Development Foundation in Shanghai. She received her MA in international relations in 2009 from Fudan University. Her focus is on Sino-US relations and East Asia integration.

Ms. Shiuan-Ju CHEN, from Taipei, Taiwan, was a 2008 Vasey Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu. She received her BA in Political Sciences from National Taiwan University in 2005 and her MA in International Affairs from the Elliott School of International Affairs, the George Washington University in 2007. Her research focuses on China’s transition and reform, cross-strait relationship, and East Asia security. She currently works for PauYuan Trading Corp. and engages in cross-strait cultural creativity development after moving back to Taiwan in 2009.

Dr. Min-hua CHIANG received her MA in International Business Economics from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Belgium) in 2002, as well as her MA in International Political Economy and Ph.D. in International Economics from Université Pierre Mendès France-Grenoble-II (France) in 2004 and 2008. She was involved in the research project, “The Current Situation in the South China Sea Region and Taiwan’s New Strategic Thinking” at the Institute of International Relations, Chengchi University. She joined the Taiwan External Trade Development Council, where her current research projects include “the threat and opportunity for Taiwanese entrepreneurs in China” and Taiwan’s long-term external trade policy.

Mr. Sungmin CHO is studying for his MA in International Relations at Peking University. He received his BA in Political Science and International Relations at Korea University. He spent one year as an exchange student at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver,

Canada in 2003-2004. Upon graduation in 2005, he joined the Republic of Korea Army as an intelligence officer. Serving three years, including a seven-month tour to Iraq in 2006, Cho finished his military duty in 2008. Currently, he is an intern at the Beijing office of UN High Commissioner for Refugees and is working on his dissertation with a focus on the North Korean nuclear issue and its impact on Sino-US relations.

Ms. Kim FASSLER is a graduate student at the Hopkins Nanjing Center and is pursuing an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Her concentrations include China Studies, International Policy and International Economics. She received her Bachelor's degree from Williams College in political science and Chinese. Originally from Honolulu, Hawaii, she previously worked as a reporter for The Honolulu Advertiser and writes a blog for their online site.

Mr. Zheng GONG, from China, is a secretary at Center for International & Strategic Studies (CISS) and a Master's candidate in International Relations at School of International Studies, Peking University. He received his Bachelor Degree of International Politics at Peking University. His research interests focus on the issues of nationalism, China-Japan relations, and China's domestic politics.

Dr. Yongtao GUI (Ph.D., Waseda University and Peking University, double degree, 2005) is Associate Professor of International Relations in the School of International Studies at Peking University. His publications include *Edwin O. Reischauer and the US Policy toward Japan: The American Factor in the Postwar Japanese Conception of History*, Chongqing Press, 2008; "The Rise of New Conservatism in Japan and the China-US-Japan Relations," in Uno Shigeaki and Tang Yanxia ed., *Sino-Japanese Relations and the United States at Crossroads*, Kokusai Shoyin 2008; "The Japanese Debate on Constitution and Defense Policy," research report, Center for International and Strategic Studies, Peking University, No. 6, 2007; "Japan's Position on Humanitarian Intervention," *International Politics Quarterly*, No. 1, 2008; "Nationalism and the Historical Conceptions in Modern China, Japan and Korea," *International Politics Quarterly*, No.2, 2007; "Toward a Dialogue on History between China and Japan," *China Book Review*, No.

Mr. Michael KISELYCZNYK is a research assistant with Dr. Phillip Saunders at the National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies. He joined INSS in the spring of 2007. At INSS, he has worked on a range of projects and publications covering Chinese civil-military relations, Chinese military modernization and transparency, and US strategic posture in the Asia-Pacific region. Before joining INSS Michael received a Masters in International Security at the University of Denver's Josef Korbel School of International Studies, during which time he traveled to Peking University to study Mandarin.

Mr. Kei KOGA, from Japan, is a Vasey Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS and a Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. His research interests include international relations theory, international security, terrorism, East Asian regionalism, US-Japan relations and ASEAN. Before attending Fletcher, he served as a Research Fellow at the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) and as assistant executive secretary at the Council on East Asian

Community (CEAC), where he researched political and security cooperation in East Asia on traditional and non-traditional security issues. He also teaches International Relations and East Asian Security at the Open University of Japan. He received an MA in International Affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, and a BA in International Affairs at Lewis & Clark College.

Mr. Tetsuo KOTANI is a research fellow at the Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF). His dissertation focus is on the strategic implication of homeporting US carriers in Japan. His other research interests include US-Japan relations and international relations and maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region. He was a visiting fellow at the US-Japan Center at Vanderbilt University. He received a security studies fellowship at the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), 2006-2008. A frequent participant in the Pacific Forum Young Leaders Program, he won the 2003 Japan's Defense Minister Prize.

Ms. Nadya LARSEN holds an MA in International Policy Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where her specialization was Security/Terrorism Studies. She also has a BA in International Studies with Magna Cum Laude Honors from MIIS, a BA in American and German Studies from Johann Wolfgang Goethe University (Frankfurt, Germany) and a BA in Teaching Foreign Languages from Karelian State Pedagogical University (Petrozavodsk, Russia). She worked on the 2008 Nuclear Posture Review Project for Monterey Institute Terrorism Research and Education Program Center, the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies, Washington D.C. and General Dynamics Company requested by US Congress. Areas of expertise are ideological extremism and terrorism in Europe, Central Asia and Northern Caucasus; chemical and nuclear WMD; Eurasian internal and foreign affairs; NGOs and Terrorism; Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing. Nadya is a fall 2009 Pacific Forum CSIS Vasey Fellow.

Mr. Zhi LI "Michael" is a candidate for an MA in international relations at Peking University. He obtained his BA in international relations in July 2009 from Peking University with a double program in Economics in the National School of Development. He was president of the Student Union for the School of International Studies from June 2007 to September 2008. Mr. Li volunteered for the Olympic Games and Paralympics Games as assistant at the Award Ceremony and participated as an assistant in a research program on Sino-Japan Communication on Defense and Cooperation on Security.

Mr. LIU Junbo is an assistant research fellow at the Department for Information and Contingencies Analysis at the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS). His research focuses on Northeast Asian Security issues, especially the Korean Peninsula and conflict management. He majored in diplomacy and got his M.A from China Foreign Affairs University in 2003. His publications include *A Study of Conflict Management Theory, Conflict Management and DPRK's Nuclear Issue, Analysis on the Conditions of Third Party's International Crisis Management, The Blacklist Dispute: US vs. DPRK, Assessment of Japan's Nuclear Choice after the DPRK's Nuclear Test*. He also published the following internet articles: *Strategies of China the US and DPRK on Nuclear Crisis, Philharmonic Diplomacy and US-DPRK relations, Beef Crisis and its Impact on ROK-US Alliance, Visioning of Obama's Foreign Policy toward North Korea, Verification: Obstacles to the*

North Korean Nuclear Issue, North Korean Space Launch: Prelude of New Round of Crisis, North Korea Nuclear Crisis and the Future of Six-party Talks, and Behind North Korea Brinkmanship: Analysis of Second Nuclear Test.

Ms. Chih-Yun “Eunice” MA, from Taiwan, is a Master’s candidate at the Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies at the National Sun Yat-sen University. She earned her BA at the National Taipei University of Education, majoring in preschool education. However her interest in politics arose from studying China and her research interests focus on political communication. She closely follows the political development of Taiwan and international relationships and is interested in how Taiwan, though small, plays an important role in global politics.

Ms. Yan MA, from China, is a secretary at the Center for International & Strategic Studies, (CISS) and a Master’s candidate in international relations at the School of International Studies, Peking University. She received a Bachelor of Law in international political economy at Renmin University of China. Her research interests include economic security, Sino-US relations, and East Asian regionalism.

Mr. Scott MOORE’s interest in Asia dates from two years of high school study at the United World College of Hong Kong. At university he studied public and international affairs, environmental studies, and Chinese language and culture, and recently completed a one-year study of Chinese environmental policy. He will begin graduate study in October to pursue a PhD in geography and environmental change.

Ms. Aki MORI is a Ph.D. candidate at Doshisha University and is a research fellow at the Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF). She researches the implications of the rise of China, including the strategic linkage between military modernization and military operations other than war of the Chinese army (PLA), and US-Japan-China trilateral relations. She will also publish a paper focused on Beijing’s diplomacy in the globalized financial crisis in a book scheduled for publication in 2009. She studied US-China relations from a Chinese perspective at the School of International Studies in Renmin University in China during 2007-2008.

Dr. Sachi NAGAOKA is a senior visiting researcher at the Keio Research Institute at the Shonan Fujisawa Campus (SFC) of Keio University and a visiting fellow at the Department of Government at Harvard University. She completed her BA in Policy Management in 1999 at Keio University in Tokyo and completed her MA in 2001 at the Graduate School of Media and Governance at Keio University. She received the 2001 Director’s Award for the Thesis Contest held by the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and the Defense Research Center Foundation. She received her Ph.D. from Keio University in 2008.

Dr. Masataka NAKAUCHI is a Researcher at the Research Institute for Peace and Security. After studying law at the Faculty of Law, Osaka University, he received his MA and Ph.D. from Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University. While pursuing his doctorate, he served at the Japanese Embassy in Vienna as a Special Research Fellow while also in charge of bilateral relations with Macedonia. He also occupied a position of Aid

Coordinator of Japan International Cooperation Agency in Serbia. His research interests include international integration process and its impact on member and candidate states, comparison of International Relations between Europe and Asia.

Ms. Shan “Vency” NI was born in Shanghai and is a graduate student in diplomacy at the China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU). Her research interests are diplomacy of nations from the Asia Pacific region and non-traditional security. She graduated from Shanghai Jiao Tong University with a major in public administration and minor in law. She was the only person admitted to CFAU for the Master’s program in diplomacy without any exams. She participated in both the Harvard Model United Nations (2007) as the Tanzania delegate on the Legal Committee and in the Beijing Foreign Studies University Model United Nations (2008).

Ms. A. Greer PRITCHETT is the Assistant Project Director for the Forum on Asia-Pacific Security at the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) in New York, where she manages projects on multilateral cooperation for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, the possible creation of a Northeast Asian Security Forum, cross-Strait relations, and US alliances with Japan and South Korea. She previously received a Princeton in Asia fellowship which enabled her to serve as a visiting lecturer at the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing for the 2007-2008 academic year. Greer has worked for the International Crisis Group and the International Peace Academy (now International Peace Institute). She graduated phi beta kappa and summa cum laude from Hunter College, majoring in Political Science and Classical and Oriental Studies.

Mr. D. Lee RIDLEY is a research assistant and project coordinator in the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Freeman Chair in China Studies where he focuses on projects concerning US-China relations, cross-Strait relations, and security relations in Northeast Asia. Previously, he worked in the Asia Division of the CSIS International Security Program, where he worked on issues related to US relations with Northeast and Southeast Asia. Prior to joining CSIS, he worked as Executive Assistant to the CEO of Physicians for Social Responsibility. From 2005 to 2006 he served as a Brent Scowcroft Award Fellow in the Aspen Strategy Group, a program of the Aspen Institute. In 2004, he interned in the China and North Korea country office of Handicap International, located in Beijing. Mr. Ridley received a Freeman Foundation Grant to conduct research for his senior thesis, which explored multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia. He earned a B.A. with honors in international relations from Claremont McKenna College and studied at Beijing Foreign Languages University in 2004.

Dr. Noriko SADO is an associate professor at Hiroshima Shudo University. She received an M.A. from the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University (OSIPP) in 1997 and completed her doctoral program in 2000. She received her Ph.D. in International Public Policy (D.IPP) from Osaka University in 2000. She was previously a research associate at OSIPP from 2000 to 2003 and a research fellow of the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) from 2003-2005. Her fields of specialization are conflict prevention, arms control and international security.

Ms. Xiaoqin SHI is a research fellow to the Academy of Military Science, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and a Ph.D. candidate in the School of International Studies, Peking University. She received her Bachelor's degree in history from Beijing Normal University and her Master's degree in law from the College of International Relations, Nanjing. She is now working on sea power issues and international relations.

Dr. Lu SUN is a Lecturer at the Institute of International Relations at the Communication University of China. In 2008, she obtained her Ph.D. in diplomacy in the School of International Studies, Peking University. She is also a candidate for a Ph.D. at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University. She earned her Master's in diplomacy in 2004 at the School of International Studies, Peking University.

Dr. Dong WANG is an assistant professor in the School of International Studies at Peking University. Born in 1978, Wang Dong received his Bachelor in law from Peking University in 1999 and MA and Ph.D. in political science from University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), in 2003 and 2007, respectively. Dr. Wang had taught at York College of Pennsylvania, with a tenure-track appointment, before joining the faculty of Peking University in May 2008. He now also concurrently holds an appointment as a research fellow at the Center for International and Strategic Studies, Peking University. His articles appear in *Encyclopedia of the Cold War*, *Cold War International History Project Working Paper Series*, *Journal of American Studies*, *China Information*, *Journal of East Asian Studies*, *the People's Daily*, and *the Global Times*. Dr. Wang's research interests include international relations theories, American foreign policy, Chinese foreign policy and Cold War studies, while he teaches graduate and undergraduate courses in the first three topics.

Dr. Shino WATANABE is a research fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs. After studying economics at the Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, she received her MA in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School, Tufts University and earned her Ph.D. from the Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics, University of Virginia. She worked as Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, Visiting Research Associate at the Faculty of Law, Keio University, and Research Associate at the Japan Foundation. She has also studied at the School of International Studies, Peking University. Her research interests include Chinese Foreign Policy, International Relations of East Asia, and International Relations Theory.

Ms. Ting XU was born in Sichuan, China. She started her career as an account executive for Dentsu, Inc. Before she joined the Bertelsmann Foundation she was a World Bank consultant, working on sustainable development projects for China. She was a member of the World Bank team on Wenchuan Earthquake Emergency Relief and Reconstruction in 2008. Ms Xu has also worked for the International Fund for Agricultural Development in Washington and the Asian Development Bank Institute in Tokyo. She was a Graduate Fellow of the United Nations Association. She holds a BA in Business Administration from Beijing Normal University and an MA in International Economics and International Affairs from Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies.

Dr. Masahiro YUMINO is a visiting lecturer at Waseda University, Organization for Asian Studies. He received his Ph.D. from Waseda University in the Department of Politics and his Master's Degree from Peking University, School of International Relations. His research interests include the areas of Chinese foreign and security policy.

Appendix C

Pacific Forum CSIS **YOUNG LEADERS**

Young Leaders Roundtable Forum
School of International Studies, Peking University ♦ August 31, 2009

Agenda

- 9:00 -9:15 Young Leaders Program Introduction (Brad Glosserman)
- 9:15-10:00 US-China Roadmap: A Young Leaders project
Ms. Victoria Hart (US)
Ms. Chen Chaoyi (China)
Ms. Aki Mori (Japan commentary)
- 10:00-11:00 “Views of the other” – Chinese perspectives of the US-Japan relationship and US perspective of the China-Japan relationship
Ms. Ni Shan “Vency” (China)
Dr. Gui Yongtao (China)
Ms. A. Greer Pritchett (US)
- 11:15-12:00 Trilateralism and its Impact
Presenters from outside the China, Japan and the US provide external perspectives on trilateralism. Focus then turns to realistic prospects for trilateral cooperation. Breakout groups will be identified.
Ms. Nadya Larsen (Russia)
Mr. Sungmin Cho (South Korea)
- 12:00-13:30 Lunch at Changchun Yuan Guesthouse
- 13:30-15:00 Breakout sessions: Participants should identify specific efforts and the benefits of trilateral cooperation in the following fields; Nonproliferation, terrorism, sustainable development, energy security, good governance, climate change
- 15:30-17:00 Groups present and discuss findings
- 18:30 Young Leaders Dinner at Shaoyuan Guesthouse, Building 7 (Yuanyuan Hall)
(Followed by post-dinner discussion)