Regionalizing the Japan-US Alliance: Toward the Construction of a Peaceful Transition System in East Asia

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Issues and Insights
Vol. 10-No. 8

Honolulu, HI
March 2010

Pacific Forum CSIS

Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate areas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to express my deepest appreciation to Admiral Lloyd R. (Joe) Vasey, who provided the inspiration for the Lloyd R. (Joe) and Lilian Vasey Fellowship which gave me the opportunity to serve as a Vasey fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS. I would also like to thank Pacific Forum President Ralph A. Cossa, Executive Director Brad Glosserman, and Director of Programs Carl W. Baker for their support and guidance.

Special thanks go to Brad, who not only spent time and effort editing this paper and having productive discussions with (and yelling at – in a "friendly" manner) me, but also let me participate in Young Leaders conferences in East Asia, where I gained insight into current policy debates from researchers and government officials. The staffs at Pacific Forum and my colleagues, Kevin Shepard (Kelly Fellow), Brittany Billingsley (Monterey Institute Fellow), Nadya Larsen (Vasey Fellow), Dayea Diana Park (Kelly Fellow), Mark Garnick (Monterey Institute Fellow), and Adrian Yi (Kelly Fellow), all contributed ideas and technical help for my paper.

Having said that, the views expressed in this paper are solely my own. I remain fully responsible for them.

Executive Summary

This report examines four sets of questions: what common objectives do the United States and Japan aim at through their security alliance? Is the current Japan-US alliance sustainable? Where do US and Japanese security interests converge and diverge? What are the potential and future limitations of the Japan-US alliance?

Argument

The Japan-US alliance, whose core function is military and political cooperation, needs to "deepen" a *common* strategic vision of East Asia rather than to "widen" the scope of the alliance. Given the asymmetric nature of the military and diplomatic resources between Japan and the United States, Japan cannot play the same military and political role in the global arena as the United States. To this end, the alliance should be fine-tuned: narrow the scope of the alliance to the establishment of a regional security mechanism.

There is much to be done in the region through the Japan-US alliance. Japan and the United States can work together to establish a peaceful power-transition system in East Asia. While the current East Asia security system is founded on the US "hub-and-spoke" system and multilateral institutions, East Asia has yet to establish a concrete concept for the future of an East Asian security system. The concepts of an "East Asian community" that Japan pursues and of "East Asian regional architecture" that the United States has begun to create have emerged, yet it is difficult to understand their long-term objectives and their concepts. Considering China's rising economic and military power and its potential, as the current first and second largest economic powers in the world, Japan and the United States should aim at creating a peaceful transition system in East Asia.

This does not suggest a scaling back of the roles and missions in the global arena that Japan and the United States currently undertake. Rather, this aims at maintaining the Japan-US "global partnership" to contribute to international stability, especially in the non-military fields, while pursuing the effective use of US and Japanese military and diplomatic resources to achieve regional strategic goals through the "alliance" where their strategic objectives converge. In so doing, they can sustain the Japan-US alliance even when Japan and the United States set different priorities in the global agenda. Unless the policy priorities of each state are set and a division of labor that serves both US and Japanese interests is clarified, the Japan-US alliance will be weakened by the exposure of their diverging interests, which will produce political frictions between them.

The 50th anniversary of the security treaty is the ideal opportunity to create new momentum to consolidate bilateral cooperation, and to this end, Japan and the United States need to produce long-term objectives for the alliance.

Policy Recommendations

1) Conclude a New Joint Declaration for the Japan-US Alliance in 2010:
The new declaration should not only commemorate the 50th anniversary of the revised Japan-US Security Treaty, but reconfigure the substance of the strategic objectives mentioned below.

2) Enhance Bilateral Cooperation to Establish a Peaceful Regional Power-Transition System:
A simple long-term future projection of a geostrategic shift in East Asia looks like a rising China, a relative decline of the United States, and decline of Japan. In order to maintain peace and stability in the long-term, Japan and the United States should work together to establish a peaceful regional power-transition system that shapes China's behavior to value and follow international standards, such as democratic principles, human rights, and rule of law. Also, while there are various community-building efforts, including "East Asian Community," "Asia-Pacific Community," and "Regional Architecture," Japan and the United States should recognize that multi-layered communities in East Asia are possible and should not be politicized. Rather, these community-building efforts should be encouraged by Japan and the United States through close communication between them.

3) Regionalize the Japan-US Alliance:
Japan and the United States need to promote the establishment of regional security building by emphasizing the alliance's role as a provision of regional public goods. By promoting stability in East Asia, the United States can use its resources in other regions or for transnational issues, while Japan can use its resources for global security issues through multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations. To this end, there are four specific sets of policy recommendations: i) *reassure the credibility of the US extended deterrent*; ii) *strengthen the functions and image of the alliance as a regional public good*; iii) *embed the Japan-US alliance into ASEAN-led East Asian regionalism*; and iv) *institutionalize the Japan-US Track-1.5 bilateral network of East Asian research*.

4) Enhance the "Global Partnership," but not a "Global Alliance":
Japan and the United States should widen and deepen cooperation in the global arena. There are many fields in which they could work together, especially in non-military fields; nonetheless, they should cooperate as a "global partnership", not an "alliance". This is because both Japanese and US global priorities are likely to change over time, and this may cause political frictions. Japan and the United States should not trade Japan's nontraditional security cooperation in the global arena for US military cooperation in the region.

5) Recognize Realignment Issues serve Strategic Purposes, not Vice Versa:
Although Japan and the United States have several conflicts over such issues as relocation of the *Futenma* base, extraterritoriality issues within the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and Japan's host nation support, the strategic importance of the Japan-US alliance should be reaffirmed, and tactical-level coordination should be carefully handled to avoid impeding strategic interests.

Introduction

On Jan. 19, 1960, Japan and the United States signed the revised Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, of which Article V and VI promised the defense of Japan and the Far East. Despite violent demonstrations against the political move to revise the treaty in Japan during the late 1950s, it was eventually ratified by both Japan and the United States Jun. 23, 1960. Since then, Japan-US cooperation has expanded in political, economic, social, and cultural fields, which further strengthened the ties that bind Japan and the United States. Building on this cooperation, Japan and the United States today possess both material and ideational common ground, and the "Japan-US alliance"（日米同盟）has been strengthened more than ever.

The functional expansion of the Japan-US alliance has been remarkable. Despite the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the 1996 "U.S. Joint Declaration on Security-Alliance for the 21st Century" established the conceptual framework for new management and functions for the alliance in bilateral, regional, and global spheres. Moreover, there are a plethora of joint declarations for the Japan-US alliance in the 21st century to further strengthen ties, and both Japan and the United States maintain a political desire to further deepen and widen the alliance.

The year 2010 is the 50th anniversary of the Japan-US alliance. Despite several disagreements over alliance management, Jan. 19, 2010, US President Barack Obama and Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Japan-US alliance by making independent statements regarding the alliance. In their statements, Hatoyama emphasized the importance of deterrence provided by the Japan-US alliance,[1] while Obama underscored the multi-functional perspectives of the Japan-US alliance, including joint engagement with the world, and US commitment to Japan's security, shared values, and public and institutional ties.[2] At the same time, they agreed to "deepen" the Japan-US alliance in 2010 by providing a joint-statement. But a question remains: what does "deepen" mean? More specifically, what common objectives do we aim at through the alliance? Is the current Japan-US alliance sustainable? Where do US and Japanese security interests converge and diverge? What are the potential and future limitations of the Japan-US alliance?

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[1] Hatoyama stressed the importance of deterrence by US forces in Japan and the role of the Japan-US alliance as a security public good Jan. 19, 2010. See Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, "Nihonkoku to Amerika gasshukoku tonoaidano sougokyoryoku oyobi anzenhoshoujouyaku (nichibei anpo joyaku) no shomei 50 shunen ni atatteno naikakusouri daijin no danwa" (Prime Minister's Statement on the 50th Anniversary of Mutual Cooperation and The Security Treaty between Japan and the United States (The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty)), Jan. 19, 2010, at <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hatoyama/statement/201001/19danwa.html>. Accessed Jan. 20, 2010.

[2] The White House, "President Obama on 50th Anniversary of U.S.-Japan Alliance," Jan. 19, 2010, at <http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/January/20100119191020eaifas0.8014446.html>. Accessed Jan. 20, 2010. Also, Obama stated "the two of us [Japan and the United States] have not only reaffirmed our alliance – we've agreed to deepen it." See "Transcript of Obama's Asian-policy speech in Tokyo," *The Washington Post*, Nov. 13, 2009, at <http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2009/11/transcript-of-obamas-asian-pol.html>. Accessed Nov. 14, 2009.

In this paper, I argue that the Japan-US alliance, whose core function is military and political cooperation, needs to "deepen" its common strategic vision regarding East Asia rather than "widen" the scope of the alliance. Given the asymmetric nature of the military and diplomatic resources of Japan and the United States, Japan cannot play the same military and political role in the global arena as the United States. To this end, the alliance should be fine-tuned: narrowing the scope of the alliance to the establishment of a regional security mechanism.

However, this does not suggest scaling back the role and missions in the global arena that Japan and the United States hold. Rather, this aims at maintaining the Japan-US "global partnership" to contribute to international stability, especially in the non-military field, while pursuing effective use of US and Japanese military and diplomatic resources to achieve their regional strategic goals through the "alliance," where strategic objectives converge. In so doing, they can sustain the Japan-US alliance even when Japan and the United States set different priorities in the global arena. Unless priorities are set and the division of labor that serves both US and Japanese interests is clarified, the Japan-US alliance can be weakened by exposing the diverging interests of both states and producing political frictions between them.

Currently, the Obama administration has been forging its strategy toward East Asia and emphasizing the importance of the Japan-US alliance, but it is still unclear what will be the scope of the Japan-US alliance. While the Hatoyama administration currently puts emphasis on the Japan-US alliance as well as the establishment of an East Asian community on the surface, Hatoyama's unclear concept of an East Asian community and policies toward the United States only invite confusion and concerns. Thus, the 50th anniversary is the ideal opportunity to clarify these ambiguities and create new momentum to consolidate bilateral cooperation. To this end, Japan and the United States need to produce long-term objectives for the alliance by concluding a new joint declaration.

This paper consists of five parts: first, I discuss current international, regional, and domestic political issues that are likely to have an impact on the Japan-US alliance; second, I describe functions of the Japan-US alliance and discuss the dilemma Japan and the United States face; third, I discuss the concepts of and expectations for the alliance from both the US and Japanese perspectives and their management of the alliance; fourth, I analyze US and Japanese security policy in the post-Cold War era and how they meet each other's expectations for alliances; fifth, I discuss policy convergences and divergences for the alliance between Japan and the United States; and finally, I propose recommendations for the 50th anniversary of the Japan-US alliance.

Background: Current Political Trends and the Security Environment in East Asia

Since the end of World War II, Japan and the United States have strengthened strategic and economic relations. Despite current concerns, including economic setbacks caused by the 2008 global financial crisis, the US relative decline of economic power, and Japan's weakening military, economic, and social power, both states have enjoyed a strong relationship as well as the status of the world's first and second economic power, which gives them strategic and economic advantages.[3]

However, additional concern has arisen. On Aug. 30, 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won Lower House elections, defeating the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Over the past half century, the LDP had held political power, and due to changes in Japan's foreign policy, there have been political and strategic concerns about the future of the Japan-US alliance from both Japan and the United States on several issues, especially the *Futenma* Relocation Facilities (FRF). In order to understand the current situation and potential direction of the Japan-US relations, it is necessary to first assess current political and security trends from three perspectives: first, the international and East Asian security environment; second, Japanese and US policies toward East Asia; and third, change in Japanese foreign policy toward the United States.

Change and Continuity in the East Asian Security Environment

The global security environment has changed since the end of the Cold War. While the Cold War focused on state-to-state relations, nontraditional security issues have become more salient in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, in the 1990s and 2000s, the importance rose of domestic security issues that can cause instability in surrounding states and of non-state actors that are capable of damaging state security and economy, as was illustrated by the terror attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 (9/11). These changes also affected the East Asian security environment.

In East Asia, there are more concerns about domestic political instability and potential intra-national conflicts as illustrated by recent examples, such as the Khmer Rouge's sporadic insurgencies in Cambodia after the establishment of the coalition government in 1993, East Timor's unstable domestic politics after its independence in 1999, and Thai military coup in 2006. Though domestic instability in the region does not necessarily lead to instability at the regional level, it could cause spill-over effects for other states in the region. For example, during the 1999 East Timor crisis, the Indonesian army and anti-separatist militia in East Timor attacked civilians after the independence referendum, causing human rights violations and refugee problems that affected neighboring states' security. The uncertainty of stability in states such as Myanmar may also cause spill-over

[3] Militarily, Japan's defense budget has been steadily decreasing since 2002. Economically, Japan's gross domestic product has been stagnated for more than a decade. Socially, Japan has begun to experience the aging society and a decreasing population. For trends of Japan's military budget and GDP, see "Boei kankeihi no suii" (The trend of the budget relating to defense), in Ministry of Defense, Japan, *Boei Hakusho*, (2008), at <http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2008/2008/html/ks22b000.html>. Accessed Jan. 30, 2010. For the future prospects of Japan's demographic change, see Brad Glosserman and Tomoko Tsunoda, "The Guillotine: Japan's Demographic Transformation and its Security Implications," *Issues & Insights*, Vol. 9, No. 10 (2009), at <http://csis.org/files/publication/issuesinsights_v09n10.pdf>. Accessed Jan. 30, 2010.

effects of security risks. Myanmar will hold a national election in late spring or early summer, 2010,[4] and it is necessary to monitor the development of domestic politics in these states. To a lesser degree, fragile democracies, such as Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia, may cause similar problems.

In addition, nontraditional security issues caused by non-state actors have risen in Southeast Asia, especially global jihad terrorist groups such as *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI). This is illustrated by the fact that since 9/11, Indonesia has faced five major terrorist attacks by JI, including the 2002 Bali bombing, the 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing, the 2004 Australian Embassy bombing, the second Bali bombing in 2005, and the 2009 Jakarta bombings. Moreover, although the actions of terrorist groups such as *Abu Sayyaf* and *Moro Islamic Liberation Army* (MILF) remain on the local level to date, it is possible for these groups to create operational linkages with other global terrorist organizations. The United States and Australia have worked to thwart terrorist attacks by establishing the Jakarta Center of Legal Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) and the Indonesian special force, Densus-88. Consequently, the number of major terrorist incidents has decreased and led to a Densus-88 raid against JI Sept. 17, 2009, which killed Noordin Mohammad Top, who was the mastermind of major terrorist attacks in Indonesia from 2003 to 2009.[5] However, these terrorist groups have not disappeared, and potential realignments and threats still exist in Southeast Asia.[6]

Transnational issues, such as natural disaster and pandemics, are also likely to afflict regional stability in East Asia. Asia has been susceptible to natural disasters and pandemics. For example, according to data provided by Japanese Cabinet Office from 1978 to 2007, Asia has been first in the number of natural disasters (3,366 incidents: 37 percent of the total), death toll (1,338 people: 59 percent of the total), the number of afflicted people (4,977 people: 89 percent of the total), and economic losses ($604.8 billion: 45 percent of the total), outpacing all any other regions.[7] Since 2000, there have been some 40 over-magnitude-6 earthquakes, including the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake, the 2008 Sulawesi earthquake, the 2009 Papua earthquake, the 2009 Java earthquake, and the 2009 Padang earthquake. In addition, while regional efforts has been taken to prevent pandemics after the 2002 SARS incident and the 2009 Avian Influenza incident, the regional preventive mechanism is still weak. These transnational issues create social instability among afflicted East Asian states, which can destabilize the domestic order and be utilized by terrorist groups for recruitment.

Yet, there is also continuity in the East Asian security environment – there are ongoing state-to-state security concerns that produce uncertainty. Two states in particular are problematic: China and North Korea. China's economic growth has increased over 10 percent annually since the 1990s, its military budget has enjoyed 10-25 percent annual

[4] Mark McDonald, "Leader of Junta Confirms Myanmar Is Planning 2010 Elections," *New York Times*, Jan. 4, 2010, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/world/asia/05myanmar.html>. Accessed Jan. 10, 2010.
[5] Zachary Abuza, "Indonesian Counter-Terrorism: The Great Leap Forward", *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 8, No. 2, (Jan. 2010), pp. 6-8.
[6] Mydans, S., "Terror in the family: a defector's dilemma," *International Herald Tribune*, Mar. 1-2, 2008, p. 1.
[7] Japanese Cabinet Office, *Heisei 21 Nen Ban: Bosai Hakusho* (2009), at <http://www.bousai.go.jp/hakusho/h21/index.htm>. Accessed Jan. 24, 2010.

growth in the past 20 years, and China is modernizing its military.[8] Its military capabilities now exceed the capability to deter Taiwan's independence, which is said to be China's primary political concern. Although the future is not necessarily a linear projection of the past, the lack of transparency regarding China's military posture creates concerns in regional states, especially Southeast Asian states, due to their territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea. On the other hand, it is also true that China has started to engage with global and regional multi-lateral institutions as the World Trade Organization (WTO), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN+3, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the Japan-China-Republic of Korea Trilateral Summit. China's ambivalent behavior has led most East Asian states to pursue a hedging strategy: engaging China while maintaining a military linkage with Western states, especially the United States. For its part, China utilizes some multilateral frameworks that exclude the United States, such as ASEAN+3 and EAS, to increase its diplomatic leverage over the region. In so doing, the question whether China is a revisionist or a status-quo power lingers, and neighboring states have faced strategic dilemmas over balancing or engaging China.

Then, there is North Korea, which remains the hermit kingdom even in the post-Cold War era. It poses security threats from various perspectives. From the military security perspective, North Korea has carried out nuclear and missile tests in 2006 and 2009, and its nuclear development continues to progress, although the Six-Party Talks attempted to prevent further nuclear development through dialogue. After those tests, the international community responded, and the United Nations Security Council subsequently issued Resolution 1718 in 2006, which condemned North Korean nuclear tests and pursues economic sanctions under Chapter VII, and Resolution 1874, which strengthens economic sanctions described in Resolution 1718.[9] Nonetheless, North Korea has maintained its fundamental diplomatic posture and has been unwilling to discard its nuclear program. From the domestic political perspective, regime survival has come under question due to Kim Jong-Il's health problems, North Korea's succession issues, difficult economic times, and food shortage. If North Korea collapses from internal political and social instability, refugees from North Korea are likely to spread across the region, which would cause instability in afflicted states. The combination of these security threats also has heightened risks of nuclear proliferation and transfer to other states as well as non-state actors.

In general, all these strategic issues are on the table for Japanese and US policy-makers, and both states seek to deal with them through Japan-US political coordination. The

[8] Ministry of Defense, Japan, *Defense of Japan (Annual White Paper)*, (2009), pp. 50-51, at <http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2009/2009/figindex.html>. Accessed Dec. 23, 2009; Department of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2009*, (2009), pp. 31-32, at < http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf>. Accessed Jan. 24, 2010.

[9] United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1718 (2006: Action Prevents Provision of Nuclear Technology, Large-Scale Weapons, Luxury Goods to Country; Permits Inspection of Cargo to Ensure Compliance," Oct. 14, 2006, SC/8853, at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8853.doc.htm>. Accessed Jan. 25, 2010; United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1874 (2009)," Jun. 12, 2009, S/RE/1874, at <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/368/49/PDF/N0936849.pdf?OpenElement>. Accessed Jan. 25, 2010.

question is how they can coordinate their policies and the Japan-US alliance in this new security environment.

Competing Policies toward East Asia

To deal with strategic problems in East Asia, the establishment of a new regional security system has been under consideration. The traditional view of the security system in East Asia was characterized as a two-layered system: the first layer is the US "hub-and-spoke" bilateral alliance system, in which the Japan-US alliance plays a pivotal role in maintaining peace and stability in the region, and the second layer consists of multilateral institutions, such as APEC forum and ARF, which promote confidence-building among East Asian states. However, this security system has been dynamic, and diplomatic and military linkages between the US bilateral alliances, such as the Japan-US-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogues (TSD), and new regional institutions, such as ASEAN+3 and EAS, have arisen. Although the fundamental security system in East Asia remains, it has become a security web rather than a "mere" hub-and-spoke.[10] Moreover, ASEAN's institution-building efforts have created a numerous multilateral forums in the region although the division of labor among them is still unclear. Therefore, it can be argued that East Asian security system is under transition to a new form.

After Obama and Hatoyama took office, they have begun to increase their political and diplomatic commitments to East Asia and attempted to formulate a grand scheme for Asia. In March 2009, Secretary Clinton made her first trip to Asia, and President Barack Obama also made a trip to Asia in November to show his intention to commit to Asia. And, after his inauguration in September, Prime Minister Hatoyama showed his intention to improve relation with East Asian states and to foster establishment of an East Asian community. However, questions over whether their policy objectives match up remain due to Hatoyama's ambiguous concept of an "East Asian Community" and the evolving US policy toward East Asia, and the establishment of a "Regional Architecture in East Asia."

i) Hatoyama's "East Asian Community"

When Hatoyama became prime minister, he spoke of his desire to establish an East Asian Community, as the DPJ manifesto laid out.[11] However, Hatoyama's concept of an "East Asian community" remains ambiguous, which raises concerns among US policy-makers. This is because Hatoyama argues that along with the establishment of an East Asian community Japan needs to recognize the decline of US power indicated by the 2008 Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and a need to restrain US unilateralism, such as the 2003 Iraq war, even though he admits the importance of the Japan-US alliance in terms of

[10] Dennis Blair and John Hanley Jr., "From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No.1 (Winter 2001), pp.7-17.

[11] In the 2009 DPJ Manifesto, the DPJ advocated that Japan should strengthen its foreign relations in Asia with the aim of building an East Asian Community by establishing intra-regional cooperative mechanisms in Asia-Pacific region, in such fields as trade, finance, energy, the environment, disaster relief, and measures to control infectious diseases. However, it does not define its concept of an "East Asian Community". See Democratic Party of Japan, "Manifesto: Detailed Policies – The Democratic Party of Japan's Platform for Government," *2009 Manifesto* (Aug. 11, 2009), p. 28, at <http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto/manifesto2009.pdf>. Accessed Jan. 26, 2010.

regional stability.[12] Thus, many speculate that his desire to establish an East Asian community aims to politically balance the United States. Though the Hatoyama administration has yet to produce any concept paper for an East Asian community, from his various speeches and articles, it seems that the characteristics of Hatoyama's concept of an East Asian community are four-fold:

(1) "East Asian community" as a Long-term Vision:

Hatoyama says that an East Asian community is a long-term vision whenever he touches on the concept.[13] For example, in the article, "*Wastashi no Seiji Tetsugaku* (My Political Philosophy)," he argues that it is important to make efforts toward the creation of "regional currency integration" and the establishment of "permanent security frameworks essential to underpinning currency integration" as long-term regional objectives.[14] His argument is based on his belief that through the process of "greater regional integration," territorial disputes and historical antagonism in East Asia can be "resolved" on the basis of the EU model. However, he does not say that an East Asian community should aim at regional currency integration and permanent security frameworks, nor does he elaborate on the method to pursue such objectives. Instead, he mentions "open regionalism" as a long-term vision.[15]

(2) Building-Block Method of Regional Functional Cooperation:

As the 2009 DPJ Manifesto indicates, Hatoyama says that Japan should promote the building-block method to enhance regional cooperation in the fields of FTA, finance, currency, energy, environment, and disaster relief.[16] Since Japan is an

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[12] See Hatoyama Yukio, "Watashi no Seiji Tetsugaku" (My Political Philosophy), *Voice* (Sept. 2009). This volume was issued Aug. 10, 2009. An English version of this article is available from his official website at <http://www.hatoyama.gr.jp/masscomm/090810.html>. Accessed Jan. 22, 2010; Hatoyama argued at the 2nd Japan-China-ROK Summit that since "Japan depended on the United States too much," it needs to focus more on Asia. However, he did not mention in what way Japan has depended too much on the United States. See "Nicchukan Shuno Kaidan: Hatoyama gaiko no seika wa?" (Japan-China-ROK Summit Meeting; Hatoyama Diplomacy's outcome?), *Nippon TV News 24*, Oct. 10, 2009, at <http://www.news24.jp/articles/2009/10/10/04145542.html> (Audio). Accessed Jan. 25, 2010.

[13] "Hatoyama shusho, higashi ajia kyodotai koso no hitsuyosei uttae" (Prime Minister Hatoyama asserts the necessity of an East Asian community," *Nippon TV News 24*, Oct. 25, 2009, at <http://www.news24.jp/articles/2009/10/25/04146463.html#>. Accessed Jan. 26, 2010.

[14] Hatoyama mentions that realization of an Asian common currency would take more than a decade and that political integration will take more time than it. Hatoyama Yukio, "My Political Philosophy."

[15] Hatoyama argues that "the concept of an East Asian community as a highly transparent cooperative entity which is open to other regions" needs to be promoted. See Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, "Dai 173 kai kokkai ni okeru Hatoyama naikakusori daijin shoshinhyomei enzetsu" (Policy Speech by Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio at the 173rd Session of the Diet), Oct. 26, 2009, at <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hatoyama/statement/200910/26syosin.html>. Accessed Jan. 21, 2010; Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, "Hatoyama Sori ni yoru Ajia seisaku kouen: Ajia e no atarashii comittomento – Higashi ajia kyodotai koso no jitsugen ni mukete" (Addressed by H.E. Dr. Yukio Hatoyama Prime Minister of Japan: Japan's New Commitment to Asia – Toward the Realization of an East Asian Community), Nov. 15, 2010, at <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hatoyama/statement/200911/15singapore.html>. Accessed Jan. 26, 2010.

[16] Democratic Party of Japan, *2009 Manifesto*; Hatoyama shusho, no kokuren soukai enzetsu (zenbun)" (Prime Minister Hatoyama's Speech at UN General Assembly (All Texts)), Asahi.com, Sept. 25, 2009, at <http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0925/TKY200909240357.html>. Accessed Jan. 25, 2010; Prime

economically and technologically developed state that is capable of fostering a network of functional cooperation in such fields, he says Japan needs to play an active role. In particular, he emphasizes cultural and student exchanges among East Asian states. Also, promoting democratization among East Asian states seems to be an objective of his East Asian community.[17]

(3) Unclear Membership:

Hatoyama has avoided details about the membership of an East Asian community. At the Japan-China-ROK Summit Oct. 10, 2009, Hatoyama mentioned that Japan, China, and South Korea would be the core of an East Asian community.[18] However, he has never repeated this statement or mentioned its membership, and he states that it is not his intention to exclude the United States as a member of an East Asian community.[19] Also, he mentioned that members in an East Asian community would be "people who share [the] ideals and dreams" of his initiatives.[20] For him, it is not meaningful to decide which state should be parts of an East Asian community in the current situation.[21]

(4) Undecided Institutional Frameworks:

Hatoyama has not mentioned which regional frameworks he intends to utilize in establishing an East Asian community. As the "Second Joint Statement of East Asia Cooperation" indicated, previous Japanese prime ministers acknowledged ASEAN+3 as "the main vehicle toward the long term goal of building an East Asian community" and ASEAN as the "driving force,"[22] while the East Asian Summit (EAS) makes a "significant contribution to the achievement of the long-

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Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, "Dai 173 kai kokkai ni okeru Hatoyama naikakusori daijin shoshinhyomei enzetsu," (Policy Speech by Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio at the 173rd Session of the Diet), Oct. 26, 2009, at <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hatoyama/statement/200910/26syosin.html>. Accessed Jan. 21, 2010; Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, "Hatoyama Sori ni yoru Ajia seisaku kouen: Ajia e no atarashii comittomento – higashi ajia kyodotai koso no jitsugen ni mukete".

[17] Hatoyama said, "Japan supports the self-motivated efforts of other governments towards democracy. I believe that an East Asian community, of which I am a proponent, will also come into view in time as we forge ahead in this way." See Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, "Remarks by Prime Minister Hatoyama at the Bali Democracy Forum II," Dec. 10, 2009, at <http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/hatoyama/statement/200912/10bali_e.html>. Accessed Jan. 26, 2010.

[18] "Nicchukan shuno kaidan: Hatoyama gaiko no seika wa?" (Japan-China-ROK Summit Meeting; Hatoyama Diplomacy's outcome?), Oct. 10, 2009.

[19] "[Shinseiken Hossoku] Beikoku wa jogai sezu, higashi ajia kyodotai koso, Hatoyama shin shusho ga hatsukaiken" ([New Administration] New Prime Minister Hatoyama does not exclude the United States – East Asian community), *Sankei News*, Sept. 16, 2009, at <http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/policy/090916/plc0909161832025-n1.htm>. Accessed Jan. 26, 2010.

[20] Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, "Hatoyama sori ni yoru Ajia seisaku kouen: ajia e no atarashii comittomento – higashi ajia kyodotai koso no jitsugen ni mukete."

[21] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Dai 4 kai higashi ajia shuno kaigi (EAS) no gaiyo" (Summary of the fourth East Asian Summit (EAS)), Oct. 26, 2009, at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/%5Cmofaj/area/eas/shuno_4th.html>. Accessed Jan. 26, 2010.

[22] ASEAN Secretariat, "Second Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation: Building on the Foundations of ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation," Singapore, Nov. 20, 2007, at <http://www.aseansec.org/21099.htm>. Accessed Jan. 26, 2010.

term goal of establishing an East Asian community."[23] Thus, it is recognized that ASEAN-led institutions are primary vehicles for community building. However, in the fourth EAS, Hatoyama downplayed ASEAN's role by merely stating that it played a "significant role," and stated that the region needed to envision an East Asian community by pursuing functional cooperation in the region and combining multiple multilateral frameworks.[24] In this way, he does not decide which institutional framework should be the primary vehicle for establishment of an East Asian community.

Considering these four characteristics, Hatoyama's concept of an East Asian community does not necessarily intend to politically balance against the United States. Nevertheless, his statements clearly remain ambivalent. He does not argue that the United States is not excluded. In almost every speech he makes, he confirms that the United States plays a pivotal security role in maintaining stability in East Asia. Yet, he desires to reduce dependence on the United States as indicated by his statement about a "More Equal Partnership" or his statement at the Second Japan-China-ROK Summit that "Japan has depended too much on the United States." This ambivalent attitude confueses policy-makers.

Confusion is caused not only by unclear statements regarding an East Asian community, but also by his Cabinet. For example, Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya stated Oct. 7, 2009 that the concept of an East Asian community would be based on EAS member states, namely Japan, China, South Korea, ASEAN, India, Australia, and New Zealand, although he added 9 days later that the concept was still under consideration.[25] Hatoyama stated Oct. 25 that he did not have any intention to exclude the United States or any other countries and that both Japan-US relations and East Asia are important.[26]

Hatoyama and his Cabinet remain unclear about the concept of an East Asian community initiative since they avoid setting the policy priorities to realize such a community, which creates unnecessary concern from other states, not only the United States but also ASEAN states. He has difficulty positioning the Japan-US alliance in the context of community-building efforts in East Asia and has failed to mention the US economic, social, and developmental roles, and contributions to East Asia except for its military security role. He has also failed to mention the roles of ASEAN in fostering cooperation among East Asian states during the post-Cold War era. While ASEAN welcomes Hatoyama's initiative to revitalize discussion about an East Asian community, it wants Hatoyama to express the

[23] ASEAN Secretariat, "Chairman's Press Statement for the Seventh ASEAN Plus Three Foreign Ministers' Meeting," Kuala Lumpur, Jul. 26, 2006, at <http://www.aseansec.org/18579.htm>. Accessed Jan. 26, 2010.
[24] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Dai 4 kai higashi ajia shuno kaigi (EAS) no gaiyo."
[25] "'Higashi ajia kyodotai' koso ni bei wo kuwaezu: Okada Gaisho" (Not Include the United States in the Concept of "East Asian Community": Foreign Minister Okada" *Sankei News*, Oct. 7, 2009, at <http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/policy/091007/plc0910072045012-n1.htm>. Accessed Jan. 25, 2010; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Gaimudaijin kaiken kiroku (yoshi) (Heisei 21 nen 10 gatsu)" (Press Conference of Foreign Minister (Summary) (Oct. 2009)", at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/kaiken/gaisho/g_0910.html>. Accessed Jan. 25, 2010.
[26] "Higashi ajia kyodotai koso, beikoku haijo surutsumorinai: Hatoyama shusho" (East Asia Community, no intention to exclude the United States: Prime Minister Hatoyama), *Reuters*, Oct. 25, 2009, at <http://jp.reuters.com/article/topNews/idJPJAPAN-12104320091025>. Accessed Jan. 25, 2010.

importance of ASEAN as a driving force in nurturing an East Asian community. Without acknowledging these facts or formulating a grand strategy, however, he wants Japan to play a leading role in East Asian community building, which illustrates his attitude, but not a policy or strategy. This tendency was evident Jan. 4, 2010, when Hatoyama stated at a press conference that he would make this a year "to attach importance to relations with Asia and advance the East Asian community initiative,"[27] but he did not further elaborate on this initiative. On Jan. 6, 2010, Hatoyama even asked Sengoku Yoshihito, Minister of State for national policy, to develop the concept of an East Asian community from the mid- and long-term strategic perspectives.[28]

Hatoyama's first administrative policy speech Jan. 28, 2010 argued that the establishment of an East Asian community is based on the unshakable Japan-US alliance, which indicated a policy priority for the first time.[29] Yet, in this speech, he did not clarify the concept, and it remains unclear.

ii) Obama's "Regional Architecture in East Asia"

Since his inauguration in January 2009, Obama has buttressed the US political commitment as a "Pacific nation" to East Asia despite the political and military difficulties that the United States faces in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Indeed, since the beginning of his inauguration, there have been a number of diplomatic moves that show Obama's commitment to Asia: in February, Secretary Clinton's first trip was to East Asia, while President Obama invited Japanese Prime Minister Aso Taro to be the first visitor to the White House of the Obama administration; on July 22, the United States signed ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which emphasizes the peaceful resolution of international disputes and non-interference principles;[30] on July 28, the United States and China held the "US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue" to discuss diplomatic and economic issues; and in November, Obama made a trip to Asia, including Japan, China, and South Korea, and attended the APEC Summit and held the first US-ASEAN Summit, while Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell visited Myanmar to discuss prospects for democratization. In other words, Obama has made efforts to strengthen relations with not only Northeast Asian states, but also Southeast Asian states, which have become a vehicle to forge regional cooperation.

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[27] Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, "Press Conference by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama," Jan. 4, 2010, at <http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/hatoyama/statement/201001/04nentou_e.html>. Accessed Jan. 26, 2010.

[28] "Shusho, Sengoku shi ni higashiajia kyodoutai koso no gutaika shiji" (Prime Minister asked Mr. Sengoku to materialize the structure of an "East Asian community"), *Nikkei Net*, Jan. 6, 2010, at <http://www.nikkei.co.jp/news/seiji/20100107AT3S0602I06012010.html>. Accessed Jan. 21, 2010.

[29] Hatoyama Yukio, "Dai 174 kai kokkai ni okeru Hatoyama naikaku sori daijin shisei hoshin enzetsu" (Policy Speech at the 174th Diet Session by Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio), Jan. 29, 2010, at <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hatoyama/statement/201001/29siseihousin.html>. Accessed Jan. 28, 2010.

[30] The Accession to the TAC is one of three criteria for the East Asian Summit (EAS). The other two criteria are to need to be ASEAN's "dialogue partnership" and "significant economic relations with ASEAN," which the United States has already had. See Kurt Campbell, "President Obama's Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs," statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., Jun. 10, 2009, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2009/06/124554.htm.

Indeed, on Jan. 12, 2010, Secretary Clinton stated:

> America's future is linked to the future of the Asia-Pacific region; and the future of this region depends on America. The United States has a strong interest in continuing its tradition of economic and strategic leadership, and Asia has a strong interest in the United States remaining a dynamic economic partner and a stabilizing military influence.[31]

With the US interests embedded in East Asia, and given its significant military and economic capabilities, the United States continues to commit to the region, and its characteristics can be summarized in three ways:

(1) Strengthen the US Alliance System as a Foundation of Regional Architecture

The fundamentals of US strategy are unchanged: the emphasis on the US "hub-and-spoke" system. As Obama and Clinton confirmed, the US alliance system, especially the Japan-US alliance, plays the key role in maintaining stability in East Asia and engaging the region.[32] Although Assistant Secretary Campbell indicated that the Japan-US alliance is currently "aimed at no specific or particular nation," it "served as the foundation to bring a degree of confidence to the Asia-Pacific region."[33] In other words, the United States will not create a power vacuum in the region in the context of a potential regional power transition, and its top priority is to hedge against any security instability through its alliance system.[34] This also becomes the foundation of US policy to create regional architecture in Asia.

(2) Supporting Existing Formal and Ad-hoc Multilateral Institutions in East Asia

The United States recognizes the utility of regional multilateral institutions, such as ASEAN, ASEAN-led institutions and APEC, to promote economic cooperation and confidence-building among East Asian states. Clinton continued to support and strengthen ties with ASEAN through the US-ASEAN Summit, US-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership, and US-ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. For issues that cannot be solved through multilateral institutions, the United States supports ad-hoc, informal institutions, including the Six-Party Talks for North Korea's nuclear program, the US Lower Mekong Initiative for capacity building and management of natural resources in Lower Mekong states, and strategic dialogues with allies and partners, such as the Japan-US-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue for such issues as disaster relief and climate issues.

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[31] Hillary Clinton, "Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities," Jan. 12, 2010, at <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135090.htm>. Accessed Jan. 15, 2010.

[32] "Transcript of Obama's Asian-policy speech in Tokyo"; Hillary Clinton, "Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities."

[33] Kurt Campbell, "Briefing on the 50th anniversary of U.S.-Japan Relations," Jan. 19, 2010, at <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/01/135400.htm>. Accessed Jan. 20, 2010.

[34] At the same time, Obama assured that "China's emergence is not a zero-sum game." The US regards a prosperous China as "a source of strength for the community of nations." See "Transcript of Obama's Asian-policy speech in Tokyo."

(3) Establish Regional Architecture through Efficient Multilateral Institutions

While Obama said that the United States would become "involved in the discussions that shape the future of [the East Asian] region," it demands that multilateral institutions in the region be effective, and to this end, it will focus more on particular institutions. For example, Obama mentions that the United States will have formal engagement with the EAS,[35] strengthen the ARF for its roles in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) and promoting human rights, and promote economic cooperation through APEC.[36]

Furthermore, Clinton puts emphasis on the need for effective and result-oriented multilateral institutions in East Asia. According to her, while the United States does not dismiss regional institutions in East Asia, it believes East Asia needs an effective multilateral institution to "embrace efficient decision-making processes and, where appropriate, differentiated roles and responsibilities" and to embrace burden-sharing among member states for its operation.[37] Accordingly, East Asian states need to "decide which will be defining regional institutions," and Clinton's speech hints that the United States will not participate in every institution in East Asia.[38] In this sense, she identified three policy options to decide defining regional institutions: well-established institutions, such as APEC; recent institutions, such as EAS; and a mix of these institutions. Although the United States will not decide which option to pursue without consultation or coordination, it aims at building a new inclusive institutional architecture in the region to "maximize [the] prospects for effective cooperation, build trust and reduce the friction of competition."[39]

Plainly, the basic policies of US strategy are unchanged. Strengthening the US "hub-and-spoke" system and engaging multilateral institutions in East Asia are two fundamental strategies that have complemented each other since 1995, when the United States produced the first East Asian Strategic Report (EASR).[40] Thus, in the short- and mid-term, the United States is likely to rely on the current regional security system to maintain stability in East Asia.

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[35] According to Obama's speech, the US might become a formal member or observer of East Asian Summit; however, it is not certain when the United States will do so. "Transcript of Obama's Asian-policy speech in Tokyo".

[36] Hillary Clinton, "Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities."

[37] Ibid.

[38] Clinton stated that "we *hope* that we will be able to participate actively in many of those [fora]" and that we "need to *decide* which will be the defining regional institutions" (emphasis added). In other words, despite the strong US diplomatic commitment to East Asia, it is not feasible to participate in every single meeting in East Asia due to the fact that more than 600 hundred conferences are held every year by ASEAN alone.

[39] Hillary Clinton, "Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities."

[40] More discussions in "5. The Evolution of Security Policies of Japan and the United States. Also, more discussions for the future of the U.S. security policy towards Asia, see Ralph Cossa, Brad Glosserman, Michael McDevitt, Nirav Patel, James Przystup, and Brad Roberts, *The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region: Security Strategy for the Obama Administration*, (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2009).

The new element that the Obama administration has introduced in US policy toward East Asia is an attempt to establish a regional architecture. Though the administration's definition of "regional architecture" is not clear, the United States aims at the establishment of effective institutions that have efficient decision-making processes and are result-oriented to further enhance regional cooperation and stability. This implicitly criticizes ASEAN-led institutions, which are based on the "ASEAN Way" and employ slow consensus decision-making process, values the non-interference principle, and focuses on process rather than results.[41] While it does not dismiss entirely the utility of the ASEAN-led institutions or decide which institutions will become the center of such an initiative, the United States aims at playing a leading role in establishing regional architecture in East Asia. Therefore, this US policy can be also assessed as a hedge against an East Asia community that might exclude the United States.

Changing Japanese Politics: DPJ Policy regarding the Japan-US Alliance

The coming to power of the DPJ in September 2009 has altered Japan's policy toward the United States. While the DPJ recognizes the US military presence in Asia as the foundation of peace and stability in the region,[42] just as the LDP does, its perception on security cooperation with the United States differs from that of its predecessor.

From the perspective of alliance politics, the LDP feared "abandonment" by the United States, yet the DPJ fears "entrapment." For the LDP, the Japan-US alliance needs to be strengthened for Japan's national security, and this should be accomplished by expanding its functions and objectives because of the disappearance of the Soviet threat in the post-Cold War era, which weakened the *raison d'être* of the alliance. However, since Japan still has political and legal constraints on the Self Defense Force (SDF), the party has adopted a two-pronged strategy. First, the LDP attempted to develop the national consensus on the use of the SDF in the international arena, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, more often by establishing security related laws.[43] Second, it maintained ties with the United States through a "tactical issue-linkage."[44] This is well-illustrated by former Prime Minister Koizumi's justification to support the Iraq War in 2003. He argued that the United States was the indispensable ally which provides invaluable deterrence to maintain peace and security for Asia as well as Japan, and thus, it was Japan's responsibility to support the United States when the United States attempted to contribute to international security despite expected

[41] Kei Koga, "Normative Power of ASEAN Way: Potentials, Limitations, and Implications for East Asian Regionalism," *Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. 10, No.1, (Winter 2010), pp. 80-95.
[42] Hatoyama Yukio, "Our View of the World Today," Feb. 23, 2009, at <http://www.hatoyama.gr.jp/speech/090223_en.html>. Accessed Jan. 29, 2010.
[43] During LDP rule, there were domestic legal changes regarding security after the end of the Cold War, which include the international cooperation law in 1992, the laws on areas surrounding Japan in 1999, the emergency measures law in 2002, and the elevation of the Japan Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense in 2006.
[44] Through the tactical issue-linkage, the objective is "simply to obtain additional bargaining leverage, to extract a quid pro quo not obtainable if the discussion remains confined to a single issue." See Ernst Haas, "Why Collaborate?: Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," *World Politics*, Vol. 32, No. 3, (Apr. 1980), pp. 371-372.

sacrifices.[45] In other words, his logic was based on a *quid pro quo* between the US global strategy and Japan's national security.

The DPJ perceives that the Japan-US alliance has been losing its *raison d'être*, and that Japan's national security can be secured by improving relations with neighboring states and using the United Nations.[46] The DPJ fears entrapment in the US global strategy through "tactical issue-linkage." This was seen during the 2003 Iraq War, when the DPJ argued that US action did not have international support due to a lack of evidence that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and subsequently, the party criticized Japan's support for US action because the United States violated the UN Charter.[47] However, this does not mean that the DPJ has little incentive to play an active role in international security. Kan Naoto, then-president of the DPJ and current deputy prime minister, said in 2004 that Japan would consider dispatching the SDF if there was a UN mandate and Iraq had its own government. Moreover, as Ozawa Ichiro, one of the most influential DPJ politicians, argued Japan should consider SDF participation in the International Security Assistant Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, which is under UN mandate,[48] although this did not reflect a party consensus. The DPJ's security policy is that while relations with the United States are important, it needs to be distant from the United States in the event that Washington acts "unilaterally," and it is eager to strike a better balance between autonomy and security, so that it can hedge against US "unilateral" behavior.

From these basic policy principles, which differ from those of the LDP, the DPJ has begun to reformulate Japan's policy toward the United States. However, its principles also have been constrained because of its coalition with *Kokumin Shinto* (the People's New Party), which focuses on domestic political issues, such as the revision of privatization of the national postal service, and *Shakai Minshuto* (the Social Democratic Party), which strongly demands revision of the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), opposes the dispatch of the SDF and argues that the existence of the SDF is a violation of Japan's constitution.[49] Thus, from September 2009 to January 2010, the coalition government reduced the SDF

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[45] Prime Minister's Office, "Iraku ni taisuru buryokukoushigo no jitai e no taiou nit suite no hokoku" (Report regarding Japan's response to the situation in Iraq after the use of force), Mar. 20, 2003, at <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/koizumispeech/2003/03/20houkoku.html>. Accessed Jan. 29, 2010.

[46] See Leif-Eric Easley, Tetsuo Kotani, and Aki Mori, "Electing a New Japanese Security Policy? Examining Foreign Policy Visions within the Democratic Party of Japan," *Asia Policy*, no. 9, (Jan. 2010), pp. 45-66; Yukio Hatoyama, "Our View of the World Today."

[47] The Democratic Party of Japan, "'Iraku senso wa kokuren kensho ihan: Anan kokuren jimusocho to Kan daihyo ga icchi" (The Iraq War violated the UN Charter: UN Secretary General Annan and DPJ President Kan agreed), Feb. 24, 2004, at <http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/?num=3039>. Accessed Jan. 29, 2010; The Democratic Party of Japan, "Iraku senso shiji wa goriteki handan towa ienai: kaiken de Hatoyama kanjicho" (Supporting the Iraq War is not a rational choice: Press Conference by Secretary General Hatoyama), Dec. 15, 2005, at <http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/?num=4376>. Accessed Jan. 29, 2010.

[48] Ozawa Ichiro, "Imakoso kokusai anzenhosho no gensoku kakuritsu wo: Jieitai yojo kyuyukatudo – dou kangaeru bekika-kawabata kiyotaka shi e no tegami" (Establishing Principles of International Security: SDF's Refueling Mission-How to think about it – a letter to Mr. Kawabata Kiyotaka), *Sekai*, (Nov. 2007), pp. 149-153.

[49] However, Fukushima Mizuho, the chair of Social Democratic Party, reversed its position and said on March 12, 2010 that the SDF is constitutional. "Jieitai goken, shibushibu mitomeru=toben kyushi, tabitabi shingi chudan – Fukushima shi" (SDF constitutional, reluctantly admitted: difficult to answer the question and often stopped discussion–Ms. Fukushima), *Jiji.com*, March 12, 2010, at <http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=pol_30&k=2010031200902>. Accessed March 12, 2010.

roles in the international arena and has shaken the Japan-US alliance. For example, Japan chose not to extend the SDF refueling mission the in Indian Ocean to support international war efforts in Afghanistan Jan. 15, 2010. Instead, Japan pledged $5 billion in aid to Afghanistan for training the Afghan national police, vocational training, job development, health care and other basic services. Moreover, the new government has reconsidered the relocation of *Futenma* Air Station to *Henoko*, which was agreed upon by Japan and the United States in 2005. In the mayoral election in *Nago* Jan. 24, 2010, Inamine Susumu, who opposed the relocation plan, won, and this created difficulty in pursuing the agreed plan.

Reactions from the United States and Japan have been mixed. Some argue that the United States needs to be patient until the new Japanese government settles in and develops its foreign policy, and those who believe that Japan and the United States need to use *gaiatsu* (external pressure) or *naiatsu* (internal pressure) to shape Japan's foreign policy. There are also two types regarding future prospects for the Japan-US alliance: optimists and pessimists. These views exist in both Japan and the United States and are illustrated in *Table 1*.

Table 1. Japanese and US Reactions to DPJ Foreign Policy

		Long-term Perspective	
		Optimistic	***Pessimistic***
Immediate Policy	***Patience***	**Passive Optimist** ◆ Alliance remains strong. ◆ The DPJ eventually strengthens the alliance and it is not necessary to use *gaiatsu* or *naiatsu*.	**Reluctant Pessimist** ◆Alliance may be weakened. ◆ The DPJ will formulate its own foreign policy, but not they do not advocate intervention in Japanese politics, as long as the U.S. (or Japanese) interests are not threatened.
	Gaiatsu/ Naiatsu	**Cautious Optimist** ◆Alliance remains strong. ◆ The DPJ eventually strengthens the alliance, but it takes time. To shorten the time, *gaiatsu* or *naiatsu* is appropriate.	**Active Pessimist** ◆Alliance may be weakened. ◆ The DPJ will formulate its own foreign policy, and this is likely to threaten US (or Japanese) interests.

Optimists think that the foundation of the Japan-US alliance is strong and Washington should counsel patience with the DPJ, as they expect that the DPJ will likely adopt policies very similar to those of the LDP once the party gains more information and experience (*Passive Optimist*). They believe that as strategic objectives and interests of Japan and the United States remain unchanged, both states will eventually strengthen the alliance. Those who would like to employ *gaiatsu* or *naiatsu* believe that it would take longer for the DPJ to realize the importance of the Japan-US alliance, and in the meantime, the DPJ might create future obstacles, such as the complication of the FRF, though it will not break the alliance (*Cautious Optimist*). Pessimists believe the Japan-US alliance will be weakened in the long-term, but they do not see much utility in the Japan-US alliance and are ready to remain silent as long as US (or Japanese) interests are not threatened (*Reluctant Pessimist*). Those who would employ *gaiatsu* or *naiatsu* believe that the DPJ foreign policy is likely to harm not only Japan-US relations but also US (or Japanese) interests (*Active Pessimist*).[50]

[50] *Passive optimists* include Joseph Nye, Sheila Smith, Okazaki Hisahiko and Sakamoto Kazuya, *cautious optimists* include Michael Green and Patrick Cronin, *reluctant pessimists* include Michael Finnegan, and *active*

The number of adherents to each of these categories fluctuates as Japan and the United States interact over time, and thus, it is difficult to distinguish which identifies the majority of people in Japan and the United States. For example, Japanese public opinions regarding Japan-US relations and the FRF have fluctuated since September 2009. In November, according to the *Asahi Shimbun*, 54 percent of Japanese said that the Japan-US agreement over the *Futenma* relocation should be renegotiated, and only 28 percent said that the agreement should be implemented.[51] According to the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, public opinion indicated that 51 percent of Japanese did not support postponing the decision about the FRF to 2010 as the Hatoyama administration did, and 68 percent believe this decision would undermine Japan-US relations.[52] When asked about the place to transfer US forces, 35 percent said "outside Japan," 34 percent said "*Henoko*, *Nago* City," and 14 percent said "Outside Okinawa." In other words, the majority of the Japanese public preferred to quickly decide to renegotiate relocation of US bases. However, when asked the same questions in January 2010, the result was different: 44 percent said "*Henoko*, *Nago* City," 30 percent said "Outside Japan," and 13 percent said "Outside Okinawa,"[53] which indicates that Japan-US

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pessimists include Robert Gates and Morimoto Satoshi. (See Joseph Nye, "A Glass Half Full," in Brad Glosserman (Rapporteur), "Japan-U.S. Security Relations: A Testing Time for the Alliance," *Issues & Insights*, Vol. 9, No. 14, (Mar. 2009), pp. 51-56; Joseph Nye, "Will Japan-US Alliance Survive?" *The Korea Times*, Jul. 14, 2009, at <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19249/will_usjapan_alliance_survive.html?breadcrumb=%2Fexperts%2F3%2Fjoseph_s_nye%3Fpage%3D2>. Accessed Jan. 21, 2010; Joseph Nye, "An Alliance Larger Than One Issue", *New York Times*, Jan. 7, 2010, at <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19845/alliance_larger_than_one_issue.html?breadcrumb=%2Fexperts%2F3%2Fjoseph_s_nye>. Accessed Jan. 22, 2010.; Sheila Smith, "Nichibei kankei no kongo wa: Obama shi kyou honichi" (The future prospect of U.S.-Japan relations: Mr. Obama comes to Japan today – asked three experts), *Asahi Shimbun*, Nov. 13, 2009; Okazaki Hisahiko, "Nichibei kyoka ni beikoku no nintairyoku wo kitai" (Hoping the U.S. patience for strengthening the U.S.-Japan relations), *Sankei news*, Jan. 8, 2010, <http://sankei.jp.msn.com/world/america/100108/amr1001080232000-n1.htm>. Accessed Jan. 30, 2010; Sakamoto Kazuya, "Nichibei domei no kadai: Anpo kaitei 50 nen no shiten kara" (Challenges for the U.S.-Japan Alliance: From the Perspective of the 50th Anniversary of the Revised U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty), *Kokusai Mondai*, no. 15, (Jan./Feb. 2010), pp. 19-22; Michael Green, "Japan's Confused Revolution," *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 33, no. 1, (Jan. 2010), pp. 3-19; Patrick Cronin, "The Looming Crisis in U.S.-Japan Relations," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (Nov. 2009), at <http://www.feer.com/international-relations/20098/november53/The-Looming-Crisis-in-U.S.-Japan-Relations>. Accessed Jan. 20, 2010; Michael Finnegan, "Managing Unmet Expectations in the U.S.-Japan Alliance," *NBR Special Report # 17*, (Nov. 2009), at <http://nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/SR17.pdf>. Accessed Dec. 20, 2010); "Gates pushes Japan on U.S. troop shift plan," *Reuters*, Oct. 21, 2009, at <http://jp.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE59J0FD20091021>. Accessed Jan. 30, 2010; Morimoto Satoshi, "Kokka wo yurugasu nichibei domei no kiki," (Crisis of the Japan-US Alliance) *Sankei News*, Dec. 4, 2009, at < http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/policy/091204/plc0912040306002-n1.htm >. Accessed Jan. 30, 2010.

[51] "Naikaku shijiritsu 62%, muda sakugen 'hyoka' 76%, yoron chosa" (62% supports the Hatoyama administration, 76% appreciate reform initiative to cut the waste, public poll), *Asahi.com*, Nov. 15, 2009, at <http://www.asahi.com/special/08003/TKY200911150288.html>. Accessed Jan. 30, 2010.

[52] "Futenma toshikoshi 'Hyokasezu' 51%" ("Do not appreciate" the postponement of the decision over Futenma next year), *Yomiuri Online*, Dec. 20, 2009, at <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20091219-OYT1T01225.htm>. Accessed Jan. 28, 2010.

[53] See "Naikaku shiji 56%, Ozawa shi setsumei busoku 91%" (56 % supports the Hatoyama administration, 91% thinks Ozawa's explanation is not enough), *Yomiuri Online*, Jan. 11, 2010, at <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/20080116-907457/news/20100111-OYT1T00044.htm>. Accessed on Jan. 28, 2010.

relations are more important than the FRF.[54] In other words, as Japan and the United States deal with an unprecedented political situation, the frequency of fluctuations of opinions amplifies.

Evaluation

The current phase of Japan-US relations is still being defined. From the strategic perspective, Japan and the United States have the same understanding of issues, but it remains to be seen to what degree they can coordinate policies. Japanese and US policy toward East Asia differs: Japan aims at the establishment of an East Asian community while the United States attempts to formulate a new regional architecture in East Asia. It is not clear yet whether these visions are mutually exclusive, complementary, or the same. Japan's policy toward the United States has been changed. Although the image of the United States has been altered since the Obama administration took office, DPJ skepticism of potential US "unilateralism" due to the legacy of the Iraq War leads the administration to eschew the entrapment of alliance politics. The administration shows its intention by failing to coordinate policies regarding Japan-US relations, such as the FRF issue, and refusing to extend the SDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. However, politicization of these issues created more political confusion among policy-makers and the public in both Japan and the United States.

While Japanese and US policies toward East Asia and Japanese domestic politics are being formulated, the broader strategic objectives of the Japan-US alliance have remained constant since the end of the Cold War: "integrate but hedge against China" and "attempt to integrate but deter North Korea," and include nontraditional security cooperation in both the regional and global arena, such as nuclear nonproliferation and environmental issues. At the same time, what is missing in these debates is agreement on longer-term strategic objectives of the alliance. Then, the key question is whether the Japan-US alliance is sustainable in the long-term if it continues to perform only the same functions that the alliance currently does. This question takes on new urgency in light of the international and regional security environment, which also caused changes in the functional importance of the Japan-US alliance. The next section discusses the changing functions of the alliance since the end of World War II.

[54] It should be noted that the general trend in the public opinion in both Japan and the United States indicates that U.S.-Japan relations remain strong. See *Appendix V and VI.*

The Functional Dilemma over "Alliance": Five Core Functions of the Japan-US Alliance

In 1951, Japan concluded the San Francisco Peace Treaty and signed the Security Treaty with the United States to end the allied occupation. With the appearance of the Cold War and consideration of the implications of Japan's recovery of full sovereignty after World War II, Japan-US bilateral talks on revising the 1951 security treaty began in 1959, and the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was signed in Washington Jan. 19, 1960. Although the ratification process in Japan became socially and politically contentious, the treaty passed on June 23, 1960. Since then, Japan-US security relations have been defined by this treaty, but its concept has evolved through the Cold War and post-Cold War era.

During the Cold War, the Japan-US security treaty served three core functions. First, it provided extended deterrence for Japan under the US nuclear umbrella. In the meantime, Japan could concentrate on economic issues to recover from World War II; this policy was later called the "Yoshida Doctrine." Second, it provided the opportunity for the United States to maintain or increase power projection capabilities in the East Asia region and beyond. This served US national interests by containing Soviet threats over Japan and East Asia. Third, it provided psychological reassurance to East Asian states that Japanese militarism could be contained as long as US military bases stay in Japan. As a result of the Japanese invasion of East Asia under the doctrine of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" during World War II, most East Asian states were suspicious of the reemergence of Japanese militarism if Japan re-militarized. Thus, US bases in Japan created psychological stability within the region, especially for China and the Koreas, so that East Asian states could exclude Japan as a strategic factor in terms of the regional balance of power.

With the demise of the Soviet Union, the Japan-US security treaty lost the logic of the Cold War period. Japan and the United States needed to redefine the alliance's *raison d'être* to maintain its institutional coherence. For this purpose, in 1996, the redefinition of the Japan-US alliance took place along with the arguments of the Higuchi Report and the Nye Initiative, which have ensured Japan's further contribution to international security and the US military presence in East Asia in the post-Cold War era to deter the threat from Cold War remnants (active); to contain potential instability on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait, and contain China as it emerged as a regional power hostile to the United States and Japan. And since there is the potential for an arms race in East Asia if the United States disengages from the region, the Japan-US alliance serves as a public good to maintain the balance of power in the region. In addition, while maintaining its traditional functions (albeit with different reasoning), the Japan-US alliance security relationship has expanded its scope to include global security issues, such as military operations other than war (MOOTW) including peacekeeping operations and counter-terrorism. Currently, there are five core functions of the Japan-US security relationship:

1) extended deterrence – the US nuclear umbrella over Japan (the defense of Japan);
2) US power-projection;
3) "cap on the bottle of Japanese militarism (regional arms race)";
4) regional "public goods"; and

5) nontraditional security – peacekeeping operations, counterterrorism and MOOTW.

These developments notwithstanding, there are growing concerns over the Japan-US security relationship due to the weakened foundation of some of its functions. First, Japanese are concerned about the credibility of the US nuclear extended deterrent. This is illustrated by the current situation regarding North Korea's nuclear capabilities. Although the United Nations Security Council condemned North Korea and strengthened economic sanctions after North Korea's two nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, the Six-Party Talks have stalled, and there is a growing concern among Japanese that the United States might recognize North Korea as a *de facto* nuclear state (as the Department of Defense seems to do).[55] Furthermore, while the United States is concerned by the rapid increase in China's military capabilities through its acquisitions and modernization, it has sought cooperation with China in a variety of fields as shown in the case of the US-China strategic and economic dialogue. With military threat perceptions in East Asia diverging, the credibility of the US extended deterrent has been perceived as decreasing from a Japanese perspective.[56]

Second, changes in the US force structure through military transformation mean that bases in Japan become relatively less important than during the Cold War. According to Richard Samuels,

> Although Washington welcomes Japanese contributions to US policing along the "arc of instability" from East Asia to the Middle East, and although advocates insist that Japanese bases are the "heart," the "key," the "cornerstone," the "anchor," and the "foundation" of the relationship, some in the Pentagon are unconvinced that large forward bases remain the most effective means to win the "war on terror" or to police stability along trade routes. For one thing, technological change has made offshore balancing more attractive. US Navy doctrine now calls for a "sea strike" to project power, a "sea shield" to extend defense far from US shores, and "sea basing" to project US sovereignty deep into international waters. Former Chief of Naval Operations Vernon Clark explains: "The independence of naval vessels operating on the high seas allows us to conduct combat operations anywhere, anytime, without having to first ask for permission." This doctrine, and the capabilities which it is based, degrade the relative value of large US bases in Japan. Indeed, the Pentagon has recognized that such high-value targets are highly vulnerable. So although US bases in Japan have been identified as strategic "hubs" rather than tactical "lilypads," it is not at all clear that this logic will prevail. As the bases become less significant, the United States is likely to ask Japan to add value in different ways – ways in which it may be loathe to contribute. Once this split becomes clear, the United States will begin to recalculate its guarantee of Japan's defense, which will force Japan to reconsider whether to pursue a security policy premised on US protection.[57]

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[55] Nishihara Masashi, "Strategic Priorities at 50," in Brad Glosserman, "Conference Report – Japan-U.S. Security Relations: A Testing Time for the Alliance," *Issues & Insights*, Vol. 9, No. 12 (Mar. 2009), p. 32; "Expectations Out of Sync: The Second U.S.-Japan Strategic Dialogue," *Issues & Insights*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Jun. 2009).

[56] Although this depends on what kind of methods are required to maintain the credibility of the extended deterrent. Credibility depends on the perceptions of the country. However, "[e]xtended deterrence requires reiterated commitment…Washington and Tokyo were working hard to make sure that there would be no daylight between Tokyo and Washington on how to deal with Pyongyang – and most strategists in both capitals agreed that a nuclear would destabilize Northeast Asia." Richard Samuels, *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), p. 176.

[57] Ibid., pp.191-192.

Therefore, although US bases in Japan are important for HADR, regional stability and deterrence over the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan, in terms of US power projection capabilities, Japan's bases can be considered to be relatively less important.

Third, containment of the resurgence of Japanese militarism has been another function of the Japan-US security treaty. East Asian states in the post-World War II period have argued that the US presence in East Asia would prevent Japan from remilitalizing.[58] For example, China often argues that while the Japan-US security treaty has the potential to be utilized by the United States to increase its military influence in East Asia, the treaty has successfully contained Japan's militarism in the post-World War II period. Nevertheless, in the post-Cold War period, this argument has weakened. East Asian states, especially Southeast Asian states including Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, encouraged Japan in the post-Cold War era to play more active security roles, especially in nontraditional security fields.[59] These states no longer consider increasing Japan's military roles as a threat to the region, as Japanese economic cooperation with and development assistance to East Asian states in the postwar period have altered perceptions of Japan's security role in East Asia. Thus, the nature of concerns has changed: while Korea and China still consider

[58] Commission on United States-Japan Relations for the Twenty-First Century, *Reassessing the U.S.-Japan Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Context*, (1991), p.18.

[59] Although Southeast Asian states were skeptical about Japan's security role in the region soon after the Cold War, Thailand proposed joint naval exercises with Japan and Suharto supported a Japanese peacekeeping role in March, 1991. See "South-East Asia; Suharto supports Japanese peacekeeping role; Kaifu makes commitment to Asia," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, Mar. 6, 1991, accessed at <http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T7877950639&format=GNBFI&sort=DATE,A,H&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T7877949777&cisb=22_T7877949776&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=21>. Accessed Nov. 13, 2009. Keith Richburg, "Many Asians Fear Potential Military Threat From Japan; With the Soviet Union's International Image Changing, Concerns Rise Over Tokyo's Ambitions," *Washington Post*, Aug. 4, 1990, at <http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T7877950639&format=GNBFI&sort=DATE,A,H&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T7877949777&cisb=22_T7877949776&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=21>. Accessed Nov. 13, 2009. Also, these perceptions from Southeast Asia has improved with bilateral joint declarations between Japan and ASEAN member states, including the 2006 Japan-Indonesia Joint Declaration, "Strategic Partnership for Peaceful and Prosperous Future" in 2006, the 2009 Japan-Philippines Joint Declaration, "Fostering a Strategic Partnership for the Future between Close Neighbors"; and the 2007 Japan-Malaysia Joint Declaration, "Everlasting Friendship and Far-reaching Partnership: Towards a Common Future." According to Nishihara, Southeast Asian states have remained silent over Japanese SDF maneuvers since the 1990s. There are three occasions: Japan sent Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) planes to Singapore at the time of anti-government demonstrations in Jakarta, Indonesia, in May1998; Japan sent around 700 troops to East Timor to serve in UN peacekeeping operations in East Timor; and Japanese destroyers went to the Indian Ocean to supply oil in 2001. These actions did not raise concern from Southeast Asian states. Furthermore, Philippine President Gloria Arroyo stated in 2002 that Japan should play an extensive role in the area of international security, referring to the post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan. Nishihara Masashi, "Japan's Political and Security Relations with ASEAN," in *ASEAN-Japan Cooperation: A Foundation for East Asian Community* (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2003), pp. 155-156.
"Japanese indecision riles Southeast Asia: Region wants Tokyo to play active political role, Murayama told," *The Nikkei Weekly*, Sept. 5, 1994, at <http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T7764449085&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T7764449904&cisb=22_T7764449903&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=8002&docNo=10>. Accessed Oct. 27, 2009.

Japanese remilitarization problematic, Southeast Asian states have more confident views of Japan's security role. Currently, the concern is more about a possible arms race in the region: if the Japan-US security treaty was dissolved, Japan would feel the need to increase its military capabilities, or may develop nuclear weapons, which would likely accelerate an arms race in East Asia and destabilize regional security. Thus, the utility of US forces in Japan has regional implications.

Fourth, the public good function combines the first, second, and third functions of the Japan-US alliance. East Asian states better appreciate how the Japan-US alliance reduces uncertainty in East Asia, especially in the current power transition period when China is gaining economic and military power.[60] Furthermore, China's unclear intentions regarding its increase in military capability, which is said to aim at expanding its influence over the western Pacific, draws concern from East Asian states. Also, there are remnants of the Cold War, such as the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, which have the potential to deteriorate not only regional security but also the economy in times of crisis. As East Asia has yet to establish the foundation of a security mechanism, the US hub-and-spoke system, which includes the Japan-US alliance, functions as the stabilizer in East Asia. Therefore, from the East Asian perspective, the Japan-US alliance is a hedging tool against regional uncertainty while the region attempts to utilize and nurture a soft security mechanism, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN+3, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and the East Asian Summit (EAS), to further ensure peace and stability. These utilities of the alliance notwithstanding, it is hard to strike the right balance between an East Asian security mechanism and the Japan-US alliance. Although they are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as confidence building in the region succeeds, the alliance can be seen as a regional security provider that accelerates political tensions among East Asian states. Therefore, while there are less political concerns over the Japan-US alliance during the transition period, the utility of the alliance needs to be reconsidered as the regional strategic landscape evolves.

Fifth, the nontraditional security function was attached to the Japan-US security relationship in the post-Cold War era. In 1996, Japan and the United States agreed on the "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security-Alliance for the 21st Century."[61] In this declaration, security cooperation was divided into three areas: bilateral, regional, and global cooperation. Bilateral cooperation focused on close consultation and coordination as well as a division of labor in Japan-US security cooperation for the defense of Japan. Regional cooperation aims at maintaining stability in East Asia and bringing China into the international community to play a constructive role. Global cooperation highlights Japan-US cooperation on international activities such as peacekeeping, humanitarian operations, arms control and disarmament, and the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of

[60] Kurt Campbell stated that the U.S.-Japan relationship matters not only to Japan and the United States, but also to South Korea, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and all countries in Southeast Asia, which regard the relationship as a "sort of the irreducible component of American and Japanese approaches to global policy." See Kurt Campbell, "Briefing on the 50th Anniversary of U.S.-Japan Relations", Washington, D.C., Jan. 19, 2010. at <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/01/135400.htm>. Accessed Jan. 20, 2010.

[61] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security – Alliance for the 21st Century," Apr. 17, 1996, at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html>. Accessed Oct. 26, 2009.

delivery. Instead of focusing exclusively on Japan's defense and the maintenance of the regional balance of power, Japan and the United States have begun to seek areas that can enhance cooperation between them. By passing the Peacekeeping Operation Laws in 1992 and the Law Relating to Measures for Preserving the Peace and Security of Japan in the Event of a Situation in the Areas Surrounding Japan in 1999, Japan has attempted to increase room for military maneuvers to meet the expectations posed by the Japan-US security declarations. The terror attacks of September 11 have also pushed Japan to pass legislation, including the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures in 2001, the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq in 2003, and the Law of Punishment of and Measures against Acts of Piracy in 2009 to dispatch the SDF even though these have not led to the revision or reinterpretation of Article IX of the Japanese constitution.

The nontraditional security function is not free from problems, either. The international community in the post-Cold War, especially after 9/11 committed to the nontraditional security agenda, and there are numerous multilateral international organizations, including the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that deal with nontraditional security issues. Consequently, Japan-US security cooperation in this field is not unique, and their individual activities can be incorporated into other multilateral frameworks. As the comparative advantages of the alliance are not necessarily maintained in the global context, the nontraditional security function of the Japan-US security relationship does not provide a rigid foundation to sustain Japan-US security cooperation. Furthermore, considering Japan's constraints on full-fledged military cooperation with the United States, even if Japan takes initiatives to reinterpret or change its constitution to have more military capabilities to this end, it will be difficult to pursue such cooperation unless their national interests converge. This is often exemplified by the central dilemma of alliance politics: abandonment and entanglement.[62] For example, while the United States asked Japan to contribute to Afghanistan and Iraq by "showing the flag" and putting "boots on the ground," Japan was wary about dispatching SDF to conflict zones as it was not sure to what extent US demands for Japan's contribution would increase as the situation changed.[63]

Japan and the United States share vital security interests in the post-Cold War period.[64] These common security interests prevent the Japan-US security relationship from eroding in the short-term. Nevertheless, in terms of functional foundations, there remains the potential for Japan-US security ties to diminish in the long-term.

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[62] See Glenn Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance," *World Politics*, Vol. 36, (Jul. 1984), pp. 461-485; Richard Samuels, *Securing Japan*; and Mike Mochizuki, "Japan: Between Alliance and Autonomy," in Ashley Tellis and Michael Wills, eds, *Strategic Asia 2004-05: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power* (Washington: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004) , pp. 103-138.

[63] Brad Glosserman, "Back to Earth with the DPJ," *PacNet*, No. 60, (Sept. 10, 2009).

[64] Samuels, *Securing Japan*, p. 152, Przystup (2005, 2) speaks of "an ongoing convergence of a common strategic vision." In February 2005, the U.S.-Japan Consultative Committee issued a similar list. These included: 1) Preserve stability among great and aspiring powers, 2) Preserve the safety of the sea-lanes of communication throughout East and Southeast Asia, 3) Maintain leadership roles in regional and global institutions, 4) Keep the Korean Peninsula peaceful, 5) Maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait, 6) Defend against terrorism, 7) Avoid the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to unfriendly states and non-state actors, and 8) Ensure the independence of Indochina and Southeast Asia.

Different Concepts and Expectations of "Alliance"

Given the changing nature of the Japan-US security relationship in the post-Cold War international environment, there are fears that the Japan-US alliance would be weakened, which could lead to the end of the alliance.[65] Although these arguments are alarmist, these fears are not unfounded. There are growing political debates over future objectives of alliances, including NATO, the US-ROK alliance, and the Japan-US alliance.

These problems derive from the term, "alliance," which connotes military characteristics. Indeed, "alliance" in the field of international relations is defined as a collective self-defense mechanism, where "formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, intended for either the security or the aggrandizement of their members, against specific other states, whether or not these others are explicitly identified."[66] For example, NATO stipulates that "in the event of aggression, the signatory states are required to provide assistance for the restoration of security."[67]

Considering the Soviet threats of the Cold War era, US alliances had an explicit function of militarily containing the expansion of communism. Although the "alliance" included political cooperation among allies, the assumption was that the United States and allies could not afford breaking up military ties that countered Soviet threats. As the Cold War ended, the term, "alliance," has become ambiguous and expanded to include both military and non-military functions. With this vague definition of "alliance," Japan and the United States have understood the term differently, and US and Japan's expectations of the alliance have diverged since the end of the Cold War.

Japan: Strategic Use of an Ambiguous Definition

Since Japan has only one alliance, the term, "alliance" is politically considered in the context of the Japan-US alliance. However, due to negative domestic and international perceptions of Japan's military, the term has been loosely defined and strategically used by politicians, and thus is more political rhetoric than substantive.

Indeed, Japan's definitional ambiguity of "alliance" mainly stems from four domestic reasons. First, there was strong domestic anti-militarist sentiment in Japan in the immediate postwar era. Partly due to the experiences of World War II and partly due to the idea that Japan needed to concentrate on economic recovery from the war, the Japanese were reluctant to rearm. Second, constitutional constraints over the formation of Japanese military capabilities gave justification for demilitarization. Although there were intense debates over Article IX of the Japanese constitution, Japan's basic stance is not to possess the land, air,

[65] Realist argues common threats sustain alliances. See John Measheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001); Rajan Menon, *The End of Alliances*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
[66] Snyder, p. 84. In general, "alliance" is defined as "a close association of nations or other groups, formed to advance common interests or causes." See *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, Fourth Edition (Florida: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000).
[67] *The North Atlantic Treaty*, Washington D.C., Apr. 4, 1949, at <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm>. Accessed Oct. 27, 2009.

and sea military capabilities to fight a war to resolve international disputes. Therefore, forming alliances with a state to practice collective self-defense is inconceivable in the legal sense. Third, Japan feared entrapment by the US global strategy. Since the very reason that the United States took the "reverse course" of democratization and demilitarization of Japan was its conceptualization of the global strategy, the containment of communism, it was likely that Japan needed to militarily contribute to the US strategy if it formed an alliance with the United States. Fourth, despite these constraints, Japan needed to ensure military capabilities for self-defense, considering the postwar international environment. The cheapest way to increase its military capability is to form an alliance; however, since this creates the potential for entrapment, Japan concluded an asymmetrical security treaty with the United States without using the term "alliance."[68]

In addition, since the "alliance" has a collective defense connotation, the use of the term "alliance" was politically controversial during the Cold War. For example, the first time Japan used the term "Japan-US Alliance" in an official document is in the 1981 "Joint Communiqué of Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko and US President Ronald Reagan."[69] Prime Minister Suzuki was asked what the "Japan-US alliance" meant and said that the Japan-US alliance did not aim at increasing military ties.[70] This illustrates the political dilemma he faced; while the "Japan-US alliance" connoted strengthening military ties with the United States, which was domestically controversial, denying a military tie in the alliance was literally contradictory and created US doubts over Japanese political view on its alliance. In order to avoid this dilemma, the best way was not to use the term "alliance". Accordingly, instead of using the "U.S.-Japan alliance (日米同盟: *Nichibei Domei*)," Japan traditionally used the term, the "U.S.-Japan security arrangement (or treaty) (日米安保: *Nichibei Anpo*)."

As *Table 2* indicates, Japan's political use of the term "Japan-US alliance" has been a recent phenomenon. Until 1985, the prime minister's policy speeches used only the term "Japan-US security arrangement." Since then, there were several mixed uses of the Japan-US security arrangement and alliance, and only since 2005 has the Japan-US security arrangement been replaced by the Japan-US alliance.

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[68] As Japan has politically decided not to use the right of collective defense, which is given to all states by the UN Charter, the Japan-US security treaty was not a reciprocal treaty. In other words, Japan cannot defend the United States if the United States is the only target of the military attack, but the United States would defend Japan during a military attack on Japan. This non-reciprocal security relationship between Japan and the United States has made it difficult for Japan to accept active military roles with the United States. Thus, from the Japanese perspective, the "alliance" was founded on the trade-off between US military and Japanese bases. See Sakamoto Kazuya, "Nichibei domei no kadai: Anpo kaitei 50 nen no shiten kara."

[69] Informally, the term "U.S.-Japan alliance" relationship was used before 1981. See Fukuda Takeo, "Nashonaru puresu kurabu ni okeru Fukuda Takeo naikaku sori daijin no supichi" (Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda's Speech at National Press Club), Washington D.C., Mar. 22, 1977; Ohira Masayoshi, "Howaito hausu ni okeru kangeishiki no sai no Ohira naikaku sori daijin touji" (Prime Minister Ohira's Speech in the Welcome Reception at White House), 2 May 1979: Miyazawa Kiichi, "Nichibei shuno kaidango no puresu rimakusu" (Press Remarks after the U.S.-Japan Summit), Washington D.C., Jul. 1, 1992.

[70] National Diet Library, "Sangiin Kaigiroku Joho Dai 094 Kokkai Honkaigi Dai 20 Go" (Upper House Information: the 94th Diet Session, 20th), May 25, 1981, at <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/094/0010/09405250010020a.html>. Accessed Oct. 27, 2009.

Table 2: Use of Term in Japanese Prime Minister's Policy Speech (1951-2010)[71]



The reason that Japan needed to use the term "alliance" is that Japan needed to manage security relations with the United States. Since the term "alliance" has been internationally used to refer to a military alliance, by using the term "alliance," Japan can signal the United States about Japanese intentions to strengthen military cooperation. However, to achieve such objectives, Japan also needs to overcome political opposition. Thus, Japan created a strategic method to expand its definition of the alliance by widening bilateral cooperation during the Cold War, and by linking it to the alliance in the post-Cold War era.

During the Cold War, the foundation of the Japan-US alliance was consolidated by gradually expanding Japan-US relations. In 1968, Prime Minister Sato Eisaku said that the United States would provide for the defense of Japan while Japan provides bases to the United States.[72] In this sense, Japan's political posture toward the Japan-US alliance was asymmetric in nature; Japan was less willing to play a military role. However, in 1970, after the Ogasawara Islands were returned to Japan by the United States, Sato suggested that through the assessment of national power and its state of affairs, Japan needed to consolidate its defense capability, and the Japan-US security treaty complemented areas that Japanese defense capability lacked.[73] This indicates that, whether Japan took actual actions or not, it

[71] The number given the use of term, "alliance," is divided by the number of policy speeches or administrative policy speeches. Generally, Administrative Policy Speech (*Shisei Hoshin Enzetsu*) is made at the beginning of regular Diet Session every year while the Policy Speech (*Shoshin Hyomei Enzetsu*) is made when the prime minister is newly appointed. The text data is from the database provided by the Tanaka Akihiko Lab. See Tanaka Akihiko Lab, "Teikoku gikai – kokkai nai no sori daijin enzetsu" (Prime Minister's Speech at Imperial Diet and Diet), *Deta Besu 'Sekai to Nihon'* (Database 'The World and Japan"), at <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/>. Accessed Oct. 27, 2009. For data, see Appendix I.

[72] Sato Eisaku, "Dai 59 kai kokkai ni okeru shoshin hyomei enzetsu" (Policy Speech in the 59th Diet Session), Aug. 3, 1968, in the Tanaka Akihiko Lab, "Teikoku gikai- kokkai no enzetsu: Shusho."

[73] Sato Eisaku, "Dai 63 kai kokkai ni okeru shisei hoshin enzetsu" (Administrative Policy Speech in the 63th Diet Session), Feb. 14, 1970, in the Tanaka Akihiko Lab, "Teikoku gikai- kokkai no enzetsu: Shusho."

showed the political commitment to take more responsibility for its own defense. Furthermore, Japan began to recognize that the Japan-US security relationship was gradually expanding beyond its primary objective, the defense of Japan, as the international community began to perceive a relative decline of US power, which was illustrated by the US retreat from the Vietnam War. For example, in 1972, Sato argued that trust and cooperation between Japan and the United States created peace and prosperity not only for Japan and the United States, but also for Asia and the world, which should be strengthened.[74] This was echoed by Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo in 1978, when he mentioned that Japan-US cooperation needed to aim at the establishment of a peaceful and prosperous international society.

Also, Japan's conceptual expansion of "security" to so-called "comprehensive security" during the late 1970s helped lay the foundation for Japan-US cooperation to become part of the Japan-US "alliance." In 1978, Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi established a comprehensive security research group, which created the concept of "comprehensive security" that includes not only military power but also energy security, food security, and earthquake management.[75] In its report, which was formally submitted to the prime minister in 1979, the research group pointed out that given the decline of the US global power, excessive dependence on the United States for its own security was not sustainable. At the same time, given the constitutional and political constraints on the use of force, Japan needed to develop a broader concept of security.

Although the research group defined the alliance from a military perspective, the concept of comprehensive security aimed at broadening the Japan-US alliance from purely military cooperation to broader political cooperation. The report acknowledged that the close relationship between Japan and the United States was the main pillar of Japan's comprehensive security policy since the United States provided a "nuclear umbrella" and deterrence; it also argued that this was not the most important element of the relationship, but that the most important element for the Japan-US relationship was the basic political common ground that both states possessed, including importance of democracy and the "free world." To this end, Japan would cooperate with the United States to maintain and develop the international order on the basis of their common values.[76] Japan coped with domestic constraints while widening the fields of bilateral cooperation with the United States. By expanding Japan's concept of "security" beyond the military security of the Cold War, Japan created a foundation to use the term "alliance" with the United States.

In the post-Cold War era, there has been a political use of the term, "alliance" by linking other fields of Japan-US cooperation to strengthen the Japan-US security relationship. This is because Japan's concerns about the Japan-US alliance has shifted from fear of entrapment to fear of abandonment due to the disappearance of the ideological conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union and international criticism over Japan's

[74] Sato Eisaku, "Dai 68 kai kokkai ni okeru shisei hoshin enzetsu" (Administrative Policy Speech in the 68th Diet Session), Jan. 29, 1972 in the Tanaka Akihiko Lab, "Teikoku gikai- kokkai no enzetsu: Shusho."
[75] Sogo Anzenhosho Gurupu (Comprehensive Security Research Group), *Ohira Sori no Seisaku Kenkyu Hokokusho – 5: Sogo Anzenhosho Senryaku*, Jul. 2, 1980, at <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPSC/19800702.O1J.html>. Accessed Oct. 27, 2009.
[76] Ibid.

inability to contribute personnel in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In other words, there was a fear that the United States would consider Japan strategically less significant while Japan still needed US defense capabilities to cope with flash-points in East Asia, such as the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula.

Indeed, as *Table 2* shows, the number of mentions of "alliance" in the prime minister's policy speeches increased since the 1990s. For example, Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki in 1991 argued that Japan needed to consolidate the "Japan-US alliance" by tackling global concerns such as drug trafficking and environmental issues through the "global partnership" between Japan and the United States.[77] Prime Minister Hata Tsutomu argued in 1994 that the alliance was centered on the Japan-US security arrangement, implying the "alliance" includes not only military cooperation but also other forms of cooperation.[78] Prime Minister Hashimoto and US President Clinton confirmed their "Common Agenda" as one of the most important pillars of Japan-US relations, which included such global issues as health, rapid population growth, disaster management, and the environment, and which they recognized as a symbol of widening cooperation between Japan and the United States as an alliance partner.[79]

In the post-9/11 world, when the concept of security can no longer be explained only through the traditional "state-to-state" security lens, Japan's definition of the alliance has become increasingly expansive, as *Figure 1* illustrates. For example, Prime Ministers Koizumi Junichiro and Abe Shinzo argued in 2005 and 2006 respectively that the Japan-US alliance is the basis for Japan's security and peace and stability in the world,[80] which expanded the alliance utility to the world security. Also, Prime Minister Aso's definition of the Japan-US alliance included global problems such as the financial crisis, combating terrorism, nuclear reduction and nonproliferation, and climate change,[81] which was previously regarded as political cooperation and distinguished from alliance cooperation. Indeed, with the expansive nature of the definition of the Japan-US alliance, since the latter half of the Koizumi administration, the term the "Japan-US alliance" has replaced the use of the Japan-US security arrangement since 2005. Even Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio says "Japan-US alliance" instead of "U.S-Japan security arrangement."[82] However, other than the

[77] Kaifu Toshiki, "Dai 120 kai kokkai ni okeru shisei hoshin enzetsu" (Administrative Policy Speech in the 120th Diet Session), Jan. 25, 1991. in the Tanaka Akihiko Lab, "Teikoku gikai- kokkai no enzetsu: Shusho."
[78] Hata Tsutomu, "Dai 129 kai kokkai ni okeru shoshin hyomei enzetsu" (Policy Speech in the 129th Diet Session), May 10, 1994, in the Tanaka Akihiko Lab, "Teikoku gikai- kokkai no enzetsu: Shusho."
[79] At this speech, Hashimoto identified that common agenda is transnational issues as well as the symbol of the broader U.S.-Japan cooperation. Hashimoto Ryutaro, "Beikoku Nashonaru Puresu Kurabu ni okeru Hashimoto Sori Enzetsu (Prime Minister Hashimoto's Speech at the U.S. National Press Club), Apr. 25, 1997, in the Tanaka Akihiko Lab, "Kokkai gai de okonatta enzetsu; Shusho."
[80] Koizumi Junichiro, "Dai 162 kai kokkai ni okeru shisei hoshin enzetsu" (Administrative Policy Speech in the 162th Diet Session), Jan. 21, 2005, in the Tanaka Akihiko Lab, "Teikoku gikai- kokkai no enzetsu: Shusho.": Abe Shinzo, "Dai 165 kai kokkai ni okeru shoshin hyomei enzetsu" (Policy Speech in the 165th Diet Session), Sept. 29, 2006, in the Tanaka Akihiko Lab, "Teikoku gikai- kokkai no enzetsu: Shusho."
[81] Aso Taro, "Dai 171 kai kokkai ni okeru shisei hoshin enzetsu" (Administrative Policy Speech in the 171th Diet Session), Jan. 28, 2009, in the Tanaka Akihiko Lab, "Teikoku gikai- kokkai no enzetsu: Shusho."
[82] Hatoyama Yukio, "Dai 173 kai kokkai ni okeru shoshin hyomei enzetsu" (Policy Speech in the 173th Diet Session).

fact that the core of the Japan-US alliance is the Japan-US security treaty, Japan's definition of alliance is still ambiguous, especially the utility of the alliance in the global fields.

Figure 1: Japanese Conceptualization of the Japan-US Alliance



Thus, the characteristics of Japan's use of the term "alliance" can be summarized as follows: first, its definition is still ambiguous; second, definitional ambiguity has been strategically used to strengthen ties with the United States; and third, Japan's definition of alliance has been expansive since the post-Cold War era.[83]

US Definition of Alliance on the basis of Global Strategy

There has been no definitional ambiguity over the term "alliance" in the United States. The United States has defined its alliances in the international arena as political and military associations that have formal military agreements, such as security treaties, and it expects each member state to militarily and politically cooperate in times of both peace and contingencies. In this sense, the United States has attempted to increase the utility of its alliances by striking balance between allies' capabilities and its expectations of allies. Therefore, US expectations of allies are based on its global strategy, and the management and the utility of US alliances are two key factors in pursuing its global interests.

First, the management of its alliances has been historically important for US strategy. The very first US principles about the alliance date back to the George Washington farewell address in 1796, which warned against danger of entrapment by creating a permanent alliance with foreign governments because such a relationship would nurture attachment with and animosity against the United States and subvert US interests.[84] In this sense, before World War II, the United States maintained an isolationist tendency in the international arena. However, since this isolationist policy exacerbated the consequences of World War II, the United States decided to engage the international community by forming institutions,

[83] Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya said that the Japan-US "alliance" includes a security dimension as well as political and even cultural dimension. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Gaimudaijin kaiken kiroku (yoshi) (Heisei 22 nen 1 gatsu)," February, 2010, at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/kaiken/gaisho/g_1001.html>. Accessed Feb. 26, 2010.

[84] George Washington, "To the People of the United States," 106th Congress, Senate Document No. 106-21, Washington, 2000, pp. 9-10 and pp. 27-28, at <http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/farewell/sd106-21.pdf>. Accessed Oct. 27, 2009.

including alliances. In the postwar period, the United States and the Soviet Union were the only global powers that were capable of shaping the international security environment, and to compete for its sphere of influence with the Soviet Union, the United States regarded its allies as military and diplomatic tools to ensure its sphere of influence. It prevented its allies from defending by providing military and economic assistance.

At the same time, US expectations for the alliances differed by region. Following Truman's speech about the "Iron Curtain," the United States engaged in the economic and military reconstruction of Europe through the Marshal Plan and the establishment of NATO. In Asia, the United States established the "hub-and-spoke" security arrangement through bilateral and trilateral alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. Through these multilateral and bilateral alliance systems, the United States expected the rapid recovery of Western Europe and Japan to play a security role in Europe and Asia.[85] The United States did not consider substantial military assistance from its allies, especially Asian allies, considering their low political, economic, and social development and devastation from World War II.[86] These factors led the United States to have lower expectations for Asian allies than for European allies. *Table 3* illustrates the US interests and expectations for the recovery of Europe through the Presidential State of the Union Address at the beginning of the Cold War.

Table 3: US Presidential State of the Union Address: 1951-2009[87]



[85] Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein, "Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism," *International Organization*, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Summer 2002), p. 584; Victor Cha, "Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia," *International Security*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter, 2009/10), pp. 158-196. Though both articles examines why there is no NATO in Asia, which is beyond the scope of this paper, both agree that the U.S. expectations for Asian allies were minimal.

[86] Watanabe Akio, "Nichibei Domei no 50 nen no kiseki to 21 seiki he no tenbou" (50 years of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and Perspectives towards the 21st Century), *Kokusai Mondai*, No. 490, (Jan. 2001), p. 29.

[87] These numbers show the number of times of the terms, "Europe" and "Asia" used in each U.S. presidential State of the Union Address. From 1961 to 1970, the number of "Asia" increases due to U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. Note: there are two "state of union" in 1953, 1961, and 1981. Therefore, the data on these years averages the number of times. See The American Presidency Project, "State of the Union Messages," at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/sou.php>. Accessed Oct. 27, 2009. For data, see Appendix II.

Although the Japan-US alliance was one of the most important strategic assets for the United States after the emergence of the Cold War, Japan was not at the forefront of US global strategy. This is well illustrated by the 1951 security treaty between Japan and the United States, of which *Article I* stipulates:

> Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside Power or Powers.[88]

It focused on US military capabilities for the security of Japan and its power projection. This position was also reflected in the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States despite the full recovery of the Japan's sovereignty. From the US perspective, although it was necessary to consult with the Japanese government to use bases in Japan for military combat operations that did not relate to the defense of Japan, by using other areas as staging bases, the United States could gain longer power projection capabilities.[89] This low expectation of allies is apparent as the US president State of the Union Addresses did not much touch upon Asian allies, compared with NATO during the 39 years between 1951 and 1990.[90]

Despite the asymmetric nature of the Japan-US alliance, the United States was paradoxically in a weak position vis-à-vis Japan in terms of alliance management. Admittedly, for the formation of the Japan-US alliance, Japan and the United States had a shared threat from the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and thus created the alliance for mutual security benefits. However, Japan could pursue different policies from the United States: it concentrated its political and material resources on building economic power while eschewing a military build-up, the so-called "Yoshida Doctrine." This became possible because, from the Japanese perspective, there was a clear assurance that the United States would protect Japan since Washington could not afford to lose Japan to the Soviet Union. Thus, the basic political and security stance that Japan took was to eschew excessive US demands for Japan's rearmament.[91] Although the United States demanded more burden-sharing as the Japanese economy recovered during the 1970s, Japan successfully limited its military commitment to the Japan-US alliance while maintaining the alliance.

From the US perspective, the Japan-US alliance was a convenient tool to extend its power-projection capabilities. Even though the United States was in a weak position, as long as US military bases in Japan were secure, there were few reasons to dissolve the alliance; at best, the United States could demand burden-sharing with Japan. In this way, the United

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[88] *Security Treaty Between Japan and the United States of America*, Sept. 8, 1951, *Joyakushu*, 30-6. Japan's Foreign Relations-Basic Documents Vol.1, pp.444-448 in Tanaka Akihiko Lab, "The World and Japan," at <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19510908.T2E.html>. Accessed Oct. 27, 2009.
[89] Watanabe, p. 31.
[90] See *Table 4: U.S. Presidential State of the Union Address (Allies): 1951-2010.*
[91] Watanabe, p. 33.

States assimilated the US-Japan alliance into its global strategy, the purpose of which was to deter Soviet threats toward Japan.

Table 4: US Presidential State of the Union Address (Allies): (1951-2010)[92]



Second, the utility of the US alliance has been defined in terms of US global strategy. In fact, the United States has changed its expectations for the alliance as its global strategy shifted from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era. While the United States considered alliances during the Cold War as a means to enhance its power projection capability and lessen its security burden to contain Soviet threats, it has attempted to take a leading role in shaping the world order in the post-Cold War with the help of its alliances.[93] Therefore, the utility of the alliance takes into account not only the counter-threat utility but also regional public good and global security utility. In Europe, NATO has gained the characteristic of a regional public good and global security provider, although its institutional future remains to be seen. This is illustrated by the reformulation of its institutional objectives as well as its organizational behavior for peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction during the 1990s, which resulted in the 1999 NATO air campaign in Serbia without a UN Security Council Resolution, the 2001 NATO military campaign in Afghanistan, and its role and efforts within the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In East Asia, where there are still potential state-to-state conflicts, the Japan-US alliance has gained a regional public goods utility – it maintains stability in the region while expanding its utility to the global arena.

Nonetheless, US policy toward East Asia soon after the Cold War was in flux. While the US hub-and-spoke security arrangement in East Asia was maintained after the Cold War

[92] Although the total number of times mentioning each ally is higher than the data shown, these numbers reflect the number of times that relates to the security alliance. See The American Presidency Project, "State of the Union Messages," at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/sou.php>. Accessed Oct. 27, 2009. For data, see Appendix III, *Table 4: U.S. Presidential State of the Union Address (Allies): (1951-2010)*.

[93] This topic will be discussed in more detail in "5. The Evolution of Security Policy of Japan and the United States" in this paper.

for regional peace and stability, the United States did not have a concrete policy toward the Asia-Pacific region. Admittedly, in the early 1990s, even though the United States showed its intention to cut the number of troops in the region, it regarded forward-deployed troops, oversea bases, and bilateral treaties as important factors for maintaining regional stability.[94] However, Washington only touched upon the alliance by pointing out the US desire for more host-nation support and for maintaining the alliance.[95] Moreover, during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the United States doubted the *raison d'être* of the Japan-US alliance by which Japan could do much but provide financial assistance for the coalition.

To deal with these political frictions, in 1995, the United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, the so-called "Nye Initiative," recommended that around 100,000 troops of US forward-deployed force should stay in the Asia-Pacific region to prevent regional destabilization caused by social, economic, and political turmoil in East Asian states, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rising nationalism, territorial disputes, and long-standing mutual distrust.[96] It also pointed out that although multilateral institutions in the Asia-Pacific, such as the ARF, were useful, bilateral alliances, especially the Japan-US alliance, were the most important for the United States, Japan and even regional security.[97] In this sense, the United States shifted its alliance objectives from countering threats of the Soviet Union to providing regional public goods.[98] Furthermore, the United States expanded the roles of its alliance to play a more active role in the global security arena. This has become more evident in the post-9/11 era. When the United States undertook two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it asked its allies, including NATO and Japan, to play a larger global security role by providing military assistance in these regions.

Convergence and Divergence between Japan and the United States

The US global strategy was to contain Soviet power during the Cold War and to prevent and deter regional conflicts, to keep smaller powers and non-state actors from creating instability and attacking the United States in the post-Cold War world. To this end, the role of alliances has shifted from the exclusively threat-based model to a both threat-based and capability-based model, and thus, from geographically defined national defense to global security. In the current international security environment, the possibility of Great Power conflicts is less likely.[99] The United States has attempted to persuade its allies to embrace greater burden-sharing and a greater security role in the regional and global arena. Although the United States has not expected Japan to play the same security role in the global arena as it did its NATO allies, Japan needed to play a more active role in maintaining

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[94] Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress, n.d.* (released in Jul. 1992), pp. 28-29.
[95] Takagi Seiichiro, "Reisengo no nichibei domei to hokuto ajia – anzenhosho no jirenma ron no shiten kara" (The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Northeast Asia in the Post-Cold War – From the Perspective of the Security Dilemma Theory), *Kokusai Mondai*, No. 474, (Sept. 1999), p. 3.
[96] Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, (Feb. 1995), p. 2.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Kamiya Matake, "Nichibei Domei no Tenbo – Beikoku no Me" (The Prospective of the U.S.-Japan Alliance – The U.S. Eye), *Kokusai Mondai*, No. 491, (Feb. 2001), p. 36.
[99] See Joseph Nye, "Conflicts after the Cold War," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 5-24

stability in the international arena. When frictions arise, the United States has emphasized the utility of the Japan-US alliance by reconfirming its security guarantee to allies and the importance of the alliance for regional stability in East Asia.

On the other hand, Japan calculates the costs and benefits of the Japan-US alliance for its traditional security concerns, and then decides the role of the alliance by skillfully adjusting its policies. Japan's expectation of the alliance is ultimately the defense of Japan. During the Cold War era, Japan could play a minimum role in its own defense as well as regarding international security, relying on external and internal constraints. The external constraints were the negative perception of East Asian states about Japan's military force that was caused by the historical legacy of Japan's militarism during World War II; the internal constraints were the constitutional and its self-imposed constraints on military role, including Article IX of the Japanese constitutions, 1 percent budget ceilings on its military spending, its principle of an "exclusively defense-oriented policy (*Senshu Boei*: 専守防衛)," three non-nuclear policies, and three principles on arms exports. As the fear of abandonment by the United States was relatively small due to the bi-polar system of the Cold War, Japan could pursue the Yoshida Doctrine.[100] When political friction over the alliance has emerged, Japan has attempted to ease it by using the term "alliance" to confirm the strategic importance of its ties with the United States.

However, the Gulf Crisis in 1990 exposed Japan's inability to play a security role in the international arena, which invited severe criticism from not only the United States but also the international community. This incident forced Japan to feel the necessity of a more proactive security role. In the post-Cold War era, Japan gradually incorporated its security role, especially a military role, into the framework of the Japan-US alliance. In this way, Japan strengthened the Japan-US alliance while playing a security role in the international arena.

Currently, the common objective of the alliance at the national and regional levels is still valid: East Asia has Cold War remnants, and it is necessary to maintain the Japan-US alliance for regional stability, which also serves to defend Japan. To this end, Japan and the United States need to coordinate the division of labor within the alliance. However, in the global arena, the difference becomes relatively acute. Because the current international security environment has become increasingly complex due to the increasing power of the non-state actors in the world, the United States needs to draw more cooperation from the international community, especially its allies, to maintain international stability. On the other hand, with limited resources, while considering the importance of global security, Japan's threat perception is geared more toward the regional level, East Asia.

The question here is what the United States expects from its alliances in the future and how Japan copes with US expectations. To answer this question it is necessary to examine the development of Japanese and US security policy in the post-Cold War era.

[100] Yoshida did not think that his policy, the Yoshida Doctrine, would be pursued in the long-term. Although he did not accept the remilitarizing of Japan in the short-term due to the economic and social conditions soon after World War II, he suggested that Japan would not refuse to rearm in the long-term.

The Evolution of Security Policies of Japan and the United States

In the post-Cold War era, the functions of US alliances have gradually expanded with the evolution of the US global strategy, and the international community also accepts the US leadership to shape the international security environment. Indeed, Japan and the United States have not only undertaken political management of the alliance, but also functional expansion of the Japan-US alliance through redefinition of each state's security policies. While the United States reformulates its global strategy and adjusts the utility of alliance, Japan has begun to play a larger security role by reforming the legislative and political limitations on its SDF.

Japan: Continuity and Change in Security Policies

In the post-Cold War era, the shift in Japan's security policy was triggered by change in the international security environment. With the help of the broadening concept of security that resulted from emerging security missions such as peacekeeping and disaster relief, Japan could expand its security role despite constitutional constraints on the SDF. Also, further changes in the international and regional security environment after 9/11 affected Japan. After 9/11, the line between global and regional became blurred, and regional and global security policies have become linked to some degree. Moreover, Japan's perceptions of threat posed by North Korea and China during the 2000s pushed it to increase its military defense capabilities, such as missile defense. Consequently, Japan has begun to play a security role at the national, regional, and global levels. In this sense, the triggers for change in Japan's security policy can be divided into three phases: first, the international pressures from the 1991 Persian Gulf War; second, US pressure for more burden-sharing in the mid-1990s; and third, the East Asian regional security environment in the 2000s, especially China's increasing military capabilities.

First, international pressure during the 1991 Persian Gulf War triggered the shift in Japan's security policy. During the Gulf War, while the international coalition armies expelled Iraq's troops from Kuwait, the only contribution that Japan could make was over US$13 billion in financial assistance to the coalition armies, not military contributions. Although Japan dispatched the Maritime SDF minesweepers in April 1991, it was criticized as "too late, too little" by the international society.[101] This experience pushed Japan to further reform its security policy by first introducing the International Cooperation Law in 1992.[102]

Second, US political pressures on Japan for more burden-sharing increased Japan's contribution to regional stability in East Asia in the 1990s. While the United States acknowledged its military presence in the region is vital for security stability in the early 1990s, there was no rigid security policy toward East Asia except for an intention to decrease the number of forces in the region. At the same time, as Japan and the United States had trade frictions between them, there was a fear that this would have a negative impact on Japan-US relations. In order to overcome such an obstacle, the Nye Initiative decoupled trade frictions

[101] This is well illustrated when Kuwait thanked countries that came to it, and the list did not include Japan.
[102] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Kokusai rengo heiwa iji katsudou nado ni taisuru kyoryoku ni kansuru horitsu (International Cooperation Law)," Dec. 14, 2001, at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/pko/horitu.html>. Accessed Oct. 27, 2009.

from security cooperation and confirmed the US military presence in East Asia, while the Higuchi Report confirmed that Japan needed to pursue more burden-sharing. These are confirmed in the 1996 Joint Security Declaration between Japan and the United States, and thus, US pressures promoted change in Japan's security policy.[103]

Third, developments in the East Asian regional security environment in the 2000s created momentum for Japan to change its security policy. China's increasing military capability and North Korea's nuclear development meant that regional stability remained uncertain. Thus, Japan began to consider increasing its defense capability to balance against these threats. To overcome its constitutional constraints, Japan started to strengthen the Japan-US alliance to increase its deterrence and defense capabilities by linking the enhancement of the traditional alliance role of the Japan-US alliance with a new role that promoted cooperation in the nontraditional security arena, such as post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this sense, Japan attempted to rebalance the Japan-US asymmetrical alliance by increasing nontraditional military cooperation with the United States.

Through these three phases, Japan has gradually expanded its security role since the early 1990s, and there are two trends of its evolution. First, the scope of Japan's traditional security policies has expanded from a national to a regional to a global focus. Second, Japan developed a role in the international arena separately from the United States in the early 1990s, but it has begun to merge it within the context of the Japan-US alliance. Five important developments mark these evolutions in Japan's security policy: the 1996 National Defense Program Outline; the 1996 Japan-US Declaration on Security; the 2005 National Defense Program Guidelines; the 2005 Joint Declaration of the Japan-US Security Consultative Commission; and the 2006 Japan-US Summit meeting.

First, the redefinition of the Japan-US alliance in the post-Cold War was officially declared in the 1996 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO 96).[104] This outline was based on the 1994 report, "The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan The Outlook for the 21st Century," the so-called "Higuchi Report," which analyzed the post-Cold War security environment and Japan's new security role in the world.[105] According to the report, international cooperation in the post-Cold War was likely to center on the United States, and the new security system was likely to be based on the US-centered institutions,

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[103] However, the United States was cautious about the Higuchi Report because it perceived that Japan focused on more independent diplomacy through multilateral institutions though it emphasized the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. This view was often seen in the early 1990s as illustrated in the 1990 "A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking toward the 21st Century," See Murata Koji, "Nichibei Domei no 'Saitegi' wo Meguru Giron" (Debates over the redefinition of the Japan-U.S. alliance), *Kaigai Jijo*, vol. 44, no. 4, (Apr. 1996), pp. 20-23; *The Report of the Bush Administration on the Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim*, Apr. 19, 1990, at <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPUS/19900419.O1E.htm>. Accessed Feb. 10, 2010.

[104] Ministry of Foreing Affairs, Japan, "National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996," December 1995, at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/POLICY/security/defense96/index.html>. Accessed Oct. 27, 2009.

[105] *Bouei Mondai Kondankai* is a private advisory committee to the Prime Minister. See Advisory Group on Defense Issues, *The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century*, Aug. 12, 1994, at <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPSC/19940812.O1J.html>. Accessed Oct. 27 2009.

including NATO and the Japan-US alliance, and Japan's basic security policy should be based on the Japan-US alliance. However, the reports asserted that Japan should further enhance its security role in the international community. Globally, Japan needed to contribute more in the security field as a "world order creator" through multilateral organizations, especially the United Nations, because it had a responsibility due to its economic power and its resolution not to become a military power.

Considering uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific region, such as a potential arms race, the absence of a security architecture in East Asia, and the existence of regional military powers including the United States, Russia, and China, cooperation between Japan and the United States was indispensable since it ensured the US commitment to the region that was demanded by many Asian states. Nationally, Japan needed to deepen and widen cooperation with the United States by utilizing the framework of the Japan-US security treaty to proactively respond to the changing situations.

With "the fundamental principles of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that might pose a threat to other countries, upholding civilian control, adhering to the three non-nuclear principles," the NDPO 96 followed the Higuchi report. Therefore, in geographic terms, the Japan-US alliance began to function not only in the defense of Japan, but also for regional security in East Asia, which was also considered as a regional public good by both states. Furthermore, Japan began to enhance international security cooperation in the global arena not through the Japan-US alliance, but through multilateral organizations, especially the United Nations. In other words, the NDPO 96 did not explicitly expand the Japan-US alliance into the global arena.

Second, the 1996 Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security reaffirmed the policy and analysis of the utility of the Japan-US alliance provided by the Higuchi Report and the NDPO 96 by declaring that the "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region as we enter the twenty-first century."[106] While military cooperation was based on the defense of Japan and security stability in East Asia, the declaration added political cooperation in the global arena, such as strengthening international organizations, especially the United Nations, to effectively manage global security issues including arms control and peacekeeping. Also, bilateral cooperation aimed at global security issues, such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivery. This declaration was reaffirmed again in the 1997 "Joint Statement: Japan-US Security Consultative Committee Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation," which strengthened Japan-US cooperation that served Japan's security and regional security by creating the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation and the 1999 Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas surrounding Japan. These measures theoretically expanded Japan's military activities outside

[106] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security-Alliance for the 21st Century"

East Asia.[107] Accordingly, the areas of cooperation between Japan and the United States under the "alliance" began to expand.

Third, the 2005 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG 05) underscored the importance of the Japan-US alliance in national and regional security as well as Japan-US political cooperation on global security.[108] According to the guidelines, the rise of non-state actors, as 9/11 illustrated, poses international security threats. Since such threats were transnational, Japan needed to flexibly and effectively respond to them by cooperating with the international community, especially the United States. To this end, Japan aimed at the establishment of the "Multi-Functional Flexible Defense Force" while maintaining the traditional deterrence function of the United States. In this sense, the guidelines conceptualized international security by dividing international threats into traditional and nontraditional security issues, and it aimed to create the necessary military functions for the Japan's SDF, which would be compatible with the US force structure and functions under the rubric of "transformation."[109] The 1996 Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security differs from the NDPG 05 the emerging recognition of threats from international terrorism. Although Japan adopted the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the 2003 Special Measures concerning Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction Work and Security Assistance in Iraq in order to deal with nontraditional security issues by dispatching the SDF, these measures were sunset laws. Thus, from this perspective, by officially regarding nontraditional threats as a grave danger to Japan, the NDPG 05 provided a stepping stone to establish a permanent law. At the same time, these measures were politically framed within the Japan-US alliance.

Fourth, the 2005 Joint Statement: Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (SCC), which was held Feb. 19, 2005, clarified the nature of Japan-US political and security cooperation in the global arena.[110] The statement emphasizes security cooperation in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Proliferation of Security Initiative (PSI), and redefined the Japan-US alliance. According to the statement, Japan and the United States expand cooperation, "recognizing that the Japan-US Alliance, with the Japan-US security arrangements at its core, continues to play a vital role in ensuring the security and prosperity of both Japan and the United States as well as in enhancing regional and global peace and stability." This illustrates that the Japan-US alliance included not only security arrangements, but also additional cooperation in the regional and global arena. Subsequently, the 2005 SCC document, "The Japan-US Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future," which was produced Oct. 29, 2005, redefined the roles and missions of the Japan-US alliance, and was centered

[107] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee: Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation," Sept. 23, 1997, at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/defense.html>. Accessed Oct. 27, 2009.
[108] This guideline was published in December 2004, but the year used here is also based on the Japanese fiscal year. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, "National Defense Program Guideline, FY 2005-," Dec. 10, 2004, at <http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2004/1210taikou_e.html>. Accessed Oct. 27, 2009.
[109] Ibid.
[110] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee," Feb. 19, 2005, at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html>. Accessed Oct. 27, 2009.

on the defense of Japan and the improvement of the international security environment.[111] Although the mission, the improvement of the international security environment, has been on the table since "international contribution (*Kokusai Koken*:国際貢献)" was asserted in the early 1990s, this was the first time that the Japanese government officially and explicitly declared the role of the Japan-US alliance in the global realm.

Fifth, the 2006 Japan-US Summit meeting, "The Japan-US Alliance of the New Century," provided the most expansive functions of the Japan-US alliance.[112] This declaration asserts that the Japan-US alliance, which is based on universal values and common interests, aims at not only countering "mutual threats," but also "the advancement of core universal values such as freedom, human dignity and human rights, democracy, market economy, and rule of law" and "winning the war on terrorism; marinating regional stability and prosperity; promoting free market ideals and institutions; upholding human rights; securing freedom of navigation and commerce, including sea lanes; and enhancing global energy security." By asserting the common values shared by two parties to the Japan-US alliance, Japan-US cooperation transcended the traditional functions of the alliance.[113] It extended the functions of the Japan-US alliance into a wide array of security fields, which includes traditional and nontraditional security arenas, not specific functions such as counter-proliferation of WMD or countering terrorism. Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi and US President Bush referred to the alliance as the "Japan-US global alliance."[114]

Through the trajectory suggested by these documents and declarations, the nature of Japan's security policy has elements of continuity and change. First, the core of the Japan-US alliance still rests on two elements: defense of Japan and regional stability in East Asia. Second, the Japanese definition of the alliance has become expansive. As the 2006 Japan-US summit indicates, the Japan-US alliance has evolved from military cooperation to political, economic, social, and cultural cooperation. Third, alliance cooperation in the global arena remains ambiguous, and it depends on the issue of the day. This has advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, as the realm of cooperation is flexible, both Japan and the United States can adjust their focus through consultations at any time, and they can officially declare that such cooperation "strengthens the Japan-US alliance." On the other hand, if the issue upon which they wish to cooperate has not been fixed, coordinating their policies on the issue would be difficult because the priority may differ. Fourth, the Japanese public seems to accept the term, "alliance," unlike the 1980s. This has become possible partly because Japan

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[111] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Security Consultative Committee Document U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future," Oct. 29, 2005, at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html>. Accessed Oct. 27, 2009.

[112] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting: The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century," Jun. 29, 2006, at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/summit0606.html>. Accessed Oct. 27, 2009. However, Prime Minister Hashimoto made the same argument in 1996. See Hashimoto Ryutaro, "Korekara no nihon to sekai ni okeru nichibei kyoryoku" (The Future of U.S.-Japan Cooperation in the World), New York, Sept. 24,1996, in the Tanaka Akihiko Lab, "Kokkai gai de okonatta enzetsu; Shusho."

[113] This value-based cooperation was previously advocated by other prime ministers, such as Nakasone. See Nakasone Yasuhiro, *Kokusai Senryaku Mondai Kenkyujo ni okeru Nakasone Yasuhiro Naikaku Sori Daijin Enzetsu* (Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's Speech at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)), Jun. 11, 1984.

[114] Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, "The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century," Jun. 29, 2006, at <http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2006/06/29joint_e.html>. Accessed Oct. 27, 2009.

faced immediate security threats from the North Korean nuclear program in 1994, the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, North Korea's 1998 missile launch, and North Korea's nuclear weapon development program and two nuclear tests since 2002.

The United States: Changes in the Global Strategy and Expectations for Alliances

As US global security strategy changes, the roles of and expectations for the US alliances also change. In other words, it is the core element of US policy toward its allies. Although the US global strategy in the post-Cold War era was fluid, it was gradually developed from the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) and the 1997, 2001, 2006, and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) by evaluating the US National Security Strategy (NSS).

The 1993 BUR examined the international security outlook in the post-Cold War era and suggested that the United States needs to internationally make political, economic, and military commitments to avoid global instability by the US overseas presence, preparation for two major regional conflicts, and partnership with its allies in Europe, East Asia, the Near East, and Southwest Asia.[115] Although this provided the basic US security strategy after the Cold War, the objectives were still being refined, and this pattern continued to be reflected until the 1997 QDR. While maintaining the US presence throughout the world, the United States took "shape, respond, and prepare" approaches, by which the United States engages the world to shape the international environment though deterrence, peacetime engagement activities, and active participation and leadership in alliances; responds to the full spectrum of crises from humanitarian assistance to fighting and winning two major theater wars; and prepares for an uncertain future by maintaining US military superiority.[116] However, even though the diversification of international threats, including state-centered threats and transnational threats, were recognized, there was no clear link between them.

Changes occurred in the 2001 QDR. Although there were several low-intensity conflicts and asymmetry attacks on the United States, such as the Khobar Towers bombing in 1996, the US embassy bombing in 1998, and the *USS Cole* bombing in 2000, the 9/11 attacks forced the United States to consider global strategic changes. While recognizing the importance of the regional balance of power, the 2001 QDR put more emphasis on shrinking protection afforded by geographic distances for the homeland security as non-state actors have gained more power to attack state-actors though globalization effects.[117] In addition, the United States regarded failed states and weak states in Asia and Africa as breeding grounds for the international terrorists, as they could provide safe-havens for their operations, including training, access to WMD, and fund-raising through such means as drug-trafficking.

[115] Les Aspin, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*, (October 1993), p. 3
[116] The Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy: Shape Respond, Prepare Now – A Military Strategy for a New Era," *The Disam Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Winter, 1997/98), pp. 47-48.
[117] Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, (Sept. 30, 2001), pp. 3-4.

Table 4: The Development of Japan's Security Policy

		National		Regional		Global		Outcome
		Objectives	Means	Objectives	Means	Objectives	Means	
1	**1976 NDPO**	**Japan's Security** (Prevention of Armed Invasion, Countering Aggression)	1) Japan's own effort (countering limited and small-scale aggression, disaster management of Japan) 2) U.S.-Japan alliance (aggression that Japan cannot deal with by itself, nuclear deterrence, U.S. Nuclear Deterrence)	-	-	-	-	The 1978 Report by the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation, Submitted to and Approved by the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee
2	**1996 NDPO**	**Japan's Security** (Prevention of Armed Invasion, Countering Aggression, Disaster Management, Terrorism)	1) Japan's own efforts (countering indirect aggression, terrorism, domestic disaster management) 2) U.S.-Japan Alliance (direct aggression, U.S. Nuclear Deterrence)	**Reduce the Regional Uncertainty and Effectively Respond to the Contingency** (Russia and Korean Peninsula, Strengthening the Multilateral Cooperation)	1)U.S.-Japan Alliance (matter affecting Japan's national security, disaster management) 2) Japan's own efforts + other international organization (disaster management, etc.)	**Contribution to a More Stable Security Environment** (Disaster Management, Security Dialogues, Arms Control and Disarmament)	Japan's own efforts (participation in international disaster relief activities, promoting security dialogues, United Nations and other international organizations in the areas of arms control and disarmament)	The 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security
3	**1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security**	**Japan's Security**	1) Japan's own efforts (establishing appropriate defense capability with "the fundamental principles of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that might pose a threat to other countries") 2) U.S.-Japan Alliance (Interoperability, Research on Ballistic Missile Defense, U.S. Deterrence)	**A More Peaceful and Stable Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region** (North Korea, Nuclear Weapons in Northeast Asia, unresolved disputed territories, potential regional conflicts, proliferation of WMD and a delivery system)	1) U.S. and Japan's own Efforts 2) U.S.-Japan Alliance (U.S. military presence in Asia, Cooperation with China and Russia, Cooperation with regional multilateral frameworks, such as ARF)	**Improve the International Security Environment** (Strengthening the United Nations, and Other International Organizations in such fields as Peacekeeping and Humanitarian assistance) + Arms control and Disarmament	U.S.-Japan Political Cooperation on the basis of mutual trust drawn from the U.S.-Japan alliance	1) The 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation 2) The 1999 Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas surrounding Japan => geographical limitations have become ambiguous 3) The 2003 Emergency Legislation
4	**2005 NDPG**	**Japan's Security**	1) Japan's Defense Capability (within the exclusively defensive defense policy and not becoming a military power that might pose a threat to other countries, Creation of Multi-Functional Flexible Defense Force) 2) U.S.-Japan Alliance (U.S. Nuclear Deterrence, Ballistic Missile Defense)	**Reduce Uncertain Situations in the Asia-Pacific Region** (Russia, North Korea, China: the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait)	U.S.-Japan Alliance (Deterrence)	**Improve the International Security Environment** (such as regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorist attacks)	1) Japan's own Efforts (ODA, International Peace Cooperation Activities, Diplomacy to other states, the U.N., ARF, and ASEAN) 2) U.S.-Japan Political Cooperation (fostering international cooperation)	
5	**2005 Joint Statement (U.S.-Japan SCC)**	**Japan's and U.S. Security**	U.S.-Japan Alliance (interoperability, Ballistic Missile Defense, U.S. Deterrence)	**Strengthen Peace and Stability in the Asia-Pacific Region** (Uncertainty and Unpredictability of Emerging threats, Arms Race, North Korea)	U.S.-Japan Alliance (North Korea, China, Russia, the Taiwan Strait, Southeast Asia, Sea Lane of Communication)	**Responds to Emerging Threats** (international terrorism, proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery)	U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation on Afghanistan, Iraq, PSI, etc. (Promote fundamental values such as basic human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in the international community, international peace cooperation activities, energy security, development assistance, multilateral cooperation through NPT, IAEA, and PSI)	1) The 2005 SCC: U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future (Security Consultative Committee Document) 2) The 2006 United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee Document)
6	**2006 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting: The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century**	**Japan's Security**	1) Japan's own efforts (Emergency Legislation in Japan) 2) U.S.-Japan Alliance (Ballistic Missile Defense cooperation)	**Maintaining regional stability and prosperity** (securing freedom of navigation and commerce, including sea lanes)common challenges in the region such as (a) promoting individual freedoms; (b) increasing transparency and confidence in the political, economic, and military fields; and (c) protecting human dignity, and resolving humanitarian and human rights problems including the abduction issue.	U.S.-Japan Alliance	Against mutual threats + The advancement of core universal values (winning the war on terrorism, enhancing global energy security, global challenges such as capacity-building for natural disaster response and prevention and response to avian/pandemic influenza. They also agreed to work on the interrelated challenges of energy security, clean development, reducing pollution, and climate change.	U.S.-Japan Strategic Development Alliance*	1) From Defense Agency to Ministry of Defense 2) Japan's SDF Role: International Cooperation - From Subordinate Duties to Main Duties.
		Transnational Political and Economic Cooperation of the U.S.-Japan Alliance: promoting growth and economic reform; promoting and maintaining open markets; ensuring efficient movement of legitimate goods, services, people, and investments, while tackling threats from terrorism; strengthening intellectual property rights protection and enforcement; enhancing global energy security; and fostering transparent and favorable business climates in both countries; promoting free market ideals and institutions; upholding human rights						

*** Strategic Development Alliance (September, 2005):** The Ministers agreed that the United States and Japan share a common development vision aimed at promoting peace, stability, and prosperity through results-oriented development assistance. The Ministers were pleased to note that the U.S. and Japan will hold the first meeting of the U.S.-Japan Strategic Development Alliance in late September in Washington to further this partnership. The Ministers recognized that cooperation between the U.S. and Japan, the world's two largest donors, will help developing countries implement policies that ensure the most effective use of assistance. They concurred that empowerment of individuals and local communities, good governance, strong democratic institutions, and political stability are critical foundations for sustainable development and poverty alleviation. They also reinforced their strong commitment to generous humanitarian and emergency relief for any country in need.

Therefore, the objectives of US global strategy has become two-pronged: countering threats from state actors and non-state actors, some of which are connected with each other.[118] In this sense, so-called traditional threats and transnational threats have begun to link to each other.

The prolonged war in Afghanistan and Iraq obliged the United States in the 2006 QDR to add the mission of post-conflict reconstruction to its counter-terrorism policies, which include counter-insurgency policies. Furthermore, since Afghanistan and Iraq are not the only places that have the potential to become safe-havens for international terrorist groups, international cooperation with US allies and partners becomes more pressing.[119] In this setting, the United States has attempted to strengthen its alliances and to develop new partnerships with other states to accomplish the mission.[120] This strategy is also reiterated by the National Defense Strategy 2008.[121]

These changes in US global strategy shaped its expectations for alliances. This is well-illustrated by the development of the US National Security Strategy (NSS), which has two characteristics of US policy toward alliances. One is burden-sharing in the global arena, which is consistent throughout the post-Cold War era; the other is changing roles of the alliances along with the change in the focus of the global agenda, which depends on the US administration's focus.

The end of the Cold War has brought about change in the roles of its alliances and pushed the United States to focus more on burden-sharing and responsibility-sharing with its allies in the global arena. During the Cold War, the 1987 NSS explicitly indicated the role of an alliance was aimed at containment of the Soviet threat. The United States security strategy was relatively clear: increasing the military capabilities of its allies

[118] Ibid., pp. iii-iv. The U.S. strategy to pursue such objectives became "Assurance, Dissuading, Deterrence, and Defeating" and accelerated the transformation of the U.S. military, which aimed to transform the US defense planning from a threat-based model to a capabilities-based model. Assuring allies and friends of the US steadiness of purpose and its capability to fulfill its security commitments; Dissuading adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of our allies and friends; Deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward the capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and impose severe penalties for aggression on an adversary's military capability and supporting infrastructure; and Decisively defeating any adversary if deterrence fails.

[119] Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, (Feb. 6, 2006), p. 1.

[120] Ibid., p. 20.

[121] Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy*, (June 2008). The 2008 National Defense Strategy has 5 key objectives: 1) Defend the Homeland; 2) Win the Long War; 3) Promote Security, 4) Deter Conflict, 5) Win our Nation's Wars. Need comprehensive strategy through a clash of arms, a war of ideas, and an assistance effort that will require patience and innovation (pp. 7-8). Also, the U.S. policy towards its allies includes: We must also work with longstanding friends and allies to transform their capabilities. Key to transformation is training, education, and where appropriate, the transfer of defense articles to build partner capacity. We must work to develop new ways of operating across the full spectrum of warfare. Our partnerships must be capable of applying military and non-military power when and where needed – a prerequisite against an adaptable transnational enemy (p.16). The capacities of our partners vary across mission areas. We will be able to rely on many partners for certain low-risk missions such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, whereas complex counterinsurgency and high-end conventional operations are likely to draw on fewer partners with the capacity, will, and capability to act in support of mutual goal (p. 15).

through US defense policy, economic policy, policy toward the Third World,[122] and burden-sharing. As it explained,

> The pursuit of American goals depends on cooperation with like-minded international partners. This relationship enhances our strength and mitigates the understandable reluctance of the American people to shoulder security burdens alone. The predictable difficulties that arise from time to time in all alliance relationships must be measured against the enormous value that these ties bring us and our friends.[123]

However, since US expectations for each ally were different, its expectations for the amount of burden-sharing by each ally differed. On the one hand, the United States expected NATO states to not only offset Soviet threats but also pursue more "equitable burden-sharing." On the other hand, US expectations of allies outside Europe were relatively low; the 1987 NSS said, "Outside of Europe, the United States seeks strong ties with nations throughout the globe, assisting friendly and allied countries in improving their military capabilities while encouraging them to assume a greater role in their own defense."[124] US policy toward Japan was more focused on economic issues and appeared satisfied with Japan's slow, incremental increase in its defense capabilities.[125]

The end of the Cold War changed this trend. The 1991 NSS brought the burden-sharing issues to the fore in order to create a new world order with its allies while the United States promised to take the lead.[126] According to the NSS, US alliances were to counter "nascent threats of power vacuums and regional instabilities" with the reduction of US conventional capabilities. The United States recognized the possibilities that significant threat reduction from the Soviet Union would weaken alliance ties despite their common goal of defense of democracy. Thus, it attempted to go beyond the traditional concept of an alliance.[127] More specifically, the roles of the alliance have become the expansion of democracies and respect of individual rights by a "greater sharing of global leadership and responsibilities."[128]

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[122] The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, (January 1987), p. 3.
[123] Ibid., p. 10.
[124] Ibid., p. 20.
[125] Ibid., p. 15. It argues that in East Asia and Pacific, "Cooperation with Japan is basic to U.S. relationships in the region….[i]n the security area, Japan's recent redefinition of its self-defense goals – especially as they relate to sea lane protection – is of particular importance. Japanese forces are developing capabilities that can make a significant contribution to deterrence…The Japanese trade surplus is the biggest in history. This surplus cannot be sustained and must be brought into better balance. We are working together on many fronts to do this." Admittedly, burden sharing is not new, as Kissinger asserted in 1970; nonetheless, its nature has been changed since the end of the Cold War. While the United States demanded an increase in its allies' self-defense capability during the Cold War, it did so within a global context in the post-Cold War era. See Henry Kissinger, "Secretary of State Kissinger's Speech at Japan Society's Annual Dinner," New York, Jun. 18, 1975, in the Tanaka Akihiko Lab, "Nich8ibei kankei shiryo shu – 1971 2007."
[126] The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, (August 1991), p. v.
[127] Ibid., p. 1.
[128] Ibid., pp. 3-4 and p. 6. According to the report, "In Europe, this meant support Western Europe's historic march toward greater economic and political unity, including a European security identity within the Atlantic Alliance, and nurture a close relationship between the United States and the European Community; and work with our North Atlantic allies to help develop the processes of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to bring about reconciliation, security and democracy in a Europe whole and free. In East Asia, it meant through a web of bilateral relationships, the United States has pursued throughout the postwar period a policy of engagement in support of the stability and security that are prerequisites to

Also, in 1994, the Clinton administration focused more on transnational threats, such as "terrorism, narcotic trafficking environmental degradation, rapid population growth and refugee flows."[129] Accordingly, the 1994 NSS proposed the strategy of "engagement and enlargement" that aimed at "enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to [the US] nation, [US] allies and [US] interests" by maintaining strong defense capability and cooperative security measures, spurring foreign markets through economic growth, and promoting democracy abroad.[130] The United States desired that these tasks could be achieved through its alliances.

In the Asia-Pacific Theater, the United States decided to maintain "close to 100,000 troops," as the 1993 BUR and the 1995 EASR recommended.[131] Despite the emergence of a multilateral security mechanism in the region, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the United States regarded its hub-and-spoke security system in East Asia as the bedrock for the regional stability.[132] Since US bases in Japan extended US power-projection capabilities in East Asia and beyond, they remained a critical to regional and global security.

The United States during the early 1990s expanded Japan-US cooperation through "common agenda" or "global partnership" to deal with transnational threats. The United States encouraged Japan to play a more active global role and to strengthen Japan-US cooperation in the international arena by pointing out Japan's past contributions to regional and global stability through its Official Development Assistance, humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts, support for democracies, and host nation support for the United States.[133] This is also illustrated in the 1999 NSS, which applauded Japan for efforts to consolidate the Japan-US alliance, including in the establishment of laws and the conclusions of treaties that allowed the SDF to play a role in the regional and global arena, including the 1999 guidelines. Thus, the US policy toward Japan as an ally was constant throughout the post-Cold War era: increase burden-sharing and embed it in the US global strategy.

US perspectives on the roles of alliances in the global arena have evolved, depending on the focus of the U.S administration and the issue of the day. Admittedly, the United States has policy consistency to some degree. With the rapid globalization and deepening interdependence in the post-Cold War era, all security agendas developed by the Bush and Clinton administrations during the 1990s, such as regional or state-centered threats, transnational threats, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, danger of

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economic and political progress. Our alliance with Japan remains of enormous strategic importance. Our hope is to see the U.S.-Japan global partnership extend beyond its traditional confines and into fields like refugee relief, non-proliferation and the environment."

[129] The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, (July 1994), p. 1

[130] Ibid., p. 2

[131] Aspin, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*; Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region;* The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, (July 1994), p. 23.

[132] Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, (Feb. 1995), p. 3, p.12-13.

[133] Ibid., p. 10.

failed states, and environmental and health threats, have been put on the table. However, the US policy focus changes with the administration. For example, in 1993, the United States asserted that by sustaining and adapting the US alliance that possesses the common values and objectives of democratic nations, "building a coalition of democracies will be central to achieving [the] overarching objective."[134] On the other hand, 9/11 significantly changed the US national strategy as illustrated by the 2002 NSS, which focused on countering global terrorism.[135] The US alliances play a pivotal role in US strategy because terrorists cannot be fought by one state alone. Thus, by shifting its policy from the United States as "world leader" to forging "international cooperation," the United States attempted to increase cooperation with its allies.

Although the counter-terrorist strategy includes a broad range of policies, which range from military to political, financial, legal, educational, and social aspects, soon after 9/11, the focus of US policy regarding alliances was military and intelligence cooperation to counter global terrorist threats and states that harbor them. When such cooperation could not be achieved, the United States employed "coalitions of the willing" to ask other states for assistance, which put political strains on alliances. As a result, after the Afghanistan war in 2001 and the Iraq War in 2003, the United States faced prolonged wars and challenges of the post-conflict reconstruction in both states. To tackle these problems, the United States put more emphasis on international cooperation in the post-conflict reconstruction as part of counter-terrorism cooperation. Indeed, the 2006 QDR stipulates;

> Over the past four years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and US bilateral alliances with Australia, Japan, Korea and other nations have adapted to retain their vitality and relevance in the face of new threats to international security…[allies] make manifest the strategic solidarity of free democratic states, promote shared values and facilitate the sharing of military and security burdens around the world.[136]

Furthermore, the 2010 QDR reiterated that the United States needed cooperation both conventionally and unconventionally from its allies and partners to maintain peace and security in the world as it is difficult for the United States alone to take on such a task due to the emergence of the increasingly complex and interdependent world.[137] To this end, with allies in Northeast Asia, the United States would pursue a "comprehensive alliance in bilateral, regional and global scope" with Japan and South Korea.[138] In other words, the United States expected its allies to expand their roles and missions as well as to undertake more burden-sharing in maintaining stability and security in the world.

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[134] Les Aspin, *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*, p. 3.
[135] The White House, *National Security Strategy 2002*.
[136] Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006*, p. 6.
[137] According to the 2010 QDR, the United States maintains its capability to fight two front conventional wars at the same time, while it prepares for a "broadest possible range of contingencies," including MOOTW, homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities, challenges posed by state and non-state groups, and cyber and space attacks. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2010*, (February 2010) pp. v-vii, at <http://www.defense.gov/QDR/QDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200700.pdf>. Accessed Feb. 1, 2010.
[138] Ibid., p. 59.

Against this backdrop, the United States expected Japan to play a more active security role in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, after the Gulf War, peacekeeping operations were one of the Japan's policy foci. In the post-9/11 world, however, the United States asked Japan to play a role in Afghanistan and Iraq by putting "boots on the ground" or "showing the flag." Although this did not specifically target SDF roles, the United States expected Japan to contribute to US global engagement by providing human resources. As one of the first states that supported the Afghanistan and Iraq wars in 2001 and 2003, Japan accepted its role by creating laws for SDF humanitarian assistance in Iraq and a refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. In this sense, stretching the range of cooperation with the United States, Japan managed to strengthen its ties to the United States. However, this also raised US expectations for Japan's role as its ally. Indeed, the 2006 NSS pointed out that the United States "will look to Japan to continue forging a leading role in regional and global affairs based on our common interests, our common values, and our close defense and diplomatic cooperation."[139]

Convergence and Divergence between Japan and the United States

US policy toward its alliances in the post-Cold War era, namely burden-sharing and global cooperation, led to opportunities for widening cooperation among allies. However, the broad range of global security agendas creates difficulties in forging cooperation since the policy priorities and resources of each state are not necessarily the same, even among allies.

Even when objectives are similar, the methods of achieving them differ. Even after 9/11, NATO's invocation of Article V notwithstanding, the United States could not facilitate long-term strong cooperation from all its allies in Afghanistan, and far fewer in Iraq as political opposition from some European allies, especially France and Germany. PSI, which aims at preventing the transfer of WMDs, had difficulty being supported by every state because some allies, such as South Korea, worried that it would grate North Korea sensitivities and lead it to employ more provocative actions. This is a contrast to the Cold War, when it was relatively easy to gain support and cooperation from its allies to counter the threat from the Soviet Union; in the post-9/11 world, it is more difficult for allies to cooperate because of the widened security agenda and different priorities.

As a result, US allies are likely to face difficulties in sharing the burden with the United States. Although expanding the global agenda can widen the range of cooperation with allies, such cooperation does not necessarily deepen security cooperation. While most US security policies during the Cold War were directed against the Soviet Union, its security agenda in the post-Cold War have been widened and diffused. In the post-9/11 era, the United States linked its national security to global security agendas, while Japan has yet to firmly link its national security to the global agenda. This causes a perception gap between the US and Japan. For example, Japan is more interested in cooperation with the United States regarding North Korea's nuclear development program and China's increasing military capabilities. Japan's cooperation with the United States over Iran's development of nuclear weapons and counter-terrorism and insurgency policies against al Qaeda and Hezbollah is limited due to its differing priorities and limited capabilities. On

[139] The White House, *National Security Strategy 2006*, p. 26.

the other hand, there is a perception gap between Japan and the United States regarding China and North Korea. The United States, although concerned with China's growing military capabilities and North Korea's nuclear development, has attempted to strengthen diplomatic and economic ties with China and had quasi-bilateral negotiations with North Korea albeit within the framework of Six-Party Talks, which raises strategic concerns for Japan. Therefore, due to subtle threat perception gaps among allies, it becomes difficult for the United States and its allies to coordinate security policy priorities to reduce US military and political burdens.

In sum, as the roles of US alliances expanded in the post-Cold War era as a result of changes in US global strategy, the United States demands more burden-sharing and responsibility-sharing from its allies. However, due to different priorities and asymmetrical military and political resources between the United States and its allies, the ranges of security cooperation between them have been overstretched. The United States thus faces difficulties in cooperating with its allies in some aspects of its global strategy, and instead they form "coalitions of the willing" to tackle particular issues. Moreover, since each US administration has a different agenda, the US emphasis on the global agenda and its desire for cooperation from allies is likely to change, which creates new strains in the alliances.

Convergence and Divergence of US and Japanese Expectations for the Alliance

Given the previous analyses of the definition, functions, and expectations of the Japan-US alliance from each state's perspective and the development of each state's security policies, the convergence and divergence in expectations are evident. In this section, I discuss and analyze convergence and divergence in alliance objectives and management from two perspectives.

Convergence

Alliance Functions and Objectives

(1) Military-Based Cooperation as the Core Function of the Alliance

Both Japan and the United States agree that the core definition of the Japan-US alliance is military-based cooperation. The Japan-US alliance has embraced global cooperation since the end of the Cold War, and Japan has employed an expansive definition of the Japan-US alliance since 2005, which includes promotion of democracy and development assistance. Nonetheless, as official documents indicate, including the 1995 East Asian Strategic Report and the Joint Declaration of the Japan-US SCC in 2005, the core of the alliance is military-based cooperation, such as traditional war-fighting cooperation and nontraditional peacetime cooperation.[140] Indeed, the redefinition of the alliance in 1996 through the US-Japan Declaration on Security focuses on regional military cooperation in East Asia while pursuing political cooperation in the global arena.

[140] The 1995 EASR separated security and economic issues. "We must not allow trade friction to undermine our security alliance, but if public support for the relationship is to be maintained over the long term, progress must continue to be made by both sides in addressing fundamental economic issues." Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, p. 10.

Table 5: The Development of the US Global Strategy, the Roles of Alliances, and the Japan-US Alliance

		Global		Roles of Alliances		U.S.-Japan Alliance	
		Objectives	**Means**	**Objectives**	**Means**	**Objectives**	**Means**
1	**1987 National Security Strategy**	**Policy of Containment:** Respond to the threats posed by Moscow with a policy of containment.	Through defense policy, economic policy, policy towards the Thrid World (economic and security assistance)	Strengthen the Military Power	1) NATO: Burden-Sharing (but not undermine the relationship) 2) Outside Europe: assist military capabilities while encouraging them to assume a greater role in their own defense.	-------	1) Develop capabilities that can mke a significant contribution to deterrence 2) Balance the Japanese trade surplus
2	**1991 National Security Strategy**	**Create a New World Order**	1) Combat not a particular, poised enemy but the nascent threats of power vacuums and regional instabilities. 2) Reduce the U.S. conventional capabilities in ways that ensure the U.S. could rebuild them faster than an enemy could build a devastating new threat agains the U.S.	**1)** Defense of Democratic Values **2)** The Establishment of healthy, cooperative and politically virous relations **3)** Build a New World Order	Build and sustain such relationships:(i) strengthen and enlarge the common wealth of free and democratic nations; ii) establish a more balanced partnership and shared global leadership and responsibilities with our allies; iii) strengthen international institutions like the United Nations; iv) support Western Europe's historic march toward greater economic and political unity; v) and work with our North Atlantic allies to help develop the processes of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe	**1)** Regional Stability in East Asia **2)** Expand Global Partnership	1) Responsibility Sharing (Share the costs and risks of Gulf operations, the costs of U.S. forces defending Japan due to its growing economic strength and necessity to adjust to a new era) 2) Expanding the U.S.-Japan global partnership, such as refugee relief, non-proliferation and the environment
3	**1994 National Secuirty Strategy**	**World Leadership:** Navigate the shoals of the world's new dangers and to capitalize on its opportunities	Engagement and Enlargement: Enlarge the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats (including transnational threats) to the U.S., allies, and the U.S. interests.	**1)** Deal with Major Regional Contingencies ("Two War" Force) **2)** Sustain and Adapt the Security relationships	1) Mainitainig the U.S. alliances (Oversea Presence) 2) Cooperation (in such activities as: conducting combined training and exercises, coordinating military plans and preparations, sharing intelligence, jointly developing new systems, and controlling exports of sensitive technologies according to common standards)	**1)** Deter regional aggression **2)** Maintain an active presence	Maintainig deep bilateral ties with Japan
4	**1999 National Security Strategy**	**World Leadership in the Global Era:** i) Enhancing American Security ii) Bolstering our Economics iii) Promoting Democracy and Human Rights Abroad	International Cooperation (i) Diplomacy, ii) Public Deplocy, iii) International Assistance, iv) Arms Control and Nonproliferation, v) Military Activities, vi) International Law Enforcement Cooperation, vii) Environmental and Health Initiatives)	**1)** Strengthen and Adapt the Formal Relationships **2)** Create New Relationships and Structure **3)** Enhance the capability of frindly nations to exercise regional leadership **4)** Regional Stability **5)** Two Major Theater War	1) Engagement (Diplomacy to Allies) 2) Overseas Presence and Peacetime Engagement (defense cooperation, security assistance, and training and exercises) 3) Reassurance 4) Seek the Support and Participation of allies 5) Support to increase allies' defense capabilities and interoperability	**1)** Maintain a Peaceful and Prosperous Environment for the Asia Pacific Region **2)** Achieve Common Security Objectives	Continue the Current Cooperation (The 1997 Revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, A Revised Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), The 1999 Japanese Lesislation for the Guidelines)
5	**2002 National Security Strategy**	**American Internationalism:** i) Political and Economic Freedom ii) Peaceful Relations with Other States iii) Respect for Human Dignity	1) Champion aspirations for human dignity, 2)Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism, 3) Work with others to defuse regional conflicts, 4) prevent our enemies from threatening the U.S., allies, and friends, 5) ignit a new era of global economic growth, 6)expand the circle of development, 7) develop agendas for cooperative action, 8) transform the U.S. national security institutions	**Defeating the Global Terrorism**	1) Isolate terrorists 2) Disrupt the financing of terrorism 3) Direct and continuous action 4) Identify and destroy the threat before it reaches the U.S border 5) War of Ideas (make clear that terrorism as illegitimate) 6) Public Diplomacy	**1)** Regional Peace and Stability **2)** Deal with New Challenges	Japan: Forging a leading role in regional and global affairs based on the common interests, common values, and close defense and diplomatic cooperation
6	**2006 National Security Strategy**	**Ending Tyranny in the World:** Supporting Democratic Movement and Institutions	To help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system	**1) Regional Stability** **2) War on Terror** **3) Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**	1) Deterring potential foes and assuring friends and allies 2) Continue to partner with allies and recruit new friends to joint the battle 3) Address proliferation concerns through international diplomacy, in concert with key allies and regional partners	**1)** The regional stability and prosperity **2)** maintaing robust partnerships supoprted by a forward defense posture supporting economic integration through expanded trade and investment and promoting democracy and human rights	Japan: the United States enjoys the closest relations in a generation. As the world's two largest economies and aid donors, acting in concert multiplies each of our strengths and magnifies our combined contributions to global progress. Our shared commitment to democracy at home offers a sure foundation for cooperation abroad.

(2) Defense of Japan and Regional Stability as the Core Objective

Both Japan and the United States agree that the core functions of the Japan-US alliance have been the defense of Japan and regional stability in East Asia as a regional public good. Although the defense of Japan and regional stability were on the security agenda for Japan and the United States during the Cold War, the two states balanced their interests differently. While the United States considered the alliance to be a linchpin of regional stability to counter a Soviet threat, Japan regarded this as a by-product of the alliance's main role, which was the extension of defense and deterrence undertaken by the US strike capability and Japan's defense capability, so that it did not seriously consider its regional role.[141] However, in the post-Cold War era, the relative decline of the US military overseas presence and remaining flashpoints in East Asia created a situation in which Japan needed to consider its role in maintaining regional stability in East Asia. Therefore, Japan's legislation to increase the SDF's range of activities since 1996 has contributed to both regional stability and strengthening the alliance through burden-sharing.

(3) Expansion of International Cooperation

Both Japan and the United States put emphasis on the importance of international cooperation over nontraditional security concerns, such as international terrorism, transnational crimes, and environmental protection. Japan's trauma after being criticized by the international community during the Gulf War despite a significant financial contribution forced Japan to reconsider its military posture and to strengthen cooperation on nonmilitary issues with the international community, especially with the United States. This was illustrated when Japan and the United States created the "global partnership" and expanded their "common agenda." The United States has linked traditional security and nontraditional security issues more concretely since 9/11, as its counter-terrorism strategy began to include not only military means but also political, social, and economic means. At the same time, as the Japanese SDF law was modified in 2007 along with upgrading the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense, international peace cooperation activities, including peacekeeping operations, has become a "primary mission (*Honrai Ninmu*: 本来任務)" rather than a "supplementary mission (*Fuzuiteki Ninmu*: 付随的任務)". In this sense, the scope of global cooperation between both states has widened.

Alliance Management

(1) Political Will to Strengthen the Alliance

Acknowledging the importance of the Japan-US alliance, both Japan and the United States have a strong political will to strengthen their alliance. Japan's strategy to cooperate with the United States employs definitional flexibility. Since it does not rigidly define the term "alliance" or limit it to military cooperation, the expansive nature of its definition helps widen cooperation with the United States under the name of the Japan-US alliance, while coping with domestic political constraints over the use of the SDF overseas. On the other hand, the United States has been patient, given Japan's slow

[141] The 1978 Guideline strictly focused on defense of Japan. Although the *Mitsuya Kenkyu* in 1963, a simulation exercise in the Korean Peninsula contingency, was conducted, it was not a contingency plan, and it was secretly undertaken by only the SDF's Joint Staff Office, not the Japanese government.

development of the roles for the SDF within the alliance. The United States acknowledged Japan's political difficulties in resolving the issue over its exercise of the right of collective self-defense under Article IX of the constitution. US patience during Japan's political paralysis during the Gulf War illustrates this point.

(2) Enhancing Functional Military Cooperation

Both Japan and the United States have attempted to further develop functional military cooperation through alliance transformation, including changes in force structures and increasing interoperability between US forces and the SDF. This is illustrated by Japan's legislation for the SDF during the 1990s and the documents of the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee in 2005 and 2007. The role and missions of the Japan-US alliance are based on the defense of Japan and improvement of the international security environment. To this end, the United States recognizes the importance of reaffirmation of its commitment and the effectiveness of US nuclear and conventional strike forces and defensive capabilities, as a complement to Japan's defense capabilities. Japan recognizes the importance of strengthening bilateral cooperation in international activities such as the fight against terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), assistance to Iraq, and disaster relief, and cooperation over ballistic missile defense (BMD), and restructuring the SDF.

(3) High Public Support

Both Japan and the United States have enjoyed high public support for their relationship. Despite changes in the form of the Japan-US alliance since the end of the Cold War, the US and Japanese publics maintain high levels of support for their relationship. As the tables in Appendix IV and V illustrate, 60-70 percent of Japanese believe that Japan has had good relations with the United States over the past 28 years, and Japanese support for the United States was basically stable. From the US perspective, positive public perceptions of Japan-US relations have steadily increased since 1990. Therefore, despite social and political problems caused by US bases in Okinawa, the overall relationship is seen favorably by both states.[142]

Divergence

Alliance Functions and Objectives

(1) Policy Priorities in the Global Arena

Japan and the United States have different definitions of the alliance. The United States regards alliances in the post-Cold War world as a tool to pursue a global agenda, while Japan's definition changes over time due to domestic constraints on the use of force as well as maintaining favorable relations with the United States. This definitional divergence creates both strength and weakness in their relations. On the one hand, Japan could flexibly adopt the agenda and issues the United States raised. For example, if the United States puts environmental issues on the table, Japan could use it as a means to strengthen the Japan-US alliance. On the other hand, once issues are locked into the Japan-US alliance agenda, it becomes difficult for Japan to distance itself from the

[142] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Beikoku ni okeru tainichi yoron chosa (Heisei 20 nen)" (The U.S. Public Opinion toward Japan (2008), June 2008, at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/yoron08/pdfs/2008_1.pdf>. Accessed Oct. 27, 2009. For the data for Table 7 and Table 8, see Appendix IV and V.

agenda. If a political disagreement over an issue becomes intense, it would create friction in the alliance.

(2) Power Status: Asymmetric Nature of Alliance

The differences in power status between Japan and the United States have significant implications for divergences in expectations of their alliance. Since the United States is a global power, it sees the alliance in a global perspective. Since Japan does not have comparable power to the United States, the primary role of the alliance for it is defense of Japan.[143] These diverging expectations have become acute in the post-9/11 era. From the US perspective, the US expected more military cooperation, particularly in nontraditional arenas, such as post-conflict reconstruction, from its allies. Due to increasing threat perceptions from North Korea and China, Japan sees more traditional roles for military cooperation within the Japan-US alliance. Therefore, although Japan recognizes nontraditional security threats from international terrorist groups and proliferation of WMD to be emerging international threats, Japan's immediate security concept is defined more by a traditional security perspective. If this trend continues, it will be more difficult to sustain the Japan-US alliance.

(3) Use of the Alliance as a Regional Public Good

There are differences in the US and Japanese perspectives on the function of the Japan-US alliance in maintaining regional stability in East Asia, although Japan and the United States agree that the defense of Japan and regional stability are closely linked. The United States regards the alliance as a regional public good to maintain stability in East Asia. Strengthening the Japan-US alliance helps maintain the regional balance of power, but it will increase political and military tensions among regional states, especially China and North Korea. To avoid such tensions, the United States attempts to strike a balance by making diplomatic outreaches to China and other states in the region. On the other hand, Japan sees the role of the alliance as a regional public good as an extension of its primary role, the defense of Japan. Strengthening the Japan-US alliance is favorable, but the US diplomatic outreach to China produces concerns in Japan about the credibility of the US extended deterrent.

ii) Alliance Management

(1) Fear of Abandonment

The threat perception gap leads to the dilemma of abandonment and entrapment for alliance management. Theoretically, Japan now fears abandonment by the United States more than it did during the Cold War. This is because rivalry between two superpowers provided little opportunity or incentive for defection.[144] Even if Japan had no strong motivation to ally with the United States or the Soviet Union, both would attempt to

[143] According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, the U.S.-Japan alliance should be maintained because without it, the defense budget will increase, and it may lose strong ties with the United States. Japan's "exclusively defense-oriented policy" (専守防衛) does not maintain sufficient capability to respond to crises. With the United States, Japan's defense policy becomes more realistic and effective. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Nichibei anpo Q&A" (the U.S.-Japan Security Arrangement FAQ), at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/hosho/qa/02.html>. Accessed Oct. 27, 2009; Also, see Glosserman and Tsunoda, "The Guillotine."

[144] Snyder, pp. 98-99.

prevent the other side from gaining influence over Japan. Thus, the US commitment to Japan's security created a situation in which Japan could feel the credibility of the US extended deterrent, and Japan was concerned more about entrapment in the US global strategy to contain communism. In the post-Cold War era, Japanese concerns have shifted from fear of entrapment to fear of abandonment. This is because the loss of the Soviet threat prompted a reduction of US forces overseas and demands for burden-sharing by its allies. Not complying with such demands would increase the danger of alliance collapse; to reduce this risk, Japan has begun to play a more active military role in the international arena. Nevertheless, Japan still has a dilemma. As the DPJ administration's political stance toward US action in Iraq in 2003 shows, it also fears entrapment in the global security issues, such as counter-terrorism. In other words, while the United States focuses on global security issues, Japan is concerned about traditional security issues due to the changing regional strategic environment, including China's increasing economic and military capabilities as well as the progress of North Korea's nuclear program. This creates concerns in Japan that its threat perceptions diverge from those of the United States.

(2) Tactical-Level Arrangements

Japan and the United States have divergences in coordination when it comes to management of the alliance. From the US perspective, the problem is Japan's self-imposed constraints on defense, including prohibition of the exercise of the right of collective self-defense created by Article IX of the Japanese constitution and the Three Principles on Arms Export, which limit Japan's military and human cooperation with the United States. From the Japanese perspective, the problem is the prolonged delay of implementing of the agreement in the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) in 1996, especially transferring *Futenma* Air Base. Both agree that this tactical-level schism is likely to affect the alliance at a strategic level in the long-term. These prolonged problems have the potential to undermine US and Japanese mutual trust at the government level as well as public support for the alliance.

Implications and Policy Recommendations

Despite drastic changes in the international security environment, the Japan-US alliance has survived for 50 years. This has become possible because both Japan and the United States have made constant efforts to consolidate their alliance by realigning security objectives, agendas, roles and missions. On Sept. 21, 2009, Japan's minister of foreign affairs, Okada Katsuya, told Secretary Clinton that he wants to create a Japan-US alliance that is sustainable "for the next 30-50 years."[145] Japan and the United States need to reformulate their security policies to construct a sustainable alliance. The 50th anniversary of the revised Japan-US security treaty in 2010 is an important opportunity for both governments to begin this process.

[145] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Nichibei gaisho kaidan no gaiyo" (Summary of the U.S.-Japan Foreign Minister's Meeting), New York, Sept. 21, 2009, at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/visit/0909_gk.html>. Accessed Oct. 27, 2009.

There are five important propositions Japan and the US need to take into account:

1. Japan and the US are the first and second largest economies and possess the capability to provide public goods; however, they cannot provide everything in the region.
2. The United States cannot be involved in every aspect of world affairs.[146] This is especially so when it needs to commit to domestic affairs, such as health care, and to stabilize Middle Eastern affairs, including Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
3. East Asian states do not fear for their own survival despite incremental changes in the regional balance of power stemming from China's increasing military capabilities and North Korean nuclear development. Although the future course is not assured, the current moment is an opportunity to begin shaping the East Asian strategic landscape.
4. The definition and objective of the Japan-US alliance as seen by Japan and the United States has diverged since the end of the Cold War.
5. Japan and the United States, the core of the US hub-and-spoke system in East Asia, has been tested since the end of the Cold War. However, current policy divergences are unprecedented due to changes in the administration in Japan.

These propositions provide a foundation for fine-tuning strategic objectives of the Japan-US alliance. The term "alliance" is politically useful to encourage cooperation and emphasize ties among allies. Nonetheless, this is only useful when Japan and the US have a shared strategic focus of the alliance, which is currently missing. Fortunately, time is on the side of Japan and the United States. Given the grace periods both currently enjoy – with relative military and economic advantages in the region – Japan and the United States can develop ideas about the future East Asian security order. I provide five recommendations that the two should address in the 50th anniversary year:

Conclude a New Joint Declaration for the Japan-US Alliance in 2010

To publicly announce and strengthen ties between Japan and the United States, it is necessary for both governments to conclude a new joint declaration of this alliance within the year 2010. It has been a decade since the joint declaration of the Japan-US alliance was signed. It is also an opportunity to articulate common strategic objectives in the context of the changing international security environment. Thus, this new declaration should not only commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Japan-US alliance, but include the strategic objectives mentioned below.

Enhance Bilateral Cooperation to Establish a Peaceful Regional Power-Transition System

Looking at geostrategic change in East Asia, key factors are the rise of China, the relative decline of the United States, and the decline of Japan. Admittedly, a peaceful transition was possible as when Japan and Germany rose peacefully after World War II. However, Japan and Germany were embedded in the US security and economic system. Given that there is no strong institutional constraint on China, the long-term strategic objective in East Asia should be to create a peaceful power-transition system in East Asia.

Such a system should see China's choices so that it will be integrated peacefully into the region as well as in the international community. In this sense, Japan and the United States can

[146] For example, see Robert Gates, "A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 31, No. 1, (Jan./Feb., 2009).

closely work together to this end because both are the most mature democracies in East Asia, which not only value democratic principles, human rights, rules of law, and market economy, but also have practiced them. This provides a great advantage and should strengthen political cooperation toward East Asia.

Currently, there are regional trends toward political and economic cooperation among East Asian states. Despite being in a rudimentary phase, such trends have been promoted by ASEAN, and the term "East Asian community" has been applauded by East Asian states. However, there are on-going debates over its vision, membership, and institutions. The membership of an East Asian community is always a focal point of debate. When Foreign Minister Okada said that the concept of East Asian community did not include the United States, it raised concerns in the US.[147] While it is necessary to accept an East Asian community as a long-term vision, discussion of membership should not be politicized since it aims at open regionalism, in which any state outside the community can have a strong political, economic, and military connection with it.

The most important element for the establishment of such a community is creating a mechanism for regional security governance, or a quasi-regional security community, where states within the region can manage political, economic, and military conflicts by themselves and maintain regional stability without a strong deterrent mechanism. To this end, there needs to be strong mutual trust among East Asian states, which is currently lacking in East Asia. Therefore, during the power transition period, the Japan-US alliance can assist regional attempts to establish such a community by including China and North Korea into international frameworks and promoting institution building. The Japan-US alliance and an "East Asian Community" or "Regional Architecture" are not necessarily mutually exclusive concepts but are complementary. While the alliance would serve as a hedging mechanism against potential threats from North Korea and China in the short-term, an "East Asian community" or "Regional Architecture" would serve as a peaceful power-transition mechanism in East Asia in the long-term.

Japan and the United States should also recognize that multi-layered communities in East Asia are possible. As there is no discussion about exclusivity between ASEAN Communities and an East Asian community, community-building efforts at the sub-regional level (Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia), regional level (East Asia), and mega-regional level (Asia-Pacific) should not be politicized but encouraged by Japan and the United States. Through close communication among other members in each region, including Australia, China, India, New Zealand, South Korea, ASEAN states as well as Japan and the United States, skepticism is likely to be mitigated.

Regionalize the Japan-US Alliance

Japan and the United States need to concentrate on promoting the establishment of a regional security system by emphasizing the alliance's role as a provider of regional public goods. Extended deterrent by the Japan-US alliance provides not only for the defense of Japan but also regional stability. Admittedly, from Beijing's perspective, strengthening the alliance to hedge against China is unlikely to be welcome, and mistrust would persist between the United States, Japan, and China. Nonetheless, East Asia cannot afford rapid changes in the regional balance of power or a power transition unless these changes are accepted by East Asian states.

[147] "Higashi ajia kyodotai koso, beikoku haijo surutsumorinai: Hatoyama shusho" (See fn. 27).

Considering the ambiguity and low transparency of China's strategic intentions, Japan and the United States can share a clear long-term strategic vision over the utility of the alliance on this matter. In other words, a triangular relation among the United States, Japan, and China are not equal, and the relations between Japan and the United States inevitably are closer than US-China and Japan-China relations.

While Japan and the United States can make joint efforts to establish a peaceful power-transition system in East Asia, the Japan-US alliance needs to pursue four more specific short-term objectives:

i) Reassert the Credibility of the US Extended Deterrent

The two most important factors regarding extended deterrence are capability and credibility. Currently, Japan is focused on the credibility of the US extended deterrent due to its diplomatic approaches to North Korea and China despite the US reassurance of its commitment to Japan's defense. To reinforce the foundation of the Japan-US alliance, Japan and the United States need to include a clause addressing the credibility of the extended deterrent just as the Japan-US SCC in 2007 and US-ROK alliance in 2009 did.

ii) Strengthening the Functions and Image of a Regional Public Goods Provider

While the core function of the Japan-US alliance has been extended deterrence in East Asia, this function does not create trust among East Asian states due to the exclusive nature of the alliance. Japan and the United States can promote a positive image of the alliance via disaster relief efforts. As relief efforts after the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake indicated, such activity fosters a positive image of the alliance. Although multilateral efforts for such purposes are desirable, Japan and the United States have comparative advantages in this field due to their financial resources and capabilities. Thus, both states should further enhance coordination.[148] At the same time, Japan needs to expand the SDF's role in regional disaster management and solve coordination problems between the SDF and Japanese NGOs through constitutional or legislative reform.

iii) Embed the Japan-US alliance in ASEAN-led East Asian Regionalism

The Japan-US alliance and ASEAN-led East Asian regionalism are not mutually exclusive, but complementary ideas. While there is a clear demarcation line between an exclusive alliance and an inclusive multilateral platform, this does not prevent Japan and the United States from participating in ASEAN-led institutional activities, including ASEAN+1 and ARF. Both states need to seek cooperation with ASEAN-led institutions and foster capacity-building means such as military training and information sharing for disaster relief.

iv) Institutionalize the Track-1.5 Bilateral Network of East Asian Research

Japan and the United States have numerous bilateral meetings, ranging from Track 1 to Track 1.5 to Track 2. Except for Track 1, such as the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (2+2), these meetings tend to be "one-off" or "two- or three-year" meetings and have not

[148] In January 2010, Hatoyama said that Japan would participate in the U.S.-led "Pacific Partnership" activities, which focuses on humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, by sending Maritime SDF transport ships. See Hatoyama Yukio, "Dai 174 kai kokkai ni okeru Hatoyama naikaku sori daijin shisei hoshin enzetsu" (Policy Speech at the 174th Diet Session by Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio).

been institutionalized. To evaluate the utility and status of the Japan-US alliance, and to give nongovernmental experts opportunity to impact policy in both Japan and the United States, institutionalization of Track 1.5 efforts should be undertaken. In addition, given that there are two major parties in both states, it is imperative to restructure multi-track frameworks to achieve bipartisanship in both states. To avoid ossification of perspectives on the alliance, the Track-1.5 bilateral network should include as wide a range of perspectives as possible, including academics, policy-makers, and decision-makers.

Regionalizing the Japan-US alliance does not mean that Japan should stop playing a global security role. Japan can play a larger role in the international community in nontraditional security areas such as post-conflict reconstruction, refugee relief, promotion of democratic principles, and technological development. However, given prospects for its political and economic power, it is unlikely to play a substantial international military role in the foreseeable future. This means priority for the Japan-US alliance should be given to regional affairs. In addition, if a power-transition mechanism is achieved in the region, the United States can use its diplomatic and military resources in other regions or transnational issues, while Japan will have more resources to commit to global security issues.

Enhance the "Global Partnership," but not the "Global Alliance"

Japan and the United States have attempted to widen and deepen cooperation in the global arena; nonetheless, broadening the definition of the alliance, it becomes likely that they will consider the idea that Japan will use nontraditional security cooperation as a substitute for military cooperation. This is evident in Japan's recent attempt to link its cooperation in Afghanistan with the US bases in Japan.[149] This causes politicization of the alliance and political frictions between allies. In this sense, political rhetoric matters. I suggest the two governments decouple the "alliance" and "global partnership," which becomes necessary to preserve the core of the alliance. A "global partnership," which does not require military obligations, fosters more political and technical cooperation in the global arena. Areas of cooperation include development assistance, energy security, environment protection, cyber security, and global health.[150]

In so doing, Japan needs to consider military means of global cooperation. Admittedly, given the current interpretation of Article IX, nonmilitary cooperation fits Japanese security policies. However, as international interdependence has deepened, international security is more interconnected to the national security of each state, although the degree of interdependence differs from state to state. In other words, given its economic interdependence and lack of natural resources, the stability of the international community affects Japan's own security.

Gradually recognizing changes in the international security environment, Japan has begun to expand SDF missions to include humanitarian assistance, disaster management, and post-conflict reconstruction. This trend should be maintained. As the roles and missions of the

[149] "Futenma to indo-yo hokyu, tai bei kosho 'pakke-ji de' – gaisho ga boeisho to kyogi" (Futenma and refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, negotiations with the U.S. through a "package" – Foreign Minister discussed with Defense Minister), *Sankei News*, Sept. 25, 2009, at <http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/policy/090925/plc0909252124028-n1.htm>. Accessed Dec. 29, 2009.

[150] See Brad Glosserman and Katsu Furukawa, "A New U.S.-Japan Agenda," *Issues & Insights*, Vol. 8, No. 4, (March 2008).

SDF can be ultimately defined and decided by Japan itself, Japan needs to forge a political consensus to actively commit to global security by continuous discussions within every level of Japanese society on all topics including Article IX of the constitution.

Japan should not justify its actions as meeting US political demands, and the United States should not utilize *gaiatsu,* foreign pressure, to force cooperation or press Japan to join the US global strategy. The Japanese have asked Washington to use *gaiatsu* to alter Japan's policies in the past. Nevertheless, as is clear in the case of the Iraq war, it is increasingly unpopular among the Japanese public when the United States uses its power to decide Japan's actions. Regardless of whether Japan justifies a policy by mentioning US demands or the United States actually uses *gaiatsu,* such reasoning and actions decrease public support for the alliance in the long term. Although there will be political disagreements between Japan and the United States, a global partnership between Japan and the United States that stems from domestic public support in both states will be more durable and more sustainable on the basis of mutual trust.

Recognize Realignment Issues Serve Strategic Purposes, Not Vice Versa

Strategic-level objectives of the Japan-US alliance are supported by tactical-level arrangements. They are "two wheels of one cart" that cannot be separated from each other. However, while tactical-level arrangements serve strategic purposes, tactics will never produce strategy. Japan and the United States should emphasize this notion.

Ultimately, realignment of the Japan-US alliance serves strategic objectives by reducing political and economic frictions. Realignment issues should not be seen as a source of political conflict between Japan and the United States; otherwise, politicization of these issues is likely to undermine relations as well as strategic purposes. To avoid such a possibility, Japan and the United States need to inform and educate the public and media to articulate meanings of the Japan-US alliance from not only a bilateral perspective, but also regional and global.

There are three obstacles that Japan and the United States currently face over realignment issues, which should be carefully managed: relocation of *Futenma* Air Base, reconsideration of extraterritoriality issues within the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and Japan's host nation support:

i) The Relocation of the Futenma Airbase

The Hatoyama administration wants to relocate *Futenma* Air Base outside Okinawa. It is true that Okinawa should not be the only place that hosts US bases. Okinawans are concerned about safety, noise, and the environmental impact, and they were eager to move the bases out of the prefecture. The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report in 1996 and the Joint Declaration of US-Japan Consultative Committee in 2005 show relocation is possible, although they remain in Okinawa. Nonetheless, bases in Okinawa play a pivotal role not only in the defense of Japan, but also for regional and global security. In this sense, there are psychological and physical strategic implications to the failure to relocate the FRF. Psychologically, the United States would see Japan as an unreliable ally. As the Japanese government agreed to shut down the US Marine facility in *Futenma* and move forces to Camp Schwab, the plan needs to be implemented or Japan needs to provide a counter-proposal that equally benefits the United States; otherwise, whenever changes in the

Japanese administration occur, there will be a perception that agreements could be withdrawn, which will affect mutual trust. Physically, if the US Marines have to leave Okinawa, the US realignment plan will have to be reconsidered to adjust its capability to execute missions in peacetime and in wartime. Furthermore, Japan is likely to lose alliance capability and a strategic connection with the United States, resulting in the creation of a power vacuum in the region, and Japan may need to increase its own military capability.[151] Considering the functions that the Japan-US alliance currently has, the regional strategic landscape would be negatively affected. Though this may be the worst-case scenario, the issue has the potential to move in this direction. Thus, Japan and the United States need to take a step-by-step approach to resolve Okinawa problems by discussing the relocation plan from a long-term perspective.

ii) Extraterritoriality Issues within the Status of Forces Agreement

The problems of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between Japan and the United States range from relocation plans to environmental clauses. However, the most contentious issue is the extraterritoriality of US forces, which allows the United States not to hand over US suspects to the Japanese judicial system. This became most contentious in the 1995 Okinawa assault incident. In this incident, the three suspects were not handed over to Japan before indictment, which pressed the Japanese to pursue alterations in the SOFA and a reduction of the US bases. However, this clause was modified in 1996 by the Japan-US Joint Committee Agreement on Criminal Procedures that the United States now hands over US suspects to Japan before indictment. For example, in the 2006 Yokosuka assault incident, a US naval officer who killed a Japanese woman was handed over to the Japanese government. The United States has other concerns. Over 100 states have SOFAs with the United States, and they will be watching for precedents that may be set.[152] So while Japan needs to consider domestic implications of its SOFA with the United States, it also needs to recognize these US concerns. Also, if political parties in Japan politicize the SOFA issue to garner domestic support, it could negatively influence Japanese perceptions on US forces in Japan, which may affect other contentious issues, such as base issues and realignment plans. Thus, Japan and the United States should take a calm approach and continue to work through the Japan-US Joint Committee to achieve revision of its SOFA.

iii) Japan's Host Nation Support

Japan's host nation support began in 1978 due to the appreciation of the Japanese yen. Currently, host nation support includes welfare expenses, facilities expenses, labor costs, utilities, and training relocation. After peaking at $29.7 billion in 1997, the budget gradually decreased, and it was around $21 billion in 2008.[153] As the Japanese economy stagnated, the

[151] Richard P. Lawless, former deputy undersecretary of the US Department of Defense, argues that if the Hatoyama administration cannot undertake an existing Henoko plan, Yoichi Kato, "Former U.S. official: Japan could lose entire Marine presence if Henoko plan scrapped," *asahi.com*, Mar. 5, 2010, at <http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201003040361.html>. Accessed Mar. 5, 2010.

[152] Leif-Eric Easley, Tetsuo Kotani, and Aki Mori, "Japan's Foreign Policy and the Alliance: Transcending Change with Trust," *PacNet*, No. 64, (Sept. 22, 2009); Ralph Cossa and Brad Glosserman, "Question for Tokyo: Remember ANZUS?" *PacNet*, No. 71, (Nov. 3, 2009); Michael Green and Nicholas Szechenyi, "U.S.-Japan Relations: Working through Tough Issues," *Comparative Connections*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Apr. 2008).

[153] US$ 1 = JY 91.5 (According to the Ministry of Defense, its host nation support budget is 192.8 billion Yen in 2008)

budget was also reduced. This budget needs to be constantly assessed to decide the amount of host nation support. Therefore, it is not reduction of host nation support for the sake of reduction. Japan needs to aim at efficiency. One example is the 2009 "Guam Agreement." While reconsidering the budget to relocate 8,000 US Marines to Guam by 2014, Japanese and US governments concluded the "Guam Agreement," by which the Japanese government provides $6 billion. This support not only helps transfer Marines to Guam but also helps reduce social costs in Okinawa.

Conclusion

The biggest question that needs to be asked about the Japan-US alliance is a counter-factual: if Japan and the United States had not had a bilateral alliance in today's strategic situation, could they create one? Perhaps, but it would not be as strong as it is now. It would be softer, more like the one that Japan and Australia currently hold. This is because such a treaty is likely to be regarded as a counter-balance to North Korea and China, which increases skepticism among East Asian states.

This suggests two implications for the Japan-US alliance. One is that Japan and the United States have an advantageous position to maintain peace and stability in the region in a manner consistent with their preferences. The other is that the current strategic dilemma is caused by the fact that Japan and the United States have more strategic choices today than they were during the Cold War. From Japan's perspective, Japan has economic and technological capabilities to build up its military to counter China's potential threats and North Korea's nuclear threats without forming the alliance with the United States. From a US perspective, the United States could work with both Japan and China to contain a regional arms race, while pursuing ad-hoc cooperation over global issues. During the Japan-US alliance formulation, these were not options: China is more cooperative and militarily weaker than the Soviet Union was. Thus, while the marginal benefits of the alliance have been reduced, there arise strategic choices that Japan and the United States can consider independently.

Although the benefits of the Japan-US alliance still exceed its cost, as the number of strategic choices increases, US and Japanese tactics to pursue their national interests are likely to diverge, and this has caused coordination problems, especially on cooperation on the global issues. Thus, the utility of the alliance rests on the East Asia region, which is the point of strategic convergence for Japan and the United States. Narrowing the scope of the Japan-US alliance and focusing on "deepening" the alliance rather than "widening" will strengthen ties between them as well as serve both states' national interests.

The "alliance" issue is not just rhetoric. The strength and credibility of the alliance depends on the linkages between political declarations and actions. If there is a wide gap between declarations and actions, the *raison d'être* of the alliance is likely to be questioned. Considering the current Japanese administration's utilization of flexible definitions and growing gaps between its declarations and this administration's actions regarding the Japan-US alliance, the existence of the alliance may be threatened. In this sense, incorporating the global agenda into the Japan-US alliance may create higher expectations for the United States, which may trigger political frictions between them if Japan cannot comply with those demands.

In this context, Japan needs to recognize that a traditional security policy based on the "Yoshida Doctrine" is no longer sustainable. Japan has been dependent on the United States for shaping its security policy, and with the change in Japan's domestic politics, the new administration should make the most of this transition to create political mechanisms to foster national discussions about its security and shape its security policy. Although Japan must always consider the security-autonomy trade-off when it comes to alliance politics, Japan should not forget the implications of a weakened Japan-US alliance for its defense and regional security.

For the United States, the regional strategy the Obama administration currently formulates should clarify the role of the Japan-US alliance and indentify the alliance as more than just a hedging tool regarding its policy toward East Asia. From this stand point, the United States should enhance political coordination with Japan. Also, the United States needs to be patient in dealing with the new administration in Tokyo and to resist the temptation to excessively use *gaiatsu*, which only produces backlash from the public. Currently the United States seems to have two views toward the new administration: one sees the need for *gaiatsu*, and the other respects the new administration. To overcome such obstacles, the United States needs to reassess Japanese domestic politics not from the "1955 system," but from a new perspective by analyzing the DPJ's intra-party politics.[154]

Japan and the United States have encountered political, economic, and military difficulties in sustaining the alliance since 1951. Each time, both states redefined the utility of alliance and changed methods to manage their alliance. Today, both states are facing external and internal changes, including political and military challenges in the regional and global arenas. In this context, the 50th anniversary is an ideal opportunity to reconstruct the Japan-US alliance, and the regionalization of the Japan-US alliance would be the optimal way to better serve Japanese and US national interests in the long-term.

[154] Michael Green, "Japan's Confused Revolution," p. 4, pp. 8-9. Green argues that after the DPJ won the 2009 Lower House election, "the structure of Japanese politics and policymaking will change" due to four main changes: the establishment of the new National Strategy Unit (*Kokka Senryaku Kyoku*), the Cabinet-based policy formation, the elimination of the administrative vice ministers coordination meeting (*Jimu jikan kaigi*), and an increase in political appointees. While these DPJ promises may be altered in the future, it is necessary for both Japanese and Americans to understand party politics and to strengthen communications with DPJ politicians.

About the Author

Kei Koga, from Japan, is a 2009-2010 Vasey Fellow and a Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. His research interests include international relations theory, international institutions, international security, terrorism, East Asian regionalism, U.S.-Japan relations and ASEAN. Before attending Fletcher, he served as a Research Fellow at the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) and as assistant executive secretary at the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC), where he researched political and security cooperation in East Asia on traditional and nontraditional security issues. He also taught International Relations and East Asian Security at the Open University of Japan. He received an M.A. in International Affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, and a B.A. in International Affairs at Lewis & Clark College. His recent publications include "The Anatomy of North Korea's Foreign Policy Formulation" (*North Korean Reviews*, 2009) and "The Normative Power of the 'ASEAN Way'" (*Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs*, 2010).

Appendix A

Use of Terms in Prime Minister's Policy Speech (1951-2010)[155]

Prime Minister	Year	Use of "U.S.-Japan Secuirty Arrangement" (日米安保)				Use of "The U.S.-Japan Alliance" (日米同盟)				Note
		Policy Speech	Times	Administrative Policy Speech	Times	Policy Speech	Times	Administrative Policy Speech	Times	
YOSHIDA, Shigeru	1951	0	0	4	2	0	0	0	2	
	1952	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	2	
	1953	0	1	0	2	0	1	0	2	
	1954	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	
HATOYAMA, Ichiro	1954	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	1955	0	1	0	2	0	1	0	2	
	1956	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	
ISHIBASHI, Tanzan	1956	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	1957	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	* Nichibei Kyodo Boei
KISHI, Nobusuke	1957	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	
	1958	0	1	0	2	0	1	0	2	
	1959	1	2	1	1	0	2	0	1	
	1960	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	
IKEDA, Hayato	1960	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	
	1961	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	
	1962	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	
	1963	1	2	0	1	0	2	0	1	
	1964	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	
SATO, Eisaku	1964	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	
	1965	0	2	1	1	0	2	0	1	
	1966	0	3	4	1	0	3	0	1	
	1967	0	2	1	1	0	2	0	1	
	1968	2	2	0	1	0	2	0	1	
	1969	3	1	3	1	0	1	0	1	
	1970	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	
	1971	0	2	0	1	0	2	0	1	
	1972	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	
TANAKA, Kakuei	1972	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	
	1973	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	
	1974	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	
MIKI, Takeo	1974	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	
	1975	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	
	1976	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	
FUKUDA, Takeo	1977	0	2	1	1	0	2	0	1	
	1978	1	1	1	2	0	1	0	2	
OHIRA, Masayoshi	1979	1	2	1	1	0	2	0	1	
	1980	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	2	
SUZUKI, Zenko	1980	2	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	
	1981	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	
	1982	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	
NAKASONE, Yasuhiro	1982	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	
	1983	1	1	3	1	0	1	0	1	
	1984	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	1	
	1985	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	1986	3	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	
	1987	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	
TAKESHITA, Noboru	1987	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	
	1988	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	
	1989	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	
UNO, Sosuke	1989	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	
KAIFU, Toshiki	1989	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	
	1990	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	
	1991	0	1	2	1	0	1	1	1	
MIYAZAWA, Kiichi	1991	2	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	
	1992	1	1	2	1	0	1	0	1	
	1993	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	
HOSOKAWA, Motohiro	1993	2	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	
	1994	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	
HATA, Tsutomu	1994	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	
MURAYAMA, Tomiichi	1994	2	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	
	1995	1	2	1	1	0	2	0	1	
HASHIMOTO, Ryutaro	1996	3	1	2	1	0	1	0	1	
	1997	2	1	2	1	1	1	0	1	
	1998	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	
Keizo Obuchi	1998	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	
	1999	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	
	2000	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	
MORI, Yoshiro	2000	2	3	0	0	0	3	0	0	
	2001	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	
KOIZUMI, Junichiro	2001	3	2	0	0	2	2	0	0	
	2002	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	
	2003	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	
	2004	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	
	2005	0	1	0	1	1	1	2	1	
	2006	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	
ABE, Shinzo	2006	0	1	0	0	3	1	0	0	
	2007	0	1	0	1	0	1	2	1	
FUKUDA, Yasuo	2007	0	1	0	1	3	1	0	1	
	2008	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	1	
ASO, Taro	2008	0	1	0	1	3	1	0	1	
	2009	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	
HATOYAMA, Yukio	2009	0	1	0	0	2	1	0	0	
	2010	0	0	1	1	0	0	4	1	*By January 29, 2010

[155] See Tanaka Akihiko Lab, "Teikoku gikai – kokkai nai no sori daijin enzetsu" (Prime Minister's Speech at Imperial Diet and Diet), *Deta Besu 'Sekai to Nihon'* (Database 'The World and Japan"), at <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/>. Accessed Oct. 27, 2009.; Hatoyama Yukio, "Dai 174 kai kokkai ni okeru Hatoyama naikaku sori daijin shisei hoshin enzetsu" (Policy Speech at the 174th Diet Session by Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio).

Appendix B

Presidential State of the Union Address (1951-2010)[156]

Year	The Number of the Use of Terms	
	Europe (including sub-regions)	Asia (including sub-regions)
1951	16	6
1952	16	2
1953	13	2.5
1954	8	2
1955	3	2
1956	4	3
1957	2	1
1958	0	0
1959	1	0
1960	3	1
1961	1.5	1.5
1962	12	0
1963	9	3
1964	0	0
1965	8	4
1966	4	4
1967	6	13
1968	0	2
1969	3	2
1970	1	2
1971	0	0
1972	1	0
1973	0	0
1974	1	3
1975	2	1
1976	0	1
1977	4	4
1978	2	1
1979	1	1
1980	3	3
1981	14.5	14
1982	2	1
1983	1	1
1984	0	1
1985	1	1
1986	0	0
1987	0	1
1988	0	1
1989	1	0
1990	9	0
1991	4	0
1992	0	0
1993	0	0
1994	5	1
1995	1	1
1996	1	0
1997	5	5
1998	4	3
1999	1	4
2000	0	1
2001	0	0
2002	1	1
2003	1	1
2004	0	0
2005	2	1
2006	3	0
2007	0	1
2008	0	0
2009	0	0
2010	0	0

[156] There are two "state of union" speeches in the years 1953, 1961, and 1981. Therefore, the data on these years are average number of times. See The American Presidency Project, "State of the Union Messages" at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/sou.php>. Accessed Nov. 22, 2009; The White House, *Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address*, Jan. 27, 2010, at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address>. Accessed Jan. 28, 2010.

Appendix C

Presidential State of the Union Address (Allies): (1951-2010)[157]

Year	The Number of the Use of Terms						
	Japan	Europe (including sub-regions)	NATO (Including Atlantic Community, european allies)	Republic of Korea	Philippines	Thailand	ANZUS
1951	1	16	6	1	1	2	0
1952	2	16	2	2	1	0	1
1953	4	0	1	1	3	0	0
1953	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
1954	0	0	1	2	1	0	1
1955	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
1956	1	0	2	0	0	0	0
1957	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1958	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
1959	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1960	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1961	1	0	1	0	0	0	1
1961	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
1962	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
1963	1	0	3	1	0	0	1
1964	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1965	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
1966	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1967	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
1968	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
1969	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1970	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
1971	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1972	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1973	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1974	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1975	2	0	1	1	0	0	0
1976	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
1977	2	0	1	1	0	0	0
1978	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1979	1	1	2	0	0	0	0
1980	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
1981	4	29	11	3	2	3	2
1981	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1982	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1983	2	0	1	0	0	0	0
1984	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
1985	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
1986	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1987	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1988	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
1989	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
1990	0	10	2	0	0	0	0
1991	0	4	0	0	0	0	0
1992	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1993	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1994	0	4	1	0	0	0	0
1995	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
1996	2	1	1	0	0	0	0
1997	0	5	8	1	0	0	0
1998	0	4	3	1	0	1	0
1999	2	1	2	1	0	0	0
2000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2002	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
2003	1	1	0	1	0	0	0
2004	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
2005	0	2	1	0	0	0	0
2006	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
2007	1	0	2	1	0	0	0
2008	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
2009	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
2010	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

[157] Although the total number of times mentioning the name of each ally is higher than the data shows, these numbers reflect the number of times relating to the security alliance. See The American Presidency Project, "State of the Union Messages". at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/sou.php>. Accessed Nov. 22, 2009; The White House, *Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address.*

Appendix D:
Japanese Perceptions of Japan-US Relations (1990-2009)

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Favorable	31.1	37.7	31	32.3	32.7	29.3	34.2	31.7	40	38.9
Relatively Favorable	43	40.4	42.7	44	40.9	41.9	41.1	42.2	37.6	36.7
Relatively Unfavorable	14.3	11.2	14.2	13.3	15.8	16.5	13.3	14.5	12.2	13.3
Unfavorable	6.7	6.4	8.4	7.2	7.7	9.5	8.2	8.5	7.9	8.2

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Favorable	33.8	37	34.3	34.9	28.5	31.9	35.2	30.3	29	37.9
Relatively Favorable	40	39.5	41.2	40.9	43.3	41.3	40.1	45.4	44.2	41
Relatively Unfavorable	13	12.5	12.6	13.1	15.5	12.9	14	14.2	15.8	12.6
Unfavorable	9.7	7.4	7.4	8.5	9.6	9.2	7.3	8.6	9	6.5

***The number here is percentages.**



Appendix E:
US Perceptions of Japan-US Relations (1990-2008)

Yesr	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
General Public	39	41	26	32	26	41	40	48	43	44
Opinion Leaders	-	-	37	43	36	57	56	64	66	63

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
General Public	42	40	60	56	60	61	63	67	63
Opinion Leaders	81	74	81	78	82	83	85	86	85

***The number here is percentages.**