



**Bridging the Strait:  
Young Leaders Perspectives on  
China-Taiwan Relations**

**PACIFIC FORUM CSIS**  

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## Introduction

At the 2009 Asia Pacific Regional Security Forum in Taiwan and the 2009 Pacific Forum CSIS US-Japan-China Trilateral Security Dialogue in Beijing, Young Leaders joined senior policy and security experts to explore a host of regional issues. A subgroup of those Young Leaders focused on the future of cross-Strait relations. A *Joint Recommendation for Cross-Strait Relations* offers views from Taiwanese and mainland Chinese on the status of cross-Strait relations. The analysis examines the two official governments' positions, public opinions, and the younger generations' perspectives on cross-Strait relations in order to grasp the complexities and nuances of each side's perspectives. The paper concludes with where the relationship will be in the next 10 years, how it *should* evolve in the next 10 years, and policy recommendations for both governments.

The Young Leaders felt that Taipei and Beijing should put economic issues first, including the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) and other Regional Trade Agreements (RTA) because economic benefit seemed to be the “only real point of convergence” following analysis of either side. However, they also felt open exchanges and tourism were necessary, though Taiwan should be able to apply protective measures while gradually opening its market and society to the mainland. To develop a greater sense of mutual trust, China should reduce the number of ballistic missiles deployed in Fujian province as a tangible, but politically symbolic goodwill measure. Increasing Taiwan's international space should also become a comprehensive goal, and the two governments should consider semi-official means to address international challenges and issues. Finally, the Young Leaders felt both China and Taiwan should provide for more unofficial exchanges and civil communication through cross-Strait NGOs, cultural activities and academic exchanges, and should allow equal publication opportunities for each other.

While the group developed a set of joint recommendations, the process wasn't easy. They disagreed over how to create a new cross-Strait political framework, the question of missile deployments in Fujian province and goodwill measures, and to what extent Taiwan should open up to the mainland.

In *Why We Care: A South Korean View*, Sungmin Cho provides South Korea's concerns about cross-Strait relations as well as a response to the Young Leaders' policy recommendations. For South Korea, there is both relief following improved cross-Strait relations, as well as concern regarding economic and trade developments. Relief because improved China-Taiwan relations will reduce the possibility of US Forces Korea (USFK) deployment to the Taiwan Strait in a contingency; concern because as Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) negotiations progress, South Korea and Taiwan will have greater competition over China's market. Following the ECFA's implementation, it is believed that this competition will favor Taiwan and South Korea will “lose out.”

Cho provides three supplemental recommendations. First, there should only be a *partial* withdrawal of missiles from Fujian province, because it would provide China with more strategic options. While Taiwan should avoid becoming “passive or inactive” and should continue to negotiate for complete missile withdrawal, it must simultaneously prepare for its own arms reduction in response. Second, Taiwan and China should contemplate ways to create a “win-win situation” for the long-term while negotiating the ECFA, taking neighboring countries and the ECFA’s effects on them into consideration. Finally, Taiwan and China should not overlook the “window of opportunity” of person-to-person interaction. Drawing on the Korean experience, Cho suggests a summit between Presidents Hu Jintao and Ma Ying-jeou, because such interaction would have a significant socio-psychological impact on both societies.

In *Dual Strategic Dilemma over the Taiwan Strait: A Japanese Perspective*, Kei Koga discusses Japan’s policy toward cross-Strait relations, and the implications for Japan of improved China-Taiwan bilateral relations. Reduction of political tensions between China and Taiwan is encouraged because it decreases Japanese concerns about contingencies in the Taiwan Strait. However, it also means Japan will face long-term dilemmas and concerns regarding its place in both the China-Taiwan-Japan and China-United States-Japan strategic relationships. In the first case, Japan is uncertain about how Taiwan’s political posture toward Japan will be affected by maneuvers such as the “Diplomatic Truce” and the ECFA and its rapprochement with China. This is disquieting considering Japanese concerns over China’s increasing economic and military capabilities, difficulties between Japan and China, and the expansion of Chinese regional influence. The second dilemma focuses on US engagement policy with China. This growing relationship has strengthened Japanese convictions that Japan could be politically marginalized if US-China relations create “perception gaps” between the US and Japan regarding China. Japan will not be able to hedge against Chinese influence if US and Taiwan align more with China.

Koga recognizes that several of the Young Leaders’ policy recommendations are in line with Japanese policy and interests, such as encouraging bilateral and regional economic cooperation between China and Taiwan, and increasing civil communication through tourism, societal, cultural, and academic exchanges. But, for example, while reducing the number of missiles deployed in Fujian province is good, those missiles are highly mobile and thus may not have a “practical impact” on cross-Strait tensions. Likewise while a peaceful resolution of bilateral disputes is encouraged, transparency and context surrounding any semi-official mechanisms are necessary. Koga also suggests institutionalizing cross-generational Track-2 mechanisms not only between China and Taiwan, but also with Japan and the United States. This encourages interaction between the countries’ younger generations, which experience fewer political constraints regarding sensitive issues and talk freely about the cross-Strait concerns. It also provides an opportunity for them to network, opening new communication channels, and expands dialogue between senior officials and the younger generations of future leaders.

# **A Joint Recommendation for Cross-Strait Relations**

by Yi-Wen “Avis” Chang, Chao Yi Chen, Shiuan-Ju Chen,  
Min-hua Chiang, Shan Ni, and Chih-Yun “Eunice” Ma

Cross-Strait relations have long been considered a “flashpoint” for potential military conflict. Taiwan’s domestic politics, the rise of China and its economic attractiveness to Taiwan, common history, their common cultural heritage, the US role, and the evolution of the East Asia Community, among other factors, all affect this relationship. One important and natural development within Taiwan and China that will also affect cross-Strait relations is generational change. This change may be less noticeable to outsiders; but there is an emerging mindset that may dictate the future of cross-Strait relations.

Young Leaders from mainland China and Taiwan joined senior policy and security experts at the 2009 Asia Pacific Regional Security Forum in Taiwan and the 2009 Pacific Forum CSIS US-Japan-China Trilateral Security Dialogue in Beijing to exchange views on cross-Strait relations and policy recommendations for future cooperation. This paper offers views from both sides on the status of cross-Strait relations and what bilateral relations will look like in 10 years. The analysis starts with official government positions, the public’s opinions, and the younger generation’s perspectives. The second section explains how the relationship should evolve in the next 10 years. The paper concludes with policy recommendations to both governments. We hope that through this process common expectation can be found and turned into tangible recommendations.

## **I. Views on the Status Quo of Cross-Strait Relations**

During the last half century, governments on both sides experienced important internal changes, and so did their positions on cross-Strait relations. This paper examines the changes and differences in the two governments’ approach to cross-Strait relations. Public understanding of and engagement in the cross-Strait relationship have also gone through important changes, especially among the younger generation. This paper considers the younger perspective critical to the future direction of the relationship, and tries to grasp core elements of each side’s perspectives.

### **Government perspectives**

**Beijing’s position and its understanding of Taipei:** Beijing’s position regarding the Taiwan question has been transformed during the past 60 years, shifting from the early policy of “no contact, no negotiations and no compromise,” to the cross-Strait negotiations of the 1990s, to the current policy of “peaceful reunification; one country, two systems.”<sup>1</sup> This shift reflects not only the growing confidence of Beijing regarding

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<sup>1</sup> The change in Beijing’s position can be described as:

its own domestic legitimacy and its handling of the cross-Strait issue, but is also a result of a more mature understanding of Taiwan politics. Beijing has realized that the more assertive it gets, the further it pushes people in Taiwan from the mainland. This realization helped shape a more tactical engagement policy toward Taiwan.

This tactical engagement policy is based on Beijing's grasp of the deep domestic divisions in Taiwan about how to handle the cross-Strait relationship. Taiwan's Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) have many policy pursuits in common, such as a search for more international space and economic interaction with mainland China which aids Taiwan's economic development. However, they differ on the "one China Policy."

Let us assume that Beijing's position is tantamount to "yes to One China." Then, the KMT's position which has remained consistent until now is "yes, BUT." YES, Taiwan is part of China, BUT it is only part of the historical, geographical, and cultural China, not part of the legal and political People's Republic of China. YES, Taiwan is part of China. BUT the mainland is also part of China. Hence Taiwan, though much smaller than the mainland in size, is equal to the mainland legally and deserves international room for maneuver.

Since Ma Ying-jeou took office on May 20th in 2008, he expressed the hope that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait could grasp the historic opportunity to achieve peace and co-prosperity. He called for both sides to "face reality, pioneer a new future, shelve controversies, and pursue a win-win solution," to strike a balance in pursuit of common

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*Phase I: Only One China.* Located on the southeastern coast of mainland China, Taiwan is China's largest island and forms an integral whole with the mainland. There is only one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and it is under the governance of the Beijing government. The Chinese government is firmly against any words or deeds designed to split China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. It opposes "two Chinas," "one China, one Taiwan," "one country, two governments," or any attempts or acts that would lead to "independence of Taiwan." China's 2005 Anti-Secession Law also includes this policy, which is the core of China's Taiwan policy. Negotiation is impossible without accepting this principle.

*Phase II: Coexistence of Two Systems and High Degree of Autonomy.* On the premise of one China, socialism on the mainland and capitalism on Taiwan can coexist and develop side by side for a long time without one swallowing the other. This concept has largely taken account of the situation in Taiwan and practical interests of Taiwanese there. After reunification, Taiwan's current socio-economic system, its way of life, as well as economic and cultural ties with foreign countries can remain unchanged. Taiwan will become a special administrative region, which will be distinguished from other provinces or regions of China by a high degree of autonomy. It will have its own administrative and legislative power, an independent judiciary, and the right of adjudication on the island. It will run its own political parties.

*Phase III: Peaceful Negotiations.* Peaceful reunification will greatly enhance the cohesion of the Chinese nation. On the premise of one China, both sides can discuss any subject, including the modality of negotiations, the question of what parties, groups, and personalities may participate as well as any other matters of concern to the Taiwan side. As long as the two sides sit down and talk, they will always be able to find a mutually acceptable solution. Meanwhile, it is a set policy of the Chinese government. However, any sovereign state is entitled to use any means it deems necessary, including military ones, to uphold its sovereignty and territorial integrity. It should be pointed out that the Taiwan question is purely an internal affair of China.



interests. The essence of Ma's cross-Strait policy is to act with a global mindset to pursue normalization of cross-Strait relations and peaceful development across the Taiwan Strait. Ma realizes that the Taipei government can no longer treat the mainland as simply a threat. Instead, it must be regarded as a source of potential opportunity for Taiwan.

The DPP's position, however, is strictly "No." This NO policy approach was reflected clearly during the Chen Shui-bian years and served as the key stumbling block to any engagement between the two sides.

From Beijing's point of view, the "yes" and "no" positions share no common ground and are bound to clash, whereas the "yes" and "yes, BUT" positions have common ground even though some differences remain. As a result, Beijing's new strategy toward Taipei focuses on providing incentives to strengthen the "Yes, BUT" camp and weaken the "No" camp. What this policy approach can achieve remains to be seen, but it has proven more effective than previous disengagement policies.

**Taipei's position and its understanding of Beijing:** In Taiwan, there are three main camps when it comes to cross-Strait relations: the pan-Blue (mostly KMT), pan-Green (mostly DPP), and middle voters. The government position in general reflects the election results of the time. However, opposition forces cannot be ignored in their ability to influence the government's cross-Strait policies.

For the pan-Blue camp, Ma's cross-Strait policy aims to pursue a good relationship with Beijing for the purpose of stabilizing relations, creating economic interests, and improving Taiwan's global image. His "Three Noes" statement serves as the fundamental guideline for this policy: "No independence, no reunification, and no use of force." Ma intentionally put political differences aside to focus on pragmatic cooperation with Beijing, a view shared with the Beijing authority. Though his policy has been recognized by a majority of people in Taiwan, it has also aroused concerns that it will eventually lead to reunification.<sup>2</sup> Despite rising mistrust in Ma's ability to rule and his intention of getting closer to Beijing since last May, Ma has kept his pace and agenda pushing economic integration with Beijing and so far has not changed any of the policies articulated in May 2008.

Ma Ying-jeou does not represent the whole pan-Blue camp. Even within that group, he faces pressure from "deep Blue" people who see reunification as inevitable and necessary. However, Ma's perspective echoes more with the public, and his mindset reveals the view of the second generation of people who immigrated to Taiwan in 1949.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> 55.4 percent of Taiwanese agree that signing an ECFA is important to Taiwan's economy; at the same time, those who think that ECFA is as important as unification with China has increased slightly from 25.7 percent to 28.1 percent from March 2009 to Dec. 2009. "Poll on signing ECFA, People's independent-reunification position, and Ma's performance." (Dec. 18, 2009). [http://www.gvm.com.tw/gvsrc/200912\\_GVSRc\\_others.pdf](http://www.gvm.com.tw/gvsrc/200912_GVSRc_others.pdf)

<sup>3</sup> Ma Ying-jeou is from the second generation of immigrants from China in 1949. People with a family background from China used to be called "mainlanders." However, as the second and third generations grow up in Taiwan, this phrase has been abandoned since they grew up in the same way as second and third generation Taiwanese.

This policy represents the notion that the KMT needs to give up its big China dream and identify more with Taiwan.

The pan-Green camp remains the largest opposition force in Taiwan. Deep Green people oppose building a good relationship and pursuing negotiations with Beijing. The friendly attitude shown by Ma's administration toward Beijing and the mutual visits of government officials intensify their desire for independence. The DPP thinks that Ma is not doing enough to protect Taiwan's security and national interests from being compromised during negotiations with China.<sup>4</sup> To express their concerns, the DPP launched multiple anti-Ma protests in 2008 to define Ma's cross-Strait policy as a disappointment and failing to save the economy. Ma's poor performance during Typhoon Morakot in August 2009 created an opportunity for the DPP to further undermine his ability to govern.

Polls in November 2009 indicate that as much as 38.1 percent of the population identify themselves as "independent" (neutral, in Chinese). This number exceeds the percentage of both pan-Green and pan-Blue supporters.<sup>5</sup> This group caused the DPP to lose the election in 2008. Their opinion reflects the need for the DPP to undergo deep reform, to be less dominated by Taiwan independence rhetoric, and to be more pragmatic in efforts to achieve sovereignty. They tend to back Ma's cross-Strait policy, though not completely, and they want to see whether Ma's policy will help Taiwan as promised.

## **Public Opinion**

### **Mainland public's perspective on cross-Strait relations**

Most people agree that whatever the cross-Strait status quo, the mainland and Taiwan should actively pursue economic cooperation and cultural exchanges. However, there are differences toward the Taiwan question among three groups of people in China.

Those focusing on *the integrity of China* believe that reunification of the country is the ultimate and only goal, while peaceful contact and negotiations with Taiwan are necessary for achieving the goal. For this group, people on both sides of the strait are Chinese. It is unacceptable for China's territorial integrity and sovereignty to be split, and the sooner the problem is solved, the better. Most of the mainland Chinese population belongs to this group.

Those focusing on the *freedom of both sides* are more open-minded and positive toward cross-Strait relations. They agree on the importance of Taiwan issue, but consider solving problems in cross-Strait relations a very long-term and complex task that needs enduring efforts from both sides. These efforts should not be interfered with by other

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<sup>4</sup> Kelly Her, "Cross-Strait Relations," *Taiwan Review*, Oct. 2008, pp. 4-11.

<sup>5</sup> "Party Identification Tracking Analysis in Taiwan, November 2009." (Dec, 2009).  
[http://www.gvm.com.tw/gvsr/GVSRC\\_PID\\_200911\\_Eng.pdf](http://www.gvm.com.tw/gvsr/GVSRC_PID_200911_Eng.pdf)

countries. Most of them accept the status quo as “no independence, no reunification, and no use of force.”

There is always a small group of “*nonchalant*,” who have no interest in political issues unless cross-Strait relations influence their daily lives. Thus far, they have not played a major role in shaping public opinion on the mainland.

### **Mainland public views of Taiwanese perspectives on cross-Strait relations**

Two polls (See Attachment I) indicate that a growing number of people in Taiwan are becoming more interested in maintaining the status quo in cross-Strait relations. A majority of the Taiwanese population prefers a more pragmatic cross-Strait relationship. They are more interested in taking advantage of economic development on the mainland than focusing on the political relationship. A majority of Taiwanese people welcome the recent conciliation and stabilization of cross-Strait relations, and support Ma’s “for the benefit of the people” approach to cross-Strait affairs. However, because of divisions between the DPP and the KMT, different identities have clashed in Taiwan. The division remains, and will continue to be reflected in each election.

Younger generation Taiwanese have more direct contact with but feel less cultural bonds to the mainland. They want to take part in opportunities presented by the mainland’s rapid development, but they are more skeptical of political integration than their parents. Most of the younger generation want to “wait and see” where development leads the mainland, and they do not want to take sides at this point.

### **Taiwanese public’s perspective on cross-Strait relations**

A poll conducted in December 2009 (See Attachment II) shows that while 44.6 percent of people in Taiwan believe that economic interaction with the mainland is in Taiwan’s interests, the percentage has decreased since the beginning of 2009.<sup>6</sup> Pursuing a peaceful, stable, and mutually beneficial relationship with the mainland is necessary, but people in Taiwan do not fully trust Beijing. Most people embrace this perspective from a pragmatic view. Taiwan must save its economy by opening the door to the mainland. They recognize that Beijing’s friendly gestures since Ma became president do not mean that Beijing will accept an independent Taiwan. Also, while as many as 42.5 percent of people prefer to maintain the status quo and defer any decision, 23.9 percent want to be independent, and only 7.4 percent want reunification. This implies that supporting closer economic links with the mainland does not equal support for reunification.

Some writers from the Taiwan group agree with their counterparts in the mainland group that Taiwan and the mainland are part of the same family: Taiwan is deeply related to the mainland, sharing common ancestors, language and culture, etc. They describe cross-Strait relations as a relationship between “*husband and wife*”: since being

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<sup>6</sup> “Poll on signing ECFA, People’s independent-reunification position, and Ma’s performance.” (Dec. 18, 2009). [http://www.gvm.com.tw/gvsrc/200912\\_GVSRC\\_others.pdf](http://www.gvm.com.tw/gvsrc/200912_GVSRC_others.pdf)

separated by lifestyle, way of thinking, and national ideology 60 years ago, the husband and wife have become very different and have quarreled with each other for a long time. They find it difficult to live together, so they consider changing their future lives. From this perspective, both the husband and the wife should have equal rights and status to decide their own future.

In contrast to this perspective, others consider the two sides as independent entities having close connections because of geographical location and history, but no blood bond or any family relationship. No matter which perspective they hold, younger generation Taiwanese generally think the cross-Strait relationship is still mostly under Beijing's control and that Taiwan must compromise greatly in exchange for little international space.

For the younger generation in Taiwan, the overall cross-Strait relationship has not changed much since Ma took office. The two sides remain friendly toward each other and many negotiations on pragmatic cooperation are under way. The younger generation has pragmatic approaches to the cross-Strait relationship. They believe that pursuing a peaceful, stable, and mutually beneficial economic relationship with the mainland is more important than solving the disagreement over political principles. They want Ma to increase social coherence and improve the relationship with the mainland without giving up Taiwan's sovereignty and dignity. They also think Ma has to prioritize economic growth in his domestic agenda because he will face increasing pressure from the pan-Green opposition forces.

## **II. Where will cross-Strait relations be in 10 years?**

Both sides recognize that conditions are not in place for an immediate solution to the sovereignty dispute between Taipei and Beijing. The status quo will likely continue for 10 years, unless there are unpredictable events.

People from the mainland believe that closer economic and cultural ties between the two sides will continue to be the prevailing trend. However, they also know that shelving political controversies does not mean the end of these controversies. A large gap still exists between the "Yes, BUT" policy and Beijing's "one China" policy. As Ma's approval rating slides, the continuity of current positive trends in cross-Strait relations could be hindered, challenging Beijing's patience and faith in engagement.

The US has so far played an important role in cross-Strait relations. Currently, it supports greater exchanges between Taipei and Beijing, while opposing any "unilateral change of the status quo." Beijing and Washington's deeper engagement in world affairs could change the US role in cross-Strait relations, adding to future uncertainties. Taiwanese national identity also greatly influences cross-Strait relations, and it is hard to say how Taiwanese national identity will change in the next decade (given the fact it has changed enormously in the last 10 years).

Many people in Taiwan believed that Ma could improve relations between Taipei and Beijing by replacing confrontation with substantial cooperation. They expect growing economic wealth, international status, and political leverage in Beijing in the next decade. They do not expect a serious change in cross-Strait policy from Beijing as long as Taiwan does not take radical action to pursue independence. They predict continued economic incentives from Beijing to draw Taiwan closer and Taipei's continued "No unification, no independence, no military conflict" policy.

But the cross-Strait relationship is full of uncertainties. Taiwan's economic uncertainties may lead people to doubt the effectiveness of economic engagement with the mainland and affect the political balance between the KMT and the DPP. Ma's cross-Strait policy has deepened political divisions in Taiwan and domestic consensus is needed to engage Beijing. Ma's declining popularity makes the next presidential election unpredictable, intensifying the uncertainty surrounding cross-Strait relations.

### **III. Where should cross-Strait relations be in 10 years?**

The two sides both think that the status quo should and will remain in the next 10 years. They also share many common visions for the next decade, such as: increasing mutual understanding and respect, especially among the younger generations; more cooperation in cross-boundary issues such as food safety, human trafficking, epidemics, climate change, and natural disasters, etc. Both sides would like to see new frameworks and mechanisms to deal with the cross-Strait issue, but it is not clear or agreed upon what these mechanisms should be. Some differences also emerge in the younger generations' vision of the next decade.

**From the mainland perspective,** the two sides should step up regular high-level communication to make progress on negotiating Taiwan's status. Economic ties should be strengthened and trade/investment barriers should be removed. People on both sides should be able to visit each other freely, and transportation linkages should be improved. Taiwan's requests for diplomatic space should be reconsidered by Beijing, and any third country's influence on cross-Strait relations should be reduced. Finally, intensive exchanges between younger generations from both sides are essential; schools in Taiwan should embrace more students from the mainland.

**From the Taiwanese perspective,** Beijing should stop claiming Taiwan as a part of China unilaterally and other countries should stop sacrificing Taiwan for their own interests. Taiwan's international space should be expanded; Beijing and Taipei should reach agreement to allow Taiwanese to work in functional or research departments of international organizations as Taiwanese. The two sides should agree on Taiwan's exploration of more forms of participation in the international community, as long as it is based on mutual respect. Both Taiwan and the mainland should look "outward" (toward regional relationships) instead of only "inward" (the cross-Strait relationship). Common external interests, such as regional economic cooperation mechanisms, should be jointly explored. Taiwan should be included in the ASEAN+1 (China) and other multilateral institutions. Opposition forces should always be included in cross-Strait communications,

regardless of which party is ruling; agreements that bring pragmatic cooperation to the interests of both sides should be sustained, regardless of election results.

#### **IV. Policy Recommendations:**

The following policy recommendations are proposed by young Chinese and Taiwanese to solve differences and strengthen common perspectives. The authors recognize that the status quo is likely to continue for the next decade or longer. Therefore, they expect people and governments from both sides to accept the fact that any final solution will have to be a compromise. The two governments should be flexible in exploring a new framework that is not only realistic but one that also provides equal status between Beijing and Taipei.

- Economic benefit is the only real point of convergence for the two sides. Therefore, both Taipei and Beijing should put economic issues first, including the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) and other Regional Trade Agreements (RTA). Any trade or investment dispute should be settled within the WTO framework or within other international laws. It may take an indefinite period to develop mutual trust, but it is required to create a stable environment for discussion of political issues.
- Opening exchanges and tourism are necessary. The mainland has a larger market and its investment can easily take over Taiwan's economy without proper restriction. Therefore, Taiwan should be able to apply measures to protect itself from negative influences while gradually opening its market and society to the mainland.
- To develop mutual trust, Beijing should take the lead in making a politically symbolic goodwill gesture. Reducing the number of short-and medium-range ballistic missiles deployed in Fujian Province is one of the most tangible measures; increasing Taiwan's international space can be a comprehensive goal.
- The two governments should explore semi-official mechanisms to address international challenges and nonsecurity issues such as climate change, pandemics, natural disasters, etc.
- Both governments should work to provide better conditions for unofficial exchanges and civil communication by encouraging cross-Strait NGOs, cultural activities and academic exchanges. For example, a cross-Strait childcare organization aimed at helping children go to school can be jointly supported by private enterprises from the mainland and Taiwan.
- The two governments should allow equal publication opportunities for each other. A review system for publication is acceptable, but it should not discriminate against different opinions and positions.

## Supplement:

While collaborating to provide a set of joint recommendations, the following disagreement arose during the discussion between the Taiwan and mainland groups.

1. We agreed that a new cross-Strait political framework should be established but disagreed about how to start it and how formal it should be.

Some in the Taiwan group did not agree with a formal union-like structure because they believe unions should be created among countries with equal status. Taiwan and the mainland are very different in nature and do not have equal status in the bilateral relationship. Therefore, the mainland and Taiwan should not form a union. Taiwan should have the same rights as the mainland to negotiate with other international actors such as ASEAN before being considered an ally to the mainland.

However, some agreed with creating a formal structure such as a union, admitting that Taiwan cannot change the unequal relationship and should maximize its interests. Taiwan may be free to talk with ASEAN, but ASEAN does not have to consider the mainland and Taiwan as equals. This group takes a more realistic view and thinks that pursuing equal status with the mainland should be evaluated while taking into consideration Taiwan's economic interests.

The mainland group suggested that Taiwan should pay more attention to real benefits such as economic growth it can get from the new framework rather than the "unrealistic" issues of equal status.

2. Missiles and goodwill.

The mainland group suggested that for the development and establishment of mutual trust in cross-Strait relations, Beijing should take the lead in making a politically symbolic goodwill gesture. Reducing the number of short-and medium-range ballistic missiles deployed in Fujian Province is one of the most tangible measures, increasing Taiwan's international space and changing the Chinese top leadership's attitude will be a fundamental goal.

The Taiwan group had differing priorities. This group agrees that withdrawing missiles deployed along Fujian Province is a goodwill gesture. However, the majority of the group tended to evaluate the mainland's goodwill in forms ranging from international space and diplomatic relations, to the assurance of not using force against Taiwan. In short, withdrawing missiles is important, but does not have to be the first priority in negotiations.

3. The Taiwan group had its biggest disagreement regarding how close Taipei should be with Beijing and to what extent Taiwan should open up to the mainland. The majority of the group agreed that Taiwan can have more charter flights and mainland tourists with proper restrictions to protect Taiwan from negative impacts. However,



disagreement emerged as these two measures created no tangible benefits or boosted Taiwan's economy and thus, further opening to Beijing was deemed unnecessary.

Despite this disagreement, the group agreed on having more economic exchanges with the mainland. Opening Taiwan's market to mainland investment is acceptable as long as rules are established and the market is well-regulated.

The mainland group held the view that there is no need to worry about whether the mainland investment will destroy Taiwan's economy. The experience of Hong Kong and Macao shows that mainland tourists and investments are a win-win situation for both sides. Because of the deep economic ties between Taiwan and the mainland, destroying the Taiwanese economy would also negatively impact the mainland economy.




**Attachment I:**  
Opinion Polls in Taiwan




**Attachment II:**

“In order to make Taiwan’s economy better, should cross-Strait economic interaction increase or decrease?”



**“The independent/reunification position of Taiwan’s public”**



Source: “Poll on signing ECFA, People’s independent-reunification position, and Ma’s performance.” (Dec. 18, 2009). [http://www.gvm.com.tw/gvsrc/200912\\_GVSRC\\_others.pdf](http://www.gvm.com.tw/gvsrc/200912_GVSRC_others.pdf)

# Why We Care: A South Korean View

by Sungmin Cho

This essay attempts to review *Joint Recommendation for Cross-Strait Relations* drawn by Young Leaders from China and Taiwan from South Korean perspective. This essay consists of two parts: addressing South Korea's concerns on the recent development of the cross-Strait relationship and responding to the joint policy recommendations suggested in the previous section.

## I. South Korea's Concerns

Observing cross-Strait relations since President Ma Ying-jeou took office in May 2008, South Korea appears to be relieved by political developments yet insecure in the economic and trade realms. Politically, South Korea is relieved since improved cross-Strait relations will greatly reduce the chances that elements of US Forces Korea (USFK) will be deployed to the Taiwan Strait in case of military conflict in the region. On the other hand, there is growing concern in the business sector as negotiations over the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between China and Taiwan make progress because South Korea and Taiwan have been competing with each other over China's market. For South Korea, the ECFA means Taiwan will obtain more advantages.

South Korea is concerned that a military conflict will occur in the Taiwan Strait and the USFK will have to intervene. Then, South Korea will be put in a very embarrassing as well as difficult position of getting dragged into neighboring countries' dispute. This scenario has sparked a fierce debate within South Korea since the Bush administration started re-assessing the mission of USFK and re-adjusting the number of troops as part of the Global Posture Review (GPR) in 2003.<sup>7</sup> Since then, the concept of 'strategic flexibility' in association with the redeployment of the USFK to foreign areas has been provoking Chinese fears of containment by US forces in Asia. In order to dispel such suspicions, the Roh Mu-hyon administration made it clear in the joint statement of the 'Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership' in 2006 that the USFK will not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people.<sup>8</sup>

Even so, speculation on the USFK's possible deployment to the Taiwan Strait continues to receive media attention in South Korea. Former Minister of Unification Lee Jong-seok once expressed weariness, commenting that such debate stemmed from 'great

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<sup>7</sup> As a part of GPR, the U.S Department of Defense announced on Oct. 6, 2004 that the United States and the Republic of Korea reached final agreement regarding the June 2004 U.S. proposal to redeploy 12,500 U.S. troops from Korea. On the relation between the redeployment of the USFK and GPR, see [http://www.defense.gov/home/features/global\\_posture/gp-index.html](http://www.defense.gov/home/features/global_posture/gp-index.html)

<sup>8</sup> The exact clause was; "In the implementation of strategic flexibility, the U.S. respects the ROK position that it shall not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people." For full "joint United States-Republic of Korea statement on the launch of the Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership," see <http://usinfo.org/wf-archive/2006/060120/epf502.htm>

misunderstanding and distrust of the Roh Mu-hyon administration.’<sup>9</sup> Even if talk of USFK involvement in the Taiwan Strait is nothing more than a conspiracy theory, the public in South Korea still feels insecure due to the changing characteristics of USFK and its possible involvement in regions outside the Korean Peninsula. This explains how the cross-Strait relationship is tied to the ‘security dilemma’ for South Korea. It has deepened South Koreans’ concern about security.

Given the current status of mutual deterrence between China and Taiwan or the US, the possibility of military conflict in the Taiwan Strait that would trigger USFK involvement appears unlikely. However, any signs of instability in the Taiwan Strait will easily lead to South Korean’s unease over possible USFK involvement. Therefore, the improvement of cross-Strait relations is welcomed and encouraged by South Korea.

South Korea pays special attention to progress in negotiations over the ECFA. South Korea and Taiwan are very similar in terms of size of GDP scale and national strategy for economic growth. Both have pursued export-oriented economic development and compete with each other, especially for the market of mainland China.<sup>10</sup> In this context, South Korea started negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with China in 2005 and launched a joint research project to explore the specific conditions needed to reach agreement. Given the status of that research, South Korea is worried that Taiwan will gain an advantage in Chinese markets through the ECFA earlier than South Korea through the FTA.

This does not necessarily mean South Korea opposes progress in the ECFA negotiations. South Korea does not have such intention, reason, or capability to oppose the ECFA. On the contrary, South Korea fully understands the worries and motivations behind Taiwan’s active pursuit of the ECFA. Since taking office in 2007, the Lee Myung-bak administration has been actively pursuing the expansion of global markets through bilateral FTAs with foreign governments.<sup>11</sup> At the same time, South Korea has sympathy for Taiwan because its competitiveness is hampered by its narrow international space imposed by China’s tactics to isolate Taiwan. Accordingly, South Korea views Taiwan as not only trying to expand its economy through economic cooperation with China but also as attempting to break through its international isolation by launching FTA negotiations with foreign governments on the basis of the ECFA.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Lee Jong-seok, “The Truth of Strategic Flexibility and people’s distrust”, *Hangyeorae Daily* (Korean), 2010 ( <http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/column/398135.html> )

<sup>10</sup> For example, in FY 2009, South Korea took approximately 10 percent of China’s import markets, following Japan’s 13 percent, while Taiwan’s share accounted for 8.5 percent. (<http://www.chinacustomsstat.com/CustomsStat/English/index.htm>)

<sup>11</sup> South Korea is preparing or conducting negotiations with 15 countries including China and Japan to launch FTAs. FTAs have been signed or entered into effect with seven foreign entities, including the US and EU, as of October 2009.

<sup>12</sup> Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) “The current status of the ECFA and its prospect; How does it affect South Korea (Korean)”, *Global Business Report 09-040* (Oct. 23, 2009) pp. 10-11.

Although there is no reason for South Korea to view progress of the ECFA negatively, there are many reasons that the South Korea business sector should be anxious. When looking at only the Chinese market, Taiwan will be in a more favorable position than South Korea with the ECFA. In 2005, South Korea outpaced Taiwan for the first time in exports to China but the difference in Chinese market share between the two remains roughly 1 percent. Once the ECFA is implemented, the fierce competition will be favorably biased towards Taiwan. South Korea will lose out. When looking at global market, the expansion of a 'Chiwan economic block' may create another dimension of competition for South Korea. Therefore, South Korea keeps focused on the progress of the ECFA in comparison with that of FTA negotiations between South Korea and China.

## **II. Supplemental Policy Recommendations**

### **Partial Withdrawal of Offensive Missiles in Fujian Province**

South Korea, as a divided country like China and Taiwan, has a tendency to evaluate the stability of the cross-Strait relationship based on the status of military confrontation and the possibility of war in the region. It is noteworthy that the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait did not experience all-out war for five decades since 1953 and 1949 respectively. This implies that mutual deterrence has been effective in both regions. The difference is that an offensive culture is dominant on the Korean Peninsula and mutual deterrence is unstable, while a defensive culture with a stable deterrence influences the cross-Strait relationship.<sup>13</sup> From a geographical perspective, unlike the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan enjoys a defense advantage of having a sea as a natural barrier. Accordingly, South Korea recommends Taiwan and China take advantage of these favorable conditions in the strategic structure surrounding the Taiwan Strait.

In the memo prepared by Young Leaders from Taiwan and China, the mainland group recommends the reduction of missiles in Fujian Province to show China's goodwill. From the South Korean perspective, this is not merely a symbolic gesture; it deserves serious strategic attention. For China, military confrontation always provides an excuse for Taiwan to import weapons from the US. Granted, the partial withdrawal of missiles from Fujian Province does not necessarily reduce weapons sales between Taiwan and the US, but such initiative will put China in a better position when arguing with Taiwan and the US, while no serious impact is expected on the defense posture of China. Moreover, China will have the freedom to redeploy missiles back to Fujian Province if necessary. As such, the partial withdrawal of offensive missiles from Fujian Province would provide more strategic options for China when negotiating with Taiwan and the US. To take tactical advantage, it is better for China to take initiative before Taiwan makes a request.

In the memo, the Taiwan group stated that withdrawing the missiles is important but does not have to be the first priority in negotiations. Even so, from the South Korean perspective, Taiwan should not be passive or inactive in negotiating the issue. Taiwan

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<sup>13</sup> Robert Ross, "Comparative Deterrence: The Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula," *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy* (California; Stanford University Press, 2006) p.13-38.

needs to perceive recent developments in cross-Strait relations as a window of opportunity and seize the opportunity to relieve the tension resulting from the military confrontation. Specifically, Taiwan should not only continue to request the withdrawal of missiles from Fujian Province, but it should also prepare measures for arms reduction in response to China's initiative.

### **Taiwan's cooperation with South Korea under the framework of the ECFA**

Young Leaders from Taiwan and China discuss the need for strengthening economic cooperation through the ECFA. From a South Korean perspective, both sides should consider the significance of the ECFA for neighboring countries and how they will respond to concerns that the ECFA may end up establishing a Chiwan trade block. At the same time, they should explore how to create a win-win situation with neighboring countries in the longer term while negotiating the ECFA.

South Korea's counter-measure to the ECFA negotiation is noteworthy. One of South Korea's strategies to cope with the ECFA is to reinforce cooperation with Taiwan when entering China's markets by helping each other. For example, South Korea has an advantage in brand marketing in China while Taiwan has relatively better prospects in the food market.<sup>14</sup> Through cooperation, Taiwan and South Korea can pursue mutual benefits when launching new food businesses within mainland China. Taiwan and South Korea should reinforce and institutionalize such initiatives.

South Korea and Taiwan share similarities in their economies and the development strategy of their macro-economies. This means that both parties can be strong rivals as well as strong collaborators. Therefore, Taiwan and South Korea should launch a joint research project at a track-two level that focuses on comparative strategies between the ECFA and FTA (South Korea and China).

### **Summit between Presidents Hu and Ma**

In the memo, no serious attention was paid to the significance of human interaction at the leadership levels. From the South Korean perspective, the Ma administration's cooperative approach toward the mainland appears to open the window of opportunity for a summit between the two parties.

Based on South Korea's experience, the summit between President Hu Jintao and Ma Ying-jeou can be expected to have great socio-psychological impact on both societies for its symbolic significance. In the case of South Korea, two summits with North Korea in 2000 and 2007 alleviated political tension. A summit between the leaders contributes to improving relations; therefore, both China and Taiwan need to conduct a cost-benefit calculus of a presidential summit.

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<sup>14</sup> Interview with Chih-Kang Wang, chairman of Taiwan External Trade Development Council(TAITRA), *Dong-A Daily* (Korean), Sept. 29, 2009.

Before the Ma administration in Taiwan, the cross-Strait relationship frequently fell into crisis due to remarks by Taiwan's former presidents Lee Tung-hui and Chen Shui-bian that implied the independence of Taiwan. In contrast, Ma Ying-jeou has been taking a pragmatic and friendly approach toward the mainland by offering a diplomatic truce and the expansion of economic cooperation. This window of opportunity may be closed again if the Democratic Progressive Party wins the next presidential election. Even before that, Ma Ying-jeou may have unexpected difficulties in continuing his policy given domestic constraints. If China is ever willing to have a summit with Taiwan, now is the time.





# **Dual Strategic Dilemma over the Taiwan Strait: A Japanese Perspective**

by Kei Koga

Japan's policy regarding cross-Strait relations is similar to that of the United States: to resolve political disputes peacefully between China and Taiwan, though Japan has recognized China as the sovereign state since the 1972 normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. Japan does not support any unilateral change of the status quo by either side; Japan will not support China's unilateral aggression to subsume Taiwan by use of force and Japan will not support Taiwan's unilateral declaration of independence.

Japan welcomes improved cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan after Ma Yingjeou assumed the presidency of Taiwan in May 2008 because political and military tensions have been diffused. Japan's interests in the Taiwan Strait include the protection of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) and maintaining stability in the strait. Reduction of political tensions further constrains unilateral maneuvers by either side; this decreases Japan's concerns about contingencies in the Taiwan Strait. Paradoxically, this puts Japan in two long-term strategic dilemmas.

One is caused by trilateral relations among China, Taiwan, and Japan. The Ma administration alleviated political tensions created by its predecessor, Chen Shui-bian, by introducing the ideas of "Diplomatic Truce" and an "Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement" (ECFA), and strategies to establish closer diplomatic and economic ties with China. However, Japan's dilemma comes from uncertainty about how the Taiwan political posture toward Japan will be affected by such maneuvers. Considering China's increasing economic and military capabilities, coupled with the difficulties that Japan and China have over memories of World War II, Japan has feared the expansion of Chinese influence in the region because it may be used to constrain Japan. In this context, Japan closely watches Taiwan's recent rapprochement with China.

Japan-Taiwan relations became relatively tense soon after Ma became president. On June 10, 2008, a Japanese Coast Guard Ship crushed and sank a Taiwanese fishery boat. After the incident, Taiwan dispatched a patrol boat, showing a hard-line stance against Japan; this soured bilateral relations that were better managed during the Chen administration. Even though Ma proposed joint resource development around the *Senkaku/Diaoyutai* islands and showed his intention to negotiate fishery rights, Japan needs to be diplomatically concerned about Taiwan's future behavior. Japan is wary about the extent to which Taiwan will get closer to China.

The second strategic dilemma is caused by cross-Strait relations within a United States, China, and Japan trilateral context. In addition to Taiwan's rapprochement with China, the United States also started an active engagement policy to China as illustrated by the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in July 2009. While there are a number of issues that the United States and China cannot agree upon, this dialogue has a

symbolic effect for Japan; it strengthened Japanese convictions that Japan could be politically marginalized in the long-term. Since the US-Japan alliance is the pivotal security and diplomatic tool for Japan, the improvement of US-China relations may create perception gaps between the US and Japan regarding China. If the United States and Taiwan are leaning toward China, Japan will not be able to hedge against China's increasing influence in the region.

Due to the US and Japanese struggle over alliance management after the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) gained political power in September 2009, there is little discussion about trilateral relations among the United States, China, and Japan. However, if the United States and Taiwan start to lean toward China again, Japan will raise this topic to recalculate its long-term strategic plan vis-à-vis China.

This dual strategic dilemma notwithstanding, Japan still has strategic advantages in the Taiwan Strait. First, the United States has maintained "Strategic Ambiguity," and does not declare its policy on the Taiwan Strait in times of crisis, and the Taiwan Relations Act, which provides military equipment in order to maintain the military balance on the Taiwan Strait. Even though the United States pursues an economic and political engagement policy towards China, uncertainty looms over China's lack of military transparency and the bedrock of stability is these US policies. Taiwan is also eager to strengthen its military capability to maintain military balance over the Taiwan Strait.

Second, it is still unclear whether Taiwan's rapprochement strategy toward China is sustainable. Admittedly, the "diplomatic truce" allowed Taiwan to attend a World Health Assembly (WHA) session as an observer in May 2009, undertake negotiations over the ECFA, and it increased cross-Strait educational exchange. However, it is uncertain to what extent China can cooperate with Taiwan's new initiatives. If China does not accept an ECFA or Taiwan's participation in other international conferences, Taiwan understands that its strategy would be deadlocked, which might increase public sentiment for independence.

Third, Taiwan is a democratic state, which it is proud of and regards as its soft power. Even if the United States maintains its "Strategic Ambiguity," it is likely to intervene in contingencies in the Taiwan Strait to maintain its credibility regarding democratic principles. Thus, Japan, the United States, and Taiwan are closer than are China, the United States, and Taiwan. The two-pronged strategy over the Taiwan Strait will likely continue in the foreseeable future: Japan needs to strengthen political and economic relations with both China and Taiwan while Japan needs to think about Taiwan contingencies.

It is a difficult period not only for Taiwan but also for the United States and Japan to further enhance relations with China. Under this condition, the prospect of unification between China and Taiwan remains highly unlikely, and relations remain a *de facto* peaceful coexistence. Considering that Taiwan needs to seek coexistence with China, US interests lay in maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, and China seeks a

peaceful environment that is conducive to economic growth, Japan should not be too concerned about Taiwan's diplomatic maneuvers toward China. However, it is in Japan's national interests to coordinate its China policy with the United States and Taiwan.

In the context of the rise of East Asian regionalism, Japan should help Taiwan become involved in regional economic cooperation processes by strengthening economic ties with Taiwan as well as China. In this way, Japan can provide channels of communication between the two actors. Japan should also encourage Taiwan's attempts to strengthen economic ties with East Asian neighbors through ECFA negotiations with China. As Taiwan is one of the most industrialized developed economies in East Asia, it is rational to promote economic cooperation with other East Asian states. This fosters not only Taiwan, but also regional economic development. Admittedly, from the political perspective, China is unlikely to allow Taiwan to participate in many of the multilateral frameworks in East Asia. However, bilateral economic cooperation would provide indirect contributions to regional economic cooperation. Japan should also point out that if Taiwan's economic development lags due to political constraints, such a trend would instigate nationalistic movement within Taiwan. This also harms political stability on the Taiwan Strait.

The specific policy recommendations that Young Leaders from China and Taiwan provided overlap with Japan's interests. Japan certainly agrees with confidence-building measures (CBMs) between China and Taiwan including the increase in civil communication, senior-official mechanisms on nontraditional security issues, economic cooperation, and societal and educational cooperation. Reduction of cross-Strait tension by functional cooperation to break the political stalemate between China and Taiwan is welcome. Nonetheless, there is still a question regarding the objectives China and Taiwan will pursue through such cooperation, and they need to understand how such diplomatic behavior will affect the perceptions of other states.

Without consulting Japan, a certain diplomatic maneuver taken by China and Taiwan may increase Japan's skepticism. Japan is concerned about its political balance with the United States, China, and Taiwan. It is not in Japan's interest that Taiwan politically tilts toward China in a way that Taipei disregards relations with Japan and Japan's strategic position. For example, reducing the number of short and medium-range ballistic missiles in Fujian Province may be a symbolic gesture to mitigate the cross-Strait tensions, and Japan will surely welcome China's decision. Yet, these missiles are highly mobile and can be deployed quickly, which does not seem to have practical impact on bilateral tension. Thus, this does not remove Japan's concerns, and at worst, it might be counter-productive: Japan might raise skepticism over bilateral relations and whether there can be anything more than symbolic gestures. The same can be said for the bilateral semi-official mechanism. Japan takes the political stance that cross-Strait tensions should be resolved through peaceful means between China and Taiwan, and it will encourage creating such a mechanism. However, it is necessary to clarify the context. In this sense, transparency will be the key to China-Taiwan bilateral relations.

Regarding bilateral economic cooperation, Japan welcomes the recommendations regarding ECFA. Considering that China's sovereign wealth fund (SWF) has been increasing for the past several years, Taiwan needs to regulate certain aspects of investment; but Taiwan now has a diplomatic tool, the WTO, to negotiate with China. Other countries, including Japan and the United States, invest intensively in Taiwan. If Taiwan attracts more investment from other countries, it can hedge against China's investment domination of Taiwan. Therefore, Japan would encourage bilateral and regional economic cooperation between China and Taiwan, which has the potential to lead to internationalization of Taiwan market and *de facto* integration into international and regional markets, even if it is difficult for Taiwan to have FTAs with other countries.

In addition, the bottom-up approaches to mitigate cross-Strait tension, such as increasing civil communication through tourism, societal, cultural, and academic exchanges, are beneficial for both China and Taiwan in terms of economic benefits and mutual understanding. From a Japanese perspective, educational exchanges are especially beneficial because it will encourage younger generations in China to foster democratic values in their country. Although the feasibility of publication exchanges may be questionable, Japan will encourage such a move.

The author would like to recommend an additional bottom-up approach. Create cross-generational Track-2 mechanisms not only between China and Taiwan, but also with Japan and the United States. There are several benefits to this proposal. First, the young generations in China, Taiwan, Japan, and the United States have less political constraints regarding such issues, and they can freely talk about the cross-Strait concerns. Second, the young generation will have an opportunity to create personal networks, opening communication channels that can be beneficial in the long-term for cross-Strait relations. Third, seniors could provide historical and political insights over the cross-Strait issues, even if the young generation does not agree with everything they say. China might be reluctant to hold such talks in China or Taiwan. However, it would not much constrain young generations from China to participate in such conferences or meetings if they are funded and hosted by third parties, such as Japan and/or the United States. Thus, institutionalization of cross-generational quadrilateral Track-2 mechanism can be beneficial for future cross-Strait relations.

## Appendix A



### PACIFIC FORUM CSIS YOUNG LEADERS

**Asia Pacific Security Forum**  
**Organized by the Institute for National Policy Research (INPR)**  
**Grand Formosa Regent Taipei**  
**Taipei, Taiwan ♦ August 24-25, 2009**  
**AND**  
**Young Leaders Activities and Roundtable Day**  
**With Taiwan Foundation for Democracy**  
**Taipei, Taiwan ♦ August 26, 2009**

### BIOGRAPHIES

**Ms. Yi-Wen “Avis” CHANG**, from Taiwan, is a M.A. candidate at the Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies at the National Sun Yat-sen University (NSYSU). She earned her Bachelor’s degree at the National Tsing-Hua University, majoring in Chinese Literature. She is interested in foreign affairs and international relationships between Taiwan and other organizations. She works at the European Union Centre in Taiwan of NSYSU as an executive assistant.

**Ms. Chao Yi CHEN** is a development officer for the Fudan University Education Development Foundation in Shanghai. She received her M.A. in international relations in 2009 from Fudan University. Her focus is on Sino-US relations and East Asia integration.

**Ms. Shiuan-Ju CHEN**, from Taipei, Taiwan, was a 2008 Vasey Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu. She received her B.A. in Political Sciences from National Taiwan University in 2005 and her M.A. in International Affairs from the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University in 2007. Her research focuses on China’s transition and reform, cross-Strait relations, and East Asia security. She currently works for PauYuan Trading Corp. and engages in the cross-Strait cultural activity development after moving back to Taiwan in 2009.

**Dr. Min-hua CHIANG** received her M.A. in International Business Economics from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Belgium) in 2002, as well as her M.A. in International Political Economy and a Ph.D. in International Economics from Université Pierre Mendès France-Grenoble-II (France) in 2004 and 2008. She was involved in Professor Liu Fu-Kuo’s research project, “The Current Situation in the South China Sea Region and Taiwan’s New Strategic Thinking” at the Institute of International Relations, Chengchi University. She then

joined the Taiwan External Trade Development Council, where her current research projects include “the threat and opportunity for Taiwanese entrepreneurs in China” and Taiwan’s long term external trade policy.

**Mr. Sungmin CHO** is a Master’s candidate at Peking University’s International Relations program. He received his B.A in Political Science and International Relations at Korea University. He spent one year as an exchange student at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada in 2003-2004. Upon graduating in 2005, Mr. Cho joined the Republic of Korea Army in the position of intelligence officer. Serving three years, including a seven-month tour to Iraq in 2006, Mr. Cho finished his military duty in 2008. Currently, he is an intern at the Beijing office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and is working on his dissertation with a focus on the North Korean nuclear issue and its impact on Sino-US relations.

**Mr. Kei KOGA**, from Japan, is a Vasey Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS and a Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. His research interests include international relations theory, international security, terrorism, East Asian regionalism, US-Japan relations and ASEAN. Before attending Fletcher, he served as a Research Fellow at the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) and as assistant executive secretary at the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC), where he researched political and security cooperation in East Asia on traditional and non-traditional security issues. He also teaches International Relations and East Asian Security at the Open University of Japan. He received an M.A. in International Affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, and a B.A. in International Affairs at Lewis & Clark College.

**Ms. Chih-Yun “Eunice” MA**, from Taiwan, is a Master’s candidate at the Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies at the National Sun Yat-sen University. She earned her B.A. at the National Taipei University of Education. Her interest in politics arose from studying China and her research interests focus on the topic of political communication. She closely follows the political development of Taiwan and international relationships and is interested in how Taiwan, though small, plays an important role in global politics.

**Ms. Shan “Vency” NI** is a graduate student in diplomacy at the China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU). Her research interests are diplomacy of nations from the Asia Pacific region and non-traditional security. She graduated from Shanghai Jiao Tong University with a major in public administration and minor in law. She participated in both the Harvard Model United Nations (2007) as the Tanzania delegate on the Legal Committee and in the Beijing Foreign Studies University Model United Nations (2008) as the US delegate on the Security Council.

## Appendix B

### Asia-Pacific Security Forum 2009

#### Asia-Pacific Security in the Context of Global Economic Crisis

##### *Updated Provisional Agenda*

Institute for National Policy Research (Taiwan)

Co-hosts:

The Pacific Forum CSIS (US)

Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (Philippines)

Asia Center (France)

August 24-25, 2009

1F, Noble House, Grand Formosa Regent Taipei, Taiwan

41 Chung Shan North Road, Section 2 台北晶華酒店, 中山北路二段41

#### **Monday, August 24<sup>th</sup>, 2009**

- 09:00 Welcoming Remarks
- 09:00 Keynote Speech
- 10:00 Panel I: The Impact of Global Recession on Asia-Pacific Security
- 11:30 Open Forum
- 12:00 Luncheon Speech
- 13:30 Panel II: Regional Integration and Economic Security in the Asia-Pacific
- 15:20 Open Forum
- 16:20 Adjourn

#### **Tuesday, Aug. 25, 2009**

- 09:00 Panel III: FTAs, “Competitive Liberalization” and Asia-Pacific Security
- 10:50 Panel IV: The Obama Administration’s Policies toward the Asia-Pacific: Human Rights, Economic Interests, and Regional Security
- 12:20 Lunch
- 13:30 Panel V: The Second Democratic Transition of Power in Taiwan and New Era of Cross-Strait Relations
- 15:20 Panel VI: Concluding Session
- 19:00 APSF conference farewell dinner

Co-sponsors: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, TAIWAN (Taiwan); Office of Trade Negotiations, Ministry of Economic Affairs, TAIWAN (Taiwan); Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (Taiwan)



## **PACIFIC FORUM CSIS YOUNG LEADERS**

**CO-ORGANIZED BY  
PACIFIC FORUM CSIS  
TAIWAN FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY  
CENTER FOR ASIA-PACIFIC AREA STUDIES**

**AUGUST 26, 2009  
TAIPEI, TAIWAN**

- |               |  |
|---------------|--|
| 09:00am       | Pick up from Hotel by arranged shuttle   |
| 09:30 – 10:30 | Visit to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)<br>Chairman of Research and Planning Committee Mr. Huang Kui-bo(黃奎博)                                     |
| 10:45 – 11:45 | Visit to Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)<br>Chairman of DPP Department of International Affairs Ms. Bikhim Hsiao (蕭美琴)                            |
| 12:15 – 13:30 | <i>Lunch at restaurant Din Tai Fung</i>  |
| 14:00 – 15:00 | Mainland Affairs Council<br>Director of Department of Policy Planning Mr. Zhu Shi(朱曦)  |
| 15:15 – 16:15 | Kuomintang (Nationalist Party)<br>Ex-ROC's ambassador to US Mr. Chen Shi-fan (陳錫藩)   |
| 16:30 – 18:00 | YL Roundtable meeting at TFD office building<br>TFD Senior Researcher Dr. Michael Kau (高英茂)<br>Pacific Forum CSIS Executive Director Brad Glosserman |
| 18:45 – 20:30 | <i>Dinner at restaurant Chi Fan</i>  |
| 20:30 – 21:00 | Back to Hotel  |