



**Alliances for Tomorrow:
Next Generation Views of
US Alliances in Southeast Asia**



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Pacific Forum CSIS

Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate arenas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

The Young Leaders Program

The Young Leaders Program invites young professionals and graduate students to join Pacific Forum policy dialogues and conferences. The program fosters education in the practical aspects of policy-making, generates an exchange of views between young and seasoned professionals, promotes interaction among younger professionals, and enriches dialogues with generational perspectives for all attendees. Fellows must have a strong background in the area covered by the conference they are attending and an endorsement from respected experts in their field. Supplemental programs in conference host cities and mentoring sessions with senior officials and specialists add to the Young Leader experience. The Young Leaders Program is currently supported by Chevron, the Henry Luce Foundation, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, and the Yuchengco Group, with a growing number of universities, institutes, and organizations also helping to sponsor individual participants. For more details, see the Pacific Forum CSIS website, www.pacforum.org, or contact Brad Glosserman, director of the Young Leaders Program, at brad@pacforum.org.

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We express our gratitude to Brig. Gen. Jose T. Almonte (Ret.), former Philippine National Security Advisor and director general of the National Security Council, for taking time from his schedule to speak to the Young Leaders at a breakfast meeting.

Introduction

On Oct. 28-29, 2010, the Pacific Forum CSIS hosted a US-Thailand-Philippines Dialogue in Bangkok, Thailand to discuss the “Future of US Alliances in Asia.” The event was co-organized with Thailand’s National Defence Studies Institute and supported by the MacArthur Foundation’s Asia Security Initiative. The conference brought together experts from academia and research institutions along with government officials from the three countries. Sessions examined the state of both the US-Philippines and US-Thailand alliances as the three nations confront the evolving economic and political landscape of the Asia Pacific. Seventeen Young Leaders from the US, Philippines, and Thailand attended the conference; this group was joined by two Japanese colleagues. Young Leaders took part in the conference sessions as well as separate discussions.

Before the conference, Young Leaders were given a query to stimulate their thinking and prepare them for the dialogue at the conference and a separate Young Leaders discussion. They were asked what their nation’s most important national security concern is in Southeast Asia. Young Leaders from the US and Japan identified maritime security: it is essential in keeping the sea lanes open for trade and preventing China’s dominance of the South China Sea. Participants from the Philippines and Thailand argued that internal threats are the primary concern in their countries. While the Philippines is worried about nontraditional security issues, such as human security and terrorism, the main concern is weak government institutions and its minimal capacity to defuse internal conflicts. In Thailand, insurgency in the south remains a major concern as the government experiences domestic turbulence and reforms its government and military.

In their post-conference assignment, Young Leaders were tasked to create a visualization of the US-Thailand and US-Philippine alliances (web links are provided in the report). They were divided into two groups, a US-Thai team and a US-Filipino team. The US-Thailand team’s visualization provides an overview of law enforcement and military cooperation, nontraditional security, and Thailand’s relations with a rising China. The US-Philippine team’s visualization draws conclusions about the alliance based on a survey that targets Filipino and American university students in the Philippines to gain a next generation view about the alliance. Their findings are solely based on the results of the survey. Both projects offer a next-generation perspective on the obligations and concerns surrounding the alliances.

Each country has diverging security concerns, but the Young Leaders agree that China’s influence in the region is growing. China is viewed as a strong economic partner in Southeast Asia, but countries are threatened by its lengthening shadow and assertiveness and disputed claims over the South China Sea. The conference gave Young Leaders the opportunity to share views and provide suggestions on the direction of the alliances as they evolve.

Program Report

By Justin Goldman

Young Leaders met for an introductory session with Pacific Forum Executive Director Brad Glosserman to meet each other and highlight the different perspectives on major security concerns and the various instruments that the three countries have regarding to these challenges. It was generally accepted that these alliances benefit all three countries, but the danger of complacency in both relationships was apparent. As the group looked ahead, it was clear that simply continuing established trends was inadequate.

- The point of departure for several US participants for regional security was the maritime commons and the vital need to protect sea lines of communication. The concern over Chinese assertiveness in this domain and its claim of “indisputable sovereignty” over South China Sea islands was echoed by a Japanese colleague.
- While some Philippine colleagues recognized the benefit of US assistance in dealing with the South China Sea disputes and acknowledged that the statement by Secretary Clinton at the ASEAN Regional Forum was helpful in balancing the Chinese, they felt that their internal concerns are a more pressing national security concerns.
- A Thai colleague explained that while Thailand has been most concerned with external threats in past decades, the insurgency in the three southern provinces as well as the current domestic political unrest demanded that the focus of Thai security efforts be on internal matters.
- Thai and Philippine colleagues raised non-traditional security issues and how the growing concept of “human security” reflects pressing issues for their societies. A Philippine colleague explained that tackling homelessness and hunger command the attention of government officials.
- An American colleague expressed that the US Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P), through joint civil-military operations with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), has supported the Philippine Government’s efforts to address these challenges. JSOTF-P and the AFP cooperation with the Philippine organization Gawad Kalinga was presented as a cooperative poverty reduction effort in areas impacted by internal conflicts.
- A Philippine participant acknowledged that while civil-military operations have made a contribution through the AFP’s role to provide “support to national development,” it is important that other institutions are strengthened and that they play a role in this area which is not a traditional military function.

On Oct. 29, Young Leaders gathered for a breakfast meeting with Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Jose T. Almonte who served as the National Security Advisor and Director General of the National Security Council in the Cabinet of President Fidel V. Ramos. He expressed views on issues ranging from the critical need for leaders within each of our nations to the evolving security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific. The following points were raised and discussed:

- There is no universality for real leadership. The highest value is human dignity, regardless of where that originates for the individual. It is incumbent upon those who lead to accept the challenge of understanding and organizing those people in their charge. The test of a great leader is to bring his or her people from where they are to where they did not think they could be. If the leader lacks the trust of the people, he will never be able to take the necessary risks to seize important opportunities.
- Southeast Asia is a developing region and nations are striving to find their identity. It is essential for nations to know themselves if they are to plot an effective course. While both the Philippines and Thailand have dealt with difficult consequences of internal conflicts, the importance of forgiveness and understanding cannot be overstated. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission established by the Unity Government in South Africa was essential for that country to come to terms with what took place during the Apartheid era. Citizens must have an organic stake in their societies.
- Regional organization has come a long way from the era of SEATO during the early Cold War to ASEAN's establishment following the era of *Konfrontasi* to its expansion and the signing of the ASEAN Charter. While Southeast Asia's strategic value continues to rise as its sea lanes link the Asia-Pacific region to the Indian Ocean and beyond, unity within ASEAN is even more important if its centrality is to remain. It is critical to convey confidence in ASEAN to the wider world. ASEAN is a natural incubator for initiatives and ideas; it must make the argument to great powers to be engaged with it. The ASEAN Defence Minister's Meeting Plus is an important example of this continuing effort to remain at the center of regional developments.
- The re-emergence of China since reforms began under Deng Xiaoping has dramatically changed dynamics of the region, especially as the US faces difficulties. Southeast Asia has been an avenue for Chinese success, both in the export of its civilization and culture, and also for regional countries to participate in China's remarkable economic expansion. The competing claims over the South China Sea are likely to linger for some time and increase tension between Southeast Asian nations and China. While this era of nuclear arsenals and interconnected global economy will reduce the likelihood of a great power war, the competition between the US and China will remain fierce. This contest ranges

from technological innovation to military power and economic strength, but conflict is not inevitable.

Following the final session in which the subject of Asian Security 2.0 was discussed, Young Leaders gathered for a wrap-up session. This roundtable discussion was moderated by Mr. Glosserman who sought out responses to statements during the conference that the Young Leaders viewed as important, but not accurate, or that they found different from their own perspective. The Young Leaders were tasked to explain where the alliances must go as they modernize.

- A Philippine participant explained that the level of public diplomacy from the US Embassy does not compare well with that from other missions in Manila. A US colleague responded by explaining that the former Ambassador Kristie Kenney was highly regarded when she was Chief of Mission in Manila and asking if that was not consistent with the local views.
- The Philippine colleague responded that Ambassador Kenney will likely be remembered as the best-loved US ambassador to the Philippines and that while Filipinos across the country would be ecstatic if offered an American visa, the US must not be complacent with such demonstrations of American support.
- Philippine and Thai participants were asked how they felt about high-level engagement with their respective countries by senior military officials.
- A Thai participant acknowledged that while the foundation of its cooperation with the US is the military-to-military relationship, the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) is a concrete example of US engagement that helps the Thai people to adapt to the impacts of climate change. A US counterpart acknowledged that this effort to engage Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam is a key avenue for the US since creating new initiatives or programs on a bilateral basis remains unlikely while Thailand deals with domestic political problems.
- A Philippine colleague responded to a question raised by an American colleague on the narrative related to the closing of Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base in 1992. The prevailing belief is that the Philippines “kicked” the US out when the Philippine Senate rejected the Military Bases Agreement in 1991, but Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea concerning the Mischief Reef led to the renewal of Philippine-US defense cooperation with the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).
- Another Philippine participant advised that Americans should not underestimate the level of emotion amongst Filipinos in regard to the base issue. Opposition to the VFA was not uniform but included groups such as those on the left that voiced opposition to the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement and Islamic

groups primarily from the southern Philippines that reject the presence of the JSOTF-P and the increased tempo of AFP operations since 9/11.

- The argument was made by both Thai and Philippine colleagues that it would be not be wise for Americans to pressure them to choose between China and the US. While both societies are wary of increasing Chinese influence, they are still interested in seeking the opportunities offered by Chinese economic expansion. A Philippine participant expressed that the country remains concerned about being dragged into a confrontation between the US and China. While US security guarantees remain essential, they demand that the country strike a difficult balance.

Appendix A

Pre-Conference Essays

What is your nation's most important national security concern in Southeast Asia?

Japan

Mr. Kei KOGA

Japan's most important national security concern in Southeast Asia is maritime security, especially the stability of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs). The two main factors are energy and food imports. Japan's energy dependence, including nuclear energy, is approximately 96 percent (according to the International Energy Agency (2009)), and oil dependence remains high although it successfully achieved reduction of oil dependency (48 percent in 2004) after the 1973 oil shock (77 percent). Moreover, Japan's food self-sufficiency is around 40 percent. It highly depends on imports of agricultural products, such as food grains. Considering those resources and products come through two SLOCs, one from the Middle East to the South China Sea, and the other from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean, Japan needs to be concerned about the stability of the SLOCs in Southeast Asia.

In this context, there are two precarious factors: nontraditional security elements, such as piracy, and China's increasing assertiveness over its territorial claim with its increasing anti-access and area-denial capabilities. The former has been discussed among regional states through ASEAN-led multilateral frameworks, such as ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crimes (AMMTC) and AMMTC+3. In the Strait of Malacca, which is the pivotal chokepoint for Asia's SLOC, they fostered cooperation to tackle the problem despite sovereignty sensitivities, and the number of pirate attacks has been declining since the latter 2000s. As this requires constant efforts, states should enhance both multilateral and bilateral cooperation, including political and military cooperation among surrounding states and fostering domestic stability in such states as Indonesia.

The other factor is China's increasing assertiveness over its territorial claims in both the South China Sea and East China Sea. In March 2010, China argued that the South China Sea is its "core" interest – non-negotiable, and in October 2010, it started to regard the East China Sea, including the *Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands* as its "core" interest, according to the *South China Morning Post* (Oct. 2). China is increasing anti-access/area-denial capabilities, as shown in its development of anti-ship ballistic missiles and long-range power projection experiments. It also showed assertiveness over the disputed territories by halting diplomatic and economic exchanges with Japan after Japan detained a fishing boat that collided with Japan's coast guard ship. Japan perceives that China might pose a threat in the future by blocking its sea lines of communications.

One option to contain precarious elements is to utilize regional multilateral frameworks, especially the East Asia Summit and ADMM Plus, by putting maritime stability on their agenda and establishing a region-wide maritime code of conduct. Although they do not possess a sanction mechanism, regular discussion would work as a monitoring mechanism to assess the stability of SLOCs in the region. Further, if violation of the code of conduct is observed, it would give other states justification to diplomatically (and possibly militarily) align to condemn the violator and hedge the deterioration of the situation.

Mr. Takahiro YAMAMOTO

In the absence of an imminent threat in this region that jeopardizes the state's short-term survival, Japan's most important national security concern: China's maritime – both military and non-military – activities. Though Japan sits north of the region concerned, Chinese maritime activities in Southeast Asia are linked to Japan's security. China and Southeast Asia states' interaction over conflicting claims on territorial, fishery, and other resource-related rights affect another key player in the region: the United States. The transformation of US troops in the Asia Pacific region will take into account the extent to which Washington feels the need to counter China's expansive posture. This has a tremendous impact on Japan's national security strategy, as dependence on American deterrence in exchange for provision of subsidized bases has been the crux of Japan's national security strategy for 50 years. Japan has a good reason to watch southward.

The clash of Chinese fishing boats and Japan's coast guard vessel near the Senkaku islands showed the similarity of Japan's situation to that of their southeastern neighbors. It's clear to Japan and ASEAN states that fishing boats and feuds over island rocks could become a diplomatic power game, regardless of whether it is controlled and coordinated by the government.

For Chinese maritime strategists, the dichotomy between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia would bear little significance. Chinese military officials regard two island chains east of its landmass as benchmarks for projection of maritime power. The first island chain runs over the southwestern islands of Japan, Okinawa at the center, through the western coast of Luzon and Palawan, down to the northern shore of Borneo. Between China's coast and the first island chain lies several territories whose status is disputed – at least by one party – such as the Senkakus, the Scarborough Shoal, the Paracels, the Spratlys and Taiwan.

In the face of China's expansive moves from its shores, Japan, United States, and ASEAN states also need to do away with the north-south nomenclature that has arbitrarily divided East Asia in people's minds. A strengthened partnership among the states that surround China's coastline would be beneficial in responding to China's assertive and sometimes reckless maritime activities.¹ The prime example is territorial disputes. Japan and ASEAN states would be better equipped to cope with territorial

¹ The author does not assume all maritime activities by Chinese ships are coordinated by CCP government.

issues if they shared information on third-party arbitration as well as legal handling of incidents in these areas.

United States

Ms. Sheena BLACK

The US faces a large nontraditional national security concern in Southeast Asia: its economic influence is dwindling within the region as its largest competitor's trade and investment burgeons. Although traditional security concerns remain, such as the proliferation of narcotics, terrorism, volatile domestic politics, and maritime security, this is not the predominant focus of Southeast Asian nations. Additionally, Southeast Asian nations are asserting their ability to handle domestic issues intra-nationally. The United States should emulate China's approach toward the region. By focusing on its economic relationship with Southeast Asian nations, and not on military alliances or domestic affairs, the US can counter the wedge China is creating between the US and its traditional allies.

The Cold War has ended. The global war on terror has agitated political constituents within Southeast Asia and fostered anti-Americanism. Moreover, China is changing its aggressive behavior in the South China Seas. While Southeast Asia remains cautious toward its growing northern neighbor, the region does not seem to perceive the same Chinese hard power threat that the United States feels. China may be challenging US global hegemony, but it is acting like a benefactor and partner within Southeast Asia. Bilateral relations between China and Southeast Asian nations have improved, and ASEAN has adopted an engagement policy toward China. For example, China and the Philippines have begun Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the South China Seas, a historic area of contention after the 1995 Mischief Reef incident.² Furthermore, bilateral trade increased by 46 percent from 2001 to 2006.³ Similarly, China made its first contribution to the International Monetary Fund to support Thailand during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and pegged the devalued Thai bhat, while the US refused to contribute.⁴ When Thaksin Shinawatra was ousted, the US withdrew \$24 million as a result of the undemocratic coup while China provided \$49 million.⁵

Since the end of the Cold War, the US has perpetuated a sense of financial abandonment and neglect. It is imperative that the US impede the region's growing disillusionment. Vietnam is an exceptional example of how the US can secure economic relationships through trade agreements, a model that should be pursued. After a 25 year diplomatic hiatus, the US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) normalized diplomatic

² Cruz de Castro. "The US-Philippine Alliance Against an Emerging China Challenge." *Contemporary Southeast Asia*. Vol 31. No 3. 2009. P. 411.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Murphy, Anne-Marie. "Beyond Balancing and Bandwagoning: Thailand's Response to China's Rise." *Asian Security*. Vol 6. No 1. 2010. P. 12.

⁵ *Ibid.*

relations and generated an increase of 46 percent in imported merchandise goods into the US, and nearly tripled US exports from 2001 to 2005.⁶ This BTA exemplifies that commercial diplomacy is effective in Southeast Asia. The US should renew free trade agreement negotiations with Thailand and Philippines. Not only would this contribute to the Obama administration's goal to double national exports, it would secure an economic relationship and extinguish fears of preferential treatment. The US can also provide high-quality substitutes to the "influx of cheap Chinese imports" that Southeast Asian nations hope to avoid. Most importantly, the US can reassure its partners that it is still strong, financially and militarily. Although the US should not neglect its military relationships, it should invest time and money into securing economic partnerships in Southeast Asia. In doing so, the US garners regional support and challenges China's growing financial presence.

Mr. Justin GOLDMAN

The most important national security concern for the US in Southeast Asia is ensuring unimpeded access throughout the region to retain freedom of action.⁷ This requires a persistent presence of US forces, particularly naval assets that ensure good order at sea in this maritime region. Second, it must reinvigorate traditional alliances while bolstering new partnerships to increase interoperability and meet sustainment requirements. The US must adapt to evolving circumstances in which the US remains the key partner for regional security, while China is the key economic partner and increasingly assertive in the region.

In the post-9/11 security environment, the US has been focused on Afghanistan and Iraq, some would argue to the detriment of its engagement in Asia. Adm. Robert Willard, commander of the US Pacific Command (PACOM), acknowledges that "for nine years, about 35,000 personnel from PACOM have gone to Iraq and Afghanistan."⁸ While the current operational tempo worldwide is high, the size of the fleet declined by 60 ships under the Bush administration, a time of growing defense expenditure.⁹ The recession and current fiscal imbalances make significant growth in the shipbuilding budget unlikely. A 2010 study for the Chief of Naval Operations examined structuring the Navy around a PACOM hub, reflecting the importance attached to combat-credible naval forces in the region.¹⁰

⁶ Department of Commerce. US Commercial Service Vietnam Country Annual Guide 2005.

⁷ U.S. Department of Defense. National Defense Strategy. June 2008. pp. 16.

⁸ Sheridan, Greg. "Why World's Most Powerful Man Matters to You." *The Australian*. 9 October 2010. <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/why-worlds-most-powerful-military-man-matters-to-you/story-e6frg6ux-1225936166873>. Date Accessed: 12 October 2010.

⁹ Hoffman, Frank. "From Preponderance to Partnership: American Maritime Power in the 21st Century." Center for a New American Security. November 2008, p. 3.

¹⁰ Galdorisi, George, Antonio Siordia and Scott C. Truver. "'Tipping' the Future Fleet." *Proceedings*, Vol. 136, Issue 10 (October 2010). <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2010-10/tipping-future-fleet-0>. Date Accessed: 13 October 2010.

US treaty allies, the Philippines and Thailand, have provided critical support to US forces operating in the region and beyond. Although these alliances have stood for decades, they cannot be taken for granted.¹¹ The US benefits from major exercises these alliances facilitate such as *Balikatan* and *Cobra Gold*; the Department of Defense has prioritized the mission of bolstering the capacity of partner military forces.¹² This facilitates interoperability and mutual understanding between forces, both critical to crisis response. The experience of previous iterations of *Cobra Gold* was crucial to rapidly deploying forces to Royal Thai Navy Base at Utapao in order to respond to the tsunami of December 2004.¹³ The improved US-Indonesian relationship following tsunami relief built the confidence to expand security cooperation. Interest in potential cooperative security locations such as Indonesia's Halim Air Base will require sustained US effort to deepen this key partnership.¹⁴

While China's rise has presented an economic opportunity for regional countries, its assertiveness in the maritime domain raises concerns. This was reflected in the Chinese reaction in May 2009 to the joint Malaysian-Vietnamese submission to the Commission to the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Claiming "China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof" sent a strong signal to other claimants of the disputed islands.¹⁵ As China expands its activities and bolsters its military capabilities, the US can play a key role in maintaining freedom of navigation in the South China Sea for the benefit of all.¹⁶

Ms. Lynn MIYAHIRA

China's claim of "indisputable sovereignty" over the South China Sea is a major concern for the US and the entire international community. China's "U-shaped" claim covers the Paracel Islands, also claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan, the Spratly Islands claimed by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan, and the Scarborough Shoals, also claimed by the Philippines. Besides containing major shipping lanes that connect the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the South China Sea is an important natural resource with atolls and reefs supposedly rich with oil, natural gas, and fish. As a potential flashpoint between China

¹¹ Chanlett-Avery, Emma. "Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations." *CRS*. January 22, 2010, pp. 15. http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32593_20100122.pdf. Date Accessed: 14 October 2010.

¹² Gates, Robert M. "Speech to the Association of the United States Army." 10 October 2007. <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1181>. Date Accessed: 15 October 2010.

¹³ Elleman, Bruce A. "Waves of Hope: The US Navy's Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia." *Naval War College Newport Papers*. February 2007, pp. 9. <http://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Press/Newport-Papers/Documents/28-pdf.aspx>. Date Accessed: 13 October 2010.

¹⁴ Halloran, Richard. "Air Sea Battle." *Air Force Magazine*. August 2010. <http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/August%202010/0810battle.aspx>. Date Accessed: 14 October 2010.

¹⁵ United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea. Chinese Submission in response to the Joint Submission by Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 7 May 2009. http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf. Date Accessed: 14 October 2010.

¹⁶ Holmes, James R. and Toshi Yoshihara. "Why China's Navy is a Threat." *The Diplomat*. 17 September 2010. <http://the-diplomat.com/2010/09/17/why-chinas-navy-is-a-threat/>. Date Accessed: 14 October 2010.

and its Southeast Asian neighbors, the border disputes in the South China Sea are of vital concern to the US.

At the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton addressed the issue by stating that, “The United States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea.”¹⁷ Clinton also said the US “opposes the use or threat of force by any claimant” in the region, and supports a “collaborative diplomatic process” to resolve border disputes. She also reiterated that the US is a Pacific nation and is committed to being an active member in the region.

China’s response was, as expected, disapproving. Jiang Yu, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, criticized an attempt at mediation by the US by stating, “We firmly oppose any country having nothing to do with the South China Sea issue getting involved in the dispute.”¹⁸ Rather than use a multilateral forum to resolve disputes, China prefers to pursue a bilateral solution with each country in “hub and spokes” model of diplomacy.

China cannot be the only one to blame for the disputes in the South China Sea as there are multiple claimants and nobody has thus far been able to resolve their disputes through ASEAN or other forums. The US must understand that its allies in the region, such as Thailand, the Philippines, are walking a fine line when dealing with China – neither wanting to antagonize the regional giant, nor wanting to completely yield to China’s wishes. By acting as a balancing power in the region, the US must continue to maintain its alliances in Southeast Asia and look for ways to improve its relations with other Southeast Asian nations.

Mr. Dominic NARDI

Over a century ago, Alfred Thayer Mahan asserted that naval power is essential to national security. Since the end of World War II, the US, with access to both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the largest navy in the world, has promoted open navigation and security in international waters. However, China’s reinvigorated territorial claims over the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea pose a significant challenge to freedom of the seas. Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Taiwan all claim portions as their sovereign territory or Exclusive Economic Zone under the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty, but they have thus far been unable to settle their claims against China’s. America’s voice in the dispute can reassure its ASEAN partners and uphold freedom of the seas in Southeast Asia.

¹⁷ “Comments by Secretary Clinton in Hanoi, Vietnam” July 23, 2010 ASEAN Forum, Retrieved 10/16/10 <http://www.america.gov/st/texttransenglish/2010/July/20100723164658su0.4912989.html#ixzz12ZUZhJpz>

¹⁸ Wong, Edward. “China’s Disputes in Asia Buttress Influence of U.S.” NY Times. 9/22/2010. Retrieved 10/16/10. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/world/asia/23china.html?scp=3&sq=Clinton%20ASEAN%20July&st=cse>

While the Spratlys and Paracels are relatively small, the seas around them contain important shipping lanes and abundant oil reserves. In 1974, China invaded the Paracel Islands and 18 Vietnamese soldiers were killed. In March 1988, Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces clashed near Chigua Reef. Seven years later, when Filipino fishermen reported that the Chinese navy had detained them near Mischief Reef for over a week, the Philippines flew reconnaissance missions over the area and discovered a Chinese base. ASEAN's harsh condemnation took Beijing by surprise. In 2002, ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which calls on all parties to resolve their claims peacefully.

The conflict flared up again this past summer when Chinese diplomats referred to the South China Sea as a "core interest," the same label as for Tibet and Taiwan. In response, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told the ASEAN Regional Forum that it "opposes the use or threat of force by any claimant... [and that] claimants should pursue their territorial claims... in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea." Some analysts believe Beijing took this last comment as an implicit criticism of Chinese maps that encircle the South China Sea with a "U-shaped line" of dubious legality. For its part, China has vocally opposed any "internationalization" of the dispute and prefers to deal with each ASEAN claimant bilaterally.

The US can help manage the tensions by balancing the asymmetry between the ASEAN claimants and China. The Obama administration should continue to vocalize its support for the peaceful resolution of all competing claims. To the extent that it can, the US should encourage joint-management of the South China Sea and its resources. Ultimately, if China refuses to negotiate in good faith, the US should encourage the ASEAN claimants petition the International Court of Justice. However, US credibility suffers because it is not yet a party to the Law of the Sea Treaty. As such, the Obama administration should lobby for Senate ratification as soon as possible. Ultimately, US involvement can uphold international law and contain China's ambitions.

Mr. Eric SAYERS

The most critical security interest for the United States in South East Asia is the protection of the region's maritime commons, specifically its lines of communication (SLOC). As part of the connective tissue of the "global commons," maritime Southeast Asia contains a number of the world's most critical SLOCs through which the commerce and energy of East Asia pass. Ensuring the continued economic prosperity of the Asia-Pacific requires guarding against irregular and conventional security challenges from the archipelagos of the South China Sea, to the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok.

On the low-end of the conflict spectrum, the US must concern itself with upholding "good order at sea" by targeting scourges like piracy and maritime terrorism. As stipulated in the United States' Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower doctrine, this task will be just as much about utilizing the capabilities of the US Navy and Coast

Guard as it will be to engage partner nations and build their capacity to conduct maritime constabulary operations.

On the high-end of the spectrum, the US must continue to prudently hedge against the uncertain intentions related to China's naval expansion. The seapower evangelist Alfred Thayer Mahan predicted over a century ago that as the economies of maritime states expand so too will the naval capabilities to protect these investments. Over the last decade, maritime Asia has been no exception to Mahan's observations. As China's economy has climbed to be the second largest in the world, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has matured from a Navy built for coastal operations to one increasingly able to conduct sea denial operations in what China calls its "near seas." Consistent with its expanding capabilities, over the past 18 months China has grown more assertive in its determination to establish its maritime claims in the South China Sea. If the US is determined to continue to uphold the free navigation of the seas and prevent the outbreak of a territorial crisis, it must ensure continuation of its naval supremacy in the region. Part of this effort will require sustaining a shipbuilding procurement budget and industrial base at a level that meets the Navy's stated requirements. In the medium-term, the Navy will also have to work with the Air Force and regional allies and partners like the Philippines, Indonesia, and Singapore to develop the Air-Sea Battle concept mandated by the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). This warfighting doctrine places an emphasis on maintaining presence by assuring access to the region through a host of long-range strike technologies, joint operations, and a diverse basing profile.

Mahan called the sea a "highway" where "men pass in all directions, but on which some well-worn paths show that controlling reasons have led them to choose certain lines of travel rather than others." Maritime Southeast Asia is home to a series of these sea lines, which for economic and geographic reasons, to hold a new significance that will make them a focal point for US security strategy.

Dr. Kevin SHEPARD

Globally, the United States seeks to create an environment in which Washington can counter extremism, prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and foster sustainable growth while broadening access to food, clean water, and medicines.¹⁹ To do so, the ability to foster growth and ensure stability in Asia, and particularly in Southeast Asia, is increasingly important.

The United States faces a wide range of security challenges in Southeast Asia, from extremist violence that threatens Americans around the world – and is directly challenging US allies in Manila and Bangkok – to the concern that China's growing influence could threaten access to sea lanes and energy fields. Human rights concerns abound in the region, as do WMD and nuclear threats, particularly in Myanmar. Piracy, accessible food and water, of Southeast Asia displays the broadest range of traditional and nontradition security challenges to the United States of any region.

¹⁹ These objectives were laid out in the 2010 National Security Strategy.

Washington is not in a position to unilaterally resolve these problems, and has competent and increasingly able allies and friends in the region upon which it should rely. Therefore, the most important national security goal for the United States in Southeast Asia should be “invest[ing] in the capacity of strong and capable partners,” as was laid out in this year’s *National Security Strategy*.²⁰ It would be short-sighted for Washington to focus on one concern and neglect others. As the sole superpower, the United States can only successfully pursue its objectives around the world and throughout the region by acting like all good leaders do: recognizing one’s own weaknesses, the strengths of partners, and the advantages of delegating to those more directly involved while maintaining oversight, providing support, and rewarding success.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s remarks to the ASEAN Regional Forum on July 23 indicate that the State Department has recognized both the importance of the region and the supporting role Washington should play. While her comments highlighted Chinese interference in the South China Sea, the United States can best pursue its interests throughout the region by taking on similar roles when tackling other issues to “facilitate initiatives and confidence-building measures”²¹ while helping our allies strengthen their positions of leadership and encouraging others by making clear the mutual benefits of cooperation, democracy, and good governance.

Mr. Jacob ZENN

For the US, the major issue in Southeast Asia – that will continue to increase US influence in the region – is counterterrorism. Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia is important to US national security interests because it is 1) a pan-ASEAN issue, 2) a permanent objective that involves deep military and diplomatic cooperation between the US and ASEAN countries, and 3) it is intertwined with US goals in other regions to root out terrorists, their infrastructure, and their international connections. If terrorists operate anywhere, they are dangerous to the US and its allies’ interests everywhere. Thus, from Southeast Asia, to Af-Pak, to Central Asia, to the Middle East, and the Horn of Africa, the global anti-terrorism commitment must be upheld.

The link between Southeast Asia and the GWOT is certain. Many Southeast Asian Muslims first became radicalized fighting the USSR in the first Afghan “jihad.” They brought their militancy back to their native countries, and especially in the case of Indonesia, with dangerous effects. An Indonesian who fought against the USSR organized the Bali bombings of 2002 and other Indonesian terror organizations like Jemaah Islameeya have had close links to al-Qaeda. Additionally, the “2000 al-Qaeda Summit” in Kuala Lumpur is where the 9/11 attacks and 2000 USS Cole bombings were believed to have been planned, the Philippines violent Islamic insurgent group, Abu Sayyaf, is linked to al-Qaeda, and although the Thai government denies al-Qaeda’s presence in the country’s restive three Muslim provinces in the south, the potential for al-

²⁰ 2010 National Security Strategy, p. 26.

²¹ “Remarks at Press Availability,” National Convention Center, Hanoi, Vietnam, July 23, 2010. Available on the US Department of State webpage at <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/145095.htm>.

Qaeda infiltration must be considered. As the US pulls out of Afghanistan, the US and its ASEAN allies must be on guard for radicals taking their Af-Pak experience and terrorizing Muslim populations of Southeast Asia.

The US and Southeast Asia have a mutual interest in eliminating regional terror networks. Unlike disaster relief or economic crises for which China and other powers are able to provide assistance, the US is the only country with the military and intelligence capacity to support Southeast countries on their country-specific counterterrorism problems and in the broader GWOT. This also presents an opportunity for the US to enmesh itself in Southeast Asia militarily, politically, and economically. Because of the permanence of the GWOT, the US involvement for many years in Southeast Asia's affairs will prohibit China from achieving one of its possible long-term objectives of superseding the US as regional leader.

The US cooperation with Southeast Asian nations in the GWOT emphasizes local police enforcement measures supported by US funding, training, and intelligence. The results have been more successful in Southeast Asia than in Af-Pak and the Arab World. This model of the US-Southeast Asian counterterrorism strategy can be transported to other regions and lead to better results for the US in the next decade. Furthermore, the success of Muslim countries in Southeast Asia in maintaining a moderate brand of Islam serves as an example and a counterweight to the more radical practices in Af-Pak, the Middle East, and Somalia.

What is your country's most important national security concern?

Philippines

Mr. Julio AMADOR

Human security is the greatest national security issue in the Philippines. As the 2005 Philippine Human Development Report states, "At a fundamental level, however, what matters most is not the abstract security of a regime or a state but rather the *security of real people, or human security.*" Consider the facts. The Philippines is nowhere near meeting its commitments to the Millennium Development Goals. The number one goal, which is reducing poverty by half, is not expected to be met by 2015.

Not being able to provide human security has implications for national governance and institutions. Politically, policymakers are not elected primarily because of national security issues, such as the rise of China and India or the peace issues in Mindanao. They are elected principally on the basis of being able to create jobs, reduce hunger and provide shelter for the homeless. These concerns take up much of their time and national security issues may not be at the heart of their policy concerns.²²

²² As admitted by a senior member of the House of Representative's committee on National Security, many representatives do not have specialized knowledge and some do not even have primary knowledge of

Human Security-National Security Nexus

With policymakers and other stakeholders focusing on human security issues, other traditional national security concerns are left unattended or given mainly to technocrats and other bureaucrats to consider. Therefore, national security becomes a side issue and may be perceived as not relevant to the whole domain of policymaking and national political life. This is a political reality in the Philippines, which must be the context of security policymaking lest the domestic constituency of the national government feel marginalized further. The potential for failure in the political process for providing human security may invite instability later as some sectors believe that they can provide the necessary answers to unresolved problems.

This is where the nexus of the human security-national security lies. The shifting focus of security concerns from traditional state-centric approach to human security is not so much the lessening potential for conflict, but rather that weak human security means there will be less material, time, and financial resources to spend on national security as government resources will be focused on human security. Strong people free from human security concerns can give greater focus on other security issues.

Deepening Philippine-US Alliance through Human Security

There is great potential for deepening the alliance between the Philippines and the US through partnerships in improving human security in the Philippines. The \$434 million grant from the Millennium Challenge Account is a good indicator that Washington sees that a soft power approach can improve its relations with Southeast Asian allies like the Philippines. Indirectly, it may help push Philippine institutions to reform and become better attuned to national development and security needs. This was also noted by the CSIS special report on US alliances in Southeast Asia.

Responding to human security issues demands the focus of Philippine stakeholders and force them to leave external security issues to its allies. The Philippines, as one analyst noted, may have no choice. The domestic problems faced by the country may not leave policymakers with enough space for strategic thinking and decision-making. This might lead them to agree to a national security policy that has at its root the stabilization of the external environment that will allow them to focus on solving human security and domestic affairs.

Ms. Tiffany CHUA

Threats to the Philippines' national sovereignty and territorial integrity, stemming from separatist movements and China's claim over the disputed South China Sea, are the country's most important national security issues. Yet, the search for an appropriate

national security issues. This was said at a forum organized by the Foreign Service Institute in September 2010.

security strategy addressing these issues in the form of a revitalized US-Philippine alliance is an equally problematic solution.

Threats to the Philippines' national sovereignty and territorial integrity have both internal and external sources. First, the Philippine government is threatened with insurgencies and separatist movements in southern Philippines. Fighting for the establishment of an independent Islamic state in southern Philippines, terrorist groups such as the Abu Sayyaf, Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Jemaah Islamiyah receive support from Al-Qaeda, particularly in terms of funding, training and weapons procurement. Since 2004, these terrorist groups have conducted more than 100 terrorist attacks,²³ claiming innocent lives and tarnishing the Philippines' international image. Combined with a weak rule of law and the geographic difficulty of flushing out terrorist cells, terrorism has become a chronic security problem that depletes limited resources and impedes state-building. Second, Philippine territory is threatened by China's claim over a sizeable portion of the South China Sea. This threat, highlighted in the 1990s when the Philippine government discovered that wooden structures and satellite equipment were built on the Mischief Reef – a rocky islet part of the disputed Spratly Islands – continues to exist as China increasingly displays assertive behavior. China's military modernization and construction of the Sanya Naval Base in Hainan have caused wariness among regional actors, including the Philippines.

While these issues are problematic, finding the appropriate security strategy is equally problematic. As a small power, the Philippines relied on its alliance with the US to ensure its security. Despite the withdrawal of US forces and closure of US bases in 1992, the Mischief Reef crisis helped revitalize the US-Philippine alliance, and after the September 11 attacks, the Philippines expressed its support for the global war on terror. But is aligning itself with the United States the best way for the Philippines to guarantee its security?

The alliance could entangle the Philippines in undesired commitments that may be detrimental to the country's security, such as a US-China confrontation over Taiwan. In the war against terror, the Philippines' show of support for the US war against Iraq incurred the wrath of terrorists, resulting in the kidnapping of a truck driver and forcing the withdrawal of the Philippines' humanitarian mission to Iraq.

Furthermore, reliance on the alliance may give the US an opportunity to shape Philippine foreign policy in a direction that the Philippines does not desire. Being the junior partner in the alliance and reliant on US resources, the Philippines' own security objectives may be subsumed under broader US security objectives which aim to maintain US hegemony in Asia. Since the alliance is often seen as part of a larger US strategy of containing China, the Philippines is forced into taking a more hard-line stance than it had intended.

²³ Council on Foreign Relations. "Terrorist Havens: Philippines." Last updated June 1, 2009. http://www.cfr.org/publication/9365/terrorism_havens.html

Enjoying US security guarantees, while not appearing too confrontational to China, is a tough balancing act for the Philippines.

Ms. Jonizel LAGUNZAD

National security is a multidimensional concept. It encompasses protection of the society as a whole and national assets. A country's ability to safeguard its national security is correlated with national power. National power is an aggregate of political, economic, and military power. The relative weight of a state's national power measured in terms of GDP and other economic development indicators, technological advancement, military strength, as well as diplomatic and cultural influence, provides a picture of the state's ability to deter external aggression and manage internal threats and disturbances. Therefore, national security is as much about capabilities as it is about concerns.

From this perspective, the most important national security issue for the Philippines is its institutional weakness (political, economic, social, and military). As national security is mediated by domestic structures (institutions), the lack of organizational capacity of these structures prevents the Philippine state from neutralizing internal threats, such as communist insurgencies, secessionist movements, and terrorism; developing credible and effective deterrence mechanisms against potential external attacks that threaten vital Philippine interests, territory, and citizens; financing the acquisition of the necessary military materiel; training Philippine forces to develop external defense capabilities; instituting genuine security sector reform; adequately safeguarding Philippine waters and natural resources from illegal activities;²⁴ protecting the welfare of millions of overseas Filipino workers whose remittances contributed to the economy \$12.2 billion in the first eight months of 2010²⁵ and exerting influence in the conduct of diplomacy and foreign relations. Without institutional capacity, the Philippines has no capability to translate national defense and foreign policy objectives into meaningful political action, nor add value to alliances and security partnerships.

The Philippines still needs to complete the twin processes of nation and state building. The power of the state has yet to be consolidated with the state apparatus remaining underdeveloped and manipulated by oligarchic interests.²⁶ Progress is delayed due to perpetuation in power of political leaders who lack a strategic and long-term vision for the country, and are more interested in power and spoils rather than tackling primary national issues, such as security. Debates on security and regional relations do not occupy national consciousness. They are as alien as the concept of "ginhawa" (freedom from want) to most Filipinos.

²⁴ Mary Ann Palma, "The Philippines as an Archipelagic and Maritime Nation: Interests, Challenges, and Perspectives," *RSIS Working Paper* No. 182 (2009): 25, <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/workingpapers/wp182.pdf>.

²⁵ "Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas October 15, 2010 Media Release on OFW Remittances," <http://www.bsp.gov.ph/publications/media.asp?id=2432>.

²⁶ See Paul D. Hutchcroft, *Booty Capitalism: The Politics of Banking in the Philippines* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998), 13-30.

If the Philippines aims to attain national security and engage constructively in regional and international affairs, the country needs to conduct a serious overhaul of its political, economic, military, social, and diplomatic institutions. A preference for political and economic handouts from domestic and international patrons, and acceptance of mediocre performance will not suffice in a strategic environment where “survival of the fittest” remains the norm.

Ms. Charmaine MISALUCHA

The Philippines is a developing country: it is working on the consolidation of its nation while operating alongside great powers. It is trying to balance domestic concerns and its international commitments. However, the current administration has made it apparent that its primary concern is social issues at the domestic level. While there are some international concerns that require attention, – such as the need to beef up relations with the US, keeping in mind that China could take a more active stance in the South China Sea – a range of domestic problems confronts the Philippines, including the August hostage crisis, the involvement of top leaders in an underground lottery, and the conflicting interests surrounding the reproductive health bill. These stem from less proximate, but equally pertinent issues: poverty, insufficient education opportunities and resources, and lack of competitive social welfare programs, among others.

Therefore, the national security of the Philippines rests on the resolution of its domestic problems. These domestic problems constitute a national security threat because failure to resolve them weakens the country even more. Domestic consolidation is important for a developing country because it can strengthen its international position, and the Philippines can then improve its domestic conditions. It is not impossible to close the chapter of the hostage crisis, stop illegal gambling, improve education about population explosion, or infuse quality and efficiency in social safety nets.

The question is not whether the Philippines can do it, but whether these issues should take precedence over others. In identifying the domestic (social) level as a sector that houses the national security threat to the Philippines, I taking the role of a securitizing actor. I am launching the securitization process. Doing so is not deleterious, but it is counterproductive. Securitizing problems politicizes them, puts them on top of the agenda, and by implication, they are privileged over other concerns. The danger lies in the institutionalization of securitization in not having a definite timeframe when “panic politics” end. In the case of the Philippines, focusing solely on the resolution of domestic problems begs the question of the gravity of its international commitments: Is the South China Sea dispute figure any less? Is the building of an ASEAN Community a secondary priority? Is the threat of some states going nuclear not a cause for concern? When should the Philippines start worrying about these international problems? So, while not trivializing the Philippines’ domestic concerns, caution must be exercised and desecuritization must be practiced. The aim is not to politicize issues at the expense of others for an indefinite time period, but to ensure that national security issues are addressed in a manner that fits the gravity of the threats.

Thailand

Mr. Danny MARKS

For decades, Thailand's greatest security threats have been external threats, particularly from neighboring communist and socialist countries. However, today Thailand's biggest security threats are internal, particularly the two internal conflicts of the southern insurgency and the color-coded political crisis in Bangkok.

Since the insurgency claimed 4,000 lives in 2004, the southern insurgency remains unabated despite numerous changes in governments and military strategies, and personnel. The insurgents, whose goals range from greater administrative autonomy to separatism, continue to be in control on the ground, committing acts of violence against Thai civilians and soldiers. Accused of numerous human rights abuses, the military has not been able to curb the insurgency and often has exacerbated it. The insurgents have limited the scope of their violence to the southernmost provinces. A major terrorist incident, such as a bombing of a hotel or shopping mall in Bangkok or Phuket, would have major repercussions on Thailand's security outlook, foreign relations, and economy.

To move forward and to ensure such an incident does not occur, political solutions are required. Foremost, the central government should give greater autonomy. Other solutions include making "yaw" an official second language, decentralizing taxes, and developing local governance structures. So far, however, both the military and central government have rejected such an approach. Also, the current political crisis in Bangkok is distracting the government from addressing the insurgency.

The current crisis in Bangkok, which caused 91 deaths and over 1,300 injuries in April and May this year, is largely between the masses and the establishment. Thaksin helped usher in an era of mass politics by enacting populist policies and embracing the rural majority as part of Thailand's political community. Simultaneously, higher levels of education, access to the media, higher levels of income, social and physical mobility, and political organization also contributed to empowering the masses and made them more cognizant of their political interests.

However, the establishment, which most commentators identify as the monarchy, military, and bureaucracy, continues to uphold traditional values. Increasingly under challenge, the traditional centers of power are aggressively protecting their interests and power by stressing traditional values, such as avoidance of confrontation, respect for authority, and organization of society through hierarchy, as the core of national identity. During the past several years, academics, NGOs, and journalists have helped create space for cultural and social change by questioning these traditional values, official state narratives, and government policies. Most recently, the red-shirt movement has carried forward this process of cultural transformation by organizing sustained resistance and raising doubts about the fairness of the traditional structure of Thai society.

Because neither side seems willing to compromise, future violence is more likely than not and the conflict will not end any time soon. To solve the current impasse in the short-term, elections are needed and double standards need to be addressed. In the long-term, decentralizing and including the masses as part of the political community are needed.

Appendix B

About the Authors

Mr. Julio Santiago AMADOR III is a graduate of the University of the Philippines (UP) where he earned his BA in Public Administration. He is also pursuing his MA in Political Science in UP. He worked as a Trainer in Local Government in the Center for Local and Regional Governance-UP and as an Institutional Analyst/Human Resource Officer for the Land Administration and Management Program of the Philippines funded by the World Bank. He was a visiting graduate student in the University of California, San Diego for the 2007 Pacific Rim Summer Seminar in US Studies organized by the Center for US-Mexican Studies. He was granted a Fellowship by the Ronald Coase Institute to attend its Workshop in Institutional Analysis in 2008. He currently works as an analyst for the Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies of the Foreign Service Institute, Philippines. He specializes in the politics and security of Southeast Asia and ASEAN, Philippine Foreign Policy and Development Studies.

Ms. Sheena BLACK is completing an MA of law and diplomacy at the Fletcher School, Tufts University. Her concentrations include trade and commercial policies, business and economic law, and the Asia Pacific region. Sheena served as an adviser to the Palau Permanent Mission to the United Nations, where her work was highlighted in the presidential address to the General Assembly. Although being from Guam predisposes Sheena to Pacific small island states, she has spent time traveling throughout and living in Asia. Prior to graduate school, Sheena was a consultant for Deloitte & Touche (formerly BearingPoint, Inc.), and supported the Department of Defense. Sheena managed programs that addressed the two signature injuries of the war in Iraq – post traumatic stress disorder and mild traumatic brain injury. She is a graduate of the East-West Center Asian Pacific Leadership Program and received her BA from the University of California Santa Barbara. Sheena is also an Institute for International Public Policy Fellow and Aspen Institute Socrates Society Fellow.

Ms. Tiffany CHUA is a third-generation Chinese migrant born and raised in the Philippines. She obtained her undergraduate degree in international studies from De La Salle University, graduating cum laude and receiving the gold medal for the most outstanding undergraduate thesis. She worked at the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Manila before serving her alma mater as a junior faculty member, teaching courses on international relations and international political economy, and mentoring senior students writing their undergraduate thesis. She is currently an MA candidate at De La Salle University, and also a Gokongwei China Scholar – selected as one of 40 outstanding Filipino young leaders and professionals nationwide to study Chinese politics, economics and foreign policy in Fudan University, Shanghai. Her research interests include Chinese foreign policy, East Asian security, US-China relations, China-ASEAN relations, and US-Japan-China trilateral relations. She is fluent in English, Mandarin, Filipino and Taiwanese.

Mr. Justin GOLDMAN joined the US Marine Corps in June 1998 after graduating from high school. As a machine-gunner, he participated in two Western Pacific naval deployments, training in countries ranging from Singapore to the United Arab Emirates. He participated in humanitarian assistance in East Timor before operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan with the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit in 2001-2002. Following an honorable discharge, Goldman entered Regis University in August 2002. In the spring of 2005, he worked as a researcher in the office of the Right Honorable Colin Breed, a Member of Parliament from the southwest of England. He graduated from Regis in May 2006 with a BA in international policy and worked in Washington DC on the US-Royal Australian Navy joint heavyweight torpedo program. In April 2007, he worked as a West Africa analyst for the Marine Corps and deployed in the spring of 2008 with Africa Partnership Station, a regional maritime security cooperation engagement onboard USS Fort McHenry. He entered the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore in July 2009 and earned his MSc in Strategic Studies in July 2010. He is currently an associate research fellow in military studies at RSIS.

Ms. Jonizel LAGUNZAD holds a Master's degree in diplomacy with distinction, and a Master's degree in international affairs, both from the Australian National University. At ANU, she specialized in Asia-Pacific security, China's global engagement and domestic transformation, ASEAN and Asian regionalism, as well as crisis management, negotiation, and conflict resolution. Her professional experience is mainly on public policy, foreign relations, strategic communications, and advocacy campaigns. She worked for the Philippine government for six years, recently as a Director at the Office of Senator Richard J. Gordon, Senate of the Philippines, where she provided analysis and strategic direction to the legislative and political programs of the Office. She was also part of the policy advisory team of a Presidential candidate for the 2010 Philippine presidential election.

Mr. Daniel MARKS is a Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS), Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University. Funded by the David L. Boren Fellowship, he is conducting research on the impacts of climate change on Thailand and the Thai climate change policy process. Before joining ISIS, he worked in Bangkok at the World Bank's East and Pacific Regional Governance Hub, APCO Worldwide, and Sunbelt Asia. He was also a Rotary Ambassadorial Scholar in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia from 2005-2006. He received his MA degree from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in international affairs, and his BA from Grinnell College. He has published on climate change policy in Asia and Thai domestic politics in the *Journal of Contemporary China*, the *Bangkok Post*, and the *Nation*, among others.

Ms. Charmaine MISALUCHA received her PhD from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies of the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. She currently serves as an Assistant Professor and Vice Chair at the International Studies Department of De La Salle University in Manila.

Mr. Dominic NARDI is pursuing a career in international law in Southeast Asia. Through his undergraduate education at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, he studied environmental law in Southeast Asia. For his senior thesis, he traveled to the region for two months to conduct interviews with government officials, Buddhist monks, and environmental activists. He decided to pursue these interests through a graduate education in Asian legal issues through a J.D. from Georgetown and Master's in Southeast Asian studies from Johns Hopkins SAIS. At Georgetown Law, he studied how Asian courts take social and political factors into account when deciding cases. His coursework on Southeast Asia often dealt with specific rule of law and human rights challenges in individual ASEAN countries. He worked on these issues through internships in the region. Last summer, he interned at the Asia Foundation office in Manila, where he advised Filipino attorneys about remedies to extrajudicial killings under international human rights conventions. In 2007, as a summer associate with an Indonesian law firm, he reviewed international contracts. He also published academic and op-ed articles on Asian legal challenges, as well as presented his analysis of Burma's constitution at several conferences.

Mr. Jacob ZENN is a third year law student and Global Law Scholar at Georgetown Law. He is pursuing the Certificate in Refugee Law and Humanitarian Emergencies and interned at UNHCR in Malaysia in 2009 and drafted the International Migrants Bill of Rights Treaty with the Global Law Scholars program. He graduated from Emory University in 2005 with a BA in international relations and Mandarin, and received a graduate degree in international affairs from the Johns Hopkins SAIS-Nanjing Center for Chinese and American Studies in 2007. Before law school, Jacob worked as the program administrator at the Language and Cultural Centre of the University of Duhok in Iraq and traveled in over 90 countries, including all of China's 14 border nations. He speaks more than 15 languages proficiently, including Mandarin, Korean, Japanese, Vietnamese, Thai, Hindi, Indonesian and Malay, Russian, Arabic, and Farsi. During college, he spent one semester each in Osaka, Japan and Beijing, China and he spent a law semester abroad at Korea University in spring 2010. After graduating from law school in May 2011, he hopes to work for a think-tank and research the emerging regional power structure in the Asia-Pacific and the role of international law norms in securing regional stability.

Ms. Selinta CLARKE was born in the United Kingdom and is half Thai. She studied at an international school in Thailand where her interest in international politics began. She is currently lecturing at one of Thailand's more prestigious universities. During the previous terms, she lectured Southeast Asian Studies. This term, she started lecturing in Psychology. She started this job after completing her MA in international studies at the University of Birmingham where she became increasingly interested in ASEAN from studying with Professor Marc Beeson (an expert on ASEAN integration). Her interest also stemmed from research conducted during her undergrad thesis on the Global Slave Trade where she was majoring in international politics at the University of Wales. She has an international background and aspires to fulfill her interests in the field of international politics as a life-term goal.

Mr. Chatch KHAMPHET is a research associate at the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance, Thammasat University.

Mr. Netipat PHATKULCHAI is assistance to the Directorate of Joint Intelligence, RTARF. He received his BA in aero nautical engineering at RTAF and his MBA from the Kasetsart University.

Dr. Nakorn SUWUNTANASARN is with the Special Warfare Command (SWCOM), Royal Thai Army. He received a PhD in Physics and a BE in electrical engineering at the University of New South Wales. In 2000, he worked with the Australian Army, Darwin, Australia. In 2003, he worked with Air Services Australia in Canberra. His research interests include spin-based solid state quantum computer devices, instrumental setup for the in-house pulsed/continuous wave electron spin resonance spectrometer, pulsed electron spin resonance techniques for investigating solid state devices, low temperature physics, and digital image processing techniques.

Ms. Praewsiree TALAPPETCH is a research associate at the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance, Thammasat University.

Appendix C



PACIFIC FORUM CSIS
YOUNG LEADERS

**“The Future of US Alliances in Asia”
US-Thailand-Philippines Conference**

**October 28-29, 2010
Imperial Queen’s Park Hotel ♦ Bangkok, Thailand**

Agenda

Wednesday, Oct. 27

Overseas participants check in at the Imperial Queen’s Park Hotel
(199 Sukhumvit Soi 22, Bangkok 10110, Thailand Tel: +66 2 261-9000
Fax: +66 2 261-9499 <http://www.imperialhotels.com>)

17:45 **YOUNG LEADERS introductory session with Brad Glosserman**
Meet in the hotel lobby

18:30 – 21:00 Welcome Reception (*Attire: Smart Casual Venue: Uncle Ho, 4th Floor*)
Welcome Remarks by General Puchong Rattanawan, Commanding
General of National Defence Studies Institute, Royal Thai Armed Forces
Headquarters

Thursday, Oct. 28

8:30 – 9:00 Registration (*Venue: Terrace Room, 9th Floor, Imperial Club Tower*)

9:00 – 9:15 Welcome Statement by Major General Surasit Thanadtang, Director of
Strategic Studies Center, National Defence Studies Institute

Introductory Remarks by Mr. Ralph Cossa, President of Pacific Forum
CSIS

9:15 – 10:45 **Session 1: Threat Perceptions and the Security Environment**
This session focuses on threat perceptions. What are each country’s
primary security concerns, domestically, regionally, and beyond? How
do those threat perceptions influence security policy? Is there a
domestic consensus regarding national security? How have the “rise” of
China and India and the perceived decline of Japan influenced regional

relations? What are the significant trends in the regional security environment? What are the key threats? How do “Asian security concerns” fit into national thinking about threats?

- Presenters:
1. Dr. Suchit Bunbongkarn
Former Director of ISIS Thailand
Professor Emeritus, Faculty of Political Science,
Chulalongkorn University
 2. Brigadier General (ret.) Jose Almonte
Former Philippine National Security Advisor and
Director-General of the National Security Council
Republic of the Philippines
 3. Mr. Brad Glosserman
Executive Director
Pacific Forum CSIS

10:45 – 11:00 Group Photo/ Coffee Break

11:00 – 12:30 **Session 2: The US Alliance and Domestic Politics**

This session explores the role that their respective alliances with the US play in Thai and Philippine domestic politics. What are the perceptions of the US in each country? How important is the alliance to the relationship? Do elites and the public see the alliance in the same way? How does the alliance fit into domestic politics in each country? Are there similarities in how Thailand and the Philippines view the alliance? Are there lessons to be learned in how each government has handled the alliance relationship?

- Presenters:
1. Ms. Kathline Talosa
Senior Researcher, Office of Strategic and Special
Studies
Armed Forces of the Philippines
 2. Major General Surasit Thanadtang
Director of Strategic Studies Center
National Defence Studies Institute

12:30 – 14:00 Lunch (*Venue: Parkview Restaurant, Ground floor*)

14:00 – 15:30 **Session 3: Future of the US-Thai Alliance**

This session explores Thailand’s vision for the alliance and ways to make it more effective. How does Thailand perceive its alliance with the US evolving? Will the alliance get stronger? Weaker? Why? What

role should this alliance play in internal security? Does it have a role in non-traditional security issues? Can and should the US-Thai alliance be networked? How? Who are the best non-alliance partners? How can they best be brought into working relationships with the allies?

Presenters: 1. Dr. Sarasin Veerapol
Executive Vice President of Charoen Phokaphan
Former Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs

2. Mr. John Brandon
Director of International Programs
The Asia Foundation

15:30 – 15:45 Coffee Break

15:45 – 17:00 **Session 4: Future of the US-Philippines Alliance**

This session explores the Philippines vision for the alliance and ways to make it more effective. How does the Philippines see its alliance with the US evolving? Will the alliance get stronger? Weaker? Why? What role should this alliance play in internal security? Does it have a role in nontraditional security issues? Can and should the US-Philippines alliance be networked? How? Who are the best non-alliance partners? How can they best be brought into working relationships with the allies?

Presenter: Mr. Raymund Quilop
Assistant Secretary for Strategic Assessment
Department of National Defense

18:30 – 21:00 Dinner (*Attire: Casual; Venue: Bangkok Panorama Room 2, 3rd Floor*)

Post-dinner YOUNG LEADER led discussion

Friday, Oct. 29

7:30 YOUNG LEADERS breakfast meeting

9:00 – 10:30 **Session 5: ASEAN, East Asian Regionalism and Beyond**

This session will assess each country's views of regionalism in Asia. What is the significance of East Asian regionalism? What are the most important regional organizations? What is the appropriate membership in each? What is the role of ASEAN and East Asian regionalism? What role does the US have in East Asia regionalism? Other ASEAN dialogue partners? [This discussion should explore the meaning of regionalism

broadly and the potential role of extra-regional actors; we will focus on multilateral security initiatives in the next session.]

- Presenters :
1. Dr. Ellen Frost
Visiting Fellow
Peterson Institute for International Economics
 2. Dr. Noel Morada
Executive Director
Asia-Pacific Centre for Responsibility to Protect
 3. Dr. Chulacheeb Chinwanno
Associate Professor, Faculty of Political Science
Thammasat University

10:30 – 10:45 Coffee Break

10:45 – 12:30 **Session 6: Security Mechanisms in Asia and the US Alliances**
This session focuses on Asian security structures by examining such initiatives as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ADMM +, and ad hoc efforts. How does each country view those security structures? What is the appropriate role of these mechanisms? Who should be included in them? What is their effectiveness? What are their limits? How can they be made more effective? How do the US alliances influence these mechanisms? How do these organizations influence the alliances?

- Presenters:
1. Dr. Renato Cruz DeCastro
Associate Professor, De La Salle University
 2. Professor Catharin Dalpino
Visiting Fellow at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and Professor at Simmons College
 3. General (Ret.) Vaipot Srinual
Former Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence
Former Director of National Intelligence Agency

12:30 – 14:00 Lunch (*Venue: Parkview Restaurant, Ground floor*)

14:00 – 15:30 **Session 7: Asian Security 2.0**
This session focuses on the future of security relations in East Asia. What are the key influences in the evolution of an East Asian security mechanism? What should the relationship be between the Philippines

and Thailand and other US alliance partners? Who are the important security partners for each country beyond the alliances? Should they be brought into working relationships with the alliances? How? What is most effective way to address nontraditional security issues?

- Presenters:
1. Dr. Prapat Thepchatree
Associate Professor, Faculty of Political Science and
Director of Thammasat University Research and
Consultancy Institute
 2. Professor Herman Kraft
Associate Professor
University of the Philippines
 3. Mr. Ralph Cossa
President
Pacific Forum CSIS

15:45 **YOUNG LEADERS roundtable discussion, moderated
by Brad Glosserman**

17:30 Dinner (*Attire: Casual; Venue: Bangkok Panorama Room 2, 3rd Floor*)

Post-dinner YOUNG LEADER led discussion

Appendix D



“The Future of US Alliances in Asia” US-Thailand-Philippines Conference

October 28-29, 2010
Imperial Queen’s Park Hotel ♦ Bangkok, Thailand

Participants

Philippines

Mr. Julio AMADOR
Foreign Affairs Research Specialist
Foreign Service Institute

Ms. Tiffany CHUA
MA Candidate
De La Salle University

Ms. Jonizel LAGUNZAD
Research Analyst, Technical Working
Group on AFP Doctrine Review
Philippine Department of National
Defense

Ms. Charmaine MISALUCHA
Assistant Professor and Vice Chair
De La Salle University

United States

Ms. Sheena BLACK
MA Candidate
Tufts University

Mr. Justin GOLDMAN
Associate Research Fellow
S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies

Ms. Lynn MIYAHIRA
MBA Graduate
University of Hawaii

Mr. Dominic NARDI
Law & Public Policy Research Fellow
Governance Institute

Mr. Eric SAYERS
SPF Fellow
Pacific Forum CSIS

Dr. Kevin SHEPARD
Kelly Fellow
Pacific Forum CSIS

Mr. Jacob ZENN
Law Student
Georgetown Law

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Ms. Selinta CLARKE
Lecturer
Mahidol University

Mr. Chatch KHAMPHET
Research Associate
Thammasat University

Mr. Daniel MARKS
Visiting Research Fellow
The Institute of Security and
International Studies Thailand

Mr. Netipat PHATKULCHAI
Assistance
Directorate of Joint Intelligence, RTARF

Dr. Nakorn SUWUNTANASARN
Special Warfare Command (SWCOM)
Royal Thai Army

Ms. Praewsiree TALAPPETCH
Research Associate
Thammasat University

Others

Mr. Kei KOGA
RSIS-MacArthur Visiting Associate
Fellow S.Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, Nanyang
Technological University

Mr. Takahiro YAMAMOTO
MA in Law and Diplomacy
The Fletcher School
Tufts University