



**Alliances in Motion:  
Next Generation Views of America's  
Northeast Asia Alliances**



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## **Pacific Forum CSIS**

Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS ([www.pacforum.org](http://www.pacforum.org)) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate arenas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

## **The Young Leaders Program**

The Young Leaders Program invites young professionals and graduate students to join Pacific Forum policy dialogues and conferences. The program fosters education in the practical aspects of policy-making, generates an exchange of views between young and seasoned professionals, promotes interaction among younger professionals, and enriches dialogues with generational perspectives for all attendees. Fellows must have a strong background in the area covered by the conference they are attending and an endorsement from respected experts in their field. Supplemental programs in conference host cities and mentoring sessions with senior officials and specialists add to the Young Leader experience. The Young Leaders Program is currently supported by Chevron, the Henry Luce Foundation, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, and the Yuchengco Group, with a growing number of universities, institutes, and organizations also helping to sponsor individual participants. For more details, see the Pacific Forum CSIS website, [www.pacforum.org](http://www.pacforum.org), or contact Brad Glosserman, director of the Young Leaders Program, at [brad@pacforum.org](mailto:brad@pacforum.org).

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The YL participants of the US-Korea Strategic Dialogue wish to express gratitude to Dr. Kongdan Oh-Hassig and Mr. L. Gordon Flake for taking the time to speak at the breakfast roundtable to the Young Leaders.

## **Introduction**

The U.S. alliance system provides security for the Asia Pacific and the framework for US engagement with the region. A changing security environment, along with changes in domestic politics in the US and its allies, have raised questions about the durability and viability of those alliances. For more than a decade, the Pacific Forum CSIS has conducted dialogues to better understand the stresses those relationships face, anticipate future pressures, and devise recommendations to ensure our alliances are ready for them.

In recent years, there has been increasing attention to the central role played by the US extended deterrent in these alliances. With support from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, we launched a series of strategic dialogues that included experts, government officials, and analysts from the US and its partners in Northeast Asia to examine, compare, and contrast views of the security environment and the US extended deterrent. Integral to this process has been the participation of Pacific Forum Young Leaders: they have provided next-generation views of the issues we explore as well as gain intimate knowledge of those concerns.

This volume combines two Young Leader programs: the third US-Japan Strategic Dialogue and the second US-ROK Strategic Dialogue. It includes brief summaries of the two Young Leader programs, as well as the preconference essays that participants wrote for each meeting. These essays are short responses to questions that prime YL thinking about the discussions they will join. Astute readers of these reports will note that there are no post-conference essays. These two meetings were held back to back in April 2010. In the day between the two meetings, the Young Leaders from both meetings (Americans, Japanese, and South Koreans) held a simulation in which they developed responses to a contingency in North Korea. The results from that exercise have been published in a stand-alone volume “Ready for Action: Responding to Crisis in North Korea” (<http://csis.org/publication/issues-insights-vol-10-no-19>); we encourage readers to explore that report for insights into next generation thinking about a North Korean contingency.

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# **US-Japan Strategic Dialogue**

## **Program Report**

By Ross Matzkin-Bridger

From April 25-27, Pacific Forum CSIS hosted the third US-Japan strategic dialogue in Maui, Hawaii a project that was sponsored by the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The conference featured experts and policy makers from both the US and Japan who explored the future of bilateral relations and the role of the US extended deterrent in that relationship. They were joined by 13 Young Leaders from the US and Japan who observed and participated in those sessions.

Before the conference began, Young Leaders met for a roundtable discussion moderated by Pacific Forum Executive Director Brad Glosserman. Discussions focused on the state of the US-Japan alliance, and the implications of current difficulties on the future of the bilateral relationship. The majority of participants agreed that the alliance is not in a “crisis,” but that there is drift between the two countries. We argued that:

- There is a drift between the US and Japan that is caused by a lack of vision for the alliance. This is not unlike the period in years following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Then, as now, there was no clear purpose for the alliance. The US and Japan need to determine what the alliance stands for and what its goals are to get it back on track.
- The current drift is very different from the post-Cold War situation. At that time a change in international structure (the collapse of the Soviet Union) prompted questions about the necessity of the alliance. Now these questions are driven by internal factors, namely domestic political change within Japan.
- While current drift is minimal, the gap could become wider. The biggest problem is that the DPJ and the Japanese public are uninformed about the utility of the alliance.
- The US and Japan are still tightly bound, and the alliance is not in crisis. This is just a period of growing pains.
- There may in fact be a state of crisis. It is easy to blame current tensions on the DPJ’s inexperience; however, the DPJ might represent wider sentiment within Japan that devalues the alliance.

While there was disagreement over the extent of the troubles in the US-Japan alliance, there was a broad consensus that it faces serious challenges. Both US and Japanese participants offered differing views on the cause of the present problems. Japanese participants were more likely to blame the DPJ and the Hatoyama administration specifically for souring relations with the US. Several US participants

argued that the alliance is faltering due to more fundamental shifts in Japan and/or the US:

- There will be a few years of drift as the DPJ learns how to govern and run foreign policy. But current problems are transitory and will be fixed as the DPJ gains experience.
- Alliance problems are not due to the DPJ learning curve. If and when the DPJ and Japanese public become more educated on alliance issues, they may decide that the structure of the US-Japan relationship is not in the best interest of the country. This may also occur in the US.

At this point, one participant suggested that while the alliance may only be experiencing “drift,” prolonged drift would not be sustainable in today’s dynamic world. While we are trying to sort out past and current problems, we are not paying attention to the future. If we don’t start looking more toward the future, the mission of the alliance must be scaled back. This ignited one final discussion on realistic missions for the alliance:

- The US and Japan need to be clearer about goals. The alliance is necessary, but both sides need to be more transparent.
- We need to ask why the alliance is necessary. The US might need to scale back what its expectations are of Japan.
- The US and Japan have different expectations as to the mission of the alliance. This is the cause of much friction. The US is focused on nontraditional security concerns, namely terrorism. Japan still thinks of security mainly in terms of state actors. It might be too much for the alliance to expand beyond that regional scope.

On April 27, the Young Leaders held a breakfast meeting with Mr. Katsuhisa Furukawa, fellow at Japan’s Research Institute of Science and Technology for Society. Mr. Furukawa discussed his views on nontraditional security threats and the prospects for US-Japan cooperation. He noted that US intelligence agencies have expanded their focus to place more weight on new threats like cyber security, climate change, and international criminal networks. Mr. Furukawa’s main points included:

- Traditionally international security is conceptualized on three levels: international, national, and sub-national. In fact, security includes a much more complicated web of levels and actors. Nontraditional threats will force actors to expand their networks and to work together to manage new threats.
- To effectively deal with new threats, there must be cooperation between the scientific and national security communities. The scientific community has the essential capabilities to address nontraditional security issues and is already

working its way into deeper collaboration with policy and intelligence community in the U.S. and Europe.

- Nontraditional threats such as climate change, natural disasters, pandemics, and cyber security are starting to have an impact on force posture. Every military has been forced to look for ways to tackle these new challenges without massive budget increases. Effective collaboration between the military and the scientific community can hold the keys for addressing these challenges successfully.
- Coupled with the trends of rapid urbanization and population growth, climate change may worsen problems such as natural disasters and resource scarcity in many parts of the world. These problems can increase stress on local and national governments, forcing them to be preoccupied with managing these internal pressures, which may possibly reduce their capacity for international cooperation. To prevent this trend, there should be more intimate cooperation among various stakeholders in the government, industries, and academia in the respective countries. These stakeholders must collaborate internationally in order to avoid reinventing the same wheels elsewhere. Scientists play an indispensable role in this regard. A good way to catalyze such cooperation would be to make sure that strong contingents of new stakeholders, especially scientists, are invited to conferences and dialogues on international security.

Mr. Furukawa's main point was that there needs to be a stronger focus on science and technology to deal with emerging security threats. Because the US and Japan are at the forefront of new science and technology, this presents an opportunity for further collaboration and a stronger bilateral relationship. Mr. Furukawa suggests that the US-Japan relationship needs to be more like the US-EU relationship in that it must extend beyond the realms of diplomacy and military to include more sophisticated cooperation among new stakeholders in such areas as crisis management, law enforcement, development, and science from various professional fields including NGOs and industry.

For the remainder of the day, the Young Leaders again sat in on the roundtable of senior experts. Presenters for the day included Michael McDevitt, Ken Jimbo, Yuki Tatsumi and Victor Cha. Young Leaders then met in the early evening for a wrap-up session to discuss the conference. The discussion began with a debate over where the alliance is headed. The room was again generally split between those who think the alliance is only in a temporary rut, and those who think that it is experiencing more fundamental troubles. There was a consensus that if the two countries want to pursue deeper cooperation, they will need to better define what the alliance stands for, and what each side wants from the other. There was agreement as to what the US wants from Japan. This includes bases for troops, a strong partner to counter global and regional threats, and clarity and continuity in policy. There was a more varied response regarding what Japan wants from the US:

- Japan wants US presence, reassurance, and continued confidence.
- Strike capability from nuclear and conventional forces. These needs are currently being met. Japan is uncertain about how the US will act in the future. This creates anxiety.
- It is important to educate the Okinawa public. The US should come to Okinawa to present its views and make its case for why the US should have troops stationed there.
- Japan has everything that it wants and needs from the US. The Japanese government must show more confidence and leadership.

The wrap-up session ended with the Young Leaders discussing the purpose of the US-Japan alliance. There was a consensus on promoting regional stability and the defense of Japan; North Korea and China were identical as potential challenges. Some saw the alliance as a force for public good in the Asia Pacific, creating regional security. Others saw the alliance as crucial for promoting democratic values, human rights, and free trade. The final commenter suggested that the US-Japan alliance simply promotes general cooperation and stability, adding that the alliance does not need a stated goal, as it is a goal in and of itself.

## US-Japan Pre-Conference Essays

*At the 16<sup>th</sup> Japan-US Security Seminar, held in January 2010, Young Leaders developed three scenarios for the future of this bilateral relationship. (For a complete report on their work, see “Come What May: Three Scenarios for the US-Japan Alliance,” *Issues & Insights*, Vol. 10 No. 9, March 2010)*

*At the third US-Japan Strategic Dialogue, participating Young Leaders read and assessed the three scenarios. In their pre-conference essay, they were asked to identify which of the three scenarios was the most realistic assessment of the future of the alliance and why; they were then asked to identify which of the three should be the future of the alliance and why.*

### **Mr. Joshua Archer**

The US-Japan alliance has proven its ability to adapt and remain relevant to meet the changing demands of global security. This trend will continue, and the alliance is likely to be deeper and more cooperative in 2030, as projected in the *Status Quo Plus* scenario. Japanese security policy will continue to evolve through a process of legislative exception, whereby emergency legislation eliminates the need for constitutional revision. The real-world limitations of Japan’s military infrastructure will frustrate alliance managers in Washington, but a growing defense role in outer- and cyber-space will help to ameliorate their frustrations. In the field of maritime security, integrated US-Japan naval operation will be the new *modus operandi* in the Pacific. China’s campaign of naval modernization will have produced a limited blue-water PLA Navy, and Japan’s defense planners will focus on securing the choke points to the north and south to ensure the Seventh Fleet’s access to littoral waters. All parties will recognize a shared interest in avoiding conflict in the South China Sea, and trilateral dialogue will be expanded in part to manage compounding concerns over diminished US freedom of movement and Chinese resource brinkmanship. In 2030, Tokyo and Washington will look back two decades to see that the emergence of a more vibrant democracy in Japan was unable to disrupt the trajectory of alliance relations, and the status quo will have produced a strengthened US-Japan alliance that serves an important role in the stability of the Northeast Asian security environment.

Alliance managers in the US and Japan might also see missed opportunities, however. Growing intra-Asian economic interdependence will make Washington’s regional allies more reluctant to support US interests in regional forums. Some might argue that straying from the status quo to form a more nimble alliance would have allowed the US and Japan to better engage in Asia’s regional governance. For those alliance managers, the preferable reality is that projected in *Regional Architecture and Japan*. They will argue that the alliance should have been more proactive in constructing a regional architecture to handle the increasingly dynamic Northeast Asia security environment. Those frustrated by the reactive nature of trilateral dialogue in handling security issues and territorial disputes with China in particular will lament that a more effective dispute management

body such as the Northeast Asia Security Forum (NASF) had not been created. While economic interdependence and converging interests will help the alliance manage the security environment satisfactorily, the relative decline of Japanese diplomatic clout in regional institutions will concern defense planners in Tokyo. Therefore, in 2030, as alliance managers review two decades of deepened US-Japan security relations, they may argue that the preferred trajectory would have allowed Japan to move more freely among the emerging Asian regional architecture, as a supplement to the bilateral alliance.

### **Ms. Brittany Billingsley**

For the last 50 years, the US-Japan alliance has remained steadfast in the face of bilateral tensions – a testimony to the relationship’s importance to both parties. But these tensions have led to three future scenarios for the relationship, a future regional security architecture, an independent Japan, and a “status quo plus.”

Of these proposed scenarios, the “status quo plus” is the most realistic future for the US-Japan alliance. Significant policy and strategy modifications require both the political will and the resources to carry out the shift. When either is lacking, change is difficult. In this scenario, the US and Japan continue on the current path for bilateral collaboration. The alliance remains “asymmetrical but reciprocal,” and little change is seen in the current structure. However, ongoing problems – such as US military presence and each side’s contribution to the alliance – remain. The fact that these issues have been all but institutionalized into the alliance itself points to a serious flaw in the relationship. The alliance will not be broken by these issues because both sides recognize the importance and the benefit of their relationship; thus they seek to maintain the status quo. But persistent problems hinder further development. Also, the scenario focuses on the bilateral relationship and US and Japanese actions and reactions to various regional security challenges. This detracts from the potential for extensive multilateral collaboration beyond the current regional architecture. While the US-Japan alliance serves a number of common security objectives, such as being a regional stabilizer to China’s rise and taking a leading role in ad hoc multilateral coordination, incidental and ongoing spats will prevent the alliance from reaching its full potential.

The most *desirable* future for the US-Japan alliance would be the development of new, regional security architecture. The bilateral relationship’s ability to adapt to shifts in the regional security architecture is important for the alliance’s endurance. By placing emphasis on greater multilateral regional coordination, and the US and Japan’s combined role therein, the scenario points to the alliance’s flexibility and adaptability to an evolving security architecture. This kind of change would shift the emphasis of the US-Japan alliance from a bilateral unit to one that is part of a wider web of regional security relationships: a partnership within the greater community. While the alliance would remain the foundation of US policy in Asia, Japan and the US would also find new areas in which to expand cooperation. Despite occasional intra-alliance disagreements and ongoing regional security concerns, the alliance’s long-term stability allows for broader cooperative regional arrangements and the “enmeshing” of regional security relationships. The ability to adapt to changing dynamics in the Asia-Pacific security

architecture and to engage multilaterally improves the sustainability of the alliance, reinforcing its legitimacy in more than just the bilateral sense. But strategy shifts take time and effort – from both parties – and it is too easy to stick to the status quo.

### **Mr. Mark Garnick**

The US-Japan alliance is a crucial element of stability in Asia. An independent Japan would not be able defend itself from regional security threats, nor can it financially afford to do so. A regional architecture is promising, but there has been little development of US-ROK-Japan security cooperation, and current regional security architectures have not matured. Domestic politics continues to be a barrier to regional integration, especially historical interpretations of World War II and Japanese imperialism. China's commitment to regional security architecture is another barrier. For these reasons, the likely assessment of the future of US-Japan alliance is status quo plus.

Status quo plus recognizes the important variables influencing the US-Japan alliance, namely China and North Korea. US-Japan alliance support of extended deterrence is crucial to counter China's political leverage and military modernization. While conflict in the Taiwan Strait is unlikely, China's military will continue to grow and will require greater reliance on US extended deterrence. North Korea is the other critical component. Japan is threatened by DPRK conventional and nuclear weapons. These concerns together with US-Japan basing relocation issues will continue until Futenma is reconciled. While issues such as maritime security, humanitarian crises, multilateral regional architecture, and economic stability will be critical to the development of the alliance, it will be dependent on future "Big Bang" events involving North Korea and China.

The "regional architecture and Japan" should be the future of the US-Japan alliance, as coordination and numerous ad hoc mechanisms to solve regional concerns would be beneficial for regional security. Ad hoc mechanisms would provide a framework to address US-Japan and Japan-Asia concerns, as well as environmental protection, disaster cooperation, transnational crime prevention, and financial coordination; trade would also enhance the security of Asia. Although historical, territorial disputes, nationalism, and competition have hindered development of a regional architecture in the past; Japan could play a larger role in these institutions, and would be useful in mitigating the rise of China, and North Korea's provocative actions. The development of a Northeast Asia Security Forum with China, Japan, ROK, Russia, and the US would promote transparency, and lead to military-to-military relations. I would argue to include DPRK in this institution. This ad hoc mechanism should address nonproliferation, anti-piracy, port security, and other issues in the maritime domain. It is important to focus on these issues, since there are many flashpoints between individual members triggered by territorial disputes and other security concerns. The development of a regional architecture will provide a forum for nations to address security concerns such as US extended deterrence and hold discussions bilaterally, trilaterally, or quadrilaterally. A scenario where a regional architecture is in place and the US-Japan alliance continues is ideal since it promotes

regionalism, and provides a forum to discuss issues of the US-Japan alliance and China's rise.

### **Mr. Daniel Kliman**

A recent report authored by the Young Leaders explored three future scenarios for the US-Japan alliance: a fracturing of the alliance followed by the emergence of a strategically independent Japan; an extrapolation of the alliance status quo; and enmeshment of the alliance in an increasingly robust regional architecture. Of these scenarios, the last is the most likely future for the US-Japan alliance. Why?

First, though periodic tensions may mar US-Japan security ties, a breakdown in the alliance is improbable. The alliance is manifestly in the interest of the United States and Japan, so neither is likely to jettison it. Looking ahead, shared concerns about the uncertainty overhanging China's rise will override fissiparous tendencies created by differences over North Korea and the realignment of US bases in Japan.

Second, public opinion on the Japanese side will preclude a gradual evolution of the alliance along lines resembling that of the last decade. For Japanese politicians, championing new bilateral security initiatives will become increasingly costly. Instead, they will take the path of least resistance – deepening the US-Japan alliance in the context of regional institutions.

Third, the US-Japan alliance will naturally become a locus for regional institutions, particularly ad hoc coalitions that aim to address specific problems as they arise. The reason is straightforward: the United States and Japan will continue to bring unique military and economic capabilities to the table, plus, they will remain the most trusted major powers in the region.

Of the three US-Japan alliance scenarios explored by the Young Leaders, enmeshment in a regional architecture is the most desirable future.

A future where the alliance continues to exist is, by itself, of considerable value. For the United States, the alliance provides a platform for a strategic presence in East Asia that no other configuration of formal alliances and security relationships can fully replace. For Japan, the alliance allows the pursuit of security on the cheap at a time of growing fiscal constraints imposed by a rapidly aging population.

However, another future – the status quo plus scenario – also featured a robust US-Japan alliance. Why deem enmeshment in a regional architecture the most desirable future?

First, given Japanese public opinion, linking the alliance to regional institutions represents a more sustainable path than gradual evolution. It will be easier for the United States and Japan to undertake new security initiatives in the context of strengthening the regional architecture.

Second, tying the alliance to regional institutions will serve as a force multiplier. The alliance already functions as a major stabilizer in the region. As a cornerstone of regional institutions, the alliance will become even more effective in this public goods provision role.

Third, the US will have a voice in institutions underpinned by the alliance. Indeed, enmeshing the alliance in a regional architecture will help prevent the emergence of a closed political order in Asia.

### **Mr. Kei Koga**

The status quo plus scenario provides the most realistic assessment of the current security situation in East Asia, the US and Japanese security interests in the region, including management of the contingencies in Taiwan and North Korea, strengthening sea-lane stability, promoting humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and regional multilateralism as well as democratic values. However, considering the political and security impacts caused by events that may occur the next 10 years, including Japan's new political dynamics and relations with the United States, China's leadership changes in 2012, Kim Jong-II's succession problems and the future of the Korean Peninsula, the increasing role of the US-ROK alliance, and community building efforts in East Asia as well as Southeast Asia, the strategic objectives of the United States and Japan are likely to change, resulting in changes in the form and objectives of the alliance.

On the other hand, the regional architecture scenario provides a longer trajectory by setting a certain condition: changed situations on the Korean Peninsula. Although outcomes will depend on how the situation on the Peninsula develops, any instability is likely to create the situation where cooperation among states is inevitable in the short-term because each state understands that military conflict triggered by instability on the Korean Peninsula would have devastating impact on its economic and social welfare.

The regional architecture scenario should be the future of the US-Japan alliance. The US-Japan alliance and regional multilateral frameworks help promote expected state behavior. While the objective of the US-Japan alliance has become management of regional uncertainty by deterrence (which has become a public good), multilateral forums in East Asia also aim at promoting confidence-building measures and cooperation over nontraditional security issues. Although there is no overarching framework in East Asia, as the objectives of the alliance and multilateral forums converge, coordination among them would ensure stability in the region.

This scenario has several advantages. First, even if a regional great power attempts a “rule and divide” strategy, its effect is likely to be small because the web of frameworks comprising different memberships and different objectives diffuse those effects. Second, issue-specific frameworks promoted by functional cooperation give member states more incentive to focus on problem-solving as these issues relate to their interests. Third, while a traditional alliance is likely to be seen as an exclusive entity that might increase skepticism among states in the region, the alliance in this scenario is likely to be regarded

as a regional public good. Admittedly, the Northeast Asian Security Forum (NASF) might not be realized; however, the implication of this scenario is that the US-Japan alliance has the potential to cooperate with and become a useful component for various regional frameworks.

### **Ms. Makiko Kohatsu**

Because the US-Japan alliance is based on a long-standing history of reciprocity, the “status quo plus” is the most likely scenario. The mutual relationship includes a wide range of matters including shared interests, making this alliance difficult to overturn.

But by the year 2030, the alliance may face further challenges, contrary to the optimistic outlook of some. By that year, Japan will have gone through several administration changes in its national government, promoting the robustness of its democracy. In Okinawa, the political system would reflect the will of the people and lead to the reduction of the US military presence in Okinawa.

However, this is a double-edged sword. Such a reduction could lead to a more understanding attitude among Okinawans toward the US presence. On the other hand, if the Japanese government continues to fail to provide persuasive reasons to the people of Okinawa why the US military must be present on the island, it is more likely that such a reduction will only fuel demands of Okinawans for the complete elimination of US military bases on the island.

In my opinion, even in 2030, the US-Japan alliance will remain in place supported by the long-standing history shared by the two nations. However, this will likely face a situation less optimistic than the scenario described in “status quo plus.”

From the Japanese standpoint, the most desirable scenario would be the future emergence of a regional architecture in Asia in which the US-Japan alliance is embedded, because such a regional architecture will greatly promote stability in the region. Stability in Asia is crucially important to Japan especially in terms of securing its maritime lifeline. In addition, the Japanese economy faces shrinking domestic demand and it forces Japan to the Asian market to maintain its robustness and to develop.

However, there is no assurance that the US-Japan alliance will continue to flourish and play a major role in the prospective regional architecture. The bilateral relationship would continue to erode unless the Japanese government stops dragging its feet and makes active efforts to end its long-standing “domestic” disputes relating to the hosting of US military bases. There is no denying that the US would develop stronger ties with China rather than Japan in the future, especially given the rapidly growing economic ties between these two nations. In such a situation, Japan could see greater Chinese assertiveness and even damage to its territorial and economic interests.

In conclusion, under the current US-Japan relationship, the establishment of a regional architecture will be the most desirable scenario. However, if Japan wishes to take

advantage of such a regional framework, it will have to make serious efforts to keep the US-Japan alliance firm and strong.

### **Mr. Tetsuo Kotani**

An ideal future for the US-Japan alliance would be that it is integrated into regional security architecture. Japan and the US share a basic strategic vision in the region. Both envision an open and inclusive security architecture based on common interests and values rather than an exclusive alliance against a common threat. Both allies would enjoy greater benefit from a broader system that allows people, goods, capital, and knowledge to flow freely.

Asia, occupying half the world's population and one-third of the global economy, has the potential to reach an unprecedented level of prosperity and freedom in the first half of this century, improving living standards for billions. But the region faces uncertainties. In addition to traditional security concerns regarding the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait, new challenges – such as proliferation, disputes over maritime interests, fluctuating economies, a deepening divide between the urban wealthy and rural poor, climate change and worsening environmental threats, shifting military capacities, and the specter of terrorism – could influence regional stability in the near future.

We face challenges that have no respect for borders. They offer new arenas for global cooperation. But a state-centric mindset cannot seize these opportunities. The US-Japan alliance is the key to regional stability providing deterrence and reassurance but not necessarily an appropriate framework to handle all those challenges. Those challenges should be dealt with by a regional web of functional mechanisms rather than an alliance.

However, it is likely that the US-Japan alliance will continue to be the key security tool for the US and Japan. It is unlikely that there will be comprehensive regional security architecture because the Asia-Pacific region is not a unified entity. There are at least four sub-regions: Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Oceania. Each sub-region has different security challenges, and each state within those sub-regions has a different threat perception, security narrative, priority, and capacity and capability. Northeast Asia is a unique sub-region where traditional security dominates because of the North Korean nuclear and missile programs and China's rapid military modernization.

It is also unlikely that a Northeast Asian regional mechanism based on the Six-Party Talks will be effective on issues beyond North Korea. Such a mechanism will not provide any solution to territorial disputes because states will continue to deal with territorial disputes on a bilateral basis. The mechanism will not be effective to meet the challenge of rising Chinese military power.

There is no doubt that the US military footprint in Japan will be reduced, but this will make the alliance more critical because it will meet the same security challenges with reduced US military power. The alliance structure is premised on US hegemony and Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. Given the fact that it is becoming difficult for the

US to maintain its dominant power, Japan needs to play a greater role to keep the alliance effective.

### **Mr. Ross Matzkin-Bridger**

The “status quo plus” scenario is the most realistic assessment of the future of the US-Japan alliance. Japan continues to rely on the US for the defense of the Japanese homeland and for regional stability. Over the next 20 years there is not likely to be any major shift that would compel the US or Japan to want to seriously change this arrangement.

In Japan, the government is bogged down in an array of domestic issues that include a stagnant economy, ballooning public debt, and a rapidly aging society. The current annual defense budget – about \$45 billion – is much less than would be required to independently provide for the security of Japan. The alliance with the US saves the Japanese government billions of dollars that would otherwise have to be pumped into defense. Looking only at economic factors, Japan would not likely move to end or severely degrade the alliance. Moreover, Japan will increasingly look to the US to counter China’s rising regional influence. From the US perspective, maintaining the alliance is important to US interests, making it unlikely that there will be any move from Washington to change the status quo.

While multilateral institutions such as APEC and ASEAN have become more important, there is little evidence that they are producing new norms for regional security. The future of regional security will likely remain rooted in bilateral alliances.

The “Regional Architecture and Japan” is the most desirable future for the US-Japan alliance. Past US administrations have searched for ways to expand the traditional hub-and-spokes alliance structure in Asia. At the same time, East Asian countries have explored the possibility of multilateral organizations that address security concerns. While building robust regional security institutions is a difficult task, successfully doing so could be an excellent complement to the US-Japan alliance.

Regional institutions have become more important in Asia, but they have produced few tangible results in security cooperation. Effective security institutions could help lessen the burden that the US shoulders in Asian security. Furthermore, building upon institutions that are relatively weak on security issues – such as ASEAN and APEC – would help promote more effective governance in a region that often resorts to consensus. We have seen how ineffective this can be when a single organization includes fledgling democracies such as Indonesia and military dictatorships like Burma. The challenge for the region over the next 20 years will be to develop security institutions that focus less on consensus and more on results. This, in combination with strong bilateral relationships such as the US-Japan alliance, would be a positive move for security in the Asia Pacific.

### **Ms. Aki Mori**

The most likely future prospect of security environment is a deepened Japan-US alliance that is inter-locked within both regional frameworks such as the APEC and issue-oriented frameworks such as the NPT.

Despite the current painful situation of the alliance, the US alliance network including the Japan-US alliance will remain the most reliable provider of regional security in the foreseeable future. This is mainly because of the complexity created by the rise of China.

First, China has developed no alternative security framework to secure Japanese interests. China is too important to refuse to forge further cooperation. However, regional powers including the US and Japan are still in the process of finding an appropriate balance between Chinese claims and their security interests. As China rises, China increasingly shows a willingness to recover “lost interests” in modern history, namely in territorial disputes in the ocean such as in the South and in the East China Sea. Regional powers still need the US as a counterbalance to China, and an alliance with the US remains a top priority in securing their interests.

Second, when we look at COP 15, we find that China sometimes finds it hard to cooperate. This might be the same when trying to strengthen the NPT regime. China has been providing economic and political support to North Korea, which challenges the NPT regime by developing a nuclear device.

However, Japan should be reminded that China has become important in world politics while Japan has focused on alliance housekeeping during the process of political shift. The Hatoyama administration needs to work with the US to strengthen the NPT regime and to cooperate to fight climate change. Making a contribution to international security is a responsibility as well as a requirement to secure Japan’s interests.

Fostering a security architecture with a deepened Japan-US alliance is the most desirable future. A rapid shift in the security environment could destabilize the region and it should be carefully managed. Here too, the complexity of China’s rise is a major factor.

China’s growing role and influence in world politics will continue to expand strategic space and allow it to be a game changer. In this regard, it is inevitable that Asian states and the US will develop cooperative frameworks with China.

However, as we have seen in the discussion of COP15, Chinese international engagement can be selective because domestic constraints such as the huge income gap among Chinese people can limit policy choices. Concerns about these negative impacts of the rise of China drive the US and its allies toward more intense cooperation and coordination on certain issues.

In thinking about this mixed strategic picture, a web of regional architectures that weaves the US-centered alliance network and a cooperative framework with China is probably the best way to achieve a stable power transition in a changing security environment.

### **Ms. Wakana Mukai**

The most realistic future picture of the US-Japan alliance is the “status quo plus.” Since strategic interests of the United States will substantially remain in the East Asian region, it is unrealistic to expect its physical presence to decrease. The nuclear problem of North Korea seems unlikely to be resolved, and the issue of Taiwan remains untouched. Moreover, with China actively strengthening its military capability, the security situation would remain as the status quo at the very best in the short term. In this sense, the likelihood of a regional security architecture to emerge would be less promising, although there remain chances, for example, in the economic field, an area that serves the interest of all states and does not invite conflict. Less realistic is the possibility that Japan would abandon its alliance with the United States and act independently. There are too many security issues in East Asia to be resolved, and if Japan is to act individually it must strengthen its military capability: neighboring countries, however, would not appreciate such action. The military balance between the United States and Japan will continue to be unequal as long as nuclear deterrence remains a common understanding among the two parties. Since nuclear weapons are unlikely to be eliminated by 2030, the notion of nuclear deterrence, whether small or large, will continue to play a part in each country’s strategy.

The most desirable future of the US-Japan alliance would be a deepened alliance system that is integrated within a strengthened regional security framework. For one thing, if a regional security framework emerges in East Asia, it implies that disputes, for example, between China and Japan, South Korea and Japan, North Korea and other states in the region have been (or are nearly) resolved. The resolution of disputes would create confidence among nations and would become a strong tail wind for establishing such a forum. Like the European Union, it would be crucial for East Asian countries to use their original forum to facilitate economic growth and stability to balance other regions. Since the economic crisis in 2009, it would not be surprising if we see a similar situation in the short run. To prevent catastrophic deterioration, a structured system among neighboring countries would be preferable. However, since the strategic situation of East Asia is extremely complicated, it may remain tense for 20 years; hence, the possibility of a security architecture emerging is fairly low. If this were the case, then, the presence of the United States would continue to shape East Asian security issues, leaving Japan no option but to cooperate within the alliance system.

### **Ms. Naoko Noro**

Considering the current international and regional security environment, it is likely that the US-Japan alliance will continue to serve as the cornerstone of peace and stability in Asia for a foreseeable future.

Threats both countries are confronting today, either military threats such as North Korea's nuclear weapons capabilities or China's rapid modernization with relatively poor military transparency, or nontraditional threats such as the weapons proliferation, global terrorism, illegal trafficking, infectious diseases, or severe natural disasters, are not likely to disappear in the near future. Territorial disputes among states are likely to continue as well. It is both in countries' interest to evolve the alliance to deal with those challenges.

It isn't just Japan and US that confront these threats; other countries in Asia do too. However, it is unlikely that a permanent regional security architecture in Northeast Asia will emerge since nations in Northeast Asia (China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the United States) have not yet achieved a sufficient level of mutual trust, shared values and norms, or security interests. Rather, ad hoc multilateral forums such as the Six-Party Talks are a more likely scenario. Meanwhile, the US-Japan alliance will help strengthen confidence among the region and ensure stability.

Therefore, it is more realistic to see the US-Japan alliance in a wider perspective.

Even though there is a perception gap between the US and Japan on expectations for the alliance and problems of alliance management (exemplified by the US bases in Okinawa), it is not in Japan's or the US' interest to abolish the alliance. In the current and foreseeable future security environment, Japan and the US share the interest in strengthening the security alliance to meet these challenges. The US military presence in the region will also continue to serve as the cornerstone of peace and stability in Asia.

At the same time, to address security threats, whether military or non-traditional, there must be a commitment by the entire region to cooperate. Therefore, it will be the interests of the entire region to have an effective security architecture. However, considering the wide variety of political structures and security interests in Asia, it is likely that they will prefer expanding existing frameworks for cooperation with a relatively loose and nonbinding nature to include nontraditional security threats, rather than having a formal security architecture such as a Northeast Asia Security Forum.

Thus, *status quo plus*, the US-Japan alliance with wider roles to meet various threats and multilateral regional architectures, is likely to be the most stable scenario in Asia.

### **Ms. Jennifer Shin**

The future of the US-Japan alliance would likely develop toward a *regional security architecture*. Current US interests prefer to continue the commitment of extended deterrence to our Japanese ally. While President Obama's ambitious efforts to move toward the goal of a world without nuclear weapons continue, talks of developing a regional deterrence structure within the Northeast Asia region have begun. While a 'Northeast Asian Security Forum' emerging from the Six-Party talks is a good idea, there are too many complex security issues that the forum would need to address. There is no lack of forums or organized bodies for talks; we do lack a strong strategic policy related to Northeast Asia. President Obama has not yet made clear how his relationship is

unfolding with the new Japanese government and the basing issue could just be one contentious issue on the horizon.

Japan should not feel as though our extended deterrence commitment is being undermined by the US' role in leading the 'global zero' effort. Not only does the US have deep security interests in the region, but economic interests are also present, particularly as Japan has been struggling with a weak economy. Realistically, Japan and the US will remain close allies and move toward a regional security architecture.

The US-Japan alliance will face conflicting interests if Japan becomes more independent, and if the US is not able to fulfill extended deterrence commitments. While the idea of an independent Japan seems unlikely given the current state of the US-Japan alliance, the change of Japanese government last year resulted in small but possibly significant changes in defense policy. Since Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio has come to power, his first signal was to reexamine the location of a US military base on Okinawa. US officials were caught off guard with this move and the US expects Japan to adhere to the 2006 agreement. Additionally, while Japan has bought several US ballistic missile ships and systems, the new government indicated that it no longer 'held a view' on extended deterrence commitments met by the Tomahawk Land Attack missile. However, Japan has indicated it still 'expects' extended deterrence commitments to be met through other nuclear and conventional means, not any new nuclear weapons. It sounds like the US and Japan have different views about how extended deterrence commitments will be met, particularly as North Korea's nuclear program remains opaque, and as the new Japanese government shows signs of policy changes.

# **US-Korea Strategic Dialogue**

## **Program Report**

By Kevin Shepard

### *Breakfast Meetings*

During the two-day US-ROK Strategic Dialogue, Young Leaders met with two distinguished experts for informal breakfast sessions, and held a roundtable plenary session at the conclusion of the conference.

At the breakfast meeting with *Kongdan Oh-Hassig* (IDA), Katy explained the path she took to her current position and discussed employment opportunities in the field of research. She also explained her view of US-DPRK relations and how she believed the DPRK and DPRK issues, should be approached, and discussed her books on the subject. Young Leaders who had breakfast with *L. Gordon Flake* (Mansfield Foundation) learned about the working environment in the NGO-side of Korean affairs. Gordon discussed his background, explaining what led him to his current job as well as discussing his family and how he balances the two. In response to questions, he shared his views on education vs. experience, public- vs. private-sector work, and other career advice. He also spoke about opportunities in Washington DC for Korean citizens, his travels, and his relationships with South Korean friends and counterparts.

### *Post-Conference Roundtable*

Brad Glosserman chaired a post-conference round-table with the Young Leaders to garner YL insights into the two days of dialogue. Specifically, he asked YLs to comment on statements that struck them as important, incorrect, or different than the Young Leader's perspective. He also asked for feedback on the US-ROK visualization project that Adrian Yi and Kevin Shepard had presented to the Young Leaders after the opening dinner. He pointed out that the project was created from a US perspective, and asked YLs to consider how an ROK perspective might be different. He also asked YLs to think about whether the project could be applied to other bilateral or multilateral relationships, or if there were other formats the project could use.

One Korean YL felt the first day of talks was very much in a “Cold War mentality,” and noted that the senior participants had experienced a different international environment than the YLs. This was evident in the language and vocabulary used, and the portrayal of North Korea. The YL noted that since the 2000 inter-Korean summit, perceptions in the ROK have changed, and the North no longer is threatening.

A senior participant had stated that ‘young people don’t understand’ inter-Korean relations, and during the YL roundtable, it was observed that most people don’t understand North Korea; it’s an industrial regime in a post-industrial world. This led to a discussion of perceptions of North Korea, and a Korean YL stated that Korean men understand the North Korean threat due to ‘brainwashing’ and overemphasis on the threat

during mandatory military service. Another Korean YL expressed doubt as to whether the difference in perception was generational, suggested it was instead related to the change in ROK capabilities and confidence. A US YL concurred that there is no generational divergence in understanding among Korean men, but stated that it may not be the correct understanding; in the YL's perspective, the Korean male view of North Korea is hypersensitive. An ROK YL (male) stated that while military men are educated on the threat from North Korea, they are also taught that ROK systems are superior, and many soldiers joke about the DPRK threat, raising questions as to just how threatened they actually feel. It was also noted that the charge by the senior participant that the younger generation focuses on qualitative rather than quantitative comparisons, and a YL pointed out literature by senior ROK academics highlighting qualitative methods of measuring DPRK military capabilities. This literature confirms ROK military superiority.

This raised the question of ROK confidence, and how confidence might impact national psyche. A US YL compared the ROK threat perception to Indian perceptions of the Pakistan threat, while a Korean YL compared the generational difference in DPRK threat perception to perceptual differences between parents and children, noting that if military confrontation occurs, it is the younger generation that would become victims. Another Korean YL pointed out that the younger generation of Koreans faces other issues, and without personal experiences of North Korea, it does not warrant as much attention as job security and education. Also, the younger generation is less biased and more objective than the older generation. This was followed by a Korean YL comment that the Sunshine Policy had led to the humanization of North Korea, as had the movie, "Joint Security Area." A US YL stated that South Koreans have every right to be confident, with an impressive GDP, successful economy, Ban Ki-Moon as secretary general of the United Nations, the nuclear reactor sales deal reached with the UAE, and other developments. The ROK's hosting of the upcoming G20 Summit and Nuclear Security Summit were also noted.

The conversation then steered toward the ROK younger generation's views on inter-Korean unification. No YLs opposed unification in the long run, but it was noted that a Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) survey found that the majority of South Koreans opposed immediate unification. Potential costs and benefits of unification were discussed, and it was noted that at the beginning of the Sunshine Policy, some thought that it was cheaper to "pay off" North Korea than to absorb it; this might not be the case today, but most Koreans do not want to actively pursue implosion of the North Korean regime.

A question was raised regarding the state of unification education and education on North Korean human rights. A Korean YL stated that during the 1980s, students were taught that North Korea was portrayed as a wolf, but it is now understood that unification will happen eventually, so a better understanding of North Korea is necessary. However, with the DPRK's nuclear tests and human rights abuses, the situation seems to be moving backward. A US YL pointed out that ROK textbooks are re-written with each new government. This led to the question of whether anyone understands how the DPRK thinks or what motivates DPRK decisions.

A US YL agreed that information about the North is incomplete, but argued that is always increasing, and that people today have a better understanding than we did five or 10 years ago. This trend will continue as North Korea interacts with the international community and North Koreans continue to defect. A Korean YL noted that although we cannot know their logic, North Korea has been consistent. Another Korean YL compared the North to a puzzle to which we do not have all the pieces, saying that it had become a mystery that cannot be solved without all the information. Finally, a YL pointed out that increasing numbers of pictures of North Korea are available, and asserted that image perception is very influential.

Conversation then moved to ROK-Japan relations, and South Korean YLs' perceptions of Japan. A Korean YL said that nations have egos, just as leaders do. The more recognition Korea got on the international stage, the less it competed with Japan. Another stated his parents felt that nothing from Japan was good, but that they still had Japanese friends. He, on the other hand, enjoyed everything about Japan, but sided with Korea when flare-ups occur. Another YL stated that territorial disputes were annoying, but acknowledged that most Japanese don't seem to care. A US YL pointed out that twice during other sessions, senior ROK participants had downgraded Japan's importance in the region, one stating that he couldn't see Japan having even a regional role, and another referring to a Korean saying that describes Korea as being "a shrimp between fighting whales", but then labeling the whales 'US' and 'China;' traditionally, the whales are China and Japan. A Korean YL then argued that the ROK public feels more threatened by Japan than by the DPRK, and stated that her feelings about Japan were "all mixed up." Two Korean YLs pointed to the emotional factor in ROK-Japan relations, with one stating that strategic relations need to be strengthened, and another distrusting Japan, accusing Japanese of not saying what they feel.

YLs were challenged to choose one diplomatic initiative they would prioritize for South Korea. A Korean YL chose North Korea, explaining that the two Koreas need to resolve their problems before involving outside actors. Two others agreed, calling for direct engagement with the government and military of the DPRK. Another commented that Korea is getting a big ego due to all the upcoming summit hosting opportunities, but stated that it was necessary to fix the asymmetry in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.



## US-Korea Strategic Dialogue

### Pre-Conference Essays

*What is the big issue in the US-ROK strategic relationship?*

*What is the biggest opportunity in the US-ROK strategic relationship?*

#### **Ms. Jiun Bang**

Here, the expression ‘issue’ is assumed to be synonymous with the ‘problem’ as it relates to the US-ROK relationship. In my mind, the problem facing US-ROK relations is the strategic decision to focus on *brain-storming* and the multidirectional expansion of the functional aspect of the relationship as opposed to *problem-solving* and thus, the vertical extension in resiliency of bilateral relations. Brain-storming has resulted in ‘new’ cooperative agendas such as climate change, epidemic disease, and peacekeeping operations as evidenced by the Joint Vision of June 2009. To be fair, this has created an aura of renewed vitality and sense of mission for the relationship. Nevertheless, it was 2006 when the first round of the Korea-US (KORUS) Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations started; wartime operational control (OPCON) was suggested by the Roh administration in the early ‘00s, and it has been over seven years since North Korea withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Hence, agendas that are most pertinent on the bilateral level are outliving the leadership under which they were first brought to attention – therefore, becoming ‘rollover issues.’ Just like rollover minutes, they accumulate until action is taken to remedy them. We are at, or slightly over, the midway point in the term for both presidents in the US and South Korea, with both countries scheduled for presidential elections a month apart in late 2012. With only half or less of their terms remaining, we have a clear lack of political will and resolve in getting at the core bilateral agendas.

Despite the concern of stretching resources too thin by co-opting multilateral agendas into the bilateral sphere, there is a positive function of having framed a traditionally bilateral relationship in a less parochial setting as that of a ‘global’ alliance: the convenience of resorting to the multilateral framework to channel positive energy to seemingly bilateral issues. A case in point would be the ongoing debacle regarding South Korea’s demands for reprocessing of spent fuel. As Frank N. von Hippel astutely suggested (see, “South Korean Reprocessing: An Unnecessary Threat to the Nonproliferation Regime,” *Arms Control Today*, March 2010), R&D on fast-neutron reactors – an integral part of the reprocessing proposition made by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) – could be conducted in a multilateral setting, involving such actors as the US, Japan, China, and Russia. This alternative would be akin to the Generation IV International Forum, a cooperative international endeavor to which the aforementioned states are already party. Such collaboration on nuclear energy would also provide positive spill-over effects in confidence/trust-building and renewed momentum on nonproliferation and disarmament. If South Korea’s call for reprocessing is about genuine necessity as opposed to a claim of rights based on nationalism (or even

envy that Japan is the only non-nuclear weapon state that attempts to, and has made inroads into, reprocessing), the multilateral option should be seriously considered. With the recent signing of the US-Russia Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) follow-on agreement and the upcoming NPT Review Conference (RevCon), we have the opportunity to embed the US-ROK bilateral issue of reprocessing into a multilateral setting more conducive to nonproliferation.

### **Ms. Brittany Billingsley**

The US-ROK alliance remains a working partnership with common goals, strategic cooperation, and shared vision. However, both parties must find areas to broaden and deepen the relationship to maintain the alliance's vitality.

Ongoing uncertainty surrounding US commitment threatens to fracture the relationship's foundation. OPCON transfer and responsibility sharing come to mind, but reliability of the US nuclear umbrella also feeds into commitment concerns. President Lee required the 2009 US-ROK Joint Vision Statement to explicitly declare that the US include the "nuclear umbrella" as part of its extended deterrence strategy. This served a number of purposes: to reiterate that the US was not leaving, to reinforce the deterrent measure against the perceived DPRK threat, and to halt any stronger push within the ROK for development of its own nuclear deterrent. However, emphasis on the nuclear umbrella runs *almost* counter to current US nuclear strategy. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) declares that the US intends to use nuclear weapons primarily (though not solely) as a deterrent, and seeks to phase out their importance, shifting the emphasis of extended deterrence to conventional capabilities. As such, this concept of a nuclear umbrella needs to be revamped. Placing too much emphasis on the nuclear element of extended deterrence detracts from other components (e.g., conventional strike and missile defense capabilities).

One of the biggest opportunities for the alliance is expanding nuclear cooperation. The ROK will host the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, which is a sign of its own commitment to and responsibility for regional and global nuclear security objectives. Bilaterally, there is also the US-ROK civil nuclear cooperation agreement, set to expire in 2014. Renewing the commitment – with some revision – would reinforce US commitment to the alliance, enhance bilateral nuclear trade and cooperation, strengthen nonproliferation and export controls, and could become a model for future civil nuclear agreements. This opportunity presents its own set of challenges which will need to be addressed, notably enrichment and reprocessing (ENR). The US has thus far denied consent to the ROK to reprocess US-supplied spent nuclear fuel for a number of reasons, including the potential proliferation risk, resistance from the national and international communities, and the watchful eye of the DPRK. Unfortunately for the ROK, the inability to reprocess spent fuel is one of the biggest obstacles to expanding its civil nuclear program. With the advent of a renewed civil nuclear cooperation agreement, the US could permit pyroprocessing (a method that has caught the ROK's attention because it is considered "proliferation resistant," as it does not separate plutonium), so long as it is carried out under mutually accepted nonproliferation and safeguard requirements. Alternatively, the

US and ROK could collaborate to develop proliferation resistant reprocessing techniques while developing related safeguards with the IAEA. Either solution to the ENR dilemma could enhance bilateral civil nuclear cooperation and US-ROK coordination.

### **Ms. See-Won Byun**

A major factor shaping the US-ROK strategic partnership is China's rise. A rising China represents a challenge for the United States and South Korea in four ways. First, a comprehensive, global alliance is inconsistent with Chinese strategic preferences. Beijing is sensitive to a continued US military presence on the peninsula and any extension of the alliance beyond the North Korea threat. Second, South Korea remains suspicious of Chinese views of unification and long-term intentions in Korea. South Koreans have accused China of nurturing North Korea as its "fourth northeastern province" given historical and territorial claims that sour the Sino-ROK security relationship. Third, China's rise demands adjustments in the Asian security architecture that affect US and ROK regional relationships. US-ROK alliance coordination with Japan must take into account the potential response from Beijing. Fourth, China continues to build its traditional friendship and increasingly important economic partnership with North Korea. China's engagement with North Korea seems to reflect a preference for stability over US and ROK priorities of denuclearization.

While many economists in the late 1990s predicted China's collapse, China not only continues to grow but is now leading the global recovery from the world financial crisis. Many observers also warned against the China threat but Beijing has arguably assumed a responsible stakeholder role, emerging as a major diplomatic partner of both the United States and South Korea and as mediator of multilateral talks on North Korea. China's rise requires closer coordination with Beijing given potential tensions emerging from differences in strategic interests.

The 2009 Joint Vision Statement specifies "peaceful reunification on the principles of free democracy and a market economy" as a core alliance objective. But achieving this goal will depend on North Korea's domestic transition and how Pyongyang responds to external efforts of engagement. North Korea aims to emerge as a "strong and prosperous nation" by 2012 and appears to be shifting from self-reliance to reform and opening, particularly toward China.

North Korea's domestic transition presents an important opportunity for alliance cooperation and coordination with Beijing. There is a basic convergence of North Korea policies on denuclearization, stability, and the long-term development of North Korea; issues that cannot be separated from the North's internal transition. US-ROK political and diplomatic coordination with China on the future of Korea would enhance mutual understanding of respective strategic priorities. The possibility of sudden instability in North Korea requires strengthened military coordination that would address fears about potential Chinese or US-led unilateral interventions. Ensuring the North's sustainable development will also require long-term economic coordination with regional and

international partners. Humanitarian assistance is a major area of Chinese interest given concerns over a potential refugee crisis across the border.

A global US-ROK alliance allows an approach to North Korea in global contexts in such areas as nonproliferation, development assistance, peacekeeping, and post-conflict stabilization. Engaging China in these areas based on common understandings related to Korea's end-state would ease Chinese concerns about the alliance and positively shape US and ROK perceptions of China's rise.

### **Mr. Sungmin Cho**

The US and ROK have to face the possibility of contingency in North Korea and start developing a joint plan. Until now, the two countries have developed Operational Plan 5027 in case of a North Korean invasion, and have coordinated efforts to roll back North Korea's nuclear program under the framework of the Six-Party Talks. In addition, domestic elements in both countries have gradually increased pressure targeting North Korea's human right issues. But these different issue-areas are not integrated into a grand policy package, and will not make direct contributions to the joint efforts of the two countries when facing contingencies in North Korea in the foreseeable future.

The US and the ROK have separate scenario-planning processes. It is time for the two countries to develop coordinated contingency planning within the framework of the US-ROK alliance. The joint plan should not be limited to the military. The plan should take into account a wide range of issues: from securing WMD to large exodus of North Korean refugees, to restoration of social order, and so on. Both parties will soon realize China's involvement is key to planning a response that is both plausible and feasible. It will be required to initiate communication with China to avoid mutual misperceptions and to explore the possibility of trilateral planning. However, close coordination within the US-ROK alliance framework must precede cooperation between China and the US-ROK alliance. Therefore, it is necessary for the US and ROK to develop contingency plans together for a North Korean crisis.

The Demilitarization Zone (DMZ) mirrors the two faces of nuclear energy. North Korea has been using nuclear energy to develop weapons of mass destruction while South Korea has been utilizing nuclear energy. Likewise, the US-ROK alliance also has a two-faced mechanism in relation to the nuclear issue. The concept of Extended Nuclear Deterrence (END) or nuclear umbrella at the regional level, deep-seated in the US-ROK alliance, appears to run contrary to the US' goal of a 'nuclear-free world' at the global level. However, END not only aims to deter North Korea, but also contributes to deterring South Korea from developing its own nuclear weapons by guaranteeing its security. In other words, extended deterrence targeting North Korea turns into the extension of the nonproliferation targeting South Korea. As such, the complex nature of nuclear energy is vividly displayed on the Korean Peninsula.

In this circumstance, the US-ROK alliance has focused on how to correct North Korea's use of nuclear energy from a military perspective. The significance of South Korea's

peaceful use of nuclear energy does not receive enough attention within the framework of the US-ROK alliance. The US and ROK need to make conscious efforts about how to make use of this stark contrast between the North and South Korea to promote the global objective of a nuclear-free world. Beyond deterrence against North Korea, the US-ROK alliance should take into account the positive impact that the symbolic gesture of promoting South Korea's peaceful nuclear energy can have on the world. The upgrading of the US-ROK peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement in 2014 will send clear signals about what act will be rewarded or punished when it comes to using nuclear energy. The dual significance of nuclear energy on the Korean Peninsula, ironically, provides the US-ROK alliance with an opportunity to transcend regional boundaries and to reach a global goal.

### **Mr. Seukhoon Paul Choi**

*"Ideas matter in foreign policy, but only through the mechanism of interests and interest articulation...It is imperative to trace ideas through the maze of interests and identities before ideas come to gel as the basis for foreign policy." – Young Whan Kihl*

Throughout the past 60 years, the US-ROK alliance has provided the necessary defense for the extraordinary development and transformation of South Korea. This success, coupled with changes in the international environment, has inspired calls for change in the alliance. Proponents of the relationship, Koreans and Americans alike, argue that for it to remain strategic, it must become more comprehensive. Accordingly, leaders in both countries have promoted a broadening of the alliance – from the Cold War legacy based on threats to a 21<sup>st</sup>-century alliance based on common values and interests.

The most significant issue and opportunity for the US-ROK strategic relationship is alliance transformation. On the surface, it seems the rise of South Korea has transformed its identity and interests in a way that would support a new strategic relationship. This is demonstrated by a greater number of Koreans visiting and studying in the US, general backing of the KORUS FTA, as well as the dispatch of ROK forces to Iraq, Afghanistan, and PSI exercises. However, it is in this last area of security where identity and interests may yet converge.

The re-deployment of Korean civilian workers and security forces in Afghanistan earlier this year, as well as Korea's membership in PSI, was publicized by the Lee administration and ruling party lawmakers as acts in pursuit of Korea's national interest in promoting global stability, and an expansion of its role in the international community.<sup>1</sup> This was a welcome change from former President Roh's deployment motivation of alliance commitment, because it seemed to reflect cooperative efforts based on common interests, rather than entrapment and fears of abandonment.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Kang, Hyun-kyung, "Afghan Troop Dispatch Approved," *Korea Times*, Feb. 25, 2010, [http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/02/116\\_61413.html](http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/02/116_61413.html), accessed April 14, 2010.

<sup>2</sup> Finnegan, Michael, "Korea's Return to Afghanistan," Center for US-Korea Policy, January 2010 – Vol.2, No.1.

However, it is uncertain whether this shared interest between Korea and the US is shared between Koreans. Opposition lawmakers called the dispatch “unjustifiable” and that it only made the country “a target for international terrorism.”<sup>3</sup> The more conservative faction of the political and military elite also protested that President Lee’s decision to transform the nature of the alliance threatens security and stability on the peninsula. Finally, opinion polls reveal that in 2009, 49 percent of South Koreans believed that US troops should withdraw from Afghanistan (vs. 38 percent that believed US troops should stay), and 71 percent vs. 23 percent opposed US-led anti-terrorism efforts.<sup>4</sup> Thus, the question remains: do Koreans really believe that out-of-area international security and stabilization efforts are in their national interest? Do Koreans really identify themselves as citizens of a middle-power with a role of providing global public goods?

If Koreans have yet to identify themselves as such, then efforts to highlight this heightened status and potential role are an important task. President Lee’s promotion of a “Global Korea” corresponds to the country’s involvement in international peacekeeping and post-conflict stabilization missions around the world.<sup>5</sup> And, as many political elite are framing such participation within the context of Korea’s national interest, independent of the alliance, this notion may become popular. Furthermore, experience, regardless of intent, will help build Korea’s skills and confidence as a global actor, as well as broaden the US-ROK relationship. Sometimes it takes the help of a friend to realize things about oneself. Thus, the US should continue to encourage and support Korea in roles as host for international forums and summits, as well as partner in international security.

### **Mr. Mark Garnick**

The big issue is the DPRK’s provocative actions. The ROK perceives the DPRK as destabilizing the Korean Peninsula since it continues to develop nuclear weapons. The US perceives the DPRK as threatening South Korea which requires the US to maintain extended deterrence, but also undermines the nonproliferation regime. The US and ROK must deter the DPRK from attacking the ROK, and preventing it from proliferating sensitive nuclear technology. Another big issue is an inability to persuade China to influence the DPRK to denuclearize. While China has agreed to UNSCR 1874, it has done little to prevent ships suspected of sensitive material from leaving the DPRK or transiting China. Nonetheless, the DPRK continues to develop nuclear weapons and missile technology which threatens US forces in Korea and South Korea. North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons seeks to establish the legitimacy of its regime. In the process, the US extended nuclear deterrent is called into question. South Korean calls for the US to reaffirm the nuclear umbrella for South Korea to ensure that the US will retaliate if the DPRK attacks. Many scholars have called for the US to redeploy nuclear weapons in South Korea, or to withdraw its nuclear umbrella. Both will have adverse

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<sup>3</sup> Kang, Hyun-kyung, “Afghan Troop Dispatch Approved,” *Korea Times*, Feb. 25, 2010, [http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/02/116\\_61413.html](http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/02/116_61413.html), accessed April 14, 2010.

<sup>4</sup> Pew Global Attitudes Project Key Indicators Database. <http://pewglobal.org/database/>, accessed April 14, 2010.

<sup>5</sup> Snyder, Scott. “Strengthening the US-ROK Alliance,” Center for US-Korea Policy, February 2009, p.14.

affects on the Korean Peninsula. The US and the ROK need to develop a policy to signal to North Korea that the US will not attack the DPRK unless its proliferates sensitive technology or launches an attack against US allies in the region.

There are many opportunities to develop the US-ROK strategic relationship. One opportunity is to engage the DPRK. One way to do that is to engage North Korea multilaterally. While the Six-Party Talks remain stagnant, the US should promote bilateral meetings with other actors in the region to establish deep partnerships, especially with the ROK. The US and the ROK should discuss sanctions or alternative means of managing North Korea, and then the two nations should consult Japan, China, and finally Russia. Coming to a consensus toward the DPRK, especially involving China, will be difficult. However, the key challenge is to convince them that North Korea is a threat. China will be the greatest challenge, given its stake in Korean peninsula stability. The US and the ROK must convince China that the DPRK regime is a threat, particularly in the event of a DPRK collapse and assure it that this is a real possibility. This can be done bilaterally or trilaterally with Japan. The ROK also needs stronger customs enforcement, and further integration with port security. South Korea is a party to the Container Security Initiative (CSI) in Pusan, and there is an opportunity for Kunsan and Incheon to participate in the CSI. The US Coast Guard could deepen its relationship with the ROK Navy or customs to develop more effective ship interdiction capabilities. Improved customs authorities would enhance the PSI and promote security of the ROK.

### **Ms. Ellen Kim**

One major obstacle facing US-ROK bilateral relations is the renegotiation of the 1974 nuclear cooperation agreement that will expire in 2014. The issue has not received much public attention in either country. However, different political and security conditions in the US and South Korea and the divergent interests and views behind the current agreement will make the negotiation process a challenge for both countries that could strain their strategic relationship.

The center of controversy is South Korea's accumulating nuclear spent fuel that will fill its storage capacity by 2016 and the country's spent fuel treatment process known as pyroprocessing. The US and South Korea disagree over whether pyroprocessing is more proliferation resistant than PUREX, a method in use by most nuclear states. With President Obama's goal of nuclear safety and security and fight against nuclear terrorism, US priority of nuclear nonproliferation will likely move its decision in the direction that South Korea will find disappointing.

The unique political and security environment in South Korea, especially the North Korea nuclear factor, also adds a more complex dimension to the renegotiation process. Despite North Korea's breach of the 1992 Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and its clandestine development of nuclear weapons, South Korea has been and will continue to maintain its pledge that it would not seek nuclear enrichment or reprocessing capabilities. Nevertheless, the lack of progress in the Six-Party Talks and a precedent set by the US that allowed reprocessing in Japan and India coupled with the

long-standing military confrontation with the North, particularly after the sinking of the *Cheonan* and the speculation of North's involvement, could reshape South Koreans' perception about the 1974 accord and the US rationale behind it. The alliance managers in both the US and South Korea should keep an eye on politicization of the issue as domestic national sentiment in Korea could flare up and influence the tone, scope, and context of the new nuclear cooperation agreement.

The KORUS FTA has been stalled in both countries for three years since it was signed in 2007. South Korea, with approval from the Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee of the National Assembly, has moved closer to ratification, but no similar action has been taken by the US. President Obama's State of the Union Address in January, in which he explicitly spoke for the first time about the importance of signing FTAs with trading partners and the passage of landmark health-care legislation in the House created an opportunity for the KORUS to move forward.

The KORUS FTA is important in many ways. First, the agreement will provide real economic benefits to both countries, with increased trade stimulating their economies and stemming the rising unemployment triggered by the global economic crisis. Second, implementation of the agreement will evolve their alliance from security to an economic partnership. Considering US economic and strategic military interests in Northeast Asia, the integration of two economies will further deepen their relationship, solidifying the US presence in the region while reassuring South Korea of its commitment to peace, stability, and prosperity on the peninsula. Third, the KORUS FTA is an opportunity for the US to reaffirm its commitment to free trade and renew its global economic leadership. South Korea could step up to play a major role in global affairs and extend its influence across the world. Lastly, while South Korea is actively pursuing FTAs with other countries including China and Japan, the cost of further delaying or not ratifying the agreement by the US will not only cause American people to lose market share in Korea but could also derail its strategic alliance. The KORUS FTA is not a win-win strategy for everyone. However, in a broader perspective, it is a mutually beneficial trade pact that will forge a comprehensive alliance that both countries need to meet common challenges in the future.

### **Ms. Ji-Young Lee**

One of the big issues in the US-ROK strategic relationship is addressing the lack of shared vision on *how to cooperate* with China. This is important for two reasons. First, Beijing is increasing its political influence over the joint denuclearization efforts of North Korea. While Washington approaches the Six-Party Talks as part of a global non-proliferation issue, the strategic implications of the role that Beijing plays in the talks are most likely to go beyond the issue of stopping the North from developing nuclear weapons. Rather, dynamics among six nations involved in the Talks should be read as the strategic configuration of a transition to a unified Korea. Second, any long-term assessment of the strength of the US-ROK strategic partnership will inevitably involve the question of how Seoul and Washington as allies handle China's growing political power on the peninsula. If an external threat from North Korea has been driving

Washington's and Seoul's security cooperation with Beijing, alliance handlers should think ahead and come up with a shared vision on China's future role in the Korean Peninsula. Strengthening the relationship between Seoul and Washington should be taken as seriously as seeking a constructive working relationship with China. That way, the Six-Party Talks can be used as the basis for a more comprehensive institutional setting for future stability on the Korean Peninsula and the region. A US-PRC condominium over the North Korean situation and "Korea passing" would be Seoul's nightmare, resulting in a *serious* weakening of confidence in the alliance.

The future of the North Korean regime has been suggested as a source of great danger to the security of Northeast Asia. However, this uncertainty and fluidity can also be the biggest opportunity for the US-ROK strategic relationship. The Korean Peninsula is a junction at which strategic interests of the US, China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, and Russia meet, and it is no secret that their interests are not converging when it comes to the strategic implications of a unified Korea. On top of North Korea contingency planning, alliance handlers should engage in deep, constructive dialogue to establish a working institutional mechanism through which these strategic interests are well-coordinated throughout pre-contingency, contingency, and post-contingency phases. If handled wisely based on trust and tight coordination between the US-ROK, this could provide the region with a viable institutional basis for stability and peace. The proposed Northeast Asian Regional Forum based on the Six-Party Talks could be a useful concert-type security mechanism in which national interests of these powers are reflected. The US-ROK strategic partnership should play a key role in creating such an institutional forum to prevent South Korea from being marginalized by the unification process. By partnering with Seoul, Washington could decide the nature and extent of US engagement with a new security landscape in the region.

### **Ms. Yeun Kyung Park**

In the post-9/11 era, the ROK-US strategic relationship faces a major challenge to reinvent itself to fit the new security environment under the name of a comprehensive strategic alliance of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. There are several issues to be addressed to realize such a vision; among them wartime operational control (OPCON) transfer in 2012 appears to be the most burdensome.

In line with the growing economic power of the ROK, the demand for more autonomy in defense and security increased, and the OPCON transfer was the most symbolic demonstration of such sentiment. Unfortunately, it seems that such symbolic action hinders development of the relationship, imposing too many burdens, especially on the ROK government. This transfer requires a tremendous structure change in both the ROK military and the USFK. The tasks include relocation of the USFK forces, dissolution of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command, and ROK military capacity-building and so forth. All these tasks create not only heavy administrative work but also a huge budgetary responsibility for the ROK government. More importantly operational ability and the effectiveness of this transfer is debated, and there is criticism that this transfer

undermines the commitment of the US to regional security and may give a false impression to North Korea.

Although the two governments are trying to dilute skepticism, the *Cheonan* incident raises questions about ROK military capabilities. OPCON transfer, once considered a political triumph, now puts the ROK government in domestic political trouble.

The political geography of East Asia in the 21<sup>st</sup> century can be characterized by a lack of regional institutionalization due to historical memories, lack of common identity, and absence of leadership. Given this security architecture, the biggest opportunity for the ROK-US strategic relationship is to establish an enduring framework for long-term regional security and stability.

The ROK-US alliance is the strongest relationship in the region, especially when the US-Japan alliance is stumbling over the relocation of the USFJ, e.g. the Futenma air base. Now is the time for the two to stretch and develop a common regional strategy. The two would have the capacity to take leadership in developing a regional security framework by playing a balancing role between other regional powers such as China and Japan. There is a good foundation. The decision that South Korea will host the next Nuclear Security Summit reaffirms not only the shared security interest of the two states but also trust. The Six-Party Talks will be a practical test for their leadership. Finally, the ratification of the KORUS FTA will further consolidate the relationship. What is left is to conceptualize the mutual vision and draw an agreement on leadership.

Taking leadership in regional cooperation is not an easy task, yet a stable regional order within a framework of their own design will contribute significantly not only to promotion of strategic interests in the region but also to containment of future contingencies in North Korea.

### **Dr. Kevin Shepard**

The issue looming over the US-ROK strategic relationship that has the most potential to strain the alliance is the sinking of the South Korean Pohang-class Patrol Combat Corvette *Cheonan*. Initial reports following salvage operations confirm an external blast was responsible. There are several possible explanations, all of which could harm US-ROK ties.

If North Korea was responsible, the South must react. A military response could test the US promise of extended deterrence. The most effective military response would be several strategically-placed *Tomahawk* missiles; whether a retaliatory strike could be considered deterrence, especially after a month has passed, would be contentious. A diplomatic response would raise questions as to the need for USFK, and would raise concerns over US military commitment, both in Korea and in Japan. If the *Cheonan* struck a North Korean mine, speculation over intent would be divisive in ROK politics, while even if a torpedo strike was to blame, most South Koreans would likely not support

military retaliation; yet the lack of it would weaken trust in US deterrence and commitment.

If the culprit was a stray ROK or US mine (yes, the US mined those waters, too), it would fuel anti-US and pro-unification forces, hamper efforts to expand military cooperation, hinder joint training exercises, and create an atmosphere that would make it difficult to strengthen allied relations.

Regardless of the cause, the incident has highlighted South Korea's weak ASW capabilities, and the post-incident response has exposed inadequacies in ROK military preparedness, including SAR, salvage, and safety equipment. This calls into question ROK readiness to take over wartime OPCON. The delay or failure of OPCON transfer would considerably weaken trust between the allies, hamper US efforts to realign USFK, and pose a political challenge to the Lee administration.

Last year, Presidents Obama and Lee mapped ambitious plans for the alliance. Their Joint Vision Statement contains several points that address recently highlighted nuclear and proliferation-related concerns. The Lee administration has made good on its promise to make South Korea a more influential player in regional and international forums, and taken the South to a new level of international standing, evidenced by the upcoming G20 and the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit. In order to pursue nuclear security goals, Washington and Seoul should highlight South Korea's growing economic and diplomatic influence and link them to the South's actions as a responsible member of international nuclear agreements, its use of safe, secure nuclear energy, and its alliance with the United States. If the United States has the foresight to allow South Korea the right to pyroprocessing of its spent nuclear fuel, then South Korea can present itself as a leader in the development (and export) of civilian nuclear technology while the United States can highlight the benefits available to countries with compliant nuclear programs. The renegotiation of the US-ROK peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement (expiring in 2014) prior to the upcoming G20 summit would be a propitious opportunity to advance US nuclear safety objectives, ROK international standing, alliance benefits, and South Korean nuclear export schemes. Not only is this mutually advantageous, but failure to do so would result not in the status quo, but in a weakened relationship in which South Korea would seek other (India?) nuclear partners and the US would lose credibility regarding its promise of benefits for NPT-compliant states and nuclear safety partners.

### **Ms. Jennifer Shin**

While the Republic of Korea and the US share a long history of friendship, loyalty, and positive relations, the ROK is making a name for itself within the nuclear arena, specifically within the nuclear energy industry. There is no doubt that the ROK is an innovative and cutting-edge leader within the current economy. However, as it begins to push harder on the pyro-processing issue and was the surprise winner of the UAE reactor deal worth over \$20 billion, the US sees a growing ROK with nuclear ambitions (albeit peaceful). The ROK has declared its nuclear ambitions within the context of energy use and has no intention of developing nuclear weapons. The strategic relationship between

the US and ROK has relied heavily on the US leadership and support. With a growing ROK in an industry area that is a hot topic of proliferation issues and its North Korean neighbor with a wide range of nuclear ‘problems’ with the US, the strategic relationship faces a test: does the US view the ROK as a productive and competitive equal or prefer to keep a close hold on how far the ROK reaches?

As the ROK pursues its nuclear energy ambitions and begins to emerge as a leader in the industry, questions about its nuclear ambitions are inevitable, especially as proliferation vulnerabilities exist in such close proximity to North Korea. The US should not stifle the ROK as it tries to rely less on the US strategically. The debate in the US over a ‘nuclear renaissance’ could cause a territorial game over which country becomes the world’s nuclear energy leader, not just between the US and ROK. As the ROK moves away from reliance on the US, it has already returned to work closely with the US on missile defense. The release of the US Ballistic Missile Defense Review report supported negotiations between the US and ROK on new missile defense systems. Immediately following its release, the ROK pushed back strongly and did not want to be seen as working too closely with the US on this issue. The US has consistently held the upper hand in its strategic relationship with the ROK and now that the ROK shows signs of independence from its reliance on the US, this is an opportunity, and a test, of changing dynamics of the US-ROK strategic relationship.

### **Ms. Adrian Yi**

The big issue in the renegotiation of the US-ROK strategic relationship is the civil nuclear energy agreement as the current one, signed in 1974, is set to expire in 2014. The major point of contention is whether the US will allow the ROK to reprocess US-origin spent fuel. The ROK will reach its storage capacity for spent fuel by 2016 and is looking to reprocess to alleviate this problem. While the US is reluctant to support an ROK reprocessing program citing proliferation concerns, the ROK is growing dissatisfied, especially in light of Japan’s and India’s reprocessing agreements with the US. The DOE and KAERI are jointly researching a possible solution called pyroprocessing; this is a proliferation-resistant reprocessing alternative but the “proliferation-resistant” claim remains highly controversial.

South Korea is taking its place in the global nuclear energy market as seen by the UAE deal and it is now set to host the second nuclear security summit slated for 2012. South Korea is displaying an unprecedented drive not only in pursuing the nuclear energy market but also toward nonproliferation and nuclear security efforts. If the renegotiation of the bilateral energy agreement does not accommodate the ROK’s new momentum and status, the US-ROK relationship may become strained and the ROK may move forward without US support. Although South Korea is currently limited by employing US-based technology in its reactors and by using US-origin nuclear material, it plans to decrease

reliance on US technology by 2012.<sup>6</sup> The outcome of the renegotiations can either facilitate South Korea's development of a legitimate fuel cycle or it can isolate its efforts and possibly create more nonproliferation concerns.

Ratification of the KORUS FTA is the biggest opportunity in the US-ROK relationship because it will reflect the maturing of the relationship while securing US economic interests in Northeast Asia. With the scheduled OPCON transfer and the agreement to dismantle the CFC, Koreans are expressing increasing insecurity and lack of confidence in the US-ROK relationship. However, the economic pillar of the relationship can reinvigorate confidence in the relationship by strengthening both economies while deepening economic and political ties.

Protectionist measures that were tolerated when South Korea was a weak and developing economy are no longer pertinent for the 15<sup>th</sup> largest economy in the world. Both the US and South Korea are ready for fair competition in the form of a US-Korea Free Trade Agreement. The US is South Korea's third largest trading partner (surpassed by China and Japan in 2003 and 2005, respectively) and South Korea is the seventh largest US trading partner. Ratifying the KORUS FTA will prevent the US from slipping further down the rank of trading partners and help regain its competitive presence in Asia. An increased economic presence in Asia will provide the message to South Korea and to other US allies in East Asia that the U.S. recognizes and prioritizes its vested interests in the region. This will help allay fears of abandonment and restore confidence in the relationship.

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<sup>6</sup> While Westinghouse retains the patents for a few necessary technologies in the Advanced Pressurized Reactor – 1400 (APR-1400), South Korea aims to become fully self-sufficient in this sector by 2012. (David Stott, "South Korea's Global Nuclear Ambitions," Japan Focus)



## Appendix A

### About the Authors

**Mr. Joshua Archer** is a MA candidate in international policy studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. His research interests include Japan security policy, US-Japan alliance, and Northeast Asia political and military relations. Joshua also works as a graduate research assistant at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, focusing on Taiwan military capabilities and contributing to the maintenance of the Nuclear Threat Initiative website. Joshua will receive his MA in international policy studies in May 2010, in addition to a Certificate in Japanese Language Studies and the Institute's prestigious Certificate of Nonproliferation Studies. He holds a BA with distinction in Asian studies, and in Japanese languages and literatures from Purdue University.

**Ms. Jiun Bang** is an associate at the Center for Security and Strategy at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), a government-affiliated defense think tank based in Seoul. She is also the assistant editor of the Korean Journal of Defense Analysis (KJDA), a SSCI-registered journal on security issues. She is also juggling a part-time research position at the Institute for Development and Human Security (IDHS) at her alma mater, Ewha Womans University in Seoul. She received her Master's degree from the Security Studies Program (SSP) at Georgetown University, where she took most of her courses on non/counter-proliferation of NBC weapons. Her current passion lies in the security issues enveloping Northeast Asia, as well as those pertaining to nuclear weapons.

**Ms. Brittany Billingsley** is a 2010 visiting Monterey Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS. She is pursuing an MA in international policy studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, specializing in Asia studies and focusing on Chinese security. She spent a semester abroad at the Beijing Foreign Studies University and received a BA in East Asian studies from the Pennsylvania State University with a minor in political science and Chinese language. Brittany has interned twice with the US Department of State: at the Foreign Service Institute in 2006, and the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation in the Regional Affairs office in 2009. Her research interests include Chinese domestic policy, Chinese security issues and US-China relations, in addition to China-India-Pakistan relations, nonproliferation and nuclear issues.

**Ms. See-Won Byun** is a research associate with the Center for US-Korea Policy at The Asia Foundation in Washington. Previously, she did research for the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic & International Studies and provided program support to the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at The Brookings Institution. She was a Brent Scowcroft Award Fellow of the Aspen Institute's Aspen Strategy Group foreign policy program in spring 2007. In Korea, Ms. Byun was a Program Officer for UN-university exchanges and served as Editorial Assistant at the Institute of East & West Studies. She co-writes the China-Korea section of *Comparative Connections*, a quarterly publication of Pacific Forum CSIS. Ms. Byun received a BA in economics from Brown

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**Mr. Sungmin Cho** is studying toward a Master's degree in international relations at Peking University. He received his BA in political science and international relations at Korea University. He spent one year as an exchange student at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada in 2003-2004. Upon graduating in 2005, Mr. Cho joined the Republic of Korea Army in the position of intelligence officer. Serving three years, including a seven-month tour to Iraq in 2006, Mr. Cho finished his military duty in 2008. Currently, he is an intern at the Beijing office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and is working on his dissertation with a focus on the North Korean nuclear issue and its impact on Sino-US relations.

**Lt. Seukhoon Paul Choi** is a lecturer at the Korea Military Academy. He received his MA in international cooperation from Seoul National University, and was commissioned an officer in the ROK Army. He received his BA in philosophy, politics and economics from the University of Pennsylvania. His research interests include alliances, the role of nonstate actors in domestic and international policy, as well as technology in politics.

**Mr. Mark Garnick** is a Monterey Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS. He is pursuing his MA in international policy studies with a concentration in East Asia studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He is also a part of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, East Asia Nonproliferation Department where he researched China's Aerospace industry, and China's military modernizations. He holds a BA in International Relations from California State University Sacramento.

**Ms. Ellen Kim** is a research associate for the Korea Chair at CSIS. Prior to joining CSIS, she worked at Kim & Chang law firm and Edelman Public Relations in South Korea. She holds a BA in international relations and Japanese studies from Wellesley College and an MPP from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. She spent less than a year in Japan for her summer language program at International Christian University and study abroad program at Waseda University. Upon graduation from Wellesley College, she won the Japanese essay prize.

**Mr. Daniel Kliman** is a PhD candidate in politics at Princeton University writing a dissertation on how democracies cope with rising powers. He is the author of *Japan's Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World: Embracing a New Realpolitik*. Before entering Princeton, Daniel was a Fulbright Fellow at Kyoto University. He has worked as an adjunct researcher at the Institute for Defense Analyses, and has held positions at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the US Embassy in Tokyo, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

**Mr. Kei Koga** from Japan, is a 2009 Vasey fellow and a PhD candidate in international relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. His research interests include international relations theory, international security, terrorism, East

Asian regionalism, US-Japan relations and ASEAN. Before attending Fletcher, he served as a research fellow at the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) and as assistant executive secretary at the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC). He also teaches international relations and East Asian security at the Open University of Japan. He received an MA in international affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, and a BA in international affairs at Lewis & Clark College.

**Ms. Makiko Kohatsu** is a senior staff at the Military Base Affairs Division of Okinawa Prefectural Government. Currently, she serves as a liaison between the Government of Japan and local Okinawan municipalities relating to port calls by US nuclear submarines, as well as training and exercises conducted by the US Forces within the Prefecture. Before assuming this position, Makiko was an administrative personnel at Reversion Affairs Division of the Government and was in charge of translating relevant documents and similar tasks. She received her BS from the International Christian University.

**Mr. Tetsuo Kotani** is a PhD candidate at Doshisha University and research fellow at the Ocean Policy Research Foundation. His dissertation focuses on the strategic implication of homeporting US carriers in Japan. His other research interests include US-Japan relations, international relations in the Asia-Pacific region and maritime security. He is a member of the International Advisory Council, Project 2049 Institute, and the Book Review Editor of the Journal of Indian Ocean Region. He was a visiting fellow at the US-Japan Center at Vanderbilt University. He received a security studies fellowship at Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), 2006-2008. He won the 2003 Japanese Defense Minister Prize.

**Dr. Ji-Young Lee** is a visiting assistant professor of politics and East Asian studies and Mellon postdoctoral fellow at Oberlin College. She received her MA in Security Studies (2004) and PhD in international relations (2009) at Georgetown University. Her research and teaching interests include East Asian security, International Political Economy, and International Relations theory. She previously worked for the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, Seoul, Korea while she was completing her MA at Seoul National University, and was an East-West Center POSCO Visiting Fellow.

**Mr. Ross Matzkin-Bridger** is a graduate student at Georgetown University and a Program Assistant for the Office of the Korea Chair at CSIS. At Georgetown, he is entering his final semester in the Master of Science in Foreign Service program. He has a BA in Asian studies from George Washington University. Ross first lived in Wakayama, Japan for a year in high school. As an undergraduate, he studied at Kyoto University. Additionally, Ross spent a year abroad in Mongolia on a grant from the Freeman Asia Foundation. Upon graduating from GWU, he took a job as a translator and international relations coordinator for a mid-sized municipality outside Kyoto. Ross has worked as an intern at the US Embassy in Tokyo and participated in a 10-day policy oriented fellowship sponsored by the Japan Foundation. After graduating, he will start work at the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration in the Office of Asian Threat Reduction.

**Ms. Aki Mori** is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Doshisha University, and is concurrently a research fellow at the Ocean Policy Research Foundation. Her research interest is China's security policy which has two approaches: international cooperation and building military capability to support self-help in China, the US-China relations and its strategic implication for Japan, and maritime security. Her latest work is on Chinese realpolitik with law enforcement in the maritime domain and overflights, which was published in the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). Ms. Mori studied US-China relations from a Chinese perspective at the School of International Studies in Renmin University of China during 2007-2008. She received a BA from Waseda University and an MA from Doshisha University.

**Ms. Wakana Mukai** is a PhD candidate in International Politics at the University of Tokyo in Japan and is also a research fellow at the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Nonproliferation, Japan Institute of International Affairs. She specializes in nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation issues as well as South Asian issues, especially views from Pakistan. She received her BA in Language and Area Studies from Tokyo University of Foreign Studies and her MPP from the School of Public Policy at the University of Tokyo.

**Ms. Naoko Noro** is a research fellow at the Research Institute of Science and Technology for Society, Japan Science and Technology Agency (RISTEX/JST), Tokyo, Japan. Her research interests include East Asian security, counter-terrorism, US-Japan security relationship, science and technology, and foreign policies. Before joining RISTEX, Ms. Noro was an associate research fellow at Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR). She was responsible for coordinating international conferences, such as the Network of East Asian Think-Tank (NEAT) and US-Japan Dialogue on Asian Security. She managed research projects, such as Japan-European Cooperation on Security Issues and Japan-China Relationship on Energy, Environmental Issues. Ms. Noro earned a BA in political science at the Hunter College of the City University of New York, and an MA in security policy studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. While in DC, Ms. Noro worked as an intern at the Japan Chair of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and as a Program Assistant at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA.

**Ms. Yeun Kyung Park** is a foreign affairs coordinator at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, and a MA candidate studying international peace and security at Korea University Graduate School of International Studies. Previously, she studied at Boston University where she earned her BA in international relations specializing in international systems and world order. Her minor concentration was in French language and literature. She completed Boston University's intensive French program at Université Stendhal in 2003 and a summer internship program at the US House of Representatives in Washington DC in 2003. Her fields of interest are East Asian studies, especially East Asian multilateralism, Northeast Asian security with a focus on the role of US alliances, and ROK-US relations. She is also interested in peacekeeping operations and future ROK military development.

**Mr. Junbeom Pyon** is the founder and a consultant at INP Consulting Group. He was an analyst at SEC Research Institute under the Ministry of National Defense in Korea. He has a MA in Government and BA in international studies from Johns Hopkins University and did graduate studies at Waseda University. Mr. Pyon was the 2006-2007 Vasey Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS and has worked at the UN Headquarters, the Brookings Institution, and KIDA.

**Dr. Kevin Shepard** is a Kelly Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS. He is also a research fellow with the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University and recently earned his PhD in North Korean Politics and Unification Policies from Kyungnam University, Graduate School of North Korean Studies. He holds an MA in International Policy Studies from Sydney University and an MA in Korean from the University of Hawaii. He has published in *The Dynamics of Change in North Korea* (Kyungnam University: 2009), and contributed to the upcoming publication based on the projects “Roadmap for Expanding US-ROK Alliance Cooperation” (Center for US-Korea Policy/The Asia Foundation) and the upcoming Academic Paper Series published by the Korea Economic Institute.

**Ms. Jennifer Shin** works as a Strategic/Nuclear Security Analyst with Defense Solutions Group-Strategic Missions, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). She provides analytical support to the Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters regarding the national strategic deterrent and related issues. She has also worked with the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation to support the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue program, focusing on security stability within Northeast Asia. Her research interests include Northeast Asian security, nonproliferation, disarmament, and nuclear policy regarding the DPRK.

**Ms. Emily Warren** manages the Nuclear Security Initiative and other special projects at the Hewlett Foundation, a private grantmaking institution that provides resources to not-for-profit organizations working to solve social and environmental problems around the world. She attended Stanford University where she earned a BA in economics with a minor in political science.

**Ms. Adrian Yi** is a Kelly Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS. She received her MA in Korean Language at the University of Hawaii as a part of the National Security Education Program (NSEP). She studied abroad at Korea University for a year and interned as a research assistant at the Center for Security and Strategy at the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA). She received a BA in International Relations and Foreign Languages (Chinese and Japanese) from the University of Puget Sound. She studied Chinese at Middlebury College and has studied abroad in Japan through the Rotary Program. She also worked with the Department of State at the American Institute in Taiwan.



## Appendix B

### PACIFIC FORUM CSIS **YOUNG LEADERS**

Hosted by PACIFIC FORUM CSIS  
Sponsored by the US DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY

#### US-Japan Strategic Dialogue

Royal Lahaina Resort ♦ Maui  
April 25-27, 2010

#### Agenda

##### April 25, 2010 – Sunday

- 3:00 PM YOUNG LEADERS Roundtable – *Board Room*  
6:30 PM Welcome Reception and Dinner – *Gazebo Lawn*

##### April 26, 2010 – Monday

- 8:30 AM Continental Breakfast - *Oahu Room*  
9:00 AM Opening Remarks  
9:30 AM **Session I: National Perceptions of International Security Concerns**  
US presenter: Michael Auslin  
Japan presenter: Noboru Yamaguchi

This session explores each country's view of the international and regional security environment, to identify issues, and highlight shared and divergent concerns. What are the principal security concerns of each country? How does each country see the Asian balance of power? What could change that balance? Why? Topics could include China's growing status and influence; relations with Taiwan and the cross-Strait relationship; North Korea and prospects for relations with Pyongyang; relations with South Korea; the Middle East, Central and South Asian challenges. This overview will set the stage for subsequent discussions of US and Japanese security policies and efforts to address these challenges.

- 11:00 AM Coffee Break  
11:15 AM **Session II: Security Dynamics in Tokyo and Washington**  
Japan presenter: Masafumi Ishii  
US discussant: Robert Gromoll  
The governments in both Japan and the US are relatively new. What is each government's national security strategy? What are the timelines for new

documents on strategy and defense? What are key elements of continuity and change in the new governments' policies? How does each country see its role in Asia? How does each government see its partner's role in Asia – political, social, and military? What role does each envision for the alliance and its role within the alliance? (Assessments of the state of the alliance will be taken up later)

- 12:30 PM      Lunch – *Villas Lawn*
- 1:30 PM      **Session III: Views of the US-Japan Defense Relationship: Understanding Alliance Dynamics**  
*Session IIIA: Japan's Perspective*  
Japan presenter: Matake Kamiya

This session focuses on views of the bilateral security alliance. How does Japan characterize the state of the alliance? What are the characteristics of the ideal Japan-US alliance? What are the major challenges? How can they be addressed? What role does Japan envision for the alliance with the US in its national security strategy? How does Japan see the alliance functioning? Is extended nuclear deterrence still desired? Will a nonnuclear security umbrella suffice? Are the right topics being addressed?

- 3:00 PM      Coffee Break
- 3:15 PM      **Session IIIB: US Perspective**  
US presenter: Andrew Oros

How does the US characterize the state of its alliance with Japan? What are the characteristics of the ideal US-Japan alliance? What are the challenges in alliance relations (such as desired national roles and each nation's alliance objectives) and how can they be addressed? What are the key issues in and obstacles to future development of the alliance and the realization of those roles and objectives?

- 5:00 PM      Session adjourns
- 6:30 PM      Reception and Dinner – *Gazebo Lawn*

**April 27, 2010 – Tuesday**

- 7:30 AM      YOUNG LEADERS Breakfast Meeting – Royal Ocean Terrace**  
Speaker: Katsu Furukawa
- 8:30 AM      Continental Breakfast – *Oahu Room*
- 9:00 AM      **Session IV: Nuclear Dynamics**  
*Session IVA: US Perspectives*  
Presenter: Michael McDevitt

This session explores US perspectives of nuclear dynamics. What are the key features and forces driving the Asian and global nuclear regimes? What can be

done to reinforce positive change and minimize the negative effects? How does the Obama administration understand the influence of nuclear weapons (American, Chinese, Russian, and DPRK) on alliance relations? How does America envision the role of nuclear weapons in extended deterrence and in Asian security strategy? How might these roles of American and other nations' nuclear weapons evolve; why and to what effect?

10:30 AM Coffee Break

10:45 AM **Session IVB: Japanese Perspectives**  
Presenter: Ken Jimbo

How does Japan analyze the nature and impact of Asian and global nuclear dynamics (including vertical and horizontal proliferation, nonproliferation regimes and activities, and sensitive technology transfer)? How could, and why should Japan respond to and shape these dynamics? How does Japan understand the role of the alliance in responding to and shaping Asian nuclear dynamics?

12:30 PM Lunch – *Royal Ocean Terrace Restaurant*

2:00 PM **Session V: Enhancing Collaborative, Cooperative Strategic Security Activities**  
Japan presenter: Yuki Tatsumi  
US presenter: Victor Cha

This session will focus on the future of the alliance and ways to make it more effective. What specific joint and unilateral activities would help achieve the ideal alliance described in Session III? How can we balance our respective interests and concerns relating to extended deterrence and movement toward zero nuclear weapons? Is the current US-Japan security and extended deterrence dialogues sufficient? How can the two countries ensure that the alliance contributes to national defense and regional security? How can the alliance work with other US allies – the ROK, in particular, but also Australia -- and partners, such as India? How can it engage China? How can both countries influence the outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference?

3:30 PM **Session VI: Conclusions and Wrap Up**

4:00 PM Conference adjourns

4:10 PM **YOUNG LEADERS Roundtable Discussion, moderated by Brad Glosserman**



## **Appendix C**

### **PACIFIC FORUM CSIS YOUNG LEADERS**

**Hosted by PACIFIC FORUM CSIS  
Sponsored by the US DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY**

#### **US-Japan Strategic Dialogue**

**Royal Lahaina Resort ♦ Maui  
April 25-27, 2010**

#### **Participants**

##### **US**

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Japan Science and Technology Agency



## Appendix D



Royal Lahaina Resort ♦ Maui  
April 28-30, 2010

### Agenda

#### April 28, 2010 – Wednesday

12:00 PM     **YOUNG LEADERS Roundtable and Lunch – Oahu Room**

6:30 PM     Welcome Reception and Dinner – *Gazebo Lawn*

#### April 29, 2010 – Thursday

8:30 AM     Continental Breakfast – *Oahu Room*

9:00 AM     Opening Remarks

9:30 AM     **Session 1: Perceptions of the Strategic Security Environment**

US presenter: Michael Auslin

ROK presenter: Hwang Jaeho

This session explores each country's view of the security environment to identify issues, and highlight shared and divergent concerns. What are the principal strategic challenges to each country and to regional security and stability? How have these perceptions and concerns evolved? How are these challenges best addressed? How do US and Korean perceptions overlap? How are they different? How can the United States and the ROK best work together to address perceptions that may indicate divergent interests or lead to competing strategies?

11:00 AM     Coffee Break

11:15 AM     **Session 2: Korean Peninsula Dynamics**

ROK presenter: Jun Bong-geun

US presenter: Scott Snyder

This session focuses on security relations on the Korean Peninsula. How does each country characterize Korean Peninsula dynamics? How do they characterize the state of the Six-Party Talks? What influence do North-South relations and

unification policies have on the US-ROK alliance? How do US-DPRK relations and six-party negotiations impact the alliance? What role should multilateral institutions such as the Six-Party Talks have in defining security relations on the Peninsula? How should the US and ROK deal with a potential collapse in North Korea? What role should China, Japan and/or the U.N. play in security relations on the peninsula?

12:30 PM      Lunch – *Royal Ocean Terrace Restaurant*

1:30 PM      **Session 3: Global Nuclear Dynamics**

ROK presenter: Park Chang Kwoun

US presenter: Jim Kelly

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the spread of nuclear weapons in particular has been called one of the world's top security challenges. Does the ROK share this assessment? How are we individually, as well as in the Alliance, affected by the nuclear proliferation challenge? How does each country assess the effectiveness of the nonproliferation regime? What could be done to make it more effective? What are likely to be the key issues at the NPT Review Conference? How do nuclear energy issues – in particular, the perceived ROK need for enrichment capabilities – fit into the broader nonproliferation agenda?

3:00 PM      Coffee Break

3:15 PM      **Session 4: Thinking about Deterrence**

ROK presenter: Cheon Seongwhon

US presenter: Mike McDevitt

The session explores national thinking about deterrence. How does US extended deterrence factor in ROK national defense calculations? What are the key components of US extended deterrence? How are they maintained? Will deterrence remain as important post-unification? How can it be made more effective?

5:00 PM      Session adjourns

6:30 PM      Reception and Dinner – *Oceanfront Cottage Lawn*

**April 30, 2010 – Friday**

**7:30 AM      YOUNG LEADERS Breakfast Meeting – Royal Ocean Terrace Restaurant**

8:30 AM      Continental Breakfast – *Oahu Room*

**9:00 AM      Session 5: Nuclear Policy Dynamics**

ROK presenter: Choi Kang

US presenter: John Park

How does each country understand the impact of global and regional nuclear dynamics? What are the key forces driving changes in nuclear dynamics? What is the relationship between regional and global developments? How does each country articulate its concerns, formulate policies, and explain them to domestic and international audiences. How do other strategic systems such as BMD and improved conventional capabilities shape nuclear policy? Will a nonnuclear security umbrella suffice? Is this view changing? Is the ROK contemplating more self-reliant or ‘hedging’ strategies? How does each government view the prospect and possible impact of movement toward zero and nuclear disarmament? How could movement toward zero impact the alliance and global nuclear dynamics?

10:30 AM Coffee Break

10:45 AM **Session 6: The Alliance**  
ROK presenter: Kim Tae Woo  
US presenter: Gordon Flake

This session focuses on views of the bilateral security alliance. How do Koreans and Americans rate the health and mutual respect of the alliance? What are the two countries’ respective roles and responsibilities within the alliance? What does each country identify as the major problems in alliance relations? How can they be fixed? What is each side’s view of the roadmap for OPCON transfer in 2012? Is the ROK prepared to assume the lead role? Is the US prepared for the ROK to assume the lead role? Will the US commitment be (or appear to be) diminished?

12:30 PM Lunch

2:00 PM **Session 7: The Future of the US-ROK Alliance**  
US Presenter: Katy Oh-Hassig  
ROK Presenter: Beum Chul Shin

This session will focus on the future of the alliance and ways to make it more effective. Do the two countries share a common vision of the alliance’s future? What is it? What are the key challenges to the realization of that vision? How can the two countries ensure that the alliance contributes to national defense and regional security? How can the alliance work with other US allies – in particular, Japan but also Australia – and partners, such as India? How can it engage China? How can both work together toward a safer nonnuclear world?

3:30 PM **Session 8: Conclusions and Wrap Up**

4:00 PM Conference adjourns

**4:10 PM YOUNG LEADERS Roundtable Discussion, moderated by Brad Glosserman**



## **Appendix E**



**Hosted by PACIFIC FORUM CSIS  
Sponsored by the US DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY**

### **US-ROK Strategic Dialogue**

**Royal Lahaina Resort ♦ Maui  
April 28-30, 2010**

#### **Participants**

##### **US**

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