The US-Japan Alliance: New Direction in an Uncertain World

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Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate arenas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

The Young Leaders Program

The Young Leaders Program develops young professionals and graduate students by bringing them to policy dialogues and conferences. The program fosters education in the practical aspects of policy-making, generates an exchange of views between young and seasoned professionals, promotes interaction among younger professionals, and enriches dialogues with generational perspectives for all attendees. Fellows must have a strong background in the area covered by the conference they are attending and an endorsement from respected experts in their field. Supplemental programs in conference host cities and mentoring sessions with senior officials and specialists add to the Young Leader experience. The Young Leaders Program is currently supported by Chevron, the Henry Luce Foundation, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, and the Yuchengco Group, with a growing number of universities, institutes, and organizations also helping to sponsor individual participants. For more details, see the Pacific Forum CSIS website, www.pacforum.org, or contact Nicole Forrester, director of the Young Leaders Program, at nicole@pacforum.org.

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Key Findings

The US-Japan alliance must adapt to changes in the security environment in the Asia Pacific and must expand into areas in which it has not traditionally operated. Areas highlighted include:

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR)
Amphibious Capability
Cyber-space

Policy Recommendations: HA/DR

- The US-Japan Alliance should create a multilateral institution that coordinates and enhances HA/DR capacity.
- After a substantial regional consultation process, Japan and the US should develop guiding principles – like establishing an opt-in regime – and settle on a basic, overarching framework.
- Build capacity of member states in the following areas:
    - Develop a telecommunications network that can be linked to the UN Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC) in post-disaster regions.
    - Carry out joint HA/DR exercises between the US, Japan, and other member states on an annual basis.
    - Create grants for HA/DR research at universities in the Asia Pacific, to feed policy suggestions and new systems and technologies to the institute.
- Establish a secretariat to oversee coordinating functions.
- Activities will include: advance contingency planning, joint training and exchange of information about expected needs (e.g., medical expertise, equipment, food).
- Create guidelines for domestic legislation for all member-states.
- Arrange storage facilities for member usage, some new, and some from pre-existing non-profit joint storage facilities.

Policy Recommendations: Amphibious Capability

In order to carry out HA/DR, deter aggression, and fulfill its defensive posture over its southern islands, Japan should develop its amphibious capabilities.

- Japan should purchase the V-22 Osprey and Joint High Speed Vessel platforms to increase the speed, range, and lift from its helicopter carrier platforms.
- The US-Japan Alliance should contribute ‘shared-use facilities’ for training in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands.
- A regular training schedule, including joint exercises in the southwest islands, should be established between US Forces Japan and the Self Defense Force.
- The Japanese Ground Self Defense Forces should begin to look at lighter, more maneuverable equipment, like the light armored vehicle, and improve its logistics support capacities in line with amphibious doctrine.

Policy Recommendations: Cyber Security

- The US-Japan alliance should collaborate closely with other US allies such as the UK, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand on cyber security.
- Tokyo and Washington should promote behavioral norms in cyberspace at international forums.
- The US and Japan should establish biannual working level meetings to discuss cyber-defense. Participants would include all relevant agencies.
- The US and Japan should identify means to collaborate on attack tracing, attribution, and response.
- The US and Japan should coordinate a public-private dialogue to secure the intellectual property of their critical industries, like defense contractors, infrastructure companies, and IT firms.

Introduction

By John Hemmings

On March 23, 2012, Pacific Forum CSIS and the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) brought 14 Young Leaders from the United States and Japan to the 18th US-Japan strategic seminar in San Francisco. While attending sessions led by senior US and Japanese officials and academics, the Young Leaders were tasked with re-examining the rationale and utility of the US-Japan alliance and asked to look at new forms of cooperation for the alliance. They identified three criteria for their search: the new roles should (1) be possible for the alliance as it is currently configured; (2) fit current security needs for both countries; and (3) promote closer security cooperation among states around the Asia Pacific. Young Leaders arrived at these criteria after noting that the US-Japan alliance has been adapting and evolving to meet the shifting security environment since the end of the Cold War. The benchmark for the group was the 1996 Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security in 1996, which recognized that the US-Japan alliance should broaden its remit from bilateral to regional security, and develop new areas for alliance coordination, such as proliferation, peacekeeping, and humanitarian relief operations. Young Leaders sought to replicate this type of incremental shift in the alliance with their recommendations.

Young Leaders reviewed the region's shift in global economic importance, and the resulting surge in military spending and capabilities. As the Asia Pacific becomes more central to the global economy, so does the importance of maintaining peace and security for its inhabitants. For nearly 60 years, the US-Japan alliance has served as the anchor of security in the region, a point of stability and convergence for two of the world's greatest economies. While the region has developed regional architectures like ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the East Asia Summit, those architectures have limited resources, planning structures, and capacities for dealing with sudden and direct security threats.

In an era of economic challenges, shifts in the US security posture that include an alleged strategic focus on the Asia-Pacific amid defense budget cuts; security threats from the unpredictable Kim Jong-un regime, and territorial tensions with China, South Korea, and Russia, the US-Japan alliance can ill-afford to have distractions like the impasse over Futenma dominate the security narrative. Perspectives vary on how great a threat the debate posed to the alliance in the long term. Yet the fact remains that the unseemly scrap between two of the world's most closely aligned allies signaled fragility to strategic competitors in the Asia-Pacific region and delayed more important discussions.

The US-Japan alliance, though straining under its own fiscal constraints, still contains a wealth of material and financial resources to contribute to security and safety in the region. The 2004 Sumatra tsunami, the Sichuan earthquake, and the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami all devastated regions and populations, revealing an urgent need for quick responses involving large-scale air and sea capabilities. Continuing piracy and trans-national maritime criminal activities illustrate that many littoral states cannot

protect and secure their national waterways. Finally, a surge[1] in cyber-attacks and espionage globally and in the region over the last two years has seen an insufficient response from the alliance – despite growing risks to financial, commercial and government interests. This is partially due to the swiftly changing nature of cyber-security and the close relationship to the intelligence community.

During their discussions, Young Leaders asked if the US-Japan alliance could evolve new core missions to deal with these threats and came up with three broad areas where the Alliance could move forward: humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HA/DR), amphibious capabilities, and cyber-defense. The first, HA/DR is already strong – as evidenced by *Operation Tomodachi* – but could be broadened into a region-wide mechanism. The fact that both HA/DR and amphibious capabilities require strong navies plays to the strengths of the US and Japan, since combined they have the largest naval spending in the Asia Pacific and have close interoperability and a sound understanding of each other's capabilities.

Given their shared core values, liberal democratic political systems, and naval and technological strengths, Tokyo and Washington have a superb opportunity to lead regional states into this century. Indeed, these areas present the Alliance with low-hanging fruit in areas where the alliance can broaden security.

[1] *In the Dark: Crucial Industries Confront Cyberattacks*, McAfee and CSIS Report, April 19, 2012

Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Relief

By Petra Dunne, Akira Igata, Adam Liff

Over the last decade, Asia-Pacific nations have suffered a number of devastating natural disasters, including the Sumatra earthquake and tsunami in 2004; the Sichuan earthquake and Cyclone Nargis in Burma/Myanmar in 2008; and the Christchurch earthquake and Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in 2011. Although the disasters themselves were unavoidable, their catastrophic humanitarian and economic effects could have been significantly reduced if the affected nations and their neighbors had been better prepared to respond. After a decade of staggering fatalities and damage by natural disasters, it is clear that East Asia is in need of enhanced regional cooperation in order to facilitate more rapid, effective, and cost-efficient humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations.

The US-Japan alliance is well positioned to provide leadership in this area. Indeed, the alliance has already made significant progress over the past decade, expanding HA/DR cooperation through major operations in 2004-2005 (post-tsunami relief in the Indian Ocean),[2] 2006 (earthquake relief in Pakistan),[3] 2010 (earthquake relief in Haiti), and, most impressively, in the aftermath of the March 11, 2011 triple disaster in Tohoku, Japan.[4] In each successive operation, the US and Japan have enhanced interoperability significantly, with inter-military cooperation ranging from aviation control and facility support in the earlier operations to US forces operating under Japanese command and Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) aircraft using US ships as mobile operating bases in Tohoku. Furthermore, as evidence of the recent salutary trend, May 2012 saw the first-ever participation of US military personnel in a prefectural working-level conference to plan for future disaster relief efforts (in this case, a possible megaquake in the Nankai Trough).[5]

While the expansion in bilateral HA/DR cooperation between the US and Japan over the past decade is undoubtedly a positive development, there is more that the allies could, and should, be doing to further enhance cooperation, and not just bilaterally, to make a greater contribution to the region. There are manifold reasons to make HA/DR a

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[2] For details, see Brad Glosserman, "Tsunami Tragedy: Japan Seizes the Moment," PacNet(Pacific Forum CSIS,). <http://www.glocom.org/debates/20050114_gloss_tsunami/index.html> Jan. 14, 2005
In stark contrast to many other overseas deployments of the JSDF, the tsunami relief effort received widespread support in Japan—even from the chairman of the Japanese Communist Party. "Communist Party, Overseas Dispatch of the SDF, Approval if Humanitarian Aid" (Kyousanto, jieitai no kaigai haken, jindo shien nara younin), *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Jan. 20 2005.

[3] "Activities in Pakistan," Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), n.d., <http://www.jica.go.jp/pakistan/english/activities/activity12.html>

[4] Japan mobilized 100,000 JSDF personnel, while the US launched "*Operation Tomodachi*," an eight-week operation providing airlift, transport of relief supplies, surveillance of the affected area, and repair of critical infrastructure. In total, the operation involved 24 ships (including the *USS Ronald Reagan*), nearly 200 aircraft, and 24,000 US. service members. Chanlett-Avery, Emma, William H. Cooper, and Mark E. Manyin. "Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress." CRS Report for Congress, Sept. 23, 2011, 11.

[5] "Shizuoka draws in U.S., SDF to mull steps against possible Nankai Trough megaquake," Kyodo (in The Japan Times), May 19, 2012, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20120519b2.html.>

core focus of the US-Japan alliance, to do so now, and to do so proactively, before the next major natural and/or humanitarian disaster strikes East Asia.

The obvious reason for enhancing regional HA/DR cooperation is the direct humanitarian benefits. Second, efforts to deepen joint HA/DR operations have the ancillary benefit of enhancing military interoperability, which aids the allies in deterring a more traditional military contingency. In other words, expanded HA/DR cooperation is a surefire way to achieve the mutually reinforcing goals of contributing to regional peace and stability and strengthening the alliance. Finally, enhanced HA/DR operations between the US and Japan will deepen public support in both countries for the alliance as well as the two countries' respective armed forces.

Despite the numerous constitutional, legal, normative, popular, and institutional constraints in Japan that effectively prohibit the JSDF's participation in military operations that may involve "collective self-defense" or use of force outside the Japanese archipelago, the JSDF's role in HA/DR receives widespread, and increasing, support from the Japanese public. Indeed, annual Japanese government polls show an increase in public support for JSDF participation in overseas disaster relief operations over the past two decades; from 54.3 percent in 1991 to 88.5 percent in 2009 — even before the surge in the JSDF's popularity post-3/11/2011.[6]

In short, because HA/DR is by definition focused on human security, expanded cooperation in this area is likely to be not just politically acceptable, but popular on the home front, especially in Japan.

Issues with current HA/DR activities

There is growing awareness of the need for greater regional cooperation in the area of HA/DR. Various efforts are underway; some remain conceptual, while others are beginning to coalesce into concrete programs. While this is a positive development in principle, the sheer diversity and decentralized nature of extant programs are problematic. The current piecemeal approach is inefficient and in the longer term may lead to failure. Currently, the US military and the JSDF take part in numerous bilateral and multilateral HA/DR joint operations.[7]

Although bilateral HA/DR cooperation has made rapid progress in recent years, there is still room for improvement on many fundamental issues. These issues require the attention of US and Japanese leaders. For example, *Operation Tomodachi*, though widely praised by civilian and military leaders in the US and Japan as a success, still had minor problems. One such problem was the inability of the allies to fully secure communication channels between the US military and the JSDF. These channels, primarily limited to commercial and unclassified means including unsecure emails and telephone lines, could have been intercepted by an adversary, who would then have gained access to sensitive information.

[6] Handbook for Defense 2011 (Boei Handobukku 2011). 23. Tokyo: Asakumo Shimbun-sha, 2011, p.938.
[7] See Appendix for a list of recent activities.

Improvement, therefore, ought to be strengthened not only in the bureaucratic structures but also in communication technology itself. Another challenge during rescue operations was the recurring problem of the language barrier between US and Japanese military personnel. The ability to understand each other is critical, particularly during an emergency in which the ability to make and execute decisions in a timely manner can, literally, mean the difference between life and death. Even though the lives of the military personnel involved in the operation will rarely be directly threatened, this truism holds in HA/DR operations.

In addition to efforts to fix problems in bilateral HA/DR cooperation between the US and Japan, the allies should also engage other states in the region to find common ground and lay the foundation for expanded multilateral HA/DR operations. Certain issues pose obstacles to greater multilateralism in HA/DR. First, some states in the region (such as China) have expressed opposition to military exercises near their territory, perceiving them as a potential security threat. Second, other states, (e.g., Myanmar in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in 2008 or North Korea after flooding in 2006-2007) have refused outside aid in the aftermath of major natural disasters. The allies must take such concerns into account when designing their approach to expanded multilateral HA/DR operations in East Asia. Cooperating with governmental and non-governmental agencies and personnel that have experience in countries such as Myanmar and North Korea could prove to be an effective tool for humanitarian negotiations. Actively extending invitations to these countries to participate with their neighbors in multilateral HA/DR training and exercises could contribute to gradually reducing distrust about other states' intentions.

Establishment of a unified institutional framework

The region is in need of strong leadership that is able to not only provide a vision for greater multilateral HA/DR cooperation, but which also has the capabilities to implement that vision and lead the actual exercises and operations. The US and Japan can lead on HA/DR, working closely with regional states to forge a new institution, but doing this in an inconclusive manner, which avoids regional states' concerns. Henceforth, a major focus of bilateral alliance cooperation should be to coordinate, and when appropriate integrate, the assortment of extant bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral arrangements and frameworks into a single regional institution.

An integrated region-wide HA/DR institutional framework would achieve numerous goals. First, it would facilitate coordination and joint preparation for various crises before they occur, which would increase the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of HA/DR operations after disaster strikes. This would be accomplished through advance contingency planning and exchange of information about each country's expected needs (e.g., medical expertise, equipment, and food.) One of the major lessons of Japan's experience in the aftermath of the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami is that despite the willingness of the international community to assist Japan in responding to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, in many cases neither Japan nor the countries offering to help knew what Japan needed to address a large-scale nuclear accident. Better

advance-planning and international exchange of HA/DR best practices could have mitigated the deleterious effects.

Second, cooperation among countries through regular joint exercises will enhance interoperability, coordination, and enable more rapid disaster response, which could save thousands of lives and reduce long-term economic costs. As a case in point, advanced planning and regular joint exercises between the US military and JSDF was a major factor in the rapid and effective US response to the March 11, 2011 earthquake and tsunami, which saved many lives.

Lastly, cooperation among countries in this core area of nontraditional security would serve as an invaluable ancillary function of promoting trust and confidence-building among the member countries. Due to the universal nature of the threat, HA/DR cooperation among East Asian states in responding to natural disasters should be less controversial than traditional security cooperation.

A Two-Step process toward Institutionalization

This new HA/DR institution could be developed in two phases. First, Japan and the US should carry out 18 months of consultations with regional governments in order to build a framework that meets the needs and expectations of regional states. Then, they should develop guiding principles and settle on a basic, overarching framework for this new institution. Although other states will be allowed to provide input during this initial stage, they will not be afforded veto power. The justification for this is fourfold: (1) a multilateral negotiation for the creation of a brand new regime may be impractical due to its complexity. Thus, a predetermined basic framework is best decided by a smaller number of parties; (2) Japan and the US are best qualified to set the basic outline for the regime given the extensive operational experience they have gained from decades of large-scale HA/DR operations; (3) regardless of the regime's final membership, Japan and the US are certain to bear a large portion of the budgetary, administrative, functional, and operational burden of the regime; (4) the US and Japan are already well-positioned to lead regional nontraditional security cooperation. Militarily, the US military and the JSDF possess some of the most capable forces in the world. Politically, the US has been the primary provider of security to East Asia for decades and maintains longstanding and close bilateral, security alliances and partnerships with the majority of countries in the region, while Japan enjoys increasingly close security ties with a number of regional partners such as Australia.

Once the first phase is completed and the guiding principles defined, – the second stage would be to invite interested parties to join negotiations on specific characteristics of the regime. Participation will be open to like-minded states willing to take part and contribute to prompt, effective multilateral HA/DR cooperation. It is important that a core principle of this inclusive regime will be that participation is not limited to formal security partners of the United States, nor to states with democratic political systems. Futhermore, states that have the desire to belong to the mechanism, but not the means, will not necessarily be excluded.

Proposals

This paper recommends the following steps be taken in three different areas: (1) operational planning and crisis management; (2) establishing facilities; (3) capacity-building. In the first instance, for ***operations***, a number of concrete steps should be taken:

- **Scheme-based contingency planning and joint-training:** Different types of natural disasters require tailored plans, equipment, and personnel for effective relief operations. Parties to this HA/DR regime should prepare scenario-based contingency planning for each of the following types of disasters: earthquake, tsunami, flood, and hurricane/cyclone/typhoon/monsoons. Joint training should be conducted based on these different types of contingency plans. Because no two natural disasters, nor the operational environments in which they occur, are the same, training should place significant emphasis on developing improvisational skills.
- **Information-sharing mechanism:** Confusion is to some extent unavoidable in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. Unfortunately, however, often poor management of a crisis exacerbates the deleterious effects of the crisis itself. To help improve crisis management, prompt, accurate information-sharing in the immediate aftermath of a natural disaster is imperative. To this end, an effective information-sharing mechanism for HA/DR first-responders can help to mitigate initial confusion and facilitate the rapid dispatch of assistance to disaster-stricken areas.
- **Pre-agreed list of certified relief operation teams:** The first 48 hours after a natural disaster are critical to saving the lives of affected populations. However, especially in East Asia, the need for prompt disaster relief must be balanced against the desire of the state to protect its sovereignty. To help resolve this dilemma, a pre-defined list of first responder teams, rescue dogs, and equipment that would be allowed to bypass normal immigration, quarantine, and customs procedures during an emergency would greatly expedite the movement of HA/DR teams to the affected areas without threatening the traditional security concerns of the affected country.
- **Guidelines for necessary domestic legislation:** There are various legal issues that must be addressed before foreign actors engage in HA/DR operations. These include seemingly minor, yet critical issues such as medical liabilities of foreign doctors (what would happen if medical accidents occur) or legal status of non-governmental actors (whether they would have the same civil and criminal rights and liabilities as governmental organizations).

With regards to the second area, ***establishing facilities***, Young Leaders propose:

- **Establishment of a Secretariat:** To operate effectively and efficiently, the HA/DR regime would benefit from a central secretariat with a physical office that would be tasked with coordinating day-to-day activities among member countries and, in the event of a crisis, serve as a command center.
- **Establishment of a joint storage facility:** A joint facility for storing food, water, medical supplies, and other relief materials should be established at a central location (e.g., somewhere on Japan's southwest islands) to allow for a prompt response to a disaster anywhere in East Asia. Over time, more purpose-built HA/DR storage facilities should be established at locations throughout the region. Additionally, states could designate existing domestic facilities as available in an emergency for multilateral operations conducted under the aegis of the regime.

Finally, in the third area of ***capacity building (CB)***, Young Leaders recommend:

- **States must establish CB for disaster relief at home**: In most cases, affected countries should be expected to take primary responsibility for providing HA/DR to their own people. The multilateral HA/DR response team provided by the institution proposed here should normally play only a supporting role. One important objective will be to enhance the HA/DR capability of individual East Asian states with emphasis on improving member state capacity in the following areas: (i) management of communications technology (e.g., to protect sensitive and classified information; (ii) specialist training (especially personnel affiliated with governmental organizations, local NGOs, and other relevant actors who require specialized knowledge in conducting relief operation, such as in the case of nuclear accidents); (iii) joint research and development of equipment for disaster relief; and (iv) communications training (e.g., training personnel to communicate effectively with distressed local populations as well as their international partners so that information flows as smoothly as possible).
- **Capacity building for disaster mitigation:** The best crisis management is to prevent a potential disaster from turning into a full-blown crisis through preventive means. With this in mind, members of the regime with significant experience in HA/DR operations should regularly exchange: best practices and lessons learned; novel initiatives in disaster relief planning; technological innovations; and institutional reform.

In general, the guiding principle for sharing the financial burden of operational planning (Section II of the recommended functions) should be that of self-funding. In most cases, each state should be responsible for covering the personnel and other costs associated with their contributions to contingency planning, joint training, and domestic capacity building. Under this principle, there should be no costs that must be shared among the member countries. In terms of the establishment of the facilities (Section III of the recommended functions), the expenses that must be shared are, in fact, quite limited. If each country is to be responsible for its own personnel, a secretariat would share the construction and maintenance costs for the facility. The cost of maintaining the joint storage facility(ies) should be nominal.

The exact form of financing, whether it be equal, commensurate with each state's relative GDP, or self-determined, is something that must be decided. These financial burdens could be shared differently among the different functions as well, such as having equal burden for the maintenance of the facility (Section II) but relying on voluntary funding of each countries for capacity building (Section III). Either way, given the minimal extra expenditure required for the maintenance of the regime, which should be balanced out by the increased promptness and effectiveness of relief operations gained from consolidating individual efforts, financial burden-sharing should not be an insurmountable problem. This should be an issue that is best left for the member states to negotiate in phase 2.

The US-Japan alliance is first and foremost a military alliance, but its capabilities need not be maintained for only war operations. Indeed, its capability to carry out operations other than war is a source of its legitimacy and regional soft power. The fact that the Asia Pacific is primarily a naval space and the ability of the alliance to move around that space gives it a unique reach in times of natural disaster. The 2004 Sumatra tsunami saw an unofficial core group of India, Australia, Japan, and the US unite for the duration of the disaster and coordinate their relief and humanitarian efforts. This unique coordination could and should be institutionalized. What is needed to deliver this is the development of US-Japan alliance naval and amphibious capabilities.

Amphibious Capabilities

By Justin Goldman, Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi, Eric Sayers

Amphibious capabilities give naval forces the ability to move around coastal and littoral areas and carry out ship-to-shore maneuvers on an over-the-horizon basis, sometimes penetrating hundreds of miles inland. While this capability is relatively established in US forces, embodied in US Marine Corps doctrine and practice, it is virtually untried in Japanese Self-Defense Forces. However, the need for amphibious capabilities is a growing one for the alliance and not just for carrying out humanitarian and disaster relief missions. Amphibious capacity is a 'must' for island states like Japan in the defense of their sovereign space and contested island mass.

In December 2010, Japan's Ministry of Defense released the much-anticipated National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) 2010. The NDPG identifies Japan's off shore islands as a new priority for defense planning, and advocates shifting the nation's strategic focus to the East China Sea and Japan's southern Ryukyu Island chain. With this in mind, the NDPG calls for a Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) that will possess "readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and versatility" to "prevent and reject invasion" of these islands. The development of an indigenous Japanese capability for amphibious operations would directly support these key objectives. Achieving this end will require not just new procurement initiatives, but also the development of new doctrine and operational concepts along with the joint training necessary to become proficient in maritime defense and forcible entry operations.

The Southern Islands

The 20 islands comprising the southern Sakishima portion of the Ryukyus pepper the East China Sea from Okinawa to the coast of Taiwan. Governed by Okinawa Prefecture, the Sakishimas include the contested Senkaku islands and the main islands of Miyako and Ishigaki. The islands stand as an archipelagic border along the northern portion of China's first island chain through which Chinese naval and commercial vessels must pass on their way to the Pacific Ocean. The proximity of the Ryukyus to Taiwan also ensures that the islands would play an operational role in any conflict. The geographic position of the Ryukyus to China's first island chain, combined with the modernization and more assertive posture of China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), have demanded that Japan take steps to enhance its deterrence in the region.

As part of the NDPG and corresponding Mid-Term Defense Program (2011-2015), Japan aims to fill a "defense vacuum" in the Ryukyus by improving its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and defense capabilities and by closer cooperation with the United States. The islands house facilities to improve maritime situational awareness. Miyako-jima hosts the region's only Japanese Air Self-Defense Force radar station and a state-of-the-art signal intelligence facility. Another signal intelligence station is operated in Fukuoka city and a third is being built in the Goto Island chain. The NDPG plans to direct spending away from the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) to increase the submarine fleet from 16 to 22, and to procure more

fighters, air defense systems, surface-to-ship missiles, helicopters and helicopter-carrying destroyers for rapid deployment. Tokyo also plans to deploy GSDF troops as "surveillance units" to the southern islands for maritime defense. Finally, according to the 2011 White Paper, "the SDF will enhance its capability to respond to attacks on those islands and ensure the security of the surrounding sea and air space by securing bases, mobility, transport capacity and effective countermeasures necessary for conducting operations against such attacks." This will require the "restructuring of the 15th Expeditionary Brigade in order to further enhance responsiveness and air transport capabilities," and the "implementation of expeditionary training toward speedy deployment of troops to Japan's offshore islands."

Toward an Amphibious Capability

Amphibious forces would be a means to address many of the challenges Japan has identified. They can:

1. Deter aggression, because their amphibious nature can provide credible forward-presence to respond rapidly in a crisis by both sea and air;
2. Complicate an opponent's decision-making and impose new costs by multiplying the number of theaters they must seek to defend, stretching their resources and manpower, and;
3. Conduct humanitarian and disaster response missions.

However, acquiring these capabilities would require a significant amount of force structure reconfiguration toward more versatile platforms, not only in the Maritime Self-Defense Force but also in the GSDF. However, given the current domestic situation, whether Japan has the fiscal and political capacity to make a series of major investments is questionable at least in the short-term.

Japan already retains platforms that can form the basis for an amphibious capability. Forming the backbone of a potential amphibious force, the MSDF has two *Hyuga-class* helicopter destroyers (DDH), the *Hyuga* deployed in March 2009 and the *Ise* deployed in March 2011. This class lacks a well deck for amphibious landing craft, but can carry up to 11 SH-60K *Seahawks* helicopters that could be utilized for over-the-horizon air assaults. As a follow-on to the *Hyuga-class* , Japan also plans to build two 22DDH-class destroyers. These 27,000 ton destroyers also lack a well deck but can support up to 12 F-35B short-takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft or 8 V-22 vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft. Japan's procurement of the F-35B has yet to be finalized.

The MSDF also has three *Osumi-class* Tank Landing Ships, outfitted with a well dock that makes them similar in function to an Americana amphibious transport dock (LPD). The rear of the *Osumi-class* houses an armored landing deck for two large CH-47 helicopters and a well-dock for two Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) hovercraft. The MSDF has 6 LCAC vehicles that are capable of transporting 1 Type-90 tank or over 10 light vehicles. In addition, the MSDF has two indigenously built *Ichigo-class* utility landing ships (LCU) which has the capacity to transport up to 70 personnel (replaced the two older *Yura-class* LCUs which will be retired in 2012).

Japan could augment its amphibious capabilities in two ways. It could purchase V-22 Ospreys to increase the speed, range, and lift from its 22DDH platforms. The flexibility of this platform also makes it an ideal lift capability for HADR missions. For enhancing mobility, it might also consider procuring the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV), currently built by Austal USA in Mobile, Alabama. The JHSV can reach speeds of 35–45 knots to rapidly transport forces as well as equipment and supplies. It also has a flight deck for helicopter operations and a load ramp that allows vehicles to quickly drive on and off the ship.

In the Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee of April 26, 2012, the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) identified a desire to explore new efforts to promote bilateral dynamic defense cooperation, including developing "shared-use facilities" for training in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands by 2012. These facilities should form the basis for the alliance to conduct regular amphibious exercises, including with partner nations like Australia.

Training and Operational Readiness

For this amphibious capability to provide an effective deterrent as called for in the NDPG, it must be practiced and demonstrated. Amphibious operations are inherently cross-domain and must include ground, air, and maritime forces. It was not until 1998 that all three services conducted a joint exercise; this initial one was carried out on Iwo Jima Island.[8] An operation to re-take the territory in the Southwest Islands would be inherently a combined arms operation and greater efforts are needed, particularly to increase the familiarity of GSDF with embarking and deploying from MSDF vessels. As the NDPG calls for "quickly deploying mobile units to prevent and reject invasion" and the current reality of shorter advance warning times, training to rapidly mobilize is essential. In 2010, the SDF began a group-size exercise where GSDF trains with Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) and MSDF to bolster command and control while maneuvering units over greater distances, reflecting the shift in orientation towards the southwest islands.[9]

Starting in January 2006, the Western Army Infantry Regiment has trained with its US Marine counterparts off the coast of Camp Pendleton, California in Exercise Iron Fist. This annual exercise is one of few opportunities for GSDF personnel to embark onboard an amphibious vessel and carry out ship-to-shore maneuvers, including on the aforementioned LCACs that the MSDF possesses. *Exercise Iron Fist* presents an opportunity for unit leaders to learn about the complex command and control requirements for amphibious operations; one that should bring ASDF and MSDF personnel to future iterations. Three days after the March 11th earthquake struck, GSDF Lt. Gen. Eiji Kimizuka was tasked to lead the SDF's first tri-service operation where

[8] "Japan to stage tri-service exercise under one command", ASIA PACIFIC, in *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Sept 23, 1998 (http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Defence-Weekly-98/JAPAN-TO-STAGE-TRI-SERVICE-EXERCISE-UNDER-ONE-COMMAND.html)

[9] 2011 Defense Whitepaper 2011, pg. 226.

100,000 personnel were mobilized.[10] With the NDPG expressing the need to respond to complex contingencies, ranging from re-taking islands to disaster response, it is essential to have greater integration within the three services.

A regular training schedule, including joint exercises in the Southwest Islands, will communicate to both domestic and foreign audiences that the SDF is actively training to defend the area judged to be its most vulnerable. The US Marine Corps, working closely with the US Navy, has decades of experience in amphibious operations. Supporting the development of an amphibious capability within the SDF is a real opportunity to bolster the alliance with a focus on a tangible capability that is particularly appropriate to the regional environment. The actions needed for an amphibious maneuver are about 80 percent a process of operational logistics; in order to be ready and relevant to protect the Southwest Islands the SDF must be prepared to conduct independent amphibious operations to create decisive effects.[11]

While during the Cold War the focus for the GSDF was on heavy armor in Hokkaido based on the Soviet threat, the GSDF must continue to focus on lighter, more maneuverable equipment. The Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) from Komatsu can embark easily, move ship-to-shore onboard an LCAC, and provide key mobility once a beachhead is seized. While concern over threats from the Soviets to the north have been eclipsed by the end of the Cold War and today's reorientation of the SDF reflects Chinese military modernization and the heightened concern over the Southwest Islands, the essence remains the same. The SDF is predicated on the need to protect Japan from an amphibious invasion.[12] Although Beijing will likely reply with unease and speak of past Japanese militarism in response to creating a robust amphibious capability, China is clearly actively competing in the amphibious arena.[13] While Japan carried out its keel-laying in January 2012 for the 19,500 ton 22DDH helicopter destroyer that is significantly larger than the *Hyuga*-class, it is displaced by the 22,000 ton landing helicopter dock (LHD) Type 081 currently under development by China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation.[14]

Fielding an amphibious capability within the SDF that consists of all three services addresses the fundamental question of being applicable to the security concerns Japan faces. It is consistent with the NDPG and the Mid-Term Defense Program (2011-2015) in shifting the focus of Japanese defense toward the Southwest Islands. While significant hardware needed for an amphibious capability is already present within the

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[10] James Simpson, "Head of SDF Earthquake Response New Head of GSDF", in *Japan Security Watch*, July 28, 2011 (http://jsw.newpacificinstitute.org/?p=7536)

[11] Wayne P. Hughes, Jr, "Naval Operations: A Close Look at the Operational Level of War at Sea", in Naval War College Review, Issue: 2012 – Summer. (http://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Review/2012---Summer.aspx) p. 24

[12] Daniel Kliman, *Japan's Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World: Embracing a New Realpolitik*. Westport: Prager, 2006. pg. 24

[13] Commander David Clayton and Craig Hooper, "China at Sea", in Hoover Digest, Issue 2011: No. 2. http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/72751.

[14] J. Michael Cole, "New Chinese ship causes alarm", Taipei Times, May 31, 2012. http://taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2012/05/31/2003534139.

SDF, the critical effort will be to shift doctrine, establishing this alongside the development of operational concepts. The US Navy and Marine Corps can apply their decades of experience in amphibious operations in working with their SDF counterparts to develop the skill sets required for ship-to-shore maneuver.

Cybersecurity Cooperation

By John Hemmings, Mihoko Matsubara, Jaime Yassif

A third area highlighted by Young Leaders for further developing US-Japan alliance cooperation includes the relatively unregulated and insecure area of cyberspace. Cyber-attacks and cyber-espionage are a significant and growing national security threat to both Japan and the US. The scale and frequency of malicious actions in cyberspace are increasing and threaten to overwhelm affected organizations. Although the two allies acknowledge the urgency of cooperation on cybersecurity, specific progress has been difficult and slow.

On April 30, 2012, President Obama and Prime Minister Noda issued a joint statement on the bilateral relationship. Among other things, both leaders pledged to enhance cybersecurity cooperation, echoing the June 2011 US-Japan Security Consultative Committee commitment. Despite these promising statements, few tangible actions have been taken except for a strategic dialogue between Japan's Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs and the US Departments of Defense, State, and Homeland Security in August 2011. This work offers suggestions for overcoming existing roadblocks and advancing cybersecurity cooperation.

There are two levels of cyber threats for a nation-state: (1) cyber-espionage to steal information related to defense, diplomacy, the economy, and state of the art technology, and (2) cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure. It is necessary to improve defenses against both types of threats but difficult to protect against all attacks and to attribute their source. Establishing procedures to share information among government agencies and private organizations is an important part of improving cyber threat prevention and rapid response.

Cyber-espionage and cyber-attacks are considered a wide-ranging problem across government and the private sector. They are handled by defense, police and intelligence communities. Since cyber methodologies to manage the risks of espionage and attack involve the intelligence community, there is a need for the US and Japan to cooperate at this level. Yet, Japan has neither a good information assurance system to protect classified information nor does it have a security clearance system to share intelligence across government ministries. This is a significant obstacle to sharing intelligence in a timely and secure manner, and must be overcome. Reform of the intelligence community in Tokyo has been stymied by its stove-piped nature, stuck between the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the National Police Agency. The community needs shared information assurance and security clearance systems across different government organizations.

There are signs that the Noda Administration is aware of these problems. Until recently, it was planning to pass official secrets legislation, an urgent necessity since spying is still treated as a criminal matter in Japan. Current legislation is such that spying in Japan incurs extremely light penalties, often only one to two years of prison. Noda's

legislation was meant to update this, but it was put on hold in March 2012 as his cabinet decided to focus instead on passing the contentious consumption tax.

One possible cyber-attack scenario is sabotage of critical infrastructure, such as the power grid, with a malicious computer virus either through the internet or through a physical implant. In fact, three US nuclear facilities have experienced cyber incidents, including the Davis-Besse nuclear power station in Ohio in 2003. A computer virus prevented station workers from accessing the Safety Parameter Display System for almost five hours. In the 1990s, critical infrastructure companies started to use commercial operation systems, such as Windows and Unix, for their control systems and to connect these systems to the Internet to allow remote control. This allowed malicious actors to find vulnerabilities in these systems and launch cyber-attacks. Should an attack take place either in Japan or the United States, the following would need to happen:

i) Trace the attacks to their physical source (computers, IP address or cluster of computers).
ii) Attribute the attacks to the responsible individual, group, or state. Determine whether the attack was state-led.
iii) Respond with appropriate punitive action – diplomatic action, retaliation with armed force, a retaliatory cyber-attack, or some combination of these three options.

One obstacle to an effective response is the nature of the internet itself: anonymity and the borderless nature of cyber-space make it challenging to attribute attacks. Tokyo and Washington would face difficulties in shaping a coordinated response if there were no agreed culprit. Attribution would be particularly difficult because technical information alone would not be sufficient. Other forms of intelligence would likely be required to ascertain intent, and to determine if the attack was state sponsored or executed by individuals or a group acting independently. Despite these obstacles, coordination and cooperation in cybersecurity should still be pursued. After all, attribution difficulties are not restricted to cyberspace; biological, and nuclear terrorism also have difficulties with attribution. As with these areas, technological cooperation should be part of the solution.

An additional obstacle is that the nature of a co-ordinated alliance response to an attack on critical infrastructure would be unclear because the current security treaty between Japan and the United States does not cover cyberspace. Thus, even though the two governments have agreed to cooperate on cybersecurity, they are not legally obliged to protect each other. Moreover, there is no definition of an "attack" in the cyber domain under international law. This is why no country has determined its rules of engagement.

International Norms

A prerequisite for collaboration is the codification of international norms regarding cyberspace. Discussions are underway to forge such a consensus, both between the US and Japan and in Europe. Given that the US and its allies also use cyber-tools to advance their goals, as do China and Russia, the emerging consensus is unlikely to turn cyberspace into a de-militarized space. Instead some activity will likely be tolerated, and countries will likely be expected to protect their systems against certain types of attacks. The US and Japan should initiate bilateral discussions about attacks on their systems to forge a common understanding within the framework of the alliance.

As the negotiations at the November 2011 London Conference on Cyberspace revealed, it is extremely difficult to reach an international consensus on norms in cyberspace because countries have different interests in regulations and privacy. There are also intelligence-collecting benefits to all countries which make agreement on norms a matter of national interest. The international community cannot even agree on a common definition for an attack and for warfare in cyberspace. This makes it difficult for governments to respond to cyber threats. In April 2012 Japanese Foreign Minister Gemba stated that existing international laws are applicable to cyberspace, but he did not specify how. Despite these difficulties, the US-Japan alliance could continue to pursue at the diplomatic level.

Intelligence Sharing and Public-Private Partnerships

On the prevention front, inter-government intelligence-sharing and information sharing with private industry are also necessary. Washington is still reluctant to share sensitive intelligence with Japan, given its current intelligence system, as there have been several cases in which Japanese Diet members, Self- Defense Forces members and government officials leaked intelligence and were not strictly punished. However, the information sharing process should not be held hostage to reform of the Japanese information assurance system.

It is critical to start sharing less sensitive information obtained by both the governments and private companies. This is especially relevant to multinationals whose cooperation is necessary to the security of Japan and the US, such as the defense industry, the chemical industry, the nuclear power industry and its infrastructure. For example, the British domestic security service, MI5, has in the past issued warnings to certain sensitive British companies that deal with China on how to protect their IP in chemical and pharmaceutical industries. Australia's Security Intelligence Organization established a Business Liaison Unit to help Australian companies deal with cyber-espionage and cyber-attacks. Perhaps something along these lines could be done in tandem between the Japanese and US intelligence communities and their respective industries.

Public-private partnerships would be a good model to follow for Japan and the United States to address Chinese espionage. According to a *Sankei Shimbun* article, the US government asked the Japanese government to provide warnings about Chinese malicious activities in cyberspace and asked Japan to monitor Chinese cyber-espionage. Although it is unclear what kind of malicious activities Washington wants Tokyo to monitor, this effort requires collaboration between the public and private sectors. If the US and Japan can share alerts and cyber-espionage patterns, they are likely to become more effective at detecting espionage and preventing further attempts.

Cybersecurity and the Alliance

To improve mitigation and response, Tokyo and Washington should codify their cybersecurity obligations to each other as part of the alliance relationship. However, this would require some change in Japanese attitudes toward collective defense. In the case of the US-Australian cyber-agreement, the two powers declared that a cyber-attack on one

would invite retaliation from both. Japanese policy-makers and the public would have to have a debate on whether collective defense makes sense in cyberspace. Currently, the Japanese government interprets the Constitution as forbidding the right of collective defense even though international law permits it, but it is not clear that this applies to the cyber-realm. It might not be necessary to reinterpret the Constitution to allow Tokyo to participate in cyber-defence activities with the US, particularly if US systems in Japan are targeted.

Cyber-attack Response Coordination

Next, the US and Japan should identify means to collaborate on attack tracing, attribution, and response. Depending on the classification of intelligence, the countries need different channels to disseminate reports. They have to incorporate all concerned parties and establish appropriate channels, taking into consideration both need-to-know and need-to-share principles. Even if they cannot release sensitive intelligence to a third country to enhance the legitimacy of retaliatory actions, they can utilize the information to prevent or at least minimize damages.

While some have argued that the US should attempt to build a multilateral cybersecurity framework with its allies, the nature of cyberspace makes this impractical. The reality of cyber-attacks, their focus on sensitive infrastructure and defense information and systems means that many cyber-attacks and cyber-espionage incidents are within the purview of intelligence and counter-intelligence agencies. Moving forward on this type of cooperation is a very long-term process and must proceed slowly. When the US and Japan are able to establish a template for cybersecurity collaboration, it will be helpful to apply to other allies and friendly countries such as Australia, the UK, and Canada. Since cyber-espionage and attacks are borderless, minilateral or multilateral information-sharing is critical to detect, prevent, and minimize cyber threats.

There are a number of obstacles to closer US-Japanese cyber cooperation, ranging in scope and severity. The first is limited to Japan, which needs to reform and standardize various parts of the Japanese intelligence community. Other fundamental obstacles, more general in their scope, relate to the nature of cybersecurity itself and the lack of agreement on it. The difficulty of attribution and the lack of international law have resulted in the absence of rules of engagement in cyberspace. The following steps could help overcome these roadblocks: (1) Japan needs to develop a stronger information assurance and security clearance system to facilitate the sharing of sensitive information with the US. Japan and the US should incorporate cyberspace as an area of responsibility under their Security Treaty, specifically defining conditions under which their security assurances would apply to cyber-attacks. (3) Tokyo and Washington need to strengthen cybersecurity cooperation based on stronger intelligence collaboration. This process could begin by sharing less sensitive information that is not dependent on changes to Japan's information assurance system, so this agenda is not held hostage by domestic bureaucratic politics. Once the two allies establish a cybersecurity cooperation template, it will serve as a framework for other allies and friendly countries to join to counter cyber-threats.

Conclusion

By Chris Sedgwick

As US-Japan alliance leaders seek new directions and areas for enhanced security cooperation, renewed attention is also warranted for the exchanges that form the military and political alliance's underlying foundation. The alliance may not be self-patching; that is to say, when there are problems that obstruct security cooperation, ambitious new collaborations of the type described in this report alone may not necessarily be enough to overcome obstacles. The question of basics is crucial for the viability of new long-term projects and a strong alliance in general.

By some measures, it took last year's earthquake and tsunami to refocus the US-Japan security narrative back to its traditionally positive direction. As with the other new initiatives described in this paper, measures to address underlying intergovernmental and military frictions must not be reactive or crisis-driven, but instead proactive in their scope with an emphasis on building new institutional links. To this end, the military-academic realm would be an especially apt and fertile area for alliance patchwork, given the host of untapped or underutilized resources, as well as existing structures that can be further enhanced.

The three areas described in this paper are a mix of traditional and nontraditional security, where cooperation and enhanced capabilities would benefit the alliance immensely. The effect of each of these is different, but each has its place. The capability-building and deterrent aspect of amphibious is traditional, bilateral in scope, and strengthens the two countries' force posture in the region. The HA/DR institution on the other hand, pushes the US-Japan alliance in a multilateral direction, with the potential to reap the soft-power benefits that all that offers. Furthermore, its opt-in and inclusive nature directly deals with the potential reaction of Beijing being contained and works toward better security for the region at large. Cybersecurity has truly global ambitions, as the proposals made by the authors in Chapter 3 include the UN and US allies around the globe.

There is a common and shared understanding among the US and Japanese participants from the Pacific Forum/JIIA conference of the importance of the US-Japan alliance and the need to deepen the relationship further. When tasked with looking at new areas for the alliance to operate, the Young Leaders looked for low-hanging fruit, and for types of roles that would serve both the alliance itself and the region more generally. Washington and Tokyo are aware of potential regional challenges and threats. Moreover, the two sides expressed their commitment to address these challenges together. It is now up to policymakers in both capitals to adapt and implement the above presented suggestions in order to keep the alliance strong and successful.

APPENDIX A
18TH ANNUAL
JAPAN-US SECURITY SEMINAR
Jointly sponsored by
The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA),
The Consulate General of Japan in San Francisco,
and Pacific Forum CSIS

March 22-24, 2012
J.W. Marriott Hotel • San Francisco, CA

Young Leaders Agenda

Thursday, March 22
YLS to arrive before 11AM

Lunch at Leisure

1:30PM Meet in Lower Lobby of Marriott for taxis to the Consulate

2:00-3:00PM **Roundtable with Consul Tomotaka Kuwahara**
Section Chief for Economic Affairs
Consulate General of Japan
50 Fremont Street, Suite 2300, San Francisco, CA 94105
Phone: (415) 356-2433

Young Leaders will meet with Consul Kuwahara and discuss issues relating to trade that affect the US and Japan, including the Trans Pacific Partnership, regional FTAs, economic and global supply trends across the region, and Japan's economy one year after the earthquake.

4:00PM-6:00PM **Young Leaders Intro Session**

Brad Glosserman, Executive Director Pacific Forum, will explain Young Leaders program and cover ground rules and expectations.

6:30PM Young Leaders Dinner

Friday, March 23

7:45-8:45AM YL Breakfast at Leisure

9:00- 10:20AM **Young Leader Roundtable**
YLs will assess the US-Japan relationship and identify challenges facing the alliance and discuss opportunities and strategic visions.

10:20-10:30AM Break
10:30-12:30PM Young Leaders Roundtable

Mr. Jeff Rhea, a lieutenant in the California Highway Patrol and a recently retired United States Marine with a Chemical/Biological/Radiological/Nuclear military occupational specialty will provide insights into a variety of related areas, including lessons that have been learned from the Japanese triple disaster of March 11. He will explain how the Marine Corps, through its Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, contributed to the response. Nuclear safety, including lessons from Fukushima and how they are impacting reactor operations in California, will be addressed. He will cover current geopolitical matters with respect to nuclear weapons and broader issues of deterrence.

12:45 -2:00PM Lunch - Marines' Memorial Club

3:00PM **Welcoming Remarks**
Yoshiji Nogami, JIIA President
Ralph Cossa, Pacific Forum CSIS President

3:15-5:00PM **Session I: A New Strategic Setting?**
Japan Presenter: Yasuhiro Matsuda
US Presenter: Evans Revere

The opening session explores the two allies' strategic priorities, focusing on global and regional concerns, and highlighting areas where interests and approaches overlap or diverge as we design future strategies under a new strategic setting. Key issues include the death of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and the assumption of power by his son Kim Jong Un; perceptions of China, and the impact of its leadership transition; January elections in Taiwan; March parliamentary elections in South Korea and the presidential ballot in the ROK in December; and the ramifications of the Russian presidential election. How will these events impact the security environment? Has the US outreach to Myanmar changed Southeast Asian dynamics? How? Have tensions over the South China Sea abated? How can the two governments deal with Iran's nuclear ambitions? How do speakers assess the development/maturation of multilateral security architectures in the region, such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus, the East Asian Summit, and the Six-Party Talks? As always, this overview sets the stage for in-depth discussions of US and Japanese security policies and our individual and bilateral efforts to address these challenges.

5:00-5:30PM **Keynote Remarks:** Hon. Kurt Campbell

6:30- 9:00PM Reception/Dinner
Keynote Address: Hon. Richard Armitage

Saturday, March 24

7:55-8:45AM Young Leaders Breakfast Meeting
Breakfast Speaker: Hon. Kurt Campbell

9:00-10:15AM **Session II: Domestic Politics and the Alliance**
US Presenter: Gordon Flake
Japan Presenter: Toshihiro Nakayama

This session examines the political setting in each country and its impact on the alliance. A Japanese presenter will focus on US developments. How do Japanese perceive US politics and how it affects US defense and security policy in general and the alliance in particular? Have the debt discussions impacted US leadership and standing? How will the 2012 US elections affect the alliance? A US presenter will look at developments in Japan. Are Japanese politics stable? If not, why not? What is the impact of a continuation of the political status quo in Tokyo? What are views of the DPJ as a security partner? What is the impact of Japanese political developments on the alliance? How have the events of March 11, 2011 impacted Japanese politics? The alliance more generally?

10:15-10:30AM Break

10:45-12:00PM **Session III: Economic relations, the region, and the alliance.**
US Presenter: Robert Madsen
Japan Presenter: Yoshiji Nogami

This session explores the economic, political, social, and cultural dimensions of the alliance and regional security. Has the region recovered from the 2008 financial crisis? What has been its effect on the regional balance of power? How has it affected regional security? How does each country assess regional economic developments? How important, for example, is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)? Will Japan join? What happens if it doesn't? What has been the impact of the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS)? How should the US respond to growing economic integration among the "Plus Three"? How do participants assess China's economic prospects and their potential impact on regional security? How do both sides broaden and deepen the non-military dimensions of the alliances, focusing on both common interests and common values?

12:00-1:30PM Lunch
Keynote Address: Tsuyoshi Yamaguchi
Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs

1:45-3:00PM **Session IV: National Security Policies, Strategic Cooperation and the Alliance**
Japan Presenter: Matake Kamiya
U.S. Presenter: James Przystup

This session explores the two governments' thinking about national security policies and deeper strategic cooperation. How do the two countries progress their cooperation based on the Common Strategic Objectives presented by the last "2+2" Joint Statement (June, 2011)? What is the meaning and significance of the US "pivot" to Asia? How will it impact the alliance? What is the significance of the Darwin Marine rotations? What expectations does Japan have regarding US deterrence policy and how does it view the US global posture and nuclear umbrella? What are the implications of changes in US nuclear policy that lessen the role of nuclear weapons and enhance credible conventional deterrence? Do these changes offer the alliance opportunities for burden sharing and a more "equal" relationship? How are the new National Defense Program Guidelines and Mid-Term Defense Program being implemented, in particular the idea of "dynamic deterrence"?

3:15-3:30PM Break

3:30-5:00PM **Session V: Visions for the Alliance**
US Presenter: James Kelly
Japan Presenter: Hiroshi Nakanishi

This session will focus on how Japan and the US see the alliance evolving. Do we have a common vision of future security challenges and preferred responses? How does the alliance fit? What is the significance of the Japanese decision to acquire the F-35? How does the decision to allow exports of components related to missile defense impact the alliance? What other countries should the US and Japan be working with to maximize their contributions (and that of the alliance) to regional security?

5:00-5:30PM **Session VI: Conclusions and Wrap Up**

This session provides participants an opportunity to make overall observations or to focus further on specific issues. The chairs will make concluding remarks.

5:30-6:30PM **Young Leaders Wrap Up roundtable**
Brad Glosserman will chair a wrap up session that will focus on lessons learned and will include a discussion about the post-conference project or publication.

6:45PM YL Dinner

APPENDIX B
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Young Leaders Participants List

Japan

Mr. Ryo HINATA-YAMAGUCHI
Ph.D. Candidate
University of New South Wales
Australian Defense Force Academy

Mr. Akira IGATA
Ph.D. Candidate
Keio University

Dr. Nori KATAGIRI
Assistant Professor
Air War College

Ms. Mihoko MATSUBARA
SPF Research Fellow
Pacific Forum CSIS

Ms. Aya SAKAMASU
National Security Policy Official
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Hiroyuki TAHARA
MA Candidate
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

US

Ms. Ellise AKAZAWA
WSD-Handa Research Fellow
Pacific Forum CSIS

Ms. Petra DUNNE
James A. Kelly Fellow
Pacific Forum CSIS

Mr. Justin GOLDMAN
SPF Research Fellow
Pacific Forum CSIS

Mr. John HEMMINGS
WSD-Handa Research Fellow
Pacific Forum CSIS

Mr. Adam LIFF
Ph.D. Candidate
Princeton University

Mr. Eric SAYERS
Military Legislative Assistant
US Congress

Mr. Christopher SEDGWICK
Special Assistant for Intergovernmental Affairs
Consulate General of Japan, San Francisco

Ms. Jaime YASSIF
Ph.D. Candidate
UC Berkeley

APPENDIX C
Current Arrangements for HA/DR in the Asia Pacific

Section 2: Current arrangements

Below is a list of HA/DR-related activities currently taking place in the Asia-Pacific region, organized by the number of participating countries. These activities include negotiations, joint military operations, and other formal security frameworks involving Japan and/or the US.

(1) Bilateral arrangements

(a) US-Japan

Keen Edge 2012: Training on events ranging from noncombatant evacuations to integrated air-missile defense to enhance bilateral coordination/cooperation. Annual exercise.[v]

Yama Sakura: Training to develop and refine JGSDF and US Army Pacific's efforts in the areas of bilateral planning, coordination and interoperability. Skills honed during this exercise can also be applied to domestic operations such as disaster response. Annual exercise (since 1982).

Cobra Gold: Multinational combined joint training exercise held throughout the Kingdom of Thailand. It is the US' largest multilateral exercise in the Asia-Pacific region and offers more than 20 participating countries critical training opportunities to improve interoperability in conducting multinational operations. *Cobra Gold* includes a computer-simulated command-post exercise, field training operations and humanitarian and civic-assistance projects.

(b) US-Australia

Talisman Sabre: Aims to improve combat training, readiness and interoperability across the spectrum of military operations as well as provide humanitarian assistance and effectively share information. Involved a number of nonmilitary organizations in 2011. A biennial exercise.

(c) US-South Korea

Key Resolve: Observers from the UN Command, Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark and Norway. An exercise focused on crisis management with a whole of government approach. Annual exercise.

Foal Eagle: Combined Field Training Exercise conducted between the ROK and US armed forces under the auspices of Combined Forces Command. Annual exercise, one of the largest in the world.

(d) US-Indonesia

Bilateral negotiation: At a high-level ministerial visit in Canberra in mid-March, Indonesian ministers hoped for Indonesia to join in training exercises with the United States focused on disaster relief.

Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT): The first phase featured events ashore, and the second at-sea phase focused on developing maritime security capabilities

(maritime interdiction, combined sea operations, anti-piracy and anti-smuggling exercises, etc.) Annual four-day exercises.

(2) Minilateral arrangements

(a) Japan, US, and Australia

Cope North: Aimed to improve coordination between the three air forces through training in HA/DR, dissimilar air combat, strike mission, and large force employment. Biannual exercise.

(b) Japan, US and South Korea

In 2010: South Korea sent troops to a Japan-US exercise as observers, and Japan also sent SDF observers to a U.S.-South Korean exercise, after North Korea's military provocations against South Korea. The exercise also addressed how to promptly respond to a regional crisis should the DPRK collapse and humanitarian assistance is needed.

In 2011: Japan and South Korea agreed on the need for a General Security of Military Information Agreement to protect confidential information and an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement to supply fuel and parts in joint training and UN peacekeeping operations.

(c) Japan, US, Australia and South Korea

Balikatan: The Japanese Self-Defense Forces are to participate for the first time in joint annual military exercises involving US and Filipino forces in the Philippines from the end of March to April, 2012. Australia and South Korea are also expected to take part for the first time in the exercises. Vietnam and Singapore, members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, will also participate. Japan will take part in a simulated exercise that is premised on a major earthquake and that is to be performed as part of the same exercise. Training will consist of a computer-simulated command post exercise (CPX), multiple field training exercises (FTX), and medical, veterinary, and engineering humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) projects. Balikatan has been held annually by US and Filipino forces since 2000.

(3) Regional arrangements

(a) Pacific Partnership 2010 (PP10): Pacific Partnership has served as a template in providing a clear and committed program in a large area threatened by frequent natural disasters.

(b) APEC: Giving due consideration of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015, APEC economies have identified principles for a better disaster response and cooperation within individual member economy and in the APEC as a whole. APEC Senior Officials' Meeting, November 2008.

(c) EAS: Discussed the importance of cooperation on the region's most pressing challenges, including maritime security, nonproliferation, and disaster response. EAS, November 2011.

(d) ASEAN

(d-1) AHA Center: The Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) was signed on Nov. 17, 2011. AHA Centre aims to be the regional hub for information and knowledge for disaster management. It will also serve as the center point for mobilization of resources to disaster-affected areas and act as the coordination engine to ensure ASEAN's fast and collective response to disasters within the ASEAN region. The establishment of the AHA Centre highlights ASEAN's commitment to strengthen collective response to disasters and to reduce disaster losses. The establishment is mandated through a legally-binding agreement called the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), which is the region's response to the need for a regional disaster management framework.

(d-2) ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus): ADMM-Plus inaugurated Experts' Working Group (EWG) on HA/DR in 2010 in Hanoi, Vietnam. The EWG, co-chaired by China and Vietnam, held its first meeting Nov. 3-4, 2011, in Beijing. Participants included most of the ADMM-Plus countries and representatives from the ASEAN Secretariat. The meeting aimed at familiarizing all member countries on respective nations' HA/DR organizational structure and experience with emphasis on military's functions, missions and relations to other government agencies.

(e) ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF): In March 2011, Japan co-led ARF Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercise (DiREx) with Indonesia, which included over 4,000 personnel from 25 ARF participants focused on civilian-led, military-supported operations in the immediate aftermath of an earthquake-tsunami scenario. In Search, Rescue, and Disaster Relief Related activities, ARF is currently engaging in various Track I Activities.

(f) Asian Development Bank: Promotes an integrated disaster risk management approach that combines disaster risk reduction, elements of climate change adaptation, and disaster risk financing.

(g) Other regional arrangements:
-Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER)
-ASEAN Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations
-ASEAN Declaration on Cooperation in Search and Rescue of Person and Vessels in Distress at Sea
-ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM)